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CASE NO.:

Appeal (civil) 336 of 2004

PETITIONER:

Pramod Kumar Jaiswal and others

RESPONDENT:

Bibi Husn Bano & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/05/2005

BENCH:

P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.

A building, as defined in the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and

Eviction) Control Act, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), was taken on

rent from one Quasim, the predecessor of the respondents, by Ram Babu

Jaiswal, the predecessor of the appellants, some time in the year 1958.

Rent was enhanced and a fresh rent deed was executed on 7.4.1970. That

tenancy continued. Quasim, the landlord died. His rights devolved on his

heirs. It is the case of the appellants that they have taken assignment of

the rights of certain heirs, being co-owner landlords, on 29.12.1988. The

respondents in this appeal, the heirs of Quasim, filed House Control Case

No.33 of 1993 under the Act, for fixation of fair rent. By order dated

22.3.1994 the House Controller fixed the fair rent at Rs.4,950/- per month.

The plea based on assignment of the reversion by some of the legal

representatives of Quasim, the landlord, and the consequential

extinguishment of the lease was rejected. An appeal preferred by the

appellants against the order fixing the fair rent as H.C. Appeal No.3/94-95

was also dismissed. It is the case of the appellants that they have filed a

revision under the Act against the order fixing fair rent and the same is

pending.

2. On 13.8.1997, the respondents herein filed a suit, T.S. (Eviction)

No.80/97, seeking eviction of the appellants on grounds of non payment of

rent and the bona fide need of the landlords for their own occupation. On

13.9.1998, an application for the issue of a direction to the tenants to pay

the rent in arrears, was also filed by the landlords. The trial court, directed

the defendants-tenants, to deposit rent at the rate of Rs.600/- per month, on

the basis that it was the last rent that was paid. The suit was subsequently

transferred. The trial court issued a subsequent direction to the tenants to

deposit the rent at the rate of Rs.4,950/- p.m., being the fair rent fixed under

the Act. This was challenged in revision by the appellants, before the High

Court. The High Court, by the impugned order, dismissed the revision

finding against the only contention on behalf of the appellants that since a

revision filed by them against the order fixing the fair rent was pending,

they could not be asked to deposit the rent at the rate at which the fair rent

was fixed. It is this order that is challenged in this appeal.

3. In this appeal, the only ground taken was that the tenants having

taken an assignment of the rights of certain co-owners, being the heirs of

Quasim, the original landlord, the lease or the tenancy over the building

must be taken to have been extinguished and since there was no subsisting

relationship of landlord-tenant between the parties, there could be no

direction to deposit the rent in terms of the Act. On behalf of the appellants

a decision of this Court in Abul Alim vs. Sheikh Jamal Uddin Ansari

(1998 (9) SCC 683) was relied on. The Bench before which the matter

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came up, noticed that the decision relied on by the appellants was in conflict

with another decision of a co-equal Bench of this Court in T.

Lakshmipathi and ors. Vs.P. Nithyananda Reddy and others (2003 (5)

SCC 150) and referred the matter for being heard by a Bench of three

Judges. The appeal is thus before this Bench.

4. Learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. M.K.S. Menon submitted that

the ratio of the decision in Abul Alim vs. Sheikh Jamal Uddin Ansari

(supra) should be accepted and approved by this Court and the decision in

T. Lakshmipathi and ors. Vs.P. Nithyananda Reddy and others (supra)

deserves to be overruled. Counsel submitted that once a tenant acquires

even the right of a co-owner landlord, or a fraction of the reversion, the

tenancy comes to an end and it could not be postulated that there could be a

continuance of the lease or the subsistence of the relationship of landlord

and tenant between the parties. He also referred to the decision in Jagdish

Dutt and Another vs. Dharam Pal and Others (1999 (3) SCC 644) in

support, pointing out that therein, this Court upheld an order of remand to

investigate the quantum of shares purchased by the tenant in occupation.

Counsel submitted that in T. Lakshmipathi and ors. Vs. P. Nithyananda

Reddy and others (supra) where a contrary view was taken, the effect of

Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act had not been considered.

Learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the

matter has been elaborately discussed in T. Lakshmipathi and ors. Vs.P.

Nithyananda Reddy and others (supra) and the view taken therein was

consistent with Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act and the

settled position in that regard. He also brought to our notice the decision in

the India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. and Others vs. Shagabandei

Agarwalla (dead) by Lrs. Savitri Agarwalla (Smt.) and Others (2004 (3)

SCC 178) in support of his position.

5. On the admitted facts and based on the arguments, the only question

that requires to be considered is the effect of the purchase of the rights of

certain co-owner landlords by the tenants of the building, on the lease

originally taken by them and on the basis of which they held the building.

A lease in terms of Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act gets

determined on the happening of one of the events referred to in Section 111

of the Transfer of Property Act. The clause relevant for our purpose is

admittedly clause (d). Insofar as it is relevant, the Section reads:

"Section 111: Determination of lease \026 a lease of

immovable property determines \026

(a) x x x x

(b) x x x x

(c) x x x x

(d) In case the interests of the lessee and the lessor in

the whole of the property become vested at the same

time in one person in the same right.

(e) x x x x

(f) x x x x

(g) x x x x"

On a plain reading of the provision, it is clear that in a case where a tenant

takes an assignment of the rights of the landlord or the reversion, the lease

is determined, only in a case where by such assignment, the interests of the

lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property, become vested in the

tenant. The emphasis in the Section is clearly on the coalescing of the

entire rights of the lessor and the lessee in the whole of the property in the

hands of the lessee. The above provision incorporates the doctrine of

merger at common law. According to Blackstone (as quoted in Broom's

Legal Maxims):

"when a less estate and a greater estate, limited subsequent to it,

coincide and meet in one and the same person without any

intermediate estate, the less is immediately annihilated; or in

the law phraseology, is said to be merged, that is sunk or

drowned in the greater; or to express the same thing in other

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words, the greater estate is accelerated so as to become at once

an estate in possession".

In Cheshire and Burn's Modern Law of Real Property, 16th Edition, it is

stated,

"The term 'merger' means that, where a lesser and a greater

estate in the same land come together and vest, without any

intermediate estate, in the same person and in the same right,

the lesser is immediately annihilated by operation of law. It is

said to be "merged", that is, sunk or drowned, in the greater

estate. "

It is further stated :-

"The essentials are that the estates shall unite in the same

person without any intervening estate, and that the person in

whom they unite shall hold them both in the same right.

To illustrate the first essential, if A, who is tenant for life, with

remainder to B for life, remainder to C in fee, purchases and

takes a conveyance of C's fee, the intervening life interest of B,

since it is vested, excludes the possibility of merger." (see page

993).

In Megarry's Manual of the Law of Real Property, 8th Edition, it is

explained as follows:-

"Merger is the counterpart of surrender. Under a surrender, the

landlord acquires the lease, whereas merger is the consequence

of the tenant retaining the lease and acquiring the reversion, or

of a third party acquiring both lease and reversion. The

principle is the same in both surrender and merger: the lease is

absorbed by the reversion and destroyed.

For merger to be effective, the lease and the reversion must be

vested in the same person in the same right with no vested

estate intervening."

This is based on the principle that a man cannot be a lessee of

himself. The House of Lords in Rye v. Rye [1962] A.C. 496 said that a

person cannot grant himself a lease of the land of which he is the owner.

According to the Woodfall on Landlord and Tenant,

"It may be laid down as a general rule that whenever the

particular estate and that immediately in reversion are both

legal or both equitable, and by any act or event subsequent to

the creation of the particular estate become for the first time

vested in one person in the same right, their separate existence

will cease and a merger will take place."

An extinguishment of a tenancy by merger is thus a counterpart of

surrender by the tenant to the landlord. In Puran Chand Vs. Kirpal Singh,

(2001) 2 SCC 433, this Court stated that a landlord could not become his

own tenant and

"when a landlord transfers his rights in the leased property to

his tenant there would be a merger of the rights of the tenant in

his property to his higher rights as owner and the tenancy would

come to an end under Section 111(d) of the Transfer of

Property Act."

Thus, the ingredients are that two immediate estates should come into

the hands of the same person at the same time and it must be rights in the

whole of the property. A merger is prevented if there is an intermediate

estate outstanding with another at the relevant time.

6. Obviously, the taking of an assignment of a fraction of the reversion,

or the rights of a co-owner landlord, does not and cannot bring about a

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determination of the lease in terms of Section 111(d) of the Transfer of

Property Act. That a lease is not extinguished because the lessee purchases

a part of the reversion was laid down by the Privy Council in Faquir Baksh

vs. Murli Dhar (58 Indian Appeals 75). Their Lordships after setting out

the terms of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act quoted with

approval the statement of the law made by the trial Court in that case that

for a merger to take place, "The fusion of interests required by law is to be

in respect of the whole of the property." This Court in Badri Narain Jha

and others vs. Rameshwar Dayal Singh and others (1951 SCR 153) held

that if a lessor purchases the whole of the lessee's interest, the lease is

extinguished by merger, but there can be no merger or extinction where one

of several joint holders of the mokarrari interest purchases portion of the

lakhraj interest. It was held that when there was no coalescence of the

interest of the lessor and the lessee in the whole of the estate, there could be

no determination of the lease by merger. We do not think that it is

necessary to multiply authorities in the face of the plain language of the

provision and the authoritative pronouncements of the Privy Council and of

this Court referred to above. The position emerging from the relevant

provision of the Transfer of Property Act is that the lease or tenancy does

not get determined, by the tenant acquiring the rights of a co-owner landlord

and a merger takes place and the lease gets determined only if the entire

reversion or the entire rights of the landlord are purchased by the tenant.

7. In Abul Alim vs. Sheikh Jamal Uddin Ansari (supra) relied on by

the learned counsel for the appellants, the question has not been considered

with reference to the relevant provision of the Transfer of Property Act

referred to above. There is also no discussion on this question. It appears

that in that case, an application filed by the landlord under Section 21(1)(a)

of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act,

1972 for release of the building from the tenant, was held to be not

maintainable because the tenant had in the meanwhile acquired co-

ownership in the demised shop. It is simply stated

'that the change of status of the tenant to that of being an equal

co-owner of the un-partitioned property, would, therefore, lead

to an irresistible conclusion that the release application was not

maintainable. It is not disputed that there has been no partition

of the suit premises till date. The High Court was under the

circumstances not justified in upsetting the findings of the trial

court and the appellate court in exercise of its powers under

writ jurisdiction.'

With respect, we cannot consider this decision as laying down a

proposition of law that on a tenant acquiring the right of a co-owner

landlord, the tenancy of a building gets extinguished and the landlord

cannot seek eviction of the tenant under the Act or the fixation of fair rent

under the Act. It must be pointed out that the observations as above are

made even without referring to Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property

Act which governs such a case and the earlier decisions of this Court. The

observation runs counter to the statutory provision. Hence, the decision

must be held to be not correctly decided on this question. The decision in

Jagdish Dutt and Another vs. Dharam Pal and Others's case (supra) is

also of no assistance to the appellants since that was a case to which,

according to this Court, Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act had

no application. Their Lordships stated in paragraph 6 of the Judgment

therein,

"We need not examine the scope of Section 111(d) of the

Transfer of Property Act inasmuch as Respondent No.2 is held

to be trespasser and not a lessee."

Their Lordships proceeded to say that they had to find out the effect

of the purchase of divided interest of some of the coparceners in the family

of the decree-holder in respect of the property that was the subject matter of

execution. In view of the fact that, that was not a case dealing with merger

under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, we do not think it

necessary to consider the correctness or otherwise of the above decision,

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though there may be merit in the submission on behalf of the respondents

that the said decision cannot be said to lay down the correct law, even in

respect of the effect of acquisition of co-ownership rights by a person,

claiming to obstruct the execution of a decree for eviction especially since

that was also a claim of right by a judgment debtor who had been directed

to be evicted by the decree.

8. In T. Lakshmipathi and ors. Vs.P. Nithyananda Reddy and

others (supra) this Court considered the question in detail in the context of

Sections 105 and 111 of the Transfer of Property Act and came to the

conclusion that there is no determination of the lease in terms of Section

111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act where a tenant acquires only partial

ownership interest. After referring to the decision of the Privy Council, the

decision of this Court and other relevant materials, this Court held that the

lease cannot be said to have been determined by merger so long as the

interests of the lessee, the lesser estate and that of the owner, the larger

estate, do not come to coalesce in full. This Court also noticed that merger

was largely a question of intention dependant on certain circumstances and

the courts will presume against it when it operates to the disadvantage of a

party. With respect we find that the position has been correctly stated in T.

Lakshmipathi and ors. Vs.P. Nithyananda Reddy and others (supra).

The subsequent decision in India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. and

Others vs. Shagabandei Agarwalla (dead) by Lrs. Savitri Agarwalla

(Smt.) and Others (supra) also proceeds on the same lines and supports

the above position. We approve the principle of law stated in T.

Lakshmipathi and ors. Vs.P. Nithyananda Reddy and others (supra).

9. Learned counsel for the appellants referred to the decision in

Nalakath Sainuddin vs. Koorikadan Sulaiman (2002) 6 SCC 1) and

submitted that the ratio of that decision supports his arguments. That was a

case where a lessor granted a building consisting of two rooms on lease to a

tenant. The tenant, in his turn sub-let one of the rooms to another and

continued to be in possession as a tenant of one of the rooms. The sub-

tenant of one of the rooms, purchased the entire reversion or the rights of

the landlord from the original owner, the head lessor. On the strength of

the assignment of the reversion, the sub-tenant of one of the rooms sued his

lessor \026 the original tenant, for eviction under the Kerala Buildings (Lease

and Rent Control) Act. What the sub-tenant of a part of the building had in

his hands was only sub-tenancy regarding that portion and the reversion of

the entire original lease in his hands. The original lease granted was still

outstanding and it had to be terminated and the assignee \026 sub-tenant had

approached the Rent Control Court for extinguishment of the tenancy

granted by the landlord in favour of the original tenant and for possession of

the portion or the room in the hands of the original lessee. It could not be

said to be a case where the entire rights of the lessor and the lessee in the

whole of the property had come into the hands of the sub-lessee. Therefore,

there could be no merger in the eye of law. In an identical situation this

Court in Indra Perfumery v. Moti Lal & Ors. (1969) II S.C.W.R. 967)

held that Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act would have no

application. This Court stated:

"Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, on

which the appellant relied, does not assist his case. That clause

provides that a lease of immoveable property determines in case

the interests of the lessee and the lesser in the whole of the

property becomes vested at the same time in one person in the

same right. The clause has no application, unless the interest of

the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property is vested

in the same person. The appellant is the owner of the house, he

is also a tenant of a part of the house of which the respondents

are tenants from Mohd. Shafi."

10. When an owner of property grants a lease to another, he retains with

himself the reversion and transfers the right as a lessee to the transferee.

When that transferee, the first lessee, leases out the building or a part

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thereof further, that lessee retains with him the reversion of that sub-lease

and transfers to the sub-lessee only the rights of a lessee under him. Even

in spite of the transfer of the reversion of the first lease by the ultimate

landlord to the sub-lessee, the original lessee, on the strength of the tenancy

created by him, is entitled to seek eviction of his tenant, namely, the sub-

tenant on the strength of his letting. The fact that the sub-tenant had

acquired the ultimate reversion, might not stand in the way since so long as

the tenancy in favour of the original lessee is not terminated in the mode

known to law, that lessee would continue to enjoy the rights of the transfer

in his favour by way of lease. The merger takes place in terms of Section

111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, only in a case where the interests of

the lessee and that of the lessor in the whole of the property, become vested

at the same time in one person, in the same right. In Nalakath Sainuddin

vs. Koorikadan Sulaiman (supra) such a sub-tenant had rightly

approached the Rent Control Court for eviction of his lessor, the lessee from

the landlord, by invoking the relevant provisions of the Rent Control Act on

the strength of the transfer of ownership in his favour by the head lessor.

The rights under the original lease still continued with the original lessee

and the right in the property to possess, outstanding with the lessee had not

come into the hands of the sub-lessee merely on the strength of the

assignment of the ultimate reversion. It could not, therefore, be said that

there was a coalescing of the interest of the lessee and the lessor in the

assignee landlord, (the sub-tenant) in respect of the original lease in the

whole of the property as contemplated by Section 111(d) of the Transfer of

Property Act. The decision in Nalakath Sainuddin vs. Koorikadan

Sulaiman (supra) is of no avail to the appellants.

11. It is clear from the facts of the case in Nalakath Sainuddin vs.

Koorikadan Sulaiman (supra) that when the sub-tenant of a part took an

assignment of the reversion of the head-lease, an intermediate estate in the

form of the original lease was still outstanding not only as regards the room

or portion in the possession of the lessee himself but also as regards the

portion or room in his possession as a sub-lessee.

12. As the passages from text books extracted in paragraph 6 show, the

intervention of an intermediate estate prevents a merger in the hands of the

sub-lessee-assignor of the ultimate reversion. The original lease still

outstanding, is an intermediate estate. 'Intermediate', according to concise

Oxford Dictionary means "coming between two things in time, place,

character etc." The estate in the leasehold would hence be an intermediate

estate coming between the ultimate reversion and the sub-lease.

In Someshwari Prasad Narain Deo vs. Maheshwari Prasad

Narain Deo, ILR X Patna 630, the owner had acquired the rights of the

sub-tenant of a portion of the leased property. The plea of merger raised

therein was rejected in the following words:

"The position in Artoka was that the Raj was the superior and

had granted the village in lekheraj to certain Baids who had

created a mukarrari lease of a portion thereof. This mukarrari

was acquired by the Raj. Consequently there could be no

coalescence, because there is an intermediate estate of the Baids

still in existence to prevent it; and moreover the mukarrari

interest was only over a portion of the property."

Fry, J, stated in Chambers V. Kingham, Law Reports (1878) 10

Chancery 743, "I take the general rule to be, that where one of the interests

is held en autre droit, no merger takes place." According to Black's Law

Dictionary en autre droit means 'in the right of another'. The leasehold

interest outstanding with the original lessee would be an interest held by

that lessee in his own right standing in the way of merger.

In Madan Pal v. Bashanti Kumar Shit, AIR 1989 CALCUTTA

223, a sub-lessee of a portion had acquired a part of the interest of the

superior lessor. The plea of extinguishment by a merger was raised. The

Court held,

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"The interest of the lessor and the lessee in the whole of the

property should become vested at the same time in one person

and in the same right, i.e., there must be the union of the entire

interest of the lessor and the lessee. Thus a lease is not

extinguished because the lessee purchases a part of the

reversion. Again, the union of estate cannot occur if there is

any intervening estate. In the instant case the petitioner has

acquired only 1/3rd interest of the lessor. Moreover, the

petitioner has not acquired the interest of the opposite party,

who is his lessee. He has acquired only a partial interest of the

superior landlord or the lessor of the first degree. It can not,

therefore, be said that there has been the union of the entire

interest of the lessor and the lessee. There is no merger even

though by virtue of the purchase, the petitioner has become one

of the co-sharer landlords of the opposite party but the sub-

tenancy created by the opposite party in favour of the petitioner

can not be said to have determined."

In a case involving surrender by a sub-lessee in favour of the landlord

or the ultimate owner, the Kerala High Court in P. Veeriah v. Mohammed

Kunju Koya and others, 1991 (2) KLJ 96, held that there would be no

extinguishment of the original lease granted by the owner by merger and

that the lease between the lessor and the lessee will continue. Thus, so long

as an intermediate estate was outstanding, it appears to be not possible to

say that there would be a merger in the hands of sub-lessee of a portion

when he takes an assignment of the interests of the original landlord.

13. Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act referred to by learned

counsel does not enable him to contend that rights of the lessee and the

lessor in the whole of the property has vested in the lessee. The right to

joint possession acquired by the assignment from a co-owner, under that

section still leaves outstanding the rights of the other co-owners in the

property and does not bring about a situation enabling the lessee to plead

that the entire rights in the whole of the property have come to coalesce in

him so as to bring about a merger. There is no merger unless the interests

are co-extensive. In other words, there must be a union of the entire interest

of the lessor and the lessee. This does not happen when a lessee takes an

assignment of only the rights of a co-owner-lessor. The position emerging

from Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, therefore, does not make

any dent in the ratio enunciated in T. Lakshmipathi and ors. Vs.P.

Nithyananda Reddy and others (supra).

14. Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act also does not help the

appellant. Section 109 only provides that even without an attornment by the

lessee, an assignee of the rights of the lessor would be entitled to proceed

against the lessee on the basis that he is his lessee, except as regards arrears

of rent already accrued (unless it is specifically conveyed). This statutory

attornment, so to say, does not enable the assignee of the reversion to plead

that the lease has become extinguished. It would only enable the assignee

from the lessor to assert his rights as a lessor notwithstanding that there is

no privity of contract between him and the lessee. In a case where he is an

assignee of a portion, he could enforce his right to claim eviction or that

portion, on the strength of Section 109 of the Act even though the original

lessor could not split up the lease himself. Construing the effect of the

words of the Section, in connection with the question whether the tenancy

gets split up on the assignment of a part of the reversion, this Court in

Mohan Singh (Dead by L.Rs.) v. Devi Charan and others (AIR 1988 SC

1365), observed:

"It is trite proposition that a landlord cannot split the

unity and integrity of the tenancy and recover possession

of a part of the demised premises from the tenant. But

S.109, T.P. Act, provides a statutory exception to this

rule and enables an assignee of a part of the reversion to

exercise all the rights of the landlord in respect of the

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portion respecting which the reversion is so assigned

subject, of course, to the other covenants running with

the land. This is the true effect of the words 'shall

possess all the rights\005\005 of the lessor as to the property

or part transferred\005\005' occurring in S.109, T.P. Act.

There is no need for a consensual attornment. The

attornment is brought about by operation of law. The

limitation on the right of the landlord against splitting up

of the integrity of the tenancy, inhering in the inhibitions

of his own contract, does not visit the assignee of the part

of the reversion. There is no need for the consent of the

tenant for the severance of the reversion and the

assignment of the part so severed. This proposition is too

well settled to require any further elucidation or

reiteration."

This indicates the effect of Section 109 of the Act. It only does away with

the need for an attornment and brings about a splitting up of the tenancy in

certain cases. It does not put an end to the tenancy itself as regards the split

portion and only leaves the assignor-lessor to work out the rights against the

tenant.

In Vishnu Deo v. Bal Kishan (AIR 2002 SC 569), this Court

considered the availability of a plea based on an attornment by a sub-lessee

to the original lessor. In that case, the lessee had sued the sub-lessee for

eviction with arrears of rent under the Rent Control Act. The ultimate

lessor, the owner, a trust, had sued the lessee for possession. The sub-lessee

resisted the suit by his lessor by pleading that he had attorned to the original

lessor-owner and since the owner had sued the lessee for possession, the

lessee could not seek to evict the sub-lessee and the lessee's suit was not

maintainable. This Court repelled the said contention. This Court held that

the defence of eviction by title paramount, was not available to the sub-

lessee. On the subsistence of the relationship of lessor and lessee between

the parties in spite of the attornment by the sub-lessee to the ultimate lessor-

owner, this Court held :

"The tenant's tenancy with the trust will not come to an end

unless and until a decree for eviction on one of the grounds

available under the Rajasthan Act has been passed against him

and termination of his tenancy upheld by a judicial verdict. Till

then he would remain a tenant of the Trust. Mere institution of

a suit for eviction by the Trust, the owner of the property;

against the tenant does not bring the tenancy of the tenant to an

end. The tenant cannot be said to have been evicted by

paramount title holder. It cannot be said that the tenant does

not have any defence nor can he lawfully resist the suit filed by

the owner Trust. The plain and simple legal position which

flows is that the sub-tenant must discharge his statutory

obligation to put his landlord, that is, the tenant in possession of

the premises in view of the latter's entitlement to hold the

tenancy premises until his own right comes to an end and the

tenant must discharge his statutory obligation to put his own

landlord, that is, the Trust, in possession of the tenancy

premises on his entitlement to hold the tenancy premises

coming to an end."

(Head Notes. Emphasis supplied)

This Court also re-emphasized the obligation of the sub-tenant to surrender

to his lessor in terms of Section 108 (q) of the Transfer of Property Act.

15. Here in this case, the lessee has acquired only the rights of certain co-

owner landlords and may have the right to work out his rights against the

others. The right to work out his rights would not enable him to plead that

the two rights in the whole of the property has come to vest in him. What is

involved in the present case is the question whether on the acquisition of the

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rights of some of the co-owner landlords by the tenant, there is an

extinguishment of the tenancy by merger as postulated by Section 111 (d)

of the Transfer of Property Act. T. Lakshmipathi answers that question

and with respect, answers that question correctly.

16. A plain and grammatical interpretation of Section 111(d) of the

Transfer of Property Act leaves no room for doubt that unless the interests

of the lessee and that of the lessor in the whole of the property leased,

become vested at the same time in one person in the same right, a

determination of the lease cannot take place. On taking an assignment

from some of the co-owner landlords, the interests of the lessee and the

lessor in the whole of the property do not become vested at the same time in

one person in the same right. Therefore, a lessee who has taken assignment

of the rights of a co-owner lessor, cannot successfully raise the plea of

determination of tenancy on the ground of merger of his lessee's estate in

that of the estate of the landlord. It is, thus, clear that there is no substance

in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that in the case on

hand, it should have been held that the tenancy stood determined and the

application of the landlord for a direction to the tenant to deposit the rent in

arrears should have been dismissed. The position of the appellants as

tenants continue and they are bound to comply with the requirements of the

Rent Control Act under which the order for deposit has been passed against

them. The High Court has rightly dismissed the revision.

17. Thus, there is no merit in this appeal. Confirming the order of the

High Court the appeal is dismissed.