2025 INSC 655 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.6066/2024]

PARITALA SUDHAKAR …APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF TELANGANA …RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.

Leave granted.

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2. This is an appeal at the instance of the sole Appellant-convict

(hereinafter also referred to as the ‘accused officer’) against the Final

Judgment and Order dated 06.03.2024 (hereinafter referred to as the

‘Impugned Judgment’) in Criminal Appeal No.157 of 2008 passed by a

learned Single Judge of the High Court for the State of Telangana at

Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as the ‘High Court’). The High Court

dismissed the Criminal Appeal and affirmed the Judgment dated

29.01.2008 of the learned Additional Special Judge for Special Police

Establishment & Anti-Corruption Bureau Cases at Hyderabad

(hereinafter referred to as ‘Trial Court’) in Calendar

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Case No.19 of

2004, whereby the Trial Court convicted the Appellant and sentenced

him to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of one year and to

pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- (Rupees One Thousand) and in default to

undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of six months for the

offence punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,

1988 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) and also for the offence

punishable under Section 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Act to

undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of one year and pay a fine

of Rs.1,000/- (Rupees One Thousand) and in default to undergo Simple

Imprisonment for a further period of six months.

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[Mis-spelt as ‘Calender’ in the Trial Court Judgment.]

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FACTUAL POSITION:

3. The Appellant, presently aged about 70 years, was working as a

Revenue Inspector in the office of the Mandal Revenue Office

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘MRO’) posted at Gundala Mandal,

Nalgonda District, which was in the undivided State of Andhra Pradesh

between 12.10.2001 to 20.08.2003. On 06.08.2003, the complainant

submitted an application to the MRO, Gundala Mandal, claiming

compensation for trees that dried up due to drought. The MRO

forwarded the same to the accused officer/Appellant for conducting an

inquiry. On the same day, in the evening, it was alleged that when the

complainant (hereinafter also referred to as ‘PW1’) approached the

Appellant to discuss a matter regarding compensation for the damaged

trees, the Appellant demanded a bribe of Rs.2,000/- (Rupees Two

Thousand) to conduct the inquiry and prepare a report. It was further

alleged that on 07.08.2003, PW1 met the accused officer and requested

that he is not in a position to pay such huge amount, whereupon the

accused officer is said to have stated that unless the bribe amount of

Rs.2000/- (Rupees Two Thousand) is paid to him, he would not come to

the village for inspection. It is alleged that the Appellant finally asked

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PW1 to come with the bribe amount of Rs.2000/- (Rupees Two

Thousand) and meet him at his residence at Mothukur Village on

11.08.2003.

4. Aggrieved by these demands, PW1 filed a written complaint with

the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau,

Hyderabad Range, Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as ‘PW7’) on

08.08.2003. PW7 registered a case being Cr. No.19/ACB-HR/2003

against the Appellant under Section 7 of the Act, on 11.08.2003.

5. On 11.08.2003, in presence of independent mediators, PW1 and

others, pre-trap proceedings were conducted. The trap party then went

to the Appellant’s house. The house of the Appellant was found locked

and PW1 was informed by the Appellant’s neighbours that the Appellant

had gone to the MRO at Gundala. From the house, independent

witness-PW2 and PW1 went on scooter to the MRO, where PW7 and

the other trap members followed them in a jeep. PW1 met the Appellant

in the MRO. The Appellant informed that he would come over to Ambala

Village and meet him. PW1 and PW2 came out of the office and

informed PW7 that the Appellant would meet him at Ambala Village.

Again, PW1 and the trap party members went to Ambala Village and

waited there. Around 6 PM, the Appellant came on his motorcycle and

PW1 approached him, whereafter the Appellant and PW1 both went to

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PW1’s house on their respective vehicles. Both vehicles were parked in

front of PW1’s house. The Appellant visited the garden/fields of PW1

and thereafter returned to PW1’s house.

6.The Appellant had tea and informed that he would conduct

‘panchanama’ in the presence of the mediators in the garden and asked

PW1 to keep the bribe amount in a rexine bag attached to the petrol

tank of his motorcycle. Accordingly, PW1 kept the bribe amount in the

said bag. PW1 then signalled to the trap party indicating acceptance of

bribe by the Appellant. The trap party then approached the Appellant

and questioned him regarding the bribe amount. Tests were conducted

on the hands of the Appellant which proved negative. However, money

was recovered from the rexine bag attached to the petrol tank of the

Appellant’s motorcycle.

7. On 29.01.2008, considering the evidence and after hearing

arguments on behalf of the prosecution and the defence, the Trial Court

concluded that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable

doubt. The Trial Court convicted the Appellant and sentenced him to

undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a

fine of Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees One Thousand) and in default to undergo

Simple Imprisonment for a further period of six months for the offence

punishable under Section 7 of the Act and also sentenced to undergo

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Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of

Rs.1,000/- (Rupees One Thousand) and in default to undergo Simple

Imprisonment for a further period for six months for the offence

punishable under Section 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Act.

8. Aggrieved by the Trial Court’s Judgment dated 29.01.2008, the

Appellant preferred Criminal Appeal No.157 of 2008 before the High

Court and on 06.03.2024, the High Court delivered the Impugned

Judgment, whereby it dismissed the Criminal Appeal on the grounds

that the prosecution had successfully established the element of

demand of bribe and acceptance thereof by the Appellant beyond

reasonable doubt.

APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS :

9. Learned senior counsel for the Appellant contended that the triple

test for gauging trustworthiness of trap cases i.e., (i) Prior verification of

demand by investigator; (ii) use of shadow witness, and; (iii) successful

pH test are entirely absent, in the instant case.

10. Learned senior counsel contended that the entire factual matrix

surrounding the alleged bribe is extremely flawed. It was submitted that

the alleged demand was made during the late evening of 11.08.2003 at

PW1’s house where there were no independent witnesses. The demand

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was also not heard by any of the trap team members who were present

at the scene of the incident. It was argued before us that the

complainant also failed to disclose the fact that he had previously

approached the MRO for grievance(s) regarding drought compensation,

and this had led to a prior altercation with the Appellant. This shows a

further insight into the entire (alleged) crime being a farce and a ploy to

take revenge from the Appellant, due to prior animus between the

Appellant and PW1.

11. It was argued that there is no verification of alleged demand or of

the genuineness of the grievance made before deciding to lay trap. It

was contended that the need for proper verification of demand and

allegation has been held to be a settled convention in trap cases as per

the recent judgment of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Mir Mustafa

Ali Hasmi v State of A. P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1689.

12. Reliance was further placed on Rajesh Gupta v State, 2022

SCC OnLine SC 1107 and K Shantamma v State of Telangana ,

(2022) 4 SCC 574, wherein conviction was overturned due to the

prosecution’s failure to adequately prove demand by means of

evidence.

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13. While referring to DW1’s (complainant’s wife) statements, it was

pointed out that her narration of the events that transpired completely

contradicted the one given by the complainant-PW1. In fact, the wife

had not supported the case of any demand being made at the time

when both parties were present in the house. It was, hence, urged that

the appeal be allowed, as there was no evidence worth the name

available against the Appellant.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENT :

14. Learned counsel for the Respondent drew our attention to

Paragraph no.17 of the Trial Court Judgment and contended that

ordinarily, a demand for illegal gratification would not be made openly

by corrupt officials to avoid being reported and to safeguard their

reputation. Therefore, the absence of other direct witnesses to the

demand would not amount to controverting or denying the demand but

would only suggest that the same was not made in the presence of

other persons. In fact, PW2 had stated in his examination-in-chief that

the Appellant had asked the complainant about the bribe amount and

after nodding his head, the Appellant instructed the complainant to meet

him at the crossroads. It was submitted that as to the fact that PW2 was

not inside the room when the afore-noted conversation occurred, he

was just outside the door, showing that he was at a hearing distance.

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15. The learned counsel further submitted that there is no motive for

complainant to falsely concoct a story against the Appellant and even if

the altercation between complainant and the Appellant is believed to

have taken place, it was an attempt by the Appellant to signal to the

complainant that his application for compensation would be rejected

unless he approves it. This was nothing more than a prelude to the

demand being made by the Appellant of illegal gratification and it only

strengthens the Respondent’s case. Furthermore, it was urged that the

presumption against the Appellant would be operative under Section 20

of the Act, as recovery was effected from the rexine bag attached to the

petrol tank of the Appellant’s motorbike.

16. Learned counsel contended that though it was brought to the

Court’s attention that the complainant had contradicted his statement

when he stated that the Appellant was not with him when he placed the

money in the pouch/bag, but the same is not true as the complainant

had corrected his statement(s) thereafter in the cross-examination. But,

even if it were to be believed that only the complainant was present at

the time the money was kept, as noted by the Trial Court, there is a

clear line of sight from inside the house towards where the Appellant’s

motorcycle was parked. Therefore, even in such scenario, it is clear that

the currency notes were placed in the Appellant’s bag with his

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knowledge and upon his instructions, hence, establishing the

acceptance of illegal gratification. Even while referring to the statements

made by DW1, it was contended that the entire conversation relating to

the bribe amount happened while she was preparing tea for the parties,

so naturally, she could not have heard anything. It was urged that the

appeal deserved dismissal at the hands of this Court.

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION :

17. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the

Judgment(s)/Orders(s) of the Courts below and the material on record,

it transpires that there are material contradictions in the evidence of the

witnesses. In this connection, it would not be out of place to take note of

the observations in Yogesh Singh v Mahabeer Singh, (2017) 11 SCC

195 to the following effect:

‘29. It is well settled in law that the minor discrepancies are

not to be given undue emphasis and the evidence is to be

considered from the point of view of trustworthiness. The

test is whether the same inspires confidence in the mind of

the court. If the evidence is incredible and cannot be

accepted by the test of prudence, then it may create a dent

in the prosecution version. If an omission or discrepancy

goes to the root of the matter and ushers in incongruities,

the defence can take advantage of such inconsistencies. It

needs no special emphasis to state that every omission

cannot take place of a material omission and, therefore,

minor contradictions, inconsistencies or insignificant

embellishments do not affect the core of the prosecution

case and should not be taken to be a ground to reject the

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prosecution evidence. The omission should create a

serious doubt about the truthfulness or creditworthiness of

a witness. It is only the serious contradictions and

omissions which materially affect the case of the

prosecution but not every contradiction or omission.

(See Rammi v. State of M.P. [Rammi v. State of M.P.,

(1999) 8 SCC 649: 2000 SCC (Cri) 26], Leela Ram v. State

of Haryana [Leela Ram v. State of Haryana, (1999) 9 SCC

525: 2000 SCC (Cri) 222] , Bihari Nath Goswami v. Shiv

Kumar Singh [Bihari Nath Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh,

(2004) 9 SCC 186: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1435], Vijay v. State of

M.P. [Vijay v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191: (2010) 3

SCC (Cri) 639],  Sampath Kumar  v. Inspector of

Police [Sampath Kumar v. Inspector of Police, (2012) 4

SCC 124: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 42], Shyamal Ghosh v. State

of W.B. [Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC

646: (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 685] and  Mritunjoy

Biswas v. Pranab [Mritunjoy Biswas v. Pranab, (2013) 12

SCC 796: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 564].)’

(emphasis supplied)

18. In Krishnegowda v State of Karnataka, (2017) 13 SCC 98, it

was observed as under:

‘26. Having gone through the evidence of the prosecution

witnesses and the findings recorded by the High Court we

feel that the High Court has failed to understand the fact

that the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond

reasonable doubt and this is a classic case where at each

and every stage of the trial, there were lapses on the part

of the investigating agency and the evidence of the

witnesses is not trustworthy which can never be a basis for

conviction. The basic principle of criminal jurisprudence is

that the accused is presumed to be innocent until his guilt

is proved beyond reasonable doubt.

27. Generally in the criminal cases, discrepancies in the

evidence of witness is bound to happen because there

would be considerable gap between the date of incident

and the time of deposing evidence before the court, but if

these contradictions create such serious doubt in the mind

of the court about the truthfulness of the witnesses and it

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appears to the court that there is clear improvement, then it

is not safe to rely on such evidence.

28. In the case on hand, the evidence of the eyewitnesses

is only consistent on the aspect of injuries inflicted on the

deceased but on all other factors there are lot of

contradictions which go to the root of the matter.

xxx

32. It is to be noted that all the eyewitnesses were relatives

and the prosecution failed to adduce reliable evidence of

independent witnesses for the incident which took place on

a public road in the broad daylight. Although there is no

absolute rule that the evidence of related witnesses has to

be corroborated by the evidence of independent witnesses,

it would be trite in law to have independent witnesses when

the evidence of related eyewitnesses is found to be

incredible and not trustworthy. The minor variations and

contradictions in the evidence of the eyewitnesses will not

tilt the benefit of doubt in favour of the accused but when

the contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution

witnesses proves to be fatal to the prosecution case then

those contradictions go to the root of the matter and in

such cases the accused gets the benefit of doubt.

33. It is the duty of the Court to consider the

trustworthiness of evidence on record. As said by

Bentham, “witnesses are the eyes and ears of justice”. In

the facts on hand, we feel that the evidence of these

witnesses is filled with discrepancies, contradictions and

improbable versions which draws us to the irresistible

conclusion that the evidence of these witnesses cannot be

a basis to convict the accused.’

(emphasis supplied)

19. To begin with, PW3 had stated that a few days prior to the

incident, there was hot talk between the complainant-PW1 and the

Appellant, and in fact, PW3 had reprimanded the Appellant for

quarrelling with PW1. However, the High Court has disbelieved this

aspect without assigning any reason(s) for the same. Further, PW1’s

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version itself during his deposition before the Trial Court is self-

contradictory, inasmuch as initially he stated in his examination-in-chief

that both he and the accused officer came back to his house and were

drinking tea inside the house, when PW1 came out and kept the

amount in the rexine bag attached to the petrol tank of the Appellant’s

bike. However, when he was re-examined by the Public Prosecutor

concerned, PW1 stated that the Appellant was with him when the

tainted currency was kept in the rexine bag attached to the petrol tank.

Why this aspect is of significance is for the reason that if the Appellant

had come out of the house along with PW1 and in full view of the trap

party members who were just 20 yards away and could witness the

signal from PW1 of removing his spectacles and wiping it and then they

would, but naturally, also have seen that PW1 had directly kept the

bribe amount in the rexine bag attached to the petrol tank of the

motorcycle of the Appellant. In this background, the statement of PW7

that when the Appellant was already on his motorcycle and was about

to start it, he was stopped and taken inside the house, where he was

made to dip his hand in the solution mixed with water, but his hands did

not change colour, is inexplicable for the reason that the trap party

members had already witnessed the complainant directly putting the

tainted notes, allegedly as demanded by the Appellant, in the rexine

bag. Thus, there was no occasion for the Appellant to be taken inside

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the house to get his hands dipped in the solution, as the Appellant had

not touched the notes. Further, when the solution did not change colour,

PW7 states that he called the complainant to narrate what had

happened and then, upon coming to know that the money was kept

inside the rexine bag directly, the same was recovered and the number

of the notes matched with those which had been kept for the purposes

of the trap. The actual circumstances leading to the recovered notes

being kept by the complainant-PW1 directly in the rexine bag attached

to the petrol tank of the motorcycle of the Appellant are not forthcoming.

To further confound the matter, DW1-wife of the complainant stated that

her husband/PW1 went outside the house and again came back inside

the house with the Appellant. Thereafter, DW1 states, after consuming

tea, both went outside. Subsequently, the trap party entered the house

along with PW1 and the Appellant. Thus, from all the official versions of

the witness’ depositions before the Trial Court, the claimed/projected

sequence of events by the prosecution-Respondent, of both (i) the

money being placed in the rexine bag attached to the petrol tank of the

Appellant’s bike, and; (ii) its recovery as also whether the same was in

the presence of the Appellant, does not seem to inspire confidence. The

same cannot be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt, in

our considered opinion. In Suresh Thipmppa Shetty v State of

Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1038, while allowing the appeals

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preferred by the convicts therein, it was observed that when the Court is

to choose between the version proffered by the prosecution vis-à-vis the

defence version, in the face of reasonable doubt towards the

prosecution story, the Court should lean in the defence’s favour.

20. One further aspect which the Court would like to dwell on is that

as per the version of the witnesses themselves, at the very least, what

is common is that the Appellant had taken a round of the horticulture

garden of the complainant for preparing a report relating to the claim of

insurance/compensation for PW1’s trees which were destroyed due to

drought, whereafter the Appellant returned to the house and had tea.

The presence of DW1-wife of the complainant inside the house, who

prepared the tea, is undisputed. She has stated during deposition that

she was not aware of any demand by the Appellant of any money for

preparing any report. Thus, on an overall circumspection of the facts

and circumstances of the case, the evidence on record and for reasons

stated above, we find that the guilt of the Appellant has not been proved

beyond reasonable doubt. Having found so, this is a case where benefit

of doubt was required to be given to the Appellant.

21. As far as the submission of the State is that the presumption

under Section 20 of the Act, as it then was, would operate against the

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Appellant is concerned, our analysis supra would indicate that the

factum of demand, in the backdrop of an element of animus between

the Appellant and complainant, is not proved. In such circumstances,

the presumption under Section 20 of the Act would not militate against

the Appellant, in terms of the pronouncement in Om Parkash v State of

Haryana, (2006) 2 SCC 250:

‘22. In view of the aforementioned discrepancies in the

prosecution case, we are of the opinion that the defence

story set up by the appellant cannot be said to be wholly

improbable. Furthermore, it is not a case where the burden

of proof was on the accused in terms of Section 20 of the

Act. Even otherwise, where demand has not been proved,

Section 20 will also have no application. (Union of

India v. Purnandu Biswas [(2005) 12 SCC 576: (2005) 8

SCALE 246] and T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. [(2006) 1

SCC 401: (2006) 1 SCALE 116])’

(emphasis supplied)

22. Accordingly, for reasons afore-stated, the instant appeal is allowed.

The conviction and sentence awarded to the Appellant is set aside,

extending to him the benefit of doubt. The Judgments of the Courts

below are quashed.

23. As the Appellant was already granted exemption from

surrendering, no further orders are required to be passed in this regard.

If fine was deposited by the Appellant, let the same be refunded within

four weeks from date. No order as to costs.

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24. I.A. No.91184/2024 is allowed – the Appellant is exempted from

filing a Certified Copy of the Impugned Judgment.

…………………………………J.

[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]

…………………………………J.

[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]

NEW DELHI

MAY 09, 2025

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