2026 INSC 890 Page 1 of 20

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1177 OF 2015

RAFIKMIYA AHMEDMIYA MALEK APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF GUJARAT RESPONDENT

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1183 OF 2015

SIRAJBHAI RASULBHAI VORA APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF GUJARAT RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

ATUL S. CHANDURKAR, J

1) These appeals take exception to the common judgment of the

learned Single Judge of the High Court of Gujarat dated

22.01.2015 whereby the conviction of the appellants for the offence

punishable under Sections 7, 12 and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988

1 has been upheld. They were sentenced to

suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and fine of

1

For short, ‘the Act of 1988’.

Page 2 of 20

₹2000/-. The appeal preferred by the State of Gujarat seeking

enhancement in the sentence of punishment was , however,

dismissed.

2) As per the prosecution case, one Hasmukhbhai Maganbhai

Chauhan

2 was pursuing his education and was required to

produce an Income Certificate for being entitled to certain

concessions. For obtaining the Income Certificate, he approached

the Mamlatdar on 06.02.1996 and made an application in that

regard. The application was examined and forwarded to the Talati-

cum-Mantri of Village Bechri. The complainant, accordingly, went

to the Bechri Grampanchayat and met the Talati-cum-Mantri

3 on

07.02.1996. On perusing the said application, A1 demanded an

amount of ₹120/- from the complainant. A1 stated that ₹100/- was

to be given to him and ₹20/- was to be given to the Peon

4. The

complainant, thereafter, returned back stating that he would get

the money afterwards. The complainant, thereafter, went to the

office of A1 on 14.02.1996. A1 demanded a copy of his father’s

income certificate along with the amount of ₹120/-. The

complainant was asked to come back with the certificate. The

2

For short, ‘the complainant’.

3

For short, ‘A1’.

4

For short, ‘A2’.

Page 3 of 20

complainant, thereafter, on 19.02.1996 met A1 near the bus stand

at about 11:30 am. He gave him the income certificate of his father.

The complainant, thereafter, proceeded to the office of the Anti-

Corruption Bureau and lodged a complaint as he did not want to

pay the money demanded by A1. Accordingly, the complaint was

accepted and preparations were made for laying the trap.

3) The complainant along with the raiding party visited the office

of A1 on 19.02.1996 for collecting the concerned certificate.

According to the prosecution, on receiving such certificate the

complainant gave a note of ₹20/- to A2 who put it in his pocket.

On giving the pre-determined signal, the raiding party appeared

and, thereafter, drew the necessary panchnama. After completing

all the formalities, an offence was registered against A1 and A2.

Investigation was, thereafter, undertaken. On its completion, a

chargesheet was duly filed. The charge was framed against A1 and

A2 alleging commission of offence under Sections 7, 12 and

13(1)(d) of the Act of 1988. In addition, charge for the offence

punishable under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

5

was also framed. As A1 and A2 denied the charges, they were tried.

The prosecution examined five witnesses to prove the charge. The

5

For short, ‘the Penal Code’

Page 4 of 20

defence raised by A1 and A2 was of denial. They submitted their

explanation in writing.

4) At the conclusion of the trial, the learned Judge of the trial

Court after considering the evidence on record held that A1, who

was holding the post of Talati-cum-Mantri and A2, who was

serving as Peon with the Grampanchayat were public servants.

The sanction granted for their prosecution by the Deputy District

Development Officer and the Sarpanch respectively, was found to

be valid. The demand of the amount of bribe was proved as against

A1 but not against A2. It was further held that the prosecution had

failed to prove criminal conspiracy between A1 and A2 for

demanding the amount of bribe. By its judgment dated

30.11.1999, A1 and A2 were held guilty of having committed the

offence punishable under Section 7 read with Section 13(1)(d) of

the Act of 1988. After hearing A1 and A2 on the question of

sentence, they were directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for

a period of one year for the offence punishable under Section

13(1)(d) of the Act of 1988. As regards offence punishable under

Section 7 of the Act of 1988, they were awarded punishment of

rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months with fine of

₹2000/-.

Page 5 of 20

5) A1 and A2 being aggrieved by their conviction preferred

Criminal Appeal Nos.1343 of 1999 and 1344 of 1999 respectively.

The State of Gujarat preferred Criminal Appeal No.1380 of 1999

seeking enhancement in the quantum of punishment. A learned

Single Judge of the High Court heard all the appeals together. On

re-consideration of the evidence on record, the conviction of A1

and A2 was maintained. Their respective appeals were dismissed.

It was also held that since A1 and A2 were dismissed from service

after their conviction, there was no necessity to enhance the

sentence. Accordingly, the appeal preferred by the State of Gujarat

was also dismissed. Being aggrieved, A1 and A2 have challenged

the judgment of the High Court.

6) Mr. Divyesh Pratap Singh, learned counsel for the appellants

in support of the appeals made the following submissions:

a) It was submitted that insofar as A1 was concerned, he was

serving on the post of Talati-cum-Mantri. The District

Development Officer was the competent authority to make an

appointment on the post of Talati-cum-Mantri. The sanction

for prosecution of A1, however, was given by PW-2, Mukesh

Kumar, who was serving as Deputy District Development

Officer at the relevant point. Since the Deputy District

Page 6 of 20

Development Officer was not the competent authority to

appoint a Talati-cum-Mantri, the order granting sanction vide

Exhibit 25 was defective. On the ground that A1 was

prosecuted on the basis of an invalid sanction order, his

conviction could not be maintained. Placing reliance on the

decisions in Gopalbhai Mohanbhai Nagoda vs. State of

Gujarat

6

and Shamji Karshan vs. The State of Gujarat

7

, it

was submitted that it was only the District Development

Officer, who was competent to grant valid sanction for

prosecuting a Talati-cum-Mantri. Without considering this

aspect in its proper perspective, the conviction of A1 had been

upheld. Reliance was also placed on the decision in Mohd.

Iqbal Ahmad vs. State of Andhra Pradesh

8

to urge that as

the sanction was granted without due application of mind, it

vitiated the entire proceedings.

b) It was submitted that according to the case of the

prosecution, a demand of ₹100/- was made on behalf of A1

while demand of ₹20/- was made on behalf of A2. The

evidence on record indicated that an amount of ₹20/- was

6

1993 II LLN 540

7

1974 SCC Online Guj 64

8

1979 INSC 11

Page 7 of 20

placed in the pocket of A2 by the complainant. Amount of

₹100/- was neither offered to A1 nor was it found on his

person. Only on the basis of placing a note of ₹20/- in the

pocket of A2, A1 had been prosecuted. In absence of any

amount whatsoever being accepted by A1, he could not have

been prosecuted for the aforesaid offence. The evidence on

record was not appreciated in the light of these facts. In fact,

there was no demand whatsoever made by A1 as alleged. A1,

therefore, was liable to be acquitted from the charge. In that

regard, the learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions

in Pramatha Nath Taluqdar vs. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar

9

and

Shri Ram & Another vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh

10

. It

was also urged that since the amount of ₹20/- was stated to

be given to A2 after receiving the certificate that was sought

by the complainant, presumption under Section 20 of the Act

of 1988 would not arise. The decision in State of Lokayuktha

Police, Davanagere vs. C.B. Nagaraj

11

was referred to in this

context. Relying upon the decision in N. Vijayakumar vs.

State of Tamil Nadu

12

, it was submitted that in the absence

9

1961 INSC 357

10

1974 INSC 230

11

2025 INSC 736

12

2021 INSC 60

Page 8 of 20

of demand being proved, no presumption under Section 20 of

the Act of 1988 could be drawn.

c) Coming to the case of A2, it was submitted that the trial Court

had found that the alleged demand by A2 was doubtful. This

finding by the trial Court was also accepted by the High Court

in Paragraph 20 of the impugned judgment. Thus, when any

demand by A2 was not proved, as held by both the Courts, it

was clear that the complainant had thrust the note of ₹20/-

in the pocket of A2 without any demand. The defence as raised

that the festival of Eid was to be celebrated on the next day

and it was for that purpose that the complainant had given

the note of ₹20/- to A2 after receiving the necessary

certificate, therefore, assumed significance. It was, thus, clear

that even in absence of any demand whatsoever by A2, he had

been convicted by both the Courts. Thus, from the material

on record it was evident that no amount of bribe was paid to

A1 while there was no demand made by A2. The trial Court

rightly held the absence of any conspiracy between A1 and A2

in that regard. Ignoring this vital aspect, the High Court

proceeded to uphold the conviction of the appellants.

Page 9 of 20

d) It was, thus, submitted that on considering the entire

evidence on record, it was clear that the prosecution had

failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The

appellants were entitled to acquittal. Both the Courts had

erred in coming to the conclusion that A1 and A2 were guilty

of the offence punishable under Sections 7, 12 and 13(1)(d) of

the Act of 1988.

7) On the other hand, Mr. Prashant Bhagwati, learned counsel

appearing for the State of Gujarat while opposing the appeals,

made the following submissions:

a) It was submitted that the trial Court as well as the High Court

concurrently found that demand of ₹120/- had been made by

A1. Out of the said amount, ₹100/- was to be retained by A1

and ₹20/- was to be paid to A2. With the payment of ₹20/- to

A2, the trap was successful which also proved the demand as

well as acceptance of the amount of bribe. Merely because the

amount of ₹100/- was not actually paid to A1, it could not be

said that the offence was not proved. For the purposes of

issuing the requisite certificate, such demand had been made

by A1. Hence, they were rightly convicted by the trial Court

and its judgment was upheld by the High Court.

Page 10 of 20

b) A1 and A2 being public servants, the sanction granted for

their prosecution was in accordance with law. After due

application of mind and after considering all relevant aspects,

the sanction orders had been issued. Considering the nature

of evidence on record coupled with the concurrent findings

by both Courts, it was submitted that there was no reason

whatsoever to interfere with the conviction of A1 and A2. Both

the criminal appeals were liable to be dismissed.

8) We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length.

With their assistance, we have also perused the records of the case.

We have, thereafter, given thoughtful consideration to the entire

material on record.

9) It would be necessary to first consider the aspect of demand,

which has been held to be proved against A1 . The trial Court

recorded a finding that insofar as the aspect of demand is

concerned, the same was proved as against A1 and that there is

no demand by A2. This finding has been affirmed by the High

Court. In this regard, it would be necessary to first consider the

deposition of the complainant at Exhibit 13. He had stated that for

the purpose of obtaining an Income Certificate, he had approached

the office of the Mamlatdar and had made an application in that

Page 11 of 20

regard on 06.02.1996. That application was forwarded to the office

of Talati-cum-Mantri of village Bechri. In that regard on

07.02.1996, A1 after seeing the papers had stated that

complainant would have to pay ₹120/- for the certificate. From the

said amount, ₹100/- was to be paid to A1 and ₹20/- for A2. This

demand was repeated on 14.02.1996 . It is, thereafter, that on

19.02.1996 that the complainant met A1 at the bus stand where

he was told to get the Income Certificate of his father after which

the certificate could be collected in the evening. The complainant

was told to come with ₹120/-.

10) As regards demand of the amount of ₹120/-, the complainant

in his cross-examination was confronted with his deposition that

was recorded in Criminal Case No.826 of 1996. According to the

complainant, after the Anti-Corruption Bureau had lodged the

report against A1 and A2, he had filed another case against both

of them. This case related to threats given by A1 and A2 to the

complainant. The complainant admitted that in his deposition in

the said case, he had stated that A1 had demanded an amount of

₹200/- and that the amount of ₹120/- was agreed by way of final

settlement. Relevant portion of his cross-examination reads thus:

“9. After the A.C.B. filed case against the accused persons, I have filed

another case against both of them. I have filed the said case against

him in lower Court for threatening me. I have given deposition in the

Page 12 of 20

said case. My sister has also given deposition in the said case. My

father has also given deposition in the said case. The case no. 826/96

has been filed against the accused in the J.M.F.C. Court of Umreth.

My deposition has been recorded in the said case. I do not know that

I might have dictated such in the said deposition that, when I went

to the Talati on 07.02.96, the Talati had demanded Rs.200/- from

me. It is true that, I have dictated such in my deposition that, when

I went to the Talati for the last time, he demanded Rs.120/-. It is true

that, I had dictated such in my deposition that, the Talati demanded

Rs.200/- and the amount of Rs.120/- was decided towards final

settlement. As per your say, I produce certified copy of my deposition

recorded in Criminal Case No. 826/96. It is given exhibit 21.”

From the aforesaid, it is clear that when the complainant

deposed in the present proceedings, he did not refer to an initial

demand of ₹200/- being made by A1 on 07.02.1996. He further

does not state that by way of final settlement an amount of ₹120/-

was agreed to be paid. The version of the complainant as recorded

in this case, therefore, is in variance with his deposition in

Criminal Case No.826/1996 on the amount of demand by A1. Be

it noted that the complaint leading to Criminal Case No.826/1996

was made on 06.03.1996, which is within a month of the alleged

demand.

11) The complainant further in his deposition stated that after

lodging the complaint, he was instructed by the Anti-Corruption

Bureau office to give the entire amount of ₹120/- in the form of two

notes of ₹50/- and one note of ₹20/- to the accused. This fact is

reiterated in the cross-examination of PW-3, the first Panch

witness, who admitted that the complainant was instructed to give

Page 13 of 20

all the currency notes when the demand was made by A1. On

19.02.1996, when he had gone to collect the Income Certificate,

A1 and A2 were in the office. A2 was at a distance of one to two

feet away from A1. The complainant admitted that if anyone talked

with A1, A2 could have heard it. In his examination-in-chief, the

complainant stated that after receiving the certificate along with

other papers, the same were placed in his plastic bag. When the

complainant stood up with the said papers, A1 demanded the

amount of ₹120/- from him and told him that the said amount be

given to A2. According to the complainant, as he understood that

A2 was to be given ₹20/-, he took out the currency note of ₹20/-

and gave it to A2, who thereafter placed it in his left pocket. In his

cross-examination, the complainant stated that when A1

demanded ₹120/- from him, he did not take out the money from

his pocket at that time. A2 did not demand any money from him.

He further admitted that he was instructed at the Anti-Corruption

Bureau office to take out the entire money from the pocket when

it was demanded. Though A1 told him to give ₹120/- to A2, he

understood it as to give ₹20/- to A2. He further admitted that when

he gave the money to A2, A2 did not inquire as to why he was giving

only ₹20/- though A1 had told him to give ₹120/-.

Page 14 of 20

12) From the aforesaid evidence of the complainant, it becomes

clear that though he was instructed to give the entire amount of

₹120/- on demand being made, he gave ₹20/- only to A2. Further,

according to the complainant an amount of ₹120 was demanded

from him after receiving the certificate and A2 was standing at a

distance of one to two feet from A1. However, A2 did not inquire

from the complainant as to why only ₹20/- was being given though

A1 had told him to give an amount of ₹120/-. This again raises a

doubt as regards demand of ₹120/- by A1 in the backdrop of the

complainant giving ₹20/- to A2 despite being instructed to give the

entire amount of ₹120/- whenever the demand was made. When

this conduct of the complainant is considered along with his

admission in the cross-examination that A2 did not make any

demand, the entire episode gives rise to serious suspicion. There

is no explanation as to why the instructions given to the

complainant at the Anti-Corruption Bureau office of giving the

entire amount of ₹120/- on demand were not followed.

13) The complainant in his cross-examination volunteered to

demonstrate as to how he took out the currency note of ₹20/- from

his pocket for being given to A2. According to him, he held the said

currency note with his first two fingers and thumb. PW-3 who

Page 15 of 20

acted as Panch was examined vide Exhibit 26. In his cross-

examination, he stated that he knew as to how the complainant

gave the money to A2. He stated that the complainant took out the

currency note of ₹20/- from his left pocket using all five fingers of

his right hand. He denied the suggestion that the complainant took

out the money using his three fingers, his thumb and two other

fingers.

Though the aforesaid could be termed as a discrepancy when

considered in isolation, the same would have some bearing while

considering the entire evidence, especially as regards demand and

giving of the amount of bribe. In our view, the prosecution evidence

is insufficient to hold that demand of ₹120/- by A1 was proved

beyond reasonable doubt.

14) It is also material to note that both the accused were also

charged with having hatched a criminal conspiracy to demand and

receive the amount of bribe from the complainant. The said charge

was under Section 120B of the Penal Code. The trial Court,

however, on consideration of the evidence on record held that

prosecution had failed to bring on record any evidence to

substantiate this charge. It, therefore, acquitted both the accused

from the offence punishable under Section 120B of the Penal Code.

Page 16 of 20

Though the State Government preferred an appeal before the High

Court seeking enhancement in the amount of punishment

imposed on the accused, their acquittal under Section 120B of the

Penal Code has not been interfered with by the High Court. This

aspect assumes relevance in view of the fact that both the Courts

have held that it was proved that A1 had made the demand of bribe

while it was only A2 who received the amount of ₹20/-. The

demand as against A2 was held to be not proved. Similarly, A1 was

not found with any bribe amount.

15) It was sought to be urged on behalf of the prosecution that

the presumption under Section 20 of the Act of 1988 would arise

once it was proved that the bribe amount of ₹20/- was received by

A2. This contention cannot be accepted for the reason that the

statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Act of 1988 would

come into play only after the initial demand is proved by the

prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. If the initial demand itself

is not proved, mere recovery of the amount of ₹20/- from A2 would

not resurrect the case of the prosecution to enable the Court to

hold that the charge was proved. This position is clear in view of

the decision of the three Judge Bench in N. Vijayakumar (supra).

The High Court in the impugned judgment has proceeded to draw

Page 17 of 20

presumption under Section 20 of the Act of 1988 on the premise

that both the accused were public servants and that A2 was found

in possession of the currency note smeared with anthracene

powder. It is clear from the evidence brought on record by the

prosecution that the demand by A1 itself is doubtful and, hence,

not proved. The presumption under Section 20 of the Act of 1988,

therefore, cannot be drawn in such a situation.

16) Another relevant aspect that cannot be ignored is that the

amount of ₹20/- was given by the complainant to A2 after receiving

the Income Certificate from A1. This is another relevant factor that

requires consideration inasmuch as the Income Certificate for the

issuance of which it was alleged that the bribe was demanded had

already been prepared and was handed over to the complainant.

When this circumstance is considered in totality of the prosecution

material on record, it again raises a doubt as the Income Certificate

was duly prepared and handed over to the complainant by A1, after

which he gave the amount of ₹20/- to A2. Reference in this regard

can be made to the decision in State of Lokayuktha Police,

Davanagere (supra) wherein it was held that ipso facto, it cannot

be assumed that such payment was pursuant to a demand made.

Page 18 of 20

17) According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the

sanction granted to the prosecution of A1 was invalid in view of the

fact that the same was granted by PW-2, who was holding the post

of Deputy District Development Officer. As A1 was holding the post

of Talati-cum-Mantri, sanction for his prosecution was required to

be granted by the District Development Officer. This was for the

reason that the District Development Officer was the authority

competent to remove a Talati-cum-Mantri from his office. As A1

was holding the post of Talati-cum-Mantri, the provisions of

Section 19(1)(c) of the Act of 1988 would be required to be complied

with. As per the said provision, cognizance of an offence

punishable under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act of 1988 cannot be

taken unless there is previous sanction of the authority competent

to remove the public servant from office. In his deposition at

Exhibit 24, PW-2 admitted that he was performing duties as a

Deputy District Development Officer since September 1995. He

further admitted that if a Talati-cum-Mantri desires to go abroad,

he has to seek no objection of the Department and permission of

the appointing authority. He admitted that in such a situation, it

was the District Development Officer, who had authority to issue

a no objection certificate. It has not been brought on record by the

Page 19 of 20

prosecution that a Deputy District Development Officer is

empowered to remove a Talati-cum-Mantri from office. It may be

true that A1 was initially appointed on ad-hoc basis as Talati-cum-

Mantri by an order issued by the Deputy District Development

Officer. What is contemplated by Section 19(1)(c) of the Act of 1988

is the grant of sanction by an authority competent to remove the

concerned public servant from office. When the sanction was

sought, A1 was holding the substantive post of Talati-cum-Mantri

and, hence, it was only the District Development Officer under the

Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961 who could have removed him from

office. On this count, the sanction granted to the prosecution of A1

by the Deputy District Development Officer is found to be invalid.

We would, however, not set aside the conviction of A1 solely on the

ground of an invalid order of sanction. Even otherwise, we find on

an appreciation of the entire material brought on record by the

prosecution that it falls woefully short of proving the charge

against both the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

18) Having found that the charge of demand of bribe amount has

not been proved against A1 coupled with the fact that both the

Courts have recorded a finding that no demand was made by A2,

it is obvious that the case of the prosecution must fail. As noted

Page 20 of 20

above, mere possession of a currency note of ₹20/- with A2 by itself

would not be sufficient to uphold the conviction of A1 and A2 for

the offence punishable under Sections 7, 12 and 13(1)(d) of the Act

of 1988. The defence raised by A2 that the festival of Eid was on

the next day and, hence, the complainant gave ₹20/- to him after

receiving the Income Certificate is also probable.

19) For all these reasons, the judgment of the trial Court in

Special Case No.15 of 1996 dated 30.11.1999, as affirmed by the

High Court in its common judgment dated 22.01.2015 in Criminal

Appeal Nos.1343/1999 and 1344 /1999 is set aside. The

appellants are acquitted of the charge of having committed an

offence punishable under Sections 7, 12 and 13(1)(d) of the Act of

1988. The appellants are presently enlarged on bail. Their bail

bonds shall stand cancelled. The Criminal Appeals are ,

accordingly, allowed.

…...………………………..J.

[ UJJAL BHUYAN ]

.…..………………………..J.

[ATUL S. CHANDURKAR]

NEW DELHI,

AUGUST 19, 2026.