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Pratap Mehta Vs. Sunil Gupta and Ors.

  Supreme Court Of India Civil Appeal /8172/2018
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Case Background

The appellant has lodged Letters Patent Appeals challenging the High Court of Delhi's unified judgment, in which the Learned Single Judge resolved the writ petitions with specific directives.

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REPORTABLE

  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8172­8173 OF 2018

PRATAP MEHTA   … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

SUNIL GUPTA & ORS.               … RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8174­8177 OF 2018

BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA  … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE BAR COUNCIL OF M.P. 

& ORS. ETC.                   … RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

These   appeals   have   been   filed   against   the   common

judgment dated 17.07.2018 of the High Court of Delhi in

Letters   Patent   Appeal   NO.365/2018   and   other   connected

LPAs. Letters Patent Appeals were filed by the appellant

aggrieved by common judgment dated 06.07.2018 of learned

Single Judge in Writ Petition(C)No.2142 of 2016 (State

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Bar Council of M.P. vs. Bar Council of India & Ors.)

and Writ Petition (C) No.2215 of 2016 (Sunil Gupta vs.

Bar Council of India & Ors.).  Learned Single Judge vide

its   judgment   dated   06.07.2018   disposed   of   the   writ

petitions with certain directions.

2.The brief facts of the case necessary to be noted

for deciding these appeals are:

State   Bar   Council   of   Madhya   Pradesh   held   the

elections for its constituent members in the month of

May­June, 2014. After declaration of the result notice

dated   09.06.2014   was   issued   for   holding   the   first

meeting of newly elected members on 29.06.2014.  Agenda

for the meeting to be held on 29.06.2014 was to conduct

the elections for the various offices and the Committees

of the State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh including the

office of its representative member in the Bar Council

of India. In these appeals we are concerned only with

one Agenda item which is to the following effect:

" Part­B

Serial   No.1:   Discussion,   consideration   and

decision   regarding   the   election   of   the

representative member of the Bar Council for

the Bar Council of India.”

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3.Pursuant to notice dated 09.06.2014, a meeting  was

held   on   29.06.2014,   which   was   presided   over   by   the

Advocate General of the State of Madhya Pradesh and was

attended by all the 25 members of the State Bar Council

of M.P. In the meeting, one Shri Rameshwar Neekhra was

elected as Chairman.

4.The   case   of   the   respondents,   who   were   writ

petitioners before the High Court was that in the said

meeting,   election   for   other   office   bearers   including

election   for   representative   member   of   the   State   Bar

Council to Bar Council of India was held in which Shri

Sunil Gupta was unanimously elected. Shri Sunil Gupta,

also started working as member representative in the Bar

Council of India. On 29.06.2014, 9 members of the State

Bar Council wrote a letter to its Secretary requesting

him to organise a meeting for conducting elections to

the   various   offices   and   Committees   of   the   State   Bar

Council. It was further alleged in the letter that after

the election of Chairman on 29.06.2014, the meeting has

been   adjourned   and   the   members   without   any   further

notice to the members who had thereafter left the place

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of   meeting,   reconvened   the   meeting   and   elected   Shri

Sunil   Gupta   as   representative   of   the   Bar   Council   of

India. A letter dated 13.07.2014 was also sent to the

above effect by 13 members.

5.On   13.07.2014   another   letter   was   sent   to   the

Secretary   by   13   members   requesting   to   consider   a   no­

confidence   motion   under   Rule   122A   of   the   State   Bar

Council of  M.P. Rules  against  Shri  Rameshwar  Neekhra,

the   Chairman.   Taking   cognizance   of   the   letters   dated

29.06.2014 and 13.07.2014 sent by various members to the

Secretary, notice dated 16.07.2014/19.07.2014 was issued

to the members of State Bar Council informing them of a

special meeting scheduled to be held on 02.08.2014 for

deciding the issues brought forth in the said letters.

The   special   meeting   was   convened   on   02.08.2014.   The

proposed   no­confidence   motion   against   Chairman   was

withdrawn, Chairman relying on the various letters sent

by   the   members   declared   all   the   elections   held   on

29.06.2014   except   his   own,   as   void.   All   the   office

bearers   and   members   who   were   elected   on   29.06.2014

submitted their resignations from their respective posts

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except   Shri   Sunil   Gupta   who   refused   to   resign   as

representative   to   the   Bar   Council   of   India.   On

02.08.2014,   election   of   several   officer   bearers

including representative to the Bar Council of India was

conducted   in   which   Shri   Pratap   Mehta   was   declared

elected as representative of the State Bar Council to

the Bar Council of India. 

6. Aggrieved   by   the   Resolution   dated   02.08.2014

electing Shri Pratap Mehta, Election Petition No.01/2014

was filed by Shri Sunil Gupta before the Bar Council of

India.   During   pendency   of   the   aforesaid   Election

Petition,   State   Bar   Council   passed   Resolution   on

07.02.2015, with a majority of 17 votes, withdrawing its

earlier   Resolution   dated   02.08.2014,   thereby   re­

affirming  that  Shri Sunil  Gupta is  its  representative

member in the Bar Council of India. Shri Sunil Gupta

filed   an   application   on   11.02.2015   before   the   Bar

Council   of   India   for   seeking   leave   to   withdraw   his

Election   Petition   No.01/2014.   However,   instead   of

permitting for withdrawal, Chairman of the Bar Council

of India passed an order dated 16.11.2015 observing that

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Pratap Mehta has  prima facie  case, hence, he permitted

Pratap Mehta to join as representative of the State Bar

Council in the Bar Council of India pending the final

report  of  the  sub­committee which  was  constituted  for

enquiring   into   the   elections   of   Shri   Sunil   Gupta   and

Shri   Pratap   Mehta.   The   sub­committee   submitted   its

report in which report sub­committee found that election

of   Shri   Sunil   Gupta   cannot   be   held   to   be   valid   as

representative of State Bar Council in the Bar Council

of India rather it is Shri Pratap Mehta who was elected

on   02.08.2014   in   continuation   of   the   meeting   held   on

29.06.2014   which   meeting   was   held   to   dispose   of   and

transact the un­transacted business which was fixed for

29.06.2014.   The   Bar   Council   of   India   passed   an   order

dated 05.12.2015, dismissing the Election Petition filed

by   Shri   Sunil   Gupta.   Bar   Council   of   India   held   that

there is no infirmity in the election of Shri Pratap

Mehta as representative to the Bar Council of India. 

7.The State Bar Council of M.P. withdrew Writ Petition

(C) No.No.973 of 2016 challenging order dated 16.11.2015

and Writ Petition(C) No.2142 of 2016 was filed by the

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State   Bar   Council   of   M.P.   challenging   order   dated

05.12.2015   of   the   Bar   Council   of   India.   Another   Writ

Petition   (C)No.2215   of   2016   was   filed   by   Shri   Sunil

Gupta challenging order dated 05.12.2015 passed by the

Bar Council of India. Both the writ petitions were heard

by the learned Single Judge and have been decided by a

common judgment dated 06.07.2018. Learned Single Judge

held that election of Shri Sunil Gupta as representative

in   the   Bar   Council   of   India   dated   29.06.2014   is   not

valid.   Learned   Single   Judge   also   held   that   election

dated   02.08.2014   electing   Shri   Pratap   Mehta   as

representative in the Bar Council of India is also not

valid it having been held contrary to the Bar Council of

India Rules.

8.The   learned   Single   Judge   vide   its   judgment   dated

06.07.2018   allowed   few   of   the   prayers   made   by   writ

petitioners,   however,   certain   other   prayers   were

refused.   Allowing  the  petition,  learned  Single Judge

held that election of representative in Bar Council of

India from the State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh held

on 29.06.2014 as well as 02.08.2014 were both invalid.

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In the circumstances, learned Single Judge took the view

that   the   State   Bar   Council   cannot   be   without   any

representative   in   the   Bar   Council   of   India,   hence   he

directed for holding of fresh elections by the State Bar

Council to elect its representative in the Bar Council

of India.   Paragraph 45 of the judgment contains the

operative   portion   of   the   judgment,   which   is   to   the

following effect:­

“45. The prayers in the writ petitions, so far

as   they   seek   implementation   of   the

Petitioner s Resolutions dated 29.06.2014 and

07.02.2015 electing the Respondent No. 3 as a

member  representative  of   Petitioner/SBCMP  in

the   Respondent   No.1/BCI,   are   rejected.

However,   the   prayer   quashing   the   Respondent

No.   1 s   Impugned   Order   dated   05.12.2015   is

allowed   and   accordingly   the   Impugned   Order

dated 05.12.2015 is quashed and set aside. The

Petitioner in W.P.(C) No.2142/2016, i.e., the

State   Bar   Council   of   Madhya   Pradesh   is

directed to hold within a period of 4 weeks,

fresh   elections   for   electing   its

representative   member   in   the   Respondent

No.1/BCI   by   following   the   procedure   as

prescribed   in   the   BCI   Rules.   Upon   the

Petitioner   communicating   the   result   of   the

election to be held in terms of the aforesaid

directions to the Respondent No.  1/BCI, the

said Respondent No. 1 would take consequential

steps   to   include   the   name   of   the   person

elected   by   the   Petitioner/SBCMP   as   its

representative   member   in   the   Respondent   No.

1/BCI.”

 

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9.Aggrieved   by   the   judgment   dated   06.07.2018,   Shri

Pratap   Mehta   and   Bar   Council   of   India   filed   letters

patent   appeals   before   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High

Court.   All the appeals were dismissed by the Division

Bench vide its judgment dated 17.07.2018.   Shri Pratap

Mehta aggrieved by said judgment has filed Civil Appeal

Nos. 8172­8173 of 2018 whereas Bar Council of India has

filed   Civil   Appeal   Nos.   8174­8177   of   2018.     All   the

appeals have been heard together.

10.Shri   Vikas   Singh,   learned   senior   counsel   has

appeared for Shri Pratap Mehta whereas Shri S.N. Bhat

has   appeared   for   Bar   Council   of   India.       Shri   Vikas

Upadhyay,   learned   counsel   has   appeared   for   State   Bar

Council   of   Madhya   Pradesh.     Shri   Nitin   Gaur,   learned

counsel has appeared on behalf of Shri Sunil Gupta.

11.Shri Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel appearing

for the appellants submits that High Court committed an

error in exceeding its jurisdiction under Article 226 by

entering into the issues of the facts by re­appreciating

evidence.  It is submitted that High Court under Article

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226 could not have re­appreciated evidence and come to a

different conclusion to one which was arrived at by Bar

Council of India, the adjudicating authority, regarding

election   of   State   Bar   Council   for   electing   a

representative   to   the   Bar   Council   of   India.     It   is

submitted that both learned Single Judge as well as the

Division   Bench   of   the   Delhi   High   Court   committed   an

error in holding that there was no agenda for holding

election of the State Bar Council representative for Bar

Council of India for the meeting dated 02.08.2014. It is

submitted that for the meeting dated 02.08.2014, letters

of the members of the State Bar Council dated 29.06.2014

as well as 13.07.2014 itself contain items, which were

to be considered in the meeting to be scheduled, hence

agenda of the meeting was very much clear and High Court

erred in setting aside the election dated 02.08.2014 on

an erroneous ground.  The meeting dated 02.08.2014 being

an adjourned meeting of 29.06.2014, no separate agenda

was   required   to   be   issued   for   the   meeting   dated

02.08.2014.  

12.Shri Vikas Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing for

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State   Bar   Council   submits   that   the   meeting   dated

02.08.2014 was not an adjourned meeting of meeting dated

29.06.2014. He submits that special meeting was convened

by   the   Secretary   of   the   State   Bar   Council   to   take   a

decision on the letter dated 29.06.2014 and 13.07.2014

given by members of the State Bar Council. The question

as to whether the election of representative to the Bar

Council of India was validly held on 29.06.2014, was a

disputed   question,   which   was   required   to   be   decided

before   holding   any   fresh   election,   hence   no   fresh

election could have been held on 02.08.2014.  He further

submits that the Bar Council of India Rules framed under

the   Advocates   Act,   1961   are   statutory   rules,   which

govern election of the member of the State Bar Council

to the Bar Council of India, which election is to be

held   in   accordance   with   the   Statutory   Rules.     The

election dated 02.08.2014 for electing a member of the

State Bar Council to the Bar Council of India having not

been held in accordance with Part II of Bar Council of

India   Rules   has   rightly   been   invalidated   by   the   High

Court.   It is submitted that election dated 02.08.2014

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is in breach of Rules 2, 3 and 7.   He further submits

that State Bar Council having already elected Shri Sunil

Gupta   as   its   member   in   the   Bar   Council   of   India   on

29.06.2014, the said election could not have been set

aside   except   in   accordance   with   the   procedure   as

prescribed in Rule 9 of the Bar Council of India Rules.

There was no challenge to the election dated 29.06.2014

of Shri Sunil Gupta as per Rule 9, hence it was not

within the jurisdiction of State Bar Council to elect

another representative in place of Shri Sunil Gupta. He

submits that in the Election Petition No.1 of 2014 filed

by Shri Sunil Gupta in spite of there being application

by Shri Sunil Gupta to withdraw the election petition in

view of the resolution of the State Bar Council dated

07.02.2015,   the   Bar   Council   of   India   erroneously

proceeded to decide the election petition on 05.12.2015.

He   further   submits   that   in   pursuance   of   judgment   of

learned Single Judge as confirmed by Division Bench on

17.07.2018, the State Bar Council has fixed 12.08.2018

for   holding   election   of   the   State   Bar   Council’s

representative   in   the   Bar   Council   of   India,   which

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election has been held on 12.08.2018 and the result of

the election in pursuance of order of this Court dated

03.10.2018  has been submitted before this Court in the

sealed envelope on the date fixed for hearing.  

13.Learned   counsel   for   the   Bar   Council   of   India

supported the decision of the Bar Council of India dated

05.12.2015.   It is submitted that in the meeting dated

29.06.2014, no election was held except the election of

Chairman.   After election of Chairman, the meeting was

adjourned, which is recorded in the meeting itself.  The

letter   dated   29.06.2014   and   13.07.2014   submitted   by

members   of   the   State   Bar   Council   were   for   fixing   a

meeting to hold rest of the elections and that meeting

having been fixed for 02.08.2014, no fresh agenda was

required to be issued and there was no illegality in the

meeting dated 02.08.2014.  It is further submitted that

on 02.08.2014, apart from electing the representative to

the Bar Council of India, rest of the elections were

conducted   and   no   one   has   any   objections   regarding

elections  held  on  02.08.2014  except Shri  Sunil  Gupta,

who did not submit his resignation on that day whereas

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all   other   office   bearers   and   members   elected   on

29.06.2014 has submitted their resignations. He submits

that   High   Court   committed   an   error   in   holding   that

election dated 02.08.2014 in so far as it relates to

representative of State Bar Council in the Bar Council

of India is not correct.  

14.We have considered the respective submissions of the

parties and have perused the records.  

15.The entire dispute in the present appeals centres

round   the   election   dated   02.08.2014   in   so   far   as   it

relates to election of Shri Pratap Mehta as State Bar

Council representative in the Bar Council of India.  The

learned Single Judge having held that election of Shri

Sunil   Gupta   on   29.06.2014   as   State   Bar   Council

representative in the Bar Council of India was not valid

and the said decision having not been challenged either

by the State Bar Council or by Shri Sunil Gupta,   the

said issue has become final between the parties.   The

High Court having held that election dated 02.08.2014 is

not   valid   in   so   far   as   it   relates   to   election   of

representative of State Bar Council in the Bar Council

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of India is concerned, the only issue to be answered is

as to whether the said election is valid or not?

16.The Advocates Act, 1961, Section 4 provides for the

Bar Council of India.   According to Section 4(1)(c) in

the Bar Council of India, one member has to be elected

by   each   State   Bar   Council   from   amongst   its   members.

Section 4(1)(c) is as follows:­

“4. Bar Council of India.­(1) There shall be a

Bar Council for the territories to which this

Act extends to be known as the Bar Council of

India   which   shall   consist   of   the   following

members, namely:­

(a)... ... ...

(b)... ... ...

(c) one member elected  by each  State  Bar  

    Council from amongst its members.”

17.Under Section 49 of the Advocates Act, 1961, Bar

Council   of   India   is   empowered   to   make   rules   for

discharging its functions.   In exercise of power under

Section   49   and   all   other   enabling   powers   under   the

Advocates Act, 1961, the Bar Council of India has framed

the Bar Council of India Rules. Chapter I of Part II of

the Rules refers to Section 15, Sections 4 and 10B of

the   Advocates   Act,   1961.     Chapter   I   Part   II   of   the

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Rules, thus, are to give effect to provisions of Section

4 of the Act, which provides for constitution of Bar

Council   of   India   in   which   one   of   its   members   to   be

elected   by   each   State   Bar   Council   from   amongst   its

members.  Rule 2, Rule 3 and rule 7 of Chapter I of Part

II of the Rules are as follows:­

“2.   (1)   The   notice   and   agenda   for   the

first meeting of the State Council held after

the election of its members on the expiry of

the   term   of   its   members   elected   at   the

previous election under Section 8 of the Act

may include the election of a member of the

State Council to the Council under Section (1)

(c) of the Act. 

(2) Every such election shall be held not

later than 30 days after the first meeting of

the State Council after election under Section

8 of the Act. 

3. The election of a member of the Council

shall   be   conducted   by   the   Secretary   of   the

State Council who shall act as the Returning

Officer. 

7. Every notice by the Secretary of the

State Council fixing a date for the election

of a member to the Council under these rules

shall   be   sent   not   less   than   15   clear   days

before the date fixed for the election. A copy

of   the   said   notice   shall   be   sent

simultaneously   to   the   Secretary   of   the

Council.”

18.A conjoint reading of the aforesaid Rules indicate

that for holding election of a member of Bar Council of

India to be elected by State Bar Council, notice and

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agenda has to be issued by the Secretary of the State

Bar Council, which is a statutory requirement.  There is

no   issue   between   the   parties   regarding   the   fact   that

agenda dated 09.06.2014 was issued for the meeting of

the   members   of   the   State   Bar   Council   on   29.06.2014

including   the   agenda   for   electing   a   member   from   the

State Bar Council to the Bar Council of India as noticed

above. Minutes of the meeting dated 29.06.2014 has been

brought on the record in Civil Appeal Nos. 8174­8177 of

2018   as   Annexure   A4.   A   perusal   of   the   proceeding

indicates   that   all   25   elected   members   and   learned

Advocate General, who is Ex­officio member was present

and meeting started at 11.00 am and by 12.00 noon, the

election   of   the   Chairman   was   completed.     The   Minutes

record that for greeting the newly elected Chairman and

to see­off learned Advocate General, the proceeding of

the meeting were stayed/adjourned and thereafter again

the meeting started in presence of members for election

of   rest   of   the   office   bearers   and   members   of   the

Committees.  It is useful to refer to the above portion

of the proceeding (English translation of the proceeding

18

brought on record), which is to the following effect:­

“The meeting of the Council started at 11:00

am   at   morning   and   till   12:00   noon   the

election for the post Chairman was completed

and in wishing the newly elected Chairman and

for   giving   respectful   departure   to   the

Hon’ble Advocate, the working of the meeting

was stayed.  Thereafter, again the meeting of

general   assembly   was   started   before   the

present   members   and   the   remaining   office

bearers   and   member   of   the   Council   were

elected.” 

19.The   proceeding   dated   29.06.2014   also   contain   a

resolution as Resolution No. 7 Part B, by which Shri

Sunil Gupta’s name was proposed and unanimously approved

as representative of the State Bar Council to the Bar

Council   of   India.     On   29.06.2014   itself,   9   members

submitted a letter addressed to Chairman of the State

Bar Council that no information of holding of adjourned

meeting   after   2.00   pm   was   received   by   them,   hence

adjourned meeting be called for completing the rest of

the elections.    To the same effect is another letter

dated 13.07.2014 by 13 members of the Bar Council of

State, which was received on 15.07.2014 by the State Bar

Council.  Another  letter  dated  13.07.2014  signed  by 13

members of the State Bar Council was submitted to the

19

State   Bar   Council   of   M.P.   requesting   for   convening   a

meeting under  Rule  122A for considering no  confidence

motion against the Chairman of the State Bar Council –

Shri Rameshwar Nikhra.  The Officiating Secretary of the

State Bar Council issued a notice dated 16.07.2014 to

all the members of the State Bar Council referring to

the   letters   received   from   members   where   election

proceeding   of   Vice­Chairman,   Treasurer   and

representative   to   the   Bar   Council   of   India   are   being

disputed   and   no   confidence   motion   has   been   presented

against   the   Chairman.     The   officiating   Secretary   has

convened a special meeting dated 02.08.2014 for disposal

of aforesaid letters received from the members of the

State Bar Council.   It is useful to extract the entire

notice dated 16.07.2014 issued by officiating Secretary,

which is to the following effect:­

“No.   –   SBC/MP/Important   Meeting/General

Body/4277/2014,

Date 16/07/2014

To,

All Hon'ble Members

State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh,

Sir/Ma'm„

The Special Meeting of the General Body of the

State   Bar   Council   of   Madhya   Pradesh   is

20

scheduled for 2nd August, 2014, Day­Saturday,

in the Meeting Room of the Council's Office at

11:   O'clock   in   the   Morning,   in   which   the

letter dated 29/06/2014 signed  by 9 Hon'bie

Members   of   the   Council,   two   letters   dated

13/07/2017 received on 14/07/2014 signed by 11

Hon'ble   Member   and   Two   letters   signed   by   2

Hon'ble   Members   received   by   e­mail   dated

15/07/2014 and one letter signed by 1 Hon'ble

Member   received   on   16/07/2014,   vide   which

because of the election process of the Vice

Chairman   of   the   Council,   Treasurer,   various

committees including the representative to the

Bar   Council   of   India   being   disputed,   a

proposal   for   no   confidence   against   the

Chairman   of   the   Council   has   been   submitted

under   Ru1e   122­A   of   the   Council.   In   the

special meeting both the aforesaid letters are

to be decided. You all are requested to be

present in the Meeting.

For   the   convenience   of   the   Hon’ble   Members

Rule 122­A of the Council is as under:­

"122­A   The   Chairman,   Vice   Chairman   or   the

Treasurer of the Council could be removed by a

vote of no confidence passed by majority of

the members present and voting in a meeting of

the council especially called for the purpose

provided   that   at   least   7   members   of   the

Council   have   signed   the   requisition   for

holding   such   a   special   meeting,   and   such

meeting shall be called within a period of 21

days   from   the   date   of   receipt   of   the

requisition by the Secretary”.

Sd/­

(MUKESH M1SHRA)

Officiating Secretary

ENCLOSED­   The   letters   dated   29/06/2014,

14/07/2014, 15/07/2014 and 16/07/2017 received

from the Hon’ble members.” 

21

20.Another   notice   referred   to   as   Amended   notice   of

letter dated 16.07.2014 convening a special meeting was

issued on 19.07.2014, which is to the following effect:­

No. ­ SBC/MP/Important Meeting/General 

Body/4311/2014,

Date 19/07/2014

Amended letter for date 16/07/2014 of Special

Meeting

To,

All Hon'bie Members

State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh,

Sir/Ma' m,

The Special Meeting of the General Body of the

State   Bar   Council   of   Madhya   Pradesh   is

scheduled for 2

nd

  August, 2014, Day­Saturday,

in the Meeting Room of the Council's Office at

11:   O'clock   in   the   Morning,   in   which   the

letter dated 29/06/2014 signed  by 9 Hon'ble

Members   of   the   Council,   two   letters   dated

13/07/2017 received on 14/07/2014 signed by 11

Hon'bie Members and Two letters signed by 2

Hon'ble   Members   received   by   e­mail   dated

15/07/2014 and two letters signed by 1 Hon'ble

Member received on 16/07/2014, in which vide

one letter the prayer has been made to call

for   the   meeting   for   election   of   the   Vice­

Chairman   of   Council,   Treasurer,   election   of

various   committees   along   with   the

representative to the Bar Council of India and

vide   the   second   letter   the   no­confidence

motion has been presented against the Chairman

of the Council under Rule 122­A of the Rules

of the Council.  In the special meeting both

aforesaid letters are to be decided.  You all

are requested to be present in the meeting.

[Enclosure­Page 1 to 7] 

For   the   convenience   of   the   Hon’ble   Members

Rule 122­A of the Council is as under:­

22

"122­A   The   Chairman,   Vice   Chairman   or   the

Treasurer of the Council could be removed by a

vote of no confidence passed by majority of

the members present and voting in a meeting of

the council especially called for the purpose

provided   that   at   least   7   members   of   the

Council   have   signed   the   requisition   for

holding   such   a   special   meeting,   and   such

meeting shall be called within a period of 21

days   from   the   date   of   receipt   of   the

requisition by the Secretary”.

Sd/­

(MUKESH M1SHRA)

Officiating Secretary

NOTE­ The letters received  from the Hon'bie

Members in relation to the Special Meeting has

already been sent alongwith the letter dated

16/07/2014.”

21.The   notice   dated   16.07.2014   as   well   as   dated

19.07.2014   clearly   indicate   that   special   meeting   was

convened for taking a decision on the letters received

from   members   of   the   Council.     The   notice   dated

19.07.2014   categorically   mentions   “in   the   special

meeting both aforesaid letters are to be decided” .  The

letters   dated   29.06.2014   and   13.07.2014   has   been

referred in the notice where following two subjects were

mentioned:­

(a)Request for convening a meeting for conducting

elections of the rest of the office bearers and

23

members;

(b)Under Rule 122­A, considering the motion of no

confidence   given   by   13   members   of   the   Bar

Council against the Chairman, Rameshwar Nikhra.

22.The notice dated 16.07.2014 clearly indicate that it

did not contain any agenda for the meeting.  The notice

convening the meeting only referred to consideration of

letters   received   from   the   members,   which   was

specifically   mentioned   as   noticed   above.   The   subject

mentioned   in   both   the   notices   was   to   the   following

effect:­

(i)Notice   dated   16.07.2014   “in   the

special   meeting   both   the   aforesaid   letters

are to be decided”;

(ii)Amended   notice   dated   19.07.2014  “in

the   special   meeting   both   aforesaid   letters

are to be decided”.

  

23.Shackleton  on   the   Law   and   Practices   of   Meetings,

Fourteenth   Edition,   while   dealing   with   the   subject

“notice” states following:­

“The purpose to be stated

A notice, to be valid, must clearly state the

business to be transacted at the meeting and

24

give all material information to enable it to

be fully understood.”

24.It is clear from the aforesaid that notices dated

16.07.2014 and 19.07.2014 were issued not for convening

any   adjourned   meeting   rather   special   meeting   was

convened to consider two set of letters given by members

of the Council  requesting for convening a meeting for

holding elections of office bearers and the members of

different   Committees   including   representative   to   Bar

Council   of   India   and   for   considering   no   confidence

motion against the Chairman of the State Bar Council.

In the notice dated 16.07.2014 as well as notice dated

19.07.2014, the subject of special meeting was thus for

disposal   of   letters   received   by   the   members   of   the

Council.   It is to be noted that the minutes of the

proceeding dated 29.06.2014 has recorded and signed by

Chairman   containing   the   election   of   not   only   the

Chairman   rather   election   of   other   office   bearers   and

different   representatives,   which   is   clear   from   the

proceedings   brought   on   the   record   by   Bar   Council   of

India itself as Annexure A4.   It is a well established

25

principle that minutes of the proceeding signed by the

Chairman   are   prima   facie   evidence   of   proceeding   and

decisions recorded therein are deemed to be valid until

contrary   is   proved.    Shackleton,   while   dealing   with

minutes as evidence in Chapter 8 states following:­

“8.  MINUTES AS EVIDENCE

8­07In general, minutes form evidence of the

matters   to   which   they   refer,   which   can   be

relied on in civil proceedings:

'In an action against one or several

members   of   the   Gosport   and   Forton

Water Works Company for the value of

lead pipes supplied by the plaintiffs

to   the   company,   after   the   defendant

had been proved to be a partner in the

company the entries in a book contain­

ing a record of the proceedings of the

society produced at its meetings, and

open,   to   the   inspection   of   ail

members,   were   admissible   in   evidence

against   the   defendant;   the   minutes

showed   that   the   order   had   been

authorised by the society:”

When minutes are signed by the chairman of

the meeting, or the next succeeding meeting,

they   are   prima   facie   evidence   of   the

proceedings,   and   decisions   recorded   therein

are deemed to be valid until the contrary is

proved.   In   practice,   certified   copies   of

minutes   are   frequently   provided   to   third

parties   as   evidence   of   the   matters   decided

upon at the Meeting.

The chairman of a meeting has authority to

determine all incidental questions which arise

26

at the meeting, and an entry by him in the

minute book of the result of a poll, or of his

decision   on   such   questions,   is   prima   facie

evidence   of   that   result,   and   the   onus   of

displacing that evidence  is thrown on those

who impeach the entry:”

25.Thus,   the   letters   issued   by   the   members   on

29.06.2014   and   13.07.2014   raised   a   dispute   containing

allegations  disputing  minutes of the proceeding of the

meeting dated 29.06.2014. Thus, it was a disputed matter

as to what actually happened on 29.06.2014, i.e. as to

whether   the   election   of   other   office   bearers   and

representatives were validly completed on 29.06.2014  or

after   the   election   of   the   Chairman,   the   meeting   was

adjourned.   This   dispute   was   to   be   resolved   in   the

special   meeting   dated   02.08.2014,   which   was   clearly

indicated by notice dated 16.07.2014 and 19.07.2014 as

indicated   above.     The   issue   of   agenda   alongwith   the

notice is requirement of a valid meeting and it is only

in   context   of   adjourned   meeting   that   no   fresh   agenda

need   to   be   issued.   The   notices   dated   16.07.2014   and

19.07.2014   having   not   contained   any   agenda   and   the

meeting also not being described as adjourned meeting,

27

issuance   of   agenda   for   the   meeting   was   necessary.

Issuance   of   an   agenda,   if   any   election   was   to   be

conducted on 02.08.2014 was necessary.  

26.We, thus, do not find any infirmity in the view of

the High Court ­ both of learned Single Judge as well as

the   Division   Bench   that   no   election   could   have   been

conducted on 02.08.2014 for electing member to the Bar

Council of India from the State Bar Council.   Further,

the election of the member to the Bar Council of India

is statutorily regulated by Bar Council of India Rules

and Rule 7 require notice by the Secretary of the State

Council fixing a date for the election of the member to

the Council. The notices dated 16.07.2014 and 19.07.2014

cannot be read as notice as required under Rule 7 for

holding election of a member to the Bar Council of India

from   the   State   Bar   Council,   hence,   the   conduct   of

election of a member as a representative from State Bar

Council to Bar Council of India in the meeting dated

02.08.2014 cannot be said to be in conformity with Rule

7 of Bar Council of India Rules.   The High Court was,

thus, clearly right in its view that election of Shri

28

Pratap Mehta on 02.08.2014 as member of the Bar Council

of India was not a valid election. The learned Single

Judge having already taken a view that election dated

29.06.2014   electing   Shri   Sunil   Gupta   as   the

representative to the Bar Council of India was not a

valid election, which issue was not, however, agitated

either   by   the   State   Council   or   by   Shri   Sunil   Gupta,

there   is   no   need   to   ponder   over   the   above   election.

Both  the  elections  dated  29.06.2014 and 02.08.2014  to

elect a member in the Bar Council of India having been

held to be invalid, the  High Court was right in issuing

directions for conducting a fresh election to elect a

member in the Bar Council of India, which was necessary

and just. 

27.Now, we come to the submission of Shri Vikas Singh

that High Court committed error in re­appreciating the

evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion

to one which was recorded by the Bar Council of India.

Shri   Vikas   Singh   has   relied   on   the   judgment   of   this

Court   in  Waryam   Singh   and   another   Vs.   Amarnath   and

another,   AIR   1954   SC   215;   Syed   Yakoob   Vs.   K.S.

29

Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 SC 477.

28.In  Waryam Singh (supra) , the landlord has filed a

petition for eviction on the ground of non­payment of

rent by the tenant.   The Rent Controller rejected the

application of the landlord against which landlord has

moved   to   the   Judicial   Commissioner,   Himachal   Pradesh.

Exercising   jurisdiction   under   Articles   226   and   227,

which allowed the application for ejectment of tenant,

which has been noted in Para 10 of the judgment, which

is to the following effect:­

“10.  The   respondents   moved   the   Judicial

Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, under Articles

226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for

setting aside the order of the District Judge.

The learned Judicial Commissioner held that in

view of the admitted failure to pay the rent

as provided by the rent deed or at the first

hearing   of   the   court   under   the   proviso   to

Section 13 (2) (i) the courts below had acted

arbitrarily in refusing to make an order for

ejectment against the tenants who had not done

what was incumbent on them to do under the law

and   that   such   a   situation   called   for

interference   by   the   Court   of   the   Judicial

Commissioner in order to keep the subordinate

courts within the bounds of their authority.

He, accordingly, set aside the orders of the

courts below and allowed the application for

ejectment   but   gave   the   appellants   three

months’ time for  vacating the premises. The

appellants have now come up before this court

on appeal by special leave obtained from this

30

court.”

29.The tenant challenged the orders under Articles 226

and 227 in this Court and one of the submissions raised

was   that   Judicial   Commissioner   acted   wholly   without

jurisdiction   in   as   much   as   the   order   of   the   Rent

Controller   exercising   powers   under   the   Act   was   not

amenable   to   the   jurisdiction   of   the   High   Court   under

Article 227, the said submission is noted in Para 11,

which is to the following effect:­ 

“11.  Learned advocate appearing in support

of this appeal urges that the learned Judicial

Commissioner acted wholly without jurisdiction

inasmuch   as   (1)   the   Rent   Controller   or   the

District Judge exercising powers under the Act

was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the

High Court and, therefore, Article 227 confers

no   power   on   the   Court   of   the   Judicial

Commissioner over the Rent Controller or the

District Judge, and (2) that Article 227 read

with Article 241 confers no power of judicial

superintendence on the Court of the Judicial

Commissioner.”

30.This Court repelled the submission of the tenant and

held  that  the  High  Court  has  judicial  superintendence

over tribunals and authorities.   In Paragraph Nos. 13

and 14, following has been laid down:­ 

“13.   Re. 2.—The material part of Article

227 substantially reproduces the provisions of

31

Section   107   of   the   Government   of   India

Act,1915,   except   that   the   power   of

superintendece   has   been   extended   by   the

Article   also   to   Tribunals.   That   the   Rent

Controller and the District Judge exercising

jurisdiction   under   the   Act   are   Tribunals

cannot and has not been controverted. The only

question raised is as to the nature of the

power   of   superintendence   conferred   by   the

Article. Reference is made to clause (2) of

the article in support of the contention that

this article only confers on the High Court

administrative   superintendence   over   the

subordinate   courts   and   tribunals.   We   are

unable   to   accept   this   contention   because

clause   (2)   is   expressed   to   be   without

prejudice to the generality of the provisions

in clause (1). Further, the preponderance of

judicial opinion in India was that Section 107

which was similar in terms to Section 15 of

the High Courts Act, 1861, gave a power of

judicial   superintendence   to   the   High   Court

apart from and independently of the provisions

of   other   laws   conferring   revisional

jurisdiction on the High Court. 

In this connection it has to be remembered

that Section 107 of the Government of India

Act, 1915, was reproduced in the Government of

India Act, 1935, as Section 224. Section 224

of   the   1935   Act,   however,   introduced   sub­

section   (2),   which   was   new,   providing   that

nothing in the section should be construed as

giving   the   High   Court   any   jurisdiction   to

question  any judgment of any  inferior court

which was not otherwise subject to appeal or

revision. The idea presumably was to nullify

the effect of the decisions of the different

High Courts referred to above. Section 224 of

the 1935 Act has been reproduced with certain

modifications   in   Article   227   of   the

Constitution. It is significant to note that

32

sub­section (2) to Section 224 of the 1935 Act

has been omitted from Article 227. 

This significant omission has been regarded

by all High Courts in India before whom this

question has arisen as having restored to the

High   Court   the   power   of   judicial

superintendence it had under Section 15 of the

High Courts Act, 1861, and Section 107 of the

Government of India Act, 1915. See the cases

referred to in Moti Lal v. The State through

Shrimati   Sagrawati1.   Our   attention   has   not

been   drawn   to   any   case   which   has   taken   a

different view and, as at present advised, we

see no reason to take a different view.

14. This power of superintendence conferred

by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries

C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar

Mukherjee2, to be exercised most sparingly and

only in appropriate cases in order to keep the

subordinate courts within the bounds of their

authority and not for correcting mere errors.

As   rightly   pointed   out   by   the   Judicial

Commissioner in the case before us the lower

courts   in   refusing   to   make   an   order   for

ejectment acted arbitrarily. The lower courts

realised   the   legal   position   but   in   effect

declined to do what was by Section 13(2)(i)

incumbent on them to do and thereby refused to

exercise jurisdiction vested in them by law.

It was, therefore, a case which called for an

interference   by   the   Court   of   the   Judicial

Commissioner  and it acted quite properly in

doing so. In our opinion there is no ground on

which   in   an   appeal   by   special   leave   under

Article 136 we should interfere. The appeal,

therefore, must stand dismissed with costs.”

31.The above decision in no manner support the

case of the appellant rather it reiterates that

33

the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 can

interfere with an arbitrary order passed by an

authority.   The   next   judgment   relied   by   the

appellant is Constitution Bench judgment of this

Court   in  Syed   Yakoob   (supra).  This   Court   had

elaborately considered the scope of Article 226

of the Constitution in the aforesaid case.  This

Court   held   that   a   writ   of   certiorari   can   be

issued   for   correcting   errors   of   jurisdiction

committed   by   inferior   courts   or   tribunals.   It

was further held that jurisdiction of High Court

under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari

is a supervisory jurisdiction and the High Court

exercising   it   is   not   entitled   to   act   as   an

appellate court.  

32.The findings of the fact reached by the inferior

Court   or   Tribunal   as   result   of   the   appreciation   of

evidence   cannot   be   reopened   or   questioned   in   writ

proceedings.   There cannot be any dispute to the above

propositions laid down by the Constitution Bench of this

Court.   However, in the same judgment, in paragraph 8,

34

following was laid down by this Court:­

“8. It is, of course, not easy to define or

adequately   describe   what   an   error   of   law

apparent on the face of the record means. What

can be corrected by a writ has to be an error

of law; hut it must be such an error of law as

can be regarded as one which is apparent on

the face of the record. Where it is manifest

or clear that the conclusion of law recorded

by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on

an obvious mis­interpretation of the relevant

statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance

of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or

is   expressly   founded   on   reasons   which   are

wrong   in   law,   the   said   conclusion   can   be

corrected   by   a   writ   of   certiorari.   In   all

these cases, the impugned conclusion should be

so   plainly   inconsistent   with   the   relevant

statutory   provision   that   no   difficulty   is

experienced by the High Court in holding that

the said error of law is apparent on the face

of the record. It may also be that in some

cases, the impugned error of law may not be

obvious or patent on the face of the record as

such and the Court may need an argument to

discover the said error; but there can be no

doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of

certiorari is an error of law and the said

error   must,   on   the   whole,   be   of   such   a

character as would satisfy the test that it is

an error of law apparent on the face of the

record……………………..”

33.Applying the above proposition in the present case,

it was clear that High Court had referred to statutory

provisions of Bar Council of India Rules and came to the

35

conclusion   that   there   was   no   notice   of   agenda   for

holding election of the State Bar Council member in the

Bar Council of India for meeting dated 02.08.2014.   An

obvious error of law was committed by Bar Council of

India in dismissing the election petition of Shri Sunil

Gupta.     The   High   Court   was   right   in   exercise   of   its

certiorari jurisdiction to set aside the erroneous order

of the Bar Council of India.  The High Court was, thus,

well   within   its   jurisdiction   in   deciding   the   writ

petition and submission of the learned counsel for the

appellant   cannot   be   accepted   that   the   High   Court

exceeded its jurisdiction in deciding the writ petition.

  

34.Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on

K.   Narasimhiah   Vs.   H.C.   Singri   Gowda   and   others,   AIR

1966 SCC 330.   In the above case, this Court held that

three   days   clear   notice   to   Councillors   for   holding   a

special general meeting is not mandatory.  What was held

that period of notice in the facts of that case was not

mandatory.     Present   is   not   a   case   where   any   one   has

complained that there was no notice for meeting to be

held on 02.08.2014.  In the above case also, the notice

36

was   received   by   members,   some   of   them   have   received

three days notice, some of them had received notice of

less than three days.  In the above circumstances, this

Court held that provision of three days notice was only

directory and not mandatory.   The said judgment has no

application in the present case.

35.Another   judgment   relied   by   the   appellant   is  P.

Kasilingam Vs. P.S.G. College of Technology, AIR 1981 SC

789.   In the said case, this Court was dealing with a

question   regarding   effectiveness   of   resignation   and

consequence   of   withdrawal   of   resignation   before   the

effective date.  The said case has no application in the

present case.  Last case relied by the appellant is  V.S.

Krishnan and others Vs. Westfort Hi­tech Hospital Ltd.

and Others, (2008) 3 SCC 363 .   In the above case, the

Court held that when there are materials to show that

notices were sent, the burden is on the addressee to

rebut   the   statutory   presumption.   In   paragraph   29,

following has been held:­     

“29.  Section   172   as   well   as   Section   53

emphasised   “giving   notice”.   We   have   already

adverted to how notice should be given for AGM

37

as per Section 172(2) and Sections 53(1) and

(2) of the Act. In view of the fact that the

Company has placed materials to substantiate

that   notices,   in   terms   of   the   above

provisions, were given, as rightly pointed out

by learned Senior Counsel for the contesting

respondents,   statutory   presumption   under

Section 53 will apply though the said act is

rebuttable. In view of the fact that there are

materials to show that notices were sent, the

burden   is   on   the   addressee   to   rebut   the

statutory   presumption.   The   High   Court,   on

verification of those materials, has concluded

that “postal receipt with post office seal was

produced to show that notice was sent to all

shareholders by certificate of posting in the

correct address as per the report”.”

36.In   the   present   case,   challenge   to   the   proceeding

dated 02.08.2014 was not on the ground of want of notice

for the special meeting, hence this case also does not

help the appellant in the present case.

37.Learned counsel appearing for the State Bar Council

has   produced   the   result   of   fresh   election   dated

12.08.2018 as conducted in pursuance of the directions

of the High Court, which election was also permitted by

this Court vide its order dated 09.08.2018 but with a

condition that the result thereof shall not be declared

without the permission of the Court.

38

38.In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the

view that there are no merits in these appeals, which

are hereby dismissed.   In view of the dismissal of the

appeals, the election already conducted on 12.08.2018 be

given   effect   to   by   all   concerned.     The   appeals   are

dismissed subject to above.   Parties shall bear their

own costs.

            ..........................J.

( A.K. SIKRI )

..........................J.

    ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )

NEW DELHI,

November 02, 2018.

       

        

   

  

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