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Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:159524

Reserved on 09.09.2024

Delivered on 30.09.2024

AFR

Court No. - 36

Case :- SECOND APPEAL No. - 528 of 2010

Appellant :- Punjab National Bank

Respondent :- M/S Allen And Alvan Private Ltd. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Ashok Bhatnagar

Counsel for Respondent :- Ishir Sripat

with

Case :- SECOND APPEAL No. - 527 of 2010

Appellant :- Punjab National Bank

Respondent :- M/S Allen And Alvan Private Ltd. And Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Ashok Bhatnagar

Counsel for Respondent :- Ishir Sripat

Hon'ble Kshitij Shailendra,J.

THE TWO APPEALS

1.These two second appeals arise out of consolidated judgment

passed by the trial court and the first appellate court in the following

proceedings:-

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(i) Original Suit No.143 of 1991 (M/s Allen and Alvan Private Ltd

Vs. Punjab National Bank and two others) giving rise to Civil

Appeal No.147 of 2002 (M/s Allen and Alvan Private Ltd Vs.

Punjab National Bank and two others); and

(ii) Original Suit No.176 of 1991 (M/s Allen and Alvan Private

Ltd Vs. Punjab National Bank and two others) giving rise to Civil

Appeal No.146 of 2002 (M/s Allen and Alvan Private Ltd Vs.

Punjab National Bank and two others).

RESULT OF TRIAL PROCEEDINGS AND THE DECREE DRAWN

2.The trial court dismissed both the civil suits by a consolidated

judgment dated 28.08.2002, however, two civil appeals were allowed

by the first appellate court by consolidated judgment dated

07.08.2009. The decree impugned in these two appeals is a money

decree drawn in favour of the plaintiff-respondent against the

defendant-appellant bank.

PLAINT OF THE FIRST SUIT

3.Original Suit No.143 of 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the

‘first suit’) was filed claiming a decree for a sum of Rs.41,986.25

along with 24% interest per annum stating that the plaintiff, being a

private company through Devinder Jit Singh Vadara (hereinafter

referred to as the ‘Managing Director/M.D.’) was having current

account No.4869 with the defendant-bank and a cheque bearing No.

PYC 883200 dated 05.02.1988 covering a sum of Rs.24,410.60 had

been wrongly cleared by the bank. Signatures of the Managing

Director on the cheque were stated to be forged with a statement that

an employee of the company, namely, Indrapal, in conspiracy with the

bank officials, was instrumental in such clearance. A first information

report was lodged by the Managing Director of the Company against

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Indrapal in July, 1988, later on, matter was transferred to the Crime

Branch, Meerut. Negligence of the bank in clearing the cheque

without comparing the signatures of the drawer was pleaded and the

suit was instituted based upon a notice dated 19.08.1990 sent by

registered post with a further statement that since limitation

concerning the aforesaid cheque was going to expire, the suit was

filed. In paragraph no. 4 of the plaint, fraudulent encashment of six

more cheques was pleaded with a statement that the plaintiff reserved

its rights to subsequently claim the amount of the said cheques

together with interest.

PARTIES, INITIAL AND SUBSEQUENTLY IMPLEADED AND

THE SECOND SUIT

4.The first suit was filed initially only against the bank. Later on,

the aforesaid employee of the bank, namely, Indrapal, and the payee

of the cheque, namely ‘Investment Corporation’ were impleaded as

defendants no.2 and 3 sometime in the year 1995. In the meantime,

another suit being Original Suit No.176 of 1991 (hereinafter referred

to as the ‘second suit’) was instituted by the plaintiff-company, that

too, initially only against the bank and, later on, the employee

Indrapal and two payees, namely, ‘Ayodhya Investment Syndicate’

and ‘Investment Corporation’ were respectively impleaded as

defendants no.2, 3 and 4 in the year 1995. The second suit was in

respect of following six cheques:

Sr.

No.

Cheque No.DateAmount

(Rs.)

Payee’s

Name

Endorsement

in favour of

1QEM 87860017.02.8850,000.00 Self-

Withdrawal

by Indrapal

2QEM 87857825.02.8840,000.00 Self-

Withdrawal

by Indrapal

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3PYC 88340027.02.8823,641.00M/s KP Box

Makers

M/s Ayodhya

Investment

Syndicate

4.PYC 88339901.03.8822,751.00Munesh

Kumar

M/s Ayodhya

Investment

Syndicate

5.PYC 88369913.06.8826,953.00Ashok KumarM/s Ayodhya

Investment

Syndicate

6.PYC 88370003.06.8826,581.00K.P. Box

Makers

Investment

Corporation

Total Amount 2,14,336.60

THE DEFENCE

5.The bank contested the suits by filing written statement denying

wrongful encashment of cheques stating that signatures of the

Managing Director thereon were not forged and that the payment was

made after comparing the signatures of the Managing Director with

his specimen signatures. Plea of non-impleadment of the payees

(before their impleadment), was also taken with various other

statements defending action of the bank as regards encashment of

cheques in normal course of business transactions. The employee

Indrapal and the payees also filed their separate written statements in

both the suits. Whereas Indrapal denied any conspiracy or fraud and

stated that cheques were rightly encashed and also took a plea that he

had demanded salary, bonus and others perks from the company but

his request was rejected against which he moved some application

before the Labour Commissioner and that he was also removed from

service in December, 1987 and, therefore, institution of suit was a

result of malice of the employer. The payees took a defence that

cheques were rightly presented and credited into their accounts. Bar of

Order 2 Rule 2 CPC as regards second suit was also pleaded praying

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for dismissal of both the suits as barred by the provisions of

Limitation Act, CPC as well as Sections 82 and 85 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act.

6.Both the suits were consolidated by the trial court by order

dated 11.11.1992 and the Original Suit No.143 of 1991 (first suit) was

made the leading case.

THE TRIAL COURT’S JUDGMENT

7.The trial court, by judgment and decree dated 28.08.2002,

dismissed both the suits. It held the second suit as barred by Order 2

Rule 2 CPC on the ground that on the date of filing first suit, cause of

action to institute the second suit had already arisen, particularly in

view of notice dated 19.08.1990 (Exhibit-1), paper No.22-C and

observed that non-claiming relief in the first suit as regards six

cheques forming subject matter of second suit would be fatal to

plaintiff’s case. As regards negligence of the bank officials towards

clearing cheques, the trial court observed that the plaintiff had failed

to lead sufficient evidence to establish forgery in signatures of the

Managing Director, particularly when no expert was ever called for. It

also observed that the plaintiff was a company of high repute involved

in everyday transactions of lacs of rupees where 20-25 cheques were

issued on daily basis.

THE FIRST APPELLATE COURT’S JUDGMENT

8.Two civil appeals arising out of consolidated dismissal of two

suits have been allowed by the first appellate court by the impugned

judgment dated 07.08.2009 holding the bank as guilty of negligence.

The first appellate court found the trial court having erred in not

comparing the disputed signatures of the Managing Director with

those available on record, i.e. the plaint and other documents and

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observed that even in absence of expert evidence under Section 45 of

the Evidence Act, the court had ample power conferred under Section

73 of the Act to compare signatures with any other signatures

available on record; that there were separate and distinct dates of

cause of action in relation to filing of two separate civil suits and,

therefore, bar of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC did not stand attracted; that PW-

1 had succeeded to establish forgery in the cheques; that specimen

signature of the Managing Director were available on paper No.29-C/

1 (Exhibit 8), an introduction letter issued by PNB to its another

branch at Railway Road, Aligarh; that specimen signatures available

in the bank were not produced by the bank and that the statement of

DW-1 Amar Deo, being secondary evidence in absence of production

of the officials working at the relevant point of time of clearance of

cheques, was not admissible. Though the appellate court did not

record a finding that the defendants acted in collusion with each other

or that there was some conspiracy in between them, it found the bank

negligent in discharging its duties and drew the money decree. A

significant feature of the first appellate court’s judgment is that

original file concerning criminal case lodged by the company against

Indrapal, i.e. Sessions Trial No.1908 of 1994, under Sections, 420,

467, 468, 471 IPC (State Vs. Indrapal), P.S. Banna Devi, District

Aligarh was summoned and it was observed that the Managing

Director of the plaintiff-company had, after perusing original cheques

available on record of the criminal case, proved his signatures on the

cheques to be forged.

ADMISSION ORDER IN THE INSTANT APPEAL

9.The instant second appeal was admitted by a co-ordinate bench

of this Court by order dated 08.02.2023, framing following four

substantial questions of law:-

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“1. Whether the lower appellate court has erred in law in

accepting the case of plaintiff by comparing the signatures on

the cheques with the signature of the plaintiff on the plaint, his

testimony and Exhibit-8 as well as on different

correspondences between the bank and the plaintiff regarding

transactions which were the subject matter of the original suits?

2. Whether the findings of the lower appellate court regarding

negligence of the bank in encashing the cheques and its

liability to return the amount involved in the cheques is

supported by evidence and findings on record and whether, in

any case, the appellant-bank was liable to refund the amount

involved in the cheques?

3. Whether original suit no.143 of 1991was barred by Order 2

Rule 2 C.P.C?

4. Whether the interest awarded by the lower appellate court to

the plaintiff is in accordance with Section 34 of Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908?”

10.The Court may observe an inadvertent error in question No.3 as

regards number of the original suit. As the question relates to bar

under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC, it was raised and decided by two courts

differently in relation to Original Suit No.176 of 1991 (second suit)

and not in respect of Original Suit No.143 of 1991 (first suit). Hence,

third question would be understood and decided qua bar associated

with the “second suit” and not the “first suit”. The said inadvertent

error, in the opinion of the Court, being borne out from the record,

need not be corrected at this stage of writing final judgment. It is also

apparent that the appellant-bank, in pursuance of the interim order

dated 06.09.2022 passed in these proceedings, has deposited the

decretal amount and although certain dispute has been raised by the

decree holder by filing an application to the effect that there is a

shortfall in making deposit as per the interim order, since this Court is

finally deciding both the appeals on consent of both sides, the

question of compliance/non-compliance/partial compliance of the

interim order would be no significance at this stage and, therefore, the

Court is not entering into the said controversy.

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LEARNED COUNSEL HEARD

11.I have heard Sri Ashok Bhatnagar, learned counsel for the

appellant and Sri Rahul Sripat, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Sri

Ishir Sripat, learned counsel for the respondents.

APPELLANTS’ ARGUMENTS

12.Sri Bhatnagar vehemently argues that the plaintiff had raised

dispute regarding seven cheques in toto. The first suit, admittedly, was

filed on the basis of notice dated 19.08.1990, paper No.22-C-1/1 on

record, which contained details of all the seven cheques and asking

the Chairman, Zonal Manager and the Chief Manager of the Bank to

credit total amount of Rs.2,14,336/- in the account of the plaintiff. He

submits that the plaintiff chose to file first suit based upon cause of

action arising out of clearance of first cheque No. PYC 883200

covering a sum of Rs.24,410.60 and there being no leave obtained

from the civil court before institution of the second suit, Original Suit

No.176 of 1991 was barred by provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC. He

further submits that though the appellate court summoned the record

of criminal trial containing original cheques but, instead of calling for

an expert evidence, if required to examine the plea of forgery, it, in

itself, acted as an expert and findings recorded in paragraph no.26 of

the appellate court’s judgment are wholly un-called for. Contention is

that though Section 73 of the Evidence Act has no application in the

facts of the present case as it applies in case of admitted signatures in

order to ascertain whether a signature, writing or seal is that of the

person by whom it purports to have been written or made to the

satisfaction of the Court, since the Managing Director of the plaintiff-

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company had denied his signatures on the cheques, nothing was there

as “admitted signatures” on record but it was a case where the

signatures were “not admitted” by the plaintiff. Alternate submission

of Sri Bhatnagar is that even if Section 73 could be invoked by the

first appellate court, it was not a case where analysis of signatures of

the Managing Director could be done in the manner it has been done

in the judgment and the findings on trimmer, pen-lift, pen-pass, pen-

hall, sharpness of words, speed and alienation etc have been recorded

as if the Cout was a qualified handwriting or signature expert. As

regards evidence from the side of the bank, it is submitted that

officials posted at the time of clearance of the disputed cheques

(Exhibits No.12 to 18) had already left services of the bank after

availing Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) due to which Amar

Deo, a current employee of the bank, was produced as the defence

witness. Further submission is that as far as alleged non-production of

specimen signatures, there was already on record letter dated

10.09.1988 (Exhibit-8) by which the bank had introduced the

Managing Director of the plaintiff-company to the other branch of the

bank. He further submits that once both the courts below have not

recorded finding that the bank officials had acted in conspiracy with

other defendants, holding the bank as liable to pay the amount covered

by the cheques which sum was not retained by the bank but was paid

to the payees, i.e. Investment Corporation and M/s Ayodhya

Investment Syndicate, the decree drawn against the bank is wholly

unsustainable.

13.Sri Bhatnagar further submits that the plea raised by the

plaintiff-respondent that some of the defendants were different which

required leading of different evidence and for this reason two separate

suits were filed, is fallacious, far-fetched and not tenable in the eyes of

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law inasmuch as no relief was ever claimed against other defendants.

Moreover, a perusal of both the plaints would reveal that the

defendants no. 1, 2 and 3 in the first suit are common and only the

defendant no. 3 in the second suit i.e. M/s Ayodhya Investment

Syndicate was not made party in the first suit as it was not the payee

of the first cheque. However, M/s Investment Corporation is

defendant in both the suits. Explaining the cause of action, it is urged

that a plaintiff cannot create a cause of action solely by his own effort.

It must be created for him by some act of the defendant that must be a

part of the cause of action. In the instant case, the cause of action in

relation to all seven cheques arose only on 19.10.1990 when the

defendant-bank refused to pay the plaintiff the amount claimed in the

legal notice dated 19.08.1990. Therefore, the first suit filed claiming

the amount mentioned in the first cheque would infer that the plaintiff

failed to include the whole of the claim which it was entitled to make

in respect to the cause of action, thereby relinquishing its claim for the

remaining 6 cheques, hence the second suit was barred under Order 2

Rule 2 CPC. Reliance has been placed upon paragraph no.11 of the

Full Bench decision of this Court in Zila Parishad Vs. Shanti Devi,

AIR 1965 All 590. As regards incompetence of a court to act as a

handwriting or signatures expert in itself, Sri Bhatnagar placed

reliance upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in State (Delhi

Administration) Vs. Pali Ram: AIR 1979 SC 14 and referred to

paragraph no.29 whereof, which reads as under:-

“29. The matter can be viewed from another angle, also.

Although there is no legal bar to the Judge using his own

eyes to compare the disputed writing with the admitted

writing, even without the aid of the evidence of any

handwriting expert, the Judge should, as a matter of

prudence and caution, hesitate to base his finding with

regard to the identity of a handwriting which forms the

sheet-anchor of the prosecution case against a person

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accused of an offence solely on comparison made by

himself. It is, therefore, not advisable that a Judge should

take upon himself the task of comparing the admitted

writing with the disputed one to find out whether the two

agree with each other; and the prudent course is to obtain

the opinion and assistance of an expert.”

RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS

14.Per contra, Sri Rahul Sripat, learned Senior Counsel, submits

that the bar of Order 2 Rule 2 does not at all stand attracted in the

facts of the case as rightly held by the first appellate court, inasmuch

as all cheques of different dates were presented in different points of

time and, therefore, wrongful credit thereof in the bank accounts of

the payees would give rise to separate causes of action. In addition to

Order 2 Rule 2 CPC, Rule 3 thereof was also referred as regards

joinder of several causes of action and it was contended that separate

dates, separates payees, separate amounts and separate clearance of

every cheque giving rise to separate cause of action, if the plaintiff

filed first suit in respect of one cheque and joined causes of action of

remaining six cheques in the second suit, bar of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC

would not be attracted. He further submits that although no expert

evidence was brought on record, certainly there was an order of

conviction of Indrapal and also the original cheques before the first

appellate court pursuant to summoning of the file of the criminal trial

and for invocation of Section 73 of the Evidence Act, it is not required

to exercise such power only when there are two conflicting expert

reports. He submits that in the facts of the case the first appellate court

has rightly compared the signatures of the Managing Director as

available on various documents on record and rightly arrived at a

conclusion that the bank was negligent in not comparing the same

with the specimen signatures available with it. In support of his

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submissions, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance upon

following authorities:-

(i) The Haryana Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd., Rohtak Vs.

Joint Hindu Family Firm Styled as Gupta Drum Supply Company:

AIR 1976 P&H 117;

(ii) Murari Lal Vs. State of M.P.: AIR 1980 SC 531;

(iii) Shriniwas Pansari Vs. Hari Prasad Mehra and others: AIR

1983 Pat 321;

(iv) Canara Bank Vs. Canara Sales Corporation and others: AIR

1987 SC 1603;

(v) Babulal Agarwalla Vs. State of Bikaner and Jaipur: AIR

1989 Cal 92;

(vi) Syndicate Bank Vs. West Bengal Cements Lts. and others:

AIR 1989 Delhi 107;

(vii) Mahabir Prasad Bubna Vs. United Bank of India: AIR

1992 Cal 270;

(viii) Mathew Jacob Vs. Salestine Jacob and others: AIR 1998

Delhi 390;

(ix) Jyoti H. Mehta and others Vs. Kishore J. Janani and others:

MANU/MH/0133/2019; and

(x) Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta and others Vs. Ahemdabad

Municipal Corporation: MANU/SC/0420/2024.

ANALYSIS OF RIVAL CONTENTIONS

Re:- Order 2 Rule 2 CPC

15.Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I find it

established on record that the plaint of first suit filed on 05.02.1991

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disclosed sending of notice dated 19.08.1990 and non-compliance

thereof by the bank. The said notice being on record as Exhibit-1,

paper No.22-C-1/1, contains details of all the seven cheques out of

which four were issued on different dates in February, 1988, one

cheque in March, 1988 and two cheques in June, 1988. The second

suit was filed on 16.02.1991 in respect of remaining six cheques.

From the statement contained in paragraph nos.4, 9 and 10 of the first

suit, it appears that since three years period from the date of

encashment of first cheque, i.e. 05.02.1988, was going to expire, the

plaintiff-company reserved its right to claim amount of remaining six

cheques and cause of action behind filing of the first suit was alleged

to have arisen on 06.03.1988, i.e. the date of fraudulent encashment of

the cheque and payment made negligently. Paragraphs no.4 and 10 of

the plaint of first suit read as under:-

“4. That in addition to the said cheque, six more cheques were

also fraudulently encashed and negligently paid by the

defendant Bank from the said account on different dates

bearing forged signatures of the Managing Director and the

plaintiff reserves its right to claim the amount of those cheques

together with interest subsequently.

10. That the cause of action for the present suit arose on

6.3.1988, the date of fraudulent encashment of the cheque and

payment made negligently by the defendant Bank, on different

dates, the defendant Bank was requested to make good the loss,

on 19.8.1990, the date of notice, on 19.10.1990, the date of

reply notice and lastly about a week ago, when the defendant

Bank was personally approached to settle the matter amicably,

but to no fruitful result or effect, hence this suit, which lies

within the jurisdiction of this Court and the Hon’ble Court is

competent to try the same.”

16.The submission of Sri Rahul Sripat that relinquishment to

institute a lis in relation to six cheques would not create a bar to

institute a second suit, when examined from the bare statements

contained in the plaint of first suit, it would reveal that the plaintiff

itself had alleged arising of cause of action in relation to first suit on

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06.03.1988, the date of fraudulent encashment of the cheque and

payment made negligently by the defendant Bank on different dates

and when the defendant Bank was requested to make good the loss, on

19.8.1990, i.e., the date of notice, on 19.10.1990, i.e., the date of reply

notice and, lastly, when the defendant-Bank was personally

approached to settle the matter amicably. It appears that the plaintiff

took shelter of plea of limitation of three years from the date of arising

of cause of action and, according to the plaintiff, at the best, its plea

was that as the limitation was about to expire in March, 1991, the first

suit was filed. Interestingly, second suit was also filed in February,

1991, i.e. after 11 days from the date of filing of first suit. By that

time, obviously limitation to file either of the two suits had not

expired, if, at all, computation of period of limitation is understood in

the manner in which it has been sought to be explained vide the

statements contained in both the plaints. As per law, limitation to file a

suit for recovery of money would be three years computed either from

the date when the amount became payable/due or from the date when

demand was made or it was not satisfied, as the case may be. In both

the suits, issue of bar of limitation was framed and has been decided

by the first appellate court in favour of the plaintiff-respondent and

against the bank. There is no challenge to the said finding by the

appellant-bank. Even otherwise, this Court is satisfied that both the

suits were well within period of limitation.

17.In view of the above, it is now to be seen as to whether the first

appellate court was right in holding the suit as not barred by the

provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC. For a ready reference, Order 2

Rules 2 and 3 CPC are reproduced as under:-

“2. Suit to include the whole claim.—(1) Every suit shall

include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to

make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may

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relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit

within the jurisdiction of any Court.

(2) Relinquishment of part of claim.—Where a plaintiff omits to

sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his

claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so

omitted or relinquished.

(3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs.—A person entitled

to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action

may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if he omits, except with

the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not

afterwards sue for any relief so omitted.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this rule an obligation and a

collateral security for its performance and successive claims

arising under the same obligation shall be deemed respectively to

constitute but one cause of action.

3. Joinder of causes of action.—(1) Save as otherwise provided,

a plaintiff may unite in the same suit several causes of action

against the same defendant, or the same defendants jointly; and

any plaintiffs having causes of action in which they are jointly

interested against the same defendant or the same defendants

jointly may unite such causes of action in the same suit.

(2) Where causes of action are united, the jurisdiction of the

Court as regards the suit shall depend on the amount or value of

the aggregate subject-matters at the date of instituting the suit.”

(emphasis supplied)

18.The provisions, as extracted above, show that the plaintiff has to

include whole of the claim which he is entitled to make in respect of

cause of action but he can relinquish any part of his claim in order to

bring the suit within the jurisdiction of Court. The omission or

intentional relinquishment of any part of his claim would certainly bar

the plaintiff to sue afterwards in respect of portion so omitted or

relinquished. The subsequent suit can be saved by the rigours of Rule

2 only when the plaintiff obtains a leave of the Court at the time of

relinquishment or omission of part of his claim. In the instant case, no

leave as regards institution of the second suit in respect of remaining

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six cheques was obtained by the plaintiff, although it was not only

well aware of the wrongful credit of the accounts of the payees but it

itself had sent composite notice dated 19.08.1990 and received reply

dated 19.10.1990 in respect of all seven cheques and mentioned this

fact in the plaint of the first suit itself. The submission of Sri Sripat

that in paragraph no.4 of the plaint of first suit, the plaintiff had

reserved its right to subsequently claim the amount of remaining six

cheques together with interest, does not impress the Court, inasmuch

as Order 2 Rule 2 or 3 CPC does not contemplate any such reservation

by the plaintiff himself. If interpretation of the aforesaid provision, as

suggested by Sri Sripat, is accepted, it would demolish the very

statutory bar contained in CPC and negate the legislative intent and

would give leverage to any plaintiff to omit or relinquish any part of

his claim or its portion according to his own whims and wishes,

whereas such a reservation is provided in clear words “except with the

leave of the Court” as per sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order 2 CPC.

19.Joinder of causes of action, as argued by Sri Sripat while

referring to Rule 3 of Order 2, in the facts of the case, would be read

only in respect of joinder of causes of action based upon payment

concerning six cheques and the Court does not find any defect in the

frame of second suit on individual or separate basis but when read

with the first suit and the composite notice, the second suit was

certainly barred by the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC. Further,

joinder is contemplated in respect of several causes of action in the

same suit and not joining of causes in two suits. In the facts of the

case, nothing prevented the plaintiff to join grievance and relief in

relation to all the seven cheques in the first suit, as the record position

at the time of institution of both the suits was the same, i.e. payment

of all the cheques had been released in favour of all the payees and a

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composite notice Exhibit-1 describing a joint cause of action was very

much there. One should not forget that the plea of different defendants

as raised by Shri Sripat while arguing against the bar of Order 2 Rule

2 is of no avail inasmuch as the payees were added after 4 years of

institution of both the suits and no relief was ever claimed against

them.

20.The judgment in Haryana Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd.

(supra), cited by Sri Sripat, cannot be read in favour of the plaintiff,

inasmuch as the Punjab and Haryana High Court had laid down the

correct test falling under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC stating that the claim in

the new suit is in fact founded upon a cause of action distinct from

that which was the foundation in the former suit. It explained the

cause of action as every fact which will be necessary for the plaintiff

to prove in order to support his right to judgment and observed that if

the evidence to support the two claims is different, then the causes of

action are also different. There is no dispute about the proposition laid

down in the said judgment, however, as to how it can help the plaintiff

in the facts of the present case, is not understandable. As observed

above, single cause of action in relation to all the seven cheques had

arisen at the time of filing of the first suit itself and no distinction is

found in any of the parameters or components, either qua pleadings or

evidence in both the cases. It is, therefore, held that the second suit

was clearly barred by Order 2 Rule 2 CPC as rightly held by the trial

court and wrongly decided by the first appellate court. Hence, third

question framed by this Court in the admission order is answered in

favour of the defendant-appellant (bank).

Re:- Section 73 of Evidence Act

21.On merits of the plaintiff’s case as regards wrongful payment of

cheques, the only dispute was as regards genuineness of signatures of

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the Managing Director of the plaintiff-company on the cheques.

Admittedly, neither before the trial court nor before the first appellate

court any expert evidence in terms of Section 45 of the Evidence Act

was brought on record. What the Court notices from the record is that

FIR was registered by the Managing Director of the plaintiff-company

against the accused Indrapal on 29.07.1988. During the pendency of

the original suit, charge sheet was submitted against the accused and

he was being tried by the court of competent criminal jurisdiction in

S.T. No.1908 of 1994. Suits were dismissed in the year 2002 by which

time the sessions trial was not over. Accused Indrapal was convicted

by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aligarh on 29.03.2006, i.e. during

the pendency of civil appeals. Admittedly, the original cheques were

never brought on record of the proceedings of civil suit, however, the

same formed part of the record of the criminal trial. The trial court

observed about lodging of the FIR, transfer of investigation to the

Crime Branch and also perused Exhibit Ka-5, i.e. the first information

report registered at Case Crime No.254 of 1988. The first appellate

court observed about summoning of the file of the criminal case by

the trial court itself. The first appellate court perused the original

cheques or their certified copies on record and observed that though

there were various documents such as plaint, statement of PW-1 and

certain correspondences entered into between the parties, the trial

court did not make any efforts to compare the said signatures before

deciding the suits. As regards Exhibit-8, in relation whereto first

question has been framed in the admission order, the first appellate

court observed that it being an introduction letter issued by the bank to

its Railway Road Branch, it would be deemed to be “admitted

signatures” of the Managing Director. The appellate court, thereafter,

proceeded to observe that the bank had not produced specimen

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19

signatures on record and then recorded following findings in

paragraph no.26 of the judgment:-

"२६. इस उद्देश्य से मैंने फौजदारी पत्रावली में उपलब्ध मूल विववाविदत चैकों

जिजनकी प्रमाणि'त फोटो प्रतितयाँ प्रदर्श- - १२ लगायत १८ विवचार' न्यायालय

की पत्रावली पर उपलब्ध है। देवेन्द्रजीत वाडरा के हस्ताक्षरों की विमलान

अणि9लेख पर उपलब्ध दावे , ब्यानात एवं प्रदर्श- क - ८ लगायत क - ११ पर

देवेन्द्रजीत वाडरा के हस्ताक्षर और विवर्शेषकर प्रदर्श- - ८ पर उपलब्ध

देवेन्द्रजीत वाडरा के नमूने के बैंक के द्वारा सत्याविपत हस्ताक्षर , से अत्यन्त

सूक्ष्मतापूव-क एवं गम्9ीरतापूव-क की। चैक विदनांक १३-६-८८ सं० पी०

वाई० सी० ८८३६९९ धनराणिर्श २६,९५३/- चैक सं० पी० वाई० सी०

८८३७०० विदनांक ३-६-८८ धनराणिर्श २६,५८१/-, चैक सं० पी० वाई०

सी० ८८३४०० विदनांक २७-२-८८ धनराणिर्श २३६४१/-, चैक सं० पी०

वाई० सी० ८८३३९९ विदनांक १-३-८८ धनराणिर्श २२,७५१/-, चैक सं०

क्य

ू० ई० एम० ८७८५७८ विदनांक २५

-२-८८ धनराणिर्श ४०,०००/-, चैक

सं० पी० वाई० सी० ८८३२०० विदनांक ५-२-८८ धनराणिर्श २४,४१०.६०,

चैक सं० क्य

ू० ई० एम० ८७८६०० विदनांक १७

-२-८८ धनराणिर्श

५०,०००/- पर उपलब्ध देवेन्द्रजीत वाडरा के हस्ताक्षर ख

ुली आँख से देखने

पर ही प्रदर्श- - ८ पर देवेन्द्रजीत वाडरा के हस्ताक्षरों से विकसी 9ी लेखीय

विवर्शेषताओ

ं के परिरप्रेक्ष्य में मेल नहीं खाते हैं। विबना विकसी गहन परीक्ष' या

प्रयोगर्शाला परीक्ष' पर आधारिरत विमलान के 9ी ये स9ी हस्ताक्षर फजQ बनाये

गये दर्शिर्शत हो रहे है जिजसमें तमाम लाइन क्वालिलटी तिडफे क्टस यथा ट

्रेमर

अस्वा9ाविवक पेनलिलफ्ट पेनपास एवं पेनहाल उपस्थिस्थत है। लिलखे गये र्शब्दों की

र्शाप-नेस , गतित तथा झुकाव में इतने स्पष्ट अंतर विदखाई दे रहे हैं विक विकसी 9ी

स्थिस्थतित में इन्हें एक व्यवि[ के लेख का नही माना जा सकता। हस्ताक्षर के

अतितरिर[ कतितपय चैकों में धारक जिजनके नाम चैक जारी विकये गये है तथा

धनराणिर्श की विहज्जे में ऐसे चौकाने वाले दोष है जो इतनी प्रतितवि^त कम्पनी के

द्वारा अपने व्यापार के सामान्य अनुक्रम में जारी चैकों में नही हो सकते।

उदाहर' के लिलये चैक सं० पी० वाई० सी० ८८३२०० विदनांक ५-२-८८ में

पैसे को प्राइस लिलखा गया है, टवेन्टी व थाउजेन्ड के बीच नीचे ओर फोर

अलग कलम से बढ़ाया गया है। थाउजेन्ज के आगे के फोर को काटा गया है

विफर उसके ऊपर फोर लिलखा गया है। यहाँ 9ी देवेन्द्रजीत वाडरा के जो

हस्ताक्षर है उनका विवणि9न्न तथा तुरन्त प्रकार में आ जाने पर विवणि9न्नता स्पष्ट

रूप से उजागर है। इसी तरह चैक पी० वाई० सी० ८८३४०० में फोरटी की

स्पेलिंलग गलत है तथा सेल्फ को लेल्वज लिलखा गया है।"

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22.The above findings demonstrate that the appellate court

apparently acted as a well qualified expert of comparing handwriting

as well as signatures. The component and parameters, like trimmer,

pen-lift, pen-pass, pen-hall, sharpness of words, speed and alienation

etc have been described in the manner in which a well qualified expert

explains the same. The Court may also reproduce here the nature of

the signatures of the Managing Director which are found on different

documents on record. Scanned copy of the signatures of the Managing

Director, both undisputed (On Exhibit-8) and disputed (On 7

cheques), are reproduced as below:-

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22

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23

23.A perusal of the signatures would show that the same being

highly complicated, in order to arrive at a definite conclusion by a

court of law as to whether they were forged or genuine, expert

evidence was required and it is beyond the competence of a judge to

arrive at such a conclusion in purported exercise of power under

Section 73 of the Evidence Act. It may be noted that there is on record

an expert report accompanied by various cheques, both disputed in the

civil litigation and undisputed but the same was on the record of the

criminal case and the expert had given opinion which, ultimately,

resulted into conviction of the accused Indrapal. As to what happened

to the conviction, either in appeal or otherwise, is not on record. Even

otherwise, none of the courts below has, in fact, treated either the

expert report of criminal proceedings or even the findings recorded by

the investigating officer or the learned Magistrate as an evidence in

the civil proceedings and rightly so, inasmuch as record of criminal

proceedings cannot be treated as evidence in civil proceedings. Hence,

what is there before the court is the oral and documentary evidence

led before the civil court but to answer issues arisen and questions

framed by this Court, it has to be seen as to whether the evidence was

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sufficient to hold the bank negligent as regards discharge of its duties

in clearance of cheques.

24.The Court may refer to Section 73 of the Evidence Act that

reads as under:-

“73. Comparison of signature, writing or seal with others

admitted or proved.- In order to ascertain whether a signature,

writing or seal is that of the person by whom it purports to have

been written or made, any signature, writing or seal admitted or

proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written or

made by that person may be compared with the one which is to

be proved, although that signature, writing or seal has not been

produced or proved for any other purpose.

The Court may direct any person present in Court to write any

words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to

compare the words or figures so written with any words or

figures alleged to have been written by such person.”

25.The Supreme Court in O. Bharathan vs. K. Sudhakaran and

another , AIR 1996 Supreme Court 1140, condemned the judgment

of the High Court of Kerala in an election petition where the High

Court had compared the signatures on two counterfoils alleged to be

related to certain witnesses without the aid of an expert or the

evidence of persons conversant with the disputed signatures. The

Supreme Court held that the High Court had erred in taking upon

itself the task of making comparison and found the approach of the

High Court not in conformity with the spirit of Section 73 of the

Evidence Act.

26.Gauhati High Court in Shyam Sundar Chowkhani alias

Chandan and others vs. Kajal Kanti Biswas and others, AIR 1999

Gauhati 101, after referring to judgment in State of Maharashtra vs.

Sukhdeo Singh and another, AIR 1992 SC 2100, observed that

although Section 73 empowers the Court to compare the disputed

writing with the specimen/admitted writing shown to be genuine,

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prudence demands that the Court should be extremely slow in

venturing an opinion on the basis of comparison, more so, when the

quality of evidence in respect of specimen/admitted writing is not of

high standard.

27.The Orissa High Court in Laxmi Bai vs. A. Chandravati, AIR

1995 Orissa 131, held that under Section 73 of the Evidence Act, a

Court is competent to make comparison of disputed writings, it would,

however, be too hazardous for a Court to use his own eyes and merely

on the basis of personal comparison decide a very vital issue between

the parties centering round the handwriting or signatures of a person.

28.As far as the judgment of Patna High Court in Shriniwas

Pansari (supra), cited by Sri Sripat, it was held that there is no bar to

the judge using his own eyes to compare the disputed writing with the

admitted writing even without the aid of the evidence of any

handwriting expert. There is no dispute about the said proposition but

the same would not be applicable in the present case as the first

appellate court has not simply compared the signatures with his open

eyes but has acted as a well qualified expert having specialized

knolwledge when it used words like trimmer, pen-lift, pen-pass, pen-

hall, sharpness of words, speed and alienation etc.

29.The third judgment relied upon by Sri Sripat in Canara Bank

(supra) deals with the liability of the bank to make good the payment.

In that case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the

trial court and the first appellate court which had held the bank liable

to pay amount covered by the disputed cheques. The Hon’ble

Supreme Court discussed the relationship of the bank with its

customers and the terms of the contract between the two and also

observed that the bank’s business depends upon the trust and

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whenever a cheque purported to be by a customer is presented before

a bank, it carries a mandate to the bank to pay. If the cheque is forged,

there is no such mandate and the bank can escape liability only when

it can establish knowledge to the customers of the forgery in the

cheques. In the instant case, admittedly, the first information report

was lodged by the Managing Director against Indrapal in 1988 itself,

i.e. immediately after the cheques were cleared and alleged forgery

came to the knowledge of the Managing Director. The suits were filed

just before the third year was going to lapse in 1991. During this

period of time, the plaintiff-company was prosecuting its own

employee. After institution of suits, whatever evidence was brought

on record, as discussed above, the same is sufficient for this Court to

form an opinion that the Bank had successfully established its defence

of no negligence and non-conspiracy with the accused and also of

taking reasonable care in clearing the cheques considering the large

number of transactions by the company and the nature of forgery

alleged by the plaintiff. Further, knowledge of alleged forgery to the

plaintiff was also established in view of prosecution lodged by

plaintiff immediately in 1988. Therefore, with due respect, the

judgment in Canara Bank (supra) would also not be helpful to the

plaintiff-respondent.

30.The judgment of Calcutta High Court in Babulal Agarwalla

(supra), with due respect, does not lay down any law so as to dislodge

the bank’s defence. The said judgment was delivered in an original

suit with no discussion of oral or documentary evidence. Single

cheque was presumed to be forged without any discussion and just a

passing reference of Supreme Court’s judgment in Canara Bank

(supra) was given with a further observation that Section 85(2) of the

N.I. Act would not stand attracted in case of a forged cheque. In the

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facts of the instant case, oral and documentary evidence read as a

whole, want of expert evidence under Section 45 of the Evidence Act

and improper and illegal exercise of power under Section 73 of the

Evidence Act by the first appellate court does not persuade this Court

to read the judgment in Babulal Agarwalla (supra) in favour of the

appellant. Another judgment in Syndicate Bank (supra) is on

payment of interest which, with due regards to Delhi High Court, is of

insignificant value in the present case as this Court has arrived at a

conclusion that the bank was not liable to pay any amount to the

plaintiff and, hence, question of interest would not arise.

31.The judgment of Calcutta High Court in Mahabir Prasad

Bubna (supra) and Delhi High Court in Mathew Jackob (supra), on

the interpretation of Section 73 of the Evidence Act, are also not

helpful for the plaintiff-respondent, for the same reasons stated above.

Bombay High Court in Jyoti H. Mehta (supra) on the point that the

plaintiff is entitled for refund as the bank is a custodian of the amount

is also of no help to the plaintiff as facts of the said case were different

from the one involved in the present lis where initially the suit was

instituted against the bank but, later on, the accused of the forgery, i.e.

the employee of the plaintiff as well as the payees were impleaded as

defendants without amending the plaint. No decree having been

claimed against the payees, suit could not be decreed against the bank

merely on the ground that it was custodian of the amount kept by the

customers. The last judgment in Mrugendra Indravadan (supra) is

on the proposition laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in relation to

Order 41 Rule 31 CPC which having not been argued from either side

and, even otherwise, not being significantly involved in view of

analysis of every aspect of the matter, the same has no application in

the facts of the present case.

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Re:- Liability of Bank to refund the amount

32.Here, the Court would like to refer oral testimony of PW-1

Devinder Jit Singh Vadara, i.e. the Managing Director. In his cross

examination, he stated Indrapal as his peon. As regards payees ‘M/s

Ayodhya Investor Syndicate’ and ‘Investment Corporation’, it was

stated that there had never been any commercial transaction in

between the plaintiff-company and the said payees. He also stated that

he had not claimed any decree against the said payees. He stated his

qualification as MA (Economics) and LL.B and stated that his

company did not trade in India and explained his transactions in

relation to foreign countries. Acquaintance with the payees

‘Investment Corporation’ and ‘M/s Ayodhya Investor Syndicate’ was

clearly stated by him but he expressed his ignorance as to why despite

their impleadment, no relief was claimed against them. From the

overall testimony of PW-1, though it is clear that he denied issuance

of cheques and also termed his signatures thereon as forged, the bare

statement to that effect would not suffice drawing a decree for

payment of money against the bank and in favour of the plaintiff. The

reason is that the bank was neither a wrongful gainer of the money nor

can it otherwise be stated to be a case of undue enrichment of the

bank. If Indrapal, an employee of the plaintiff-company, was

convicted and it is assumed that his conviction has attained finality, he

being a party to both the original suits, decree might have been drawn

against him but since no relief was claimed by the plaintiff to that

effect, there is no such decree. Similar is the position with respect to

additionally impleaded payees in both the suits and it is clear that

though PW-1 denied business transactions with the said payees,

ultimately the amount covered by all the cheques was credited in their

bank accounts. Therefore, it is the payees who were rightly or wrongly

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benefited with the amount credited with them and in such situation,

there could be a decree against the said payees but, for the reasons

best known to the plaintiff, neither any relief was claimed despite

subsequent impleadment of the payees, nor did the first appellate

court look into this aspect. The appellate court has simply held the

bank negligent in discharge of its duties and has drawn a decree

against it. It may also not be forgotten that it is not a case arising out

of deficiency in service under Consumer Protection Act, 1986 or

Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 where respectively Consumer

Redressal Forum or a Permanent Lok Adalat under Sections 22-A and

22-C of the Act of 1987 may or may not adjudicate liability of the

bank in relation to services rendered by it. The appeal arises out of a

civil suit where liability to pay would accrue when all components

affecting civil rights of the parties have to be adjudicated upon as a

court exercising civil jurisdiction in relation to parameters of civil

procedural law and Specific Relief Act, 1963.

Re:- Negotiable Instruments Act

33.While discussing the arguments based upon Section 85 of the

N.I. Act, the appellate court observed that the cheques being forged in

the present case, they would not fall within the parameters of a

‘negotiable instrument’ and, hence, benefit under sub-section (2) of

Section 85 of the N.I. Act would not be available to the bank. Here,

the Court deems it appropriate to refer to the provisions of Sections 7

and 85 of the N.I. Act, which are as under:-

“7. “Drawer”, “Drawee”.—The maker of a bill of exchange or

cheque is called the “drawer”; the person thereby directed to pay

is called the “drawee”.

“drawee in case of need”.— When in the bill or in any

indorsement thereon the name of any person is given in addition

to the drawee to be resorted to in case of need such person is

called a “drawee in case of need.”

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“acceptor”.—After the drawee of a bill has signed his assent

upon the bill, or, if there are more parts thereof than one, upon

one of such parts, and delivered the same, or given notice of

such signing to the holder or to some person on his behalf, he is

called the “acceptor”.

“acceptor for honour”.— [When a bill of exchange has been

noted or protested for non-acceptance or for better security], and

any person accepts it supra protest for honour of the drawer or

of any one of the indorsers, such person is called an “acceptor

for honour”.

“Payee”.—The person named in the instrument, to whom or to

whose order the money is by the instrument directed to be paid,

is called the “payee”.”

“85. Cheque payable to order.— [(1)] Where a cheque payable

to order purports to be endorsed by or on behalf of the payee,

the drawee is discharged by payment in due course.

(2) Where a cheque is originally expressed to be payable to

bearer, the drawee is discharged by payment in due course to the

bearer thereof, notwithstanding any endorsement whether in full

or in blank appearing thereon, and notwithstanding that any

such endorsement purports to restrict or exclude further

negotiation.”

34.It appears from the record that protection of sub-section (2) of

Section 85 was claimed by the bank on the ground that the cheques

originally expressed to be payable to bearer, once the same were

cleared in due course, the bank would be discharged from its liability.

In the instant case, the plaintiff-company was the drawer and the bank

was drawee. Even if the cheques were termed as containing forged

signatures of the Managing Director so as to take them away from the

definition of a negotiable instrument, the appellate court should have

examined the significance of sub-section (2) of Section 85 so as to

appreciate as to whether the bank had discharged its obligation in its

normal course of business, particularly when it had come on record

that the plaintiff-company, being a reputed one, presented 20-25

cheques per day in the bank.

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35.In addition to it, Section 131 of Negotiable Instruments Act,

1881 indicates the circumstances when the Bankers are not liable for

consequences of wrongful payment. The provision reads as under:

“131. Non-liability of banker receiving payment of cheque.—

A banker who has in good faith and without negligence received

payment for a customer of a cheque crossed generally or

specially to himself shall not, in case the title to the cheque

proves defective, incur any liability to the true owner of the

cheque by reason only of having received such payment.

Explanation I.—A banker receives payment of a crossed cheque

for a customer within the meaning of this section

notwithstanding that he credits his customer’s account with the

amount of the cheque before receiving payment thereof.

Explanation II.— It shall be the duty of the banker who receives

payment based on an electronic image of a truncated cheque held

with him, to verify the prima facie genuineness of the cheque to

be truncated and any fraud, forgery or tampering apparent on the

face of the instrument that can be verified with due diligence and

ordinary care.”

36.Although, the Explanations I and II were added or replaced by

the amendments brought in the Act in the year 2002-03, by which

time the trial in the aforesaid suits was over, even if the same are seen

in view of the fact that the matter was pending before the first

Appellate Court, a plain reading of the provision and the Explanations

appended to it would indicate that the bankers shall not be liable to the

true owner for receiving payment of a cheque crossed generally or

specially in good faith and without negligence in case the title of the

cheque proves defective. The provision protects bankers who, in good

faith and without negligence, receive payment for a customer of a

crossed cheque when the title to the cheque proves defective. Proof of

good faith and no negligence depends on the facts and circumstances

of the case. The said provision has been explained by Madras High

Court in Mrs. Rosali vs. M/s Syndicate Bank, Luz, Mylapore

Madras-4, 2018 (1) CTC 441.

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37.The Karnataka High Court, in Ashit Roy vs. Syndicate Bank,

2000 (101) CC 178, after placing reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Canara Bank (supra) and Mahabir

Prasad Bubna (supra) held that the banks have a mandate to pay only

when a cheque is genuine and signed by the customer and they cannot

escape liability unless they can establish knowledge to the customer of

the forgery in the cheques. Meaning thereby that in a given case, if

bank is able to establish that as regards forgery committed in cheque,

the customer had knowledge, it can put a defence to avoid its liability

otherwise situation might be different. In the instant case, immediately

after the dispute cheques were cleared, the Managing Director of the

plaintiff-company lodged first information report against its own

employee Indrapal and it instituted suit only after a period of three

years, by which time charge sheet had already been filed against the

accused. Significantly, none of the bank officials was made an

accused in the criminal case and the plaintiff succeeded to get its own

employee convicted.

38.The Division Bench of Kerala High Court, in State Bank of

India vs. Kerala State Co-operative Marketing Federation and

others, O.S. No. 252 of 1988 decided on 05.10.1995 held that in order

that a payment should be held to be made in due course, it should be,

firstly, in accordance with the apparent tenor of the instrument;

secondly, it must be made in good faith and without negligence;

thirdly, payment must be made to a person in possession of the

instrument; and fourthly, while making the payment care should be

taken to see that no circumstances exist which afford a reasonable

ground for believing that the instrument-holder is not entitled to

receive payment of the amount mentioned in the instrument. The

phrase "apparent tenor" seems to indicate the information available on

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the face of the instrument itself. Factors such as the identity of the

payee or of the drawee, the figure of the amount or the date on which

or after which the amount becomes payable must be deemed to have

been conveyed by the apparent tenor of the instrument.

(emphasis supplied)

CONCLUSION

39.When the entire material on record is examined in the light of

the questions framed in the admission order, this Court safely comes

to a conclusion that the first appellate court has grossly erred in

accepting the plaintiff’s case by comparing the signatures on the

cheques with the signature on the plaint, oral testimony, Exhibit-8 and

on different correspondences and that liability to pay and credit the

amount covered by the cheques in the bank account of the plaintiff-

company out of alleged negligence in clearing the cheques has been

wrongly decided by the first appellate court. Therefore, first two

questions are answered in favour of the appellant-bank.

40.As far as fourth question relating to interest with reference to

Section 34 CPC, since this Court has arrived at a conclusion that the

decree drawn against the bank is unsustainable, no question of

awarding any interest arises and, therefore, fourth question is also

answered in favour of the bank. Third question as regards bar of

second suit under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC has already been answered in

favour of the bank.

41.In view of the above discussion, both the second appeals

succeed and are, accordingly, allowed. The impugned consolidated

judgment dated 07.08.2009 and the decree drawn on that basis in both

the Civil Appeals No. 147 of 2002 and 146 of 2002 is set aside and

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the trial court’s judgment dismissing both the Original Suits No.143 of

1991 and 176 of 1991 is upheld.

42.Any amount lying deposited, either pursuant to the interim

order of this Court or otherwise, is directed to be refunded to and

credited in the concerned account of the appellant-Punjab National

Bank along with accrued interest upto date. The Executing Court shall

facilitate such refund forthwith.

43.This Court records all its appreciation for both the learned

counsel in very ably assisting the Court in deciding these old appeals.

Order Date :- 30.9.2024

AKShukla/-

(Kshitij Shailendra, J.)

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