2026 INSC 716 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9032-9034 OF 2026

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 4086-4088 of 2025)

PRANESH M.K. … APPELLANT

Versus

A.V. GAYATHRI

SHANTHEGOWDA & ORS. ETC. ETC. … RESPONDENTS

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No. 9035 OF 2026

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 17748 of 2023)

CIVIL APPEAL No. 9036 OF 2026

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 17017 of 2023)

CIVIL APPEAL No. 9037 OF 2026

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 21599 of 2023)

J U D G M E N T

VIPUL M. PANCHOLI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals arise out of the following judgments and order:

A. The common order dated 29.01.2025 passed by the High

Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Election Petition

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Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of 2022, whereby the election of the

returned candidate has been set aside and consequential

directions have been issued.

B. The common judgment and order dated 20.04.2023

passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in

Writ Appeal Nos. 1247, 1256 and 1250 of 2022, whereby

the Division Bench affirmed the findings of the Single

Judge and upheld the interpretation of the statutory

provisions governing the electoral process, including the

the eligibility and voting rights of nominated members,

which has a direct bearing on the validity of the election in

question.

3. The present batch of matters also includes connected Special

Leave Petitions arising out of allied proceedings involving

similar questions of law and fact. Since the issues involved are

substantially overlapping, all the matters were heard together

and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

4. The present case arises out of the election to the Karnataka

Legislative Council from the 12-Chikkamagaluru Local

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Authorities Constituency (2021). The constituency comprises

members of various local bodies including Zilla Panchayat,

Taluk Panchayat, Municipal Councils and Town Panchayats. In

four Town Panchayats, namely, Koppa, Mudigere, Sringeri and

Narasimharajapura, three members each were nominated by

the State Government under Section 352(1)(b) of the Karnataka

Municipalities Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as “the KMA”),

resulting in a total of 12 nominated councillors, whose names

were included in the electoral rolls.

5. Elections were notified on 16.11.2021, polling took place on

10.12.2021 and counting was conducted on 14.12.2021. Out of

2410 votes polled, 2371 votes were valid. The appellant secured

1188 votes (including votes of nominated members), while

Respondent No.1 secured 1182 votes and the appellant was

declared elected by a narrow margin of 6 votes in accordance

with the statutory rules governing the conduct of elections.

6. Following the declaration of results, the inclusion and voting

rights of the nominated members became the subject matter of

challenge. Writ petitions were filed before the High Court

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questioning the inclusion of nominated councillors in the

electoral rolls. By judgment dated 03.11.2022, the High Court

held such inclusion to be invalid and unconstitutional, directing

deletion of their names. The said view was affirmed by the

Division Bench on 20.04.2023, holding that nominated

members do not have the right to vote in Legislative Council

elections.

7. Parallelly, election petitions were instituted challenging the

appellant’s election on the ground that votes cast by the

nominated members were invalid and had materially affected

the election result. The appellant contested the said

proceedings, inter alia, contending that the electoral rolls had

attained finality, that nominated members were validly included

in terms of statutory provisions and executive clarification and

that it was not possible to identify or segregate votes cast by

such members without violating the secrecy of the ballot.

8. By the impugned order dated 29.01.2025, the High Court

directed securing and opening of ballot boxes, segregation of

ballot papers pertaining to the 12 nominated members and

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recounting of votes after excluding such votes, to be completed

within a stipulated time.

9. Aggrieved by the said order and the interpretation adopted by

the High Court regarding the eligibility and voting rights of

nominated members, the appellant has approached this Court.

10. On 17.02.2025, this Court permitted recounting of votes,

however, it directed that the results shall not be declared and

instead be placed before this Court in a sealed cover and the

same was complied with on 15.04.2025. On 22.07.2025, an

application for impleadment was allowed and the Union of India

was impleaded as a party respondent. On 05.08.2025, this

Court opened the sealed covers containing (i) recount based on

original votes and (ii) revised results excluding votes of

nominated members. After perusal, the documents were

resealed and directed to be kept in safe custody.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT - PRANESH MK -

ELECTED MEMBER (@ SLP (C) No. 4086-4088 of 2025, SLP (C)

Nos. 17748 and 21599 of 2023)

11. Learned senior counsels appearing for the appellant challenged

the impugned order mainly on the following grounds:

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A. It is submitted that the core issue that whether nominated

members of Town Panchayats are entitled to be included

in electoral rolls and vote in Legislative Council elections,

is res integra and presently pending consideration before

this Court in connected Special Leave Petitions. The High

Court erred in relying upon its earlier judgments despite

the issue not having attained finality.

B. It is stated that the High Court has mechanically relied

upon the judgments dated 03.11.2022 and 20.04.2023

(Single Judge and Division Bench), without independent

adjudication, even though those very judgments are under

challenge before this Court.

C. It is contended that the names of the 12 nominated

members were duly included in the electoral rolls and were

never challenged prior to the election. Once finalized, the

electoral roll cannot be questioned in an election petition

except on limited grounds of disqualification under

Section 16 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950

(hereinafter referred to as “the 1950 Act”). Reliance is

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placed on Hari Prasad Mulshanker Trivedi v. V.B. Raju

& Ors., (1974) 3 SCC 415 and Kunwar Nripendra

Bahadur v. Union of India, (1977) 4 SCC 153 .

D. Even assuming that nominated members were ineligible,

it is argued that votes cast by persons included in the

electoral roll cannot be treated as void and an election

cannot be set aside merely on the ground that ineligible

voters participated. Reliance is placed on decisions,

including, Shyamdeo Pd. Singh v. Nawal Kishore

Yadav, (2000) 8 SCC 46 , P. Shardamma & Anr. v.

Marithibbegowda, 2009 SCC OnLine Kar 218 , Gayatri

Devi v. Suman Devi & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine Raj 885

and Rooplal Mehta v. Dhan Singh & Ors., 1967 SCC

OnLine P&H 128.

E. It is urged that recount of votes can be ordered only in

exceptional circumstances based on specific pleadings and

proof. The High Court erred in directing recount solely on

the basis of alleged illegality in electoral roll and narrow

margin of votes, without any concrete material. Reliance is

8

placed on P.H. Pujar v. Kanthi Rajashekar Kidiyappa,

(2002) 3 SCC 742 , Mahant Ram Prakash Dass v.

Ramesh Chandra, (1999) 9 SCC 420 and R. Narayanan

v. S. Semmalai, (1980) 2 SCC 537.

F. It is contended that the High Court wrongly interpreted

Section 27(2)(b) of the 1950 Act, Sections 352(1)(b) and

2(6) of the KMA and Article 243-R of the Constitution of

India, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as “the Constitution”).

It is submitted that the restriction on nominated members

applies only to voting in municipal meetings, such

restriction cannot be extended to Legislative Council

elections and the expression “every member” includes

nominated members.

G. Reliance is placed on the Election Commission’s Circular

dated 21.10.1997, which clarifies that nominated

members are entitled to be included in electoral rolls and

to vote in Local Authorities Constituency elections. The

High Court failed to consider this binding clarification.

9

H. It is submitted that segregation of votes of nominated

members is impracticable and would violate the secrecy of

the ballot, which is a fundamental principle of electoral

law. Reliance is placed on Jeet Mohinder Singh v.

Harminder Singh Jassi, (1999) 9 SCC 386 .

I. The impugned order is also challenged on the ground that

it does not comply with statutory requirements under the

Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, particularly regarding

the authority competent to open ballot boxes.

J. It is contended that writ proceedings and election petitions

involve distinct causes of action, writ court findings are

not binding in election disputes and in any event, the

earlier judgments have not attained finality.

12. On these grounds, it is urged that the impugned order dated

29.01.2025 directing recount of votes after excluding votes of

nominated members is legally unsustainable and liable to be set

aside.

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SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT NO.1 - HP

MANJUNATH - NOMINATED MEMBER (@ SLP (C) Nos. 17748 and

17017 of 2023)

13. Learned senior counsels appearing for the Appellant No.1 -

nominated member challenged the impugned judgment on the

following principal grounds:

A. It is contended that the High Court failed to appreciate the

fundamental distinction between voting in meetings of a

Town Panchayat and voting in Legislative Council

elections. The statutory restriction on nominated members

applies only to participation in municipal decision-making

and cannot be extended to elections to the Legislative

Council.

B. It is submitted that Article 243-R and Section 352(1)(b) of

the KMA, only restrict nominated members from voting in

municipal meetings. There is no express prohibition on

their participation in elections to the Legislative Council.

Accordingly, Section 27(2)(b) of the 1950 Act, which uses

the expression “every member”, must be interpreted to

include nominated members.

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C. It is argued that the object of Article 171(3)(a) of the

Constitution and Section 27 of the 1950 Act is to provide

representation of local authorities in the Legislative

Council. Excluding nominated members would defeat this

purpose and leave a segment of local governance

unrepresented. Reliance is placed on L. Shivanna v.

State of Karnataka, 1988 SCC OnLine Kar 228 .

D. It is contended that once nominated under statutory

provisions, such persons become members of the local

authority for all relevant purposes, unless expressly

excluded. Drawing analogy from the provision of Section 5

of the Karnataka Zilla Parishads, Taluk Panchayat

Samithis, Mandal Panchayats and Nyaya Panchayats Act,

1983 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1983”), it is

submitted that nominated members cannot be treated as

a separate or inferior class for electoral purposes.

E. It is stated that the High Court has erroneously read the

word “elected” into provisions such as Section 27(2)(b) of

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the 1950 Act and Section 2(6) of the KMA, despite the

statute using the broader expression “every member”.

F. It is further submitted that while the right to vote is

statutory in nature, it must be exercised strictly in

accordance with the governing law. In the absence of an

express statutory prohibition, nominated members cannot

be excluded from electoral participation.

G. It is urged that treating nominated members differently in

the context of Legislative Council elections, while

recognizing them as members for other purposes, leads to

arbitrariness and violates the constitutional scheme of

representative governance.

H. It is further submitted that excluding nominated members

from voting in indirect elections to the Legislative Council

would result in denial of representation to segments of

local authorities, thereby defeating the purpose of a

bicameral legislative structure.

14. On these grounds, it is submitted that the High Court erred in

law in excluding nominated members from the electoral process

13

and in misinterpreting the constitutional and statutory

framework. The impugned judgment and order dated

20.04.2023 is therefore liable to be set aside.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS (@ SLP (C) No.

4086-4088 of 2025)

15. Learned senior counsels appearing for the respondents

supported the impugned judgments and orders on the following

grounds:

A. It is submitted that nominated members of Town

Panchayats have no voting rights under the constitutional

scheme, cannot be treated as “members” for electoral

purposes and their inclusion in the electoral roll is void ab

initio. Reliance is placed on Article 243-R of the

Constitution, which expressly bars nominated members

from voting, reflecting a clear distinction between elected

and nominated representatives.

B. It is contended that the writ petitions were maintainable

because no statutory appellate remedy exists under

Section 27 of the 1950 Act, any purported remedy is

illusory and violative of nemo judex in causa sua and

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electoral rolls cannot be challenged in election petitions,

necessitating recourse to Article 226 of the Constitution.

Reliance is placed on N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning

Officer & Ors., (1952) 1 SCC 94, Dhampur Sugar Mills

Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2007) 8 SCC 338 and Ram &

Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC 267 .

C. It is argued that Article 329(b) bars interference only with

the election process, whereas challenge to electoral roll is

anterior to the election, hence, writ jurisdiction is not

barred.

D. It is submitted that the expression “every member” must

be read harmoniously with Article 243-R of the

Constitution and therefore includes only elected members,

not nominated members. A literal interpretation including

nominated members would lead to constitutional

inconsistency.

E. It is contended that Section 352 of the KMA denies voting

rights to nominated members, Section 2(6) of the KMA

distinguishes elected councillors and the 74th

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Constitutional Amendment intends governance through

elected representatives, while nominated members play

only advisory roles.

F. It is further submitted that the right to vote is purely

statutory, not fundamental, must be expressly conferred

and cannot be inferred in favour of nominated members.

Reliance is placed on Ramesh Mehta v. Sanwal Chand

Singhvi, (2004) 5 SCC 409, Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal,

(1982) 1 SCC 691 and Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India,

(2006) 7 SCC 1.

G. It is argued that inclusion of nominated members being

void ab initio, the election based on such inclusion is

vitiated and the doctrine of material effect is clearly

satisfied (12 invalid votes vs. 6 votes margin).

H. It is further submitted that the direction for recount is a

consequential relief flowing from invalidation of votes, is

narrowly tailored and ensures correction without

disturbing the entire election.

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I. It is contended that inclusion in electoral roll does not

confer a vested right if inclusion itself is void, reliance on

Article 171 of the Constitution is misplaced, Section 62 of

the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter

referred to as “the 1951 Act”) applies only to valid electors

and plea of delay or acquiescence is unsustainable.

J. It is pointed out that recount has already been conducted

pursuant to Court orders, the result demonstrates that

exclusion of invalid votes alters the outcome and

continuation of the returned candidate would perpetuate

illegality.

16. On these grounds, it is submitted that the High Court

judgments are legally sound and constitutionally valid, no

interference under Article 136 of the Constitution is warranted

and the Special Leave Petitions deserve to be dismissed with

affirmation of recount and exclusion of votes of nominated

members.

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SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO.11 - UNION

OF INDIA (@ SLP (C) No. 4086-4088 of 2025)

17. Mr. K.M. Nataraj, learned Additional Solicitor General,

appearing for the Union of India, confined submissions to the

two core legal issues arising in the present matter:

A. It is submitted that Article 171(3)(a) of the Constitution

provides that members of the Legislative Council are

elected by an electorate consisting of “members of

municipalities and other local authorities”, without

distinguishing between elected and nominated members.

A comparative reading of constitutional provisions

demonstrates that where the Constitution intends to

restrict voting to “elected members”, it does so expressly

(e.g., Articles 80, 54) and in contrast, Article 171 uses the

broader term “members”, thereby indicating an inclusive

intent. Under Article 243-R, while nominated members are

barred from voting in meetings of the municipality, there

is no express prohibition on their participation in

Legislative Council elections. Under the KMA, Section 2(6)

defines “councillor” broadly to include any person who is

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legally a member, without distinguishing between elected

and nominated members and thus, nominated members,

being lawfully inducted, fall within the category of

“members” of the local authority. Similarly, Section

27(2)(b) of the 1950 Act provides that “every member” of a

local authority is entitled to be registered as an elector,

without excluding nominated members. It is therefore

contended that the Constitution and statutory framework

do not exclude nominated members and the courts cannot

read in a restriction where none exists.

B. It is further submitted that the statutory scheme of the

1950 Act provides a mechanism for pre-election objections

to the electoral roll. Once the final electoral roll is

published, the election must proceed on that basis and

inclusion of ineligible voters, even if assumed, does not

vitiate the election. Reliance is placed on Shyamdeo Pd.

Singh (supra), holding that inclusion of ineligible persons

in electoral roll cannot be a ground to set aside an election

and Lakshmi Charan Sen v. A.K.M. Hassan Uzzaman,

(1985) 4 SCC 689, affirming that elections must proceed

19

on the basis of the electoral roll in force, notwithstanding

pending objections or errors. It is emphasized that a voter

included in the electoral roll by a competent authority is

entitled to vote unless disqualified under law and

subsequent challenge to eligibility cannot retrospectively

invalidate the electoral process.

18. On the above analysis, the Union of India submits that the

nominated members, being “members” of local authorities, are

eligible to be included in electoral rolls and to vote in Legislative

Council elections and even otherwise, inclusion of allegedly

ineligible voters in the electoral roll does not render the election

void once the roll has attained finality.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NOS. 1 TO 4 (@

SLP (C) No. 21599 of 2023)

19. Learned senior counsels appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 to

4 supported the impugned judgments of the High Court and

opposed the Special Leave Petitions on the following grounds:

A. It is submitted that the writ petitions challenging the

electoral roll were fully maintainable because no effective

statutory remedy exists under the 1950 Act to challenge

20

inclusion of ineligible voters in Local Authorities’

Constituencies. The challenge pertains to a foundational

illegality in the electoral roll, which lies outside the bar on

judicial interference in electoral matters and an election

petition is not an adequate remedy, as it cannot adjudicate

upon the validity of the electoral roll itself. Reliance is

placed on N.P. Ponnuswami (supra) and Maharashtra

Chess Association v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC

285.

B. It is contended that the expression “every member” under

Section 27(2)(b) of the 1950 Act must be interpreted

harmoniously with the Constitution. Under Article 243-R

of the Constitution, nominated members are expressly

denied voting rights and form a distinct class from elected

representatives. Under the KMA, nominated members are

not “councillors” in the electoral sense. Accordingly, only

elected members with democratic mandate can constitute

the electoral college.

21

C. It is submitted that the election result was materially

affected as the margin of victory was 6 votes and the

ineligible voters were 12 nominated members. The test of

“material effect” is clearly satisfied, rendering the election

invalid. Reliance is placed on Ramesh Mehta (supra) and

Shyamdeo Pd. Singh (supra).

D. It is argued that allowing nominated members (who lack

electoral mandate and are appointed by the executive) to

vote undermines representative democracy, introduces

executive influence and violates the constitutional scheme

of democratic decentralisation under Part IX-A of the

Constitution. The right to vote is purely statutory and

must be exercised strictly in accordance with law. Reliance

is placed on Rajbala v. State of Haryana, (2016) 2 SCC

445.

E. It is submitted that both the Single Judge and Division

Bench have given concurrent findings on facts and law.

Such findings are based on proper statutory

interpretation, consistent with constitutional provisions

22

and free from perversity. This Court, under Article 136 of

the Constitution, ordinarily does not interfere with

concurrent findings unless manifestly erroneous. Reliance

is placed on Kunwar Nripendra Bahadur Singh (supra) .

F. It is contended that the plea of alternative remedy is

illusory and ineffective, the bar under election law is

inapplicable, as the challenge is to the electoral roll, not

merely the election result, the interpretation of “every

member” to include nominated members is contrary to

constitutional scheme and parallel proceedings (writ and

election petitions) are legally permissible as they address

distinct issues.

20. On these grounds, it is submitted that the impugned judgments

of the High Court are legally sound and constitutionally

consistent, inclusion of nominated members in the electoral roll

is invalid, the consequential recount excluding such votes is

justified and thus, the Special Leave Petitions deserve to be

dismissed.

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ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

21. Having heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties

and perusing the material on record, the principal issue in the

present batch of appeals is whether nominated members of

Town Panchayats have the right to vote in the election to the

Karnataka Legislative Council from a Local Authorities’

Constituency and the consequential effect of their participation

on the validity of the election in question.

22. Before dealing with the substantive issue, it is necessary to

address the preliminary objection raised by the appellants that

the writ petitions filed before the High Court were not

maintainable in view of the remedies available under the

Representation of the People Acts.

23. We find no merit in the submission. The challenge raised before

the High court was not directed against the conduct of the

election or against any stage of the electoral process, however,

the challenge was to the legality of inclusion of nominated

members in the electoral roll prepared for the Local Authorities’

Constituency. The challenge was raised before the election and

24

went to the root of the composition of the electoral college and

not merely to the validity of the election result. Thus, the issue

raised was a pure question concerning interpretation of

constitutional and statutory provisions.

24. Section 27 of the 1950 Act, which governs the preparation of

electoral rolls for Legislative Council constituencies, does not

provide an effective statutory mechanism for adjudicating the

legality of inclusion of nominated members in the electoral roll

of a Local Authorities’ Constituency. While considering this

issue in the impugned common judgment dated 20.04.2023 in

Writ Appeal Nos. 1247, 1256 and 1250 of 2022, the High Court

noticed that the remedy contemplated under the statutory

framework was illusory in the peculiar facts of the case. The

controversy involved a pure question of constitutional and

statutory interpretation, namely, whether nominated members

possessed the right to vote in elections to the Legislative Council

and did not require determination of any disputed question of

fact. The High Court observed as under:

“14. Admittedly, in the present case, the District

Magistrate is the Electoral Registration Officer, who as

25

prepared the electoral roll and he himself being an

appellate Authority, the appeal would not lie before the

person who was prepared the electoral roll. Further, the

issue involved in the present case is, whether the

nominated member has right to cast his vote. The

controversy involved in this writ appeal is purely a legal

one and does not involve disputed question of facts, but

only a question of law. If the controversy is purely a legal

one, it should be decided by the High Court under Article

226 of the Constitution of India, instead of dismissing the

writ petition on the ground of an alternative remedy being

available.”

25. The principles laid down by this Court in N.P. Ponnuswami v.

Returning Officer (supra) does not lay down an absolute bar

against judicial review in every matter having some nexus with

elections. Similarly, as observed in Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd.

v. State of U.P. (supra) and Ram & Shyam Co. v. State of

Haryana (supra), existence of an alternative remedy does not

preclude exercise of writ jurisdiction, where the remedy is

ineffective or where the controversy involves a pure question of

law. The relevant paragraph of Ram & Shyam Co. v. State of

Haryana (supra) reads as under:

“9. Before we deal with the larger issue, let me put out of

the way the contention that found favour with the High

Court in rejecting the writ petition. The learned Single

Judge as well as the Division Bench recalling the

observations of this Court in Assistant Collector of Central

Excise v. Jainson Hosiery Industries [(1979) 4 SCC 22 :

1979 SCC (Cri) 896] rejected the writ petition observing

26

that “the petitioner who invokes the extraordinary

jurisdiction of the court under Article 226 of the

Constitution must have exhausted the normal statutory

remedies available to him”. We remain unimpressed.

Ordinarily it is true that the court has imposed a restraint

in its own wisdom on its exercise of jurisdiction under

Article 226 where the party invoking the jurisdiction has

an effective, adequate alternative remedy. More often, it

has been expressly stated that the rule which requires the

exhaustion of alternative remedies is a rule of convenience

and discretion rather than rule of law. At any rate it does

not oust the jurisdiction of the Court. In fact in the very

decision relied upon by the High Court in State of U.P. v.

Mohammad Nooh [AIR 1958 SC 86 : 1958 SCR 595 : 1958

SCJ 242] it is observed “that there is no rule, with regard

to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only

where there is no other equally effective remedy”. It should

be made specifically clear that where the order complained

against is alleged to be illegal or invalid as being contrary

to law, a petition at the instance of person adversely

affected by it, would lie to the High Court under Article 226

and such a petition cannot be rejected on the ground that

an appeal lies to the higher officer or the State

Government. An appeal in all cases cannot be said to

provide in all situations an alternative effective remedy

keeping aside the nice distinction between jurisdiction and

merits. Look at the fact situation in this case. Power was

exercised formally by the authority set up under the Rules

to grant contract but effectively and for all practical

purposes by the Chief Minister of the State. To whom do

you appeal in a State administration against the decision

of the Chief Minister? The clitch of appeal from Caesar to

Caesar's wife can only be bettered by appeal from one's

own order to oneself. Therefore this is a case in which the

High Court was not at all justified in throwing out the

petition on the untenable ground that the appellant had an

effective alternative remedy. The High Court did not pose

to itself the question, who would grant relief when the

impugned order is passed at the instance of the Chief

Minister of the State. To whom did the High Court want the

appeal to be filed over the decision of the Chief Minister.

There was no answer and that by itself without anything

27

more would be sufficient to set aside the judgment of the

High Court.”

26. We are therefore in agreement with the Single Judge and

affirmed by the Division Bench that the writ petitions were

maintainable.

27. This brings us to the principal issue arising out of the present

batch of appeals. The appellants have placed considerable

reliance upon the language used in Article 171(3)(a) of the

Constitution and Article 27(2)(b) of the 1950 Act. The legal

provisions are reproduced as under:

“171. Composition of the Legislative Councils. –

… … …

(3) Of the total number of members of the Legislative

Council of a State

(a) as nearly as may be, one-third shall be elected by

electorates consisting of members of municipalities, district

boards and such other local authorities in the State as

Parliament may by law specify;”

“27. Preparation of electoral roll for Council

constituencies. –

… … …

(2) For the purpose of elections to the Legislative Council of

a State in any local authorities’ constituency—

… … …

28

(b) every member of each such local authority within a local

authorities’ constituency shall be entitled to be registered

in the electoral roll for that constituency;”

28. It was argued that Article 171(3)(a) of the Constitution uses the

expression “members of municipalities, district boards and other

local authorities” and not “elected members”. Similarly, Section

27(2)(b) of the 1950 Act used the expression “every member of

each such local authority”. It was urged that where the

Constitution intended to confine an electoral college to elected

representatives, it has expressly done so in provisions such as

Articles 54 and 80 of the Constitution. According to the

appellants, once a person becomes a member of a municipality

by virtue of a valid nomination under the KMA, such person

necessarily becomes entitled to form part of the electoral college

for the purposes of election to the Legislative Council.

29. We are of the view that the submission is attractive on a plain

reading of the provisions, however on closer examination,

overlooks the constitutional transformation brought about by

the Constitution (Seventy-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992. The

constitutional provisions cannot be construed in isolation or by

adopting a purely textual approach divorced from the

29

constitutional structure and every provision must be

interpreted harmoniously so as to give effect to the Constitution

as a coherent whole. Part IX-A of the Constitution introduced a

constitutional framework for democratic local self-government.

Article 243-R of the Constitution fundamentally altered the

constitutional structure governing urban local bodies. The

constitutional objective was to strengthen democratic local self-

government and ensure governance through elected

representatives at the grassroots level. Article 243-R of the

Constitution is reproduced as under:

“243R. Composition of Municipalities. –

(1) Save as provided in clause (2), all the seats in a

Municipality shall be filled by persons chosen by direct

election from the territorial constituencies in the Municipal

area and for this purpose each Municipal area shall be

divided into territorial constituencies to be known as

wards.

(2) The Legislature of a State may, by law, provide-

(a) for the representation in a Municipality of-

(i) persons having special knowledge or experience in

Municipal administration;

(ii) the members of the House of the People and the

members of the Legislative Assembly of the State

representing constituencies which comprise wholly or

partly the Municipal area;

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(iii) the members of the Council of States and the members

of the Legislative Council of the State registered as electors

within the Municipal area;

(iv) the Chairpersons of the Committees constituted under

clause (5) of article 243S:

Provided that the persons referred to in paragraph (i) shall

not have the right to vote in the meetings of the

Municipality;

(b) the manner of election of the Chairperson of a

Municipality.”

30. A careful perusal of Article 243-R demonstrates that the

Constitution itself makes a conscious distinction between

elected representatives and nominated members. Clause (1)

declares that all seats in a municipality shall be filled by

persons chosen by direct election and Clause (2) permits

representation of certain categories of persons, including

persons possessing special knowledge or experience in

municipal administration. However, the Proviso expressly

provides that such nominated members shall not have the right

to vote in meetings of the municipality.

31. Therefore, the constitutional distinction between elected and

nominated members is clear and intentional, as the elected

members derive their authority from the democratic mandate of

31

the electorate and represent the will of the people. On the other

hand, the nominated members are inducted into the municipal

body because of their expertise, experience or specialised

knowledge. Thus, their role is advisory and consultative rather

than representative.

32. The same constitutional philosophy finds statutory recognition

in Section 352 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, which

provides as under:

“352. Election to Town Panchayat.—

(1) A Town Panchayat shall consist of,-

… … …

(b) not more than three persons nominated by the

Government from amongst the residents of the transitional

area and who are,-

(i) persons having special knowledge and experience in

municipal administration or matters relating to health,

town planning or education; or

(ii) social workers

… … …

Provided that the persons referred to in clause (b) shall not

have the right to vote in the meetings of the Town

Panchayat.”

33. This constitutional distinction has been recognised in several

decisions of this Court. In Ramesh Mehta v. Sanwal Chand

32

Singhvi (supra), while interpreting the post Seventy-Fourth

Amendment framework, this Court emphasised that

constitutional interpretation in matters concerning municipal

governance must be informed by the objective of strengthening

democracy at the grassroots level. The Court observed:

“22. A right to contest election although arises under a

statute but having regard to the Constitution (Seventy-

fourth) Amendment Act, the interpretation thereof must be

made keeping in view the constitutional scheme.

Democracy at the grass-root level was sought to be

introduced by reason of the said amendment in the

Constitution. Once the concept of a grass-root democracy

is accepted, a pragmatic and purposive meaning to the

provisions of the Act must be assigned.

… … …

25. It is accepted that the Rules have not been altered

despite the fact that amendments have been carried out in

the Municipalities Act in the year 1994. All members who

were not elected members under the unamended

provisions were treated as elected members. Their rights

were at par with them. The very fact that the Constitution

made a difference between an elected member and a

nominated member in the matter of election and removal

of a Chairman is suggestive of the fact that now a new

interpretation is called for. Nominated members are

persons with special knowledge in the subject. They are

nominated so that they may render their advice properly

to the members of the Board which would enable it to run

the municipal affairs efficiently. They remain as members

of the Board irrespective of the fact as to who the person

occupying the post is or his political affinity. He is not

concerned with election. He does not take part in it. A

fortiori he has also not been assigned any role to play as

regards removal of the Chairman or Vice-Chairman.”

33

34. More recently, in Shelly Oberoi v. Office of Lieutenant

Governor of Delhi, (2023) 5 SCC 414 , this Court clearly

recognized the distinction between elected representatives and

nominated members and affirmed that nominated members do

not enjoy voting rights in matters involving democratic decision-

making. The relevant paragraphs read as under:

“11. We are unable to accept the submission which has

been urged on behalf of the Municipal Corporation and the

Lt. Governor and by the counsel supporting them. The

source of the statutory provision is contained in Article

243-R of the Constitution itself. Part IX-A of the

Constitution was introduced by the Constitution (Seventy-

fourth Amendment) Act, 1992. Article 243-R provides for

the composition of Municipalities. As already noted, the

Constitution provides for direct election to all the seats in

Municipality, save as specified in clause (2) which

enunciates the exceptions. Clause (2) contains provisions,

inter alia, for the representation in a Municipality of

persons having special knowledge or experience in

Municipal administration as well as other persons such as

members of the House of the People and the Legislative

Assembly and members of the Council of States and the

Legislative Council of the States representing the specific

constituency and the Chairpersons of the Committees

constituted under clause (5) of Article 243-S. The

Constitution has imposed a restriction in terms of which

nominated members who are brought in on account of their

special knowledge or experience in Municipal

administration do not have the right to vote. The same

restriction finds statutory recognition in Section 3(3)(b)(i) of

the Act. The above provisions indicate that persons who

are nominated under the sub-clause shall not have the

right to vote in the meetings of the Corporation. The

Constitution and the Act place value on their experience

but the right to vote is not granted to them at meetings of

34

the Corporation. The meetings of the Corporation would

include all meetings, including the first meeting which is

held after the holding of the general election. Section 73 of

the Act provides for the first meeting to be convened by the

Administrator as early as possible after the publication of

the results, while Section 35 provides for the election of the

Mayor and Deputy Mayor at the first meeting of the

Corporation. The prohibition on nominated members

exercising the right to vote in terms of Section 3(3)(b)(i)

shall, therefore, also apply to the first meeting of the

Corporation at which the Mayor and, thereafter, the

Deputy Mayor are to be elected.

… … …

13. The interpretation which we have placed on the

provisions of the statute is in accord with the judgment of

a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Ramesh Mehta v.

Sanwal Chand Singhvi [Ramesh Mehta v. Sanwal Chand

Singhvi, (2004) 5 SCC 409].”

35. Taking into consideration the above discussion, the crucial

question is whether people who are not allowed by the

Constitution to vote in municipal matters can still vote in

elections for members of the Legislative Council. In our

considered view, the answer must necessarily be in the

negative.

36. If Article 171(3)(a) of the Constitution was to be interpreted

literally so as to include nominated members, an unreasonable

consequence would follow, that is, a nominated member who is

not allowed by the Constitution to vote in the municipality’s own

35

decision-making process would still be allowed to vote in the

election of a member of the Legislative Council. This

interpretation would give nominated members more voting

power in the election of a constitutional legislative body than

they have within the municipality itself, which Article 243-R of

the Constitution never intended. The Constitution should not

be interpreted in a way that creates such contradictions. The

Courts need to contextually interpret the provisions in order to

further the constitutional objective, that is, democratic

representation. The purpose of Article 171(3)(a) is not just to

give representation to local authorities as institutions, but to

ensure representation of democratically elected local self-

governing bodies in the Legislative Council. Since nominated

members are not democratically elected and cannot vote in

municipal affairs, allowing them to participate in Legislative

Council elections would dilute the democratic nature of the

electoral process and go against the constitutional objective of

strengthening local self-government.

37. Accordingly, the expression “members of municipalities … and

other local authorities” occurring in Article 171(3)(a) must be

36

understood in the context of the constitutional framework

governing local self-government. Likewise, the expression “every

member” occurring in Section 27(2)(b) of the 1950 Act cannot be

construed in a purely literal sense divorced from constitutional

context. A purposive and harmonious interpretation is that both

expressions apply to those members who are elected

representatives and voting rights within the concerned local

authority.

38. We are therefore in agreement with the view taken by the High

Court that nominated members appointed under Section

352(1)(b) of the KMA were not entitled to be included in the

electoral roll prepared for the Local Authorities’ Constituency

and their inclusion was contrary to the constitutional scheme

and could not be sustained in law.

39. Thereafter, the appellants relied upon the doctrine of finality of

electoral rolls and the decisions of this Court in Hari Prasad

Mulshanker Trivedi v. V.B. Raju (supra), Lakshmi Charan

Sen v. A.K.M. Hassan Uzzaman (supra) and Shyamdeo Pd.

Singh v. Nawal Kishore Yadav (supra) . There can be no

37

dispute with the principle emerging from those decisions that

elections must ordinarily proceed on the basis of the electoral

roll in force and that election disputes cannot routinely be

converted into proceedings for reopening electoral rolls.

40. However, the above referred cases cited by the appellants do not

apply to this case because they dealt with ordinary mistakes or

irregularities in preparing electoral rolls. In the present case,

the issue is different, here, the inclusion of certain voters in the

electoral roll was later found to be unconstitutional void ab

initio, thus, this means the issue affects the basic composition

of the electoral college itself. Therefore, the Court cannot

overlook this constitutional violation simply by saying that the

electoral roll had become final. It is true that finality of electoral

rolls is important to ensure certainty and stability in elections,

however, it cannot override the Constitution. The principle of

finality is meant to prevent endless challenges to electoral rolls,

but it cannot be used to validate the participation of persons

who were found constitutionally ineligible in collateral

proceedings to constitute the electorate itself.

38

41. Moreover, the challenge to the inclusion of nominated members

was not raised for the first time after declaration of results.

Their inclusion had already been questioned before the High

Court and had been declared unconstitutional in the impugned

common judgment and order dated 20.04.2023 passed in Writ

Appeal Nos. 1247, 1256 and 1250 of 2022. The election

petitions merely sought consequential relief flowing from that

declaration, in the impugned common order dated 29.01.2025

passed in Election Petition Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of 2022. Once the

Court decided that nominated members were not

constitutionally allowed to be included in the electoral college,

it automatically follows that any votes cast by them are invalid.

Therefore, the illegality does not arise from any procedural

defect in voting, however, it arises from the absence of legal

authority to participate in the election itself.

42. The Single Judge and the Division Bench had already declared

the inclusion of the 12 nominated members to be

unconstitutional in the judgment dated 03.01.2022 and the

39

impugned judgment dated 20.04.2023, respectively.

Admittedly, no stay of the said judgment was granted. The High

Court, while deciding the election petitions in the impugned

order dated 29.01.2025, was therefore justified in proceeding

on the basis of the declarations already rendered in relation to

the very same electoral roll and constituency.

43. Section 100(1)(d)(iii) of the 1951 Act provides that an election

may be declared void if the result has been materially affected

by the improper reception of any vote or by the reception of any

vote which is void. Section 100(1)(d)(iii) is reproduced as under:

“100. Grounds for declaring election to be void.—

(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) if the High

Court is of opinion—

… … …

(d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a

returned candidate, has been materially affected—

… … …

(iii) by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any

vote or the reception of any vote which is void, or”

44. As per the factual matrix of the present case, the returned

candidate secured victory by a margin of 6 votes. The number

40

of votes cast by the nominated members was 12. Thus, the

number of invalid votes was double the margin of victory. In

such circumstances, the requirement of material effect stands

established.

45. We also do not find merit in the contention that segregation of

the votes cast by the nominated members would violate the

secrecy of the ballot. The principle of ballot secrecy is

undoubtedly a vital feature of the electoral process and is to

ensure the freedom and independence of the voter, however,

such secrecy is not an absolute principle and cannot be invoked

to sustain a constitutional illegality. As observed by this Court

in Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (supra), while secrecy of

the ballot is an important aspect of elections, the higher

constitutional objective remains the preservation of free and fair

elections and the purity of the electoral process. In the present

case, the Returning Officer has categorically stated that the

votes cast by the nominated members can be identified and

segregated through comparison of ballot papers, counterfoils

and marked copies of the electoral rolls. The relevant

41

paragraph of the impugned order dated 29.01.2025 reads as

under:

“56. One Sri.K.N.Ramesh, State Project Director, Samagra

Shikshana, Karnataka was the Returning Officer to the

No. 12 Chikkamagaiuru Local Authorities Constituency-

2021. He was examined as RW2 in E.P.No.3/2022. In his

evidence, he has stated that it is not possible to identify

the voting made by the voters based on the ballot papers

alone. He has further stated that it is possible to segregate

votes of nominated members by comparing the ballot

papers, counterfoils and marked copy of the electoral rolls.

Further, he added that, it may violate the provisions of the

secrecy of voting. However, it is his evidence that it is

possible to segregate the votes of nominated members.”

46. Therefore, the direction issued by the High Court is not an open-

ended exercise into individual voting preferences, however, a

necessary exercise confined to excluding votes which were

found to be void in law.

47. The reasoning adopted by the High Court is fully consistent with

the constitutional objective of preserving democratic

governance through elected representatives. No perversity,

manifest illegality or jurisdictional error has been demonstrated

warranting interference under Article 136 of the Constitution.

42

CONCLUSION

48. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the

nominated members appointed under Section 352(1)(b) of the

KMA were not entitled to be included in the electoral roll

prepared for the Local Authorities’ Constituency and their

inclusion was contrary to the constitutional scheme and cannot

be sustained in law.

49. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no error in the view taken by

the High Court of Karnataka in the impugned common order

dated 29.01.2025 in Election Petition Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of 2022

and in the impugned common judgment and order dated

20.04.2023 in Writ Appeal Nos. 1247, 1256 and 1250 of 2022.

Accordingly, the present appeals stand dismissed.

50. The Registry is directed to transmit the sealed cover containing

the recount report and the revised result to the Registrar

General, High Court of Karnataka, forthwith. The respondent-

authorities thereafter shall take appropriate steps as per the

directions issued by the High Court in the order dated

29.01.2025 passed in Election Petition No. 1 of 2022 and the

43

allied matters, within a period of 30 days from the date of this

judgment, and thereafter, submit the report before the High

Court as directed in the order dated 29.01.2025.

51. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

.……………………………CJI

SURYA KANT

………………………………J.

JOYMALYA BAGCHI

………………………………J.

VIPUL M. PANCHOLI

NEW DELHI

JULY 16, 2026