Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CONTEMPT PETITION NO.330 OF 2025

IN

APPEAL FROM ORDER NO.874 OF 2024

Preeti Manohar Sakpal ]

D/o Manohar Baburao Sakpal (deceased) ]

M/s. Video Game Parlour, ]

Aged-41 years, Occupation – Services, ]

Residing at M. G. Road, Near Tilak Road, ]

Santacruz (w), Mumbai – 400 054 ] …Petitioner

(Original Appellant)

V/s.

1. The Municipal Corporation of Greater ]

Mumbai, (a body, Corporate, Incorporated ]

under the Provision of B.M.C. Act, 1888), ]

having its Head of�ce at Annex Building, ]

Mahapalika Marg, Fort, Mumbai – 400 001. ]

2. Sachin Hanamdhar, ]

Assistant Engineer, “H/W” Ward ]

Of�ce of the Assistant Commissioner ]

“H/W” Ward, 2

nd

Hasnabad Lane, ]

BMC building, ]

Khar (w), Mumbai – 400 052. ] … Respondent/

Contemnors

WITH

APPEAL FROM ORDER NO.874 OF 2024

WITH

INTERIM APPLICATION NO.15379 OF 2024

Preeti Manohar Sakpal ]

D/o Manohar Baburao Sakpal (deceased) ]

M/s. Video Game Parlour, ]

Aged-35 years, Occupation – Services, ]

Residing at M. G. Road, Near Tilak Road, ]

Santacruz (w), Mumbai – 400 054 ] …Petitioner

(Original Appellant)

V/s.

1

SUMEDH

NAMDEO

SONAWANE

Digitally

signed by

SUMEDH

NAMDEO

SONAWANE

Date:

2026.02.10

18:59:17

+0530

Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc

The Municipal Corporation of Greater ]

Mumbai, (a body, Corporate, Incorporated ]

under the Provision of B.M.C. Act, 1888), ]

having its Head of�ce at Annex Building, ]

Mahapalika Marg, Fort, Mumbai – 400 001. ] … Respondent

(Orig. Defendants)

______________________________________

Mr. Abhishek L. Tripathi a/w. Adv. Bharat Tiwari for the

Petitioner.

Mr. Girish Godbole, Senior Advocate a/w. Mr. S.B. Vajale i/by Adv.

Komal Punjabi for the Respondent-BMC.

Dr. Dhruti Kapadia a/w. Adv. Kavita Dhanuka for Respondent

No.2.

_____________________________________________

CORAM : KAMAL KHATA, J.

RESERVED ON : 28TH JANUARY 2026.

PRONOUNCED ON : 10TH FEBRUARY 2026.

JUDGMENT:

1) By the present Appeal, the Appellant seeks to set aside the

impugned Order dated 7

th

May 2024 passed by City Civil Court,

Dindoshi, in Notice of Motion No.2767 of 2019 in L.C. Suit No.1879

of 2019, whereby the Trial Court dismissed the said Notice of

Motion.

2) The Notice of Motion taken out by the Appellant-Plaintiff

sought an interim order to restrain the Defendant – Brihanmumbai

Municipal Corporation (‘BMC’) from demolishing the Suit

structure or any part thereof situated on M.G. road, Near Tilak

Nagar Road, Santacruz (W), Mumbai – 400 054.

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FACTS & RIVAL SUBMISSIONS

3) Mr. Abhishek Tripathi, Advocate for the Appellant, submitted

that the Appellant’s father had acquired the premises from one

Shri Pandurang Gawade under an agreement dated 12

th

September

1986 for a sum of Rs.95,000/-. He submitted that in 1987, an

application was made for transfer of electricity meter in

Appellant’s name. He further submitted that the Additional

Tahsildar had issued a Notice dated 3

rd

February 2012 under

Section 45 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act,

1966 (‘MRTP Act’), which according to him establishes that the

Suit premises was in existence prior to the datum line. He

contended that the Notice under Section 314 of the Brihanmumbai

Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (‘BMC Act’) could not have been

issued to the Appellant, as the Appellant has been in uninterrupted

use and occupation of the Suit premises several decades.

4) He submitted that the Notice dated 30

th

July 2019 is

ordinarily issued in respect of hawkers’ stalls and is therefore

unsustainable in law. He further submitted that the Appellant has

been paying applicable taxes. He contended that the Trial Court

erred in holding that the Appellant failed to establish that the land

on which the structure stands is non-agricultural land. He

submitted that the Trial Court ignored the order dated 5

th

March

2002, which according to him substantiates that the Suit structure

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is permanent structure. He further submitted that the electricity

bills on record demonstrate the existence of the Suit premises for

over 40 years. He contended that the the Trial Court has

erroneously treated the suit premises as unauthorized and has

mixed up the reference to open space in the agreement with the

structure of the shop admeasuring 40 x 10 feet. He further

submitted that the BMC has also issued a shop and establishment

certi�cate for running the business of video games. According to

him, in view of the documentary evidence including electricity

bills, payment of the non-agricultural tax, and the agreement of

dated 1986, the Appellant was entitled to an order of injunction.

5) He further submitted that the impugned notice has been

issued under the guise of road widening, whereas in fact the Suit

premises is neither situated on the road nor abutting any nala. He

submitted that there are two other structures abutting the road,

behind which the Appellant premises is situated. He contended

that the land in dispute does not form part of a public street and

that the disputed structure is not situated on, nor touching, any

street— a fact which is evident from the impugned notice itself. He,

therefore, submitted that considering the long-standing existence

of the Suit premises, a notice under Section 314 of the BMC Act

could not have been issued. He submits that the Notice under

Section 314 is vague, sham, and does not disclose any reasons.

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6) He further submitted that a notice under Section 314 of the

BMC Act is ordinarily issued in cases relating to hawkers and,

therefore, could not have been invoked in the present case,

particularly having regard to the long-standing existence of the

suit premises. It was contended that the impugned notice is vague

and non-speaking, as it does not disclose any reasons or furnish

particulars such as the description of the land, the area of the

structure, or other material details. He submitted that, if at all any

action was warranted, the BMC ought to have proceeded under

Section 351 by affording him an opportunity of hearing and by

following due process of law.

7) He further submitted that the Contempt Petition ought to be

taken up �rst, alleging breach of the Court’s order dated 27th

November 2024. It was contended that notwithstanding a

subsisting stay granted in favour of the Appellant, the BMC had

demolished a portion of the premises. He submitted that although

the said portion was subsequently reconstructed, it was of a

smaller extent than the original, and that in the meantime the

BMC had permitted two additional structures adjacent to the

Appellant’s premises. He therefore sought restoration of the

premises to its original size and, on that basis, urged initiation of

appropriate action against the concerned BMC of�cers for alleged

disobedience of the Court’s orders.

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8) On the aforesaid submissions, the learned Advocate

submitted that the impugned Order dated 7

th

May 2024 deserves

to be set aside.

9)

Per Contra Mr. Godbole for the Respondent submitted that

the Suit is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. The

structure is constructed in gross breach and violations of the

provisions of the BMC Act. The unauthorised construction is

admeasuring 10.40 mtrs x 1.6 mtrs is on the Municipal footpath as

per the BMC plan. The sanctioned plan also establishes that the

structure was not constructed prior to the datum line. The

Appellant has obtained no approval or obtained any permission

from the BMC. The Appellant has failed to produce any document

establishing it to be an authorised structure and consequently the

Appellant is not entitled to any relief. There are neither pleadings

nor documents to support the contention of the Appellant and does

not deserve any protection from demolition.

10) The notice was issued to all illegal structures on the street as

these structures were causing obstruction in the implementation

of a Public Project and for improvement of traf�c �ow in the area.

11) The learned Senior Counsel relied on the de�nition of “street”

under section 3 (w) of the BMC Act to submit that the Appellant’s

structure is on the street and consequently the BMC is entitled to

demolish it. He submitted that an encroachment on a public place

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could be dealt with under section 314 of the BMC Act.

12) Relying upon the af�davits of the Assistant Engineer, he

submitted that the subject structure was situated on a public road

abutting the Santacruz (West) Railway Station. He submitted that

during a demolition drive undertaken by the BMC on 15th May

2025 to remove unauthorised structures, vendors and roof

projections from the station road—almost six months after the

order dated 27th November 2024—the Appellant’s stall, which was

one amongst thirty-eight such stalls, came to be partially

demolished inadvertently. He explained that no one from the

Appellant’s side was present when the demolition staff arrived at

site, and consequently a portion of the structure was damaged and

demolished. However, immediately upon the Court’s order being

brought to the notice of the staff, the demolition of the suit

structure was stopped. It was therefore submitted that the partial

demolition was neither intentional nor mala �de, as alleged. He

further submitted that the structures were reconstructed on 16th

August 2025, and that the Appellants had acknowledged due

reconstruction. He submitted that the present Contempt Petition

has been �led only to delay the adjudication of the Appeal and

thereby continue the protection of an illegal structure. He further

submitted that the Appellant’s contention that the reconstruction

was accepted “without prejudice” is itself mala �de and aimed at

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deriving bene�ts to which the Appellant is not entitled.

13) In view of the foregoing submissions, it is submitted that the

Appeal is liable to be dismissed and that the Contempt Petition also

deserves to be disposed of, the alleged contempt having already

been purged by the Respondents.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

14) Upon anxious consideration of the rival submissions and

upon a careful perusal of the record, the following conclusions

emerge.

15) Having considered the entire matter, it is evident that the

Appellant has succeeded in retaining possession of an admittedly

unauthorised structure for more than six years since issuance of

the notice dated 30th July 2019. Such prolonged retention,

facilitated by procedural delays, sends an adverse signal and has

the effect of encouraging similar illegal constructions, as

wrongdoers are able to continue deriving bene�t from

unauthorised structures for years while proceedings remain

pending. In the present case, the material on record indicates that

the structure has been in use for a considerable period, spanning

well beyond two decades.

NO TITLE, NO RIGHT, NO EQUITY

16) The Agreement dated 12th September 1986 relied upon by

the Appellant is an unregistered document and is therefore

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inadmissible in evidence for the purpose of establishing any right,

title or interest. The document does not relate to private property

but purports to deal with public land. It does not transfer, nor does

it even purport to transfer, any structure standing thereon. On the

contrary, the agreement expressly contemplates transfer of “open

space”.

17) It is well settled that payment of user charges to the

Municipal Corporation, electricity bills, shop and establishment

registration, or licences for commercial activity do not create or

evidence title. None of the documents relied upon by the Appellant

establishes that the structure existed prior to the datum line of 1st

January 1961 or that it was erected with lawful authority.

18) The Trial Court has correctly appreciated the documentary

material and the legal position. The �ndings recorded therein are

neither perverse nor contrary to law and warrant no interference.

ABUSE OF PROCESS AND LACK OF CLEAN HANDS

19) The conduct of the Appellant disentitles him to any equitable

relief. A litigant who seeks protection of an unauthorised structure

erected on public land cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this Court

by presenting himself as a lawful occupier.

20) In

Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

1

, the Supreme

Court has categorically held that courts must deny relief to

litigants who approach with falsehood, suppression or

1 (2010) 2 SCC 114

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misrepresentation. The present case is a textbook illustration of

the mischief sought to be curbed by the said principle. The extracts

reproduced hereinbelow are relevant even in the present day:

“

1. ….. However, post-Independence period has

seen drastic changes in our value system. The materialism

has overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal

gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation

do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood,

misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the Court

proceedings.

2. In the last 40 years,

a new creed of litigants

has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have

any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood

and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to

meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the

courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is

now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute

the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of

justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief,

interim or �nal.”

(Emphasis supplied)

21) The Appellant has attempted to confer legitimacy upon an

otherwise unlawful occupation by relying upon a purported

unregistered sale agreement relating to public land. The document

itself, on its face, belies any such claim. The attempt is not merely

misconceived, but borders on a deliberate effort to mislead the

Court.

PROCEEDINGS UNDER S.314

22) Section 314 that is under consideration is reproduced herein

below for ready reference:

“314. [Power to remove without notice anything erected,

deposited or hawked in contravention of section 312 or

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313A].— The Commissioner may, without notice, cause to

be removed—

(a) any wall, fence, rail, post, step, booth or other

structure or �xture which shall be erected or set up in or

upon any street, or upon or over any open channel drain,

well or tank contrary to the provisions of sub-section (1) of

section 312, after the same comes into force 5[in the city or

in the suburbs, after the date of the coming into force of the

Bombay Municipal (Extension of Limits) Act, 1950 (Bom.

VII of 1950) [or in the extended suburbs after the date of

the coming into force of the Bombay Municipal (Further

Extension of Limits and Schedule BBA (Amendment)] Act,

1956];]

(b) any stall, chair, bench, box, ladder, bale, board or

shelf, or any other thing whatever placed, deposited,

projected, attached, or suspended in, upon, from or to any

place in contravention of sub-section (1) of section 313;

[(c) any article whatsoever hawked or exposed for

sale in any public place or in any public street in

contravention of the provisions of section 313A and any

vehicle, package, box, board, shelf or any other thing in or

on which such article is placed or kept for the purpose of

sale.]

[(d) any person, unauthorisedly occupying or

wrongfully in possession of any public land, from such land

together with all the things and material unauthorisedly

placed, projected or deposited on such land by such person:

Provided that, the Commissioner shall, while

executing such removal, allow such person to take away his

personal belongings and household articles, such as

cooking vessels, bed and beddings of the family, etc.]”

23) The contention that the proceedings are wrongfully initiated

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under Section 314 of the BMC Act is erroneous in law. In

Municipal

Corporation of Gr. Bombay

v. Premnagar Zopadpatti Committee

Society

2

, 1991 Supp. (2) SCC 712 similar contentions were raised

before the High Court and the High Court had granted interim

injunction restraining the corporation from evicting the

respondents from the land in dispute in the proceedings under

sections 313 and 314 of the Act. While dealing with the appeal

against the order of the High Court, the Supreme Court in

paragraph 5 made the following observations:

“5. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are of

the opinion that the view taken by the High Court that the

land was not a public place although it had been acquired

for purpose, therefore no proceedings under sections 313

and 314 of the Act could be taken against the respondents

is erroneous in law.

The land which had been acquired for

the public purpose by the Corporation is a public place and

any encroachment made on that land by any person could

be dealt with under sections 313 and 314 of the Act. In this

view, we allow the appeals and set aside the order of the

High Court.”

24) It is thus evident that a “street”, by virtue of its de�nition

under Section 3(w), constitutes a public place. The de�nition of

“Street” as well as “Public Street” is extracted for ready reference:

“3(w). “street” includes any highway and any causeway,

bridge, via duct, arch road, lane, footway, square, court,

alley or passage, whether a thoroughfare or not, over

which the public have a right of passage or access or have

passed and has access uninterruptedly for a period of

2 1991 Suppl. (2) SCC 712

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twenty years: and, when there is a footway as well as

carriageway in any street, the said term includes, both:

Section 3(x) :- “public street” means any street heretofore

levelled, paved, metalled, channelled, sewered or repaired

by the corporation and any street which becomes a public

street under any of the provisions of this Act: [ or which

vests, in the corporation as a public street]:

25) Consequently, any encroachment made thereon by the

appellants could validly be proceeded against under Section 314 of

the Act.

ASSESSMENT, TAX AND THE MYTH OF REGULARISATION

26) The reliance placed on assessment to property tax is wholly

misplaced. The legal position is no longer res integra. In

Sidharam

M. Yanagandul & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.

3

, af�rmed by

the Division Bench in

Laxmi Gopinath Shetye v. MHADA & Anr.

4

, it

has been authoritatively held that assessment of an unauthorised

structure to property tax neither alters its unauthorised character

nor amounts to regularisation. The extracts reproduced

hereinbelow squarely apply to the present case.

“7. The letter of the municipal corporation dated 2nd June,

es the description of the structures assessed for property tax

for the year 1978-1979. Structure No. 4 is the shop No. 3

wherein appellant is running the Santosh Bar. Rateable

value of the shop is shown of Rs. 40/-. Rateable value of the

suit shed (structure No. 4-A) is shown as Rs. 33.30/-.

3 2006 SCC OnLine Bom 971

4 2024:BHC-OS: 4270

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Relying upon this letter counsel for the appellant submitted

that the fact that the suit shed was assessed to property tax

would show that the suit shed was an authorised structure

constructed after obtaining appropriate permission and in

event the assessment of it for property tax would amount to

regularisation of an unauthorised construction. I am unable

to agree. In my view, any structure, whether authorised or

unauthorised, constructed on a property within the limits of

a municipal corporation can be assessed to municipal taxes.

Mere fact that a structure which is erected without the

permission of the Planning Authority and unauthorisedly is

subsequently assessed to the property tax by the municipal

corporation would not change the unauthorised character of

the structure nor would make the structure authorised from

the date of assessment. Of course, the fact that the structure

is assessed to property tax for a long time may be a relevant

circumstance while considering the evidence on whether the

structure is authorised or unauthorised especially when

sanctioned plans are not available because of long passage of

time. The weight to be attached, to such evidence would

depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

However once it is proved that the structure is

unauthorised, the mere fact that the structure is assessed to

property tax would not have the effect of deemed

regularisation or structure being treated as authorised.

8. Reference may be made to the decision of this Court in

(Tata Hydro Electric Power Supply Co. Ltd. v. The Municipal

Commissioner of Greater Bombay, reported in A.I.R. 1979

BOMBAY 10. In that case the question involved was

whether the municipal corporation was entitled to assess

for property tax the structures which were

unauthorisedly

erected on the land.

Relying upon the earlier decision of the

Supreme Court in (National Grindlays Bank Ltd. v.

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Municipal Corporation for Greater Bombay)3, reported in

(1969) 1 SCC 541 : A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1048 and of this Court

in (Ramji Keshavji v. The Municipal Commissioner of

Greater Bombay)4, reported in (1954) 56 Bom. L.R. 1132

and after considering the de�nition of the word “premises”

contained in section 3(gg) of the Bombay Municipal

Corporation Act this Court held that the municipal

corporation was entitled to levy property tax not only in

respect of the land but also on structures, whether

authorised or unauthorised. It was speci�cally held that

even when a trespasser on the land errects a structure, the

municipal corporation would be entitled to take that into

consideration in �xing rateable value of the property. In

other words, municipal corporation is entitled to �x rateable

value and impose the property tax even in respect of an

unauthorised structure. If so, mere fact that rateable value

in respect of a structure has been �xed would not, by itself,

prove that the structure was authorised nor would it

amount to regularisation of the structure. This is because

municipal corporation is authorised to �x rateable value of

not only for the authorised structures but also in respect of

unauthorised structures erected on the land. In my view,

therefore the

letter dated 2nd June, 1979 showing that the

suit shed was assessed to property tax, would not, by itself

prove that the suit shed was an authorised structure.

24. I

n our view, the Petitioner has attempted to mislead the

Court and gain unlawful advantage by stating that the shop

was attached to the building, whilst not particularising

which of the buildings 18A or 18B, and that based on the

shop and establishment certi�cate, assessment paid and

electricity bills attempted to make us believe that the shop

was authorised. Thus, entitled to an authorised premises.

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This in our view would be encouraging wrongdoers and

illegal occupants to bene�t from their wrongdoings. Neither

do these documents prove any title or entitlement of the

Petitioner in law. On this ground alone the Petition

deserves to be dismissed. The Supreme Court in SP

Chengalvaraya Naidu v Jagannath & Ors has held that a

litigant who approaches the Court is bound to produce all

the documents executed by him which are relevant to the

litigation. If he withholds a vital document or suppresses

material information in order to gain advantage over the

other side then he would be guilty of playing a fraud on the

Court as well as the opposite party. Such a party is not

entitled to any relief. Above all, a Court must have a

complete and candid disclosure of all material particulars.

A failure to disclose material particulars is

indistinguishable from an attempt to mislead the Court.

This is now well settled in our jurisprudence.”

[Emphasis supplied]

27) The reliance placed on the circular dated 20th March 2017

prescribing policy guidelines for removal of bottlenecks or missing

links in Development Plan Roads, Town Planning Roads and Road

Lines (“bottleneck policy circular”) is wholly misconceived. It is

undisputed that the Appellant’s structure is situated on a public

street, which includes the footpath. The impugned notice has been

issued in furtherance of easing traf�c congestion and ensuring free

and unobstructed use of the public street. In any event, the

bottleneck policy circular does not confer any right of protection,

regularisation or compensation in respect of such an unauthorised

structure, and the Appellant cannot claim any bene�t thereunder.

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28) The challenge to the validity of the notice issued under

Section 314 of the BMC Act proceeds on the same erroneous

premise. The contention that the notice was issued for the purpose

of road widening is equally untenable and belied by the record. The

record clearly establishes that the Appellant’s structure is situated

on a public street and not abutting the carriageway, and that the

notice was issued to remove obstruction and ease traf�c congestion

on the public street, and not for road widening. The attempt to

invoke State policies governing road widening, in the teeth of these

undisputed facts, is a clear effort to derive unwarranted bene�t

from an unauthorised structure and cannot be countenanced.

STATUTORY NON-COMPLIANCE AND FORUM SHOPPING

29) The notice dated 30th July 2019 was issued under Section

314 of the BMC Act. Instead of availing of the statutory remedy

before the competent authority, the Appellant rushed to �le a civil

Suit on 2nd August 2019 without complying with the mandatory

requirement under Section 527 of the said Act. The suit itself was

thus vulnerable at inception.

30) The judgment in

Sopan Maruti Thopte & Anr. v. Pune

Municipal Corporation & Anr.

5

is clearly distinguishable, having

arisen from notices under Sections 351 and 260. The reliance is

therefore entirely misconceived.

5 AIR 1996 Bom 304

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TACTICAL USE OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS

31) The Appellant thereafter sought to invoke contempt

proceedings and insisted that the same be heard prior to the

Appeal. This sequencing was clearly intended to divert attention

from the core issue of illegality and to prolong enjoyment of the

unauthorised structure. Courts cannot permit contempt

jurisdiction to be employed as a strategic tool to perpetuate

illegality.

CONTEMPT BY THE CORPORATION - ADDRESSED BUT

CONTAINED

32) It is true that the Municipal Corporation failed to adhere to

the interim status quo order and proceeded with partial

demolition. The explanation of inter-departmental

miscommunication is unsatisfactory and cannot be accepted as a

justi�cation for disobedience of court orders.

33) However, it is equally material that the demolition formed

part of a larger drive undertaken along the entire street and that

the demolished portion was subsequently reconstructed. In these

circumstances, the unconditional apology tendered by the

concerned of�cers, coupled with restorative action, is suf�cient to

close the contempt proceedings with a warning.

SYSTEMATIC FAILURE AND MUNICIPAL ACCOUNTABILITY

34) The location of the unauthorised structure—immediately

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behind a Municipal chowki and abutting a railway line—raises

serious and troubling questions. Such a structure could not have

existed for years without willful blindness or dereliction of duty on

the part of municipal of�cers.

35) The Municipal Commissioner shall treat this case as a test

case and initiate an inquiry to identify responsibility for prolonged

inaction. Failure to act against illegal constructions emboldens

wrongdoers and corrodes the con�dence of law-abiding citizens in

municipal governance and the rule of law.

36) In view of the above, the following order is passed:

ORDER

i. The Appeal is dismissed is with costs 5,00,000/- (Rupees₹

Five Lakhs only), payable by the Petitioner to the Armed

Forces Battle Casualties Welfare Fund, within a period of four

weeks from today. In the event of default, the said amount

shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue. Details of the

bank account for payment of cost are as under :-

Account Name :Armed Forces Battle Casualties

Welfare Fund

Account Number: 90552010165915.

Bank Name : Canara Bank

Branch : South Block, Defence Headquarters,

New Delhi – 110 011.

IFSC Code : CNRB0019055.

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ii. The AGP shall intimate this order to the Armed Forces. In the

event the Petitioner fails to deposit the said cost within

stipulated period as noted herein above, the Authorized

Of�cer of the Armed Forces Battle Causalities Welfare Fund

will be entitled to �le an application for execution of the

present Order and for recovery of the said amount before this

Court through the learned A.G.P.

iii. The impugned Order dated 7th May 2024 passed by the City

Civil Court, Dindoshi, in Notice of Motion No. 2767 of 2019 in

L.C. Suit No. 1879 of 2019 is upheld.

iv. The Contempt Petition is dismissed with a stern warning that

any future violation of court orders by the Corporation or its

employees shall invite strict consequences, including

departmental inquiry and suspension, and shall be placed on

the service records of the concerned of�cers.

v. A copy of this order shall be forthwith communicated to the

Municipal Commissioner, Brihanmumbai Municipal

Corporation, for necessary steps against the concerned

of�cers who permitted the structure for more than two

decades and shall be placed on the service records of the

concerned of�cers.

vi. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated.

vii. Interim Application, if any, stands disposed of.

20

Sumedh 1-ascp-330-2025-F(1).doc

viii. List the matter for compliance on 24

th

March 2026.

(KAMAL KHATA, J)

37) At this stage, learned Advocate for the Petitioner requested

for stay. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the request for stay is

rejected.

(KAMAL KHATA, J)

Judgements Relied:

1. Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2010) 2 SCC

114.

2. Municipal Corporation of Gr. Bombay v. Premnagar

Zopadpatti Committee Society 1991 Suppl. (2) SCC 712.

3.Sidharam M. Yanagandul & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra &

Anr.

2006 SCC OnLine Bom 971.

4. Laxmi Gopinath Shetye v. MHADA & Anr. 2024:BHC-OS:

4270.

5. Sopan Maruti Thopte & Anr. v. Pune Municipal Corporation &

Anr. AIR 1996 Bom 304.

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