( 2026:HHC:25590 )

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

CWP No. 2079 of 2026 a/w

CWP Nos. 1601 and 1602 of

2026

Reserved on: 16.06.2026

Decided on: 18.06.2026

1. CWP No. 2079 of 2026

Neeraj Kumar …Petitioner

-Versus-

State of Himachal Pradesh and others ….Respondents

2. CWP No. 1601 of 2026

Rajat Chandel .…Petitioner

-Versus-

State of Himachal Pradesh and others ….Respondents

3. CWP No. 1602 of 2026

Rahul Verma .…Petitioner

-Versus-

State of Himachal Pradesh and others ….Respondents

Coram:

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Mohan Goel, Judge

Whether approved for reporting?

1

Yes.

______________________________________________________________

1. CWP No. 2079 of 2026

For the petitioner: Mr. K.D. Shreedhar, Senior Advocate with

Ms. Sneh Bhimta, Advocate.

For the respondents: Mr. Anup Rattan, Advocate General, with

Rahul Thakur, Deputy Advocate General

& Mr. Rajat Chauhan, Assistant Advocate

General, for the respondent-State.

1

Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

2. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

2. CWP No. 1601 of 2026

For the petitioner: Mr. Rajiv Jiwan, Senior Advocate with

Mr. Yug Singhal, Advocate.

For the respondents: Mr. Anup Rattan, Advocate General, with

Mr. Rahul Thakur, Deputy Advocate

General and Mr. Rajat Chauhan, Assistant

Advocate General, for the respondent-

State.

3. CWP No. 1602 of 2026

For the petitioner: Mr. Rajiv Jiwan, Senior Advocate with

Mr. Yug Singhal, Advocate.

For the respondents: Mr. Anup Rattan, Advocate General, with

Mr. Rahul Thakur, Deputy Advocate

General and Mr. Rajat Chauhan, Assistant

Advocate General, for the respondent-

State.

Ajay Mohan Goel, J.:

CWP No. 2079 of 2026 a/w CWP Nos. 1601 and

1602 of 2026

As common issues of facts and law are involved in

these writ petitions and as arguments were also heard jointly in all

the petitions, they are being disposed of vide common judgment.

2. In brief, I will deal with the facts of each case

independently before reverting to the legal issues involved in these

petitions.

3. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

CWP No. 2079 of 2026

3. Petitioner-Neeraj Kumar was appointed as a Constable

in the month of April, 2001. Thereafter, he was promoted as Head

Constable in the month of March, 2009. In the year 2010, he was

appointed as a Sub-Inspector, upon qualifying the competitive

examination through Service Selection Board. Thereafter, he was

promoted as an Inspector in the month of March, 2016. FIR No. 04 of

2021 was registered against him on 21.12.2021 at Police Station,

Hamirpur, under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Two more FIRs.,i.e., FIR No. 168 of 2021, under Section 307 of IPC

and FIR No. 170 of 2021, under Section 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and

Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 were also registered against the

petitioner. In terms of the averments made in the writ petition, all

these FIRs. are pending consideration at the stage of charge before

the learned Trial Court. The petitioner was suspended from service

on 23.12.2021. On 26.12.2021, a regular departmental inquiry was

ordered against him by the Superintendent of Police, Hamirpur,

under Rule-16.24 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, as applicable to

the State of Himachal Pradesh. A Summary Charge -sheet was

issued against the petitioner on 28.12.2021. According to the

petitioner, regular departmental inquiry was based on the

4. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

abovementioned three FIRs. and additionally, on one DD No. 50,

dated 21

st

December, 2021 of Police Station, Nadaun, in which, it

was recorded that the petitioner was found to have left the duty

station without any prior permission of the competent authority.

4. To cut the controversy short, in the disciplinary

proceedings, on 21.04.2023, the Disciplinary Authority imposed

minor penalty of forfeiture of two years approved service for

increment temporarily upon the petitioner.

5. It is further the contention of the petitioner that in the

meanwhile, he was reinstated in service since 18.11.2022 and since

then, he was performing his duties diligently. The grievance of the

petitioner is that after three years as from imposition of minor penalty,

the Director General of Police, vide impugned order dated

12.01.2026, while invoking Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of

India and Government of India OM dated 25.11.2022, suo motu

revised the order of penalty of the Disciplinary Authority and

dismissed the petitioner from service, in terms of the provisions of

Sections 63 and 87 of the Himachal Pradesh Police Act, 2007,

without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.

CWP No. 1601 of 2026

6. Case of petitioner Rajat Chandel is that he was

appointed as a Consable in the year 2013. On 14.08.2024, an FIR,

5. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

i.e., FIR No. 107, dated 14.08.2024, under Sections 21,29 & 27(A) of

the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act and Section

111 of the Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita was registered at Police Station

Sadar, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh. The petitioner was one of the

accused therein. On 08.07.2025, a Charge-sheet was served upon

the petitioner by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cyber Crime,

Shimla. On 18.08.2025, he was arrested in connection with the

abovementioned FIR. He was placed under suspension by the

competent authority on 19.08.2025. Vide office order dated

30.08.2025, a regular departmental inquiry was initiated against the

petitioner. The grievance of the petitioner is that in terms of impugned

order dated 12.01.2026, the Director General of Police, while

invoking the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India

read with Sections 63 and 87 of the Himachal Pradesh Police Act,

2007, dismissed him from service, without affording any opportunity

of hearing to him and without awaiting the outcome of the

departmental inquiry or the trial.

CWP No. 1602 of 2026

7. The case of the petitioner Rahul Verma is that he was

appointed as a Constable on 01.10.2023. An FIR, i.e., FIR No. 107,

dated 14.08.2024, under Sections 21, 29 & 27(A) of the Narcotic

Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act and Section 111 of the

6. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita was registered against him at Police Station

Sadar, Shimla. The petitioner was placed under suspension on

20.11.2025 and a regular departmental inquiry was initiated against

him. He was arrested on 27.11.2025. The grievance of the petitioner

is that in terms of impugned order dated 12.01.2026, the Director

General of Police, while invoking the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of

the Constitution of India read with Sections 63 and 87 of the

Himachal Pradesh Police Act, 2007, dismissed him from service,

without affording any opportunity of hearing to him and without

awaiting the outcome of departmental inquiry or the trial.

CWP No. No. 2079 of 2026

8. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner-

Neeraj Kumar argued that the impugned order passed by the

Director General of Police was not sustainable in the eyes of law.

Learned Senior Counsel submitted that once departmental inquiry

stood initiated against the petitioner, in which, a minor penalty was

imposed upon him, there was no occasion for the Director General of

Police, to revise the order, in the mode and manner, in which the

same has been done by dismissing the petitioner from service, by

invoking the provisions under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of

India. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the power under Article

311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India has to be, otherwise also,

7. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

invoked by the Disciplinary Authority and herein, the Director General

of Police was not the Disciplinary Authority. He submitted that in the

present case, the Director General of Police, though was an Authority

superior to the Disciplinary Authority, but he was not the Disciplinary

Authority. He argued that as a result of the Director General of Police

passing the impugned order, the right of appeal and revision of the

petitioner has been jeopardized. Learned Senior Counsel further

submitted that otherwise also the impugned order is bad in law, as it

violates the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in

Union of India and another Vs. Tulsi Ram Patel, (1985) 3 Supreme

Court Cases 398 and other judgments, including the latest judgment

of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Vs. Commissioner of

Police and others, 2025 SCC Online SC 363. Learned Senior

Counsel argued that the impugned order has been passed by the

Director General of Police without holding any inquiry, thus, the

principles of natural justice were flouted with impunity in the case. He

submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, there was

no occasion for the Authority to have had invoked the provisions of

Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India, because the

circumstances were not such that they posed such a grave danger to

the life and liberty of anyone or to the State property so as to do

away with the normal course of holding an inquiry. Learned Senior

8. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

Counsel submitted that in the present case, the petitioner was

serving the Department after being reinstated in the year 2022 and

since then, there was no complaint against him till the passing of the

impugned order. He submitted that in these circumstances, passing

of the impugned order was totally unjustified. Learned Senior

Counsel by taking the Court through the impugned order also argued

that the contents thereof demonstrate that the same was passed with

a premediated mind, rather than due application of mind. He

submitted that the language used in the impugned order was

demonstrative of the fact that herein the Authority had firstly decided

to do away with the services of the petitioner and the order was

nothing but a “mean” adopted by the Authority to achieve the ‘end’

which already stood decided by the earlier Authority. He submitted

that the passing of the impugned order was nothing but an act of

colourable exercise of power, which violates the Constitutional

mandate and spirit, as also Punjab Police Act, as applicable to the

State of Himachal Pradesh, relating to holding of inquiries. Learned

Senior Counsel also submitted that in the present case, the petitioner

was firstly made to face the inquiry, in which, he was punished and

subsequently, on the same set of events, he was punished again this

time, by terminating his services, without associating him with the

process undertaken by the Authority. Learned Senior Counsel thus

9. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

submitted that as the impugned order was not sustainable in the

eyes of law,, the same be quashed and set aside.

9. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the other two

petitioners adopted the arguments of Shri K.D. Shreedhar, learned

Senior Counsel. In addition, he submitted that in the other two cases,

the departmental inquiry was still pending and, therefore, in these

circumstances, there was no occasion for the Director General of

Police to have had passed the impugned orders, which demonstrated

that the same were passed with premediated mind. Leaned Senior

Counsel submitted that the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the

Constitution of India are to be used sparingly, in rare cases. He

submitted that this extremely important aspect of the matter was

ignored by the Authority concerned while passing the impugned

orders.

10. On the other hand, learned Advocate General argued

that there is no infirmity in the orders passed by the Director General

of Police, in terms whereof, the services of the petitioners stand

terminated. Learned Advocate General argued that due process was

followed by the Authority while passing the impugned orders and the

parameters laid down under Article 311(2)(b) as also the relevant

provisions of the Punjab Police Act, as applicable to the State of

Himachal Pradesh were followed in letter and spirit by the Authority.

10. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

Learned Advocate General argued that herein, it is a case wherein

three Police Officials were found involved in offences punishable

under the NDPS Act. He submitted that if protectors of law

themselves take the law in their hands by involving themselves in the

activities which are punishable under the NDPS Act, then, it would be

very difficult for the Government to move towards its goal of making

the State as a drug free State. He submitted that the Director General

of Police passed the impugned orders so that it sets an example to

all concerned that the Police Department was serious about making

the State a drug free State. Learned Advocate General also relied

upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Suprme Court in Union of India and

another Vs. Tulsi Ram Patel, (1985) 3 Supreme Court Cases 398.

Learned Advocate General argued that the Policy of the Government

was to ensure that no employee involved in drug trafficking went scot

free and more so, of the Police Department. Learned Advocate

General argued that the orders passed by the Director General of

Police were not without jurisdiction and he was competent to pass

such orders under the provisions of the Punjab Police Rules, as

applicable to the State of Himachal Pradesh. Learned Advocate

General also argued that there was no violation of the provisions of

Article 311 (2)(b), because it was in fact this Clause of Article 311 (2)

of the Constitution of India, which conferred power upon the Director

11. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

General of Police to take hard and harsh steps to meet the ends of

justice. Learned Advocate General also argued that the earlier

departmental inquiry was not held on the allegations of NDPS Act

and, therefore, there is no merit in the contention of learned Senior

Counsel appearing for petitioner Neeraj Kumar that it was a case of

double jeopardy. By referring to the order earlier passed by the

Disciplinary Authority, he submitted that the said order was passed

on totally different charges and the allegation of NDPS was not the

foundation of the earlier order passed against the petitioners qua

imposition of minor penalty. Learned Advocate General also

submitted that as tough measures are required to be taken to deal

with the drug peddlers, therefore, least interference should be there

in such like matters by the Court.

11. I have heard learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners

as also learned Advocate General and have also carefully gone

through the pleadings and the documents appended therewith,

including the impugned orders.

12. The moot question involved in these writ petitions is

that as to whether in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the

case, the termination of the services of the petitioners without holding

any inquiry is sustainable in the eyes of law or not.

12. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

13. It is not in dispute that there are FIRs. registered

against the petitioners for commission of offences under the NDPS

Act. It is also not in dispute that all the petitioners were

officer/officials from the Police Department. It is clarified at this stage

itself that minor punishment imposed on Neeraj Kumar was not for

commission of alleged offences under the NDPS Act.

14. This Court is of the considered view that in view of drug

menace, harsh measures are required to be taken by one and all to

fight this menace and there is no dispute on this issue, as argued by

learned Advocate General that strict measures indeed are required to

be taken to deal with the drug menace and if any officer or official of

the State Government is found involved in this drug menace, then,

harsh measures are required to be taken in such like cases, But

then, this Court would like to put a Caveat and the same is that come

what may, due process of law has to be followed in every case,

including the cases under the NDPS Act.

15. Before proceeding further, I will first of all address the

contentions of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that the

impugned orders passed by the Director General of Police were not

sustainable, as under the provisions of Article 311 (2)(b) of the

Constitution of India, the Authority competent to pass the order was

the Disciplinary Authority only and as the Director General of Police

13. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

was not the Disciplinary Authority, therefore, he could not have

passed the impugned orders.

16. The petitioners herein are the employees of the Police

Department. They are governed by the provisions of the Punjab

Police Rules, 1934, as are applicable to the State of Himachal

Pradesh. Departmental proceedings are envisaged in Rule 16.24 of

the said Rules.

17. Chapter-16 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, as is

applicable to the State of Himachal Pradesh provides for

‘punishments’. Rule-16.1 of the said Rules provides for ‘Authorized

punishments’. Sub-Rule of Rule-16.1 provides that no Police Officer

shall be departmentally punished otherwise than as provided in the

said Rules and Sub-Rule (2) thereof provides that the departmental

punishments mentioned in the second column of the subjoined table

may be inflicted on officers of the various ranks shown in the heading

Nos. 3 to 6, by the officers named below each heading in each case,

or by any officer of higher rank. The Rule provides as under:-

“16.1 Authorized punishment.-(1) No police

officer shall be departmentally punished otherwise than

as provided in these rules. (2) The departmental

punishments mentioned in the second column of the

subjoined table may be inflicted on officers of the

various ranks shown in the heading Nos. 3 to 6, by the

14. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

officers named below each heading in each case, or by

any officer of higher rank-

1 2 3 4 5 6

Sr.

No.

Departmental

punishment

Inspectors Sergeants, Sub -

Inspectors and

Assistant Sub -

Inspectors

Head Constables Constables

1. Dismissal Deputy Inspectors-

General, Assistant

Inspector-General,

Government Railway

Police, the Assistant

Inspector-General,

Provincial Addit-ional

Police, designated as

Commandant, Provincial

Additional Police, and

the Assistant Inspector-

General of Police

(Traffic)

Superintendents of

Police Commandants of

Punjab Armed Police

and Deputy

Superintendent

(Administrative),

Government Railway

Police.

Superintendent of

Police; Deputy

Superintendent

(Administrative).

Government Railway

Police; Deputy

Superintendents

incharge of Railway

Police Sub-Divisions;

Senior Assistant

Superintendent of

Police, Lahore; Officers-

in-charge of Police

Constables Training

Centres. Deputy

Superintendent of

Police, Lahaul and Spiti

Superintendents of

Police, Deputy

Superintendent

(Administrative),

Government Railway

Police; Deputy

Superintendents in

charge of Railway Police

Sub-Divisions; Senior

Assistant

Superintendent of

Police, Lahore; Officer-

in-charge of Recruits

Training Centres.

Deputy Superintendent

of Police, Lahaul and

Spiti.

18. The petitioners before this Court are Inspector and

Constables, respectively. The punishment of dismissal can be

imposed upon an Inspector, by a Deputy Inspectors- General or any

Officer of higher rank and similarly, the punishment of dismissal can

be imposed upon a Constable by the Superintendent of Police or by

any officer of higher rank. Herein, the punishment of dismissal has

been imposed upon the petitioners by the Director General of Police,

who obviously is an Officer of higher rank than the one envisaged in

Rule 16.1.

19. Therefore, in light of the fact that the Punjab Polcie

Rules do empower the Director General of Police to impose the

punishment of dismissal on the petitioners, being an Officer of higher

15. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

rank than the Officers shown in Headings 3 to 6 (supra), this Court

finds no merit in the contention of learned Senior Counsel for the

petitioners that the Director General of Police could not have had

passed the impugned orders.

20. Now, this Court would be referring to the next important

aspect of the matter as to whether in the peculiar facts and

circumstances of these three cases, the Director General of Police

was justified in dismissing the petitioners from service by invoking the

provisions of Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitutions of India by doing

away with the inquiry.

21. Article 311 of the Constitution of India deals with

dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil

capacities under the Union or a State. The provisions of this Article

provides as under:-

“311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons

employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State-

(1) No person who is a member of a civil

service of the Union or an all India service or a civil

service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union

or a Slate shall be dismissed or removed by a authority

subordinate to that by which he was appointed.

(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be

dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after

an inquiry in which he has been informed of the

16. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

charges against hi m and given a reasonable

opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges;

Provided that where it is proposed after

such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty,

such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the

evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not

be necessary to give such person any opportunity of

making representation on the penalty proposed:

Provided further that this clause shall not

apply—

(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or

reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led

to his conviction on a criminal charge; or

(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss

or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied

that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in

writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such

inquiry; or

(c) where the President or the Governor, as

the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the

security of the State, it is not expedient to hold such

inquiry.

(3) If, in respect of any such person as

aforesaid, a question arises whether it is reasonably

practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in

clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority

empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to

reduce him in rank shall be final.”

17. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

22. In terms of Article 311 (2), no person shall be dismissed

or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has

been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable

opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. However,

proviso to Article 311 (2) provides that said Clause shall not apply in

following circumstances: -

“(a) where a person is dismissed or

removed or reduced in rank on the ground of

conduct which has led to his conviction on a

criminal charge; or

(b) where the authority empowered to

dismiss or remove a person or reduce him in rank

is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by

that authority in writing, it is not reasonably

practicable to hold such inquiry; or

(c) where the President or the Governor,

as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest

of the security of the State it is not expedient hold

such inquiry.”

23. In the present case, Sub-Clause (a) and Sub-Clause (c)

have no applicability. The Director General of Police has exercised

the power conferred under Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of

India, which provides that the Authority empowered to dismiss or

remove a person or reduce him in rank, if it is satisfied that for same

reasons, to be recorded by that Authority in writing, it is not

18. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry, then in such

circumstances, it can do away with holding of an inquiry.

24. Issue qua the exercise of power conferred under Article

311 (2) of the Constitution of India came up for consideration before

the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Union of India and another Vs.

Tulsi Ram Patel, (1985) 3 Supreme Court Cases 398, in which,

Hon’ble Supreme Court, by majority, qua applicability of Article 311(2)

of the Constitution of India held as under:-

“101. Not only, therefore, can the principles

of natural justice be modified but in exceptional cases

they can even be excluded. There are well-defined

exceptions to the nemo judex in causa sua rule as also

to the audi alteram partem rule. The nemo judex in

causa sua rule is subject to the doctrine of necessity

and yields to it as pointed out by th is Court

in J.Mohapatra & Co. and another v. State of Orissa

and another [1985] 1 S.C.R. 322,334-5. So far as the

audi alteram partem rule is concerned, both in England

and in India, it is well established that where a right to a

prior notice and an opportunity to be heard before an

order is passed would obstruct the taking of prompt

action, such a right can be excluded. This right can also

be excluded where the nature of the action to be taken,

its object and purpose and the scheme of the relevant

statutory provisions warrant its exclusion; nor can the

audi alteram partem rule be invoked if importing it

would have the effect of paralysing the administrative

19. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

process or where the need for promptitude or the

urgency of taking action so demands, as pointed out

in Maneka Gandhi's case at page 681. If legislation and

the necessities of a situation can exclude the principles

of natural justice including the audi alteram partem rule,

a fortiorari so can a provision or the Constitution, for a

Constitutional provision has a far greater and all-

pervading sanctity than a statutory provision. In the

present case, clause (2) of Article 311 is expressly

excluded by the opening words of the second proviso

and particularly its key-words this clause shall not

apply. As pointed out above, clause (2) of Article

311 embodies in express words the audi alteram

partem rule. This principle of natural justice having

been expressly excluded by a Constitutional provision,

namely, the second proviso to clause (2) of Article 311,

there is no scope for reintroducing it by a side-door to

provide once again the same inquiry which the

Constitutional provision has expressly prohibited.

Where a clause of the second proviso is applied on an

extraneous ground or a ground having no relation to the

situation envisaged in that clause, the action in so

applying it would be mala fide, and, therefore, void. In

such a case the invalidating factor may be referable

to Article 14. This is, however, the only scope

which Article 14 can have in relation to the second

proviso. but to hold that once the second proviso is

properly applied and clause (2) of Article

311 excluded, Article 14 will step in to take the place of

20. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

clause (2) would be to nullify the effect of the opening

words of the second proviso and thus frustrate the

intention of the makers of the Constitution. The second

proviso is based on public policy and is in public

interest and for public good and the Constitution -

makers who inserted it in Article 311(2) were the best

persons to decide whether such an exclusionary

provision should be there and the situations in which

this provision should apply.

…….. ….. …. … … … …

130. The condition precedent for the application

of clause (b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary

authority that "it is not reasonably practicable to hold"

the inquiry contemplated by clause (2) of Article

311. What is pertinent to note is that the words used

are "not reasonably practicable" and not

"impracticable". According to the Oxford English

Dictionary "practicable" means "Capable of being put

into practice, carried out in action, effected,

accomplished, or done; feasible". Webster's Third New

International Dictionary defines the word "practicable"

inter alia as meaning "possible to practice or perform:

capable of being put into practice, done or

accomplished : feasible". Further, the words used are

not "not practicable" but "not reasonably practicable".

Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines

the word "reasonably" as "in a reasonable manner : to a

fairly sufficient extent". Thus, whether it was practicable

to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context

21. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. It is

not a total or absolute impracticability which is required

by clause (b). What is requisite is that the holding of the

inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable

man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing

situation. It is not possible to enumerate the cases in

which it would not be reasonably practicable to hold the

inquiry, but some instances by way of illustration may,

however, be given. It would not be reasonably

practicable to hold an inquiry where the government

servant, particularly through or together with his

associates, so terrorizes, threatens or intimidate

witnesses who are going to given evidence against him

with fear of reprisal as to prevent them from doing so or

where the government servant by himself or together

with or through other threatens, intimidates and

terrorizes the officer who is the disciplinary authority or

member of his family so that he is afraid to hold the

inquiry or direct it to be held. It would also not be

reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry where an

atmosphere of violence or of general indiscipline and

insubordination prevails, and it is immaterial whether

the concerned government servant is or is not a party

to bringing about such an atmosphere. In this

connection, we must bear in mind that numbers coerce

and terrify while an individual may not. The reasonable

practicability of holding an inquiry is a matter of

assessment to be made by the disciplinary authority.

Such authority is generally on the spot and knows what

22. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

is happening. It is because the disciplinary authority is

the best judge of this that clause(3) of Article

311 makes the decision of the disciplinary authority on

this question final. A disciplinary authority is not

expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly

or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order

to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the

Department's case against the government servant is

weak and must fail. The finality given to the decision of

the disciplinary authority by Article 311(3) is not binding

upon the court so far as its power of judicial review is

concerned and in such a case the court will strike down

the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order

imposing penalty. The case of Arjun Chaubey v. Union

of India and others, [1984] 3 S.C.R. 302, is an instance

in point. In that case, the appellant was working as a

senior clerk in the office of the Chief Commercial

Superintendent, Northern Railway, Varanasi. The

Senior Commercial Officer wrote a letter to the

appellant calling upon him to submit his explanation

with regard to twelve charges of gross indiscipline

mostly relating to the Deputy Chief Commercial

Superintendent. The appellant submitted his

explanation and on the very next day the Deputy Chief

Commercial Superintendent served a second notice on

the appellant saying that his explanation was not

convincing and that another chance was being given to

him to offer his explanation with respect to those

charges. The appellant submitted his further

23. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

explanation but on the very next day the Deputy Chief

Commercial Superintendent passed an order

dismissing him on the ground that he was not fit to be

retained in service. This Court struck down the order

holding that seven out of twelve charges related to the

conduct of the appellant with the Deputy Chief

Commercial Superintendent who was the disciplinary

authority and that if an inquiry were to be held, the

principal witness for the Department would have been

the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent himself,

resulting in the same person being the main accuser,

the chief witness and also the judge of the matter.

131. It was submitted that where a delinquent

government servant so terrorizes the disciplinary

authority that neither that officer nor any other officer

stationed at that place is willing to hold the inquiry,

some senior officer can be sent from outside to hold the

inquiry. This submission itself shows that in such a case

the holding of an inquiry is not reasonably practicable. It

would be illogical to hold that the administrative work

carried out by senior officers should be paralysed

because a delinquent government servant either by

himself or along with or through others makes the

holding of an inquiry not reasonably practicable.

132. It is not necessary that a situation which

makes the holding of an inquiry not reasonably

practicable should exist before the disciplinary inquiry is

initiated against a government servant. Such a situation

can also come into existence subsequently during the

24. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

course of an inquiry, for instance, after the service of a

charge-sheet upon the government servant or after he

has filed his written statement thereto or even after

evidence has been led in part. In such a case also the

disciplinary authority would be entitled to apply clause

(b) of the second proviso because the word "inquiry" in

that clause includes part of an inquiry. It would also not

be reasonably practicable to afford to the government

servant an opportunity of hearing or further hearing, as

the case may be, when at the commencement of the

inquiry or pending it the government servant absconds

and cannot be served or will not participate in the

inquiry. In such cases, the matter must proceed ex

parte and on the materials before the disciplinary

authority. Therefore, even where a part of an inquiry

has been held and the rest is dispensed with under

clause (b) or a provision in the service rules analogous

thereto, the exclusionary words of the second proviso

operate in their full vigour and the government servant

cannot complain that he has been dismissed, removed

or reduced in rank in violation of the safeguards

provided by Article 311(2).

133. The second condition necessary for the

valid application of clause (b) of the second proviso is

that the disciplinary authority should record in writing its

reason for its satisfaction that it was not reasonably

practicable to hold the inquiry contemplated by Article

311(2). This is a Constitutional obligation and if such

reason is not recorded in writing, the order dispensing

25. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

with the inquiry and the order of penalty following

thereupon would both be void and unconstitutional.

134. It is obvious that the recording in writing of

the reason for dispensing with the inquiry must proceed

the order imposing the penalty. The reason for

dispensing with the inquiry need not, therefore, find a

place in the final order. It would be usual to record the

reason separately and then consider the question of the

penalty to be imposed and pass the order imposing the

penalty. It would, however, be better to record the

reason in the final order in order to avoid the allegation

that the reason was not recorded in writing before

passing the final order but was subsequently fabricated.

The reason for dispensing with the inquiry need not

contain detailed particular, but the reason must not be

vague or just a repetition of the language of clause (b)

of the second proviso. For instance, it would be no

compliance with the requirement of clause (b) for the

disciplinary authority simply to state that he was

satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable to hold

any inquiry. Sometimes a situation may be such that it

is not reasonably practicable to give detailed reasons

for dispensing with the inquiry. This would not, however,

per se invalidate the order. Each case must be judged

on its own merits and in the light of its own facts and

circumstances.

135. It was vehemently contended that if

reasons are not recorded in the final order, they must

be communicated to the concerned government

26. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

servant to enable him to challenge the validity of that

reasons in a departmental appeal or before a court of

law and the failure to communicate the reasons would

invalidate the order. This contention too cannot be

accepted. The constitutional requirement in clause (b)

is that the reason for dispensing with the inquiry should

be recorded in writing. There is no obligation to

communicate the reason to the government servant. As

clause (3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the

disciplinary authority on this point final, the question

cannot be agitated in a departmental appeal, revision or

review. The obligation to record the reason in writing is

provided in clause (b) so that the superiors of the

disciplinary authority may be able to judge whether

such authority had exercised its power under clause (b)

properly or not with a view to judge the performance

and capacity of that officer for the purposes of

promotion etc. It would, however, be better for the

disciplinary authority to communicate to the

government servant its reason for dispensing with the

inquiry because such communication would eliminate

the possibility of an allegation being made that the

reasons have been subsequently fabricated. It would

also enable the government servant to approach the

High Court under Article 226 or, in a fit case, this Court

under Article 32. If the reasons are not communicated

to the government servant and the matter comes to the

court, the court can direct the reasons to be produced,

and furnished to the government servant and if still not

27. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

produced, a presumption should be drawn that the

reasons were not recorded in writing and the impugned

order would then stand invalidated. Such presumption

can, however, be rebutted by a satisfactory explanation

for the non-production of the written reasons.

136. It was next submitted that though

clause (b) of the second proviso excludes an inquiry

into the charges made against a government servant, it

does not exclude an inquiry preceding it, namely, an

inquiry into whether the disciplinary inquiry should be

dispensed with or not, and that in such a preliminary

inquiry the government servant should be given an

opportunity of hearing by issuing to him a notice to

show cause why the inquiry should not be dispensed

with so as to enable him to satisfy the disciplinary

authority that it would be reasonably practicable to hold

the inquiry. This argument is illogical and is a

contradiction in terms. If an inquiry into the charges

against a government servant is not reasonably

practicable, it stands to reason that an inquiry into the

question whether the disciplinary inquiry should be

dispensed with or not is equally not reasonably

practicable.

137. A government servant who has been

dismissed, removed or reduced in rank by applying to

his case clause (b) or an analogous provisions of a

service rule is not wholly without a remedy. As pointed

out earlier while dealing with the various service rules,

28. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

he can claim in a departmental appeal or revision that

an inquiry be held with respect to the charges on which

the penalty of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank

has been imposed upon him unless the same or a

similar situation prevails at the time of hearing of the

appeal or revision application. If the same situation is

continuing or a similar situation arises, it would not then

be reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry at the time

of the hearing of the appeal or revision. Though in such

a case as the government servant if dismissed or

removed from service, is not continuing in service and if

reduced in rank, is continuing in service with such

reduced rank, no prejudice could be caused to the

Government or the Department if the hearing of an

appeal or revision application, as the case may be, is

postponed for a reasonable time.

138. Where a government servant is

dismissed, removed or reduced in rank by applying

clause (b) or an analogous provision of the service

rules and the approaches either the High Court

under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32, the

court will interfere on grounds well established in law

for the exercise of power of judicial review in matters

where administrative discretion is exercised. It will

consider whether clause (b) or an analogous provision

in the service rules was properly applied or not. The

finality given by clause (3) of Article 311 to the

disciplinary authority's decision that it was not

reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry is not binding

29. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

upon the court. The court will also examine the charge

of mala fides, if any, made in the writ petition. In

examining the relevancy of the reasons, the court will

consider the situation which according to the

disciplinary authority made it come to the conclusion

that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the

inquiry. If the court finds that the reasons are irrelevant,

then the recording of its satisfaction by the disciplinary

authority would be an abuse of power conferred upon it

by clause (b) and would take the case out of the

purview of that clause and the impugned order of

penalty would stand invalidated. In considering the

relevancy of the reasons given by the disciplinary

authority the court will not, however, sit in judgment

over them like a court of first appeal. In order to decide

whether the reasons are germane to clause (b), the

court must put itself in the place of the disciplinary

authority and consider what in the then prevailing

situation a reasonable man acting in a reasonable way

would have done. The matter will have to be judged in

the light of the then prevailing situation and not as if the

disciplinary authority was deciding the question whether

the inquiry should be dispensed with or not in the cool

and detached atmosphere of a court room, removed in

time from the situation in question. Where two views

are possible, the court will decline to interfere.”

25. Recently, again the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in

Manohar Lal Vs. Commissioner of Police and others, 2026 SCC

30. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

Online SC 363, qua applicability of Clause (b) of the second proviso

to Article 311 (2) has been pleased to hold as under:-

“16. It is trite law that the decision of the

appointing authority on the issue of recording reasons

in writing on its satisfaction as to why holding an inquiry

is not reasonably practicable may be subject to judicial

review under Article 226 by High Court or under Article

32 by the Supreme Court. This Court in the Constitution

Bench judgment rendered in the case of Tulsiram

Patel (Supra) reiterated the legal positions and

explained the same. The High Court in the impugned

judgment has relied upon paragraph 101 of the said

judgment. Learned senior counsel for the appellant

contended before us that subsequent paragraphs, in

particular, paragraphs 130, 133 and 138, which

enunciates the law while interpreting Article 311(2) of

the Constitution of India, have not been considered.

Therefore, for ready reference, we reproduce all the

aforesaid paragraphs as thus:

“101. Not only, therefore, can the principles of

natural justice be modified but in exceptional cases

they can even be excluded. There are well-defined

exceptions to the nemo judex in causa sua rule as also

to the audi alteram partem rule. The nemo judex in

causa sua rule is subject to the doctrine of necessity

and yields to it as pointed out by this Court in J.

Mohapatra & Co. v. State of Orissa [(1984) 4 SCC 103 :

(1985) 1 SCR 322, 334- 5] . So far as the audi alteram

partem rule is concerned, both in England and in India,

it is well established that where a right to

31. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

a prior notice and an opportunity to be heard before an

order is passed would obstruct the taking of prompt

action, such a right can be excluded. This right can also

be excluded where the nature of the action to be taken,

its object and purpose and the scheme of the relevant

statutory provisions warrant its exclusion; nor can the

audi alteram partem rule be invoked if importing it

would have the effect of paralysing the administrative

process or where the need for promptitude or the

urgency of taking action so demands, as pointed out in

Maneka Gandhi case [(1978) 1 SCC 248 : (1978) 2

SCR 621, 676] at p. 681. If legislation and the

necessities of a situation can exclude the principles of

natural justice including the audi alteram partem rule, a

fortiori so can a provision of the Constitution, for a

constitutional provision has a far greater and all-

pervading sanctity than a statutory provision. In the

present case, clause (2) of Article 311 is expressly

excluded by the opening words of the second proviso

and particularly its keywords “this clause shall not

apply”. As pointed out above, clause (2) of Article

311 embodies in express words the audi alteram

partem rule. This principle of natural justice having

been expressly excluded by a constitutional provision,

namely, the second proviso to clause (2) of Article 311,

there is no scope for reintroducing it by a side-door to

provide once again the same inquiry which the

constitutional provision has expressly prohibited. Where

a clause of the second proviso is applied on an

extraneous ground or a ground having no relation to the

situation envisaged in that clause, the action in so

applying it would be mala fide, and, therefore, void. In

such a case the invalidating factor may be referable

to Article 14. This is, however, the only scope

which Article 14 can have in relation to the second

proviso, but to hold that once the second proviso is

properly applied and clause (2) of Article

311 excluded. Article 14 will step in to take the place of

clause (2) would be to nullify the effect of the opening

words of the second proviso and thus frustrate the

intention of the makers of the Constitution. The second

proviso is based on public policy and is in public

interest and for public good and the Constitution-

makers who inserted it in Article 311(2) were the best

32. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

persons to decide whether such an exclusionary

provision should be there and the situations in which

this provision should apply.

130. The condition precedent for the application of

clause (b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority

that “it is not reasonably practicable to hold” the inquiry

contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311. What is

pertinent to note is that the words used are “not

reasonably practicable” and not “impracticable”.

According to the Oxford English Dictionary “practicable”

means “Capable of being put into practice, carried out

in action, effected, accomplished, or done; feasible”.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines

the word “practicable” inter alia as meaning “possible to

practice or perform: capable of being put into practice,

done or accomplished: feasible”. Further, the words

used are not “not practicable” but “not reasonably

practicable”. Webster's Third New International

Dictionary defines the word “reasonably” as “in a

reasonable manner: to a fairly sufficient extent”. Thus,

whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not

must be judged in the context of whether it was

reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or

absolute impracticability which is required by clause (b).

What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not

practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a

reasonable view of the prevailing situation. It is not

possible to enumerate the cases in which it would not

be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry, but some

instances by way of illustration may, however, be given.

It would not be reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry

where the government servant, particularly through or

together with his associates, so terrorizes, threatens or

intimidates witnesses who are going to give evidence

against him with fear of reprisal as to prevent them from

doing so or where the government servant by himself or

together with or through others threatens, intimidates

and terrorizes the officer who is the disciplinary

authority or members of his family so that he is afraid to

hold the inquiry or direct it to be held. It would also not

be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry where an

atmosphere of violence or of general indiscipline and

insubordination prevails, and it is immaterial whether

the concerned government servant is or is not a party

33. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

to bringing about such an atmosphere. In this

connection, we must bear in mind that numbers coerce

and terrify while an individual may not. The reasonable

practicability of holding an inquiry is a matter of

assessment to be made by the disciplinary authority.

Such authority is generally on the spot and knows what

is happening. It is because the disciplinary authority is

the best judge of this that clause (3) of Article

311 makes the decision of the disciplinary authority on

this question final. A disciplinary authority is not

expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly

or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in

order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the

Department's case against the government servant is

weak and must fail. The finality given to the decision of

the disciplinary authority by Article 311(3) is not binding

upon the court so far as its power of judicial review is

concerned and in such a case the court will strike down

the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order

imposing penalty. The case of Arjun Chaubey v. Union

of India [(1984) 2 SCC 578 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 290 :

(1984) 3 SCR 302] is an instance in point. In that case,

the appellant was working as a senior clerk in the office

of the Chief Commercial Superintendent, Northern

Railway, Varanasi. The Senior Commercial Officer

wrote a letter to the appellant calling upon him to

submit his explanation with regard to twelve charges of

gross indiscipline mostly relating to the Deputy Chief

Commercial Superintendent. The appellant submitted

his explanation and on the very next day the Deputy

Chief Commercial Superintendent served a second

notice on the appellant saying that his explanation was

not convincing and that another chance was being

given to him to offer his explanation with respect to

those charges. The appellant submitted his further

explanation but on the very next day the Deputy Chief

Commercial Superintendent passed an order

dismissing him on the ground that he was not fit to be

retained in service. This Court struck down the order

holding that seven out of twelve charges related to the

conduct of the appellant with the Deputy Chief

Commercial Superintendent who was the disciplinary

authority and that if an inquiry were to be held, the

principal witness for the Department would have been

34. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent himself,

resulting in the same person being the main accuser,

the chief witness and also the judge of the matter.

138. Where a government servant is dismissed,

removed or reduced in rank by applying clause (b) or

an analogous provision of the service rules and he

approaches either the High Court under Article 226 or

this Court under Article 32, the court will interfere on

grounds well established in law for the exercise of

power of judicial review in matters where administrative

discretion is exercised. It will consider whether clause

(b) or an analogous provision in the service rules was

properly applied or not. The finality given by clause (3)

of Article 311 to the disciplinary authority's decision that

it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry is

not binding upon the court. The court will also examine

the charge of mala fides, if any, made in the writ

petition. In examining the relevancy of the reasons, the

court will consider the situation which according to the

disciplinary authority made it come to the conclusion

that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the

inquiry. If the court finds that the reasons are irrelevant,

then the recording of its satisfaction by the disciplinary

authority would be an abuse of power conferred upon it

by clause (b) and would take the case out of the

purview of that clause and the impugned order of

penalty would stand invalidated. In considering the

relevancy of the reasons given by the disciplinary

authority the court will not, however, sit in judgment

over them like a court of first appeal. In order to decide

whether the reasons are germane to clause (b), the

court must put itself in the place of the disciplinary

authority and consider what in the then prevailing

situation a reasonable man acting in a reasonable way

would have done. The matter will have to be judged in

the light of the then prevailing situation and not as if the

disciplinary authority was deciding the question whether

the inquiry should be dispensed with or not in the cool

and detached atmosphere of a court-room, removed in

time from the situation in question. Where two views

are possible, the court will decline to interfere.”

35. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

17. Upon perusal of the judgment of the

Constitution Bench in the case of Tulsiram

Patel (Supra), it is luculent that the constitutional

provision has a far greater and all-pervading sanctity

than a statutory provision, therefore, second proviso

restricts application of Article 311(2) only in the

circumstances as contemplated under Clauses (a), (b)

and (c) of the second proviso. This clause uses the

word “this clause shall not apply”, therefore, Article

311(2) shall not apply in the contingencies in clauses

(a), (b) and (c) of the second proviso. The intention

thereof has been expressed indicating that there is no

scope for reintroduction of principles contained

in Article 311(2) by a side door which the constitutional

provision has expressly excluded. It is further clarified

in the said judgement that if the second proviso is

applied on an extraneous ground or a ground having no

relation to the situation envisaged in that clause, the

action of so applying would be mala fide and therefore

void. This Court indicated that in such cases the

invalidating factor may be referrable to the Article

14 distinguishing between a situation where the proviso

has been properly applied and one where it has been

improperly applied. Otherwise, if Article 14 is applied in

a manner to take the place of clause (2) that would

mean to nullify the effect of opening words of the

second proviso and frustrate the intention of makers of

the Constitution. It is said that the second proviso is

36. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

based on public policy and is in public interest and for

public good.

18. The wording as used in clause (b) of the

second proviso indicates the satisfaction of the

Disciplinary Authority by using the word “it is not

reasonably practicable to hold” the inquiry

contemplated by clause 2 of Article 311. The Court

emphasised the meaning of “not reasonably

practicable” as juxtaposed against not “impracticable”.

It is intended that the requirement to hold an inquiry is

not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man

taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation. The

Court contemplated certain situations therein and said

that a common man must bear in mind that numbers

may coerce and terrify while an individual may not. The

reasonable practicability of holding an inquiry is a

matter of assessment to be made by the disciplinary

authority holding the post and it is he who must

visualize what is happening at the ground-zero. The

Court clarified that the disciplinary authority is not

expected to dispense with a departmental inquiry lightly

or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order

to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the

Department’s case against the government servant is

weak and must fail. In this connection, referring Article

311(3), it is held that the finality given to the decision of

the disciplinary authority is not binding upon the Courts

and the scope of judicial review is open to strike down

37. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order

imposing penalty.

19. Further, the Court emphasised the words

used in clause (b) of second proviso that the

disciplinary authority should record its reasons in

writing for its satisfaction that holding an inquiry is not

reasonably practicable. In case such reason is not

recorded in writing or not valid and justifiable, the order

dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty

flowing therefrom would be void and unconstitutional.

Emphasising the scope of judicial review, it is said that

in the matters where administrative discretion is

exercised, it is open to assail either under Article

226 before High Court or under Article 32 before this

Court. Referring clause 3 of Article 311 and reiterating

that the decision of disciplinary authority indicating why

it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry is not

binding on Court and the scope of judicial review is

open. In the said contingency, the Court will examine

the charges of mala fides if any made in the Writ

Petition. It is emphasised that the Court, while

exercising judicial review, would not sit as an appellate

court but it shall consider the situation due to which,

according to the disciplinary authority, it was not

reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry. While

examining the relevance of the reasoning, the Court

ought to place itself as a disciplinary authority and

consider whether in the prevailing situation, a

reasonable man acting in a reasonable way, would

38. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

have taken the same decision as taken by the

disciplinary authority. If the Court finds that the reasons

are irrelevant, then satisfaction of the disciplinary

authority may be held to be an abuse of power. In that

situation, it would be open to the Court to take the case

out of purview of that clause and the order of penalty

would stand invalidated.

20. In view of the foregoing conclusions of the

Constitution bench in Tulsiram Patel (Supra), it can be

safely observed that despite the use of the words “this

clause shall not apply” in the second proviso, it shall not

make power of Article 311(2) inapplicable. In fact,

second proviso to Article 311 is an exception for

dispensing with the inquiry on satisfaction by recording

the reasons in writing by such authority.

21. In view of the analysis of the judgment of

the Constitution Bench in Tulsiram Patel (Supra), we

have examined the impugned judgement passed by the

High Court wherein in paragraph 19, while referring to

the judgment of Sudesh Kumar vs. State of Haryana

and Ors. (2005) 11 SCC 525 in respect of the principle

of audi alteram partem and also referring to paragraph

101 of Tulsiram Patel (Supra), it has been observed by

the High Court that the appellate authority had heard

the appellant before affirming the decision of the

disciplinary authority, it appears that the judgment

of Sudesh Kumar (Supra) has not been appreciated in

its true spirit by the High Court.

39. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

22. In our view, the reasoning as given by the

High Court is completely misplaced, in particular, when

the Court is examining the scope and applicability of

clause (b) to the second proviso of Article 311(2), the

reasoning assigned by the disciplinary authority ought

to be relevant for dispensing with an inquiry which is

the issue involved in the present case. Merely

indicating that the reasons provided in writing have

already been held justified by the CAT would not be

sufficient in the context of law laid down by the

judgment of Tulsiram Patel (Supra) merely observing

that opportunity of hearing has been afforded by the

appellate authority.

23. This case was heard on 04.02.2026. At the

time of hearing, learned ASG appearing on behalf of

the State vociferously contended that the reasoning to

dispense with the inquiry finds its place in the

preliminary inquiry report of the ACP whereby it was

found that the complainant/witnesses have been

traumatised, threatened or intimidated by the action of

the criminals specially the police personnel involved

therein and due to the close association of the police

personnel with the hard-core criminals, there was every

possibility that the appellant may approach the

complainant/witnesses through his associates to

threaten and intimidate them.

24. In this context, the argument advanced by

the learned counsel for the appellant is that after

lodging the FIR on 28.06.2017, the appellant was sent

40. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

to custody on 29.6.2017 and was released on bail on

14.10.2017. In the meanwhile, the dismissal order

dated 18.07.2017 was passed. Therefore, we deemed

it appropriate to call for the said preliminary inquiry

report which had not been placed before us for

consideration.

…. … …. … … …. …. …

36. It is relevant to note that applying the

judgment of Tulsiram Patel (Supra), various cases have

been decided by this Court indicating what may be a

sufficient reason and how and in what circumstances

holding a departmental enquiry is not reasonably

practicable, and the scope of judicial review in such

cases. In the judgement of this Court in Ex. Constable

Chhote Lal (Supra) the Court held as thus:

“4. Having examined the rival contentions of

the parties and bearing in mind the law laid down

by this Court indicating the circumstances under which

the inquiry under Article 311(2), second proviso, clause

(b) of the Constitution can be dispensed with and

applying the same to the facts and circumstances and

the reasons advanced by the authorities in arriving at

the decision, we have no hesitation to come to the

conclusion that the order dispensing with the

departmental inquiry is not in accordance with law and

necessarily the order of dismissal cannot be sustained.

We accordingly set aside the order of dismissal passed

against the appellant and permit the departmental

authority to hold an inquiry if so desired, in accordance

with law and come to the conclusion in the said

proceeding.

5. Normally, an order of dismissal on being

set aside, the employee can claim back wages, but in

this case we are not inclined to grant back wages to the

employee concerned, more so, in view of the nature of

charges against him.”

37. In the case of Tarsem Singh (Supra) this

Court has observed that the power of dispensing with

the constitutional remedy of a delinquent, should not be

exercised lightly or arbitrarily, or out of ulterior motive

41. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

with the intent to avoid holding an enquiry. In the said

case in paras 10 and 14, this Court observed as thus:

“10. It is now a well-settled principle of

law that a constitutional right conferred upon a

delinquent cannot be dispensed with lightly or arbitrarily

or out of ulterior motive or merely in order to avoid the

holding of an enquiry. The learned counsel appearing

on behalf of the appellant has taken us through certain

documents for the purpose of showing that ultimately

the police on investigation did not find any case against

the appellant in respect of the purported FIR lodged

against him under Section 377 IPC. However, it may

not be necessary for us to go into the said question.

xxx xxx xxx

14. In view of the fact that no material had

been placed by the respondents herein to satisfy the

Court that it was necessary to dispense with a formal

enquiry in terms of proviso (b) appended to Clause (2)

of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, we are of the

opinion that the impugned orders cannot be sustained

and they are set aside accordingly. The appellant is

directed to be reinstated in service. However, in view of

our aforementioned findings, it would be open to the

respondents to initiate a departmental enquiry against

the appellant if they so desire. Payment of back wages

shall abide by the result of such enquiry. Such an

enquiry, if any, must be initiated as expeditiously as

possible and not later than two months from the date of

communication of this order.”

38. This Court in the case of Risal

Singh (Supra), emphasized that while assigning the

reason in writing it is imperative that such reason must

be plausible and based on definite material. In the said

case, the Court relied upon on para 130 on the

judgment of Tulsiram Patel (Supra) and referring the

same concluded in paras 9 and 10 as thus:

“9. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid

authorities, the irresistible conclusion is that the order

passed by the Superintendent of Police dispensing with

the inquiry is totally unsustainable and is hereby

annulled. As the foundation founders, the order of the

High Court giving the stamp of approval to the ultimate

order without addressing the lis from a proper

perspective is also indefensible and resultantly, the

42. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority

has to pave the path of extinction.

10. Consequently, we allow the appeal and set

aside the order passed by the High Court and that of

the disciplinary authority. The appellant shall be

deemed to be in service till the date of superannuation.

As he has attained the age of superannuation in the

meantime, he shall be entitled to all consequential

benefits. The arrears shall be computed and paid to the

appellant within a period of three months hence.

Needless to say, the respondents are not precluded

from initiating any disciplinary proceedings, if advised in

law. As the lis has been pending before the Court, the

period that has been spent in Court shall be excluded

for the purpose of limitation for initiating the disciplinary

proceedings as per rules. However, we may hasten to

clarify that our observations herein should not be

construed as a mandate to the authorities to initiate the

proceeding against the appellant. We may further

proceed to add that the State Government shall

conduct itself as a model employer and act with the

objectivity which is expected from it. There shall be no

order as to costs.”

39. In the case of Reena Rani (Supra) this

Court has again applied the law laid down in the

judgment of Tulsiram Patel (Supra) and Jaswant Singh

(Supra) and held that the order of dismissal did not

disclose the reasons explaining why it was not

reasonably practicable to hold a regular departmental

enquiry and applicability of the proviso in such a case is

not justified. The Court in para 7 in the said judgment

observed as under: -

“7. In the order of dismissal, the

Superintendent of Police has not disclosed any reason

as to why it was not reasonably practicable to hold

regular departmental enquiry. The learned Additional

Advocate General fairly stated that the order of

dismissal does not contain the reasons as to why it was

not reasonably practicable to hold regular departmental

enquiry against the appellant. He also admitted that no

other record has been made available to him which

would have revealed that the Superintendent of Police

had recorded reasons for forming an opinion that it was

not reasonably practicable to hold regular departmental

43. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

enquiry for proving the particular charge(s) against the

appellant.”

40. On overall analysis of the intent of Article

311(2), it is vivid that an employee holding a post in

Union or State ought not to be dismissed or removed by

an authority subordinate to the one by which he was

appointed. It is further specified that a person shall be

dismissed or removed or reduced in rank after an

inquiry supplying the charges if any against him and

giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard in

respect of those charges. The applicability of the said

clause is restricted in a situation wherein his conduct

led to his conviction of criminal charges or where the

authority empowered who dismissed, removed or

reduced in rank records reason in writing upon

satisfaction that it is not ‘reasonably practicable’ to hold

an enquiry against him. In addition, where such power

has been exercised by the President or the Governor it

may be in the interest of security of the State or if not

expedient to hold such an enquiry, then exceptional

power under clause (c) of second proviso to Article

311 ought to be exercised.

41. In case such a decision invoking the

extraordinary power is taken by the competent authority

in light of the judgment Tulsiram Patel (Supra) within

the parameter as discussed, the scope of judicial

review is available to the Constitutional Courts wherein

the reasons as assigned for satisfaction of the authority

must be reasonable, valid, justified and in writing. In

addition, the satisfaction as recorded must be the

objective satisfaction on the basis of material brought

on record which ordinarily the disciplinary authority may

take as a prudent person. Otherwise, dispensing with

the enquiry is not permissible in law.”

26. At this stage, it is relevant to refer to Office

Memorandum, dated 11

th

November, 1985, issued by the

Government of India, Bharat Sarkar, Ministry of Personnel and

Training, Administrative Reforms and Public Grievance and Pension,

44. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

Department of Personnel & Training, on the subject: “Judgment of

Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 6814 of 1983, Civil Appeal No.

3484 of 1982 etc. delivered on 11.07.1985 regarding the scope of

second proviso to Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution”. This Office

Memorandum, which stood issued in pursuant to the judgment

passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tulsi Ram Patel’s case

(supra) reads as under:-

“OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Subject: Judgement of Supreme Court in Civil

Appeal No.6814 of 1983, Civil Appeal

No.3484 of 1982 etc. delivered on 11-7-

1985 regarding the scope of second

proviso to Art. 311(2) of the Constitution.

The judgement delivered by the Supreme

Court on 11-7-1935 in the case of Tulsi Ram Patel and

others has been the cause of much controversy. The

apprehension caused by the Judgement is merely due

to an inadequate appreciation of the points clarified in

this judgement and in the subsequent Judgement of the

Supreme Court delivered on September 12, 1985 in the

case of Satyavir Singh and others (Civil Appeal No.242

of 1982 and Civil Appeal No.576 of 1982). It is,

therefore, imperative to clarify the issue for the benefit

and guidance of all concerned.

2. In the first place it may be understood that

the Supreme Court in its judgement has not established

45. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

any new principle of law. It has only clarified the

constitutional provisions, as embodied in Art. 311(2) of

the Constitution. In other words, the judgement does

not take away the constitutional protection granted to

government employees by the said Article, under which

no government employee can be dismissed, removed

or reduced in rank without an inquiry in which he has

been informed of the charges against him and given a

reasonable opportunity to defend himself. It is only in

three exceptional situations listed in clauses(a), (b) and

(c) of the second proviso to Art. 311(2) that the

requirement of holding such an inquiry may be

dispensed with.

3. Even under these three exceptional

circumstances, the judgement does not give unbridled

power to the competent authority when it takes action

under any of the three clauses in the second proviso to

Art. 311(2) of the Constitution or any service rule

corresponding to it. The competent authority is

expected to exercise its power under this proviso after

due caution and considerable application of mind. The

principles to be kept in view by the competent authority

while taking action under the second proviso to Art.

311(2) or corresponding these service rules have been

defined by the Supreme Court itself. These are

reproduced in the succeeding paragraphs for the

information, guidance and compliance of all concerned.

4. When action is taken under clause (a) of

the second proviso to Art. 311(2) of the Constitution or

46. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

rule 19(1) of the CCS (CC &A) Rules, 1965 or any other

service rule similar to it, the first pre-requisite is that the

disciplinary authority should be aware that a

government servant has been convicted on a criminal

charge. But this awareness alone will not suffice.

Having come to know of the conviction of a government

servant on a criminal charge, the disciplinary authority

must consider whether his conduct, which had led to

his conviction, was such as warrants the imposition of a

penalty and if so, what that penalty should be. For that

purpose, it will have to peruse the judgement of the

criminal court and consider all the facts and

circumstances of the case. In considering the matter,

the disciplinary authority will have to take into account

the entire conduct of the delinquent employee, the

gravity of the misconduct committed by him, the impact

which is misconduct is likely to have on the

administration and other estimating circumstances or

redeeming features. This, however, has to be done by

the disciplinary authority by itself. Once the disciplinary

authority reached the conclusion that the government

servant's conduct was blameworthy and punishable, it

must decide upon the penalty that should be imposed

on the government Servant. This too has to be done by

the disciplinary authority by itself. The principle,

however, to be kept in mind is that the penalty imposed

upon the civil servant should not be grossly excessive

or out of all proportion to the offence committed or one

47. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the

case.

5. After the competent authority passes the

requisite orders as indicated in the preceding

paragraph, a government servant who is aggrieved by it

can agitate in appeal, revision or review, as the case

may be, that the penalty was too severe or excessive

and not warranted by the facts and circumstances of

the case. If it is his case that he is not the person who

was in fact, convicted, he can also agitate this question

in appeal, revision or review. If he fails in all the

departmental remedies available to him and still wants

to pursue the matter, he can seek judicial review. The

court (which term will include a Tribunal having the

powers of a Court) will go into the question whether the

impugned order is arbitrary or grossly excessive or out

of all proportion to the offence committed, or not

warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case

or the requirements of the particular service to which

the government servant belongs.

6. Coming to clause (b) of the second proviso

to Art. 311(2), there are two conditions precedent which

must be satisfied before action under this clause is

taken against a government servant. These conditions

are:-

(i) There must exist a situation which makes

the holding of an inquiry contemplated by Art. 311(2)

not, reasonably practicable. What is required is that

holding of inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a

48. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the

prevailing situation. It is not possible to enumerate all

the cases in which it would not be reasonably

practicable to hold the inquiry. Illustrative cases would

be :-

(a) Where a civil servant, through or together

with his associates, terrorises, threatens or intimidates

witnesses who are likely to give evidence against him

with fear of reprisal in order to prevent them from doing

so; or

(b) where the civil servant by himself or with or

through others threatens, intimidates and terrorises the

officer who is the disciplinary authority or members of

his family so that the officer is afraid to hold the inquiry

or direct it to be held; or

(c) where an atmosphere of violence or of

general indiscipline and insubordination prevails at the

time the attempt to hold the inquiry is made.

The disciplinary authority is not expected to

dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arb1-trarily

or out of ulterior motives or meraly in order to avoid the

holding of an inquiry or because the Depart-ment's

case against the civil servant is weak and is, therefore,

hound to fail.

(ii) Another important condition precedent to

the application of clause (b)' of the second proviso to

Art. 311(2), or rule 19 (11) of the CCS (CC &A) Rules,

1965 or any other similar rule is that the disciplinary

authority should record in writing the reason or reasons

for its satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable

to hold the inquiry contemplated by Art. 311(2) or

corresponding provisions in the service rules. This is a

constitutional obligation and, if the reasons are not

recorded in writing, the order dispensing with the

inquiry and the order of penalty following it would both

49. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

be void and unconstitutional. It should also be kept in

mind that the recording in writing of the reasons for

dispensing with the inquiry must precede an order

imposing the penalty. Legally speaking, the reasons for

dispensing with the inquiry need not find a place in the

final order itself, though they should he recorded

separately in the relevant file. In spite of this legal

position, it would be of advantage to incorporate briefly

the reasons which led the disciplinary authority to the

conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to

hold an inquiry, in the order or penalty. While the

reasons so given may he brief, they should not be

vague or they should not be just a repetition of the

language of the relevant rules.

7. It is true that the Art. 311(3) of the

Constitution provides that the decision of the competent

authority under clause (h) of the second proviso to Art.

311(2) shall be final. Consequently, the decision of the

competent authority cannot be questioned in apneal,

revision or review. This finality given to the decision of

the competent authority is, however, not binding on a

Court (or Tribunal having the powers of a Court) so far

as its power of judicial review is concerned, and the

court is competent to strike down the order dispensing

with the inquiry as also the order imposing penalty,

should such a course of action he considered

necessary by the court in the circumstances of the

case. All disciplinary authorities should keep this factor

50. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

in mind while forming the opinion that it is not

reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry.

8. Another important guideline with regard to

this clause which needs to be kept in mind is that s civil

servant who has been dismissed or removed from

service or reduced in rank by applying to his case

clause(b) of the second proviso to Art. 311(2) or an

analogous service rule can claim in appeal or revision

that an inquiry should be held with respect to the

charges on which such penalty has been imposed upon

him, unless a situation envisaged by the second

proviso is prevailing at the hearing of the appeal or

revision application. Even in such a case the hearing of

the appeal or revision applicable should be postponed

for a reasonable length of time for the situation to return

to normal.

9 . As regards action under clause (c) of the

second proviso to art. 311(2) of the Constitution, what is

required under this clause is the satisfaction of the

President or the Governor, as the case may be, that in

the interest of the security of the State, it is not

expedient to hold an inquiry as contemplated by Art.

311(2). This satisfaction a of the President or the

Governor as a constitutional authority arrived at with

the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. The

satisfaction so reached by the President or the

Governor is necessarily a subjective satisfaction. The

reasons for this satisfaction need not be recorded in the

order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank; nor can

51. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

it be made public. There is no provision for

departmental appeal or other departmental remedy

against the satisfaction reached by the President or the

Governor. If, however, the inquiry has been dispensed

with by the President or the Governor and the order of

penalty has been passed by disciplinary authority

subordinate thereto, a departmental appeal or revision

will lie. In such an appeal or revision, the civil servant

can ask for an inquiry to he held into his alleged

conduct, unless at the time of the hearing of the appeal

or revision a situation envisaged by the second proviso

to Article 311(2) is prevailing. Even in such a situation

the hearing of the appeal or revision application should

be postponed for a reasonable length of time for the

situation to become normal. Ordinarily the satisfaction

reached by the President or the Governor, would not be

a matter for judicial review. However, if it alleged that

the satisfaction of the President or Governor, as the

case may be, had been reached mala fide or was

based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds, the

matter will become subject to judicial review because,

in such a case, there would be no satisfaction, in law, of

the President or the Governor at all. The question

whether the court may compel the Government to

disclose the materials to examine whether the

satisfaction was arrived at mala fide or based on

extraneous or irrelevant grounds, would depend upon

the nature of the documents in question 1.e. whether

they fall within the class of privileged documents or

52. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

whether in respect of them privilege has been properly

claimed or not.

10. The preceding paragraphs clarify the scope

of clauses(a), (b) and (c) of the second proviso to Art.

311(2) of the Constitution, rule 19 of CCS (CC & A)

Rules, 1965 and other service rules similar to is, in the

light of the judgements of the Supreme Court delivered

on 11-7-1985 and 12-9-1985. It is, therefore, Imperative

that these clarifications are not lost sight of while

invoking the provisions of the second proviso to Art.

311(2) or service rules based on them. Particularly,

nothing should be cone that would create the

impression that the action taken ta arbitrary or mala

fide. So far as clauses(a) and (c) and Service rules

similar to them are concerned, there are already

detailed instructions laying down the procedure for

dealing with the cases falling within the purview of the

aforesaid clauses and rules similar to them. As regards

invoking clause (b) of the second proviso to Art. 311(2)

or any Similarly worded service rule, absolute care

should be exercised and it should always he kept in

view that action under it should not appear to he

arbitrary or designed to avoid an inquiry which is quite

practicable.

11. Ministry of Finance etc. are requested to

bring the above clarifications to the notice of all the

authorities serving under their control for their

information, guidance and compliance.

12. Hindi version will follow.”

53. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

27. A harmonious reading of the judgment of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Tulsi Ram Patel’s case (supra) and Office

Memorandum dated 11

th

November, 1985 demonstrates that in terms

of Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2), an Authority

can do away with the holding of the inquiry while dismissing an

employee from service, but then, there must exist a situation which

makes the holding of an inquiry contemplated by Article 311 (2) not

reasonably practicable. What is further required is that such holding

of inquiry is not practicable, has to be perceived from the

perspective of a reasonable man, taking a reasonable view of the

prevailing situation.

28. Illustrative cases, which are mentioned in this Office

Memorandum dated 11

th

November, 1985, where holding of an

inquiry can be done away with are; (a) where a civil servant, through

or together with his associates, terrorizes, threatens or intimidates

witnesses who are likely to give evidence against him with fear of

reprisal in order to prevent them from doing so; or (b) where the civil

servant by himself or with or through others threatens, intimidates

and terrorizes the officer, who is the disciplinary authority or

members of his family so that the officer is afraid to hold the inquiry

or direct it to be held; or (c) where an atmosphere of violence or of

54. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

general indiscipline and insubordination prevails at the time the

attempt to hold the inquiry is made.

29. It is also mentioned in the Office Memorandum that the

Disciplinary Authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary

inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order

to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department’s case

against the civil servant is weak and is, therefore, bound to fail.

30. It is also mentioned in the said Office Memorandum

that condition precedent to the application of Clause (b) of the

second proviso to Article 311 (2), or Rule 19(ii) of the CCS (CC &A)

Rules, 1965 or any other similar rule is that the disciplinary authority

should record in writing the reason or reasons for its satisfaction that

it was not reasonable practicable to hold the inquiry contemplated by

Article 311 (2) or corresponding provisions in the service Rules.

31. As per the Office Memorandum, this is a Constitutional

obligation and if the reasons are not recorded in writing, the order

dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty following it would

both be void and unconstitutional.

32. Office Memorandum further mentions that it should be

kept in mind that the recording in writing of the reasons for

dispensing with the inquiry must precede an order imposing the

penalty and legally speaking, the reasons for dispensing with the

55. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

inquiry need not find a place in the final order itself, though they

should be recorded separately in the relevant file.

33. In the backdrop of the above, when we peruse the

impugned orders, a perusal thereof demonstrate that in all the cases

before this Court, cyclostyle orders have been passed by the

Authority. In fact, the impugned orders in the said three writ petitions

firstly deal with the facts of each case, which obviously are different,

but after giving the factual backdrop, verbatim word to word, same

order has been passed in all the three cases and this verbatim order

which finds mention in all the three petitions, is quoted hereinbelow

from the petition of Sh. Neeraj Kumar:-

“Whereas, the State of Himachal Pradesh is

confronted with a grave, persistent, and escalating

threat from narcotic drugs and psychotropic

substances, particularly heroin (chitta), which has

caused deep and widespread damage to public order,

the social fabric and the physical, mental, and moral

well-being of the youth, who constitute the most

vulnerable and productive segment of society, and

Whereas, official data unmistakably

demonstrates a disturbing upward trend in offences

under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances

Act, 1985, with 1,517 cases registered in the year 2021,

2,147 cases in 2023, 1,715 cases in 2024, and a sharp

rise again to 2,149 cases in 2025, reflecting not only

the growing scale and sophistication of the narcotics

56. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

menace but also its deepening penetration into society;

and

Whereas, the Government of Himachal

Pradesh has consistently declared and enforced a

policy of zero tolerance towards any involvement of

Government servants, particularly members of the

police force, in offences under the NDPS Act, such

involvement being viewed as a grave breach of public

trust. institutional discipline, and service ethics; and

Whereas, the situation becomes

exceptionally alarming and corrosive when police

personnel themselves are found to be involved in illicit

drug related offences, as such conduct not only defeats

the very purpose of law enforcement but also erodes

public confidence, weakens deterrence and

undermines the credibility and moral authority of the

police organization; and

Whereas, a police official is under a dual

and inseparabla obligation, first, to maintain law and

order and enforce the law with integrity and impartiality

and second, by virtue of service discipline and

constitutional trust, to abstain from any conduct that

amounts to criminality or promotes activities prejudicial

to public interest, particularly offences which have a

direct and devastating impact on society at large; and

Whereas, maintaining integrity, discipline,

and public confidence in the police organization is a

matter of paramount public interest.

57. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

Whereas, Inspector Neeraj Kumar,

presently posted in 1st Indian Reserve Battalion,

Bangarh, District Una (hereinafter referred to as the

delinquent official), was initially appointed as a

Constable on 04.04.2001 and was subsequently

appointed as Sub -Inspector (Probationer) on

15.01.2010 and is governed by the Himachal Pradesh

Police Act, 2007, the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (as

applicable to the State of H.P) and other relevant

service rules;

Whereas, during the year 2021, the

following serious criminal cases were registered against

the delinquent official:

1. FIR No. 04/2021 dated 21.12.2021 under Section

7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Police

Station SV & ACB, Hamirpur,

2. FIR No. 168/2021 dated 22.12.2021 under

Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, Police Station

Nadaun, District Hamirpur,

3. FIR No. 170/2021 dated 22.12.2021 under

Sections 21-61-85 of the NDPS Act, Police Station

Nadaun, District Hamirpur, involving recovery of 0.84

grams of heroin(chitta);

Whereas, a regular departmental enquiry

was initiated by the Superintendent of Police, Hamirpur,

vide order dated 26.12.2021 and a charge-sheet dated

24.09.2022 was served upon the delinquent official, to

which he submitted his reply on 10.10.2022;

Whereas, upon conclusion of the

departmental proceedings limited to service-related

misconduct, the disciplinary authority while taking

lenient view, vide order dated 21.04.2023, imposed the

58. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

penalty of forfeiture of two years of service for

increment temporarily for proved misconduct relating to

willful absence and negligence on 21.12.2021, while

the departmental proceedings relating to criminal

misconduct were kept-in abeyance due to pendency of

criminal trials.

Whereas, Section 63 of the Himachal

Pradesh Police Act, 2007, provides that a police officer

of a rank superior to that of a Constable may

himselfperform any duty assigned by law or by a lawful

order to any subordinate officer and may aid,

supplement, supersede, or prevent the action of such

subordinate whenever it appears necessary or

expedient for effective enforcement of law or for

preventing any infringement thereof, and

Whereas, Section 87 of the Himachal

Pradesh Police Act, 2007. empowers the competent

authority to dismiss or remove a police officer whose

conduct is gravely prejudicial to discipline, public

interest, or the reputation of the police force; and

Whereas, Article 311(2)(b) of the

Constitution of India permits dispensing with a

departmental enquiry where the disciplinary authority,

for reasons to be recorded in writing, is satisfied that it

is not reasonably practicable to hold such enquiry; and

Whereas, DoPT, GOI vide OM dated

25.11.2022 (para-B(il), 9 and 10) has mentioned as

under-

"...Action under clause (b) of the Second

Proviso to Article 311(2)

59. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

Another important condition precedent to

the application of clause (b) of the second proviso to

Art. 311(2), or rule 19(ii) of the CCS(CC&A) Rules,

1965 or any other similar, rule is that the disciplinary

authority should record in writing the reason or reasons

for its satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable

to hold the inquiry contemplated by Art.311(2) or

corresponding provisions in the service rules. This is a

constitutional obligation and, if the reasons are not

recorded in writing, the order dispensing with the

Inquiry and the order of penalty following it would both

be void and unconstitutional. It should also be kept in

mind that the recording in writing of the reasons for

dispensing with the inquiry must precede an order

imposing the penalty. Legally speaking, the reasons for

dispensing with the inquiry need not find a place in the

final order itself, though they should he recorded

separately in the relevant file. In spite of this legal

position, it would be of advantage to incorporate briefly

the reasons which led the disciplinary authority to the

conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to

hold an inquiry, in the order or penalty. While the

reasons so given may be brief they should not be

vague or they should not be just a repetition of the

language of the relevant rules.

9. A question has been raised whether, in a

case whore Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article

311(2) of the Constitution is invoked, the disciplinary

authority may dispense with the issuing of charge

memo listing the charges. Clause (b) is attracted in a

case where the disciplinary authority concludes, "that it

is not reasonably practicable to hold such an inquiry"

The circumstances leading to such a conclusion may

exist either before the inquiry is commenced or may

develop in the course of the inquiry. In the Tulsi Ram

Patel case, the Supreme Court observed as under.-

60. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

"It is not necessary that a situation which

makes the holding of an inquiry not reasonably

practicable should exist before the disciplinary

inquiry is initiated against a Government servant.

Such a situation can also come into existence

subsequently during the course of an inquiry, for

instance, after the service of a charge sheet upon the

Govemment servant or after he has filed his written.

statement thereto or even after the evidence had

been led in parl. In such a case also, the disciplinary

authority would be entitled to apply clause (b) of the

second proviso because the word "Inquiry" in that

clause includes part of an inquiry."

[Para 2 of the OM No. 11012/11/85-Estt. (A) dated

04.04.1986]

10. In para 8(1) above, certain illustrative

cases have been enumerated where the disciplinary

authority may conclude that it is not reasonably

practicable to hold the inquiry. It is important to note

that the circumstances of the nature given in the

illustrative cases, or other circumstances which make

the disciplinary authority conclude that it is not

reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry, should

actually subsist at the time when the conclusion is

arrived at. The threat, intimidation or the atmosphere of

violence or of a general indiscipline and

insubordination, for example, referred to in the

illustrative cases, should be subsisting at the time when

the disciplinary authority arrives at his conclusion. It will

not be correct on the part of the disciplinary authority to

anticipate such circumstances as those that are likely to

arise, possibly later in time, as grounds for holding that

it is not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry and,

61. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

on that basis, dispense with serving a charge sheet on

the Government servant.

[Para 4 of the OM No. 11012/11/85-Estt. (A) dated

04.04.1986]..."

Whereas, upon a careful, conscious and

independent assessment of the entire material on

record, the nature of allegations, the prevailing

circumstances and the settled constitutional parameters

goveming Article 311(2)(b), the undersigned records the

following reasons and satisfaction for superseding and

supplementing the order of punishment awarded by the

Superintendent of Police, District Hamirpur dated

21.04.2023, whereby, the penalty of forfeiture of two

years of service for increment temporarily was awarded

to the delinquent official in the departmental enquiry

(i) That the allegations pertain to offences

under the NDPS Act, a stringent special statute dealing

with crimes that have a direct and devastating impact

on society and any prima facie involvement of a police

official in such offences fundamentally undermines the

moral authority and credibility of the police force.

(ii) That continued retention of the delinquent

official in service, even temporarily, would seriously

erode discipline, weaken morale within the force and

convey a message incompatible with the standards of

integrity and probity expected from a disciplined police

organization. To allow such police personnel who is

accused in ND&PS case, to remain in uniform even for

a single day would amount to condone a standard of

behavior that is completely incompatible with the

mandate of upholding and enforcing law.

(iii) That the criminal case under the NDPS

Act is pending before the Ld. Trial Court and a

departmental enquiry into the same alleged criminal

misconduct would necessarily involve examination of

the same witnesses and reliance on overlapping

evidence, thereby creating a real and substantial risk of

prejudicing the criminal trial and impairing the

administration of justice.

62. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

(iv) That the witnesses in the criminal case

include police officials and civilian witnesses from the

same area, many of whom are professionally or socially

connected with the delinquent official, giving rise to a

proximate and reasonable apprehension of intimidation,

inducement, or subtla influence, which camut be

offectively neutralized through ordinary administrative

measures. Further, there have been inputs that he has

been trying to influence the witnesses.

(v) That the alternative course of placing the

delinquent official under suspension has been

considered and found insufficient, as suspension does

not sever institutional association nor does it eliminate

the possibility of indirect influence or the continuing

erosion of discipline and public confidence.

(vi) That the pending departmental enquiry

pertains only to service-related misconduct and does

not adjudicate upon the alleged criminal misconduct

under the NDPS Act, therefore, the present action does

not amount to parallel adjudication or violation of

principles of natural justice.

(vii) That the impracticability of holding or

continuing a departmental enquiry in the present case

is not based on administrative inconvenience but on

objective circumstances which would render the

enquiry ineffective, compromised. or illusory.

(viii) The continuance of a police official, against

whom grave allegations under the NDPS Act are

pending, in active service poses a serious and tangible

risk to the integrity of narcotics law-enforcement. Such

retention is likely to compromise sensitive operational

plans, confidential records and source -based

intelligence relating to drug trafficking and related

offences, thereby imperiling ongoing investigations as

well as prejudicing future anti-drug enforcement efforts.

(ix) The continued association of a police

official facing serious allegations under the NDPS Act

with the police organization also creates a reasonable

and legitimate apprehension of institutional compromise

in the mind of the public. This inevitably erodes public

confidence in the fairness and credibility of the police

administration, particularly when it is well-settled that

law enforcement agencies must not only act in a fair

63. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

and impartial manner but must also be seen to do so,

more so in matters concerning narcotic drugs and

psychotropic substances.

(x) That he has completely lost the confidence

of the HP Police Department and, therefore, there

would be no purpose of conducting an enquiry when

the outcome of enquiry i.e. his unbecoming of police

personnel being an accused in the aforesaid NDPS Act

case and blatant defiance of the conduct and discipline

in the HP Police and thereby his unworthiness for

continuing in the HP Police is already established.

(xi) The conduct of a member of a disciplined

force must not only be lawful but must remain above

the reach of suspicion, In the context of the police

service, the standard of integrity is absolute; like

Caesar's wife, a police officer must be above reproach.

By engaging in such grave misconduct, the Delinquent

Officer has not only breached the trust reposed in them

by the State but has fundamentally compromised the

moral authority essential to their uniforrn. A police force

cannot function effectively if its members harbor even a

shadow of dishonesty of dereliction or involvement in

the offences under the NDPS Act

Whereas, the cumulative effect of the

aforesaid circumstances establishes that this is an

exceptional case where it is not reasonably practicable

to continue a departmental enquiry and insistence on

the normal procedure would defeat public interest,

compromise the administration of justice and

undermine the credibility & discipline of the police force;

and

Whereas, the power under Article 311(2)(b)

is being exercised sparingly, as a measure of last

resort, after due application of mind and for reasons

recorded hereinabove;

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers

conferred under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of

India, read with Sections 63 and 87 of the Himachal

Pradesh Police Act, 2007 and all other enabling

provisions and for the reasons recorded hereinabove,

the undersigned hereby supersedes and supplement

the punishment awarded to the delinquent official vide

64. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

order dated 21.04.2023 and hereby dismisses

Inspector Neeraj Kuinar, 1st IRBn, Bangarh, District

Una, from service with immediate effect.

The dismissal shall entail forfeiture of service benefits,

except those admissible under the relevant rules, if

any.”

34. In order to satisfy itself as to whether any preliminary

inquiry or otherwise an inquiry was undertaken by the Authority, in

these matters before the passing of the impugned orders, the State

was directed to produce the original record on 22.04.2026, in terms

whereof, the matter was dealt with by the Director General of Police

and the record, which was produced and which was perused by the

Court, demonstrated that there was no record of any inquiry etc.,

except the impugned order being there on the file, passed by the

Director General of Police.

35. As has been observed by me hereinabove, in all the

three cases, the reasoning that has been given by the Authority while

dismissing the petitioners, is the same. After referring to the relevant

provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Police Act, 2007, i.e., Sections

63 and 87 thereof and then Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of

India and thereafter, DoPT, Government of India OM dated

25.11.2022, in each case, eleven (xi) reasons have been culled out.

36. Verbatim same eleven reasons have been given for

recording satisfaction for dispensing with the inquiry in all three

cases, which is really strange. A perusal of these reasons

65. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

demonstrates that what weighed with the Authority while dispensing

the inquiry was the alleged gravity of offences, the continued

retention of the delinquent official in service, eroding discipline,

weakening morale of the force etc., the factum of Criminal Cases

under the NDPS Act pending in the Trial Court and departmental

inquiry into the same alleged misconduct, unnecessarily involved

examination of the same witnesses and reliance on overlapping

evidence, thereby creating a real and substantial risk of prejudicing

the criminal trial and impairing the administration of justice; the

factum of witnesses in the criminal case being police officials and

civilian witnesses from the same area, many of whom were

professionally or socially connected with the delinquent official, giving

rise to a proximate and reasonable apprehension of intimidation,

inducement or subtle influence, which cannot be effectively

neutralized through ordinary administrative measures.

37. Further reasons mentioned are that placing the

delinquent officials under suspension has been considered and

found insufficient, as suspension does not sever institutional

association nor does it eliminate the possibility of indirect influence or

the continuing erosion of discipline and public confidence and the

departmental inquiry not based on administrative inconvenience, but

on objective circumstances, which would render the inquiry

66. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

ineffective, compromised or illusory. The continuance of a police

official, against whom grave allegations under the NDPS Act were

pending, in active service poses a serious and tangible risk to the

integrity of narcotics law-enforcement and such retention is likely to

compromise sensitive operational plans, confidential records and

source-based intelligence relating to drug trafficking and related

offences, thereby imperiling ongoing investigations as well as

prejudicing future anti-drug enforcement efforts and the continued

association of a police official facing serious allegations under the

NDPS Act with the Police Organization also creates a reasonable

and legitimate apprehension of institutional compromise in the mind

of the public., which inevitably erodes public confidence in the

fairness and credibility of the police administration etc.

38. These reasonings given in the impugned order as to

why the Authority decided to dispense with the inquiry, in the

considered view of this Court, are no reasonings in the eyes of law,

on the basis of which, the departmental inquiry could have been

dispensed with under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India,

because none of these reasons satisfy the test that on account of the

same, an inquiry could not have been held or that holding of an

inquiry was impossible by the Authority.

67. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

39. At this stage, this Court would also like to refer to Office

Memorandum dated 25

th

November, 2022, issued by the

Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances &

Pensions, Department of Personnel and Training, copy whereof is

appended as Annexure P-18, in CWP No. 2079 of 2026. This Office

Memorandum is on the subject: “Special Procedure in Disciplinary

Action” and with regard to action under Clause (b) of second proviso

to Article 311, the following is mentioned in this communication: -

“……Action under clause (b) of the Second

Proviso to Article 311(2)

8. Coming to clause (b) of the second proviso

to Art. 311(2), there are two conditions precedent

which must be satisfied before action under this

clause is taken against a government servant. These

conditions are:-

(i) There must exist a situation which makes

the holding of an inquiry contemplated by Art. 311(2)

not reasonably practicable, What is required is that

holding of inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a

reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the

prevailing situation. It is not possible to enumerate all

the cases in which it would not be reasonably

practicable to hold the inquiry. Illustrative cases would

be :-

(a) where a civil servant, through

or together with his associates, terrorises,

threatens or Intimidates witnesses who are

likely to give evidence against him with fear

68. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

of reprisal in order to prevent them from

doing so; or

(b) where the civil servant by

himself or with or through others threatens,

Intimidates and terrorises the officer who is

the disciplinary authority or members of his

family so that the officer is afraid to hold the

Inquiry or direct it to be held; or

(c) where an atmosphere of

violence or of general indiscipline and

insubordination prevails at the time the

attempt to hold the inquiry is made.

The disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense

with a disciplinary Inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of

ulterior motives of merely in order to avoid the holding

of an inquiry or because the Department's case

against the civil servant is weak and is, therefore,

bound to fail.

(ii) Another important condition precedent to

the application of clause (b) of the second proviso to

Art. 311(2), or rule 19(li) of the CCS(CC&A) Rules,

1965 or any other similar rule is that the disciplinary

authority should record in writing the reason or

reasons for its. satisfaction that it was not reasonably

practicable to hold the inquiry contemplated by

Art.311(2) or corresponding provisions in the service

rules. This is a constitutional obligation and, if the

reasons are not recorded in writing, the order

dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty

following it would both be void and unconstitutional. It

should also be kept in mind that the recording in

writing of the reasons for dispensing with the inquiry

must precede an order imposing the penalty, Legally

69. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

speaking, the reasons for dispensing with the inquiry

need not find a place in the final order itself, though

they should he recorded separately in the relevant file.

In spite of this legal position, it would be of advantage

to "Incorporate briefly the reasons which led the

disciplinary authority to the conclusion that it was not

reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry, in the order

or penalty. While the reasons so given may be brief,

they should not be vague or they should not be just a

repetition of the language of the relevant rules.

[Para 6 of the OM No. 11012/11/85-Estt.(A) dated

11.11.1985)

9. A question has been raised whether, in a

case where Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article

311(2) of the Constitution is invoked, the disciplinary

authority may dispense with the Issuing of charge

memo listing the charges. Clause (b) is attracted in a

case where the disciplinary authority concludes, "that

it is not reasonably practicable to hold such an

inquiry". The circumstances leading to such a

conclusion may exist either before the inquiry is

commenced or may develop in the course of the

inquiry. In the Tulsi Ram Patel case, the Supreme

Court observed as under:-

"It is not necessary that a situation which

makes the holding of an inquiry not

reasonably practicable should exist before

the disciplinary inquiry is initiated against a

Government servant. Such a situation can

also come into existence subsequently

during the course of an inquiry, for instance,

after the service of a charge sheet upon the

70. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

Government servant or after he has filed his

written statement thereto or even after the

evidence had been led in part. In such a

case also, the disciplinary authority would be

entitled to apply clause (b) of the second

proviso because the word "inquiry" in that

clause includes part of an inquiry."

[Para 2 of the OM No. 11012/11/85-Estt.(A) dated

04.04.1986]

10. In para 8(i) above, certain illustrative cases

have been enumerated where the disciplinary

authority may conclude that it is not reasonably

practicable to hold the inquiry. It is important to note

that the circumstances of the nature given in the

illustrative cases, or other circumstances which make

the disciplinary authority conclude that it is not

reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry, should

actually subsist at the time when the conclusion is

arrived at. The threat, intimidation or the atmosphere

of violence or of a general indiscipline and

insubordination, for example, referred to in the

illustrative cases, should be subsisting at the time

when the disciplinary authority arrives at his

conclusion. It will not be correct on the part of the

disciplinary authority to such circumstances as those

that are likely to arise, possibly later in time, as

grounds for holding that it is not reasonably

practicable to hold the inquiry and, on that basis,

dispense with serving a charge sheet on the

Government servant.

71. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

[Para 4 of the OM No. 11012/11/85-Estt. (A) dated

04.04.1986)

11. It is true that the Art. 311 (3) of the

Constitution provides that the decision of the

competent authority under clause (b) of the second

proviso to Art.311(2) shall be final. Consequently, the

decision of the competent authority cannot be

questioned in appeal, revision or review. This finality

given to the decision of the competent authority is,

however, not binding on a Court (or Tribunal having

the powers of a Court) so far as its power of judicial

review is concerned, and the court is competent to

strike down the order dispensing with the inquiry as

also the order imposing penalty, should such a course

of action he considered necessary by the court in the

circumstances of the case. All disciplinary authorities

should keep this factor in mind while forming the

opinion that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an

inquiry.

[Para 7 of the OM No. 11012/11/85-Estt.(A) dated

11.11.1985)

12. Another important guideline with regard to

this clause which needs to be kept in mind is that a civil

servant who has been dismissed or removed from

service or reduced in rank by applying to his case

clause (b) of the second proviso to Art. 311(2) or an

analogous service rule can claim in appeal or revision

that an inquiry should be held with respect to the

charges on which such penalty has been imposed upon

him, unless a situation envisaged by the second

72. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

proviso is prevailing at the hearing of the appeal or

revision application. Even in such a case the hearing of

the appeal or revision applicable should be postponed

for a reasonable length of time for the situation to return

to normal.

[Para 8 of the OM No. 11012/11/85-Estt. (A) dated

11.11.1985”

40. Office Memorandum dated 25

th

November, 2022 is akin

to the earlier Office Memorandum, which was issued in the year

1985, which has been quoted by me in extentio hereinabove. The

circumstances again reiterated by the Government of India by way of

illustrations as to in what kind of cases holding of the inquiry can be

done away with are where a civil servant, through or together with his

associates, terrorizes, threatens or intimidates witnesses, who are

likely to give evidence against him with fear of reprisal in order to

prevent them from doing so. In the present case, there is nothing on

record to substantiate this kind of a situation.

41. Another illustration in the Office Memorandum is that

where the civil servant by himself or with or through others threatens,

intimidates and terrorises the officer, who is the disciplinary authority

or members of his family so that the officer is afraid to hold the

inquiry or direct it to be held. Again, the record does not demonstrate

the existence of any such situation in either of the cases.

73. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

42. Another illustration is that there is an atmosphere of

violence or of general indiscipline and insubordination prevails at the

time the attempt to hold the inquiry is made. Again, in none of the

cases there is such a situation.

43. A perusal of the impugned orders demonstrates that

the Authority with premediated mind took the decision to dismiss the

petitioners from service and the reasons which had been assigned

therein, were just ‘means’ to justify the ‘end’. There is not even an

iota of evidence on record to demonstrate that any threat etc. was

given by the petitioners to the witnesses or officers or any such

circumstance existed which rendered the holding of the inquiry

extremely difficult.

44. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation in holding that in

the facts and circumstances of the present cases, the dispensing of

the inquiry by invoking the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the

Constitution of India is completely not sustainable in the eyes of law.

The Authority would have been well advised to have proceeded in

the matter, in accordance with law, by following the procedure of

natural justice, rather than doing away with the same, simply on

account of the fact that allegations against the were with regard to

involvement under the NDPS Act.

74. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

45. This Court understands and appreciates the anxiety of

the Department, but then, due process of law has to be followed and

the exceptions, which have been carved out under Article 311 (2)(b)

of the Constitution of India can be invoked only if circumstances so

warrant. What is provided in Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of

India is not a ‘norm’, but ‘an exception’. Interest of justice demands

that ordinarily a Government official should be dismissed from

service only after holding an inquiry and in case the holding of the

inquiry has to be done away with, then, circumstances should exist

justifying the dispensation with the inquiry and the same cannot be

dispensed with at whims and conjectures and on hypothesis, rather

than concrete evidence and material on record. Herein, in these

three petitions, no such grave circumstances existed, which could

have justified the doing away of inquiry by the Authority concerned.

Therefore, this Court has no hesitation in holding that dispensation of

the inquiry in the present three petitions by the Authority by invoking

the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India was not

justified at all.

46. In view of the above discussions, the writ petitions are

allowed and impugned orders, dated 12.01.2026, are quashed and

set aside, with consequences to ensue. However, setting aside of

these orders shall not come in the way of the Authority concerned in

75. ( 2026:HHC:25590 )

proceeding against the delinquent officer/officials, in accordance with

law, if so advised. Petitions stand disposed of accordingly, so also

pending miscellaneous applications, if any.

(Ajay Mohan Goel)

Judge

June 30, 2026

(bhupender)