2025 INSC 217 Page 1 of 21

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO S. 2027-2028 OF 2012

PUJA FERRO ALLOYS P LTD. … APPELLANT

VS.

STATE OF GOA AND ORS. … RESPONDENTS

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4556 OF 2012

M/S KARTHIK ALLOYS LTD . … APPELLANT

VS.

STATE OF GOA AND ANR. … RESPONDENTS

AND

CIVIL APPEAL NO S.2033-2034 OF 2012

KARTHIK INDUCTIONS LTD. … APPELLANT

VS.

STATE OF GOA AND ORS. … RESPONDENTS

Page 2 of 21

AND

CIVIL APPEAL NO S.2031-2032 OF 2012

GLOBAL ISPAT LTD. … APPELLANT

VS.

STATE OF GOA AND ORS. … RESPONDENTS

AND

CIVIL APPEAL NO S.2035-2036 OF 2012

SUNRISE ELECTROMELT LTD. … APPELLANT

VS.

STATE OF GOA AND ORS. … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

THE APPEAL

1. In all but one of the civil appeals under consideration, the appellant-

companies call in question the common impugned judgment and order

dated 08.07.2011 of the High Court

1

in a batch of writ petitions

2

and a

common order dated 21.10.2011 on a batch of civil review applications.

By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court declined to grant

the relief of rebate of 25% on the electricity tariff in terms of the

1

High Court of Bombay, at Goa

2

W.P. Nos. 157-160/2011

Page 3 of 21

notification dated 30.09.1991 to the appellants. The subsequent order

dismissed the review applications.

2. Civil Appeal No. 4556/2012 [M/s Karthik Alloys Ltd. v. The State of Goa

and Another] is a connected appeal, which challenges the judgment and

order dated 08.07.2011 of the High Court dismissing the writ petition

3

filed by M/s Karthik Alloys Ltd. on similar grounds.

RESUME OF FACTS

3. This is the third round of litigation before this Court regarding the issue

of grant of relief of rebate, but not between the same parties.

4. Civil Appeal No. 2027-28 of 2012 [Puja Ferro Alloys P Ltd. v. The State

of Goa and Another] is the lead appeal. Considering the commonality of

the issues of facts and law in all the connected appeals, we proceed to

note the facts of the lead appeal to the extent the same are relevant for

a decision on these appeals.

i. Vide Notification dated 27.06.1988, the first respondent-State of Goa

4

determined tariff applicable to electricity bills issued from

01.07.1988.

ii. Vide Notification dated 30.09.1991 issued under Section 23 read with

Section 51-A of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910

5

, the SoG determined

tariff whereby industrial units which applied for availing High-Tension

or Low-Tension power supply for bona fide industrial activities were

held entitled to a rebate of 25% on the tariff chargeable under the

3

WP No. 179/2011

4

SoG

5

1910 Act

Page 4 of 21

notification dated 27.06.1988 for a period of five years from the date

on which the electricity supply was made available.

iii. The appellant-companies then applied for power from the SoG and

entered into respective power supply agreements. The details are

tabulated hereunder

6

:

Appellant-

Company

Application

for Power

Power Supply

Agreement

Date of

Power

Connection

Puja Ferro

Alloys Pvt. Ltd.

15.09.1992 05.08.1993 16.05.1995

Karthik Alloys

Ltd.

26.11.1992 - 17.11.1993

Karthik

Inductions Ltd.

- - 28.07.1995

Global Ispat

Pvt. Ltd.

21.02.1994 10.02.1995 29.04.1995

Sunrise

Electromelt

Ltd.

01.02.1994 08.02.1995 10.02.1995

iv. Vide Notification dated 31.03.1995, issued under Section 23 read with

Section 51-A of the 1910 Act as well as Section 21 of the General

Clauses Act, 1897, the previous notification dated 30.09.1991 was

rescinded w.e.f. 01.04.1995. In terms thereof, the scheme of rebate

was stopped and any new industrial unit applying for power after

31.03.1995 would not get the benefit of the notification dated

30.09.1991.

v. On 15.05.1996, the notification dated 30.09.1991 was amended to

include another consumer category of “Extra High-Tension”.

6

Data taken from GR Ispat Ltd. v. Chief Electrical Engineer, 1999 (1) Goa L.T. 218

Page 5 of 21

vi. The notification dated 30.09.1991 was once again amended on

01.08.1996 so as to extend the benefit of rebate to all the industrial

units who apply or avail extra high-tension power supply. The rebate

of 25% was given on the prevailing tariff in force.

vii. Power began to be supplied to the appellant-companies as mentioned

in the table above. However, the 25% rebate was given only from

01.01.1997. The accumulated arrears of rebate were sought to be

disbursed in 60 equated monthly instalments.

viii. Vide Circular dated 31.03.1998, the SoG suspended the rebate

entitlement. However, the said circular does not mention whether the

suspension of the rebate was of the rebate given under the

notification dated 30.09.1991 or the amending notifications of

15.05.1996 and 01.08.1996.

ix. On 24.07.1998, the amending notification dated 01.08.1996 was

rescinded.

x. A batch of writ petitions challenging the circular dated 31.03.1998

and the notification dated 24.07.1998 came to be presented before

the High Court.

xi. The High Court vide judgment and order dated 21.01.1999 in W.P.

No. 239 of 1998 [GR Ispat Ltd. v. Chief Electrical Engineer

7

] held

that rescission of the notification dated 30.09.1991 by the notification

dated 31.03.1995 would only mean that the scheme providing rebate

was given up from 01.04.1995 and that the new industrial units could

7

1999 (1) Goa L.T. 218

Page 6 of 21

not apply after 01.04.1995 to obtain the benefit of rebate. The High

Court also held that the amendment of the notification after its

rescission clearly indicates that the notification dated 30.09.1991 was

in existence and operation for those industrial units who had already

become entitled to get the benefit of rebate under it. Therefore, the

suspension of the release of rebate was invalid and inoperative. The

High Court concluded that the notification dated 24.07.1998 is legal,

valid and operative and that the petitioning companies therein were

entitled to 25% rebate in power tariff till 24.07.1998.

xii. When the decision was challenged in this Court in CA No. 3206 -

3217/1999, interference was declined vide order dated 13.02.2001

as the High Court had taken a balanced view in the matter.

xiii. A writ petition also came to be filed in the High Court challenging the

notifications dated 15.05.1996 and 01.08.1996 wherein prayer was

made to declare the same as null and void. The High Court allowed

the said writ petition [Manohar Parrikar v. State of Goa

8

] owing to

brazen non-compliance with the Rules of Business framed under

Article 166(3) of the Constitution. The impugned notifications were

held to be non-est and void ab initio and the consequential acts based

on such notifications were also to be considered null and void.

xiv. Meanwhile in 2002, the SoG enacted the Goa (Prohibition of Further

Payments and Recovery of Rebate Benefits) Act, 2002

9

. Section 3 of

2002 Act specified that any person or industrial consumer in the SoG

8

2001 SCC OnLine Bom 350

9

2002 Act

Page 7 of 21

who has already availed of the benefits of 25% rebate in pursuance

of the Government notifications dated 15.05.1996 and 01.08.1996

would be liable to refund the amount to the third respondent herein

– the Chief Electrical Engineer, Electricity Department, Government

of Goa.

xv. A batch of civil appeals challenging the judgment and order in

Manohar Parrikar (supra) was dismissed by this Court in MRF

Limited v. Manohar Parrikar & Ors.

10

.

xvi. Moreover, this Court in Goa Glass Fibre Limited v. State of Goa &

Anr.

11

categorically held that the object of the 2002 Act is not to undo

or reverse the judgments of the Supreme Court or the High Court but

it merely seeks to recover and extinguish all liabilities of the SoG that

accrue or arise from the notifications dated 15.05.1996 and

01.08.1996.

xvii. Vide demand notice dated 21.02.2011, the respondents sought

recovery from Puja Ferro [the lead appellant-company], under

Section 3 of the 2002 Act, an amount of Rs. 1,36,30,072/-. Aggrieved

by the impugned demand notice, the appellant-company preferred a

writ petition

12

before the High Court. Similar demand notices were

served on the other appellant-companies leading them too to file their

respective writ petitions before the High Court.

10

(2010) 11 SCC 374

11

(2010) 6 SCC 499

12

W.P. No.160/2011

Page 8 of 21

xviii. By the common impugned judgment and order, referred to at the

beginning of this judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court

dismissed the batch of writ petitions filed by the appellant-companies

and thereby, upheld the demand notices. Review applications filed

against the impugned judgment and order were also dismissed by the

High Court holding that no error apparent on the face of the record

was shown to exist.

IMPUGNED JUDGMENTS

5. Before the High Court, the appellant-companies assailed the demand

notices on the ground that the rebate was offered for the purpose of

increasing investment and industries in the SoG. Based on the promise

that incentives in the form of rebate would be given, the appellant-

companies set up industries in the SoG, obtaining loans from banks and

financial institutions as well as on plots of land on lease from the

Industrial Development Corporation. They urged that the SoG was bound

to provide the rebate as per the notifications providing such rebate and

the subsequent power supply agreement entered int o by and between

the appellant-companies and the authorities. Moreover, the High Court

had previously decided that the amendment of the rescinded notification

would imply that the rebate entitlement was still available to existing

consumers and that only new consumers were not eligible for the 25%

rebate. This was carried up to this Court which upheld the said order of

the Division Bench of the High Court. They further contended that the

decision of the High Court in Manohar Parrikar (supra) does not affect

Page 9 of 21

the claim of the appellant-companies as it was a judgment in personam.

It was also urged that the SoG under the guise of recovery of rebate was

actually recovering the rebate benefit granted under the notification

dated 30.09.1991.

6. The respondents defended the impugned demand notice s before the

High Court on the ground that the appellant-companies had claimed that

they availed the benefits of 25% rebate on the power tariff pursuant to

the notification dated 30.09.1991; however, their case cannot be

accepted because the notification dated 30.09.1991 was rescinded with

effect from 01.04.1995 vide notification date 31.03.1995. It was further

urged that the previous order of the High Court in Manohar Parrikar

(supra), which was subsequently challenged before this Court, binds the

appellant-companies as it has clearly held that the rebate benefit will not

be available to the appellant-companies after the unexpired period of

five years.

7. The High Court concluded that the appellant-companies are not those

who are claiming benefit of rebate under the notification dated

30.09.1991, as this notification was rescinded by the notification dated

31.03.1995. The High Court, based on the reply affidavit filed by the

respondents, proceeded on the basis that the appellant-companies have

availed the power supply only after 31.03.1995. The High Court held that

the previous decisions have clarified that the 2002 Act is valid and

constitutional and that the demand notice s had been issued under

Section 3 of the 2002 Act. Moreover, it was held that the appellant-

Page 10 of 21

companies cannot rest their claims on the basis of the notifications dated

15.05.1996 and 01.08.1996 as these decisions were held not to be

Government decisions, and the notification dated 30.09.1991 was

rescinded on 31.03.1995 with effect from 01.04.1995.

8. The High Court observed that the appellant-companies have been

supplied power only from 10.05.1995, 29.04.1995, 28.07.1995 and

16.05.1995 and, therefore, none of the appellants before the High Court

could lay a valid claim to be covered by the notification dated

30.09.1991. Consequently, all the writ petitions came to be dismissed.

9. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order of the High Court, various civil

review applications were filed seeking a review thereof. The Division

Bench dismissed the same holding that there was no error apparent on

the face of the record that would necessitate any review of the judgment

and order under review.

CONTENTIONS

10. Mr. Santosh Paul, learned senior advocate for the appellant-companies,

orally as well as through the written notes of arguments assailed the

impugned judgment and order by contending that:

i. The appellant-companies are covered by the notification dated

30.09.1991 and not by the notification dated 01.08.1996.

ii. The High Court has not appreciated that the rights of the appellant-

companies crystallized upon making the application for power while

the notification dated 30.09.1991 was in force and hence, irrespective

Page 11 of 21

of when the power was actually supplied, the appellant-companies

are entitled to the benefit of rebate.

iii. Referring to the decision in Pawan Alloys & Casting (P) Ltd. v. UP

SEB

13

, it was urged that the new industries were attracted to the

region relying upon the promise of the SoG to grant rebate and that

without the lure of rebate, the appellant-companies would not have

set up industries in the SoG.

iv. A notification cannot be rescinded with retrospective effect and only

with prospective effect and that the decision in GR Ispat Ltd. (supra)

clearly lays down that the appellant-companies cannot be denied the

rebate.

v. The impugned demand notice s are illegal, arbitrary, and ultra vires

the provisions of the 2002 Act.

vi. The appellant-companies became aware of a certain letter of the

Electricity Department of the SoG which has a direct bearing on the

matter and discovery of such new material is sufficient to exercise the

power of review, as decided in Inderchand Jain v. Motilal

14

.

vii. The appellant-companies have been treated rather unfairly and to set

things right, the impugned demand notices ought to be quashed and

the deposits made by them, in pursuance of the order issuing notice

dated 10.02.2012, may be directed to be refunded.

11. Mr. Abhay Anil Anturkar, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents,

has assiduously contended that the impugned judgment and order not

13

(1997) 7 SCC 251

14

(2009) 14 SCC 663

Page 12 of 21

suffering from any infirmity, the civil appeals deserve outright dismissal.

It was further contended that:

I. The impugned demand notice s have been issued in consonance

with the 2002 Act. The challenge to the constitutionality of the

2002 Act has been upheld by this Court.

II. The High Court has rightly concluded that the said notification

dated 30.09.1991 does not cover the case of the appellant -

companies and hence, they are not entitled to any rebate.

III. The appellant-companies have received the benefits from the

notifications dated 15.05.1996 and 01.08.1996, however, the case

that has been made out before this Court is that they received

benefit from the notification dated 30.09.1991.

THE QUESTION

12. The short question arising for decision in all the connected appeals is,

whether the appellant-companies are covered by the notification dated

30.09.1991 for the purpose of availing 25% rebate on the tariff

chargeable for availing power supply.

ANALYSIS AND REASONS

13. At the outset, we record our sense of surprise having noticed that the

notification dated 30.09.1991, which was rescinded by notification dated

31.03.1995, was amended twice vide notifications dated 15.05.1996 and

01.08.1996. However, the High Court in GR Ispat (supra) clarified the

position and such clarification having been accepted by this Court, we

refrain from expressing any further view.

Page 13 of 21

14. Moving ahead to determine the question as to which of the notifications

would apply in the case of the appellant-companies before us, we have

perused the series of notifications published by the SoG along with the

impugned demand notices and the impugned judgment and order.

15. The impugned demand notice s were issued under the 2002 Act and

seeks to recover the rebate granted to the appellant-companies by the

SoG. This Court has previously held in Goa Glass Fibre (supra) that the

2002 Act is legal and valid. This enactment provides for recovery of

rebate granted under the notifications dated 15.05.1996 and

01.08.1996. The appellant-companies have primarily urged before this

Court that since their claim is governed by the notification dated

30.09.1991, Section 3 of the 2002 Act does not apply to them and that

the SoG does not have the power to recover the rebate granted to these

companies.

16. While at first blush this argument seems to be attractive, upon a closer

examination of the facts, it must be rejected for the reasons that follow.

17. In the case of GR Ispat (supra), the High Court decided that the

rescission of the notification dated 30.09.1991 was limited to new

industrial units and that it was very much in existence and operative for

those industrial units who had already become entitled to the rebate

benefit under the said notification. Therefore, the High Court concluded

that the grant of 25% rebate was operative till it was suspended vide

notification dated 31.03.1998. The High Court ruled that only one of the

petitioners before it, i.e., the Marmagao Steel Company is entitled to the

Page 14 of 21

benefit of rebate under the notification dated 30.09.1991 or the second

notification dated 01.08.1996. The High Court ruled that the companies

could have applied before 01.10.1991 but the supply of electricity must

be availed from a date subsequent to 01.10.1991 for being entitled to

the rebate. This ruling is admittedly in favour of the appellant -

companies. However, the further discussion of the High Court from

paragraph 35 onwards merits consideration. The High Court specifically

held that the challenge against the rescission on the grounds of

promissory estoppel against the SoG is unsustainable as it must yield to

the principle of public equity. Therefore, it was held that the Government

has a justifiable ground of supervening public interest to withdraw the

grant of rebate in power tariff which was promised in the two

notifications dated 30.09.1991 and 01.08.1996. The High Court further

noted that many of the companies did not complete their respective

period of five years to get the rebate on 27.07.1998; therefore, they will

have to forgo their claim of rebate for the unexpired period in view of

the overriding public interest arising due to financial crunch. The High

Court also clearly laid down the period of entitlement of rebate up to

27.07.1998 for the respective appellant-companies in paragraph 56 of

the judgment. When challenged before this Court, it was dismissed on

the ground that the High Court has taken a balanced view of the matter.

Therefore, this judgment has attained finality.

18. Now turning to the impugned judgment and order of the High Court, the

appellant-companies on a similar challenge argued that the demand

Page 15 of 21

notices seek to recover the benefit that has already been protected by

the Division Bench earlier in GR Ispat (supra). The High Court spurned

this argument by highlighting that the previous decision was restricted

to those claims which actually accrued and were admissible in terms of

the notification dated 30.09.1991. However, if the power supply itself

has not been availed of within the period during which the notification

dated 30.09.1991 was in force, the foundation for the challenge itself is

shaky and without any legal basis.

19. First, the notification dated 30.09.1991 made the rebate available for

five (5) years from the date on which electric supply was effected to the

appellant-companies. As seen in the table above, supply of electricity

was effected to all the appellant-companies, except M/s Karthik Alloys,

on varying dates beyond 31.03.1995 ; however, the notification dated

30.09.1991 had life till 31.03.1995 whereafter it stood rescinded, leaving

no option but to decline acceptance of their pleas.

20. Secondly, reliance placed on the notifications dated 15.05.1996 and

01.08.1996 is wholly misconceived as they must be deemed not to have

existed at all because of the declaration in Manohar Parrikar (supra),

that they were non-est and void ab initio. The appellant-companies

herein were seeking benefit of these subsequent notifications before the

High Court in GR Ispat (supra), which was not accepted by the High

Court. Considering the ruling by the High Court that they are covered

under the notification dated 30.09.1991, they now seek to protect their

benefits under the guise of this notification which, in any event, stood

Page 16 of 21

rescinded with effect from 01.04.1995 whereas the supply was effected

therafter. Despite the redundancy, we stress that the appellant -

companies, except M/s Karthik Alloys, received power connection

beyond 01.04.1995; thus these claims cannot be sustained.

21. Thirdly, we do not have any doubt that the Division Bench is correct in

holding that the challenge is without any legal basis as the question is

squarely covered by the previous decision of the High Court in GR Ispat

(supra).

22. For the principle of res judicata to be applied in the subsequent

proceeding, it must be between the same parties and the cause of action

of the subsequent proceeding must be the same as in the previous

proceeding. The Supreme Court in the case of Satyadhyan Ghosal v.

Deorajin Debi

15

has succinctly noted that the principle of res judicata

is essential in giving a finality to judicial decisions by observing as under:

“The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to

judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall not

be adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and

future litigation. When a matter — whether on a question of fact or a

question of law — has been decided between two parties in one suit or

proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken

to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies,

neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the

same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata

is embodied in relation to suits in Section 11 of the Code of Civil

Procedure; but even where Section 11 does not apply, the principle of

res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving

finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original court as well as

any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that

the previous decision was correct.

The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the

same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial court or a

higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will

not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage

of the same proceedings. …”

15

[1960] 3 SCR 590

Page 17 of 21

23. A three-judge bench of this Court in the case of Hope Plantations Ltd.

v. Taluk Land Board

16

, has elucidated the applicability of the principles

of res judicata and estoppel in the Indian context and held that:

“26. It is settled law that the principles of estoppel and res judicata are

based on public policy and justice. Doctrine of res judicata is often

treated as a branch of the law of estoppel though these two doctrines

differ in some essential particulars. Rule of res judicata prevents the

parties to a judicial determination from litigating the same question over

again even though the determination may even be demonstratedly

wrong. When the proceedings have attained finality, parties are bound

by the judgment and are estopped from questioning it. They cannot

litigate again on the same cause of action nor can they litigate any issue

which was necessary for decision in the earlier litigation. These two

aspects are ‘cause of action estoppel’ and ‘issue estoppel’. These two

terms are of common law origin. Again, once an issue has been finally

determined, parties cannot subsequently in the same suit advance

arguments or adduce further evidence directed to showing that the issue

was wrongly determined. Their only remedy is to approach the higher

forum if available. The determination of the issue between the parties

gives rise to, as noted above, an issue estoppel. It operates in any

subsequent proceedings in the same suit in which the issue had been

determined. It also operates in subsequent suits between the same

parties in which the same issue arises. Section 11 of the Code of Civil

Procedure contains provisions of res judicata but these are not

exhaustive of the general doctrine of res judicata. Legal principles of

estoppel and res judicata are equally applicable in proceedings before

administrative authorities as they are based on public policy and justice.

………

31. Law on res judicata and estoppel is well understood in India and

there are ample authoritative pronouncements by various courts on

these subjects. As noted above, the plea of res judicata, though

technical, is based on public policy in order to put an end to litigation. It

is, however, different if an issue which had been decided in an earlier

litigation again arises for determination between the same parties in a

suit based on a fresh cause of action or where there is continuous cause

of action. The parties then may not be bound by the determination made

earlier if in the meanwhile, law has changed or has been interpreted

differently by a higher forum. But that situation does not exist here.

Principles of constructive res judicata apply with full force. It is the

subsequent stage of the same proceedings. If we refer to Order XLVII of

the Code (Explanation to Rule 1) review is not permissible on the ground

‘that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the

Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision

of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review

of such judgment’.”

16

(1999) 5 SCC 590

Page 18 of 21

24. It is now well settled that the principle of res judicata applies even to

petitions arising for decision in the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of

the Constitution. If any authority is required one may profitably refer to

the decision in T.P. Moideen Koya v. State of Kerala

17

.

25. In the instant case, we are convinced that the writ petitions before the

High Court were hit by res judicata in view of its previous decision in GR

Ispat (supra) which, when challenged before this Court, was upheld with

the further observation that a balanced view of the matter had been

taken and no interference was called for. The appellant-companies were

all parties and are bound by the decision in GR Ispat (supra). Having

failed up to this Court, the appellant-companies could not have adopted

a stand different from the one taken in the first round of litigation. They

sought to challenge the demand notices by re-opening the litigation and

arguing that they are entitled to the benefit for five years, which they

would have been entitled to had they availed the supply of power within

the time that the notification dated 30.09.1991 was in force.

26. Though we have emphatically held against the appellant -companies

hereinabove, we wish to also deal with the final contention that since the

appellant-companies have invested in the SoG on the basis of the rebate

granted to them, the State is now estopped from resiling and

withdrawing this benefit, which has crystallised. Reliance has been

placed on the decision in Pawan Alloys (supra), where this Court

ruled:

17

(2004) 8 SCC 106

Page 19 of 21

“24. Consequently it cannot be held on the clear recitals found in the

aforesaid three notifications issued by the Board that no representation

whatsoever guaranteeing 10% rebate on electricity consumption bills

could be culled out from these notifications. We, therefore, agree with

the finding of the High Court on Issue No. 1 that by these notifications

the Board had clearly held out a promise to these new industries and as

these new industries had admittedly got established in the region where

the Board was operating, acting on such promise, the same in equity

would bind the Board. Such a promise was not contrary to any statutory

provision but on the contrary was in compliance with the directions

issued under Section 78-A of the Act. These new industries which got

attracted to this region relying upon the promise had altered their

position irretrievably. They had spent large amounts of money for

establishing the infrastructure, had entered into agreements with the

Board for supply of electricity and, therefore, had necessarily altered

their position relying on these representations thinking that they would

be assured of at least three years' period guaranteeing rebate of 10%

on the total bill of electricity to be consumed by them as infancy benefit

so that they could effectively compete with the old industries operating

in the field and their products could effectively compete with their

products. On these well-established facts the Board can certainly be

pinned down to its promise on the doctrine of promissory estoppel.”

However, the appellant -companies have failed to consider the

discussion in paragraph 31:

“31. In the light of this settled legal position we, therefore, hold that

even though the appellants have succeeded in convincing us that the

earlier three notifications dated 29-10-1982, 13-7-1984 and 28-1-1986

did contain a clear promise and representation by the Board to the

prospective new industrialists that once they established their industries

in the region within the territorial limits of the operation of the Board,

they would be assured 10% rebate on the total bills regarding

consumption of electricity by their industries for a period of three years

from the initial supply of electric power to their concerns, the appellants

will not be able to enforce the equity by way of promissory estoppel

against the Board if it is shown by the Board that public interest required

it to withdraw this incentive rebate even prior to the expiry of three years

as available to the appellants concerned. It has also to be held that even

if such withdrawal of development rebate prior to three years is not

based on any overriding public interest, if it is shown that by such

premature withdrawal the appellant-promisees would be restored to

status quo ante and would be placed in the same position in which they

were prior to the grant of such rebate by earlier notifications th e

appellants would not be entitled to succeed……”

(emphasis supplied)

Page 20 of 21

27. In our opinion, public interest is what turns the tide against the

appellant-companies. The SoG before the High Court in GR Ispat

(supra) had specifically taken the stand that the policy of rebate was

unviable resulting from financial crunch and was overriding public

interest. This, the High Court accepted, unlike in the case of Pawan

Alloys (supra). This too would apply as res judicata against the

appellant-companies.

28. Applying these principles to the instant case, we have no doubt in our

minds that the High Court was right in holding that the appellant -

companies before it are not entitled to the rebate and the impugned

demand notices do not suffer from any vice including that of illegality.

29. Regarding Civil Appeal No. 4556 of 2012 (M/s Karthik Alloys Ltd. v. The

State of Goa and Another), the matter has not been argued before us as

Mr. Paul, representing the concerned appellant -company earlier,

submitted not having received any instructions to proceed.

30. Turning to the challenge laid to the common order dismissing the review

applications, we hold bearing in mind Order XLVII Rule 7 of the Code of

Civil Procedure that no appeal lies against an order of rejection of a

petition for review. The Civil Appeals in this behalf are misconceived.

31. Even otherwise, we have considered such appeals on merit. The

additional minor issue raised by the appellant-companies, as is revealed

from the common order on the review applications, is that review was

sought on two counts: first, that the rights of the applicants had

crystallised upon making the application for power and secondly, a new

Page 21 of 21

document had been unearthed by the applicants which proves that the

High Court had committed a mistake/error apparent on the face of the

record. As the first question has already been answered against the

appellant-companies, it is clear that this is not a ground for reviewing

the judgment. On the second count also, the argument of discovery does

not at all impress us. The document being a letter dated 06.04.1999 has

been perused. It does not aid the review applicants. We are, thus, in

agreement with the High Court in its determination that the document

does not in any way advance the case of the appellant-companies.

CONCLUSION

32. Bearing in mind the aforesaid discussion, civil appeals nos.2027-

2028/2012, 2033-2034/2012, 2031-2032/2012, and 2035-2036/2012

are dismissed. Civil appeal no.4556/2012 is dismissed as not pressed.

33. No order as to costs.

……………………………J .

(DIPANKAR DATTA)

……………………………J .

(SANDEEP MEHTA )

NEW DELHI ;

14

th

FEBRUARY, 2025.