CRL.M.C. 2115/2023 Page 1 of 17

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 17.08.2026

Pronounced on: 02.09.2026

Uploaded on: 02.09.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010106532023

+ CRL.M.C. 2115/2023

RAJESH KUMAR AND ANR. .....Petitioners

Through: Mr. Surjeet Singh & Mr. M.K. Singh,

Advs.

versus

STATE AND ANOTHER .....Respondents

Through: Ms. Richa Dhawan, APP.

Mr. Tarun Sharma and Mr. Tushar

Datta, Advs. for Respondent No. 2

along with the Respondent-in-person.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MADHU JAIN

JUDGMENT

MADHU JAIN, J.

1.The present petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CrPC’) has been preferred by

the Petitioners seeking quashing ofFIR No. 369/2017registered at Police

Station K.N. Katju Marg, for offences punishable under Sections 498A, 406

and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’)

and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as

‘the Act’), along with the proceedings emanating therefrom.

2.The Petitioners also assail the order dated 20.05.2022 passed by the

learned Additional Sessions Judge - 04 (North), Rohini Courts, Delhi in

Criminal Revision No. 64/2022, arising out of the order on charge dated

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24.11.2021 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Mahila Court - 01,

North District, Rohini Courts, Delhi.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND:

3.Petitioner No. 1, Rajesh Kumar, is the husband of Respondent No.

2/complainant, whereas Petitioner No. 2, Rani, is the step-mother of Petitioner

No. 1 and the mother-in-law of Respondent No. 2. The marriage between

Petitioner No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 was solemnised on 20.02.2002. A

daughter, namely Unnati, was born from the wedlock on 06.07.2004.

4.After about one year of marriage, Petitioner No. 1 and Respondent No.

2 shifted from the residence of Petitioner No. 2 to rented accommodation.

This circumstance is also recorded in para 9 of the complaint, wherein

Respondent No. 2 stated that Petitioner No. 2 had asked the couple to leave

the matrimonial house. According to the Petitioners, Petitioner No. 2

thereafter never resumed residence with them. The complaint, however,

further alleges that after shifting to rented accommodation, Petitioner No. 1

compelled Respondent No. 2 to obtain money from her parents towards the

security deposit and household articles, pursuant to which a sum of

Rs.2,00,000/- was allegedly paid to him.

5.Respondent No. 2 lodged a detailed complaint dated 03.04.2017 before

the Crime Against Women (‘CAW’) Cell. The complaint contains allegations

against Petitioner No. 1 of dowry demands and physical and mental cruelty.

It is alleged,inter alia, that shortly after marriage Petitioner No. 1 demanded

a sedan car; that Respondent No. 2 was subjected to physical cruelty when the

demand was not met; and that her family thereafter arranged approximately

Rs.6,00,000/- and paid the same to Petitioner No. 1. The complaint further

CRL.M.C. 2115/2023 Page 3 of 17

attributes to him repeated acts of physical assault, humiliation and demands

for money during the period of cohabitation.

6.Insofar as Petitioner No. 2 is concerned, para 4 of the complaint

contains a specific allegation that she had taken the jewellery articles of

Respondent No. 2 from the inception of the marriage and retained the same

with her. It is further alleged that whenever Respondent No. 2 demanded

return of the jewellery, Petitioner No. 2 scolded and abused her. The

complaint also states that a list of articles, jewellery, electronics, furniture,

clothes and other valuables given at the time of marriage was annexed

therewith.

7.Petitioner No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 continued to reside together

until 30.10.2013. According to the complaint, Petitioner No. 1 thereafter left

the matrimonial household and informed Respondent No. 2 that he did not

wish to continue residing with her. Respondent No. 2 further alleged that she

was left with only bare minimum household articles and that her stridhan,

jewellery, valuables and other articles remained with her husband and mother-

in-law and were not returned despite demands.

8.The complaint also records that, after the separation, Respondent No. 2

initially waited in the hope that Petitioner No. 1 would return and resume

cohabitation. She thereafter approached the CAW Cell with the object of

securing counselling and reconciliation. According to her, when repeated

attempts at mediation failed and Petitioner No. 1 declined to resume

cohabitation, she set out the allegations of cruelty and harassment in greater

detail and sought legal action as well as return of her dowry articles, valuables,

stridhan and gold ornaments.

9.The complaint culminated in registration ofFIR No. 369/2017on

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30.08.2017 at Police Station K.N. Katju Marg. Upon completion of

investigation, a chargesheet was filed on 24.11.2017 against Petitioner Nos. 1

and 2, Vishal, the step-brother of Petitioner No. 1, and Shweta, his step-sister.

The documents accompanying the final report included,inter alia, the

complaint, the CAW Cell enquiry report, notice under Section 91 CrPC and

the response thereto, a statement regarding bills, a statement regarding

stridhan and statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC.

10.By order dated 24.11.2021, the learned MM found aprima faciecase

under Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC against all four accused persons.

Insofar as the offence under Section 406 IPC was concerned, the learned MM

specifically noticed the allegation that Petitioner No. 2 had taken the jewellery

articles of Respondent No. 2 and had refused to return the same despite

demand, and accordingly directed framing of a separate charge under Section

406 IPC against her.

11.The aforesaid order was challenged by all four accused persons in

Criminal Revision No. 64/2022.Videorder dated 20.05.2022, the learned

ASJ noticed that Respondent No. 2 had been residing separately from

Petitioner No. 2 and the other step-relatives since 2003. The allegations of

cruelty against the step-relatives were found to be general in nature and Vishal

and Shweta were accordingly discharged. The learned Revisional Court,

however, sustained the charge under Section 498A IPC against Petitioner No.

1 and the charge under Section 406 IPC against Petitioner No. 2, the latter

being founded upon the specific allegation concerning the jewellery of

Respondent No. 2.

12.Aggrieved by the continuation of the aforesaid criminal proceedings,

the Petitioners have approached this Court under Section 482 CrPC.

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SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

13.Learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that continuation of the

criminal proceedings amounts to an abuse of process. Qua Petitioner No. 2, it

is urged that she admittedly ceased residing with Petitioner No. 1 and

Respondent No. 2 in the year 2003 and never thereafter shared a household

with them. The allegation of retention of stridhan, according to learned

counsel, surfaced only in the complaint dated 03.04.2017, nearly fourteen

years later. It is further submitted that no bills or receipts pertaining to the

alleged jewellery were produced during investigation and that the material on

record does not disclose any specific entrustment, demand or refusal so as to

sustain an offence under Section 406 IPC.

14.Qua Petitioner No. 1, learned counsel submits that the parties have

admittedly been residing separately since 30.10.2013, whereas the complaint

was lodged only on 03.04.2017. It is, therefore, contended that the prosecution

under Section 498A IPC is barred by Section 468 CrPC, the offence being

punishable with imprisonment extending up to three years. According to

learned counsel, this statutory bar was overlooked by both the learned Trial

Court and the learned Revisional Court.

15.Learned counsel further relies upon para 34 of the complaint to submit

that Respondent No. 2 had initially approached the CAW Cell with the object

of reconciliation and to persuade Petitioner No. 1 to resume cohabitation. It is

urged that the detailed allegations of cruelty were made only after the

reconciliation efforts failed and Petitioner No. 1 declined to return to the

matrimonial home. The criminal proceedings are, thus, stated to be a

consequence of the failed matrimonial relationship rather than any

contemporaneous grievance.

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16.It is lastly submitted that the prolonged delay in initiating criminal

proceedings materially undermines the allegations. Learned counsel

emphasises that the learned Revisional Court itself discharged the step-

brother and step-sister of Petitioner No. 1 and contends that Petitioner No. 2,

who had admittedly been residing separately since 2003, ought also to have

been discharged.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

17.Per contra, learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 submits that the

Petitioners have already availed the remedy of revision against the order on

charge and have partly succeeded therein. It is urged that the present petition,

in substance, seeks a further reappraisal of the same material under Section

482 CrPC, despite the learned Revisional Court having examined the

allegations qua each accused separately and discharged two of them. The

grounds now urged by the Petitioners, according to Respondent No. 2, raise

disputed questions which ought to be tested at trial.

18.Qua Petitioner No. 1, learned counsel submits that the complaint

contains specific allegations of dowry demand and cruelty, including a

demand for a sedan car, payment of approximately Rs. 6,00,000/- by the

family of Respondent No. 2, a further demand of approximately Rs.

2,00,000/- after the parties shifted to rented accommodation, and repeated acts

of physical and mental cruelty during the period of cohabitation. It is

contended that the truth or otherwise of these allegations cannot be

determined without evidence.

19.Qua Petitioner No. 2, learned counsel submits that the contention

regarding absence of any allegation of stridhan is contrary to the complaint.

CRL.M.C. 2115/2023 Page 7 of 17

It is pointed out that para 4 specifically alleges that Petitioner No. 2 had taken

the jewellery articles of Respondent No. 2 at the inception of marriage and

retained them despite demands for their return. It is, therefore, submitted that

the fact that Petitioner No. 2 had been residing separately since 2003 does not,

by itself, negate the allegation of prior entrustment and subsequent non-return.

20.Learned counsel further submits that the plea of limitation cannot be

determined merely by treating 30.10.2013 as the terminal date for all the

allegations in the complaint. Reliance is placed on the averments concerning

efforts at reconciliation, continued deprivation of stridhan and the alleged

demand and refusal to return the jewellery. It is urged that the relevant dates

and circumstances are matters of evidence and do not disclose an

incontrovertible legal bar warranting quashing of the proceedings at this stage.

21.Learned APP for the State also opposes the petition. He prays that the

petition be dismissed and the proceedings before the learned Trial Court be

permitted to continue in accordance with law.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

22.This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

record.

23.At the outset, the scope of interference under Section 482 CrPC needs

to be borne in mind. The Petitioners had challenged the order on charge dated

24.11.2021 by invoking the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC

and had partly succeeded. In Rajinder Prasad v. Bashir,

MANU/SC/0574/2001, the Supreme Court, while referring toKrishnan v.

Krishnaveni,MANU/SC/0223/1997, reiterated that though the power under

Section 482 CrPC is wide, it is to be exercised “sparingly and cautiously”,

CRL.M.C. 2115/2023 Page 8 of 17

particularly where revisional jurisdiction has already been invoked.

Ordinarily, the inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to circumvent the bar

against a second revision.

24.This does not mean that the jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC stands

completely excluded. InAmit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander,

MANU/SC/0746/2012, the Supreme Court clarified that there is no absolute

bar on exercise of the inherent power where an extraordinary situation or

abuse of process is demonstrated. The limitation is one of judicial restraint.

At the same time, while dealing with a challenge to an order framing charge,

the Supreme Court cautioned:

“3) The High Court should not unduly interfere. No

meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for

considering whether the case would end in conviction or

not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.

xxx

13) Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of

continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly

satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit

continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that

initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the

records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability

of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima

facie.”

25.Tested on the aforesaid principles, the order dated 20.05.2022 cannot

be said to reflect a mechanical acceptance of the prosecution case against all

the accused persons. The learned Revisional Court expressly noticed that

Respondent No. 2 had been residing separately from the step-relatives since

2003. It thereafter examined the allegations qua the individual accused and

recorded that the allegations under Section 498A IPC were principally

CRL.M.C. 2115/2023 Page 9 of 17

directed against Petitioner No. 1, whereas the allegations against the other

relatives were general, save and except the allegation concerning jewellery

against Petitioner No. 2. The relevant portion of the order reads as under:

“4. Heard. Admittedly, the complainant was residing

separately from revisionists no. 2, 3 and 4 since 2003.

Perusal of statement of complainant Chanchal dated

13/04/2017 reveals that allegations of offence u/s 498A IPC

are mainly levelled against revisionist no.1 and merely

general allegations are levelled against revisionist no.2, 3

& 4 except the 'fact that step mother-in-law i.e. Rani

(revisionist-accused no.2 herein) took all jewellery articles

from her and kept the same with her and as on date, the

same are in her possession. At the most, prima facie offence

u/s 498A IPC is made out against the husband (revisionist

no.1-accused), whereas offence u/s 406 IPC is made out

against the step mother-in-law i.e. Rani (revisionist no.2-

accused). No offence is made out against revisionists

accused no. 3 & 4 and as such they are discharged.

Accordingly, the impugned order dated 24/11/2021 qua

framing charge u/s 498A IPC against revisionist no.1-

accused Rajesh Kumar and qua framing charge u/s 406

IPC against revisionist no.2-accused is upheld. The appeal

is partly allowed. The same is disposed of accordingly.”

26.Insofar as Petitioner No. 1 is concerned, the complaint cannot, at this

stage, be characterised as containing only vague or omnibus allegations.

Respondent No. 2 has attributed specific acts to him, including a demand for

a sedan car shortly after marriage, alleged physical assault in connection with

the said demand, payment of approximately Rs. 6,00,000/- by her family and

a further demand of approximately Rs.2,00,000/- after the parties shifted to

rented accommodation. The complaint also narrates several instances of

alleged physical and mental cruelty during the period when the spouses

resided together.

CRL.M.C. 2115/2023 Page 10 of 17

27.Whether these allegations are true, whether they are exaggerated, or

whether Respondent No. 2 would ultimately be able to prove them are matters

for trial. At the stage of charge, this Court cannot test the probable defence

against the prosecution version or undertake a comparative assessment of

their respective credibility. As held inAmit Kapoor (supra), where a factual

foundation for the offence exists, the Court ought not to marshal the material

as if it were deciding the trial.

28.The principal challenge qua Petitioner No. 1, however, is founded on

Section 468 CrPC. The submission is that Petitioner No. 1 admittedly started

residing separately from Respondent No. 2 on 30.10.2013, whereas the

complaint is dated 03.04.2017. Since Section 498A IPC is punishable with

imprisonment extending up to three years, it is urged that the prosecution is

barred by limitation.

29.The plea cannot be considered by reading Section 468 CrPC in

isolation. Section 473 CrPC expressly provides an exception to the bar of

limitation. The provision permits cognizance after expiry of the prescribed

period where the delay has been properly explained or where the Court

considers it necessary to do so in the interest of justice.

30.The interaction between Sections 468 and 473 CrPC, specifically in the

context of Section 498A IPC, was examined by the Supreme Court inVanka

Radhamanohari v. Vanka Venkata Reddy, MANU/SC/0510/1993. The

Supreme Court held:

“5. …In view of Section 473 a Court can take cognizance

of an offence not only when it is satisfied on the facts and in

the circumstances of the case that the delay has been

properly explained, but even in absence of proper

explanation if the Court is satisfied that it is necessary so to

do in the interests of justice. The said Section 473 has a non

CRL.M.C. 2115/2023 Page 11 of 17

obstante clause which means that said section has an

overriding effect on Section 468, if the Court is satisfied on

the facts and in the circumstances of a particular case, that

either the delay has been properly explained or that it is

necessary to do so in the interests of justice.”

31.Importantly,Vanka Radhamanohari (supra)was itself a case where

the High Court had treated the complaint under Section 498A IPC as barred

under Section 468 CrPC. The Supreme Court reversed that conclusion and

held that, having regard to the allegations of cruelty, the matter ought to

proceed notwithstanding the plea of limitation.

32.In the present case, the complaint itself contains an explanation for the

course adopted by Respondent No. 2 after the spouses separated. Para 34

records that she initially waited in the hope that Petitioner No. 1 would return

and thereafter approached the CAW Cell for counselling and reconciliation.

It further records that attempts at mediation did not succeed and that Petitioner

No. 1 declined to resume cohabitation, whereafter the allegations were set out

in detail and legal action was sought.

33.At this stage, this Court is not required to pronounce upon the

correctness or sufficiency of the explanation offered by Respondent No. 2.

However, once Section 473 CrPC and the circumstances pleaded in the

complaint are taken into account, the date 30.10.2013 cannot, by itself, be

treated as furnishing an incontrovertible legal bar warranting quashing of the

prosecution. The plea under Section 468 CrPC, therefore, does not justify

exercise of the inherent jurisdiction in favour of Petitioner No. 1.

34.It is clarified that the above conclusion does not proceed on the premise

that every offence under Section 498A IPC is necessarily a continuing

offence. The conclusion is narrower: the plea of limitation in the present case

CRL.M.C. 2115/2023 Page 12 of 17

cannot be decided solely by reference to the date of separation, without

considering Section 473 CrPC and the circumstances pleaded by the

complainant. This is precisely the caution underlying the decision inVanka

Radhamanohari (supra).

35.The challenge qua Petitioner No. 2 must be examined independently.

Her principal defence is that she had been residing separately from the couple

since the year 2003 and that the allegation relating to stridhan has surfaced

only after about fourteen years. It is also urged that no bills or receipts

concerning the jewellery were produced.

36.The submission that there is no specific allegation concerning stridhan

against Petitioner No. 2 is, however, contrary to the complaint. Para 4

specifically states:

“4. That since beginning the mother-in-law of the

complainant took all jewellery articles from complainant

and kept the same with her since inception of the marriage

and even as on date the same are in possession of mother-

in-law and whenever the complainant demanded jewellery

articles from mother-in-law she scolded the complainant

and abused her in a filthy manner.”

37.The allegation is not confined to para 4. Para 29 again states that the

stridhan, jewellery and other valuables of Respondent No. 2 were with the

husband and mother-in-law and “they are not returning the same even when

specifically asked for.” Thus, for the limited purpose of examining whether a

prima facie case exists, there is an express allegation both of entrustment and

non-return.

38.InRashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada, MANU/SC/1052/1997,

the Supreme Court explained that where stridhan is entrusted to the husband

or any other member of the family, dishonest misappropriation or use thereof

CRL.M.C. 2115/2023 Page 13 of 17

may attract Section 406 IPC. On the nature of entrustment, the Court

observed:

“It is always a question of fact in each case as to how

property came to be entrusted to the husband or any other

member of the family by the wife when she left the

matrimonial home or was driven out therefrom. No

absolute or fixed rule of universal application can be laid

down in that behalf. It requires to be established by the

complainant or the prosecution, depending upon the facts

and circumstances of the case, as to how and in what

manner the entrustment of the stridhana property or

dominion over her stridhana came to be made to the

husband or any other member of the family or the accused

person, as the case may be.”

The Supreme Court further cautioned that, at the threshold, the Court is not to

sift the defence material to determine whether the allegation of entrustment

would ultimately stand proved.

39.Therefore, the fact that Petitioner No. 2 started residing separately from

the couple in the year 2003 cannot, by itself, negate the allegation under

Section 406 IPC. The case of Respondent No. 2 is that the jewellery had

already been taken by Petitioner No. 2 at the inception of the marriage. The

subsequent separate residence is certainly a circumstance which Petitioner

No. 2 may rely upon in defence, but it does not make the allegation of prior

entrustment inherently impossible.

40.The argument based upon the absence of bills also cannot result in

quashing of the charge. The complaint itself states that a list of the articles,

jewellery, electronics, furniture, clothes and other valuables given at the time

of marriage was annexed therewith. The chargesheet also records a

“Statement regarding bill” and a “Statement regarding Istridhan” amongst the

CRL.M.C. 2115/2023 Page 14 of 17

documents forming part of the final report. Whether the prosecution can

ultimately establish ownership, identity and entrustment of the particular

articles is a matter of proof. The absence of purchase bills, even if accepted at

this stage, does not obliterate the specific allegations in the complaint.

41.The submission regarding the fourteen-year gap qua Petitioner No. 2

also cannot be considered divorced from the allegation of demand and refusal.

InRashmi Kumar (supra), while dealing with limitation for an offence under

Section 406 IPC, the Supreme Court examined the pleaded demand for return

of stridhan and the refusal thereof and held the complaint before it to be within

limitation from the relevant demand and refusal.

42.In the present case, Respondent No. 2 has not pleaded that the only

demand and refusal occurred in the year 2003. On the contrary, her case is

that the jewellery continued to remain with Petitioner No. 2 and was not

returned despite demands. The precise date of entrustment, the manner in

which it was made, the demands for return and the alleged refusal are all

matters which would require evidence. They cannot be conclusively

determined merely from the fact that Petitioner No. 2 had ceased residing with

the couple in 2003.

43.This Court also does not proceed on the basis that an offence under

Section 406 IPC is invariably a continuing offence. InRashmi Kumar

(supra), after deciding the issue of limitation on the basis of demand and

refusal, the Supreme Court expressly observed that the question whether the

offence was a continuing one had lost relevance. It would, therefore, be

incorrect to treat the decision as laying down an unqualified proposition that

an offence under Section 406 IPC continues from day to day.

44.A similar approach was adopted by this Court inPraveen Mittal & Ors.

CRL.M.C. 2115/2023 Page 15 of 17

v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors., MANU/DE/4831/2018, where the charge

under Section 406 IPC against the parents-in-law was sustained upon

allegations that the stridhan jewellery had been taken soon after marriage and

had not been returned. The factual matrix there also involved subsequent

conciliation proceedings and recoveries and is, therefore, not identical to the

present case. The decision is relevant only to the limited principle that a

specific allegation of taking and non-return of stridhan cannot be discarded at

the stage of charge by undertaking an assessment of its ultimate evidentiary

worth.

45.The contention that Respondent No. 2 approached the criminal justice

system only after reconciliation failed also does not, at this stage, establish

mala fides. Para 34 of the complaint itself records that her initial effort was to

secure counselling and restoration of the matrimonial relationship. Whether

this explanation is credible, or whether the complaint was instituted with an

ulterior motive as alleged by the Petitioners, is a matter which can only be

tested in evidence. The Court cannot return a finding of false implication

merely because attempts at reconciliation preceded the detailed complaint.

46.The further submission regarding the independent income of

Respondent No. 2 has no material bearing upon the offences which presently

survive. Her earning capacity may be relevant in proceedings concerning

maintenance; it does not, by itself, answer the allegations of cruelty under

Section 498A IPC or entrustment and non-return of stridhan under Section

406 IPC.

47.Another circumstance which cannot be overlooked is that the learned

Revisional Court did not permit the prosecution to continue indiscriminately

against all members of the family. It accepted the plea of separate residence

CRL.M.C. 2115/2023 Page 16 of 17

while considering the general allegations against the step-brother and step-

sister and discharged them. Petitioner No. 1 was retained in the proceedings

on account of the specific allegations of cruelty attributed to him, while

Petitioner No. 2 was retained only for the offence under Section 406 IPC on

account of the specific allegation concerning jewellery. The order, therefore,

reflects a segregation of the allegations qua each accused rather than a

mechanical affirmation of the order on charge.

48.Ultimately, the grounds urged by the Petitioners would require this

Court to decide whether the allegations of cruelty are truthful; whether

jewellery was in fact entrusted to Petitioner No. 2; whether and when its return

was demanded; whether there was a refusal; whether the delay stands

satisfactorily explained; and whether the proceedings were motivated by the

failure of reconciliation. These are matters which necessarily involve

appreciation of evidence. Such an exercise cannot be undertaken while

exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, particularly when the order

on charge has already undergone revisional scrutiny and the prosecution

evidence has commenced.

CONCLUSION

49.In view of the above, this Court finds no patent illegality or such

incontrovertible legal bar as would warrant quashing of the surviving

proceedings against Petitioner No. 1 under Section 498A IPC or against

Petitioner No. 2 under Section 406 IPC.

50.Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed. Pending application(s),

if any stands disposed of.

51.It is clarified that the observations made herein are confined to the

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adjudication of the present petition under Section 482 CrPC and are only

prima faciein nature. The learned Trial Court shall decide the case on the

evidence led before it, uninfluenced by any observation made in the present

judgment.

MADHU JAIN

(JUDGE)

SEPTEMBER 02, 2026/m