IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA

Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.14490 of 2024

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Raj Karan Singh Son of Shiv Shankar Singh Permanent Resident of Village-

Baraharpur, P.S.-Harsidhi, District- East Champaran and present residing at

A-37, Block-A, Noor Nagar Extn., Jamia Nagar, P.S.-Okhla, South Delhi,

Delhi.

... ... Petitioner/s

Versus

1.The Union of India through the Secretary, Department of Finance and

Commerce, New Delhi.

2.The Reserve Bank of India through General Manager, South Gandhi

Maidan, Patna.

3.The State of Bihar through Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna.

4.The District Magistrate, Motihari, East Champaran.

5.The Superintendent of Police, Motihari, East Champaran.

6.The Station House Officer (SHO), Harsidhi, Motihari, East Champaran.

7.Tata Motors Finance Limited at 4th Floor, Sir HC Dinshaw Building, 16,

Horniman Circle, Fort, Mumbai.

8.Recovery Agent, Tata Motors Finance Limited, Branch Office, Muzaffarpur.

9.Recovery Agent, Tata Motors Finance Limited, Branch Office, Motihari,

East Champaran.

... ... Respondent/s

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Appearance :

For the Petitioner/s: Mr. Saurav Singh, Adv.

For the Respondent/s: Mr. Additional Solicitor General

For Res. RBI : Mr. Rajesh Ranjan, Adv.

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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE GIRIJISH KUMAR

CAV JUDGMENT

Date : 10-09-2026

Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and

learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Union of India as

well as learned counsel appearing on behalf of Tata Motors

Finance Ltd.

2. The present writ application has been filed, inter

alia, for the following relief(s):-

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“i. For issuance of writ/writs, order/orders in

the nature of mandamus directing the

respondent no. 7 to release the vehicle (Truck)

of the petitioner bearing Registration no.

BR06GF5379 having Chassis no.

MAT820006P1B06050 which has been

illegally seized by the respondent no. 7.

ii. For issuance of writ/writs, order/orders in

the nature of mandamus directing the

respondent no. 7 to compensate the losses of

the petitioner caused by them and the third

party along with the cost of this litigation.

iii. For the issuance of writ/writs in the nature

of mandamus to dispose of the representation

dated 13.08.2024.

iv. For issuance of writ/ writs, order/orders

directing the concerned authorities to conduct

the whole process with complete honesty.”

3. The brief facts of this case, in nutshell, are that the

petitioner had purchased a Truck (Tata LPT 4825), a commercial

vehicle, bearing registration No. BR06GF5379, Chassis No.

MAT820006P1B06050, and Engine No.

B6.7B6A250Do2132B64272550 with the assistance of loan

amount of Rs. 42,06,495/- from the respondent- Tata Motors

Finance Limited and the he had entered into an agreement with

the respondent on 28.02.2023. In terms of the agreement and

repayment schedule, the petitioner had been repaying the

monthly installment to the tune of Rs. 98,130/- regularly,

however, on account of financial crisis, the petitioner failed to

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pay the installment amount on two occasions on their due dates.

However, he had paid the last installment of Rs. 98,130/- on

09.08.2024, which is evident from annexure-3 to the writ

application. All of a sudden, he came to know that his vehicle

has been seized on 11.08.2024 by respondent No.7 without any

prior notice or information. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a

representation before the Superintendent of Police, Hapi, Hisar,

Haryana on 11.08.2024 regarding illegal seizure of his

commercial vehicle without any prior knowledge of the

petitioner. When the petitioner tried to gather information

regarding illegal seizure of his vehicle from the Motihari Branch

office of respondent No.7, he has been subjected to abuse and

physical assault made by the staffs of the respondent No.7 on

account of failure of his monthly installment. In this regard, the

petitioner reported the incident to S.H.O., Harsidhi Police

Station, East Champaran on 13.08.2024 vide Annexuer-5 to the

writ application but the same does not yield any result for him.

4. It is the specific case of the petitioner that at the time of

illegal seizure of the vehicle on 09.08.2024, a consignment of

iron rod to the tune of Rs. 20,00,023/- was loaded on the Truck

to be delivered on 11.08.2024 to the customer, despite that

vehicle of the petitioner has been illegally seized causing

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disruption of business and damage to the goods of the customer

(third party). On the intervention of the third party, the goods

were released in favour the customer after lapse of ten days with

damages, for which the third party is claiming to the petitioner.

Being aggrieved by the action of respondent No.7, the

petitioner, being left with no option, has approached this Court

by way of filing the present writ application.

5. It has been brought to the notice of this Court that this

Court, while issuing notice to respondents Nos. 7 to 9 on

25.09.2024, has directed the respondents not to sell the vehicle,

which is the subject matter of this writ application, if not already

sold, till the final adjudication of the present writ application.

However, the vehicle in question has been sold by the

respondents on 19.10.2024 and this fact has also been brought

on record by filing a counter affidavit on behalf of respondent

No.7.

6. On the query made by this Court as to why the vehicle

in question has been sold out despite the order of this Court,

learned counsel for respondent No.7 has contended that since

the respondent was not appearing on the date such order has

been passed by this Court, they had no knowledge about the

order dated 25.09.2024 and, therefore, the respondent has acted

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upon in terms of award dated 30.11.2023 passed in arbitration

proceeding. On the contrary, it has been contended by the

learned counsel for the petitioner that the said order has been

passed in the presence of the advocate of the respondent and not

only that the petitioner has also communicated the said order in

the office of respondent No.7. A statement to that effect has also

been made in paragraph-20 of the rejoinder filed by the

petitioner.

7. Before expressing any view of this Court on the action

of the respondent No.7, this Court deems it appropriate to

address the preliminary objection raised by the respondents on

the ground of maintainability of this writ application.

8. It is contended by learned counsel for the respondent

No.7 that this writ application is not maintainable on the ground

that respondent No.7, Tata Motors Finance Ltd. is a private

company and neither a State or Instrumentality of the State as

defined under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, rather its a

company falls within the category of Non Banking Financial

Company, therefore, writ would not lie in the fact and

circumstances of the present case. It is further contended that

the dispute raised in this writ application arises out of a purely

private contractual relationship between the parties inasmuch as

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that Tata Motors Finance Ltd. is a Non-Banking Financial

Company (NBFC), therefore, the dispute raised, in this writ

application, pertains to enforcement of contractual obligations.

Hence, no writ would lie against the respondent in the facts and

circumstances of the present case. It is specifically contended

that the writ application involves disputed question of facts,

hence cannot be entertained. Apart from the aforesaid, it is also

contended that the respondent No.7, being an NBFC, has an

option either to re-possess the hypothecated vehicles in terms of

the loan agreement and without taking recourse to Court or to

follow the procedure prescribed under the SARFAESI Act, 2022

and the Rules framed thereunder.

9. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the

respondent relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in the case of Shobha Vs. Muthoot Finance Ltd.

reported tin 2025 INSC 117, wherein it is held that a writ

petition is not maintainable against the Non Banking Financial

Companies.

10. Further, a reliance has been placed on the judgment of

this Court in the case of Prinsu Kumar Vs. The State of Bihar

passed in Cr. W.J.C. No. 797 of 2023, wherein the Co-ordinate

Bench of this Court has held that since the hire purchase

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agreement was executed between the petitioner and respondents

and the petitioner has made out a case of forceful possession of

the harvesting machine in violation of the terms of agreement,

the obligation between the parties arises out of contractual

relationship between the parties. The State authority was

involved as party respondents to bring this writ petition within

the jurisdiction of this Court. However, essential disputes relates

to non-compliance of contractual obligation and resultant effect

of breach of contract. A contractual obligation is not amenable

to writ jurisdiction, until an unless, it does not violates any

public policy.

11. To substantiate the submission, a reliance has also

been placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the

case of Phoenix ARC Private Limited vs. Vishwa Bharati

Vidya Mandir and Ors. reported in AIR 2022 SC 1045.

12. Besides the aforesaid reliance, it has been contended

by the learned counsel for respondent No.7 that vehicle in

question has been repossessed in accordance with law after

following the due procedure in light of the direction passed in

the arbitral award dated 30.11.2023 and even after providing

sufficient opportunity and issuance of several notices to the

petitioner. The factum of receipt of arbitral award dated

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30.11.2023 is also admitted by the petitioner, which can be

manifest from the Annexure- P/2 to this writ application. He

further contends that if the petitioner is aggrieved with the

arbitral award, he could have invoked his remedy under Section

34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 instead of filing

the present writ application and since the validity of arbitral

award has not been questioned before the appropriate forum, it

is construed that it has attained its finality. Therefore, the

respondent left with no option but to act upon in terms of the

arbitral award has sold the vehicle in question in order to

compensate its financial liability created by the default of

payment at the behest of the petitioner. He lastly, contends that

since the vehicle in question has been sold on 09.10.2024 after

providing opportunity to the petitioner and the third party right

has been created, interference of this Court is not warranted in

this case, at this stage, as it amounts to multiplicity of

proceedings, therefore, this writ application may be dismissed

being it not maintainable at its threshold.

13. This Court, while considering the submission

advanced on behalf of the respondent No.7 on the issue of

maintainability of the present writ application, finds it

appropriate to refer to the decision of Hon’ble Constitution

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Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kaushal

Kishore Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others reported in

(2023) 4 SCC 1 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in

in paragraphs 81.15, 81.16, 82 and 83, which are being

reproduced hereinbelow:

“81.15. In Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India [Jeeja

Ghosh v. Union of India98, the petitioner, a disabled

person suffering from cerebral palsy, was

unceremoniously ordered off a SpiceJet aircraft by

the flight crew on account of the disability. The

petition was filed for putting in place a system to

ensure such a violation of human dignity and

inequality is not meted out to similarly placed

persons. This Court observed as follows : (SCC p.

771, para 10)”

“10. It is submitted by the petitioner that the Union

of India (Respondent 1) has an obligation to ensure

that its citizens are not subject to such arbitrary and

humiliating discrimination. It is a violation of their

fundamental rights, including the right to life, right

to equality, right to move freely throughout the

territory of India, and right to practise their

profession. The State has an obligation to ensure

that these rights are protected — particularly for

those who are disabled.”

(emphasis supplied)

This Court awarded compensation to the petitioner

against the private Airline on the ground that the

airline, though a private enterprise, ought not to

have violated her fundamental right.

81.16. In Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India [Zee

Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India99, this Court held

that though BCCI does not fall within the purview of

the term “State”, it discharges public duties and

that therefore even if a remedy under Article 32 is

not available, the aggrieved party can always seek a

remedy before the ordinary courts of law or by way

of a writ petition under Article 226. This Court

pointed out that the violator of a constitutional right

could not go scot-free merely because it is not a

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State. The said logic was extended by this Court to a

“Deemed to be University” in Janet Jeyapaul v.

SRM University,100on the ground that though it is a

private university, it was discharging “public

functions”, by imparting education.

82. All the above decisions show that on a case-to

case basis, this Court applied horizontal effect,

considering the nature of the right violated and the

extent of obligation on the part of the violator. But to

enable the courts to have certain basic guidelines in

place, for dealing with such cases, this Court

developed a tool in K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9

J.)20. While affirming the right to privacy as a

fundamental right, this Court laid down the

landscape as follows : (SCC p. 539, paras 397-98)

“397. Once we have arrived at this understanding of

the nature of fundamental rights, we can dismantle a

core assumption of the Union's argument : that a

right must either be a common law right or a

fundamental right. The only material distinctions

between the two classes of right—of which the

nature and content may be the same—lie in the

incidence of the duty to respect the right and in the

forum in which a failure to do so can be redressed.

Common law rights are horizontal in their operation

when they are violated by one's fellow man, he can

be named and proceeded against in an ordinary

court of law. Constitutional and fundamental rights,

on the other hand, provide remedy against the

violation of a valued interest by the “State”, as an

abstract entity, whether through legislation or

otherwise, as well as by identifiable public officials,

being individuals clothed with the powers of the

State. It is perfectly possible for an interest to

simultaneously be recognised as a commonlaw right

and a fundamental right. Where the interference

with a recognised interest is by the State or any

other like entity recognised by Article 12, a claim

for the violation of a fundamental right would lie.

Where the author of an identical interference is a

non-State actor, an action at common law would lie

in an ordinary court.

398. Privacy has the nature of being [Ed. : The word

between two asterisks has been emphasised in

original.] both [Ed. : The word between two

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asterisks has been emphasised in original.] a

common law right as well as a fundamental right.

Its content, in both forms, is identical. All that

differs is the incidence of burden and the forum for

enforcement for each form.”

(emphasis supplied)

83. Thus, the answer to Question 2 is partly found

in the nine-Judge Bench decision in K.S.

Puttaswamy (Privacy-9 J.)20 itself. We have seen

from the line of judicial pronouncements listed

above that after A.K. Gopalan v. State of

Madras,101 lost its hold, this Court has expanded

the width of Article 21 in several areas such as

health, environment, transportation, education and

prisoner's life, etc. As Vivian Bose, J., put it in a

poetic language in S. Krishnan v. State of

Madras102 (S. Krishnan case102 SCC p. 524, para

63)

“63. Brush aside for a moment the pettifogging of

the law and forget for the nonce all the learned

disputations about this and that, and “and” or

“or”;, or “may” and “must”. Look past the mere

verbiage of the words and penetrate deep into the

heart and spirit of the Constitution.”

(emphasis supplied)

The original thinking of this Court that these

rights can be enforced only against the State,

changed over a period of time. The

transformation was from “State” to “Authorities”

to “instrumentalities of State” to “agency of the

Government” to “impregnation with

Governmental character” to “enjoyment of

monopoly status conferred by State” to “deep and

pervasive control”103 to the “nature of the

duties/functions performed”39 . Therefore, we

would answer Question 2 as follows: “A

fundamental right under Articles 19/21 can be

enforced even against persons other than the State

or its instrumentalities.”

14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the

question No.2 framed in the case of Kaushal Kishore (Supra)

has dealt in detail as to how the law has developed so far and

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has recognized that a fundamental right under Article 19 or 21

can be claimed against anyone other than the State or its

instrumentality. The Hon’ble Apex Court has discussed the

question as to whether Part III of the Constitution has a

“vertical” or “horizontal” effect. It has been held that wherever

constitutional rights regulate and impact only the conduct of the

government and government actors in their dealings with private

individuals they are said to have a “vertical” effect. But

wherever constitutional rights impact even the relations between

private individuals, they are said to have a “horizontal” effect.

15. In Kaushal Kishore (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme

Court has shown that some of the Articles of Part III are in the

form of a Directive to the State while others are not. In

paragraph ‘79’ of the judgment, their Lordships observed inter

alia:-

“This is an indication that some of the rights

conferred by Part III are to be honored by and

also enforceable against, non-State actors.”

16. While addressing the question as to how the Courts in

India have dealt with the cases where there was complaints of

infringement of fundamental rights by non-State actors, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court referred the several judgments in the

cases of P.D. Shamdasani Vs. Central Bank of India reported in

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(1951) SCC 1237, Vidya Varma Vs. Dr. Shiv Narain reported in

AIR 1956 SC 108, Sukhdev Singh Vs. Bhagatram Sardar Singh

Raghuvanshi reported in (1975) 1 SCC 421, People’s Union for

Democratic Rights Vs. Union of India reported in (1982) 3 SCC

235; S. Rangarajan Vs. P. Jagjivan Ram reported in (1989)2SCC

574; Nilabati Behera Vs. State of Orissa reported in (1993)

2SCC 746; Lucknow Development Authority Vs. M.K. Gupta

reported in (1994) 1 SCC 243; Bodhisattwa Gautam Vs. Subhra

Chakraborty reported in (1996) 1 SCC 490; M.C. Mehta Vs.

Kamal Nath reported in (1997) 1 SCC 388, Vellore Citizens’

Welfare Forum Vs. Union of India reported in (1996) 5 SCC

647, M.C. Mehta Vs. Kamal Nath reported in(2000) 6 SCC 213;

Consumer Education and Research Centre & Ors. Vs. Union of

India & Ors. reported in (1995) 3 SCC 42; Vishaka Vs. State of

Rajasthan reported in (1997) 6 SCC 241; Githa Hariharan (Ms.)

& Anr. Vs. Reserve Bank of India & Anr. reported in (1999) 2

SCC 228; Indian Medical Association Vs. Union of India

reported in (2011) 7 SCC 179; Society for Unaided Private

Schools of Rajasthan Vs. Union of India reported in 2012) 6

SCC 1; Jeeja Ghosh Vs. Union of India reported in (2016) 7

SCC 761; Zee Telefilms Ltd. Vs. Union of India reported in

(2005) 4 SCC 649; Janet Jeyapaul Vs. S.R.M. University

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reported in (2015) 16 SCC 530; Justice K.S. Puttaswamy Vs.

Union of India reported in (2017) 10 SCC 1.

17. In the aforesaid discussion, this Court, taking note of

the facts of the present case in which the petitioner is essentially

complaining of violation of his fundamental rights to earn his

livelihood with dignity and he is being deprived of at the behest

of the respondent without following the law and by use of force

which cannot be permitted in a State governed by rule of law,

refers to Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which

guarantees every person that he shall not be deprived of his life

and liberty except according to the procedure established by

law. The expressions “the State” is not used in Article 21 as has

been noticed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of

Kaushal Kishore (supra). In order to put it in the words of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court would reproduce the

relevant lines from paragraph ‘86’ of the judgment as under”

“Article 21 does not say “the State shall

not deprive a person of his life and

liberty”, but says that “no person shall be

deprived of his life or personal liberty.”

18. The livelihood and all those aspects of life which

come to make a man’s life meaningful, complete and worth

living are included within the meaning of the words “The Right

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to Life”

19. In this case, it is the specific case of the petitioner that

respondents have forcibly seized the vehicles while his vehicle

was on way. Admittedly the petitioner is the owner of the

vehicle, he had borrowed loan and at the time of illegal seizure

of the vehicle on 09.08.2024, a consignment of iron rod to the

tune of Rs. 20,00,023/- was loaded on the Truck to be delivered

on 11.08.2024 to the customer, despite that vehicle of the

petitioner has been illegally seized causing disruption of

business and damage to the goods of the customer (third party).

While doing so, admittedly, the respondents have not taken

recourse to the provisions either of the SARFAESI Act, 2002

and the Rules framed thereunder or under Section 36 of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The deprivation, in the

present case, is not only by way of violation of the established

procedure of law but is also against the human dignity, which

attracts the infringement of fundamental rights of the petitioner.

20. In the aforesaid discussion and the purport of

judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kaushal

Kishore (supra), this Court is of the view that the submission

advanced by learned counsel for respondent No.7 on the issue of

maintainability of writ against a non-State actor is devoid of

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merit in the facts and circumstances of the case.

21. It would be apt to refer to the recent decision of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in the in the case of Karnataka Power

Transmission Corporation Limited Vs. Rekha & Ors.. reported

in 2026 INSC 847 has held that the question of maintainability

of the writ petition is no longer res-integra. The relevant

paragraphs of the judgment is being reproduced hereinbelow:

“6. The question of maintainability of the writ petition

is no longer res-integra. Numerous judgments of this

Court have delineated on this question. We may refer

to one such judgment where the principles regarding

maintainability have been culled out. In Radha

Krishan Industries v. State of H.P.5, it has been

observed:

“27. The principles of law which emerge are

that:

27.1. The power under Article 226 of the

Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not

only for the enforcement of fundamental rights,

but for any other purpose as well.

27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to

entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions

placed on the power of the High Court is

where an effective alternate remedy is

available to the aggrieved person.

27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate

remedy arise where : (a) the writ petition has

been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental

right protected by Part III of the Constitution;

(b) there has been a violation of the principles

of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings

are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires

of a legislation is challenged.

27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not

divest the High Court of its powers under

Article 226 of the Constitution in an

appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ

petition should not be entertained when an

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efficacious alternate remedy is provided by

law.

27.5. When a right is created by a statute,

which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure

for enforcing the right or liability, resort must

be had to that particular statutory remedy

before invoking the discretionary remedy under

Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of

exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of

policy, convenience and discretion.

27.6. In cases where there are disputed

questions of fact, the High Court may decide to

decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However,

if the High Court is objectively of the view that

the nature of the controversy requires the

exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view

would not readily be interfered with.”

These principles have been referred to with approval

by a bench of three judges in T.N. Cements Corpn.

Ltd. v. Unicon Engineers6 where it further stood

clarified that:

“55. It has been well-settled through a legion of

judicial pronouncements of this Court that the

writ courts, despite the availability of alternative

remedies, may exercise writ jurisdiction at least in

three contingencies — (i) where there is a

violation of principles of natural justice or

fundamental rights; (ii) where an order in a

proceeding is wholly without jurisdiction; or (iii)

where the vires of an Act is challenged… ”

22. In light of the aforesaid discussion, this Court taking

note of the facts of the present case, is of the considered opinion

that the very action of the respondent No.7 in the present case is

in violation of principles of natural justice or fundamental rights

and is wholly without jurisdiction in terms of the order dated

25.09.2024 passed by this Court, accordingly, it is held that this

writ application is maintainable in terms of decision of Hon’ble

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Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Transmission

Corporation Limited (supra).

23. Now, at this juncture, it would be appropriate to

record the limited submission advanced on behalf of the

petitioner so as to proceed further in the matter.

24. Learned counsel for the petitioner, relying on a

judgment passed by this Court in the case of Dhananjay Seth

Vs. The Union of India & Ors. Passed in C.W.J.C. No. 3456 of

2021 and its analogous cases, submits that this Court has

categorically held that in cases where the vehicle has been sold

to a third party and the Bank/Financial Institution is not in a

position to restore the vehicle, they would be liable to pay the

petitioner to the extent of the value of the seized vehicles as per

their insurance value on the date of their seizure. It has further

been held that the said amount shall be adjusted against the

outstanding vehicle and thereafter if any surplus comes out, the

same will be made available to the petitioner.

25. In light of the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel for

the petitioner submits that in the present case, the respondents

have contended that the petitioner was issued with a pre-sale

Notice dated 21.08.2024 calling upon him to make payment of

Rs. 43,26,699/-, however, the payment was not made by the

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petitioner and, therefore, the seized vehicle was auctioned sold

on 19.10.2024, which would be evident from Annexure-R7/E,

therefore, the case, at hands, is squarely covered by the

aforesaid judgment. Hence, it is prayed that the respondent No.7

may be directed to compensate the petitioner in light of the

aforesaid judgment or to release the vehicle in favour of the

petitioner being it in violation of the order dated 25.09.2024

passed by this Court.

26. I have heard the rival submission advanced by the

respective parties and have meticulously gone through the

materials available on record.

27. Undoubtedly, the vehicle, which is the subject matter

of the present case, has been auctioned sold by the respondent

No.7 and, therefore, a third party right has been created in

favour of the auction purchaser, despite there being the order

dated 25.09.2024 passed by this Court by which the respondents

are directed not to sell the vehicle in question, if not already

sold, till the final adjudication of the present case. This Court on

this sole ground holds the sale of the vehicle illegal and also

contrary to law. Admittedly, there being an arbitral award in

favour of the respondent No.7, in which the petitioner has not

taken part, and in terms of the arbitral award, the respondent

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No.7 has proceeded with the matter and auction sold the vehicle

of the petitioner and it is the foundational ground of the

respondent No.7 in the present case. However, this Court is of

the considered opinion that respondent No.7 should have taken

recourse before the Court having civil jurisdiction for execution

of the arbitral award being it an ex-parte. Besides that Section

36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 could have

been taken into consideration before proceeding to act upon in

terms of the arbitral award. Section 36 of the Act is being

reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:

“36. Enforcement.-- (1) Where the time for

making an application to set aside the

arbitral award under Section 34 has expired,

then, subject to the provisions of sub-section

(2), such award shall be enforced in

accordance with the provisions of the Code

of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in the

same manner as if it were a decree of the

court.

(2)…”

28. In the present case, the respondent No.7 has failed to

act upon in terms of Section 36 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996 and taken the law in its hand, which in

any circumstance is impermissible. In such a situation, if this

Court considers the prayer of the petitioner to release the vehicle

(Truck) of the petitioner bearing Registration no. BR06GF5379

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in favour of the petitioner, it would amount to multiplicity of

proceeding. In the aforesaid background, this Court is persuaded

by the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the

case of the petitioner is squarely covered by the decision of this

Court in the case of Dhananjay Seth (supra) and has also

confined his prayer to the extent of compensation for the losses

of the petitioner caused by the respondent No.7 and the third

party along with the cost of this litigation.

28. In such view of the matter and taking into account the

fact that the vehicle has been auctioned sold to a third party and

the respondent No.7/Financial Institution is not in a position to

restore the vehicle, it would be liable to pay the petitioner to the

extent of the value of the vehicle as per its insurance value on

the date of the seizure. The said amount shall be adjusted

against the outstanding vehicle loan and thereafter if any surplus

comes out, the same will be made available to the petitioner. It

will be open for the petitioner, if so advised, to challenge the

accounts furnished by the respondent No.7/Financial Institution

and claim any compensation etc. for the loss arising out of

seizure of his vehicle before appropriate court/forum.

29. Since the action of the respondent No.7/Finance

Companies is found illegal, the petitioner who has been made to

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contest this case shall be entitled for cost of litigation.

Accordingly, this Court directs that respondent No. 7 i.e. Tata

Motors Finance Limited would be liable to pay a sum of

Rs.25,000/- (twenty five thousand) as cost of litigation to the

writ petitioner within a period of 30 days from the date of

receipt/production of a copy of this judgment.

30. Accordingly, this writ application is allowed in the

aforesaid term.

31. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand

disposed of.

amit/-

(Girijish Kumar, J)

AFR/NAFR AFR

CAV DATE 20.07.2026

Uploading Date 10.09.2026

Transmission Date