IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction

(APPELLATE SIDE)

Present:

The Hon’ble Justice Smita Das De

W.P.A. No. 8308 of 2025

Rais Uddin Purkait and Anr.

Vs.

The Union of India and Ors.

For the Petitioners :

:

Mr. Soumya Majumder, Sr. Adv.

Ms. Sanjukta Dutta

For the Respondent No. 1&6

For the Respondent No. 2 to

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:

:

:

:

:

:

Mr. Debapriya Gupta,

Mr. Piyas Choudhury

Ms. Sucharita Biswas

Mr. Sujoy Paul

Mr. Prasun Mukherjee

Mr. Deepak Agarwal

Reserved on : 19/08/2026

Judgment on : 15/09/2026

Smita Das De, J.:-

1. The Writ Petition is directed against the Order dated February 19, 2025,

passed by the HPCL being respondent No. 5 herein, whereby the Letter of

Intent (LOI) dated March 30, 2015, for the award of Rajiv Gandhi Gramin

LPG Vitarak (RGGLV) Distributorship at Dakshin Akraberia, District 24

Parganas, has been withdrawn and a sum of Rs. 20,000/- deposited

towards Field Verification of credentials has been forfeited.

2. Apropos the facts of the case, pursuant to an advertisement dated

January 21, 2014, petitioner No. 1 has been selected under one of the

categories of RGGLV Distributorship. Thereafter, a Letter of Intent (LOI)

has been issued on March 30, 2015.

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3. The LOI contained a specific stipulation that the LOI and the

appointment as RGGLV Distributor are subject to the final outcome of

pending litigation being WPA No. 7302 of 2015, filed by one Mozaffar

Hossain Khan, challenging the selection.

4. Petitioner No. 1 obtained No Objection Certificate (NOC) from the

concerned authorities, including the Sub-Inspector of Police, the Gram

Pradhan, and the Joint Block Development Officer, Kulpi.

5. Pursuant to the field enquiry conducted on June 26, 2015, regarding

joint verification, fulfilment of the basic criteria and delivery potential, an

Enquiry Report has been forwarded to the District Magistrate. Thereafter,

the Additional District Magistrate accorded the final NOC and intimated

the same to HPCL on July 24, 2015.

6. On May 5, 2015 Petroleum and Explosive Safety Organization (PESO)

intimated that the Site Layout and Construction Plan of the proposed

storage facilities has been conditionally approved subject to submission

of a plan, duly endorsed by the NOC issuing authority at the time of

grant of the licence.

7. The approved premise has thus crossed an important stage of statutory

scrutiny. Although such approval did not amount to the grant of License

by PESO, it evidenced that the licensing process has substantially

progressed.

8. The judgment and order passed in WPA No. 7302 of 2015 filed by

Muzaffar Hossain Khan, has been carried in appeal before the Hon’ble

Apex Court. By an Order dated September 21, 2023, the Hon’ble Apex

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Court dismissed the appeal, thereby upholding the selection of petitioner

No. 1.

9. On October 7, 2023, petitioner No. 1 applied for trade registration.

Certificates for the period of 2023-24, 2024-25 and 2025-26 and the

same have been generated accordingly.

10. On November 28, 2023, petitioner No. 1 intimated respondent No. 5

regarding the completion of the godown and showroom and requested the

issuance of a completion certificate upon inspection.

11. By letter dated January 2, 2024 the Senior Area Sales Manager, Kolkata

LPG RO, observed that, during the inspection on December 14, 2023 the

show room and the gate have not been in conformity with the approved

layout plan.

12. On January 25, 2024 a fresh plan has been issued since the previous

plan has been made on April 20, 2015.

13. By an email dated May 26, 2024 petitioner no. 1 through a letter

requested HPCL to provide the necessary documents for commencement

of commissioning and to clarify the reason for the delay in issuance of

PESO license. In response, by communication dated May 28, 2024 the

authority stated that it could not explain the reason for the delay in

issuance of the licence by PESO. Thereafter, the petitioner No. 1 has been

running from pillar to post and became embroiled in an inter-

departmental process.

14. It is submitted that, during the pendency of the proceedings, petitioner

No. 1 has been diagnosed with Schizophrenia with 70% temporary

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disability certified by Medical Board consequently, sought to nominate

his brother in his place.

15. In the meantime the petitioner no 1 joined in a school in South 24

Parganas as an Assistant Teacher (Primary) from February 2024.

16. On November 1, 2024 and December 20, 2024 applications have been

made by the petitioner no.1 before the respondent no 4, requesting

transfer of letter of Intent to his elder brother (being the petitioner no. 2

herein) and his wife, in view of the investments made for the last 9 years

and 6 months.

17. Again on December 20, 2024 petitioner no. 2 being the elder brother of

petitioner no. 1 made a representation before the respondent no. 5

requesting inter alia, transfer of LOI in his favour to carry out the

necessary formalities, in view of the current health condition of the

petitioner no 1.

18. However, without considering the prayer made by the petitioners,

respondent no. 5 merely reiterated its earlier contentions and requested

to submit the reconstitution proposal as per guidelines by another letter

dated January 6, 2025.

19. On January 17, 2025 the respondent No. 5 called upon petitioner No. 1

to provide an update regarding the commissioning process.

20. On February 19, 2025 the respondent No. 5 issued the impugned letter

withdrawing the LOI on the alleged ground of violation of Clause 1, 3.1,

3.2 of LOI and forfeiting Rs. 20,000/- deposited towards Field Verification

of Credentials.

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21. Thereafter, on March 3, 2025 the petitioner No. 1 submitted a

representation seeking withdrawal of the letter dated February 19, 2025

requesting inter alia, transfer of the LOI in favour of petitioner No. 2.

22. Being aggrieved by the rejection of the transfer of PESO license in favour

of the petitioner’s elder brother and issuance of the letter dated February

19, 2025 the petitioner has filed the present writ petition.

Contention of the Petitioner-

23. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the

reconstitution at the Letter of Intent stage is strictly regulated under

Clause 3.3 and 3.7 of the guidelines and is permissible only in cases of

death or total and permanent disability. Clause 3.2 explicitly restricts co-

ownership with the spouse, hence, induction of an elder brother at the

LOI stage is impermissible and de hors the policy.

24. It is submitted that administrative authorities are required to act fairly,

reasonably, and consistently, they cannot take advantage of their own

delay to disadvantage the petitioner. Thus, withdrawal of the LOI is liable

to be set aside and the restriction on nomination at LOI stage is arbitrary

and contrary to the RPWD Act, 2016. Respondents are liable to be

directed to complete the commissioning by permitting nomination in

favour of petitioner No. 2, since petitioners have already acted upon LOI

and invested substantial amounts in accordance with its conditions.

25. The conduct of the respondents created a legitimate expectation in the

petitioner that, upon fulfilling the prescribed conditions, the

distributorship would be commissioned. Such legitimate expectation

cannot be defeated by arbitrary action of the authorities.

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26. With regard to the identification and feasibility of the land, the State

authorities have permitted construction of the godown. The delay in

finalising the process has been on account of the oil company and the

pending litigation. Such delay cannot, therefore, be made a ground for

rejecting the petitioner’s claim.

27. The respondents cannot take advantage of their own omission or delay.

The delay in commissioning has been caused by the pending litigation

and the failure of the authorities to process the matter and issue

necessary approvals. A party cannot rely upon a delay or default caused

by its own conduct to defeat the legitimate rights of another.

28. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the LOI dated March 30,

2015 has been issued pursuant to the Advertisement dated January 21,

2014 under the “Open Category”.

29. The petitioner obtained all the necessary NOCs in 2015, and PESO

approved the site layout on May 5, 2015. Acting upon the LOI, the

petitioner completed the godown and showroom after making substantial

financial investment.

30. It is further submitted that HPCL has admitted that, due to the

pendency of proceedings before this Court, the distributorship at the

concerned location could not be commissioned or further processed.

Therefore, the delay of about nine and a half years cannot be attributed

to the petitioner.

31. By a communication dated February 5, 2024, PESO sought the latest

original LOI. However, no fresh LOI has been granted in favour of the

petitioner.

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32. On May 26, 2024, the petitioner addressed a communication to HPCL

seeking the necessary documents and clarifications. In response, HPCL

stated that they are unable to explain the reason for the delay on the part

of PESO in issuing the licence.

33. The petitioner has been approaching the concerned authorities for

completion of the required formalities. However, the matter remained

pending between the different authorities, and the distributorship could

not be commissioned due to the absence of the required explosives

licence.

34. Thereafter, the LOI has been withdrawn by communication dated

February 19, 2025. During the pendency of the litigation, the petitioner

acquired the disability and thereafter sought permission for nomination

in favour of his elder brother.

35. It is further submitted that HPCL has admitted that, because of the

pendency of the proceedings before this Court, the distributorship at the

concerned location could not be commissioned or proceeded with.

36. It is submitted that restricting nomination only to cases of death or total

and permanent disability is contrary to law. The respondents’ contention

that the petitioner is employed elsewhere is also irrelevant to the issue.

37. Neither the RPWD Act nor the applicable Guidelines provide that a

person with disability becomes ineligible for nomination or reconstitution

merely because he is employed. Therefore, the stand taken by the

respondents while rejecting the petitioner’s request cannot be sustained

in law.

Contention of the Respondent No. 2 to 5-

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38. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 2 to 5

submits that the petitioner No. 2 has no contractual relationship with the

Oil Company, respondent No. 6.

39. The conditional Letter of Intent dated March 30, 2015 has been issued

only in favour of petitioner No. 1. Petitioner No. 2 did not participate in

the selection process and, therefore, no legal right in respect of the

distributorship accrued to him.

40. It is further submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable for non-

joinder of necessary parties. The guidelines framed jointly by HPCL,

Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL), and Bharat Petroleum Corporation

Limited (BPCL) being the concerned parties require to be impleaded.

Since IOCL and BPCL have not been made parties to the writ petition, the

petition is liable to be rejected for non-joinder of necessary parties.

41. It is submitted that petitioner No. 1 failed to fulfil the mandatory

requirement of obtaining and furnishing a PESO licence. Accordingly, the

LOI dated February 19, 2025 has been withdrawn, particularly because

the PESO application has been rejected on March 19, 2024 for failure to

comply with the requisition dated February 15, 2024.

42. Possession of a PESO-licensed godown is a condition precedent under

the LOI and any challenge thrown to the rejection of the PESO licence, is

appealable under Rule 2(7) of the Gas Cylinders Rules, 2016.

43. An LOI cannot be treated as a transferable asset by way of reconstitution

when the original candidate has failed to fulfil the basic requirements for

commissioning the distributorship. Reconstitution at the LOI stage is

permitted only in the circumstances specified in Clauses 2.3 and 2.7 of

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the Guidelines, namely, death or total and permanent disability.

Induction of an elder brother is not permitted under Clause 3.2.

44. It is submitted that the grant of an LPG distributorship is a commercial

business arrangement involving business risk. It is not a social welfare or

poverty alleviation scheme covered by Section 37 of the Rights of Persons

with Disabilities Act, 2016.

45. It is further submitted that, under Clause 14(4) of the RPWD Act, an

applicant who is employed is required to resign from service before the

letter of appointment is issued. Petitioner No. 1 joined service as an

Assistant Primary Teacher in February 2024. The PESO authority sought

certain documents and compliance, by its letter dated February 15,

2024. Since the petitioner failed to comply with the said requirements,

the PESO authority rejected the licence application on March 19, 2024.

46. The appointment of a dealer is governed by RGGLV Guidelines.

Reconstitution of distributorship is not provided under the RGGLV

Selection Guidelines. It is regulated by the separate set of guidelines

known as detailed guidelines for reconstitution of LPG distributorship.

The two guidelines operate in two different dimensions. The selection

guidelines deal with initial eligibility and commissioning criteria whereas

the reconstitution guidelines govern post commissioning or contingencies

based on restructuring.

47. The withdrawal of the Letter of Intent dated February 19, 2025 is directly

routed in the non-submission of the mandatory PESO Licence.

48. The Division Bench of Karnataka High Court in Karnataka Rajya

Vikalachetanara Rakshana Samiti vs IOCL & Ors. reported in (2018)

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SCC Online Karnataka 1336 pr 24 held that the commercial contract

for LPG Distributorship does not fall under section 37 of RPWD Act,

2016. The Clause 3.2 explicitly restricts co-ownership with the spouse,

induction of an elder brother of the spouse at the Letter of Intent stage is

impermissible.

49. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent authorities raises an

objection on the ground of maintainability and submits that it is a well

settled proposition of law that court in writ jurisdiction should not

exercise while dealing with contractual matters where serious

consequences entail as a result of entertainment of writ petition, unless

there is improper exercise of power by public authority as observed in

Sanjay Kumar Shukla Vs BPCL and Others reported in 2014(3) SCC

493.

Contention of the Respondent No 6 -

50. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 6 raises an objection

as to the maintainability of the Writ Petition on the ground that the Order

of Rejection dated March 18, 2024 is an appealable order under Rule 2(7)

of Gas Cylinder Rules, 2000.

51. It is further submitted that the petitioner has an effective alternative

remedy of filing an appeal against the impugned order.

52. The petitioner has only been granted prior approval for construction of

the LPG godown premises. However, the petitioner has not yet complied

with the required conditions and steps specified in the said approval.

Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to the grant of a PESO licence at

this stage.

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53. It is stated that the allocation has never been inspected physically, as no

licence has been granted. Only the drawings of the premises have been

approved, in the nature of prior approval and nothing more. It does not

create any right or equity to claim distributorship. The requisite steps to

be adhered to for obtaining a licence from the competent authority of

PESO are as follows:-

a) Prior approval has to be obtained in terms of the drawings of the

premises.

b) Upon completion and fulfilment of the requisite formalities, approval

is granted in supersession of the prior approval. In the present Writ

Petition, the formalities to be completed have been enumerated in

Annexure P17 to the Writ Petition, in respect of which the petitioner

has failed to give a comprehensive reply with regard to each and every

condition of compliance.

c) Thereafter, construction is to be carried out in terms of the approved

plan.

d) Licence shall thereafter, be granted subject to inspection of the

constructed premises.

e) The petitioner is required to apply for physical inspection of the

constructed premises and for requisite endorsement thereof.

54. The impugned order dated March 18, 2024 passed by the Deputy Chief

Controller of Explosive is amenable to appeal before the Chief Controller

of Explosive as per Rule 2(7) of the Gas Cylinder Rule, 2017.

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55. It is contended that the construction approval of the LPG godown has

been granted vide Office Approval No. A/G/EC/WB/06/1346 (40884)

dated May 5, 2015 on receipt of the relevant documents.

56. The petitioner subsequently applied for addition and/or alterations of

land, size vide letter dated January 27, 2024 and the said proposal stood

rejected for non-compliance with the statutory requirements.

57. It is submitted that the petitioner has been required to comply with the

mandatory requirements prescribed under the Gas Cylinder Rules, 2016

and the PESO Guidelines, before a licence could be granted by the

competent authority. Mere grant of prior approval does not, by itself,

confer any right to obtain a licence.

58. The Letter of Intent issued at the pre-approval stage does not create any

vested right and cannot be transferred. The petitioner has also failed to

complete the required steps for obtaining the PESO licence, as noted in

the discrepancy letters dated February 15, 2024 and March 19, 2024.

The proposal dated January 27, 2024 for addition or alteration of the

land has also been rejected for non-compliance with the applicable

requirements. Therefore, the petitioner’s request to transfer the Letter of

Intent and the proposed PESO licence to his elder brother cannot be

accepted.

59. The construction approval and final grant of the LPG godown licence are

governed by Rule 50(1), (2) and (3) of the Gas Cylinder Rules, 2016.

PESO, being the licensing authority, found during inspection that the

premises proposed by the petitioner did not comply with the conditions

prescribed under Rule 50(4) and (5) of the Gas Cylinder Rules, 2016.

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Analysis-

60. The moot question involved are as follows-

(i) Whether the writ petition is maintainable under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India, notwithstanding the availability of an

alternative remedy?

(ii) Whether the competent authority ought to have considered

substitution of the petitioner by his elder brother, despite absence

of total permanent disablement, by invoking the doctrine of

reasonable accommodation.

(iii) Whether the LOI issued at the pre approval stage can be

transferred to the elder brother of the petitioner.

61. The preliminary objection raised by the respondents regarding

maintainability of the instant writ petition needs to be considered at the

threshold. The respondents contend that the petitioner is seeking

enforcement of a right not recognised under the applicable PESO

licensing provisions and that an efficacious alternative statutory remedy

is available to him under Rule 2(7) of the Gas Cylinders Rules,2016. Per

contra, the petitioner submits that the impugned action is arbitrary,

discriminatory and violative of the constitutional guarantees under

Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution, as well as the provisions

of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

62. This Court finds that the petitioner is not a stranger to the lis, as he is

the original selectee and has suffered legal injury due to his

incapacitation and the consequent order of rejection. Therefore, the writ

petition is maintainable, as the petitioner has the requisite locus standi

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to challenge the order of rejection. It is well settled that the availability of

an alternative remedy does not bar a writ petition where the action

challenged is arbitrary and violates the constitutional guarantees and the

provisions of the RPWD Act, 2016 which is a beneficial legislation.

63. The Supreme Court in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of

Maharashtra reported in (2013) 4 SCC 465 held that "It is a settled legal

proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to meddle in any

proceeding, unless he satisfies the authority/court that he falls within

the category of aggrieved persons. Only a person who has suffered, or

suffers from legal injury can challenge the act/action/order, etc. in a

court of law."

64. It is not in dispute that the Letter of Intent specifically records that it

shall not be construed as a ‘firm offer’ of LPG distributorship and that the

respondent reserves the liberty to withdraw the same if the progress

made by the petitioner is found to be unsatisfactory. The respondents,

therefore, rightly contended that issuance of the Letter of Intent by itself

does not create an indefeasible or vested right in favour of the petitioner

to claim grant of distributorship or issuance of a PESO licence as a

matter of course.

65. The Letter of Intent doesn’t create vested right, at the intermediate stage.

However, when petitioner takes substantial steps and crosses important

stage of statutory scrutiny by obtaining prior approval dated May 5,

2015, licensing process substantially progressed. In such circumstances,

mechanical rejection on ground that only prior approval granted and

subsequent steps not complied, without considering disability or

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beneficial legislation is arbitrary, violative of Article 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of

the Constitution of India.

66. In the present case, it is important to note that the petitioner has

already acted upon the Letter of Intent and has taken substantial steps

towards establishing the distributorship. The competent authority has

also approved the site plan and drawings after being satisfied that the

prescribed safety requirements have been complied with. This approval

shows that the proposed premises have already undergone an important

stage of statutory scrutiny. Although such approval does not amount to

the grant of a PESO licence, it shows that the licensing process has

substantially progressed. In these circumstances, the respondents are

required to consider whether the petitioner’s subsequent physical

incapacitation due to disability brought the case within Clause 3.2 of the

RGGLV Guidelines, which deals with death or total and permanent

disability, and whether the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the

provisions of the RPWD Act, 2016.

67. The respondents appear to have proceeded on the assumption that the

petitioner seeking transfer of an existing PESO licence. Such an

approach is fundamentally misconceived. Admittedly, no PESO licence

has yet been granted. Therefore, there is no existing licence which could

be transferred. In substance, the petitioner is seeking substitution of the

proposed licensee before the grant of the licence. The two situations—

transfer of an existing licence and substitution of an applicant before the

grant of a licence—are clearly different. The provisions relating to transfer

of a licence can apply only after a licence has been granted. They cannot,

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by themselves, be applied to a case where the licensing process is still

pending and has not yet been completed.

68. A Letter of Intent (LOI) issued at the pre-approval stage does not, by

itself, create any vested or enforceable right in favour of the holder. It

only indicates the authority’s intention to consider the applicant for grant

of the final licence or approval, subject to fulfilment of the prescribed

conditions. Until the statutory requirements are fulfilled and the

competent authority grants the final approval, the holder of the LOI does

not acquire any absolute or proprietary right.

69. The legal position is well settled that an LOI is distinct from a concluded

contract or a final grant. In Dresser Rand S.A. v. Bindal Agro Chem

Ltd., reported in (2006) 1 SCC 751 the Supreme Court of India held a

letter of intent merely indicates a party's intention to enter into a contract

with the other party in future. A letter of intent is not intended to bind

either party ultimately to enter into any contract.

70. Applying the above principles to the present case, the LOI has been

issued only at the pre-approval stage. The holder, therefore, has only a

conditional expectation and not a transferable right. Such an expectation

cannot be assigned or transferred unless the governing statute, rules, or

the terms of the LOI expressly allow it. In administrative law, public

authorities must act within the limits of the statute and the applicable

rules. Therefore, any transfer made contrary to the statutory provisions

would be without jurisdiction.

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71. The Court in State of Orissa v. Harinarayan Jaiswal reported in (1972)

2 SCC 36 held that the fact that “the Government being the seller does

not change the legal position once its exclusive right to deal with those

privileges is conceded. If the Government is the exclusive owner of those

privileges, reliance on Article 19(1)(g) or Article 14 becomes irrelevant.

Citizens cannot have any fundamental right to trade or carry on business

in the properties or rights belonging to the Government.”

72. Therefore, in the absence of any provision in the applicable Act, Rules,

Government Policy, or the terms of the LOI permitting transfer at the pre-

approval stage, the LOI issued in favour of the petitioner could not have

been transferred to his elder brother. If the competent authority has

permitted such a transfer, it would have acted beyond the powers

conferred upon it by law. The elder brother, therefore, could not claim

any legal right merely on the basis of the LOI issued in favour of the

petitioner. Any claim based on such a proposed transfer is, accordingly,

liable to be rejected.

73. The principle of reasonable accommodation, recognised under Section

2(y) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, requires public

authorities to make necessary and reasonable changes so that a person

with disability is not prevented from exercising his legal rights, unless

such changes would cause a disproportionate or undue burden. In the

present case, the petitioner is not seeking any relaxation of the statutory

safety requirements. He only seeks permission for his elder brother to

complete the remaining statutory formalities on his behalf because of his

physical incapacity. Such a request does not affect public safety or place

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any additional burden on the licensing authority. On the contrary,

refusing to consider such a request would defeat the beneficial purpose of

the 2016 Act.

74. In Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India reported in (2016) 7 SCC 761, the

Supreme Court recognized that “the rights that are guaranteed to

differently abled persons under the Act, 1995 are founded on the sound

principle of human dignity which is the core value of human right and is

treated as a significant facet of right to life and liberty. Such a right now

treated as human right of the persons who are disabled, has its roots

in Article 21 of the Constitution. When public facilities and services are

set on standards out of the reach of persons with disabilities, it leads to

exclusion and denial of rights. Equality not only implies preventing

discrimination (example, the protection of individuals against

unfavourable treatment by introducing anti-discrimination laws), but

goes beyond in remedying discrimination against groups suffering

systematic discrimination in society. In concrete terms, it means

embracing the notion of positive rights, affirmative action and reasonable

accommodation.”

75. The respondents cannot claim unlimited power merely because the

Letter of Intent states that it is not a firm offer. This clause only means

that the petitioner does not get an automatic contractual right to the

distributorship. It does not permit the respondents to act arbitrarily or

relieve them of the duty to consider subsequent circumstances in

accordance with law. Even where an authority has discretion under a

contract or statutory provision, such discretion must be exercised

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reasonably and fairly. Its decision remains amenable to judicial review if

it is arbitrary, irrational, or based on irrelevant considerations.

76. Further, there is nothing on record to indicate that the proposed

substitution would cause any prejudice to the licensing authority or

affect public safety. The premises already approved remain the same. The

approved layout, storage capacity, and technical safety requirements also

remain unchanged. The only change sought is in the name of the

applicant. Since no licence has yet been granted, such substitution

would neither affect any vested right of a third party nor dilute the

regulatory control of the authorities.

77. In the present case, the respondents have failed to show that allowing

the petitioner’s elder brother to be substituted would affect public safety

or violate any express provision of law. The refusal is founded merely on

the assumption that transfer or substitution at the pre-approval stage is

impermissible. The respondents, however, have failed to consider the

petitioner’s subsequent physical incapacity in the light of the Rights of

Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, and the doctrine of reasonable

accommodation.

78. This Court is, therefore, of the considered view that, although the Letter

of Intent does not, by itself, confer any vested right to obtain the

distributorship or a PESO licence, it does impose an obligation upon the

respondents to consider the petitioner’s request fairly, reasonably, and in

accordance with law. Since no PESO licence has been granted, as yet, the

question of transferring an existing licence does not arise. The

respondents ought to have examined whether, in view of the petitioner’s

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subsequent physical incapacity and the fact that there has been no

change in the approved premises or safety requirements, the petitioner’s

elder brother could satisfy the applicable statutory requirements and

enable the licensing process to proceed in accordance with law. The

failure to consider these circumstances makes the impugned decision

arbitrary and unsustainable in law. The decision is also contrary to the

object of the statutory scheme. This Court, therefore, finds it appropriate

to interfere with the impugned decision in exercise of its power of judicial

review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

79. Having heard the parties and upon perusing the materials available on

record, this Court, holds that the competent authority ought to have

considered the petitioner's request for grant or transfer of the PESO

licence in favour of his elder brother on the basis of the petitioner's

incapacitation, notwithstanding, the absence of total and permanent

disablement, provided the proposed transferee fulfils all statutory

requirements under the applicable licensing regime.

80. Accordingly, the impugned letter dated February 19, 2025 issued by the

respondent no. 5 is liable to be set aside and the matter deserves to be

remitted to the competent authority for reconsideration of the petitioner's

request for substitution of his elder brother, upon examining the

supervening circumstance of physical incapacitation in light of the

beneficial mandate of RPWD Act of 2016 and for consequential

processing of the LPG distributorship, in accordance with law, keeping in

view the principles of fairness, non-arbitrariness, and reasonable

accommodation.

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81. In view of the above, the impugned letter dated February 19, 2025

passed by the respondent no. 5 is hereby quashed and set aside. The

respondent is directed to revisit the issue involved herein and shall pass

a well reasoned and speaking order in accordance with law upon

affording opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner, and other

stake holders if any, to arrive at a logical conclusion, within a period of

eight weeks from the date of communication of this order and

communicate such a decision within a week thereafter. Till a fresh

decision is taken, status quo with regard to the approved premises shall

be maintained.

82. With the above observations and directions the writ petition WPA 8308

of 2025 is allowed and disposed of. There shall, however, be no order as

to costs.

83. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order if applied for be supplied to

the parties on priority basis upon compliance of all requisite formalities.

(Smita Das De, J.)