REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4586 OF 2009

(Arising out of SLP (C) No.23748 of 2007)

P.A. Jayalakshmi … Appellant

Versus

H. Saradha & Ors. … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

S.B. Sinha, J.

1.Leave granted.

2.Distinction between Order VIII Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure

and Order VI Rule 17 thereof is the question involved in this appeal. It

arises out of a judgment and order dated 4.9.2007 passed by a learned Single

Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in CRP (NDP) No.1643 of

2007.

3.Before embarking on the said question, we may notice the admitted

fact:

Anantha Subramania Iyer had two brothers. They were members of a

joint family. By reason of a deed of partition dated 23.8.1962, the said joint

family properties were partitioned in terms whereof the properties involved

in the present suit were allotted to Anantha Subramania Iyer. He had two

sons and five daughters. Appellant is one of them. He allegedly executed a

Will on or about 18.3.1993 in terms whereof he bequeathed the property in

suit in favour of his wife. The said Will was said to have been attested by

his sons. Anantha Sumramania passed away on 19.3.1993. Indisputably, his

wife also passed away on 13.8.1993. P.A. Ganesan, one of the sons of

Anantha Subramania Iyer passed away on 24.5.1998 leaving behind his wife

and three daughters who are respondent Nos.1 to 4 herein. The said

respondents filed a suit for partition in the year 2004. According to them,

the suit property was a joint family property and both the brothers being

coparceners had 1/3

rd

share therein. Apart therefrom, they claimed their

share also in the property which P.A. Ganesan had inherited from his father,

and, thus, the same came to 8/21 for each of the sons of Anantha

Subramania Iyer and 1/21 share so far as his daughters including the

appellant are concerned.

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4.Appellant filed her written statement on 7.4.2006, inter alia,

contending that after the death of Anantha Subramania Iyer, the properties in

suit devolved upon each of his children equally as a result whereof she

inherited 1/7

th

share therein. Allegedly, she discovered on or about 5.2.2007

that Anantha Subramania Iyer had executed a Will in favour of his wife. On

or about 1.3.2007, she filed an application for leave to file additional written

statement. By an order dated 27.3.2007, the learned Trial Judge dismissed

the said application, opining :

“10.The petitioner/4

th

defendant has filed this

petition after the start of the enquiry proceedings in

this suit and after examination of the PW1 in full

stating that one Anantha Subramania Iyer had

executed a WILL on 18.3.93, that a copy of the

same traced out only now and hence it is to be

considered that mentioning of the same in the

additional written statement itself would be a

belated one and further failure to mention this in

the written statement filed on 7.11.2006 and after

the start of trial filing a petition seeking permission

to file additional written statement with regard to a

WILL which has not been mentioned in the written

statement seems not acceptable and the petition is

a belated one.”

5.Aggrieved thereby and dissatisfied therewith, the appellant filed a

Civil Revision Petition which by reason of the impugned judgment has been

dismissed by the High Court, stating :

“On a careful consideration of the reasons stated

by the learned senior counsel appearing for the

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Respondent, this Court is of the view that the

introduction of the Will said to have been executed

by Ananthasubramaniam dated 18.3.1993 could

not be considered to receive the same. For the

reasons that if the Will is received by the Court,

then the rights of the parties will be completely

changed. Under such circumstances the share

claimed by the Plaintiff in the suit will also be

changed. Under such circumstances, this Court is

not inclined to interfere with the order passed by

the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge,

(Fast Track Court No.II), Coimbatore. This Court

does not find any valid reasons, the revision is no

merits and the same is dismissed. Consequently,

concerned M.P. No.1 of 2007 is closed. No cost.”

6.Mr. Vishwanathan, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellant, would urge :

(1)The learned Trial Judge as also the High Court committed a serious

error in passing the impugned judgment insofar as they failed to take

into consideration that in effect and substance, appellant’s application

should have been treated to be one for amendment of written

statement as envisaged under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil

Procedure and not one for leave to file additional pleadings as

envisaged under Order VIII Rule 9 thereof.

(2)The appellant having raised a contention that she discovered the

existence of Will only on 5.2.2007, even the requirements of the

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proviso appended to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure

must be held to have been satisfied.

(3)By reason of the said application, the appellant did not bring about

any change in the principal contention raised in her written statement

as the said Will was sought to be brought on record wherefor requisite

pleadings were necessary only to support her case that the properties

in question belonged to Anantha Subramania Iyer and the same was

not a joint Mitakshara Coparcenery property.

7.Mr. B.K. Pal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent,

on the other hand, supported the impugned judgment contending that the

appellant had all along contended that the said application was filed in terms

of Order VIII Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

8.By reason of Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976,

measures have been taken for early disposal of the suits. In furtherance of

the aforementioned Parliamentary object, further amendments were carried

out in the year 1999 and 2002.

With a view to put an end to the practice of filing applications for

amendments of pleadings belatedly, a proviso was added to Order VI Rule

17 which reads as under:

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“17. Amendment of pleadings--The Court may at

any stage of the proceedings allow either party to

alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and

on such terms as may be just, and all such

amendments shall be made as may be necessary

for the purpose of determining the real questions in

controversy between the parties:

Provided that no application for amendment

shall be allowed after the trial has commenced,

unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in

spite of due diligence, the party could not have

raised the matter before the commencement of

trial.”

Order VI Rule 17 speaks of amendment of pleadings whereas Order

VIII Rule 9 provides for subsequent pleadings by a defendant. The

distinction between the two provisions is evident. Whereas by reason of the

former unless a contrary intention is expressed by the court, any amendment

carried out in the pleadings shall relate back to the date of filing original

thereof, subsequent pleadings stand on different footings.

9.For reasons best known to the appellant, she had chosen to file her

application seeking leave to file additional pleadings. Such a stand might

have been taken by her with a view to obviate the bar created by reason of

the proviso appended to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The firm stand taken by the appellant both before the Trial Court as also the

High Court was that her application was under Order VIII Rule 9 of the

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Code of Civil Procedure. At no point of time, a contention was raised that

she wanted to amend her pleadings.

10.Ordinarily at such a belated stage, leave for filing additional written

statement is usually not granted. We may notice that one of the plaintiffs

was examined on 1.3.2007. It is accepted at the bar that despite the fact that

the appellant is said to have discovered the existence of the Will on or about

5.2.2007, no question was put to the said witness with regard to the said Will

or otherwise. It is only at a later stage that the aforementioned application

for grant of leave to file additional written statement was moved. There

cannot be any doubt or dispute that the courts should be liberal in allowing

applications for leave to amend pleadings but it is also well settled that the

courts must bear in mind the statutory limitations brought about by reason of

the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Acts; the proviso appended to

Order VI Rule 17 being one of them.

In North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur v. Bhagwan Das

(Dead) By LRs. [(2008) 8 SCC 511], the law has laid down by this Court in

the following terms:

“16. Insofar as the principles which govern the

question of granting or disallowing amendments

under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC (as it stood at the

relevant time) are concerned, these are also well

settled. Order 6 Rule 17 CPC postulates

amendment of pleadings at any stage of the

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proceedings. In Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v.

Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil3 which still holds the

field, it was held that all amendments ought to be

allowed which satisfy the two conditions: (a) of

not working injustice to the other side, and (b) of

being necessary for the purpose of determining the

real questions in controversy between the parties.

Amendments should be refused only where the

other party cannot be placed in the same position

as if the pleading had been originally correct, but

the amendment would cause him an injury which

could not be compensated in costs. (Also see

Gajanan Jaikishan Joshi v. Prabhakar Mohanlal

Kalwar).”

Yet again, in Bollepanda P. Poonacha & Anr. v. K.M. Madapa

[(2008) 13 SCC 179], the law is laid down in the following terms :

“15. A belated counterclaim must be discouraged

by this Court. See Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya v.

Anil Panjwani. We are, however, not unmindful of

the decisions of this Court where a defendant has

been allowed to amend his written statement so as

to enable him to elaborate his defence or to take

additional pleas in support of his case. The Court

in such matters has a wide discretion. It must,

however, subserve the ultimate cause of justice. It

may be true that further litigation should be

endeavoured to be avoided. It may also be true that

joinder of several causes of action in a suit is

permissible. The Court, must, however, exercise

the discretionary jurisdiction in a judicious

manner. While considering that subservance of

justice is the ultimate goal, the statutory limitation

shall not be overstepped. Grant of relief will

depend upon the factual background involved in

each case. The Court, while undoubtedly would

take into consideration the questions of serious

injustice or irreparable loss, but nevertheless

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should bear in mind that a provision for

amendment of pleadings is not available as a

matter of right under all circumstances. One cause

of action cannot be allowed to be substituted by

another. Ordinarily, effect of an admission made in

earlier pleadings shall not be permitted to be taken

away. See State of A.P. v. Pioneer Builders6 and

Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Union of India7 and

Himmat Singh v. ICI India Ltd.”

(Emphasis supplied)

Yet again, in Vidyabai & Ors. v. Padmalatha & Anr. [(2009) 2 SCC

409], this Court upon taking into consideration the effect of the insertion of

proviso to Order VI Rule 17 held as under :

“10. By reason of the Civil Procedure Code

(Amendment) Act, 2002 (Act 22 of 2002),

Parliament inter alia inserted a proviso to Order 6

Rule 17 of the Code, which reads as under:

“Provided that no application for amendment shall

be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless

the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of

due diligence, the party could not have raised the

matter before the commencement of trial.”

It is couched in a mandatory form. The court’s

jurisdiction to allow such an application is taken

away unless the conditions precedent therefor are

satisfied viz. it must come to a conclusion that in

spite of due diligence the parties could not have

raised the matter before the commencement of the

trial.

XXX XXX XXX

19. It is the primal duty of the court to decide as to

whether such an amendment is necessary to decide

the real dispute between the parties. Only if such a

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condition is fulfilled, the amendment is to be

allowed. However, proviso appended to Order 6

Rule 17 of the Code restricts the power of the

court. It puts an embargo on exercise of its

jurisdiction. The court’s jurisdiction, in a case of

this nature is limited. Thus, unless the

jurisdictional fact, as envisaged therein, is found to

be existing, the court will have no jurisdiction at

all to allow the amendment of the plaint.”

11.We, therefore, do not find any legal infirmity in the orders passed by

the High Court. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Counsel’s

fee assessed at Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only).

……………………….J.

[S.B. Sinha]

`

……………………..…J.

[Deepak Verma]

New Delhi;

July 21, 2009

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