As per case facts, an appeal was filed against a conviction under Section 325 IPC where the appellant was found guilty of assaulting the victim with an iron rod after ...
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Prasenjit Biswas
C.R.A. 497 of 2010
Palas Dolui @ Tanai
-Versus-
The State of West Bengal
For the Appellant : Mr. Apan Saha,
Mr. Tasnim Ahmed.
For the State : Mr. Saryati Datta
Ms. Kanchan Roy.
Hearing concluded on : 27.02.2026
Judgment On : 18.03.2026
Prasenjit Biswas, J:-
1. The instant appeal is directed against the impugned judgment
and order of conviction dated 23.06.2010 passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Amta,
Howrah in connection with Sessions Trial No. 269/09 arising
out of Joypur P.S. Case No. 54/08 dated 28.07.08
corresponding to G.R. Case No.768/08 at the instance of the
appellant.
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C.R.A. 497 of 2010
2. By passing the impugned judgment the present appellant was
found guilty for commission of offence punishable under
Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code and he was sentenced to
suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year along with fine of
Rs.5000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further
rigorous imprisonment for three months.
3. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said impugned
judgment and order of conviction the present appellant has
preferred this instant appeal.
4. Shorn of extraneous details, the facts leading to the present
appeal may be summarized as follows:
“The instant case originated on the basis of a
written complaint lodged by Smt. Ratan Pramanick
before the Joypur Police Station. In the said complaint,
it was interalia stated that on 28.07.2008, at
approximately 9:30 A.M., one Sisir Mistry was engaged
in repairing the tile shed of the complainant’s house. At
that time, Palash Dolui, the appellant and next-door
neighbor of the complainant, objected to the said
repair work. According to the complaint, the victim,
who is the daughter-in-law of the de-facto
complainant, informed the appellant that the work was
being carried out within the boundaries of their own
land. On hearing this, the appellant allegedly returned
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C.R.A. 497 of 2010
to his house, retrieved a “sabal” (iron rod), and struck
the victim on her head with the said weapon, causing a
bleeding injury. Subsequently, the injured victim,
Sandhya Pramanick, was initially taken to Joypur
Hospital for treatment and thereafter referred to the
Calcutta Medical College and Hospital for further
medical care. On the basis of the said complaint, a
formal case was registered at Joypur Police Station,
being Case No. 54/2008, dated 28.07.2008. Following
the completion of the investigation, the prosecuting
agency submitted a charge-sheet against the
appellant, Palash Dolui, under Sections 325 and 307 of
the Indian Penal Code”.
5. Charge was framed by the Trial Court against the accused
under Section 325/307 of the Indian Penal Code which was
read over and explained to the accused, in which he pleaded
not guilty and claimed to be tried. In this case, prosecution
has examined as many as seven witnesses and documents
were marked as exhibit on its behalf. Prosecution also proved
the seized alamat which are marked as material exhibits.
Neither any oral nor any documentary evidence was adduced
on behalf of the defence.
6. Mr. Apan Saha, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant,
has contended that the ingredients of Section 325 of the
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C.R.A. 497 of 2010
Indian Penal Code have not been established against the
appellant, and therefore, the impugned judgment and order of
conviction cannot be sustained. It is submitted by Mr. Saha
that the evidence on record, when scrutinized in its entirety,
fails to demonstrate that the appellant inflicted grievous hurt
upon the alleged victim as contemplated under the statutory
provisions.
7. The learned Advocate further pointed out that the statements
of the prosecution witnesses contain apparent contradictions
and material omissions, which go to the root of the
prosecution’s case. These inconsistencies, as submitted,
significantly undermine the reliability of the prosecution
evidence and create reasonable doubt regarding the
appellant’s culpability.
8. It is also submitted that the allegedly seized weapon, namely
the ‘sabol,’ was never subjected to scientific examination. This
omission, according to the learned Advocate, casts doubt on
whether the said weapon was actually employed in the
commission of the alleged offence. The non-examination of
this crucial piece of evidence, therefore, impairs the veracity
of the prosecution’s case.
9. Mr. Saha further assailed the prosecution for its failure to
examine a vital witness, one Sisir Mistry, who was present at
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C.R.A. 497 of 2010
the relevant time and allegedly witnessed the incident. No
explanation has been provided for the non-examination of this
material witness, despite the apparent importance of his
testimony to the proper adjudication of the matter. In
addition, it is submitted that the incident in question occurred
in the presence of several individuals; however, the
prosecution failed to cite these independent witnesses. The
absence of testimony from such eyewitnesses, who could have
corroborated the occurrence of the offence, renders the
prosecution’s narrative less credible.
10. The learned Advocate drew the attention of this Court to the
statements of PW1 and PW3, submitting that their evidence is
inconsistent with the testimony of PW5 concerning the place of
occurrence. These discrepancies, it is argued, further diminish
the reliability of the prosecution’s case.
11. In view of the above, Mr. Saha, learned Advocate, submitted
that the impugned judgment and order of conviction passed
by the learned Trial Court is legally unsustainable. It is,
therefore, prayed that this Court may be pleased to allow the
appeal preferred by the appellant and set aside the conviction.
12. Mr. Saryati Datta, learned Advocate appearing for the State,
submitted that there is no material on record which warrants
any interference with the findings of the learned Trial Court in
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C.R.A. 497 of 2010
the impugned judgment and order of conviction. It was
contended that the prosecution case has been fully and
satisfactorily established through the depositions of the
material witnesses, and the Trial Court’s conclusions are based
on cogent and credible evidence.
13. According to the learned Advocate, PW1, Smt. Ratan
Pramanick, the defacto complainant, and PW5, Sandhya
Pramanick, the victim/injured, consistently supported the
prosecution’s case through their oral evidence. Although both
witnesses were subjected to cross-examination by the
defence, nothing material could be elicited from their
testimony to render their accounts unreliable or
untrustworthy. Their statements clearly detail the events that
occurred on the relevant date, including the altercation
between the accused and the victim and the assault with the
offending weapon. The witnesses explicitly described the
conduct of the accused and the consequences of his actions,
leaving no doubt regarding the commission of the offence.
14. It was further submitted that PW3, Jharna Pramanick, an
independent eyewitness to the incident, corroborated the
statements of PW1 and PW5. PW3 deposed that in her
presence, the police seized the offending weapon, i.e. ‘sabal’,
along with other materials. This corroboration reinforces the
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C.R.A. 497 of 2010
testimonies of PW1 and PW5 and underscores the reliability of
the evidence regarding the assault and the seizure of the
weapon.
15. The learned Advocate emphasized that there is no dispute as
to the occurrence of the offence. The witnesses collectively
established that the accused brought the ‘sabal’ from his
house and struck the victim on the head, causing severe
injuries. PW6, Dr. Sudakshina Bhar, who treated the victim,
confirmed that the injuries were grievous in nature, as
documented in the injury report, Exhibit-3. The offending
weapon was also duly marked as a material exhibit in the case
(Material Exhibit-1) and was identified in Court by the
witnesses, further substantiating the prosecution’s version of
the incident.
16. In view of the above, the learned Advocate submitted that the
prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt.
The findings of the learned Trial Court convicting the appellant
under Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code are therefore fully
justified. There is no ground for interference, and the
impugned judgment and order of conviction ought to be
upheld. Accordingly, it was prayed that the instant appeal filed
by the appellant be dismissed and the conviction and sentence
imposed by the Trial Court be sustained in all respects.
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C.R.A. 497 of 2010
17. I have anxiously considered the rival submissions advanced by
both the parties and have gone through all the materials on
record.
18. The evidence of the material witnesses examined on behalf of
the prosecution clearly unfolds the manner in which the
incident occurred and consistently attributes the overt act to
the present appellant.
19. PW1, Smt. Ratan Pramanick, who is the mother-in-law of the
victim/injured and also the defacto complainant of the case,
deposed before the Trial Court narrating the incident in detail.
According to her testimony, on the relevant date and time one
Sisir Mistry was engaged in constructing a structure for a tile
shed in their old house. At that time, the present appellant-
accused raised objection to the construction of such structure.
The victim, who is the daughter-in-law of this witness, resisted
the objection and asserted that the structure was being
constructed on their own property and therefore the accused
had no reason to interfere. It is further stated by PW1 that
during the course of the ensuing altercation, the accused went
to his house, brought a sabal (iron rod) and suddenly struck
the victim on her head with the said weapon. As a result of the
severe blow, the victim sustained grievous bleeding injuries,
lost consciousness and fell down on the ground. PW1 further
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C.R.A. 497 of 2010
stated in her evidence that the injury was so severe that brain
matter came out from the head of the victim.
20. PW1 further stated that immediately after the incident the
victim was first taken to Joypur B.B. Dhar Hospital and
thereafter she was referred to and admitted at Calcutta
Medical College and Hospital for better treatment. She also
deposed that during the course of investigation the police
recovered the offending weapon, namely the ‘sabal’, and also
seized blood-stained earth and blood-stained bamboo leaves
from the place of occurrence by preparing a seizure list. PW1
stated that she put her Left Thumb Impression (L.T.I.) on the
said seizure list as a witness to the seizure. During her
examination before the Trial Court, she also identified the
offending weapon that had been produced before the Court.
21. PW5, Sandhya Pramanick, who is the victim/injured in the
present case, also deposed before the Trial Court and her
testimony substantially corroborates the version of PW1. She
stated that on 28
th
July, 2008 at about 9:30 A.M., when one
Sisir Mistry was working in their house for making the
structure of a tile shed on their own land, the accused Palash
Dolui raised objection to such construction. According to this
witness, when the accused objected, she protested and
asserted that the construction was being carried out within
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C.R.A. 497 of 2010
their own land and therefore there was no reason for the
accused to interfere. She further stated that during the course
of the altercation the accused brought a sabal-like material
and directly struck her on the head with the same. As a result
of such assault, she lost her senses and sat down on the
ground.
22. The injured witness further stated that she subsequently
received treatment at S.S.K.M. Hospital, Kolkata and that due
to the severe assault she had suffered physical infirmities and
was unable to move and walk easily thereafter. During the
course of her deposition before the Trial Court, this witness
identified the accused present in Court as well as the offending
weapon which was marked as Material Exhibit-1.
23. During cross-examination, PW5 stated that the altercation
between her and the accused continued for about two to five
minutes. She also stated that at the time of the incident PW3,
Jharna Pramanick, PW1, Ratan Pramanick and two other
persons, namely Aparna Pramanick and Sisir Mistry, were
present at the place of occurrence. It is true that Aparna
Pramanick and Sisir Mistry were not cited as witnesses on
behalf of the prosecution. However, the absence of their
examination does not in any manner detract from the
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C.R.A. 497 of 2010
consistent and cogent testimonies of the witnesses who were
actually examined.
24. The evidence of PW5, being that of an injured witness, carries
significant evidentiary value. Her testimony finds substantial
corroboration from the evidence of PW1 with regard to the
manner in which the appellant assaulted her with the sabal. A
careful scrutiny of their depositions reveals that there is
nothing on record which would suggest that the appellant did
not commit the assault upon the victim with the said weapon.
Both PW1 and PW5 clearly identified the accused person as
well as the offending weapon in connection with the incident.
Although both witnesses were subjected to cross-examination
by the defence, nothing material could be elicited from their
cross-examination to render their testimonies unreliable or
untrustworthy.
25. PW3, Jharna Pramanick, who is a neighbour of the accused,
was examined as an independent witness to the occurrence.
In her evidence she stated that on the relevant date and time
when the tile shed structure of the house of PW1 and PW5 was
being constructed, the accused raised objection to such
construction. She further deposed that during the course of
the altercation the accused Palash Dolui went to his house,
brought a ‘sabal’ and struck the victim (PW5) on the head with
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C.R.A. 497 of 2010
the said weapon. According to her testimony, as a result of the
blow the victim fell down on the ground in a fainted condition
and brain matter came out of her head accompanied by
profuse bleeding.
26. PW3 further stated that immediately after the incident the
victim was taken to the hospital for treatment. She also stated
that the police subsequently seized the offending weapon by
preparing a seizure list and she put her Left Thumb
Impression (L.T.I.) on the said seizure list as a witness to the
seizure.
27. Being a neighbour and an independent witness, PW3 had no
apparent reason to falsely implicate the accused. Her
testimony clearly establishes the role of the appellant in
committing the offence and lends further corroboration to the
statements made by PW1 and PW5. Although PW3 was also
subjected to cross-examination on behalf of the defence,
nothing substantial could be elicited to discredit her testimony.
Her evidence remains consistent and trustworthy and there is
no reason to discard the same.
28. Thus, upon a careful evaluation of the evidence of PW1, PW5
and PW3, it becomes evident that their testimonies are
consistent, mutually corroborative and clearly point towards
the involvement of the appellant in assaulting the victim with
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C.R.A. 497 of 2010
the ‘sabal’, resulting in grievous injuries to her head. The
defence could not succeed in shaking their credibility through
cross-examination, and therefore their evidence inspires
confidence and can safely be relied upon.
29. The evidence of PW1, PW3, and PW5 receives strong
corroboration from the medical evidence of PW6, Dr.
Sudakshina Bhar, who treated the victim immediately after the
incident. In her deposition, PW6 stated that upon examination
she found a lacerated injury on the victim’s head. The victim
was admitted to the hospital in an unconscious state and had
also vomited. PW6 further deposed that six stitches were
required to close the laceration. According to the history
recorded in the injury report, the assault was perpetrated by
the accused, Palash Dolui @ Tanai, using a ‘sabal’ at
Simultala, behind the house of the victim.
30. PW6 described the nature of the injury as grievous and noted
that the injury was of recent origin at the time of examination.
She also observed that the weapon used was probably a blunt
object. PW6 exhibited the injury report before the Court,
which was marked as Exhibit-3. In her professional opinion
recorded in the said injury report, she stated that the
lacerated injury sustained by the victim could have been
caused by a strike from a ‘sabal’ like material, which
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C.R.A. 497 of 2010
corresponds to Material Exhibit-1 produced before the Trial
Court. Thus, the medical evidence aligns closely with the
testimonies of PW1, PW3, and PW5, confirming both the
nature of the assault and the weapon used.
31. The defence, in its submissions, raised doubts regarding the
place of occurrence of the incident. In this regard, PW7, the
Investigating Officer, testified that the place of occurrence was
on the pathway near the victim’s house. Similarly, PW6, in
Exhibit-3, recorded the history of assault and specifically noted
that the incident took place at Simultala, behind the house of
the victim. Importantly, no questions were put to PW1 and
PW3 concerning the exact location, and PW5 herself stated
that she sustained the injuries on the house road. When read
together, the evidence of the victim, the Investigating Officer
(PW7), and the injury report (Exhibit-3) demonstrates that the
incident occurred on the pathway adjacent to the victim’s
house. The Trial Court rightly observed that for legal and
evidentiary purposes, the term “house” encompasses the area
of the house, including adjoining pathways, and is not
confined to any single room. Therefore, the minor discrepancy
regarding the precise location does not amount to a shift in
the place of occurrence and cannot weaken the prosecution’s
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C.R.A. 497 of 2010
case. The Trial Court’s conclusion on this point is both
reasonable and justified.
32. At the hearing, the learned Advocate for the appellant argued
that although PW1 and PW5 referred to one Sisir Mistry as
working on the repair of the victim’s house at the time of the
incident, the prosecution did not examine him as a witness.
The Trial Court addressed this issue in its judgment, noting
that Sisir Mistry had been cited as charge-sheeted witness no.
6. However, he was ultimately not examined because he had
been “gained over” by the accused and would not have given
truthful evidence. The Court considered this explanation
sufficient and found no fault with the prosecution’s case for
not citing him.
33. In sum, the medical evidence of PW6 not only corroborates
the testimonies of PW1, PW3, and PW5 regarding the assault
and the weapon used but also confirms the grievous nature of
the injuries sustained by the victim. The Trial Court correctly
considered the minor variation in the description of the place
of occurrence and rightly rejected the defence’s attempt to
discredit the testimonies based on this ground. The reasoning
of the Trial Court on these points is well-founded and
supported by the evidence on record.
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C.R.A. 497 of 2010
34. The evidence of PW3, Jharna Pramanick, who is an
independent witness to the incident, significantly reinforces
the testimonies of PW1 and PW5. PW3 specifically deposed
that on the relevant date and time, the appellant assaulted the
victim with a ‘sabal’, resulting in grievous injuries. Her
deposition is wholly consistent with the accounts given by
PW1, the mother-in-law and defacto complainant, and PW5,
the injured victim herself. Importantly, there is nothing in the
evidence to suggest any previous enmity between PW3 and
the accused that could have motivated her to give false
testimony. During cross-examination, no question was put to
PW3 regarding any purported animosity or prior disputes with
the appellant, further lending credibility to her statements.
Being an independent witness, her account carries substantial
weight and adds significant corroboration to the prosecution’s
case.
35. Regarding the offending weapon, PW7, the Investigating
Officer, deposed that the assault was committed with a ‘sabal’,
which is a pointed but not a sharp-cutting instrument. This
evidence is consistent with the medical observations regarding
the nature of the injury. PW4, Monoranjan Koley, also deposed
that in his presence, the police seized the sabal along with
blood-stained earth and blood-stained bamboo leaves from
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C.R.A. 497 of 2010
the place of occurrence. He further stated that he put his
signature on the seizure list and identified the materials in
Court. Although PW4 mentioned in his cross-examination that
he signed the seizure list at the police station under the
instruction of a superior officer referred to as “Borobabu,” this
does not affect the credibility of the seizure itself. Additionally,
PW3, an independent witness, confirmed that she put her Left
Thumb Impression (L.T.I.) on the seizure list of the offending
weapon and other materials, providing independent
corroboration of the proper seizure procedure.
36. Upon careful appreciation of all the evidence, including the
oral testimonies and medical documents, particularly Exhibit-
3, it is evident that the appellant assaulted the victim with the
‘sabal’ (Material Exhibit-1). PW6, Dr. Sudakshina Bhar, opined
that the injury sustained by the victim was grievous in nature,
caused by the strike of a blunt, pointed instrument, consistent
with the ‘sabal’. There is no material on record to suggest that
the victim was not assaulted or that the accused was not
responsible for the act. The offending weapon was recovered,
produced before the Court, and properly marked as an exhibit,
and was identified in Court by PW1, PW3, and PW5.
37. In conclusion, the combined evidence of PW1, PW3, PW4,
PW5, PW6, and PW7 establishes beyond reasonable doubt that
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C.R.A. 497 of 2010
the appellant assaulted the victim on the relevant date and
time with the ‘sabal’, resulting in grievous injuries. The
medical report (Exhibit-3) corroborates the ocular evidence,
confirming the grievous nature of the injury and linking it
directly to the assault by the accused. The prosecution’s case
regarding the assault is thus fully substantiated and reliable.
38. For the reasons discussed above, the impugned judgment and
order of conviction passed by the learned Trial Court,
convicting the appellant under Section 325 of the Indian Penal
Code, is fully justified. There is no ground to interfere with the
finding of guilt, and the conviction is therefore sustained.
39. On a careful and comprehensive examination of the facts and
circumstances of the present case, it emerges that the
incident in question took place as far back as the year 2008,
and the appeal has remained pending before this Court since
the year 2010. The records further reveal that the appellant
was initially arrested on 29
th
July, 2008, and was subsequently
enlarged on bail by the learned Trial Court on 12
th
August,
2008. Since then, the appellant has continued to remain on
bail without interruption. Significantly, there is nothing on
record to suggest that during this prolonged period the
appellant has indulged in any further criminal activity or
misused the liberty granted to him.
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C.R.A. 497 of 2010
40. In this backdrop, it is of considerable relevance that nearly
seventeen years have elapsed since the date of occurrence,
and more than fifteen years have passed since the filing of the
present appeal. Such an inordinate delay in the final
adjudication of the appeal cannot be overlooked. It necessarily
invites the application of the well-recognized principle of
judicial leniency in sentencing on account of protracted delay.
The Court is, therefore, called upon to consider whether, at
this distant point of time, it would be just, fair, and proper to
direct the appellant to undergo the remaining part of the
substantive sentence.
41. It is a matter of judicial notice that the concept of justice is
not confined merely to the imposition of punishment but
extends to ensuring fairness, reasonableness, and timeliness
in the administration of criminal justice. The right to a speedy
trial is an integral and inseparable facet of the right to life and
personal liberty as enshrined under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. Any undue and unexplained delay in the
disposal of criminal proceedings, particularly when such delay
is not attributable to the accused, amounts to a violation of
this fundamental right.
42. The prolonged pendency of the appeal, coupled with the
mental agony, uncertainty, and social stigma endured by the
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C.R.A. 497 of 2010
appellant over the years, are factors which cannot be ignored
while considering the question of sentence. The sword of
litigation hanging over the head of the appellant for such an
extended period itself operates as a form of punishment.
43. In such circumstances, the courts have consistently
recognized that undue delay in the conclusion of criminal
proceedings may constitute a valid ground for adopting a
lenient approach in the matter of sentencing. The judicial
discretion vested in appellate courts permits them to
appropriately mould the sentence so as to balance the ends of
justice. This may, in suitable cases, include reduction of the
substantive sentence of imprisonment or even substitution
thereof with a sentence of fine, particularly where the accused
has remained on bail for a long period without any adverse
conduct.
44. Therefore, having regard to the totality of circumstances,
including the long lapse of time since the occurrence, the
prolonged pendency of the appeal, the continuous compliance
of bail conditions by the appellant, and the absence of any
subsequent criminal conduct, it becomes a fit case where the
principle of leniency in sentencing deserves due consideration,
so as to advance the cause of substantive justice.
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C.R.A. 497 of 2010
45. In the present case, there is no infirmity in the Trial Court’s
finding of guilt. The conviction of the appellant is affirmed.
However, in view of the exceptional delay spanning nearly
seventeen years I am inclined to modify the sentence. The
sentence of one year’s imprisonment awarded by the Trial
Court is reduced to the period already undergone by the
appellant. This adjustment recognizes the undue delay while
maintaining the conviction for the offence.
46. At the same time, to meet the ends of justice, the fine
imposed by the Trial Court, originally Rs. 500/-, is enhanced
to Rs. 10,000/-.
47. This approach aligns with the principles laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Pounammal v. State
Represented by Inspector of Police reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 1784 , where at paragraph 9 the Apex Court
observed:
“The prolongation of a criminal case for an
unreasonable period is in itself a kind of suffering. It amounts
to mental incarceration for the person facing such
proceedings. For a person who is convicted and who has
appealed against his or her conviction and sentence and who
everyday awaits the fate of litigation, spends time in distress.
In the present-day system of administration of justice, in
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C.R.A. 497 of 2010
which proceedings have often go on protracted unreasonably
and therefore unbearably, the passage of long time itself
makes the person suffer a mental agony.”
48. Dismissing the appeal and confirming the conviction with
modification, the Apex Court ordered that-
“The sentence awarded to the appellant is accordingly
reduced to the actual undergone. At the same time the
imposition of fine is required to be increased. The appellant
shall be liable to pay fine of ₹25,000/- over and above
originally imposed.”
49. Accordingly, the present appellant is not required to undergo
any further jail sentence. However, he is directed to deposit
the enhanced fine of Rs. 10,000/- within three months from
today. In the event that the appellant has already paid Rs.
500/-, he shall be liable to deposit only the remaining Rs.
9,500/-. In default of the payment of fine the appellant shall
undergo imprisonment for two months.
50. In conclusion, the conviction of the appellant is affirmed, the
substantive jail sentence is set off to the period already
undergone, and the fine is enhanced to Rs. 10,000/- to ensure
justice is met. This approach balances the principles of
accountability for the offence with the equitable consideration
arising from the undue delay in the disposal of the appeal.
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C.R.A. 497 of 2010
51. The appeal stands partly allowed.
52. The appellant is on bail, and his bail bond shall stand
cancelled.
53. Let a copy of this judgment along with the Trial Court record
be sent down to the Trial Court immediately.
54. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be
given to the parties on payment of requisite fees.
(Prasenjit Biswas, J.)
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