CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -1-

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA 

AT CHANDIGARH 

(I) CR-5847-2025 (O&M)

PUNJAB STATE CIVIL SUPPLIES CORPORATION LIMITED

...Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

M/S GANESH RICE MILLS AND ANOTHER  

...Respondent(s)

(II) CR-8920-2025 (O&M)

PUNJAB STATE CIVIL SUPPLIES CORPORATION LIMITED AND  

ANOTHER

...Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

M/S EVERSHINE RICE MILLS AND OTHERS  

...Respondent(s)

(III) CR-8878-2025 (O&M)

PUNJAB STATE CIVIL WAREHOUSING CORPORATION

...Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

M/S UJJAGAR MAL SATPAL AND OTHERS  

...Respondent(s)

(IV) CR-9445-2025 (O&M)

THE PUNJAB STATE CIVIL SUPPLIES CORPORATION LIMITED

...Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

M/S BORDER RICE SHELLERS AND ANOTHER  

...Respondent(s)

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -2-

(V) CR-8589-2025 (O&M)

THE PUNJAB STATE COOPERATIVE SUPPLY AND MARKETING 

FEDERATION LIMITED 

...Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

M/S NANAKSAR RICE AND GEN. MILLS THR. ITS PARTNERS   

...Respondent(s)

(VI) CR-6164-2025 (O&M)

PUNJAB STATE CIVIL SUPPLIES CORPORATION LIMITED

...Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

M/S SHIVPAM AGRO FOODS PVT. LTD. AND OTHERS

...Respondent(s)

(VII) CR-7999-2025 (O&M)

HARYANA STATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION

...Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

JASBIR SINGH

...Respondent(s)

Reserved on: 05.03.2026

Pronounced on: 29.05.2026

Uploaded on: 29.05.2026

Whether only the operative part of the judgment is pronounced or whether the

full judgment is pronounced: Full

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASGURPREET SINGH PURI

Wheter on lhypaypiypvfjhfupdgmscf epfrgp

Ms. Mona Yadav, Advocate

NnR(4T-(H-4E4En8-R(E8(GO2UFPJ2ABAU 

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -3-

Mr. A. P. S. Mann, Advocate

NnR(4T-(H-4E4En8-R(E8(GO2FUFD2ABAU (

Mr. Anil Sharma, Advocate

NnR(4T-(H-4E4En8-R(E8(GO2SVSP2ABAU  

Mr. Sharad Aggarwal, Advocate

NnR(4T-(H-4E4En8-R(E8(GO2JDDD2ABAU 

Mr. Manbir Singh Batth, Advocate

NnR(4T-(H-4E4En8-R(E8(GO2FFJF2ABAU()81(GO2DPPU2ABAU.

Mr. H. S. Randhawa, Advocate

NnR(4T-(H-4E4En8-R(E8(GO2FDAB2ABAU 

Mr. Vikas Mohan Gupta, Advocate

NnR(R-5Hn81-84(pn V(E8(GO2UFPJ2ABAU 

Mr. Hardik Ahluwalia, Advocate

NnR(4T-(R-5Hn81-845(E8(GO2SVSP2ABAU 

Mr. Angrej Singh, Advocate

NnR(4T-(R-5Hn81-84(E8(GO2JDDD2ABAU 

Mr. Puneet Kumar Bansal, Advocate

NnR(R-5Hn81-845(pn VKEEEv9(KEav()81(Kav(E8(GO2FUFD22025.

Mr. Mukand Gupta, Advocate

NnR(4T-(R-5Hn81-845(E8(GO2FFJF2ABAU()81(GO2DPPU2ABA5.

Mr. Abhishek Batta, Advocate

NnR(4T-(R-5Hn81-845(E8(GO2FDAB2ABAU 

Mr. Naresh Markanda, Senior Advocate as Amicus Curiae with

Mr. Rohan Markanda, Advocate.

****

JASGURPREET SINGH PURI, J.

1. By this common judgment, a bunch of seven Civil R evision

C-4E4En85(e-)RE8L(pn5 GO2UFPJ2ABAU9(GO2FDAB2ABAU9(GO2FFJF2ABAU9(GO2DPPU2

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -4-

ABAU9(GO2FUFD2ABAU9(GO2JDDD2ABAU()81(GO2SVSP2ABAU(Es being decided. In all

the aforesaid revision petitions, an important question of law has arisen

because of which the same are being taken up together for adjudication. For

the sake of convenience and brevity, the facts are being taken from

GO2UFPJ2ABAU 

2. For the purpose of methodical elucidation and structure, this

W/1LY-84(E5()RR)8L-1(/81-R(4T-(Nn,,n.E8L(T-)1572

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. FACTUAL MATRIX

B. LEGAL ISSUE

C. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY LEARNED COUNSELS

FOR THE PETITIONERS

D. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY LEARNED COUNSELS

FOR THE RESPONDENTS

E. SUBMISSIONS BY LEARNED AMICUS CURIAE

F. ANALYSIS

G. CONCLUSION

A.FACTUAL MATRIX   

3. The present is a Revision Petition under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India for setting aside of the order dated 08.07.2025 (Annexure

C2Vv(H)55-1(E8(mgm2VJk(nN(ABAB9(.T-R-e3(4T-(b-)R8-1 Executing Court has

dismissed the execution application of the petitioners by holding the award

passed under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as

“the Arbitration Act”) to be unenforceable with a further prayer for

restoration/remanding the execution application with a direction to the learned

Executing Court to get the award executed on merits.

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -5-

4. The petitioners herein entered into an agreement dated 23.10.2006

.E4T(4T-(O-5Hn81-84(pn V20E,,-R(NnR(YE,,E8L(nN(4T-(H)113(aE1-(688-A/R-(C2A 

Thereafter, when a dispute arose between the parties, an Arbitrator was appointed

dated, who passed an award dated 17.07.2012 vide An8-A/R-(C2k(E8(N)anR(nN(4T-

petitioner to which the respondents filed their objections under Section 34 of the

Arbitration Act which were dismissed vide order dated 27.02.2019 (Annexure

C2Pv (

5. The petitioners thereafter preferred an execution application before

the learned Executing Court seeking execution of the aforesaid award which was

dismissed vide impugned order dated 08.07.2025 (Ann-A/R- ( C2Vv ( e-E8L

unenforceable on the ground that the award was inexecutable due to being in

conflict with Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act.

B.LEGAL ISSUE

6. In the present bunch of seven Revision Petitions, a common issue

of law has arisen, whereby the learned Executing Court has dismissed the

execution applications of the petitioner(s) on the LRn/81(nN(/82-8NnRd-)eE,E43 

Accordingly, the legal issue that falls for consideration before this Court is as

follows:

“Whether execution of award in cases where arbitral

proceedings were initiated prior to the amendment of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which came into effect on

23.10.2015 is enforceable or not on the ground of being in conflict

with Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act ?”

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -6-

C.ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY LEARNED COUNSELS FOR THE

PETITIONERS 

7. Learned counsels for the petitioners submitted that a short

controversy involved in all the petitions is that the learned Executing Court has

dismissed the execution application preferred by the decree holders on the ground

that the award passed by the Sole Arbitrator is unenforceable due to being in

conflict with Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act and because of this reason, the

execution application stood dismissed being unenforceable. They further

submitted that the learned Executing Court while dismissing the execution

application lost sight of the fact that the agreement between the parties and the

Re4PaeRwzIesunncPr0tz5nenz0svnernczdrcnezaSnzdrORpnnded Arbitration Act,

wherein there is no embargo upon appointment of the arbitrator by one of the

parties.

8. They submitted that learned Executing Court has not considered

the fact that ineligibility under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act, came into

existence by way of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015

(hereinafter referred to as “the 2015 Amendment Act”) stood notified on

01.01.2016 and only came into effect on 23.10.2015. Therefore, the same cannot

be applied retrospectively to the arbitral proceedings which have commenced

prior thereto. They further submitted that in the impugned orders, reliance have

been placed on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Central

Organization for Railway Electrification versus M/S ECI SPIC SMO MCML

(JV) A joint Venture Company, 2025(4) SCC 641, Perkins Eastman Architects

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -7-

DPC and another versus HSCC (India) Ltd., 2020(20) SCC 760 and TRF Ltd.

versus Energo Engineering Projects Ltd. 2017 SCC OnLine SC 692 to hold that

the award is inexecutable being in conflict with Section 12(5) of the Arbitration

Act. However, they submitted that in the aforesaid judgment of Central

Organization for Railway Electrification (supra) itself, it was held that the

decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court will be applied prospectively and not be

applicable to the ongoing Arbitral proceedings. The relevant portion of the

judgment is reproduced hereunder:

“169. In the present reference, we have upheld the decisions

of this Court in TRF (supra) and Perkins (supra) which dealt with

situations dealing with sole arbitrators. Thus, TRF (supra) and

Perkins (supra) have held the field for years now. However, we have

disagreed with Voestalpine (supra) and CORE (supra) which dealt

with the appointment of a three4member arbitral tribunal. We are

aware of the fact that giving retrospective effect to the law laid down

in the present case may possibly lead to the nullification of

innumerable completed and ongoing arbitration proceedings

involving three4member tribunals. This will disturb the commercial

bargains entered into by both the government and private entities.

Therefore, we hold that the law laid down in the present reference

will apply prospectively to arbitrator appointments to be made

after the date of this judgment. This direction only applies to three4

member tribunals.

(emphasis supplied)”

9. To further substantiate the aforesaid argument learned counsels for

the petitioners referred to a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in MilkFood

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -8-

Limited versus M/s GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd., 2004(7) SCC 288, wherein it was

held that if the arbitral proceedings have already commenced prior to the

commencement of 1996 Act, the same shall be governed under the old Arbitration

Act, 1940. They further submitted that in the present bunch of cases since the

arbitral proceedings commenced prior to the 2015 amendment Act, the reliance

placed by learned Executing Court on the provisions of the 2015 Amendment Act

and on the aforesaid judgments is misplaced and therefore, the impugned orders

are liable to be set aside on this ground.

10. Learned counsels for the petitioners have also submitted that by

way of The Repealing and Amending Bill, 2025, the 2015 Amendment Act has

been repealed and therefore, the provisions contained therein are not

applicable.

D.ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY LEARNED COUNSELS FOR THE

RESPONDENTS

11. Learned counsels for the respondents submitted that the impugned

order passed by learned Executing Court is valid and does not deserve to be

interfered with. They submitted that the Award is passed by a Sole Arbitrator

which was ineligible being hit by the provisions of Section 12(5) of the

Arbitration Act, wherein it is so provided that any person who falls under any of

the categories in the Seventh Schedule shall be ineligible to be appointed as an

arbitrator. Therefore, the learned Executing court while dismissing the execution

application has rightly held that an award passed by such Arbitrator is

unenforceable.

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -9-

12. Learned counsels for the respondents also referred to a judgment

passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ellora Paper Mills Limited versus State of

Madhya Pradesh 2022 SCC OnLine SC 8 to contend that Arbitral Tribunal

constituted much prior to 2015 Amendment Act cannot operate if it violates

neutrality under Section 12(5) and fresh Arbitrator is to be appointed. Relevant

portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under :

“16. As observed hereinabove, the Arbitral Tribunal 4

Stationery Purchase Committee consisted of officers of the

respondent4State. Therefore, as per Amendment Act, 2015 4 Sub4

section (5) of Section 12 read with Seventh Schedule, all of them

have become ineligible to become arbitrators and to continue as

arbitrators. Section 12 has been amended by Amendment Act,

2015 based on the recommendations of the Law Commission, which

specifically dealt with the issue of "neutrality of arbitrators". To

achieve the main purpose for amending the provision, namely, to

provide for "neutrality of arbitrators", sub:section (5) of Section

12 lays down that notwithstanding any prior agreement to the

contrary, any person whose relationship with the parties or

counsel or the subject matter of the dispute falls under any of the

categories specified in the Seventh Schedule, he shall be ineligible

to be appointed as an arbitrator. In such an eventuality, i.e., when

the arbitration clause is found to be foul with the amended

provision, the appointment of the arbitrator would be beyond the

pale of the arbitration agreement, empowering the Court to

appoint such an arbitrator as may be permissible. That would be

the effect of the non obstante clause contained in sub4section (5) of

Section 12 and the other party cannot insist upon the appointment

of the arbitrator in terms of the arbitration agreement.

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -10-

17. It cannot be disputed that in the present case, the

Stationery Purchase Committee 4Arbitral Tribunal comprising of

officers of the respondent4State are all ineligible to become and/or

to continue as arbitrators in view of the mandate of sub4section (5)

of Section 12 read with Seventh Schedule. Therefore, by operation

of law and by amending Section 12 and bringing on statute sub4

section (5) of Section 12 read with Seventh Schedule, the earlier

Arbitral Tribunal 4 Stationery Purchase Committee comprising of

Additional Secretary, Department of Revenue as President and (i)

Deputy Secretary, Department of Revenue, (ii) Deputy Secretary,

General Administration Department, (iii) Deputy Secretary,

Department of Finance, (iv) Deputy Secretary/Under Secretary,

General Administration Department and (v) Senior Deputy

Controller of Head Office, Printing as Members, has lost its

mandate and such an Arbitral Tribunal cannot be permitted to

continue and therefore a fresh arbitrator has to be appointed as per

Arbitration Act, 1996.

(emphasis supplied)”

13. Learned counsels for the respondents also submitted that the defect

in the award is not a mere irregularity but the same goes to the root of the

jurisdiction of the Arbitrator and where an award is passed by an Arbitrator who

is otherwise ineligible under the statute is void ab initio and cannot be accorded

any sanctity in law. Consequently, the learned Executing Court was fully justified

in dismissing the execution applications on the ground that such an award is

unenforceable.

E.SUBMISSIONS BY LEARNED AMICUS CURIAE 

14. On 26.11.2025, considering the fact that in a large number of cases

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -11-

across the States of Punjab and Haryana, learned Executing Courts have been

dismissing the execution applications by way of short orders, this court deemed

it just and proper to appoint Mr. Naresh Markanda, Senior Advocate as Amicus

Curiae to assist this Court on the aforesaid legal issue.

15. Learned Amicus Curiae submitted that Section 12(5) of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was inserted by way of the 2015

Amendment Act with effect from 23.10.2015 to ensure neutrality, independence

and impartiality of the Arbitral Tribunal. Under the aforesaid provision, any

person who has relationship with the parties, counsnwzsezaSnztd4.nuaOpRaanezs/zaSn

dispute and falls within any of the categories provided in the Seventh Schedule

is rendered ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator. He further submitted that

in view of Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act, the amended provision

governs only the Arbitral proceedings which have commenced on or after the

date of commencement of the 2015 Amendment Act and the question of its

application to pending proceedings must be determined in accordance with the

statutory scheme of the aforesaid Act and its interpretation by various judgments.

To further substantiate his argument he referred to a judgment of Hon'ble

Supreme Court in Board of Control For Cricket in India versus Kochi Cricket

Private Limited and Others, (2018) 6 SCC 287, wherein Section 26 of the 2015

Amendment Act was interpreted and it was held that the same is to be bifurcated

into "arbitral proceedings" and "court proceedings". It was held that the reason

behind the first part of Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act being couched in

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -12-

the negative was only to state that the Amendment Act would apply even to

arbitral proceedings commenced prior to the 2015 Amendment Act, provided

they have agreed to the contrary in writing and further held that the intention of

the legislature was that the 2015 Amendment Act is prospective in nature and will

apply to:

(i) Arbitral proceedings commenced as understood under

Section 21 of the said Act, on or after the 2015 Amendment Act

came into force and

(ii) Court proceedings which had commenced on or after the

2015 Amendment Act came into force.

16. Learned Amicus Curiae further submitted that the legal position

crystallised in Board of Control For Cricket in India (supra) was subsequently

affirmed and reinforced by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hindustan

Construction Company Limited and Another verus Union of India and Others,

(2020) 17 SCC 324, wherein the constitutional validity of Section 87 of the

Arbitration Act was challenged which was inserted by the Arbitration

and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019 (hereinafter referred to as the "2019

Amendment Act"), and the consequential repeal of Section 26 of the

2015 Amendment Act. It was held in the aforesaid judgment that Section 87 of

the Arbitration Act was unconstitutional as the provision was

manifestly arbitrary and contrary to the object of the principal Act as amended in

2015.

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -13-

17. Learned Amicus Curiae further submitted that the legal position as

settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments is clear and there is

no ambiguity that the 2015 Amendment Act applies prospectively to arbitral and

court proceedings commenced on or after 23.10.2015 and that Section 12(5)

renders any arbitrator falling within the Seventh Schedule ineligible and such

ineligibility can only be waived off by an express agreement in writing executed

after dispute has arisen.

F.ANALYSIS

18. After having heard the learned counsels for the parties and the

learned Amicus Curiae, the issue of law that has come up before this Court in the

present bunch of Revision Petitions with regard to the applicability of Section

12(5) read with Seventh Schedule which came into existence by way of the 2015

amendment Act needs to be decided. Before adjudicating upon the said legal

issue, this Court considers it appropriate to first advert to Section 12 of the 2015

Arbitration Act as it stood before the amendment and after the 2015 amendment

Act.

19. Section 12 of the Arbitration Act before the 2015 Amendment Act:

"12. Grounds for challenge.:

(1) When a person is approached in connection with his possible

appointment as an arbitrator, he shall disclose in writing any

circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his

independence or impartiality.

(2) An arbitrator, from the time of his appointment and throughout

the arbitral proceedings, shall, without delay, disclose to the parties

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -14-

in writing any circumstances referred to in sub4section (1) unless

they have already been informed of them by him.

(3) An arbitrator may be challenged only if4

(a) circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his

independence or impartiality, or

(b) he does not possess the qualifications agreed to by the parties.

(4) A party may challenge an arbitrator appointed by him, or in

whose appointment he has participated, only for reasons of which

he becomes aware after the appointment has been made.”

Section 12 of the Arbitration Act after the 2015 amendment Act:

“12. Grounds for challenge.— [(1) When a person is approached in

connection with his possible appointment as an arbitrator, he shall

disclose in writing any circumstances,—

(a) such as the existence either direct or indirect, of any past or

present relationship with or interest in any of the parties or in

relation to the subject4matter in dispute, whether financial,

business, professional or other kind, which is likely to give rise to

justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality; and

(b) which are likely to affect his ability to devote sufficient time to

the arbitration and in particular his ability to complete the entire

arbitration within a period of twelve months.

Explanation1.—The grounds stated in the Fifth Schedule shall guide

in determining whether circumstances exist which give rise to

justifiable doubts as to the independence or impartiality of an

arbitrator.

Explanation 2.—The disclosure shall be made by such person in the

form specified in the Sixth Schedule.]

(2) An arbitrator, from the time of his appointment and throughout

the arbitral proceedings, shall, without delay, disclose to the parties

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -15-

in writing any circumstances referred to in sub4section (1) unless

they have already been informed of them by him.

(3) An arbitrator may be challenged only if—

(a) circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his

independence or impartiality, or

(b) he does not possess the qualifications agreed to by the parties.

(4) A party may challenge an arbitrator appointed by him, or in

whose appointment he has participated, only for reasons of which

he becomes aware after the appointment has been made.

[(5) Notwithstanding any prior agreement to the contrary, any

person whose relationship, with the parties or counsel or the

subject:matter of the dispute, falls under any of the categories

specified in the Seventh Schedule shall be ineligible to be

appointed as an arbitrator:

Provided that parties may, subsequent to disputes having arisen

between them, waive the applicability of this sub4section by an

express agreement in writing.]

(emphasis supplied)”

20. A perusal of the aforesaid Section 12(1) as it stood before the 2015

Amendment Act came into force would show that a person approaching in

connection with his possible appointment as an Arbitrator was under an

obligation to disclose in writing any of the circumstances likely to give rise to

justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality. The emphasis therefore

was on disclosure and subsequent challenge on the apprehension of bias or on the

ground of lack of impartiality. However, the amended provision marks a clear

departure from the earlier regime and introduced a significantly stricter regime,

whereby in addition to enlarging the scope of disclosure under Section 12(1), the

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -16-

b-LE5,)4/R-(E8dnRHnR)4-1(5/e25-d4En8(KUv(R-)1(.E4T(the Seventh Schedule which

creates an express statutory bar to the appointment of a person as an Arbitrator

where the relationship of such person with the parties, their counsel, or the

5/eW-d42Y)44-R(nN(4T-(1E5H/4-(N),,5(.E4TE8()83(nN(4he categories specified in the

seventh schedule. Thus, what was earlier a matter of challenge on the ground of

reasonable apprehension has now been transformed to a question of statutory

ineligibility. The consequence of the amendment is that the test is no longer

confined to examining whether there exists any circumstances which may give

rise to justifiable doubts as to independence or impartiality of an already

appointed arbitrator but instead whether the proposed arbitrator is by operation

of law rendered ineligible to act as an Arbitrator as such. The only exception

carved out by the proviso to Section 12(5) is where after the disputes have arisen,

the parties expressly waive the applicability of the aforesaid provision by an

agreement in writing. The aforesaid transformation by way of the 2015

Amendment Act was intended to strengthen the neutrality of the arbitral process,

to enhance confidence in the independence and impartiality of the arbitral

tribunal and also to ensure party autonomy is kept intact.

21. Therefore, the question that now arises before this court for

consideration is as to the applicability of the said amendment to arbitral

proceedings that were already pending or had commenced prior to the coming

into force of the 2015 amending Act. In other words, the issue is whether the

provisions introduced by the 2015 amendment Act, particularly Section 12(5) is

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -17-

to be applied retrospectively to arbitral proceedings initiated under the

unamended Act or whether they operate only in respect of arbitral proceedings

commenced after the amendment came into force.

22. The answer to the aforesaid question depends upon the nature of

the amendment, the stage of the arbitral proceedings and the legislative intent

manifested in Section 26 of the 2015 amendment Act, which is reproduced as

under:

“26. Act not to apply to pending arbitral proceedings.4

Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the arbitral proceedings

commenced, in accordance with the provisions of section 21 of the

principal Act, before the commencement of this Act unless the

parties otherwise agree but this Act shall apply in relation to

arbitral proceedings commenced on or after the date of

commencement of this Act.”

23. The aforesaid Section has been interpreted by Ho n’ble

Supreme Court in Board of Control For Cricket in India (supra) to hold

that that the Amendment Act is prospective in operation and that Section 26

is bifurcated into two distinct limbs, the first limb governs arbitral

proceedings commenced in terms of Section 21 of the principal Act

before the commencement of the Amendment Act while the second limb

applies the Amendment Act to Court proceedings “in relation to” arbitral

proceedings commenced on or after the date of commencement of the

Amendment Act. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as

under:

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -18-

“39. Section 26, therefore, bifurcates proceedings, as has

been stated above, with a great degree of clarity, into two sets of

proceedings 4 arbitral Proceedings themselves, and court

proceedings in relation thereto. The reason why the first part of

Section 26 is couched in negative form is only to state that the

Amendment Act will apply even to arbitral proceedings commenced

before the amendment if parties otherwise agree. If the first part of

Section 26 were couched in positive language (like the second part),

it would have been necessary to add a proviso stating that the

Amendment Act would apply even to arbitral proceedings

commenced before the amendment if the parties agree. In either

case, the intention of the legislature remains the same, the

negative form conveying exactly what could have been stated

positively, with the necessary proviso. Obviously, "arbitral

proceedings" having been subsumed in the first part cannot re:

appear in the second part, and the expression "in relation to

arbitral proceedings" would, therefore, apply only to court

proceedings which relate to the arbitral proceedings. The scheme

of Section 26 is thus clear: that the Amendment Act is

prospective in nature, and will apply to those arbitral

proceedings that are commenced, as understood by Section 21 of

the principal Act, on or after the Amendment Act, and to court

proceedings which have commenced on or after the Amendment

Act came into force.

(emphasis supplied)”

24. Therefore, three distinct situations would arise on the basis of the

aforesaid observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which are as

follows:

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -19-

(i)Arbitral proceedings commenced and concluded before

the 2015 amendment Act came into force: In such cases where the

arbitral proceedings had both commenced and concluded before the

commencement of the 2015 amendment Act, the amendment would

not operate to revive or alter rights and obligations which had

already crystallized upon the conclusion of the arbitral proceedings.

Therefore, the 2015 amendment act would not apply retrospectively

in such cases.

(ii)Arbitral   proceedings   commenced   prior   to   the   2015

amendment   Act   but   are   still   ongoing   on   the   date   of

commencement of  the 2015  amendment Act: This category

creates a distinction to be drawn between provisions which are

procedural in nature and those which create substantive rights,

liabilities or disqualifications. Therefore, procedural provisions such

as Section 34/36 etc. would be applicable to the Court proceedings

in relation to the arbitral proceedings, however provisions which

impose a statutory ineligibility such as Section 12(5) read with the

Seventh Schedule, would operate prospectively unless the parties

otherwise agree and would not operate retrospectively to the arbitral

proceedings which are still ongoing on the date of commencement

of the 2015 amendment Act.

(iii)Arbitral   proceedings   commenced   before,   but   Court

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -20-

proceedings   (Section   34/36   etc.)   instituted   after   the   2015

amendment Act came into force: Section 26 of the Amendment

Act envisages a clear legislative intent to bifurcate “arbitral

proceedings” as commenced under Section 21 and “court

proceedings in relation thereto.” Therefore, amended provisions

relating to Court related remedies such as the amended Section 36

and Section 34 would apply to Court proceedings filed after the

amendment came into force even though the arbitral proceedings

had commenced prior to the amendment. In contrast, provisions

affecting the conduct of arbitral proceedings themselves would

operate prospectively and would govern only those arbitrations

commenced after the amendment, provided the parties have

otherwise expressly agreed. This approach preserves finality of the

arbitral tribunal’s mandate while also allowing the Legislature’s

intent to apply the provisions of the 2015 Amendment Act to court

proceedings in relation to the arbitral proceedings.

25. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Board of Control f or Cricket in India

(supra)yzSRcz5nwwORcvPtnczaSnzDsvnerpnrazPrzhnnIPr0zaSnz aatement of object and

reasons in the forefront that if it proposed to enact Section 87, the immediate

effect of the same would be to put all the important amendments made by the

Aj2(zEpnrcpnrazEuazsrzRz4RuhO4derneiz"SnzenwnvRrazIortion is reproduced as

under:

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -21-

“75. The Government will be well4advised in keeping the

aforesaid Statement of Objects and Reasons in the forefront, if it

proposes to enact Section 87 on the lines indicated in the

Government's Press Release dated 7th March, 2018. The immediate

effect of the proposed Section 87 would be to put all the important

amendments made by the Amendment Act on a back4burner, such as

the important amendments made to Sections 28 and 34 in

particular, which, as has been stated by the Statement of Objects and

Reasons, "...have resulted in delay of disposal of arbitration

proceedings and increase in interference of courts in arbitration

matters, which tend to defeat the object of the Act", and will now not

be applicable to Section 34 petitions filed after 23rd October, 2015,

but will be applicable to Section 34 petitions filed in cases where

arbitration proceedings have themselves commenced only after

23rd October, 2015. This would mean that in all matters which are

in the pipeline, despite the fact that Section 34 proceedings have

been initiated only after 23rd October, 2015, yet, the old law would

continue to apply resulting in delay of disposal of arbitration

proceedings by increased interference of Courts, which ultimately

defeats the object of the 1996 Act.

[4*]

 It would be important to

remember that the 246th Law Commission Report has itself

bifurcated proceedings into two parts, so that the Amendment Act

can apply to Court proceedings commenced on or after 23rd

October, 2015. It is this basic scheme which is adhered to by

Section 26 of the Amendment Act, which ought not to be displaced

as the very object of the enactment of the Amendment Act would

otherwise be defeated.”

26. However, by way of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment)

Act, 2019 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2019 Amendment Act”) omission of

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -22-

Section 26 was done and Section 87 was introduced with effect from

23.10.2015.

27. The aforesaid Section 87 was introduced to make the 2015

Amendment Act inapplicable to arbitral proceedings commenced prior to

23.10.2015, as well as to all court proceedings arising out of or in relation to such

arbitral proceedings irrespective of whether such court proceedings were

instituted before or after the commencement of the 2015 Amendment Act. The

provision further provided that the amendments would apply only to

arbitral proceedings commenced on or after the said date and to

Court proceedings arising therefrom. The aforesaid provision is reproduced as

under:

“[87. Effect of arbitral and related court proceedings

commenced prior to 23rd October, 2015.—Unless the parties

otherwise agree, the amendments made to this Act by the Arbitration

and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 shall—

(a) not apply to—

(i) arbitral proceedings commenced before the

commencement of the Arbitration and Conciliation

(Amendment) Act, 2015 (23rd October, 2015);

(ii) court proceedings arising out of or in relation to such

arbitral proceedings irrespective of whether such court

proceedings are commenced prior to or after the

commencement of the Arbitration and Conciliation

(Amendment) Act, 2015;

(b) apply only to arbitral proceedings commenced on or after the

commencement of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment)

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -23-

Act, 2015 and to court proceedings arising out of or in relation to

such arbitral proceedings.]”

28. However, Hon’ble Supreme Court in  Hindustan Construction

Company Limited and Another (supra), struck down Section 87 of the

Arbitration Act as being unconstitutional while holding that the provision was

manifestly arbitrary and contrary to the object of the principal Act as amended in

2015. Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Section 87 of the Arbitration Act had the

effect of reviving the very problem which the 2015 Amendments had intended to

cure thereby frustrating the legislative policy of expeditious and efficacious

arbitral proceedings. Accordingly, it was declared that the deletion of Section

26 and the insertion of Section 87 was unsustainable in law and that the legislative

intent underlying the 2015 Amendments would continue to govern all court

proceedings initiated post 23.10.2015. The effect of the judgment was to restore

the position laid down in Board of Control For Cricket in India (supra) and to

ensure that the amendments brought about in 2015 by way of the 2015

Amendment Act would not be defeated. The relevant portion of the aforesaid

judgment in Hindustan Construction Company Limited and Another (supra) is

reproduced as under:

“63. Also, it is important to notice that the Srikrishna

Committee Report did not refer to the provisions of the Insolvency

Code. After the advent of the Insolvency Code on 01.12.2016, the

consequence of applying Section 87 is that due to the automatic4

stay doctrine laid down by judgments of this Court 4 which have only

been reversed today by the present judgment 4 the award4holder may

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -24-

become insolvent by defaulting on its payment to its suppliers, when

such payments would be forthcoming from arbitral awards in

cases where there is no stay, or even in cases where conditional

stays are granted. Also, an arbitral award4holder is deprived of the

fruits of its award 4 which is usually obtained after several years of

litigating 4 as a result of the automatic4stay, whereas it would be

faced with immediate payment to its operational creditors, which

payments may not be forthcoming due to monies not being

released on account of automatic stays of arbitral awards, exposing

such award4holders to the rigors of the Insolvency Code. For all

these reasons, the deletion of Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment

Act, together with the insertion of Section 87 into the Arbitration

Act, 1996 by the 2019 Amendment Act, is struck down as being

manifestly arbitrary under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

xxx4xxx4xxx4xxx

66. The result is that the Kochi Cricket judgment (supra)

will therefore continue to apply so as to make applicable the

salutary amendments made by the 2015 Amendment Act to all court

proceedings initiated after 23.10.2015.

(emphasis supplied)”

29. The effect of the commencement of arbitral proceedings prior to

the 2015 Amendment Act has also been authoritatively considered by Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Union of India versus Parmar Construction Co., (2019) 15

SCC 682, wherein it was categorically held that the provisions of the 2015

Amendment Act are prospective in nature and do not apply to arbitral proceedings

commenced in accordance with Section 21 of the principal Act prior to

23.10.2015, unless the parties otherwise agree. It has further been held that under

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -25-

the unamended Act, primacy must be accorded to the appointment procedure

contractually agreed upon between the parties. The relevant extracts have been

reproduced herein below:

“26. The conjoint reading of Section 21 read with Section 26 leaves

no manner of doubt that the provisions of the 2015 Amendment Act

shall not apply to such of the arbitral proceedings which have

commenced in terms of the provisions of Section 21 of the

principal Act unless the parties otherwise agree. The effect of

Section 21 read with Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act has

been examined by this Court in Aravali Power Co. (P) Ltd. v. Era

Infra Engg. Ltd., (2017) 15 SCC 32 and taking note of Section 26 of

the 2015 Amendment Act laid down the broad principles as under:

22. The principles which emerge from the decisions referred to

above are:

22.1. In cases governed by the 1996 Act as it stood before the

Amendment Act came into force:

22.1.1. The fact that the named arbitrator is an employee of

one of the parties is not ipso facto a ground to raise a

presumption of bias or partiality or lack of independence on

his part. There can however be a justifiable apprehension

about the independence or impartiality of an employee

arbitrator, if such person was the controlling or dealing

authority in regard to the subject contract or if he is a direct

subordinate to the officer whose decision is the subject4matter

of the dispute.

22.1.2. Unless the cause of action for invoking jurisdiction

under clauses (a), (b) or (c) of sub4section (6) of Section 11 of

the 1996 Act arises, there is no question of the Chief Justice

or his designate exercising power under sub4section (6) of

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -26-

Section 11.

22.1.3. The Chief Justice or his designate while exercising

power under sub4section (6) of Section 11 shall endeavour

to give effect to the appointment procedure prescribed in the

arbitration clause.

22.1.4. While exercising such power under sub4section (6) of

Section 11, if circumstances exist, giving rise to justifiable

doubts as to the independence and impartiality of the person

nominated, or if other circumstances warrant appointment

of an independent arbitrator by ignoring the procedure

prescribed, the Chief Justice or his designate may, for reasons

to be recorded ignore the designated arbitrator and appoint

someone else.

22.2. In cases governed by the 1996 Act after the Amendment

Act has come into force: If the arbitration clause finds foul

with the amended provisions, the appointment of the

arbitrator even if apparently in conformity with the

arbitration clause in the agreement, would be illegal and thus

the court would be within its powers to appoint such

arbitrator(s) as may be permissible."

30. A similar position was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court

in S.P. Singla Constructions (P) Ltd. v. State of H.P.,(2019) 2 SCC 488,  wherein

while dealing with an appointment made prior to the 2015 Amendment Act, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the amended provisions could not be invoked

to invalidate an appointment made in accordance with the contractual terms

governing the parties prior to 23.10.2015. It was further reaffirmed that

departmental or unilateral appointments made under IenORpnrcpnrazR0ennpnrat

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -27-

cannot be retrospectively invalidated by invoking the 2015 Amendment Act. The

relevant paragraphs of the said judgment read as follows:

"16. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present

case, we are not inclined to go into the merits of this contention of

the appellant nor examine the correctness or otherwise of the above

view taken by the Delhi High Court in Ratna Infrastructure Projects

(P) Ltd. v. Meja Urja Nigam (P) Ltd., 2017 SCC Online Del 7808;

suffice it to note that as per Section 26 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, the provisions of the amended

2015 Act shall not apply to the arbitral proceedings commenced in

accordance with the provisions of Section 21 of the principal Act

before the commencement of the Amendment Act unless the parties

otherwise agree. In the facts and circumstances of the present

case, the proviso in Clause (65) of the general conditions of the

contract cannot be taken to be the agreement between the parties so

as to apply the provisions of the amended Act. As per Section 26 of

the Act, the provisions of the Amendment Act, 2015 shall apply in

relation to arbitral proceedings commenced on or after the date of

commencement of the Amendment Act, 2015 (w.e.f. 2341042015).

In the present case, arbitration proceedings commenced way back

in 2013, much prior to coming into force of the amended Act and

therefore, provisions of the amended Act cannot be invoked.

17. In BCCI v. Kochi Cricket (P) Ltd., (2018) 6 SCC 287, this

Court has held that the provisions of the Amendment Act, 2015 (with

effect from 2341042015) cannot have retrospective operation in the

arbitral proceedings already commenced unless the parties

otherwise agree and held as under : (SCC p. 313, para 37)

"37. What will be noticed, so far as the first part is concerned, which

states4

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -28-

'26. Act not to apply to pending arbitral proceedings.4Nothing

contained in this Act shall apply to the arbitral proceedings

commenced, in accordance with the provisions of Section 21 of the

principal Act, before the commencement of this Act unless the

parties otherwise agree.....'is that: (1) 'the arbitral proceedings' and

their commencement is mentioned in the context of Section 21 of the

principal Act; (2) the expression used is 'to' and not 'in relation to';

and (3) parties may otherwise agree. So far as the second part of

Section 26 is concerned, namely, the part which reads, '.... but

this Act shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings

commenced on or after the date of commencement of this Act' makes

it clear that the expression 'in relation to' is used; and the

expression 'the' arbitral proceedings and 'in accordance with the

provisions of Section 21 of the principal Act' is conspicuous by its

absence."

21. In the present case, the arbitrator has been appointed as per

Clause (65) of the agreement and as per the provisions of law. Once,

the appointment of an arbitrator is made at the instance of the

Government, the arbitration agreement could not have been invoked

for the second time.

25. Inspite of extension of time, since the appellant contractor had

not filed statement of claim, the arbitrator terminated the

proceedings under Section 25(a) of the 1996 Act by proceedings

dated 64842014. The appellant contractor did not file his statement

of claim before the arbitrator since the appellant had approached

the High Court by filing petition under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act,

probably under the advice that the appellant can get an independent

arbitrator appointed. The appellant had been writing letters to the

arbitrator before the hearing seeking adjournment. However, on the

fourth occasion, proceedings were simply terminated; since no

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -29-

hearings were held on earlier occasions, he expected that his

request might be accepted. The arbitrator could have issued a notice

warning the appellant that no adjournment would be granted under

any circumstances. Since, no such warning was given, we deem it

appropriate to set aside the order of termination. The appellant had

made a claim on account of delay as indicated in his letter dated 184

1042013 under various heads. In the interest of justice, in our

considered view, an opportunity is to be afforded to the appellant to

go before the departmental arbitrator (as agreed by the parties in

Clause (65) of the general conditions of contract) and the

proceedings of the arbitrator dated 64842014 terminating the

proceedings is to be set aside. We are conscious that after the

Amendment Act, 2015, there cannot be a departmental arbitrator. As

discussed earlier, in this case, the agreement between the parties is

dated 1941242006 and the relationship between the parties are

governed by the general conditions of the contract dated 194124

2006, the provisions of the Amendment Act, 2015 cannot be

invoked."

31. Recent judgment of Hon’ble Delhi high court in Avneet Soni

v ersus Kavita Agarwal, 2026 NCDHC 658 while dealing with a similar

situation held that when the arbitral proceedings have commenced prior to the

2015 amendment Act, unilateral appointment of a Sole Arbitrator must

necessarily be examined in the context of the law as it stood on the date of

commencement of the arbitral proceedings having due regard to Section 21 of the

arbitration and conciliation act and the express mandate of Section 26 of the 2015

amendment act. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduces

hereinunder:

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -30-

“72. It is well settled that an executing court cannot go

behind the award and is bound to execute it "as is". The arbitral

award in the present case has not only been passed but has also been

upheld at every stage, including by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The

courts have specifically examined the challenge to the award on the

ground of alleged "unilateral appointment" of the arbitrator. The

Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that the amendments

to the A&C Act as done in 2015 are prospective in nature.

73. While it is true that an executing court may examine

whether an award is a nullity or non est in cases where there exists

an inherent lack of jurisdiction in the court or tribunal that rendered

the decision, no such infirmity arises in the present case. On the

contrary, all courts have consistently held that there is absolutely no

defect in the award, particularly on the ground of "unilateral

appointment". In these circumstances, there being no inherent lack

of jurisdiction in the arbitral tribunal, this Court, acting as the

executing court, is bound to execute the award as it stands.”

32. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that where the

arbitral proceedings had commenced prior to the enforcement of the 2015

Amendment Act, the mere institution of an execution petition subsequent thereto

would not, by itself, attract the amended provisions at the stage of enforcement.

The execution petition being a post award proceeding would be governed by the

law applicable to the arbitral proceedings and the award as it stood when

the arbitral proceedings commenced. Consequently, the amended provision of

Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act cannot be made applicable

retrospectively.

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -31-

33. So far as judgment of Ellora Paper Mills Limited (supra) relied

upon by learned counsel for the respondents is concerned, the same is

distinguishable on facts, as in that case there was a stay on the arbitral

proceedings

and the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Tribunal had lost

its mandate under Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule and

fresh Arbitrator was to be appointed. Consequently,

instead of remanding the

matter to the High Court to name the arbitrator, the Hon’ble Supreme Court

appointed a fresh Arbitrator to adjudicate upon/resolve the dispute

between the parties. Therefore, in that case the arbitral proceedings

effectively commenced after the 2015 Amendment Act came into force and

because of aforesaid reasons the reliance placed on the said judgment is

misplaced.

34. So far as the argument raised by the learned counsel for the

petitioners with regard to repealing of 2015 amendment Act by way of the

Repealing and Amending Act,2025 is concerned, the same is unsustainable

because this exercise by the Parliament is one of those periodical measures

by which amendments which have ceased to be in force or have

become obsolete or the retention whereof as separate Acts is unnecessary are

repealed and by which certain amendments and formal defects detected in

enactments are amended and corrected. The 2015 Amendment Act, having been

incorporated into the Arbitration Act in its entirety, does not fall within that

category.

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -32-

G.CONCLUSION 

35. In the light of the aforesaid analysis, it is held that the 2015

Amendment Act applies prospectively and its applicability depends on the stage

nN(HRnd--1E8L59(.TEdT(E5(d)4-LnREI-1()5(Nn,,n.572

(i) Where the arbitral proceedings have both commenced and

concluded prior to 23.10.2015, the amendment does not affect rights

that have already been crystallized. Therefore, the 2015 Amendment

Act would not apply retrospectively to the arbitral proceedings

which already stand concluded on passing of the award.

(ii) Where the arbitral proceedings are pending as on the date of

the amendment and the award is passed post 2015 Amendment Act,

the provision pertaining to ineligibility under Section 12(5) read

with the Seventh Schedule of the Arbitration Act would not apply

retrospectively to such proceedings unless the parties otherwise

agree.

(iii) Where the arbitral proceedings have both commenced and

concluded prior to the 2015 Amendment Act but Court proceedings

in relation thereto such as Sections 34 and 36 of the Arbitration Act

are instituted post the 2015 Amendment Act, the amended provisions

governing such Court proceedings would be applicable but so far as

the execution of the award arising from the arbitral proceedings

commenced prior to the 2015 Amendment Act is concerned, the

same would not fall within the ambit of Court proceedings “in

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -33-

relation to arbitral proceedings” as provided under Section 26 of the

2015 Amendment Act. Once the award has been passed by an

Arbitrator who was eligible to pass the same in view of the law as it

stood at the time of his appointment, it is well settled that the learned

Executing Court at the time of execution of such an award cannot go

behind the same to apply the provisions of the 2015 Amendment Act

retrospectively and is bound to execute it as it is.

36. In view of the above, it is further held that execution of the awards

arising from arbitral proceedings commenced prior to the 2015 Amendment Act

cannot be said to be unenforceable on the ground of being in conflict with the

amended Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act, which is prospective in nature

unless otherwise agreed between the parties.

37. This Court now deems it proper to examine facts and

circumstances of the present batch of Revision Petitions in light of the aforesaid

conclusion. The relevant dates which are material for adjudication of the

controversy are tabulated hereunder :

CR NO. IMPUGNED

ORDER

AGREEMENT APPOINTMENT

OF ARBITRATOR

AWARD

GO2UFPJ2ABAU BF BJ ABAU Ak VB ABBS 2222 VJ BJ ABVA

GO2(FDAB2ABAU VB BD ABAU AV VB ABVB BP BS ABVU BS Bk AB 17

GO2(FFJF2ABAU kB BD ABAU VD VB ABVV VU Bk ABVU BF BU AB 18

GO2DPPU2ABAU BD BD ABAU BA VV ABVB BF BU ABVU AV BF ABV 5

GO2FUFD2ABAU BD BD ABAU BD VB ABBD BJ BF ABVA BU BU ABV 4

GO2JDDD2ABAU BJ BJ ABAU BP VB ABVA VD Bk ABVP VB VV ABV 4

GO2(SVSP2ABAU BV BF ABAP VV VB ABVV pn4Ed- ( nN

appearance

12.02.2013

29.04.2014

CR-5847-2025 (O&M), CR-8920-2025 (O&M),

CR-8878-2025 (O&M), CR-9445-2025(O&M),

CR-8589-2025 (O&M), CR-6164-2025 (O&M) and

CR-7999-2025 (O&M)                                                             -34-

38. A perusal of the aforesaid would show that in all the cases the

arbitral proceedings had commenced prior to the 2015 Amendment Act and

therefore the aforesaid Amendment Act would not be applicable to the aforesaid

arbitral awards for the purpose of execution thereof and the same deserves to be

-A)YE8-1(E8(4T-(dn84-A4(nN(4T-(HR-2)Y-81Y-84(6d4()5 it stood on the date of

commencement of the arbitral proceedings having due regard to Section 21 of the

Arbitration act and the express mandate of Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment

Act.

39. Consequently, all the Civil Revision Petitions stand allowed. The

impugned orders in all the set of cases are hereby set aside and the matters

are remitted to the learned Executing Courts for proceeding further in

respective execution applications in accordance with law in light of the present

judgment.

40. Before parting with this judgment, this Court re cords its

appreciation towards Mr. Naresh Markanda, Senior Advocate, learned Amicus

Curiae and Ms. Surpreet Kaur, Law Researcher of this Court for their valuable

assistance.

41. A photocopy of this judgment be placed on the files of other

connected cases.

(JASGURPREET SINGH PURI)

29.05.2026 JUDGE

Chetan Thakur

Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No

Whether reportable : Yes/No