carriage law, jurisdiction, transport liability
0  06 Aug, 1991
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Patel Roadways Limited, Bombay Vs. Prasad Trading Company

  Supreme Court Of India Civil Appeal /3050/1991
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Case Background

As per case facts, the appellant, a carrier, was involved in two disputes. In the first case, a consignment of cardamom, entrusted at their Bodinayakanur branch for delivery in Delhi, ...

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PETITIONER:

PATEL ROADWAYS LIMITED, BOMBAY

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

PRASAD TRADING COMPANY.

DATE OF JUDGMENT06/08/1991

BENCH:

OJHA, N.D. (J)

BENCH:

OJHA, N.D. (J)

RANGNATHAN, S.

FATHIMA BEEVI, M. (J)

CITATION:

1992 AIR 1514 1991 SCR (3) 391

1991 SCC (4) 270 JT 1991 (3) 337

1991 SCALE (2)257

ACT:

Civil Procedure Code, 1908: Section

20--Explanation--Suits-Institution of--Whether parties

entitled to agree that only a certain court would have

jurisdiction.

HEADNOTE:

The appellant in both the appeals carried on the busi-

ness of a carrier and transported goods on hire. It had its

principal office at Bombay and branch offices at various

other places.

The respondent in the first appeal a dealer in cardamom

entrusted a consignment of cardamom to the appellant at its

branch office at Bodinayakanur in Tamilnadu to be delivered

at Delhi. After the goods had been transported by the appel-

lant and kept in a godown at Delhi the same got destroyed

and damaged in a fire as a result whereof the consignee

refused to take delivery. The respondent instituted a suit

in the sub-court within whose territorial jurisdiction the

branch office of the appellant was situated for damages

alleging that the fire was due to the negligence and care-

lessness on the part of the staff of the appellant.

Respondent No. 4 in the second appeal entrusted certain

packets of pesticides insured with the second respondent

Insurance Company to the appellant at its branch office at

Madras for being carried to Delhi. The respondent alleged

that the goods were delivered at New Delhi in a damaged

condition resulting in loss and a suit was instituted for

recovery of the loss in the City Civil Court at Madras.

In both the aforesaid civil suits the appellant pleaded

in defence that in the contract entered into between them,

the parties had agreed that jurisdiction to decide any

dispute between them would be only with the courts at Bom-

bay, and consequently the courts in Madras ' where the two

suits had been instituted had no jurisdiction. This plea was

repelled by the Trial Court in each of the suits.

The aforesaid orders were challenged by the appellant in the

High

392

Court under Section 115 C.P.C. and having failed, the appel-

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lant appealed to this Court.

In the appeal, it was contended on behalf of the appel-

lant that since the courts at two places namely Madras and

Bombay had jurisdiction in the matter, the jurisdiction of

the courts in Madras was ousted by the clause in the con-

tract whereunder the parties had agreed that jurisdiction to

decide any dispute under the contract would be only in the

courts at Bombay.

On the question: whether in view of the relevant clause

in the contract between the parties the courts at Bombay

alone had jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the courts at

Madras where the two suits were instituted was barred.

Dismissing the appeals, this Court,

HELD: 1. The courts at Bombay in these two cases did not

at all have jurisdiction and consequently the agreement

between the parties conferring exclusive jurisdiction on

courts at Bombay is of no avail. [401D]

2. Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 20 refer to a court

within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant

"carries on business". Clause (c) on the other hand refers

to a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the

cause of action wholly or in part arises. [397H-398A]

3. Section 20 of the Code before its amendment by the

Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 had two Expla-

nations being Explanation I and II. By the Amendment Act

Explanation I was omitted and Explanation II was renumbered

as the present Explanation. [398G]

4. The Explanation is in two parts, one before the word

"or" occurring between the wOrds "office in India" and the

words "in respect of" and the other thereafter. The Explana-

tion applies to a defendant which is a corporation which

term, would include even a company such as the appellant in

the instant case. The first part of the Explanation applies

only to such a corporation which has its sole or principal

office at a particular place. In that event the courts

within whose jurisdiction the sole or principal office of

the defendant is situate will also have jurisdiction inas-

much as even if the defendant may not be actually carrying

on business at that place, it will "be deemed to carry on

business" at that place because of the fiction created by

the Explanation. [398C-F]

393

5. The latter part of the Explanation takes care of a

case where the defendant does not have a sole office but has

a principal office at one place and has also a subordinate

office at another place. The words "at such place" occurring

at the end of the Explanation and the word "or" referred to

above which is disjunctive clearly suggest that if the case

fails within the latter part of the Explanation it is not

the court within whose jurisdiction the principal office of

the defendant is situate but the court within whose juris-

diction it has a subordinate office which alone shall have

jurisdiction "in respect of any cause of action arising at

any place where it has also a subordinate office". [398E-F]

6. The Explanation is really an explanation to clause

(a). It is in the nature of a clarification on the scope of

clause (a) viz. as to where the corporation can be said to

carry on business. This, it is clarified, will be the place

where the principal office is situated (whether or not any

business actually is carried on there) or the place where a

business is carried on giving rise to a cause of action

(even though the principal office of the corporation is not

located there) so long as there is a subordinate office of

the corporation situated at such place. The linking together

of the place where the cause of action arises with the place

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where a subordinate office is located clearly shows that the

intention of the legislature was that, in the case of a

corporation, for the purposes of clause (a), the location of

the subordinate office, within the local limits of which a

cause of action arises, is to be the relevant place for the

filing of a suit and not the principal place of business.

[399G-400B]

7. If the intention was that the location of the sole or

principal office as well as the location of the subordinate

office (within the limits of which a cause of action arises)

are to be deemed to be places where the corporation is

deemed to be carrying or business, the disjunctive "or" will

not he there. Instead, the second part of the explanation

would have read "and, in respect of any cause of action

arising at any place where it has a subordinate office, also

at such place' '. [400C]

8. The clear intendment of the Explanation, however, is

that, where the corporation has a subordinate office in the

place where the cause of action arises, it cannot be heard

to say that it cannot be sued there because it does not

carry on business at that place. It would be a great hard-

ship if, in spite of the corporation having a subordinate

office at the place where the cause of action arises (with

which in all probability the plaintiff has had dealings),

such plaintiff is to be compelled to travel to the place

where the corporation has its principal place. That place

should be convenient to the plaintiff; and since the corpo-

ration

394

has an office at such place, it will also be under no disad-

vantage. Thus the Explanation provides an alternative locus

for the corporation's place of business, not an additional

one. [400F-G]

9. In the instant two cases since clause (c) is not attract-

ed to confer jurisdiction on courts at Bombay and the appel-

lant has admittedly its subordinate offices at the respec-

tive places where the goods in these two cases were deliv-

ered to it for purposes of transport, the courts at Bombay

had no jurisdiction at all to entertain the suits filed by

the respondents and the parties could not confer jurisdic-

tion on the courts at Bombay by an agreement. Accordingly,

no exception can be taken to the findings in this behalf

recorded by the trial court and the High Court. [401C-D]

Hakam Singh v. M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd., [1971] 3 SCR

page 314, referred to.

JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 3050-

305 1 of 199 1.

From the Judgment and Orders dated 23.8.90 & 13.6.1990

of the Madras High Court in Civil Revision Petition Nos.

1236/85 and 2758 of 1988.

T.S.K. lyer, Rajiv Datta and Shahid Azad for the

Appellant.

M.S. Nargolkar, D.M. Nargolkar and A.T.M. Sampath for

the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

OJHA, J. Special leave granted.

Since in both these appeals an identical question of

law arises they are being decided by a common judgment.

Facts in a nutshell necessary for appreciating the question

involved may be stated. M/s Patel Roadways (P) Limited, the

appellant in both these appeals carries on the business of a

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carrier and transports goods on hire. It has its principal

office at Bombay and branch offices at various other places

which shall hereinafter be referred to as subordinate of-

fices.

M/s Prasad Trading Company, the respondent in the

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 14660 of 1990 who is

a dealer in

395

cardamom entrusted a consignment of 851) kilograms of carda-

mora to the appellant at its subordinate office at Bodinaya-

kanur in Tamil Nadu to be delivered at Delhi. After the

goods had been transported by the appellant and kept in a

godown at Delhi the same got destroyed and damaged in a fire

as a result whereof the consignee refused to take delivery.

The respondent instituted a suit in the Court of Subordinate

Judge, Periakulam within whose territorial jurisdiction the

subordinate office of the appellant where the goods were

entrusted for transport is situate for damages alleging that

the fire was due to the negligence and carelessness on the

part of the staff of the appellant.

M/s Tropical Agro Systems Private Limited, the respond-

ent 1 in the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 14692

of 1990 on the other hand entrusted certain packets of

pesticides insured with the second respondent, M/s Oriental

Insurance Company Limited to the appellant at its subordi-

nate office at Madras for being carried to New Delhi. Ac-

cording to the respondents the goods aforesaid were deliv-

ered at New Delhi in a damaged condition resulting in loss

to the first respondent and a suit was instituted for recov-

ery of the loss so sustained by the respondents in the Court

of the Third Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. In

both the suits the appellant inter alia took the plea in its

defence. that in the contract entered into between them the

parties had agreed that jurisdiction to decide any dispute

between them would be only with the courts at Bombay and

consequently the courts in Madras where the two suits re-

ferred to above had been instituted had no jurisdiction.

This plea was repelled in both the suits by the trial court.

The order of the trial court in each of the two suits was

challenged by the appellant before the High Court of Judica-

ture at Madras under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Proce-

dure (hereinafter referred to as the Code). This challenge

having failed in each of the civil revisions, the appellant

has preferred these civil appeals. The question which arises

in both these civil appeals, therefore, is as to whether in

view of the relevant clause in the contract between the

parties the courts at Bombay alone had jurisdiction and the

jurisdiction of the courts at Madras where the two suits

were instituted was barred.

It has been urged by the learned counsel for the appel-

lant that apart from the courts within whose territorial

jurisdiction the goods were delivered to the appellant for

transport, the courts at Bombay also had jurisdiction to

entertain a suit arising out of the contract between the

parties in view of the Explanation to Section 20 of the Code

inasmuch as the principal office of the appellant was situ-

ate in

396

Bombay. According to learned counsel for the appellant since

courts at two places namely Madras and Bombay had jurisdic-

tion in the matter, the jurisdiction of the courts in Madras

was ousted by the clause in the contract whereunder the

parties had agreed that jurisdiction to decide any dispute

under the contract would be only in the courts at Bombay.

Consequently the courts where the two suits were instituted

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had no jurisdiction to entertain them and the trial court in

each of the two cases as well as the High Court erred in law

in taking a contrary view.

Having heard learned counsel for the parties we find it

difficult to agree with this submission. For the sake of

convenience Section 20 of the Code except the illustrations

is reproduced hereunder:

"20. Other suits to be instituted where de-

fendants reside or cause of action arises:-

Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every

suit shall be instituted in a Court within the

local limits of whose jurisdiction :--

(a) the defendant, or each of the defendants

where there are more than one, at the time of

the commencement of the suit, actually and

voluntarily resides, or carries on business,

or personally works for gain; or

(b) any of the defendants, where there are

more than one, at the time of the commencement

of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides,

or carries on business, or personally works

for gain, provided that in such case either

the leave of the Court is given, or the de-

fendants who do not reside, or carry on busi-

ness, or personally work for gain, as afore-

said, acquiesce in such institution; or

(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part,

arises.

Explanation:- A corporation shall be

deemed to carry on business at its sole or

principal office in India or, in respect of

any cause of action arising at any place where

it has also a subordinate office, at such

place."

In Hakam Singh v. M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd., [1971] 3 SCR

Page 314 it was held that "corporation" referred to in

Section 20

397

meant not only a statutory corporation but also a company

registered under the Indian Companies Act. It was also held

that it is not open to the parties by agreement to confer

jurisdiction on any court which it did not otherwise possess

under the Code. But where two courts have jurisdiction under

the Code to try a suit or proceeding an agreement between

the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in

one of such courts is not contrary to public policy nor does

such an agreement contravene Section 28 of the Contract Act.

In that case also there was a clause in the agreement being

clause No. 13 which provided that notwithstanding the place

where the work under the contract was to be executed the

contract shall be deemed to have been entered into between

the parties at Bombay and the court in Bombay alone shall

have jurisdiction to adjudicate thereon. The trial court had

held that the entire cause of action had arisen at Varanasi

and the parties could not by agreement confer jurisdiction

on the courts at Bombay which they did not otherwise pos-

sess. In a civil revision filed by the respondent the Alla-

habad High Court held that the courts at Bombay had also

jurisdiction and in view of clause 13 of the agreement the

jurisdiction of the courts at Varanasi stood ousted. It is

in the appeal against the said judgment of the High Court

that the propositions of law referred to above were laid

down by this Court. It was held that since the respondent

had its head office at Bombay the courts at Bombay also had

'jurisdiction by virtue of Section 20 of the Code read with

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its Explanation and in view of clause 13 of the agreement

between the parties the courts in Bombay alone had jurisdic-

tion in the matter. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

This view was reiterated by this Court in Globe Transport

Corporation v. Triveni Engineering Works and Another, [1983]

4 SCC Page 707.

Reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the

appellant on these two decisions and if it can be held that

the courts at Bombay also had jurisdiction in the two suits

referred to above the judgments appealed against will have

to be set aside on the basis of these decisions. The ques-

tion, however, is as to whether in any of these two suits

the courts at Bombay also had jurisdiction apart from the

courts within whose jurisdiction the goods were entrusted to

the appellant for purposes of transport. Having given our

anxious consideration to the matter we are of the opinion

that the courts at Bombay in these two cases did not at all

have jurisdiction and consequently the agreement between the

parties conferring exclusive jurisdiction on courts at

Bombay is of no avail.

Clauses(a) and (b) of Section 20 inter alia refer to a court

within

398

the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant inter

alia "carries on business". Clause (c) on the other hand

refers to a court within the local limits of whose jurisdic-

tion the cause of action wholly or in part arises. It has

not been urged before us on behalf of the appellant that the

cause of action wholly or in part arose in Bombay. Conse-

quently clause (c) is not attracted to the facts of these

cases. What has been urged with the aid of the Explanation

to Section 20 of the Code is that since the appellant has

its principal office in Bombay it shall be deemed to carry

on business at Bombay and consequently the courts at Bombay

will also have jurisdiction. On a plain reading of the

Explanation to Section 20 of the Code we find an apparent

fallacy in the aforesaid argument. The Explanation is in two

parts, one before the word "or" occurring between the words

"office in India" and the words "in respect of" and the

other thereafter. The Explanation applies to a defendant

which is a corporation which term, as seen above, would

include even a company such as the appellant in the instant

case. The first part of the Explanation applies only to such

a corporation which has its sole or principal office at a

particular place. In that event the courts within whose

jurisdiction the sole or principal office of the defendant

is situate will also have jurisdiction inasmuch as even if

the defendant may not be actually carrying on business at

that place, it will "be deemed to carry on business" at that

place because of the fiction created by the Explanation. The

latter part of the Explanation takes care of a case where

the defendant does not have a sole office but has a princi-

pal office at one place and has also a subordinate office at

another place. The words "at such place" occurring at the

end of the Explanation and the word "or" referred to above

which is disjunctive clearly suggest that if the ease falls

within the latter part of the Explanation it is not the

Court within whose jurisdiction the principal office of the

defendant is situate but the court within whose jurisdiction

it has a subordinate office which alone shall have jurisdic-

tion "in respect of any cause of action arising at any place

where it has also a subordinate office".

Here we may point out that the view which we take finds

support from a circumstance which, in our opinion, is rele-

vant. Section 20 of the Code before its amendment by the

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Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2976 had two Expla-

nations being Explanations I and II. By the Amendment Act

Explanation I was omitted and Explanation II was renumbered

as the present Explanation. Explanation I so omitted read as

hereunder:-

"Explanation I: Where a person has a permanent

dwelling

399

at one place and also temporary residence at

another place, he shall be deemed to reside at

both places in respect of any cause of action

arising at the place where he has such tempo-

rary residence."

This Explanation dealt with the case of place of resi-

dence of the defendant and provided with regard to a person

having a permanent dwelling at one place and also temporary

at another place that such person shall be deemed to reside

at both places in respect of any cause of action arising at

the place where he has such temporary residence. The lan-

guage used in Explanation II on the other hand which is the

present Explanation was entirely different. Had the inten-

tion been that if a corporation had its principal office at

one place and a subordinate office at another place and the

cause of action arose at the place where it had its subordi-

nate office it shall be deemed to be carrying on business at

both places the language used in Explanation II would have

been identical to that of Explanation I which was dealing

with a case of a person having a permanent dwelling at one

place and also temporary residence at another place. The

marked difference in the language of the two Explanations

clearly supports the view which we have taken with regard to

the interpretation of the present Explanation to Section 20

of the Code which was Explanation II earlier as indicated

above.

We would also like to add that the interpretation sought

to be placed by the appellant on the provision in question

renders the explanation totally redundant. If the intention

of the legislature was, as is said on their behalf, that a

suit against a corporation could be instituted either at the

place of its sole or principal office (whether or not the

corporation carries on business at that place) or at any

other place where the cause of action arises, the provisions

of clauses (a), (b) and (c) together with the first .part of

the explanation would have completely achieved the purpose.

Indeed the effect would have been wider. The suit could have

been instituted at the place of the principal office because

of the situation of such office (whether or not any actual

business was carried on there). Alternatively, a suit could

have been instituted at the place where the cause of action

arose under clause (c) (irrespective of whether the corpora-

tion had a subordinate office in such place or not). This

was, Therefore, not the purpose of the explanation. The

explanation is really an explanation to clause (a). It is in

the nature of a clarification on the scope of clause (a)

viz. as to where the corporation can be said to carry on

business. T'his, it is clarified, will be the place where

the principal office is ituated (whether or not any business

actually is carried on there) or the place where a business

400

is carried on giving rise to a cause of action (even though

the principal office of the corporation is not located

there) so long as there is a subordinate office of the

corporation situated at such place. The linking together of

the place where the cause of action arises with the place

where a subordinate office is located clearly shows that the

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intention of the legislature was that, in the case of a

corporation, for the purposes of clause (a), the location of

the subordinate office, within the local limits of which a

cause of action arises, is to be the relevant place for the

filing of a suit and not the principal place of business. If

the intention was that the location of the sole or principal

office as well as the location of the subordinate office

(within the limits of which a cause of action arises) are to

be deemed to be places where the corporation is deemed to be

carrying on business, the disjunctive "or" will not be

there. Instead, the second part of the explanation would

have read "and in respect of any cause of action arising at

any place where it has a subordinate office, also at such

place".

As far as we can see the interpretation which we have

placed on this section does not create any practical or

undue difficulties or disadvantage either to the plaintiff

or a defendant corporation. It is true that, normally, under

clauses (a) to (c), the plaintiff has a choice of forum and

cannot be compelled to go to the place of residence or

business of the corporation and can file a suit at a place

where the cause of action arises. If a corporation desires

to be protected from being dragged into litigation at some

place merely because a casue of action arises there it can

save itself from such a situation by an exclusion clause as

has been done in the present case. The clear intendment of

the Explanation, however, is that, where the corporation has

a subordinate office in the place where the cause of action

arises, it cannot be heard to say that it cannot be sued

there because it does not carry on business at that place.

It would be a great hardship if, in spite of the corporation

having a subordinate office at the place where the cause of

action arises (with which in all probability the plaintiff

has had dealings), such plaintiff is to be compelled to

travel to the place where the corporation has its principal

place. That place should be convenient to the plaintiff; and

since the corporation has an office at such place, it will

also be under no disadvantage. Thus the Explanation provides

an alternative locus for the corporation's place of busi-

ness, not an additional one.

There may be only one extra-ordinary situation in which

this interpretation may cause an apparent anomaly. This is

where the plaintiff has also his/its place of business at

the same place as the

401

corporation but the cause of action has arisen at some other

place. The above interpretation would preclude him from

filing a suit in that place of business common to both

parties and compel him to go to a court having jurisdiction

over the place where the cause of action has arisen. But

this is not really a hardship because such plaintiff must

have had some nexus or connection with the place since some

part of the cause of action had arisen there; if he can have

dealings with the corporation at such a place giving rise to

the cause of action, there is no reason why he should find

it disadvantageous or difficult to file a suit at such

place. Equally, the corporation, having a subordinate office

at the place, will suffer no disadvantage.

In this view of the matter since in the instant two

cases clause (c) is not attracted to confer jurisdiction on

courts at Bombay and the appellant has admittedly its subor-

dinate offices at the respective places where the goods in

these two cases were delivered to it for purpose of trans-

port the courts at Bombay had no jurisdiction at all to

entertain the suits filed by the respondents and the parties

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could not confer jurisdiction on the courts at Bombay by an

agreement. Accordingly no exception can be taken to the

findings in this behalf recorded by the trial court and the

High Court in these two cases.

In the result, we find no merit in any of these two

appeals and they are accordingly dismissed but in the cir-

cumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own

costs.

N.V.K. Appeals dismissed

402

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