REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1192 OF 2018

(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6225 of 2017)

PRADEEP BISOI @ RANJIT BISOI … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF ODISHA … RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

This appeal has been filed by the accused against

the judgment of Orissa High Court dated 25.01.2017. The

Orissa High Court vide the impugned judgment has

dismissed the criminal appeal filed by the appellant

questioning his conviction under Section 304 Part II of

the Indian Penal Code and sentence of five years

rigorous imprisonment awarded by the trial court.

2. The prosecution case as is revealed from the record

is that Bhaskar Sahu (deceased) on 28.11.1990 in the

morning at 7.00 A.M. was going near Belapada by a

bicycle. Near the Belapada bridge, the accused threw a

bomb towards the deceased, which hit the right leg of

Bhaskar Sahu, the deceased, due to which he fell down on

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the road. Bhaskar Sahu when started running to save his

life, accused came running before the deceased and dealt

a kati blow on right shoulder of Bhaskar Sahu on which

he fell down thereafter the accused poured acid on head,

face and chest of Bhaskar Sahu. Thereafter the accused

and his friends left that place. One Khalia Pati

belonging to the village of Bhaskar Sahu took the

deceased with the help of bicycle. Thereafter brother

of Bhaskar Sahu – Surendra Nath Sahu after receiving the

news of assault came with Tarini Sahu, Kasinath Bisoi

and Bidyadhar Babu belonging to the village and got

admitted Bhaskar Sahu in Berhampur Medical College.

Suurendra Nath Sahu, the brother of Bhaskar Sahu lodged

a First Information Report naming the accused. First

Information Report was lodged under Sections

324/326/286/34 IPC. The I.O. visited the spot on

30.11.1990 and seized one blood stained stone and sample

stone and one yellow colour banian with smell of acid

and prepared the seizure list. Some sample earth, one

towel with smell of acid was also noticed. Thereafter

the I.O. examined the witnesses. The I.O. on 05.12.1990

showed arrest of the accused. On 05.12.1990 the I.O.

recorded the statement of Bhaskar Sahu under Section 161

Cr.P.c. in which statement Bhaskar Sahu named the

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accused, the persons, who has thrown the bomb, hit with

kati and thrown acid on his face and head. The accused

was challaned and PW1, the informant, PW2 - Dandopani

Dass and PW3 – Prafulla Leuman Sahu were examined by the

prosecution. I.O. (PW4) – Prithandhi Moghi also

appeared in the witness box. The deceased while still

in hospital died on 25.03.1991. Defence examined two

witnesses namely DW1 – Ramesh Chandra Sahu and DW2 –

Bidyadhar Sahu.

3. The trial court after analyzing the evidence on

record and hearing the counsel for the parties convicted

the accused under Section 304 Part II of the I.P.C. and

awarded five years rigorous imprisonment. Aggrieved by

the judgment of the trial court, the appeal was filed by

the accused in the High Court, which has been dismissed

by the High Court by the impugned judgment.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that

there is contradiction in the evidence of PW1 with other

witnesses. There is contradiction as to who took the

injured to the hospital. The victim became unconscious

and it is unbelievable that he informed the PW1 that it

was accused, who attacked him. The statement of injured

recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. cannot be treated as

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a dying declaration in view of the well settled

principle of law enunciated by a Constitution Bench

judgment of this Court in Laxman Vs. State of

Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710 , as to who is the author

of the crime, both the Courts below arrived at the

findings based on surmises and conjectures and not on

evidence on record.

5. Learned counsel for the State refuting the

submission of counsel for the appellant contends that on

the basis of evidence on record, both the Courts have

rightly held the charge proved against the accused. No

error has been committed by the Courts below relying on

the statement made by the injured on 05.12.1990 recorded

by the I.O. Further, evidence of PW1, to whom deceased

had informed that it was accused, who threw bomb and

made kati attack and threw acid, has rightly been

believed by the Courts below. It is submitted that the

statement made by the injured on 05.12.1990 was fully

admissible and no error has been committed by the Courts

below in relying the same. Learned counsel for the

State has placed reliance on judgment of this Court in

Mukeshbhai Gopalbhai Barot Vs. State of Gujarat, (2010)

8 SCALE 477 and Sri Bhagwan Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh,

(2013) 12 SCC 137.

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6. We have considered the submissions of the learned

counsel for the parties and have perused the records.

7. The main thrust of submission of the learned

counsel for the appellant is that statement recorded by

I.O. on 05.12.1990 of the victim cannot be treated as

dying declaration since death occurred after more than

three months. He submits that both Courts committed

error in treating the said statement as dying

declaration.

8. Section 32 of the Evidence Act deals with cases in

which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead

or cannot be found etc. is relevant. Section 32 in so

far as relevant in the present case is as follows:-

S.32. Cases in which statement of relevant

fact by person who is dead or cannot be found,

etc., is relevant. –– Statements, written or

verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who

is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has

become incapable of giving evidence, or whose

attendance cannot be procured without an

amount of delay or expense which under the

circumstances of the case appears to the Court

unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in

the following cases: ––

(1) When it relates to cause of death. –– When

the statement is made by a person as to the

cause of his death, or as to any of the

circumstances of the transaction which

resulted in his death, in cases in which the

cause of that person’s death comes into

question.

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Such statements are relevant whether the

person who made them was or was not, at the

time when they were made, under expectation of

death, and whatever may be the nature of the

proceeding in which the cause of his death

comes into question.

xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Illustrations:

(a) The question is, whether A was

murdered by B; or

A died of injuries received in a

transaction in the course of which she was

ravished. The question is whether she was

ravished by B; or

The question is, whether A was killed by

B under such circumstances that a suit would

lie against B by A’s widow.

Statements made by A as to the cause of

his or her death, referring respectively to

the murder, the rape and the actionable wrong

under consideration, are relevant facts.

9. Other provisions relevant to be noticed are Section

161 and Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Section 161 deals with examination of witnesses by

police. Section 162 deals with “statements to police

not to be signed – Use of Statements in evidence”.

Section 162 Cr.P.C. is as follows:-

162. Statements to police not to be signed:

Use of statements in evidence. —(1) No

statement made by any person to a police

officer in the course of an investigation

under this Chapter, shall, if reduced to

writing, be signed by the person making it;

nor shall any such statement or any record

thereof, whether in a police diary or

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otherwise, or any part of such statement or

record, be used for any purpose, save as

hereinafter provided, at any inquiry or trial

in respect of any offence under investigation

at the time when such statement was made:

Provided that when any witness is called

for the prosecution in such inquiry or trial

whose statement has been reduced into writing

as aforesaid, any part of his statement, if

duly proved, may be used by the accused, and

with the permission of the Court, by the

prosecution, to contradict such witness in the

manner provided by section 145 of the Indian

Evidence Act , 1872 (1 of 1872); and when any

part of such statement is so used, any part

thereof may also be used in the re-examination

of such witness, but for the purpose only of

explaining any matter referred to in his

cross-examination.

(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to

apply to any statement falling within the

provisions of clause (1) of section 32 of the

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872); or to

affect the provisions of section 27 of that

Act.

Explanation.—An omission to state a fact

or circumstance in the statement referred to

in sub-section (1) may amount to

contradiction if the same appears to be

significant and otherwise relevant having

regard to the context in which such omission

occurs and whether any omission amounts to a

contradiction in the particular context shall

be a question of fact.

10.Sub-section (2) to Section 162 incorporate a clear

exception to what has been laid down in sub-section (1).

The statement recorded by police under Section 161,

falling within the provisions of clause (1) of Section

32 of Indian Evidence Act, thus, is clearly relevant and

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admissible. In Mukeshbhai Gopalbhai Barot (supra), this

Court had occasion to consider Sections 161 and 162 of

Cr.P.C. and Section 32 of the Evidence Act. In the

above case, the victim, who received burn injuries on

14.09.1993 was admitted to Civil Hospital. Her

statement was recorded by Executive Magistrate and by

the Police. The statement recorded by police under

Section 161 Cr.P.C. was discarded by the High Court

taking the view that it had no evidentiary value. The

view of the High Court was not accepted by this Court.

In paragraph Nos. 4 and 5, this Court held that the

statement of persons recorded under Section 161 can be

treated as dying declaration after death. In paragraph

Nos. 4 and 5, following has been laid down:-

“4. We have considered the arguments advanced

by the learned counsel for the parties. At the

very outset, we must deal with the observa -

tions of the High Court that the dying decla -

rations Ex.44 and 48 could not be taken as ev -

idence in view of the provisions of Section

161 and 162 of the Cr.P.C. when read cumula -

tively. These findings are, however, erro -

neous. Sub-Section (1) of Section 32 of the

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with several

situations including the relevance of a state -

ment made by a person who is dead. The provi -

sion reads as under:

Sec.32. Cases in which

statements of relevant fact by

person who is dead or cannot be

found, etc., is relevant. -

Statements, written or verbal, of

relevant facts made by a person who

is dead, or who cannot be found, or

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who has become incapable of giving

evidence, or whose attendance cannot

be procured without an amount of

delay or expense which, under the

circumstances of the case, appears

to the Court unreasonable, are

themselves relevant facts in the

following cases:-

(1) When it relates to cause of

death. - When the statement is made

by a person as to the cause of his

death, or as to any of the

circumstances of the transaction

which resulted in his death, in

cases in which the cause of that

person's death comes into question.

Such statements are relevant

whether the person who made them was

or was not, at the time when they

were made, under expectation of

death, and whatever may be the

nature of the proceeding in which

the cause of his death comes into

question."

We see that the aforesaid dying declara -

tions are relevant in view of the above provi -

sion. Even otherwise, Section 161 and 162 of

the Cr.P.C. admittedly provide for a restric -

tive use of the statements recorded during the

course of the investigation but sub-Section

(2) of Section 162 deals with a situation

where the maker of the statement dies and

reads as under:

"(2) Nothing in this section

shall be deemed to apply to any

statement falling within the provi -

sions of clause (1) of Section 32 of

the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of

1872), or to affect the provisions

of section 27 of that Act."

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5. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision

when read with Section 32 of the Indian Evi -

dence Act would reveal that a statement of a

person recorded under Section 161 would be

treated as a dying declaration after his

death. The observation of the High Court that

the dying declarations Ex.44 and 48 had no ev -

identiary value, therefore, is erroneous. In

this view of the matter, the first dying dec -

laration made to the Magistrate on 14th Sep -

tember 1993 would, in fact, be the First In -

formation Report in this case.”

11.A similar view has been expressed by this Court in

Sri Bhagwan (supra) , where this Court had occasion to

consider Section 161 Cr.P.C .and Section 32 of the

Indian Evidence Act. This Court dealt with a statement

under Section 161 Cr.P.C. subsequent to death of the

victim. In Para 20 to 24, following has been held:-

“20. While keeping the above prescription in

mind, when we test the submission of the

learned counsel for the appellant in the case

on hand at the time when Section 161 CrPC

statement of the deceased was recorded, the

offence registered was under Section 326 IPC

having regard to the grievous injuries sus -

tained by the victim. PW 4 was not contemplat -

ing to record the dying declaration of the

victim inasmuch as the victim was seriously

injured and immediately needed medical aid.

Before sending him to the hospital for proper

treatment PW 4 thought it fit to get the ver -

sion about the occurrence recorded from the

victim himself that had taken place and that

is how Exhibit Ka-2 came to be recorded. Un -

doubtedly, the statement was recorded as one

under Section 161 CrPC. Subsequent development

resulted in the death of the victim on the

next day and the law empowered the prosecution

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to rely on the said statement by treating it

as a dying declaration, the question for con -

sideration is whether the submission put forth

on behalf of the respondent counsel merits ac -

ceptance.

21. Mr Ratnakar Dash, learned Senior Counsel

made a specific reference to Section 162(2)

CrPC in support of his submission that the

said section carves out an exception and cre -

dence that can be given to a Section 161 CrPC

statement by leaving it like a declaration un -

der Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act under

certain exceptional circumstances. Section

162(2) CrPC reads as under:

“162. (2) Nothing in this section

shall be deemed to apply to any

statement falling within the provi -

sions of clause (1) of Section 32 of

the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of

1872), or to affect the provisions

of Section 27 of that Act.”

22. Under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act it

has been provided as under:

“32. Cases in which statement of

relevant fact by person who is dead

or cannot be found, etc. is rele -

vant.—Statements, written or verbal,

of relevant facts made by a person

who is dead, or who cannot be found,

or who has become incapable of giv -

ing evidence, or whose attendance

cannot be procured without an amount

of delay or expense which under the

circumstances of the case appears to

the court unreasonable, are them -

selves relevant facts in the follow -

ing cases:

(1) When it relates to cause of

death.—When the statement is made by

a person as to the cause of his

death, or as to any of the circum -

stances of the transaction which re -

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sulted in his death, in cases in

which the cause of that person’s

death comes into question.

Such statements are relevant whether

the person who made them was or was

not, at the time when they were

made, under expectation of death,

and whatever may be the nature of

the proceeding in which the cause of

his death comes into question.”

23. Going by Section 32(1) of the Evidence

Act, it is quite clear that such statement

would be relevant even if the person who made

the statement was or was not at the time when

he made it was under the expectation of death.

Having regard to the extraordinary credence

attached to such statement falling under Sec -

tion 32(1) of the Evidence Act, time and again

this Court has cautioned as to the extreme

care and caution to be taken while relying

upon such evidence recorded as a dying decla -

ration.

24. As far as the implication of Section

162(2) CrPC is concerned, as a proposition of

law, unlike the excepted circumstances under

which Section 161 CrPC statement could be re -

lied upon, as rightly contended by the learned

Senior Counsel for the respondent, once the

said statement though recorded under Section

161 CrPC assumes the character of dying decla -

ration falling within the four corners of Sec -

tion 32(1) of the Evidence Act, then whatever

credence that would apply to a declaration

governed by Section 32(1) should automatically

deemed to apply in all force to such a state -

ment though was once recorded under Section

161 CrPC. The above statement of law would re -

sult in a position that a purported recorded

statement under Section 161 of a victim having

regard to the subsequent event of the death of

the person making the statement who was a vic -

tim would enable the prosecuting authority to

rely upon the said statement having regard to

the nature and content of the said statement

as one of dying declaration as deeming it and

falling under Section 32(1) of Evidence Act

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and thereby commend all the credence that

would be applicable to a dying declaration

recorded and claimed as such.”

12.It is relevant to refer to judgment of this Court

in Najjam Faraghi @ Nijjam Faruqui Vs. State of West

Bengal, (1998) 2 SCC 45 . In the above case, the

kerosene oil was poured on the victim and she was put on

fire on 13.06.1985. She lived for about a month and

died on 31.07.1985. This Court referring to Section

32(1) held that mere fact that victim died long after

making the dying declaration, the statement does not

looses its value. In Para 9, following has been held:-

“9. There is no merit in the contention that

the appellant’s wife died long after making

the dying declarations and therefore those

statements have no value. The contention over -

looks the express provision in Section 32 of

the Evidence Act. The second paragraph of sub-

section (1) reads as follows:

“Such statements are relevant

whether the person who made them was

or was not, at the time when they

were made, under expectation of

death, and whatever may be the na -

ture of the proceeding in which the

cause of his death comes into ques -

tion.”

No doubt it has been pointed out that when a

person is expecting his death to take place

shortly he would not be indulging in false -

hood. But that does not mean that such a

statement loses its value if the person lives

for a longer time than expected. The question

has to be considered in each case on the facts

and circumstances established therein. If

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there is nothing on record to show that the

statement could not have been true or if the

other evidence on record corroborates the con -

tents of the statements, the court can cer -

tainly accept the same and act upon it. In the

present case both courts have discussed the

entire evidence on record and found that two

dying declarations contained in Exs. 5 and 6

are acceptable.”

13.Much emphasis has been given by the learned counsel

for the appellant on Constitution Bench judgment of this

Court in Laxman Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra). The

above constitution Bench was constituted to resolve the

conflict between two Three-Judge Bench judgment of this

Court, i.e. Paparambaka Rosamma and Others Vs. State of

A.P. (1999) 7 SCC 695 and Koli Chunilal Savji and

Another Vs. State of Gujarat, (1999) 9 SCC 562. The

facts of the case and conflicting views expressed in the

above two cases has been noticed in Paragraph Nos. 1 and

2, which are to the following effect:-

“In this criminal appeal, the conviction of

the accused-appellant is based upon the dying

declaration of the deceased which was recorded

by the Judicial Magistrate (PW 4). The learned

Sessions Judge as well as the High Court held

the dying declaration made by the deceased to

be truthful, voluntary and trustworthy. The

Magistrate in his evidence had stated that he

had contacted the patient through the medical

officer on duty and after putting some ques -

tions to the patient to find out whether she

was able to make the statement; whether she

was set on fire; whether she was conscious and

able to make the statement and on being satis -

14

fied he recorded the statement of the de -

ceased. There was a certificate of the doctor

which indicates that the patient was con -

scious. The High Court on consideration of the

evidence of the Magistrate as well as on the

certificate of the doctor on the dying decla -

ration recorded by the Magistrate together

with other circumstances on record came to the

conclusion that the deceased Chandrakala was

physically and mentally fit and as such the

dying declaration can be relied upon. When the

appeal against the judgment of the Aurangabad

Bench of the Bombay High Court was placed be -

fore a three-Judge Bench of this Court, the

counsel for the appellant relied upon the de -

cision of this Court in the case of Paparam-

baka Rosamma v. State of A.P., (1999) 7 SCC

695 and contended that since the certification

of the doctor was not to the effect that the

patient was in a fit state of mind to make the

statement, the dying declaration could not

have been accepted by the Court to form the

sole basis of conviction. On behalf of the

counsel appearing for the State another three-

Judge Bench decision of this Court in the case

of Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of Gujarat

(1999) 9 SCCC 562 was relied upon wherein this

Court has held that if the materials on record

indicate that the deceased was fully conscious

and was capable of making a statement, the dy -

ing declaration of the deceased thus recorded

cannot be ignored merely because the doctor

had not made the endorsement that the deceased

was in a fit state of mind to make the state -

ment in question. Since the two aforesaid de -

cisions expressed by two Benches of three

learned Judges was somewhat contradictory the

Bench by order dated 27-7-2002 referred the

question to the Constitution Bench.

2. At the outset we make it clear that we

are only resolving the so-called conflict be -

tween the aforesaid three-Judge Bench decision

of this Court, whereafter the criminal appeal

will be placed before the Bench presided over

by Justice M.B. Shah who had referred the mat -

ter to the Constitution Bench. We are, there -

fore, refraining from examining the evidence

on record to come to a conclusion one way or

15

the other and we are restricting our consider -

ations to the correctness of the two decisions

referred to supra.”

14.The Constitution Bench approved the view taken by

later judgment in Koli Chunilal Savji (supra). In

Paragraph No. 5, following has been laid down:-

“5. The Court also in the aforesaid case

relied upon the decision of this Court in Har-

jit Kaur v. State of Punjab

4

wherein the Mag-

istrate in his evidence had stated that he had

ascertained from the doctor whether she was in

a fit condition to make a statement and ob -

tained an endorsement to that effect and

merely because an endorsement was made not on

the declaration but on the application would

not render the dying declaration suspicious in

any manner. For the reasons already indicated

earlier, we have no hesitation in coming to

the conclusion that the observations of this

Court in Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of A.P.

(1999) 7 SCC 695 (at SCC p. 701, para 8) to

the effect that

“in the absence of a medical certi -

fication that the injured was in a

fit state of mind at the time of

making the declaration, it would be

very much risky to accept the sub -

jective satisfaction of a Magistrate

who opined that the injured was in a

fit state of mind at the time of

making a declaration”

has been too broadly stated and is not the

correct enunciation of law. It is indeed a hy -

pertechnical view that the certification of

the doctor was to the effect that the patient

is conscious and there was no certification

that the patient was in a fit state of mind

especially when the Magistrate categorically

stated in his evidence indicating the ques -

16

tions he had put to the patient and from the

answers elicited was satisfied that the pa -

tient was in a fit state of mind whereafter he

recorded the dying declaration. Therefore, the

judgment of this Court in Paparambaka Rosamma

v. State of A.P. (1999) 7 SCC 695 must be

held to be not correctly decided and we affirm

the law laid down by this Court in Koli Chuni-

lal Savji v. State of Gujarat (1999) 9 SCC

562.”

15.The view expressed by Three-Judge Bench in

Paparambaka Rosamma (supra) that in the absence of

medical certification that the injured was in a fit

state of mind at the time of making the declaration, it

would be very much risky to accept the subjective

satisfaction of a Magistrate who opined that the injured

was in a fit state of mind at the time of making a

declaration, does not lay down a correct law. Thus, the

Constitution bench was only considering the question of

nature of medical certification regarding fitness of

victim to make a dying declaration. The proposition

laid down in the above case does not in any manner

support the contention raised by the counsel for the

appellant in the present case. Present is a case where

a statement was recorded by I.O. under Section 161 of

the victim on 05.12.1990. Both the trial court and the

High Court held the statement relevant and placed

reliance on the said statement.

17

16.We have noticed that this Court has laid down that

statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., which is covered

under Section 32(1) is relevant and admissible. Thus,

we do not find any error in the judgment of the trial

court as well as of the High Court in relying on the

statement of the injured recorded by the I.O. on

05.12.1990. It is also relevant to notice that I.O. in

his cross-examination has stated that he went on the

night of 30.11.1990 to the Medical College to record the

statement but as his condition was serious, he was not

examined. Thus, reliance on the statement made on

05.12.1990 to the I.O. does not lead to any suspicious

circumstances so as to discard the value of such

statement. The statement, which was made by the victim

on 05.12.1990 was to the following effect:-

“My name is Bhaskar Sahu, S/o. Kaibalya Sahu,

present/permanent Resident of Village - Langal

Dei, P.S. Digapahandi Dist. Gangnam, Today,

i.e. on 05.12.1920, being at the Medical

College ward I hereby give my verbal statement

that, I was going to Belapada from our Village

Langal Del on 28.11.1990 at about 6:30 to 7:00

O'clock on my bi-cycle. On my way near the

bridge of Belapada Village, inhabitant of our

village namely Pradeep Bisoi, S/o. Madhab

Bisoi and some of his friends were waiting to

kill me. They had come by a Scoter. I don't

know others. Near the Belapada Bridge, all of

a sudden Pradeep Bisoi threw a Bomb towards me

which was defused after hitting my right leg

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for which I fell down on the road. When I

started running, trying to save my life, at

that time Pradeep Bisoi came running after me

and dealt a kati blow on my right solder, for

which I fell down bloodstained. Thereafter

from a bottle carried by him, he poured acid

on my head, face, chest and also on my entire

body To save my life. I threw away my black

color vest from my body. Looking at my

critical condition, Pradeep Bisoi and his

friends left that place. After that, the son

of Khalia Pati of our village saw me, and

while taking me by the help of a cycle, my

brother Surendar Sahu got that news and Tarini

Sahu, and Kishnath Bisoi and Bidhyadhara Babu

of our village reached to me and my brother

immediately admitted me in the Berhampur

Medical Collage. Otherwise I would have died

on the spot. Because of our previous enmity,

Pradeep Bisoi was trying to kill me. But I was

just saved. There is no chance of my

survival.”

17.The trial court after appreciation of evidence

recorded the findings that deceased had acid injuries as

well as bomb blast injuries. In the acid attack, he has

lost his eye-sight and also lost his right foot. The

trial court has rightly held that statement of deceased

made on 05.12.1990 is admissible under Section 32

because it is regarding his cause of death and how he

was injured. In para 8 of the judgment, trial court has

recorded as follows:-

“8. From the medical report it is clear that

the deceased was having acid injury and bomb

blasting injury and during the treatment he

died in the hospital. Now it is to be seen

who has caused those acid and bomb blast

injuries on the person of the deceased. There

19

is no eye witness to the occurrence. The

deceased had given information to the P.W.1

and also to the I.O. P.W.1 says that he learnt

from the deceased that accused assaulted him

and threw acid on his face, and other parts of

his body and he reported the matter to the

police, after knowing the fact from the

deceased, vide Ext. 12. It is also clear from

the evidence of P.W.3 that he carried the

deceased to the hospital, who had sustained

injuries. The statement of the deceased to

P.W.1 is admissible under 32 of the Evidence

Act. Because, it gives regarding his cause of

death and how he was injured.”

18.The injuries on the body of deceased fully support

the prosecution case. The statement made by the

deceased on 05.12.1990, thus, finds corroboration from

the injuries on the body of deceased and the sequences

of the events and manner of incidents as claimed by the

prosecution. The PW1, the informant has fully supported

the prosecution case.

19.The High Court while dismissing the appeal has also

made observation that conviction and sentence of the

accused was for a lesser offence and lenient one.

20.We having gone through the evidence on record are

fully satisfied that the trial court did not commit any

error in convicting the appellant. High Court while

deciding the appeal has also analysed the evidence on

record and has rightly dismissed the appeal. We, thus,

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do not find any merit in this appeal, which is

dismissed.

......................J.

( A.K. SIKRI )

......................J.

( ASHOK BHUSHAN )

New Delhi,

October 10, 2018.

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