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CASE NO.:

Appeal (civil) 2652-2654 of 1995

PETITIONER:

P. TULSI DAS AND ORS.

RESPONDENT:

GOVERNMENT OF A.P. AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/10/2002

BENCH:

DORAISWAMY RAJU & H.K. SEMA

JUDGMENT:

JUDGMENT

2002 Supp(3) SCR 306

The Judgment of the Court was delivered

Leave granted in special leave petition (C) Nos. 3699-3710, 7808 and

21533-21580 of 1995.

The above appeals have been filed against the common order of the Larger

Bench of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad dated 27th

April, 1994 in O.A. Nos. 50430-50441 of 1991 etc., whereunder by a

majority, with the dissenting opinion recorded by the Chairman, the

challenge to the constitutional validity of Sections 2 and 3 of the Andhra

Pradesh Educational Service Untrained Teachers (Regulation of Services and

Fixation of Pay) Act, 1991 (Act No. 14 of 1991) (hereinafter referred to as

'the Act') came to be rejected.

The facts which lead to the passing of the said enactment, resulting in the

order under challenge may briefly be stated for a proper appreciation of

the contentions of the parties on either side. After the formation of the

State of Andhra Pradesh the State Government framed a composite set of

rules called Andhra Pradesh Educational Rules, 1966 in exercise of the

executive powers available for the State. The Schools in the State for the

purpose of those Rules were classified into three categories: Elementary

Schools for classes 1st to 5th; Upper-Primary Schools for classes 6th and

7th and Secondary Schools for classes 8th, 9th and 10th. In several schools

there were combined classes from elementary stage to secondary stage also,

though in some schools classes upto upper-primary alone were conducted. For

SSLC trained teachers (in short SGBT Teacher) the scale of pay at the time

of introduction of 1966 Rules was Rs. 80-150. In the Telangana area earlier

the scales were lower and classification was also said to be different. The

scale of pay for a Graduate B.Ed, known as School Assistant was Rs.

130-250. In addition to the other academic qualification, the teachers'

training certificate or B.Ed, degree, was also an eligibility criteria for

appointment as SGBT teacher or School Assistant, as the case may be,

respectively.

In G.O.M.S. No. 910, Education dated 27th April, 1970, Statutory Rules were

said to have been framed revising the scale of pay with effect from

19-3-1969 and the scale of pay of SGBT teacher were said to have been

revised to Rs. 96-200. Likewise the scale of pay of a School Assistant was

also revised to Rs. 150-300. But during the relevant point of time in the

year 1967, the scale of pay of SGBT with Matriculation and Teachers

Training Certificate was Rs. 80-150 and of the School Assistant with

Graduation and B.Ed, degree was Rs. 150-250. Due to dearth of trained

graduates in Science and Mathematics with Mulki qualification for

appointment as teachers in Telangana area the Government in G.O. No 257

Education dated 10-2-1967 accepting the proposals of the Director of

Schools, Education, passed orders that untrained graduates in those

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subjects may also be appointed in the minimum pay of Rs. 130 in the scale

of pay of Rs. 130-250 with usual allowances admissible for a trained

graduate teacher for a period of two years from the date of the said order.

Keeping in view the fact that previously and at the time of issuance of the

said Government Order such untrained graduates, untrained intermediates and

matriculates who were being appointed only on a pay of Rs. 100 in the scale

of pay of Rs. 80-150, the Government issued G.O. 2069 Education dated

9-10-1967 that untrained teachers in any part of the State may be appointed

at the minimum of the scale applicable and they will not be eligible to

draw any increments in the scale till they acquire the necessary

qualification prescribed for the post. Since the Government Order dated

10-2-1967 was with reference to the appointment of untrained graduates at

the minimum scale of pay of Rs. 130-250 with usual allowances in respect of

Science and Mathematics subjects only the untrained graduates appointed to

teach the subject of Humanity were not paid at the same scale but were

being paid at Rs. 100 which was being paid to such untrained teachers prior

to 10-2-1967. After the Revision of scales of pay in the year 1970, noticed

(supra) some of the untrained graduates appointed as School Assistants to

teach subjects in Humanities filed W.P. No. 2295 of 1973 before the High

Court of Andhra Pradesh and by a judgment dated 23rd June, 1975 the High

Court held that the untrained graduate teachers in Humanities were also

entitled to get minimum scale of pay of Rs. 130 in the time scale of Rs.

130-250 as in the case of untrained graduates appointed to teach Science

and Mathematics. This decision was not challenged further by the

authorities of the State Government. By the time the High Court rendered

the judgment the scale of pay then in force at Rs. 130-250 was further said

to have been revised as Rs. 150-300 w.e.f. 19-3-1970 and the High Court,

therefore sustained the claim for the revised scale of pay.

While matters stood thus a group of teachers belonging to both SGBT and

School Assistant categories teaching the subject in Humanities working in

Zilla Praja Parishad Schools in Nalagonda approached the High Court with a

grievance that they were being denied the benefit on the ground that they

were not graduates in Science and Mathematics, by filing W.P. No. 6387 of

1976. With the constitution of the erstwhile Administrative Tribunal in the

State in exercise of the powers under Article 371-D of the Constitution of

India, the said writ petition stood transferred to the Tribunal as Tr. W.P.

No. 1361 of 1976. When the matters came up before the Tribunal for hearing

it was disposed of by an order dated 15-9-1977 stating that it was not

disputed that the facts of that case and those earlier decided by the High

Court were identical and that the learned Government Pleader appearing also

conceded the position that the case was covered by the earlier decision of

the High Court. Consequently, the Tribunal directed that even the untrained

graduates in Humanities appointed in the Secondary Grade posts in the scale

of pay of Rs. 80-150 should be allowed the minimum of Rs. 130 in the scale

of pay of Rs. 130-250, admissible to trained graduates appointed as B.Ed.

School Assistants posts with effect from 10-2-1967 as a result said to have

been not intended by the Government. Subsequently, several other judgments

came to be rendered following the said decision, as and when claims were

made before the Tribunal. Consequential benefits including the fixation of

seniority on the said position was also granted. The Government without

challenging such orders took up the matter for consideration in the light

of the decision of the Tribunal and by orders dated 12-1-1982 and 20-2-1984

resolved to implement the judgment of the Tribunal individually and to

facilitate the same also created supernumerary posts of B.Ed. Assistants

with retrospective effect to carry out the directions issued by the

Tribunal. Even during January 1976, thousands of posts of B.Ed. Assistants

and SGBT teachers were created. The resultant position was that even SGBT

Teachers who were appointed in the scale of pay of Rs. 80-150 became

entitled to the scale of pay attached to the post of School Assistants on

the plea raised that they have also possessed the same qualification

prescribed for the post of School Assistant. Subsequent to this several

other judgments also seems to have been rendered following the order dated

15-9-1977 in Tr. W.P. No. 1361 of 1976 and all those petitioners also were

able to get payments in the scale of pay attached to the post of School

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Assistants inspite of the fact that some of them were appointed against the

post of SGBT Teachers only. It appears that all orders were not

expeditiously or effectively implemented and thought in the large majority

of the cases they were implemented, some such orders remained unimplemented

also.

The decision rendered in Tr. W.P. No. 1361 of 1976 has become final in the

sense that no challenge was pursued thereafter to the said judgment as also

to the other judgments rendered subsequently following this judgment. With

the constitution of the State Administrative Tribunal under the provisions

and the Administrative Tribunals Act. 1985 w.e.f. I-11-1989, not only some

of the cases pending on the file of the earstwhile Tribunal stood

transferred to the new Tribunal, but several cases were also seem to have

been filed afresh. It was at this stage that the Government suddenly became

alive, though in a belated manner to the possible heavy financial

commitments and serious implications flowing from the various: judgments

considered to be detrimental to the public interest and promulgated the

Andhra Pradesh Educational Service Untrained Teachers (Regulation of

Services and Fixation of Pay) Ordinance, 1991 subsequently replaced by the

Act under challenge. The Preamble to the Act set out in detail the

development of relevant events, from time to time and the passing of the

various Orders by the Government as well as by the Court and the Tribunals,

and reasons which necessitated the promulgation of the Ordinance as well as

the enactment of the law in question.

The Ordinance as well as the Act referred to above was brought into force

w.e.f. 10-2-1967. Sections 2 and 3 which are relevant for our consideration

reads as under:

2. Notwithstanding anything contained in any rule or order of the

Government or any judgment of any Court, Tribunal or other authority, the

untrained graduate teachers in the subjects of Science and Mathematics

appointed in pursuance of G.O. Ms. No. 257 Education Department, dated the

10th February, 1967 and the untrained graduate teachers in the subjects of

Humanities appointed in pursuance of orders of Tribunal in Transferred writ

petition No. 1361/76 dated the 15th September, 1977 who actually handled

eight, ninth and tenth classes in the Secondary Schools of Government Zilla

Praja Parishads or as the case may be, aided managements in the Telangana

area of the State of Andhra Pradesh shall be entitled to the minimum of

Rs. 130 in the time scale of Rs. 130-250 admissible to trained graduate

teachers if they are appointed to posts carrying that scale with effect

from the 10th February, 1967 to 31st December, 1973 and thereafter, their

pay shall be regulated as per their eligibility as untrained graduate

teachers in accordance with the rules and orders in forces.

3. Notwithstanding any Government order, judgment, decree or order of

any court, Tribunal or other authority, the supernumerary posts created in

the B.Ed., scale of Rs. 130-250 in accordance with the orders issued by the

Government in Memos, No. 1630/H-1/81-3, dated the 12th January, 1982 and

also on the 20th February, 1984 in place, of the Secondary Grade posts of

teachers in the time scale of Rs. 80-150 shall and shall be deemed always

to have- been secondary grade posts in the time scale of Rs. 80-150 with

subsequent increases due to revision of pay scales from time to time and

accordingly;

(a) at excess amount already sanctioned and paid to the incumbents by

creating supernumerary posts as aforesaid shall be recovered in such manner

and in such number of instalments as the Director of School Education may,

by order, direct;

(b) the teachers working in such supernumerary posts shall not be entitled

for counting their service in the B.Ed., scale for the automatic

advancement scheme formulated in G.O.Ms. No. 164, Finance dated, the 1st

June, 1982;

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(c) any benefit given to the teachers referred to in clause (b) in

accordance with the said Government order shall stand cancelled from the

date of extending such benefit and any among drawn in pursuance of such

benefit shall be recoverable in the manner specified in clause (a);

(d) no suit or other proceedings shall be maintained or continued in any

Court, Tribunal or other authority against the Government or any person or

the authority whatsoever for creation of supernumerary posts for the

teachers referred to in clause (b) and also such pending proceedings shall

abate forthwith and

(e) no court shall enforce any decree or other directing the pay fixation

on par with the posts of teachers created for the subjects of Mathematics

and Science in accordance with G.O.Ms. No. 257 Education Department, dated

the 10th February, 1967."

Since the provisions of the Act not only purported to disturb the state of

affairs prevailing as on the date of the Act but proceeded to deprive the

benefits already accrued and acquired by the class of petitioners by giving

retrospective effect to the Act w.e.f. 10-2-1967 and further by providing

also for the recovery of the amounts already paid otherwise than in terms

of the Act and in the manner specified therein. Hence, the petitioners

approached the Tribunal seeking for striking down the provisions contained

in Sections 2 and 3 of the Act. As noticed earlier the Chairman of the

Tribunal who was in the minority sustained the challenge made by the

appellants to provisions contained in Section 2, Section 3(a) and (e).

Though Section 3(b) was held to be valid, in view of Sections 2 and 3 held

to be bad, sub-section (b) to (d) was considered not capable of surviving

in isolation. Section 3(b) related to the grant of benefit of automatic

advancement, scheme, in special grade Posts. So far as the remaining two

Members who constituted the Bench are concerned, they rendered separate

opinions upholding the validity of the Act. One Member while dissenting

from the view expressed by the Chairman was of the view that discriminatory

and offending part of the enactment can be set right if the words "the

Telangana Area of occurring in Section 2 of the Act is alone struck down to

make it applicable uniformly to the entire State. The other Member who also

expressed his dissent with the opinion of the Chairman but purported to

agree with the Member who upheld the validity subject to the modification

in Section 2 noticed above, assigned further reasons high-lighting certain

anomalies, lapses and mistakes which according to him crept into the matter

resulting in the passing of indiscriminatory orders not really justified on

the facts of the cases which were brought before the Tribunal from time to

time. Hence these appeals.

Mr. L. Nageshwar Rao, learned senior counsel for the appellants urged that

the enactments in question brought into force with retrospective effect

from 10-2-1967 takes away the vested rights of the appellants and

consequently suffers the vice of hostile discrimination, arbitrariness and

expropriation of vested rights and, therefore, are liable to be struck down

as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It was

also urged by the learned senior counsel that insofar as the Act purports

to destroy the rights acquired under the orders of the High Court as also

the judicial orders passed by the statutory Tribunals, it tends to encroach

into the judicial sphere and consequently is liable to be struck down. A

new point, not raised before the Tribunal based on alleged violation of

Articles 202 and 203 of the Constitution, though was sought to be urged,

was not permitted to be raised at this stage, Per contra Mrs. K.

Amareshwari, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-State with

equal vehemence tried to justify the decision of the majority view of the

Tribunal below and urged that the indisputable factual details indicated in

the Preamble to the Act and noticed by the Tribunals also warranted the

interference of the Legislature to set right the anomalies said to have

resulted in the matter. According to the learned senior counsel serious

mistakes, lapses and errors have been committed having grave consequences

both in the matter of enforcement of law as also the effective

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administration and control of the schools resulting in serious financial

problems and, therefore, no exception could be taken to the provisions of

the Act which were meant to set right the whole matter. In substance the

submission was that there was no deprivation of any of the legally acquired

or vested rights, but the Act purported to really deny and discontinue ill-

gotton rights and benefits undeservably obtained. We have carefully

considered the submissions on behalf of both parties.

In State of Gujarat and Anr. v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni and Ors., [1983]

2 SCC 33 a Constitution Bench of this Court had an occasion to deal with

the situation arising out of a retrospective legislation by the Gujarat

State enacting Gujarat Panchayats (Third Amendment) Act, 1978 depriving the

Secretaries, officers and servants of old village Panchayats the status as

members of the State service. It was observed therein, while sustaining the

challenge to the constitutionality of the Act on the ground of unjust

deprivation of vested or acquired rights as follows:

"48. From the summary of the provisions of the Amending Act that has been

set out above it requires no perception to recognise the principal target

of the amending legislation as the category of 'ex-municipal employees',

who are, so to say, pushed out of the panchayat service and are to be

denied the status of government servants and the consequential benefits.

The ex-municipal employees are virtually the "poor relations", the castle,

the panchayat service, is not for them nor the attendant advantages,

privileges and perquisites, which are all for the "pedigree descendants"

only. For them, only the outhouses. As a result of the amendments they

cease to be government servants with retrospective effect. Their earlier

allocation to the panchayat service is cancelled with retrospective effect.

They become servants of Gram and Nagar Panchayats with retrospective

effect. They are treated differently from those working in Taluqa and

District Panchayats as well as from the Talatis and Kotwals working in Gram

and Nagar Panchayats. Their conditions of service are to be prescribed by

Panchayats, by resolution, whereas the conditions of service of other are

to be prescribed by the Government. Their promotional prospects are

completely wiped out and all advantages which they would derive as a result

of the judgments of the courts are taken away.

51. Now, in 1978 before the Amending Act was passed, thanks to the

provisions of the principal Act of 1961, the ex-municipal employees who had

been allocated to the Pachayats service as Secretaries, Officers and

servants of Gram and Nagar Panchayats, had achieved the status of

government servants. Their status as government servants could not be

extinguished, so long as the posts were not abolished and their services

were not terminated in accordance with the provisions of Article 311 of the

Constitution. Nor was it permissible to single them out for differential

treatment. That would offend Article 14 of the Constitution. An attempt was

made to justify the purported differentiation on the basis of history and

ancestry, as it were. It was said that Talatis and Kotwals who became

Secretaries, Officers and servants of Gram and Nagar Panchayats were

government servants, even to start with, while municipal employees who

became such Secretaries, Officers and servants of Gram and Nagar Panchayats

were not. Each carried the mark or the 'brand' of his origin and a

classification on the basis of the source from which they came into the

service, it was claimed, was permissible. We are clear that it is not. Once

they had joined the common stream of service to perform the same duties, it

is clearly not permissible to make any classification on the basis of their

origin. Such a classification would be unreasonable and entirely irrelevant

to the object sought to be achieved. It is to navigate around these two

obstacles of Article 311 and Article 14 that the Amending Act is sought to

be made retrospective, to bring about an artificial situation as if the

erstwhile municipal employees never became members of a service under the

State. Can a law be made to destroy today's accrued constitutional rights

by artificially reverting to a situation which existed 17 years ago? No.

52. The legislation is pure and simple, self-deceptive, if we may use such

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an expression with reference to a legislature-made law. The legislature is

undoubtedly competent to legislate with retrospective effect to take away

or impair any vested right acquired under existing laws but since the laws

are made under a written Constitution, and have to conform to the dos and

don'ts of the Constitution, neither prospective nor retrospective laws can

be made so as to contravene fundamental rights. The law must satisfy the

requirements of the Constitution today taking into account the accrued or

acquired rights of the parties today. The law cannot say, 20 years ago the

parties had no rights, therefore, the requirements of the constitution will

be satisfied if the law is dated back by 20 years. We are concerned with

today's rights and not yesterday's. A legislature cannot legislate today

with reference to a situation that obtained 20 years ago and ignore the

march of events and the constitutional rights accrued in the course of the

20 years. That would be most arbitrary, unreasonable and a negation of

history. It was pointed out by a Constitution Bench of this Court in B.S.

Yadav v. State of Haryana, Chandrachud, CJ, speaking for the Court held:

(SCC head-note)

Since the Governor exercises the legislative power under the proviso to

Article 309 of the Constitution, it is open to him to give retrospective

operation to the rules made under that provision. But the date from which

the rules are made to operate must be shown to bear either from the face of

the rules or by extrinsic evidence, reasonable nexus with the provisions

contained in the rules, especially when the retrospective effect extends

over a long period as in this case.

Today's equals cannot be made unequal by saying that they were unequal 20

years ago and we will restore that position by making a law today and

making it retrospective. Constitutional rights, constitutional obligations

and constitutional consequences cannot be tampered with that way. A law

which if made today would be plainly invalid as offending constitutional

provisions in the context of the existing situation cannot become valid by

being made retrospective, Past virtue (constitutional) cannot be made to

wipe out present vice (constitutional) by making retrospective laws. We

are, therefore, firmly of the view that the Gujarat Panchayats (Third

Amendment) Act, 1978 is unconstitutional, as it offends Articles 311 and 14

and is arbitrary and unreasonable. We have considered the question whether

any provision of the Gujarat Panchayats (Third Amendment) Act, 1978 might

be salvaged. We are afraid that the provisions are so intertwined with one

another that it is well nigh impossible to consider any life-saving

surgery. The whole of the Third Amendment Act must go......."

In Ex-Capt. K.C. Arora and Anr, v. State of Haryana and Ors., [1984] 3 SCC

281 the principles laid down by the above Constitution Bench were followed,

while striking down an amendment to the Punjab Government National

Emergency (Concession) Rules taking away acquired or accrued fundamental

rights with retrospective effect, as offending Article 14 and 16 of the

Constitution of India. The retrospective amendment of the Rules in the said

case had the effect of depriving the benefit of military service beyond a

particular date with retrospective effect thereby taking away the vested

rights which accrued to the petitioner and this was declared to be ultra

vires the Constitution and struck down.

In Chairman, Railway Board and Ors. v. C.R. Rangadhamaiah and Ors., [1997]

6 SCC 623 yet another Constitution Bench of this Court had an occasion to

deal with the validity of a retrospective amendment to the service rules

adversely affecting the pension of the employees who already stood retired

on the date of the notification issued by way of an amendment, on the view

that the pension admissible was under the Rules in force at the time of

retirement, and that reduction of the pension as admissible with

retrospective effect was held to be arbitrary and unreasonable, after an

exhaustive review of case law of the subject.

On a careful consideration of the principles laid down in the above

decisions in the light of the fact situation in these appeals we are of the

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view that they squarely apply on all fours to the cases on hand in favour

of the appellants. The submissions on behalf of the respondent-State that

the rights derived and claimed by the appellants must be under any

statutory enactment or rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution of

India and that in other respects there could not be any acquisition of

rights validly, so as to disentitle the State to enact the law of the

nature under challenge to set right serious anomalies which crept in and

deserved to undone, does not merit our acceptance. It is by now well

settled that in the absence of Rules under Article 309 of the Constitution

in respect of a particular area, aspect or subject, it was permissible for

the State to make provisions in exercise of its executive powers under

Article 162 which is co-extensive with its Legislative powers laying

conditions of service and rights accrued to or acquired by a citizen would

be as much rights acquired under law and protected to that extent. The

orders passed by the Government, from time to time beginning from February

1967 till 1985 and at any rate upto the passing of the Act, to meet the

administrative exigencies and cater to the needs of public interest really

and effectively provided sufficient legal basis for the acquisition of

rights during the period when they were in full force and effect. The

orders of the High Court as well as the Tribunal also recognised and upheld

such rights and those orders attained finality without being further

challenged by the Government, in the manner known to law. Such rights,

benefits and perquisites acquired by the Teachers concerned cannot be said

to be rights acquired otherwise than in accordance with law or brushed

aside and trampled at the sweet will and pleasure of the Government, with

impunity. Consequently we are unable to agree that the Legislature could

have validly denied those rights acquired by the appellants

retrospectively, not only depriving them of such rights but also enact a

provision to repay and restore the amounts paid to them to State. The

provisions of the Act, though can be valid in its operation 'in future' can

not be held valid in so far as it purports to restore status quo ante for

the past period taking away the benefits already available, accrued and

acquired by them. For all the reasons stated above the reasons assigned by

the majority opinion of the Tribunal could not be approved in our hands.

The provisions of Section 2 and 3(a) insofar as they purport to take away

the rights from 10-2-1967 and obligates those who had them to repay or

restore it back to the State is hereby struck down as arbitrary,

unreasonable and expropriatory and as such is violative of Articles 14 and

16 of the Constitution of India. No exception could be taken, in our view,

to the prospective exercise of powers thereunder without infringing the

rights already acquired by the appellants and the category of the persons

similarly situated whether approached courts or not seeking relief

individually. The provisions contained in Section 2 have to be read down so

as to make it only prospective, to save the same from the

unconstitutionality arising out of its retrospective application.

So far as the claim of benefits under the automatic advancement scheme

formulated in GOMS No. 164, Finance and Planning Department, dated 1st

June, 1982 is concerned we are unable to agree with the stand taken for the

appellants that any service rendered could entitle the appellants or the

class of persons similarly placed, to claim the benefit of the automatic

advancement scheme. It is well settled that a person holding a lesser grade

of post can be made to be incharge of a higher post and be paid also the

scales of pay permissible for the higher grade or category of post but that

will not make the said person entitled to claim to be a regular member or

incumbent of the post to claim consequential benefits for any advanced

career or promotion as if he is a regular incumbent to the said post. Even

any one of the appellant or the class of persons similarly situated when

assert a claim for the benefits of the said scheme they will have to

strictly comply with the requirement of the conditions stipulated therefor

in the scheme and cannot by virtue of the services rendered in a post

pursuant to the concession shown to appoint them in the higher category of

posts with a limited purpose and object as the aim automatically become

entitled to count such service for claiming the benefits under the special

scheme.

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The provisions contained in Section 3 mandates that the supernumerary posts

created in the B.Ed. Grade of Rs. 130-250 pursuant to the orders noticed

therein shall be deemed always to have been Secondary Grade Posts of

teachers in the time scale of Rs. 80-150 with subsequent increases due to

revision of pay scales from time to time, accordingly. The reasons

assigned, supra would apply with equal force to invalidate this

retrospective reclassification by a fiction to nullify the lawful rights

acquired during the past period and justify only prospective application

and accordingly read down, as in the case of Section 2 of the Act. In view

of the conclusions arrived at on the eligibility or otherwise to claim the

benefit of the automatic advancement scheme there is no need or warrant to

interfere with the stipulations contained in Section 3(c) and (d). In the

light of and to the extent of relief granted to the appellants in this

Judgment, Section 3(e) also cannot have any such force and effect to

deprive the rights accrued to and acquired by the appellants and persons

similarly placed.

The appeals are partly allowed, accordingly.

In the light of the above orders passed granting relief to all persons

similarly placed as the appellants no further orders are necessary on the

application for impleadment.

C.A. No. 5208 of 2000

The above appeal has been filed against the judgment of a Division Bench of

the Andhra Pradesh High Court dated 9th September, 1997 in Writ Appeal No.

931 of 1997 whereunder the Court while allowing the appeal of the

respondent directed the appellants to give the benefits of due scale of pay

of Rs. 320-580 as revised from time to time with effect from due date. By a

separate judgment in C.A. Nos. 2652-2654 of 1995 etc., we have dealt with

the constitutional validity of the Andhra Pradesh Education Service

Untrained Teachers (Regulation of Services and Fixation of Pay) Act, 1991

(A.P. Act No. 14 of 1991) and upheld the rights of teachers who were

appointed as SGBT Teachers to be entitled to the pay scales of School

Assistants for the period prior to the said Act. The Teacher/concerned in

this appeal also would be entitled to the benefits, to the extent such

benefits have been allowed in favour of the appellants in the other

appeals, and nothing more. If the order of the High Court purports to give

anything more than what was held permissible in respect of others, the

order in W.A. No. 931 of 1997 shall stand modified to bring it in

conformity with our decision in the connected appeals.

Consequently the appellants shall work out the monetary benefits as are due

to the respondent in this appeal in the light of the Judgment rendered by

us in the connected appeal i.e. CA Nos. 2652-54 of 1995 etc., it is also

made clear that the claim of the respondents is sustained only to the

extent of availing the monetary benefits and not for any substantive

appointment to the post of school Assistants, as such. With this

clarification of the correct position of law and modification in the light

of the other judgment rendered by us, this appeal shall stand finally

disposed of.