2026 INSC 646 SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 1 of 69

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No…………….. OF 2026

(SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019)

RAJESH SHARMA …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

NORTH DELHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION AND

ANR.

…RESPONDENT (S)

J U D G M E N T

MANOJ MISRA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal impugns the judgment and order of

the High Court

1

dated 28.08.2019 in Writ Petition (C)

No.3451/2015, whereby the writ petition of the

respondents against the order of Central Administrative

Tribunal, Principal Bench at New Delhi

2

dated

1

High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

2

CAT

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 2 of 69

07.08.2014 in Original Application (for short, O.A.)

No.4466/2011 was allowed.

FACTS

3. The appellant served as an Executive Engineer

(Civil) with the North Delhi Municipal Corporation (for

short, the Corporation). While in service he was convicted

and sentenced under Section 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention

of Corruption Act, 1988

3

and Sections 420, 120 (B) of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860

4

vide order dated 15.07.2011.

Pursuant to his conviction, the Commissioner dismissed

him from service vide order dated 15.11.2011 .

Impugning the order of dismissal, the appellant filed O.A.

No.4466/2011 before CAT, inter alia, on the ground that

on the date the order of dismissal was passed he was a

Group A officer and, therefore, the authority competent

to take disciplinary action against him was the

‘Corporation’ and not the Commissioner. CAT accepted

the aforesaid plea and set aside the dismissal vide order

dated 07.08.2014 by leaving it open for the competent

3

P.C. Act

4

IPC

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 3 of 69

disciplinary authority to pass a fresh penalty order.

Aggrieved therewith, the respondents preferred writ

petition before the High Court which came to be allowed

by the impugned order. The High Court held that

Commissioner being the Disciplinary Authority was

empowered to dismiss the respondent i.e., the appellant

herein.

4. The short question that arises for our

consideration is whether the Commissioner was

competent to inflict the punishment of dismissal from

service upon the appellant.

5. To have a clear understanding of the context in

which the issue arises for our consideration, it is

necessary to have a look at the relevant statutory

provisions as well as the regulations prevailing on the

date of the order of dismissal.

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

6. The Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957

5

(Act

No.66 of 1957) was an Act to consolidate and amend the

laws relating to the Municipal Government of Delhi.

5

The 1957, Act

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 4 of 69

Section 2 (7) of the 1957 Act defines “Corporation” as

follows:

“Corporation” means the Municipal

Corporation of Delhi established under this

Act.

7. Section 3 of the 1957 Act provided for

establishment of a Municipal Corporation of Delhi

charged with the Municipal Government of Delhi.

According to Section 3, as it stood then, ‘with effect from

such date as the Central Government may, by notification

in the official gazette, appoint, there shall be a Corporation

charged with the Municipal Government of Delhi, to be

known as the Municipal Corporation of Delhi’. It further

provided that “Corporation” shall be a body corporate

having perpetual succession and a common seal with

power, subject to the provisions of the Act, to acquire,

hold or dispose of property and may by the said name sue

and be sued. Sub-section (3) of Section 3 provided that

the Corporation shall be composed of the councilors and

alderman. Sub-section (4) of Section 3 provided that

‘councilors’ shall be chosen by direct election on the basis

of adult suffrage from various wards into which Delhi

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 5 of 69

shall be divided in accordance with the Act; and

alderman shall be chosen by the councilors from among

persons who are qualified to be councilors but are not

councilors themselves. Sub-section (5) provided that the

total number of councilors shall at the establishment of

the Corporation be 80, provided that 12 out of 80 seats

of councilors shall be reserved for the members of the

scheduled castes.

8. Chapter III of the 1957 Act delineates functions of

the Corporation. Sub-section (1) of Section 41 provided

that “subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules,

regulations and bye laws made thereunder the Municipal

Government of Delhi shall vest in the Corporation.”

9. Section 42 of the 1957 Act spells out obligatory

functions of the Corporation, inter alia, including the

fulfilment of any other obligation imposed by or under the

Act or any other law for the time being in force.

10. Section 44 of the 1957 Act enumerates the

municipal authorities under the Corporation which, inter

alia, includes the Commissioner.

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 6 of 69

11. Section 54 of the 1957 Act, inter alia, provides for

appointment of the Commissioner. Sub-section (1) of

Section 54 provides that the Central Government shall,

by notification in the official gazette, appoint a suitable

person as the Commissioner of the Corporation.

12. Section 59 of the 1957 Act specifies the functions

of the Commissioner. It reads as under:

Section 59. Functions of the

Commissioner. --

Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the

entire executive power for the purpose of

carrying out the provisions of this Act and of

any other Act for the time being in force

which confers any power or imposes any duty

on the Corporation, shall vest in the

Commissioner who shall also –

(a) exercise all the powers and perform all

the duties specifically conferred or

imposed upon him by this Act or by any

other law for the time being in force;

(b) prescribe the duties of, and exercise

supervision and control over the acts and

proceedings of, all municipal officers and

other municipal employees other than

the Municipal Secretary and the

Municipal Chief Auditor and the

municipal officers and other municipal

employees immediately subordinate to

them and subject to any regulation that

may be made in this behalf, dispose of all

questions relating to the service of the

said officers and other employees and

their pay, privileges, allowances and

other conditions of service;

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 7 of 69

(c) on the occurrence or threatened

occurrence of any sudden accident or any

unforeseen event or natural calamity

involving or likely to involve extensive

damage to any property of the

Corporation, or danger to human life,

take such immediate action as he

considers necessary and make a report

forthwith to the Standing Committee and

the Corporation of the action he has

taken and the reasons for the same as

also of the amount of cost, if any,

incurred or likely to be incurred in

consequence of such action, which is not

covered by a budget-grant;

(d) *Subject to any regulation that may be

made in this behalf, be the disciplinary

authority in relation to all municipal

officers and other municipal

employees.

*Substituted by Act 67 of 1993, w.e.f.

1.10.1993 for clause (d).

Original clause (d) reads as under:

“(d) exercise the powers and perform

the duties conferred or imposed by or

under this Act upon the General

Manager (Electricity) or the General

Manager (Transport) in his absence or

on failure by him to exercise or

perform the same.”

13. Chapter VI of the 1957 Act provides for Municipal

Officers and other Municipal Employees of the

Corporation. According to Section 89, “the Corporation

shall appoint suitable persons to be respectively the Chief

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 8 of 69

Engineer (Water Supply)

6

, the Municipal Engineer, the

Municipal Health Officer, the Education Officer, the

Municipal Chief Accountant, the Municipal Secretary and

the Municipal Chief Auditor and may appoint one or more

Deputy Commissioners and such other officer or officers of

a status equivalent to or higher than the status of any of

the officers specified earlier in this sub-section as the

Corporation may deem fit on such monthly salaries and

such allowances, if any, as may be fixed by the

Corporation.”

14. Section 92 of the 1957 Act provides that “subject

to the provisions of Section 89, the power of appointing

municipal officers and other municipal employees,

whether temporary or permanent shall vest in the

Commissioner: Provided that the power of appointing

officers and other employees immediately subordinate to

the Municipal Secretary or the Municipal Chief Auditor to

category B posts or category C posts shall vest in the

Standing Committee: Provided further that the Standing

Committee may delegate to the Municipal Secretary or the

6

Chief Engineer (Water Supply) omitted by Act 67 of 1993, w.e.f. 1.10.1993

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 9 of 69

Municipal Chief Auditor the power of appointing officers

and other employees immediately subordinate to the said

Secretary or Auditor, to category C posts.”

15. Sub-section (1) of Section 95 provides that “every

municipal officer or other municipal employee shall be

liable to have his increments or promotion withheld or to

be censured, reduced in rank, compulsorily retired,

removed or dismissed for any breach of any departmental

regulations or of discipline or for carelessness, unfitness,

neglect of duty or other misconduct by such authority as

may be prescribed by regulations: Provided that no such

officer or other employee as aforesaid shall be reduced in

rank, compulsorily retired, removed or dismissed by any

authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed:

Provided further that the Corporation may by regulations

provide that municipal employees belonging to such

classes or categories as may be specified in the

regulations shall be liable also to be fined by such

authority as may be specified therein.”

16. Section 98 of the 1957 Act confers power on the

Corporation to make regulations, inter alia, to provide for:

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 10 of 69

(a) the procedure to be followed in imposing any penalty

under sub-section (1) of Section 95, suspension pending

departmental inquiries before the imposition of such

penalty and the authority by whom such suspension may

be ordered; the officer or authority to whom an appeal

shall lie under sub-section (4) of that section; and (b) any

other matter which is incidental to, or necessary for, the

purpose of regulating the appointment and conditions of

service of persons appointed to services and posts under

the Corporation and any other matter for which in the

opinion of the Corporation provisions should be made by

regulations.

17. Sub-section (1) of Section 480 of the 1957 Act

provides that “any regulation which may be made by the

Corporation under this Act, may be made by the Central

Government within one year of the establishment of the

Corporation; and any regulation so made may be altered

or rescinded by the Corporation in the exercise of its

powers under this Act.” Sub- section (2) of Section 480

provides that “no regulation made by the Corporation

under this Act shall have effect until it has been approved

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 11 of 69

by the Central Government and published in the official

gazette.”

RELEVANT REGULATIONS

18. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 480

of the 1957 Act, the Central Government notified Delhi

Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal)

Regulations, 1959

7

vide notification dated 04.04.1959.

19. Regulation 6 of the 1959 Regulations specifies the

penalties which may be imposed for good and sufficient

reasons on a municipal officer or other employee. These

are:

Minor Penalties

(i) Censure;

(ii) Withholding of increments or promotion; and

(iii) Recovery of the whole or part of any

pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation by

negligence or misconduct.

7

1959 Regulations

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 12 of 69

Major penalties

(iv) Reduction in rank including reduction to a

lower post or to a lower time scale or to a

lower stage in a time scale;

(v) Compulsory retirement; and

(vi) Dismissal from service which shall be a

disqualification for future employment.

20. Regulation 7 of the 1959 Regulations provides:

“7. The authority specified in column 1 of the

Schedule may impose on any of the municipal

officers or other municipal employees specified

there against in column 2 thereof any of the

penalties specified there against in column 3

thereof. Any such officer or employee may appeal

against the order imposing upon him any of those

penalties to the authority specified in column 4 of

the said Schedule.”

21. Relevant part of the Schedule as referred to in

Regulation 7 is extracted below:

SCHEDULE

(See Regulation 7)

Description of

posts

Authority

competent to

impose penalties

Penalties Appellate

Authority

1 2 3 4

PART ‘A’

In case where appointments are made under Section 509

All Municipal

Officer and

other

employees.

Corporation (i)

(ii)

& (iii)

Central

Government

All Municipal

Officer and

other

employees

Central

Government

All President of India

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 13 of 69

PART ‘B’

Posts under the Corporation (Other than those under the Municipal

Chief Auditor or the Municipal Secretary).

1. Category ‘A’

posts

Corporation All Central

Government

-do- Deputy

Commissioner,

(i)

(ii)

& (iii)

Commissioner

2. Category ‘B’

& ‘C’ posts

Commissioner All Standing

Committee

(i) Where

appointment

of the Officer

or employee

was made by

the erstwhile

local bodies or

authorities

specified in the

Second

Schedule of

the Act.

Deputy

Commissioner

Any Municipal

Officer or

employee to whom

powers to impose

penalty is

delegated under

Section 491 of the

Act.

(i)

(ii)

& (iii)

(i)

(ii)

& (iii)

Commissioner

Deputy

Commissioner

(ii) Where the

appointment

was made by

the

Commissioner

Commissioner

Deputy

Commissioner

Any Municipal

Officer or

employee to whom

powers to impose

penalty is

delegated under

Section 491 of the

Act.

All

(i)

(ii)

& (iii)

(i)

(ii)

& (iii)

Standing

Committee

Commissioner

Deputy

Commissioner

CONUNDRUM BEFORE THE HIGH COURT

22. Before the High Court, submission on behalf of the

appellant was that under Regulation 7 read with the

Schedule of the 1959 Regulations, the authority

competent to impose major penalty upon an officer

belonging to category A post is the Corporation, and

therefore, the order of dismissal passed by the

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 14 of 69

Commissioner is void. Per contra, the argument on behalf

of respondents was that under the amended Section 59

(d) of the 1957 Act, which was inserted with effect from

01.10.1993 by Act 67 of 1993, the Commissioner is the

disciplinary authority in relation to all municipal officers

and other municipal employees albeit subject to any

regulation that may be made in this behalf. As the 1959

Regulations were made before the substitution of clause

(d), to the extent they were contrary to the amended

provisions of the 1957 Act would cease to operate.

Therefore, the order of dismissal passed by the

Commissioner was well within his jurisdiction and

cannot be termed void.

HIGH COURT’S VIEW

23. The High Court took the view that since Section 59

(d), as substituted by Act 67 of 1993 with effect from

01.10.1993, uses the phrase “subject to any regulation

that may be made in this behalf”, the power of the

disciplinary authority conferred on the Commissioner by

clause (d) of Section 59 would be subject to regulations

that may be made in future and not the existing ones.

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 15 of 69

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

24. The learned counsel for the appellant has

questioned the impugned order, inter alia, on the

following grounds:

(i) The High Court did not follow its own

decision rendered by a coordinate bench in

MCD Thru Commissioner vs. Ved Prakash

Kanoji

8

which affirmed decision rendered by

a Single Judge of the High Court in G.S.

Matharaoo vs. CBI

9

. Judicial propriety

demands that if a bench of co-equal strength

disagrees with the earlier view, it must refer

the matter to a larger bench. Failure to do so,

renders the decision vulnerable. Therefore,

the impugned order should be set aside, and

the matter be remitted back to the High Court

for a fresh decision.

(ii) Section 59 (d) and Section 95 of the 1957 Act

must be harmoniously construed. Moreover,

8

2013 SCC OnLine Del 791: (2014) 209 DLT 657

9

2012 SCC OnLine Del 480

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 16 of 69

Section 59 opens with the phrase “save as

otherwise provided in this Act” which signifies

that the executive power of the Commissioner

is subject to other provisions of the Act.

Further, clause (d) of Section 59 itself makes

the disciplinary power subject to the

regulations, therefore, when clause (d) of

Section 59 is read conjointly with sub-section

(1) of Section 95, which provides that

“punishment may be imposed by such

authority as may be prescribed by the

regulations”, it is clear that where the

regulations specify the authority competent

to impose the punishment, it can be imposed

by that authority and no other, not even the

Commissioner.

(iii) As Clause (d) of Section 59 was brought by

substitution, it would be deemed to be

incorporated by pen and ink in the original

statute and since it opens with the words

‘subject to any regulation made in this behalf,

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 17 of 69

the disciplinary power envisaged thereunder

would be subject to the existing Regulations.

More so, when there is nothing in the

amended provision to indicate that it

overrides the existing regulations.

(iv) If the interpretation accorded by the High

Court is accepted, there would be an

unresolved conflict between Section 59(d)

and 95(1) of the 1957 Act . Such an

interpretation must therefore be eschewed.

(v) The existing Regulations are saved by Section

24 of The General Clauses Act, 1897

notwithstanding the amendments brought by

Act 67 of 1993. This is so, because for Section

24 to apply there is no distinction between

repeal and amendment.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

25. On behalf of the respondents, it was submitted:

(i) The object of the 1993 amendment was to

streamline the municipal administration in

the light of observations made in S.

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 18 of 69

Balakrishnan Committee’s Report. A

statutory provision brought in by amendment

would have to be construed in a manner that

it seeks to achieve the object for which it is

brought in the statute book. The legislative

intent is clear in making Commissioner the

disciplinary authority in relation to all

municipal officers and employees. Therefore,

use of the words “subject to any regulation

that may be made in this behalf,” would mean

subject to regulations that are made after the

amendment. Otherwise, the legislature might

have used words “subject to any regulations

framed under the Act” or could have dropped

the phrase ‘that may be made in this behalf’.

The use of the phrase “that may be made in

this behalf” signifies that clause (d) is subject

to those regulations that are made after the

amendment.

(ii) There is no conflict between Sections 59 (d)

and 95 in as much as Section 95 does not

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 19 of 69

specify any disciplinary authority. It is a

general provision enabling Regulations to

specify the disciplinary authority

circumscribed to the limit set out in the

proviso i.e., the disciplinary authority should

not be subordinate to the appointing

authority; whereas Section 59(d) is specific in

declaring the Commissioner as disciplinary

authority of all officers and employees.

(iii) Once a statutory provision specifically

declares a particular authority as the

disciplinary authority even if such

declaration is contrary to the existing

regulations, it would prevail in as much as in

the event of a conflict between a statutory

provision and a regulation, the statutory

provision must prevail.

(iv) Clause 59 (d) was substituted with effect from

1.10.1993, therefore the argument that 59 (d)

would be deemed to be there since inception

is not sustainable. In consequence, it would

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 20 of 69

be subject to only those regulations that are

made thereafter.

(v) The earlier decisions of the High Court did

not take into consideration the object with

which clause (d) was substituted in the 1957

Act, and therefore, the earlier view is not a

binding precedent. Besides, if the

construction accorded to clause (d) by the

High Court is correct, this Court should not

interfere merely because the High Court

could have, or ought to have, referred the

matter to a larger bench.

(vi) By Act 67 of 1993, Section 92, which deals

with power to appoint, was amended. As per

which, subject to the provisions of Section

89, the power to appoint municipal officers

and other municipal employees, whether

temporary or permanent, vested in the

Commissioner. This takes care of the first

proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 95 which

mandates that no municipal officer or other

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 21 of 69

municipal employee shall be reduced in rank

or compulsorily retired, removed or

dismissed by any authority subordinate to

that by which he was appointed. The

legislative intent is, therefore, clear. By virtue

of the amendments brought by Act 67 of 1993

to Sections 59 and 92, the Commissioner is

put in complete control both as the

appointing authority as well as the

disciplinary authority.

(vii) Prior to Act 67 of 1993, Section 509 of the

1957 Act vested in the Central Government

power to make ‘first appointments.’ It

provided that notwithstanding anything

contained in Section 60 or in Section 89 or in

Section 92, the first appointment to the post

mentioned therein, may be made by the

Central Government. The 1993 amendment

repealed the aforesaid section. Consequent

to its repeal, part A of the Schedule to the

1959 Regulations became redundant, as it

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 22 of 69

related to cases where appointments were

made under Section 509. The 1993

amendment is reflective of the legislative

intent to usher in a new regime qua

disciplinary authority and, therefore, the

phrase “subject to regulations that may be

made in this behalf” as used in clause (d) of

Section 59 would have to be construed as

referring to those regulations which are made

after the amendment.

(viii) By not referring to the larger Bench, the High

Court did not commit any error because the

earlier coordinate bench decision dealt with

an issue as to who would be the appropriate

authority to grant sanction for prosecution

under the P.C. Act. Besides the learned

Single Judge whose decision was affirmed by

the Division Bench of the High Court had

overlooked that by the 1993 Amendment,

Section 92 was also amended to make

Commissioner the appointing authority .

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 23 of 69

Therefore, the restriction placed by the first

proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 95 did

not affect the powers of the Commissioner to

take disciplinary action.

ISSUES

26. Upon consideration of the rival submissions

including the facts and the statutory provisions/

regulations, in our view, the answer to the question

posited in paragraph 4 (supra) is dependent on

determination of the following issues:

(i) Whether the ‘Corporation’, named as

disciplinary authority of Category A Officers

in the 1959 Regulations, continues to be the

disciplinary authority notwithstanding

substitution of clause (d) of Section 59 by Act

67 of 1993, with effect from 01.10.1993?

(ii) Whether to reconcile the conflict between

sub-section (1) of Section 95 and Section 59

(d), as substituted, it is necessary to construe

the disciplinary authority specified in the

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 24 of 69

substituted clause (d) of Section 59 as

subject to the existing 1959 Regulations?

(iii) Whether the High Court ought to have

referred the matter to a larger bench as its

view was at variance with an earlier decision

rendered by a bench of co-equal strength? If

yes, its consequence?

DISCUSSION/ ANALYSIS

Issue No.(i)

27. Prior to substitution of clause (d) of Section 59 by

Act 67 of 1993, the 1957 Act did not specify a disciplinary

authority though Section 92, subject to Section 89,

specified the officers/ authorities who could appoint.

Sub-section (1) of Section 95 of the 1957 Act provides

that municipal officer or other municipal employees are

liable to be punished for any breach of departmental

regulations, etc. by such authority as may be prescribed

by the regulations provided that no such officer or

employee shall be compulsorily retired, removed or

dismissed by any authority subordinate to that by which

he was appointed.

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 25 of 69

28. Prior to amendment brought in by Act 67 of 1993,

Section 92 of the 1957 Act read as follows:

“92. (1) Subject to the provisions of Section 89, the

power of appointing municipal officers and other

municipal employees, whether temporary or

permanent, --

(a) to category A posts, shall vest--

(i) in the Delhi Electricity Supply Committee,

and the Delhi Water Supply and Sewage

Disposal Committee respectively in the case of

officers and other employees appointed in

connection with the affairs of the Delhi

Electricity Supply Undertaking and the Delhi

Water Supply and Sewage Disposal

Undertaking,

(ii) in the Corporation in the case of all other

municipal officers and employees;

(b) to category B and category C posts shall vest in

the General Manager (Electricity), or the

Commissioner, as the case may be:

Provided that the power of appointing officers and

other employees immediately subordinate to the

Municipal Secretary or the Municipal Chief Auditor

to category B posts or category C posts shall vest in

the Standing Committee:

Provided further that the Standing Committee may

delegate to the Municipal Secretary or the Municipal

Chief Auditor the power of appointing officers and

other employees immediately subordinate to such

Secretary or Auditor, to category C posts.

(2) The claims of the members of the Scheduled Caste

shall be taken into consideration, consistently with

the maintenance of efficiency of administration, in

the making of appointments of municipal officers

and other municipal employees.”

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 26 of 69

29. Post Act 67 of 1993, Section 92 stood amended to

read thus:

“92. Power to make appointments. --

(1) Subject to the provisions of Section 89, the power

of appointing municipal officers and other municipal

employees whether temporary or permanent shall

vest in the Commissioner:

Provided that the power of appointing officers and

other employees immediately subordinate to the

Municipal Secretary or the Municipal Chief Auditor

to category B posts or category C posts shall vest in

the Standing Committee:

Provided further that the Standing Committee may

delegate to the Municipal Secretary or the Municipal

Chief Auditor the power of appointing officers and

other employees immediately subordinate to the said

Secretary or Auditor, to category C posts.

(2) The claims of the members of the Scheduled

Castes shall be taken into consideration consistently

with the maintenance of efficiency of administration,

in the making of appointments of municipal officers

and other municipal employees.”

30. What is clear is, that by Act 67 of 1993 the

‘Commissioner’ was made not only the appointing

authority in place of the ‘Corporation’, but also the

disciplinary authority by virtue of substitution of clause

(d) of Section 59.

31. Prior to Act 67 of 1993, the 1957 Act did not

specify the disciplinary authority though sub-section (1)

of Section 95 provided that the municipal officers and

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 27 of 69

other employees may be punished for breach of

departmental regulations, etc. by such authority as may

be prescribed by the regulations. However, the 1959

Regulations do specify the disciplinary authorities.

32. The question that would therefore arise is whether

the disciplinary authority specified in clause (d) of

Section 59 would be the disciplinary authority, or the one

specified in the 1957 Regulations.

33. In ordinary course, in the event of a conflict

between the statute and the regulations, the statute

would prevail

10

. But here there is a twist. The statutory

provision i.e., clause (d) of Section 59 itself provides that

it shall be subject to any regulations that may be made

in this behalf.

34. In the aforesaid context, the argument on behalf of

the appellant is that clause (d) of Section 59, consequent

to substitution, has incorporated itself in the existing Act

and, therefore, it must be read and construed as if the

altered words had been written into the earlier Act with

pen and ink and the old words scored out so that

10

Ispat Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, (2006) 12 SCC 583, paragraphs 27 to 29

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 28 of 69

thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act

at all; in consequence, though clause (d) of Section 59

specifies the disciplinary authority, it being subject to the

Regulations, the disciplinary authority specified in the

existing 1959 Regulations would alone be competent to

impose the punishment of dismissal. Per contra, on

behalf of the respondents, it is submitted, clause (d) was

inserted w.e.f. 01.10.1993; it specifies the disciplinary

authority, though subject to the regulations that may be

made; the words ‘that may be made in this behalf’ in

clause (d) are of significance which imply that clause (d)

is subject to Regulations that may be made in future and

not the existing ones; in consequence, unless the

Regulations are re-framed or amended after 01.10.1993,

specifying a disciplinary authority other than the one

specified in clause (d), the authority specified in clause

(d) shall be the disciplinary authority; besides, the

normal rule of construction is that in absence of intention

to the contrary, statutory provision must prevail over

regulations framed under the statute.

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 29 of 69

35. To appropriately determine issue No. (i), it is

necessary to have a look at few judicial precedents

regarding construction of a statute/ statutory provision

amended by substituting an existing provision.

Amendment by Substitution

36. In general, an amending provision performs one or

more of three kinds of notional function in relation to the

legislation being amended--(1) the addition of words; (2)

the removal of words; and (3) substitution of some words

for other words. An amendment is a method of changing

the law, and the method chosen as the most apt form of

notation to record the change should not dictate how the

change is construed or applied. Therefore, one must look

at substance and not form.

11

37. In Shamarao V. Parulekar v. District

Magistrate, Thana, Bombay and Another

12

before a

Constitution Bench of this Court an order of detention

under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 was in

question. That Act was due to expire on 01.04.1951. But

11

Craies on Legislation, Chapter 14, Section 3, paragraph 14.3.1, Ninth Edition, published by Thomson/ Sweet

& Maxwell, South Asian Edition 2019.

12

(1952) 2 SCC 1: 1952 SCC OnLine SC 64, paragraph 7

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 30 of 69

there were subsequent amendments of the Act which

extended its life up to 01.10.1952. The amending Act

provided, inter alia, that the detention orders which had

been confirmed previously, and which were in force

immediately before the commencement of the amending

Act, ‘shall continue to remain in force for so long as the

principal Act is in force’. The question which arose for

consideration was whether this indicated the original

date of expiry of the principal Act or the extended date as

brought by amendment in the principal Act. This Court

had no difficulty in holding that it obviously related to the

latter, notwithstanding that the ‘principal Act’ was

defined as meaning ‘Act of 1950’. It was held that the

phrases ‘principal Act’ and ‘Act of 1950’, must be

understood as meaning the 1950 Act as amended, which

was to expire on 01.10.1952. While holding so, this Court

laid down the guiding principle for construction of an

amended statute, often referred to as the ‘pen and ink

theory’, in the following words:

“The rule is that when a subsequent Act amends an

earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself, or

a part of itself, into the earlier, then the earlier Act

must thereafter be read and construed (except where

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 31 of 69

that would lead to a repugnancy, inconsistency or

absurdity) as if the altered words had been written

into the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old

words scored out so that thereafter there is no need

to refer to the amending Act at all.”

38. In Ram Narain v. Simla Banking and

Industrial Company Limited

13

a three-Judge Bench

of this Court while accepting the ‘pen and ink theory’ to

construe an amended statute clarified that, if the

amending Act does not provide for retrospective operation

of the amended provision, the amended provision would

not relate back to the date of the original Act. The relevant

observations are extracted below:

“13. … It is perfectly true as stated therein that

whenever an amended Act has to be applied

subsequent to the date of the amendment the

various unamended provisions of the Act have to be

read along with the amended provisions as though

they are part of it. This is for the purpose of

determining what the meaning of any particular

provision of the Act as amended is, whether it is in

the unamended part or in the amended part. But this

is not the same thing as saying that the amendment

itself must be taken to have been in existence as from

the date of the earlier Act. That would be imputing to

the amendment retrospective operation which could

only be done if such retrospective operation is given

by the amending Act either expressly or by necessary

implication. …”

(Emphasis supplied)

13

(1956) 2 SCC 75

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 32 of 69

39. In Firm A.T.B. Mehtab Majid & Co. v. State of

Madras

14

a Constitution Bench of this Court took the

view that once the old rule is substituted by the new rule,

it ceases to exist and does not automatically revive when

the new rule is declared invalid. Explaining the rationale

for the aforesaid view, a three-Judge Bench of this Court

in Koteswar Vittal Kamath v. K. Rangappa Baliga &

Co.

15

observed that amendment by ‘substitution’ consists

of two steps. First, the old rule is made to cease to exist

and, next, the new rule is brought into existence in its

place and, therefore, even if the new rule be invalid, the

first step of the old rule ceasing to exist comes into effect;

in consequence, on declaration of the new rule as invalid,

the old rule is not revived.

40. In Bhagat Ram Sharma v. Union of India

16

, this

Court observed that there is no real distinction between

“repeal” and an “amendment”. By quoting Sutherland's

Statutory Construction

17

, it was held that amendment is,

14

1962 SCC OnLine SC 51

15

(1969) 1 SCC 255

16

1988 Supp SCC 30: AIR 1988 SC 740

17

3

rd

Edition Volume 1 at page 477:

“The distinction between repeal and amendment as these terms are used by the courts, is arbitrary.

Naturally the use of these terms by the court is based largely on how the legislatures have developed and applied

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 33 of 69

in fact, a wider term and it includes abrogation or

deletion of a provision in an existing statute. If the

amendment of an existing law is small, the Act professes

to amend, if it is extensive, it repeals a law and re-enacts

it. It was held that an amendment of substantive law is

not retrospective unless expressly laid down or by

necessary implication inferred. Additionally, it was

clarified that mere use of the word “substitution” does not

imply that the amended provision would relate back to

the appointed day.

41. In Gottumukkala Venkata Krishamraju v.

Union of India & Others

18

this Court after noticing the

‘pen and ink’ theory of construction held that, in certain

situations, the court having regard to the purport and

objects sought to be achieved by the legislature may

these terms in labelling their enactments. When a section is being added to an Act or a provision added to a

section, the legislatures commonly entitle the Act as an amendment... When a provision is withdrawn from a

section, the legislatures called the Act an amendment, particularly when a provision is added to replace the one

withdrawn. However, when an entire Act or section is abrogated and no new section is added to replace it,

legislatures label the Act accomplishing this result a repeal. Thus as used by the legislatures, amendment and

repeal may differ in kind -- addition as opposed to withdrawal or only in degree -- abrogation of part of a section

as opposed to abrogation of a whole section or Act; or more commonly, in both kind and degree -- addition of a

provision to a section to replace a provision being abrogated as opposed to abrogation of a whole section or Act.

This arbitrary distinction has been followed by the courts, and they have developed separate rules of

constructions for each. However, they have recognized that frequently an Act purporting to be an amendment

has the same qualitative effect as a repeal -- the abrogation of an existing statutory provision -- and have

therefore applied the term ‘implied repeal’ and the rules of construction applicable to repeals to such

amendments.”

18

(2019) 17 SCC 590, paragraph 18

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 34 of 69

construe the word ‘substitution’ as an ‘amendment’

having a prospective effect. The court further observed

that it is not a universal rule that the word ‘substitution’

necessarily or always connotes two severable steps, one

of repeal and another of a fresh enactment, even if it

implies two steps.

42. In Pernod Ricard India Private Limited v. State

of Madhya Pradesh and Others

19

, this Court held that

a repealed provision would cease to operate from the date

of repeal and the substituted provision would commence

to operate from the date of its substitution. However, this

principle is subject to specific statutory prescription.

Statute can enable the repealed provision to continue to

apply to transactions that have commenced before the

repeal. Similarly, a substituted provision which operates

prospectively, if it affects vested rights, subject to

statutory prescriptions, can also operate retrospectively.

43. In Property Owners Association & Others v.

State of Maharashtra & Others

20

the theory of two-

19

(2024) 8 SCC 742, paragraph 18

20

(2024) 18 SCC 1

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 35 of 69

step process of amendment by substitution, as

propounded in Koteswar Vittal Kamat (supra), was

placed before a nine-Judge Bench of this Court to argue

that if the words “the principles specified in clause (b) or

clause (c) of Article 39” were omitted from Article 31-C of

the Constitution of India by the Forty-Second

Amendment and substituted with different words, the

invalidation of substituted words by the Minerva Mills

21

decision cannot revive words specifically omitted by

Parliament. After considering number of decisions

including three-Judge Bench decisions of this Court in

State of Maharashtra v. Central Provinces

Manganese Ore Co. Ltd.

22

and Indian Express

Newspapers (Bombay) P Ltd. v. Union of India

23

; and

21

Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625

22

(1977) 1 SCC 643

“18. We do not think that the word substitution necessarily or always connotes two severable

steps, that is to say, one of repeal and another of a fresh enactment even if it implies two steps. Indeed,

the natural meaning of the word ‘substitution’ is to indicate that the process cannot be split up into two

pieces like this. If the process describes as substitution fails, it is totally ineffective as to leave intact

what was sought to be displaced. That seems to be the ordinary and natural meaning of the words ‘shall

be substituted’. This part could not become effective without the assent of the Governor General. The

State Governor's assent was insufficient. It could not be inferred that, what was intended was that, in

case the substitution failed or proved ineffective, some repeal, not mentioned at all, was brought about

and remained effective so as to create what may be described as a vacuum in the statutory law on the

subject matter. Primarily the question is one of gathering the intent from the use of words in the

enacting provisions seen in the light of the procedure gone through. Here, no intention to repeal,

without a substitution, is deducible. In other words, there could be no repeal if substitution failed. The

two were a part and parcel of a single indivisible process and not bits of a disjointed operation.”

23

(1985) 1 SCC 641

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 36 of 69

Constitution Bench decision in Supreme Court

Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India (NJAC

case)

24

, the Court rejected the argument made on behalf

of Property Owners Association, and held:

“105. … It is not appropriate to separate an amendment

which substitutes certain words with certain other words

into multiple steps and examine the legal effect of invalida-

tion on each of these steps independently. This is because

when a legislature enacts a substitution, it is only removing

certain text to make space for the new text it wishes to en-

act. Simply put, the legislature would not remove the text

in question without at the same time inserting alternate

text. Given that the legislative intent is composite and indi-

visible, to remove and insert simultaneously, a judicial ap-

proach which disaggregates these two steps and treats

them differently would amount to the court re-writing the

law contrary to the legislative intent. As the decisions from

the United States note, in such cases, there are two expres-

sions of legislative intent, the original text and the amended

text. If the amended text is invalidated, the only valid ex-

pression of legislative intent is the original text. If a court

were to find that even the original text could not be given

legal effect because it had been repealed, this would result

in a third outcome, a legal vacuum which was neither in-

tended by the legislature that enacted the original text nor

by the legislature which adopted the amended text. Cru-

cially, this third outcome would fail to give effect to either

legislative intent despite there being no constitutional fault

in the original provision. As the decisions in Laxmibai [Lax-

mibai v. State of M.P., 1951 SCC OnLine MP 72 : AIR 1951

Nag 94] , Central Provinces Manganese Ore [State of Maha-

rashtra v. Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co. Ltd., (1977)

1 SCC 643 : (1977) 39 STC 340] , and D.K. Trivedi &

Sons [D.K. Trivedi & Sons v. State of Gujarat, 1986 Supp

SCC 20] note, if a court were to not only invalidate the

newly inserted text but also hold that the old text stands

repealed it could lead to absurd outcomes or render the text

wholly unworkable. The practical effect of such an outcome

would be that a judicial decision invalidating an unconsti-

tutional amendment would also inadvertently nullify a valid

24

(2016) 5 SCC 1

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 37 of 69

and constitutional provision which the legislature would

never have repealed without providing a replacement.

106. Insofar as the argument that the original rule had

been repealed by the legislature itself and thus ought not

to be given effect, as noted above, this reasoning is negated

by the inference that the legislature would never have re-

pealed the original text without simultaneously adopting

the amended text. While a court cannot give effect to text

that the legislature has repealed, as noted in Shamarao Pa-

rulekar [Shamarao V. Parulekar v. DM, Thana, (1952) 2 SCC

1] , a case where a legislature has engaged in substitution,

and the newly enacted text has been invalidated, is materi-

ally different. There may exist a narrow sub-set of cases

where it is evident from the legislative circumstances or ex-

ternal aids to statutory interpretation, that the legislature

would have in fact repealed the provision or words in ques-

tion independent of its enactment of an alternative provi-

sion. Therefore, it is incumbent on courts to ask the ques-

tion posed by Beg, J. in Central Provinces Manganese

Ore [State of Maharashtra v. Central Provinces Manganese

Ore Co. Ltd., (1977) 1 SCC 643 : (1977) 39 STC 340] , is

there “intention to repeal, without a substitution”?

107. Although some of the precedents discussed frame the

question as “Would the legislature have repealed the origi-

nal text if it knew a court would invalidate the amended

text?”, a more appropriate framing of the question would

be, “Would the legislature have repealed the original text

without giving effect to the amended text?” for this is the

result of a court invalidating the amended text. If in cases

where a legislature has repealed text and inserted other

text, there is clear evidence that the legislature would have

repealed the text in question independent of its decision to

give effect to new or alternate language, then a court can

continue to give effect to the repeal despite invalidating the

new text. This is because, in such cases, the legislative in-

tent is not composite or indivisible, and it is evident that

the legislature contemplated that the original text would be

repealed independent of whether the new text was given ef-

fect or not. However, absent such clear legislative intent,

where a legislature substitutes a text by amendment and

the amendment is invalidated, it is presumed that the una-

mended text stands revived.

108. This analysis of whether legislative intent is compo-

site or not is relevant to the case of substitutions. However,

there is another reason why the argument of the appellants

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 38 of 69

that repealed text can never be enforced after a court inval-

idates an amendment may be flawed, and that is the case

of a repeal simpliciter. Let us imagine a situation where

Parliament were to, by constitutional amendment, repeal

protections concerning tenure or salary granted to consti-

tutional functionaries such as Judges or Election Commis-

sioners. This would be a case of an amendment that only

repealed constitutional text. Such an amendment would

likely violate the basic structure of the Constitution. If this

Court were to invalidate such an amendment, could it be

contended that the protections do not revive? The only log-

ical relief in such a case is the revival of those protections.

These protections would be enforceable despite the fact that

they have been omitted from the statute book or constitu-

tional text by the legislature. This would not be a case of

the court re-writing the law but merely nullifying the effect

of the repeal. Thus, it cannot be said that a court cannot

nullify the effect of a repeal. The case of substitutions is

admittedly more complicated, as the court must investigate

whether the legislative intent to repeal and enact is compo-

site and indivisible. However, once it is demonstrated that

the legislature would not have repealed without simultane-

ously enacting, there can be no doubt that a court can re-

verse both the effects of the enactment and the repeal.

109. Finally, in addition to looking at the totality of the leg-

islative circumstances, the court must also examine the

consequence of the original text reviving or not reviving vis-

à-vis the principles espoused in the judgment. Ordinarily,

where an unconstitutional provision is struck down, it is

presumed that the original text is constitutional and thus

there are no adverse consequences flowing from its reviv-

ing. However, there may exist cases where the underlying

or original rule itself is unconstitutional or that to revive

the situation that existed prior to the amendment would

either severely undermine the legal principles set out in the

judgment invalidating the amendment or result in some

other adverse consequences. In such cases, courts have the

flexibility to appropriately shape reliefs. …”

(Emphasis supplied)

44. Survey of the judicial pronouncements, in our

view, settle certain principles of construction of a

statutory provision which has been brought in through

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 39 of 69

amendment by substituting an existing provision. These

principles, inter alia, are:

(a) Use of the word ‘substitute’ or ‘substitution’

in the amending Act is not necessarily a

reflection of two severable steps, one of

repeal and the other of insertion. It may be

a single indivisible step of making the

existing provision inoperative by replacing it

with the new provision. The Court must

therefore look at the legislative intent -

whether it is to repeal the existing provision

independent to the insertion of new one. If

the legislative intent is composite and

indivisible, to remove and insert

simultaneously, a judicial approach of

segregating these two steps and treating

them differently would amount to re-writing

the law contrary to the legislative intent.

(b) Mere use of the word ‘substitute’ or

‘substitution’ in the amending Act does not

make the substituted provision relate back

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 40 of 69

to the date of enforcement of the provision

which it seeks to substitute.

(c) Unless the legislative intent is to the

contrary, the inserted provision brought by

way of substitution is to operate from the

date it is placed in the statute.

(d) The construction of the amended provision

is governed by the legislative intent and not

the nomenclature put to the amendment.

Sub-Issues

45. Having noticed the legal principles on construction

of a substituted provision, we shall now consider the

following sub-issues:

(a) Whether clause (d) of Section 59, as substituted

by Act 67 of 1993, would be deemed to be in

existence since the date of enforcement of the 1957

Act?

(b) Whether substituted clause (d) of Section 59 of

the 1957 Act would be subject to the existing

regulations i.e., the 1959 Regulations.

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 41 of 69

Sub-Issue (a)

46. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every

statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or

by necessary implication made to have a retrospective

operation. Though retrospectivity is not to be presumed

and rather there is presumption against retrospectivity,

it is open for the legislature to enact laws having

retrospective operation. This can be achieved by express

enactment or by necessary implication from the language

employed. If it is a necessary implication from the

language employed that the legislature intended a

particular section to have a retrospective operation, the

courts will give it such an operation. When retrospective

operation is not expressly given, the courts may be called

upon to construe the provisions and answer the question

whether the legislature had sufficiently expressed that

intention to give retrospectivity to the statute or its

provision. Four factors are suggested as relevant: (i)

general scope and purview of the statute; (ii) the remedy

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 42 of 69

sought to be applied; (iii) the former state of the law; and

(iv) what it was the legislature contemplated.

25

Clause (d) of Section 59 not retrospective

47. Now we shall consider whether the legislature

intended to substitute clause (d) of Section 59 with

retrospective effect. Sub-section (2) of Section 1 of Act 67

of 1993

26

provides that “it shall come into force on such

date as the Central Government may, by notification in the

Official Gazette, appoint; and different dates may be

appointed for different provisions of this Act and any

reference in any such provision to the commencement of

this Act shall be construed as a reference to the coming

into force of that provision.”

48. What is important is, though the legislature by

sub-section (2) of Section 1 of Act 67 of 1993 enabled the

Central Government to appoint different dates for

different provisions of the Act to come into force, the

Central Government appointed 01.10.1993 as the date

for coming into force all provisions of Act 67 of 1993 vide

25

Zile Singh v. State of Haryana & Others, (2004) 8 SCC 1

26

The Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1993

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 43 of 69

notification No. U-14011/177/93-Delhi II dated 30

th

September 1993 published in Delhi Gazette on

30.09.1993. The Notification dated 30

th

September 1993

reads thus:

“In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section

(2) of Section 1 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation

(Amendment) Act, 1993 (67 of 1993), the Central

Government hereby appoints the 1

st day of October,

1993 as the date on which the said Act shall come

into force.”

49. Section 43 of Act 67 of 1993, which seeks to amend

Section 59 of the 1957 Act, reads as follows:

“43. In section 59 of the principal Act, -

(a) in the opening portion, the words “other than

those pertaining to the Delhi Electric Supply

Undertaking” shall be omitted;

(b) for clause (d), the following clause shall be

substituted, namely:-

“(d) subject to any regulation that may be made

in this behalf, be the disciplinary authority in

relation to all municipal officers and other

municipal employees.”

50. The existing clause (d) of Section 59, which was

substituted by the afore-extracted clause, reads as

under:

“(d) exercise the powers and perform the duties

conferred or imposed by or under this Act upon

the General Manager (Electricity) or the General

Manager (Transport) in his absence or on failure

by him to exercise or perform the same.”

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 44 of 69

51. Section 68 of Act 67 of 1993 amended Section 92

of the 1957 Act. Section 68 reads as follows:

“68. In section 92 of the principal Act, for sub-

section (1), the following sub-section shall be

substituted, namely:-

(1) Subject to the provisions of section 89, the

power of the appointing municipal officers

and other municipal employees whether

temporary or permanent shall vest in the

Commissioner:

Provided that the power of appointing

officers and other employees immediately

subordinate to the Municipal Secretary or

the Municipal Chief Auditor to category B

posts or category C posts shall vest in the

Standing Committee:

Provided further that the Standing

Committee may delegate to the Municipal

Secretary or the Municipal Chief Auditor

the power of appointing officers and other

employees immediately subordinate to the

said Secretary or Auditor, to category C

posts.”

52. Prior to the amendment, Section 92 of the 1957

Act, which is extracted in paragraph 29 above, gave

power of appointment to the Commissioner to category B

and C posts. Whereas the amendments brought by Act

67 of 1993, subject to the provisions of Section 89, made

Commissioner not only the appointing authority of all

municipal officers and other municipal employees but

also their disciplinary authority with effect from

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 45 of 69

01.10.1993. There is nothing in Act 67 of 1993, or in the

notification bringing it into force, which may indicate that

the inserted provision shall have retrospective operation.

Besides mere use of the word ‘substitute’ or ‘substitution’

as discussed above would not make the substituted

provision relate back to the date of enforcement of the

provision which it replaced. We, therefore, answer sub-

issue (a) in the negative.

Sub-Issue (b)

53. Now, the question that arises for consideration is

whether substituted clause (d) of Section 59 would be

subject to the existing Regulations. The 1959

Regulations, referred to as the existing Regulations, were

notified by the Central Government under Section 480 of

the 1957 Act. Section 480 on the date of notification of

the 1959 Regulations stood thus:

“S.480. Supplemental provisions respecting

regulations. –

(1) Any regulation which may be made by a corporation

under this Act, may be made by the Central Government

within one year of the establishment of a corporation; and

any regulation so made may be altered or rescinded by a

corporation in the exercise of its powers under this Act.

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 46 of 69

(2) No regulation made by a corporation under this Act

shall have effect until it has been approved by the Central

Government and published in the Official Gazette.”

54. Section 98 of the 1957 Act confers power on the

Corporation to make regulations. Sub -section (1) of

Section 98 provides that the Corporation may make

regulations to provide for any one or more of the following

matters, namely:

(a) … ;

(b) … ;

(c) … ;

(d) the procedure to be followed in imposing any penalty

under sub-section (1) of Section 95, suspension pending

departmental inquiries before the imposition of such

penalty and the authority by whom such suspension

may be ordered; the officer or authority to whom an

appeal shall lie under sub-section (4) of that section;

(e) any other matter which is incidental to, or necessary for,

the purpose of regulating the appointment and

conditions of service or persons appointed to services

and posts under the Corporation and any other matter

for which in the opinion of the Corporation provisions

should be made by regulations.

55. A conjoint reading of Sections 480 and 98 makes

it clear that the Central Government had the power to

make regulations, within one year of the establishment

of a Corporation, which the Corporation was empowered

to make under the Act. The 1959 Regulations are

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 47 of 69

therefore referable to powers under Section 480 read with

Section 98 (d) & (e) of the 1957 Act.

56. The first Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 95 of

the 1957 Act makes it clear that no officer or employee

facing disciplinary action can be reduced in rank,

compulsorily retired, removed or dismissed by any

authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.

Thus, the power to make Regulations under Section 98(d)

& (e) is circumscribed by the first proviso to sub-section

(1) of Section 95.

57. Section 92 of the 1957 Act , subject to the

provisions of Section 89, specifies the appointing

authorities. Therefore, in the 1959 Regulations,

Regulation 2 (a) defines ‘Appointing Authority” as follows:

“Appointing authority in relation to a municipal officer or

other municipal employee means the authority empowered

by or under the Act to make appointments to the post

which such officer or employee for the time being holds.”

(Emphasis supplied)

58. However, the Disciplinary Authority was not

specified in the unamended 1957 Act and, therefore, by

virtue of sub-section (1) of Section 95, read with clauses

(d) & (e) of Section 98, were to be prescribed by

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 48 of 69

regulations subject to the first proviso to sub-section (1)

of Section 95. In that context, Regulation 2 (c) defines

‘Disciplinary Authority” as under:

“Disciplinary Authority in relation to the imposition of a

penalty on a municipal officer or other municipal employee

means the authority competent under these regulations to

impose on him that penalty.”

(Emphasis supplied)

59. What is important is that the requirement to

specify the Disciplinary Authority in the Regulations

arose because prior to its amendment by Act 67 of 1993,

the 1957 Act did not specify any disciplinary authority.

60. By Act 67 of 1993, the Commissioner, besides

being made the Disciplinary Authority was made the

Appointing Authority, subject to Section 89, of all

municipal officers and other employees. Additionally,

Section 95 was amended, thereby providing for an appeal

to the Administrator against penalty orders upon those

whose appointing authority was the Commissioner .

Section 70 of Act 67 of 1993, which inserts a proviso to

sub-section (4) of Section 95, reads thus:

“70. In section 95 of the principal Act, in sub-section (4),

the following proviso shall be inserted at the end, namely:

-

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 49 of 69

‘Provided that in case of an officer or other employees

appointed by the Commissioner an appeal shall lie to

the Administrator.’”

61. Under sub-section (4) of Section 95 of the 1957 Act

an officer or other employee upon whom penalty has been

inflicted could appeal to such officer or authority as may

be prescribed by the regulations. The 1959 Regulations

vested power to impose all kinds of penalty on officers of

Category A in the ‘Corporation’ and its Appellate

Authority was the Central Government. Whereas for

minor penalties, Deputy Commissioner was the

Disciplinary Authority and Commissioner was the

Appellate Authority. In so far as Category B & C posts

were concerned, the Commissioner could impose all

kinds of penalties and appeal therefrom lay to the

Standing Committee. However, minor penalties could be

imposed by the Deputy Commissioner against which

appeal lay to the Commissioner. Post 1993 amendment,

the power to appoint and to punish vested in the

Commissioner by virtue of the amendments in Section 92

and Section 59 (d). Therefore, a proviso to sub-section

(4) of Section 95 was added to declare that when an

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 50 of 69

officer or employee appointable by the Commissioner is

punished, an appeal would lie to the Administrator

27

.

Legislative intent was to make Commissioner the

Disciplinary Authority

62. In our view, nominating Commissioner as the

disciplinary authority, not specified prior to Act 67 of

1993, and the other amendments declaring that

Commissioner, subject to Section 89, shall be the

appointing authority of all municipal officers and other

municipal employees and that appeal against orders of

penalty/ punishment imposed upon the employees,

whose appointing authority is the Commissioner, would

lie to the Administrator, make the legislative intent clear

that henceforth the Commissioner shall be the

Disciplinary Authority of those whom he can appoint

under Section 92.

63. From the discussion above, it is clear that,- (a)

clause (d) of Section 59, though brought in by

substitution in the 1957 Act, did not relate back to the

27

Section 2(1) of 1957 Act was also amended by Act 67 of 1993 to define Administrator:

“Administrator means the Lieutenant Governor of the National Capital territory of Delhi”

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 51 of 69

date of enforcement of the 1957 Act; rather, it came into

force with effect from 01.10.1993; and (b) the legislative

intent was to make the Commissioner, subject to Section

89, the Appointing Authority as well as the Disciplinary

Authority of all municipal officers and other municipal

employees.

Interpretation of the phrase “may be made”

64. We shall now construe the phrase “subject to any

regulation that may be made in this behalf” employed in

clause (d) of Section 59 as inserted by Act 67 of 1993. The

issue under consideration is whether the declaration that

Commissioner shall be the Disciplinary Authority is

subject to the existing 1959 Regulations or to any

regulation that may be made in future.

65. While construing an amendment, it must be borne

in mind that the legislature knows the existing law when

it enacts a particular piece of legislation.

28

Therefore,

while construing the amended provision, if the words

employed so permit, an interpretation which serves the

28

Shree Bhagwati Steel Rolling Mills v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Another, (2016) 3 SCC 643,

paragraph 21

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 52 of 69

purpose of the amendment must be preferred. This we

say so because the task of interpretation of a statutory

provision is an attempt to discover the intention of the

legislature from the language used,

29

and in case of doubt

the Objects and Reasons of the Act should be taken into

consideration.

30

66. The High Court in the impugned order had noticed

the statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amending

Act and had extracted a portion thereof, which reads as

follows:

“The need for reorganization of administrative and

municipal set up in Delhi was being felt and the matter has

been under the consideration of the Government for some

time. For making an in-depth study, the Government

appointed a Committee to go into the v arious issues

connected with the administrative and municipal set up of

Delhi and to recommend measures, inter alia, for

streamlining of the municipal set up. The Committee on re-

organization of the Delhi set up (popularly known as

Balakrishnan Committee) went into the matter in great

detail and recommended a decentralized municipal

administration.”

67. After extracting the statement of Objects and

Reasons, the High Court proceeded to analyze as under:

“25. From the above, it would be seen that the amendments

to the Act were proposed in 1993, inter alia, on the basis of

the S. Balakrishnan Committee Report - which

recommended measures for, inter alia, streamlining of the

29

Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore v. J.H. Gotla, Yadagiri, (1985) 4 SCC 343, paragraph 46

30

Doypack Systems (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1988) 2 SCC 299

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 53 of 69

municipal set up. Chapter IV of Part 1 of the S.

Balakrishnan Committee Report enlists “Drawbacks and

Deficiencies in the Existing Set-up”. In relation to the Delhi

Municipal Corporation, it was, inter alia stated:

“In 1966, when the elected representatives were made

responsible to some extent for the administration of Delhi

the Act did not confer powers of control or supervision over

the Corporation by the Delhi Administration, despite the

fact that local self-government is a transferred subject. In

the view of some, this has resulted, to some extent, in the

uncoordinated functioning of various services under the

Corporation. It also appears that this shortcoming in the

Corporation set-up coupled with the present scheme of

relationship between the Commissioner of Municipal

Corporation and the officials under him on the one hand

and the Mayor on the other as incorporated in the Act has

contributed to lack of control and coordination which are so

necessary for the efficient functioning of a local body of the

nature of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. Further

details of the deficiency in its working will be found in Part

II of the Report.”

26. Chapter XI in Part-II of the S. Balakrishnan Committee

Report specifically deals with the Municipal Corporation of

Delhi. A perusal of the said report would show that the said

Committee strongly advocated and recommended the

division of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi into several

corporations. The Committee gave several arguments to

support its said recommendations. It observed in paragraph

11.5.7, inter alia, as follows:

“11.5.7. We will now take up for consideration the second

suggestion, namely, that the monolithic Municipal

Corporation of Delhi should be abolished and the municipal

services entrusted to separate municipalities set up at

various centres in Delhi. There are several arguments to

support this, and these are briefly set out below: -

(i) ..; (ii) ..; (iii) …; (iv) …; (v) …;

(vi) We have reasons to believe that, even for the most

dynamic Commissioner, the administration of the

Corporation has become extremely difficult. This is mainly

because of hostile postures reported to have been adopted

by the Councilors towards the Commission er and the

executive wing and also because of the problems posed by

the staff in the Corporation who cannot, under the present

conditions, be easily transferred to other places. As a

result, we have been told, vested interests have developed

among some of the members of the staff dealing with

important segments of work who manage to maintain close

contacts or influence with powerful councilors. Enforcement

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 54 of 69

of discipline has become difficult as a consequence, and

this breeds corruption and inefficiency. If, instead of one

monolithic Corporation, there are a number of smaller

municipalities in Delhi at various centres, it could be

possible for transfers of personnel from one place to

another, thereby restricting the scope for vested interest to

develop at least to some extent.”

27. Thus, it would be seen that the S Balakrishnan

Committee recognized the position that even for the most

dynamic Commissioner, the administration of the

Corporation had become difficult, mainly because of the

hostile postures reported to have been adopted by the

Councilors towards the Commissioners and the Executive

Wing.

28. The Councilors form the elected/ political arm of the

Corporation (See - Section 3 of the Act). The Municipal

Government of the area of the Corporation vests in the

corporation (See - Section 41). Sections 42 and 43 of the

Act set out the obligatory and discretionary functions of the

Corporation. A perusal of these sections show that the

Corporation - which consists of Councilors and Alderman,

is the policy making authority, whereas the Executive

Authority primarily vests in the Commissioner by virtue of

Section 59 of the Act.

29. The Committee also recognizes and documented the

fact that under the then existing dispensation, the staff in

the Corporation could not be easily transferred. The

Committee took note of this situation that vested interests

had developed among some members of the staff dealing

with important segments of work, and they managed to

maintain close contact with, and had influence over

powerful Councilors. The Committee also recognized the

fact that enforcement of discipline had become difficult as

a consequence, and that bred corruption and inefficiency.

The Committee argued that if a number of smaller

municipalities are set up in Delhi at various centres, it

would be possible to transfer the personnel from one place

to another, thereby restricting the scope for vested interests

to develop, at least, to some extent.

30. The aforesaid extracts from the report of the S.

Balakrishnan Committee are extremely telling and relevant

to understand the background in which the Act was

amended by the Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment)

Act, 1993. The reins of the Executive Wing of the

Corporation were placed in the hands of the Commissioner.

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 55 of 69

Yet he could not function effectively due to influences of the

Councilors, who provided a protective shield to the

delinquent municipal officers and other municipal

employees against disciplinary action. The Councilors did

not permit the Commissioner to set his house in order.

Evidently, the parliament recognized the serious structural

deficiencies in the pre-existing Act, inter alia, in relation to

the management and supervision of the working of the

Municipal Officers and other municipal employees, and in

relation to maintenance of discipline and efficiency in the

Corporation. Rather than agreeing to create several smaller

Corporations (as suggested by the S Balakrishnan

Committee Report, inter alia, to deal with the aforesaid

structural lacuna in the Corporation), the Parliament chose

to deal with - more effectively and directly, the aforesaid

problem by, firstly, vesting the power of appointment of

Municipal Officers and other municipal employees (except

those in respect of whom specific provision was made) in

the Commissioner and, simultaneously vesting the power

to act as the Disciplinary Authority - in respect of all

Municipal Officers and other Municipal Employees (except

the specifically excluded ones), in the Commissioner.

31. …

32. …

33. …

34. The amendment, particularly to Sections 59 and 92 of

the Act by the Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment)

Act, 1993, has to be viewed in the context that it sought to

remove several defects and deficiencies in the statutory

scheme with regard to the hierarchical structure of the

Corporation, and the functioning of the Corporation; the

Commissioner, and its officers/ employees. It is the above

noted mischief - as taken note of by the S. Balakrishnan

Committee, which has sought to be remedied by

amendment of, inter alia, Sections 59 (d) and 92 of the Act.

It is in the aforesaid light that the powers vested in the

Commissioner by the amendment to Section 59 have to be

viewed and interpreted.”

68. Based on the purposive intent of the amending Act

and the meaning of the phrase “may be made”, the High

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 56 of 69

Court held that substituted clause (d) of Section 59 would

not be subject to the existing Regulations but to those

that may be made in future.

69. At this stage, we may put on record that there is

no challenge to the observations of the High Court

regarding the object sought to be achieved by the

Amending Act 67 of 1993.

70. In the aforesaid context, we shall construe the true

meaning of the phrase “subject to any regulation that may

be made in this behalf” employed by Parliament in clause

(d) of Section 59, as substituted.

71. In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, ‘may be’ has

been interpreted thus:

“Guarantee of ‘any balance that may be due’, construed by

Pollock C.B., and Martin B. (dissenting, Bramwell B.), as

referring to a future balance (Broom v. Batchelor, 25 L.J.

Ex. 299) Pollock CB said: “‘May be’ is in my judgment,

clearly future. I have been unable to find direct authority

in any dictionary, but in Cruden’s Concordance of the Bible,

from 60 to 80 references are given, and the expression ‘may

be’ is found in various parts of the Bible, nine out of 10 of

which have manifestly a reference to the future, and not to

the past or present, and not one is necessarily future. The

Concordance of Shakespeare gives no references in respect

to the words ‘may and be’. But as far as I can bring my

knowledge of the English language to bear upon the

subject, ‘may be’ is much oftener used with reference to the

future than the past or the present”.

On the other hand, Bramwell B, said “’may be’ is the

present tense, and, prima facie, means ‘now may be’. It is

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 57 of 69

occasionally used in the future tense, no doubt, as, for

instance, ‘may be due today’, or ‘may be due tomorrow’. I

apprehend you may use it to indicate future applications;

but in that case it must be understood as applied in the

present tense. A thing ‘may be black’, or it ‘may be fit to

eat’, or it ‘may be fit to cook’. If you use the words ‘may be’,

without indicating the time, to my mind the expression

applies to the present, or, more correctly, not to a question

with reference to the future”.

“Semble, a testamentary gift to such members of a class as

‘may be born’, has a similar meaning to one where the

phrase is ‘to be born’. In Storrs v. Benbow (22 L.J. Ch. 825),

Cranworth C., said that such a gift, for children, might be

interpreted in three ways--it might mean children (i) in esse

at the date of the will, or (ii) that might come into being in

the lifetime of the testator, or (iii) that might be born at any

time. The last meaning must , generally, be rejected

because ‘a line must be drawn somewhere, otherwise the

distribution of the testator’s estate would be stopped and

executors would not know how to act ’, and the amount

required would be indefinite. The second interpretation,

when expanded to include children en ventre at the death

of the testator, is probably the more general meaning: ‘I

think it clear that the expression ‘may be born’ may include

children already born; but I rather lean to the opinion--

which I collect from the judgment in Early v. Benbow 2 Coll.

342, to have been that of my learned brother--that the

words themselves, in the absence of the context to explain

them, are to be taken as words of futurity” (per Turner L.J.,

Townsend v. Early, 3 D.G.F. & J. 11).”

72. In Vijay Kumar Shukal v. Lakhpat Ram and

another

31

, Pollock C.B. view in Brown v. Batchelor as

quoted in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary (supra) was

adopted to hold that words “such rent as may be

mutually agreed upon between the parties” in sub -

31

(1990) 4 SCC 246, paragraph 7

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 58 of 69

section (4) of Section 29-A

32

of UP Act No.13 of 1972

envisage an agreement after the coming into force of

Section 29-A. The relevant portion of the judgment is

extracted below:

“7. In our opinion, the words “such rent as may be mutually

agreed upon between the parties” in sub -section (4) of

Section 29-A envisage an agreement with regard to rent

entered by the landlord and tenant after the commencing

of Section 29-A. An agreement prior to the commencement

of Section 29-A would not preclude determination of rent

under sub-section (5) of Section 29-A. In this context it may

be mentioned that the words ‘may be’ used in sub-section

(4) of Section 29-A are much oftener used with reference to

the future than the past or the present. In sub-section (4)

of Section 29-A the words ‘may be’ are preceded by the word

‘as’ and are followed by the words ‘mutually agreed upon’

which indicate that the words are used with reference to

the future…”

(Emphasis supplied)

73. Having regard to the interpretation of the words

‘may be’ provided in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary,

which was adopted by this Court in Vinod Kumar Shukal

32

Relevant provisions of Section 29-A read as under:

“29-A. … (2) This section applies only to land let out, either before or after the commencement of this

section, where the tenant, with the landlord’s consent has erected any permanent structure and incurred

expenses in execution thereof.

****

(4) The tenant of any land to which this section applies shall be liable to pay to the landlord

such rent as may be mutually agreed upon between the parties, and in the absence of agreement, the rent

determined in accordance with sub-section (5).

(5) The District Magistrate shall on the application of the landlord or the tenant determine the

annual rent payable in respect of such land at the rate of ten per cent per annum of the prevailing market value

of the land, and such rent shall be payable, except as provided in sub-section (6) from the date of expiration of

the term for which the land was let or from the commencement of this section, whichever is later.

****

(7) The provisions of this section shall have effect, notwithstanding anything to the contrary

contained in any contract or instrument or in any other law for the time being in force.”

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 59 of 69

(supra), and the legislative intent of changing the existing

administrative set up, we are of the considered view that

the phrase ‘subject to any Regulation that may be made

in this behalf’ refers to the Regulations that are made

after the substitution of clause (d) of Section 59 by Act 67

of 1993 and not the existing 1959 Regulations.

74. Besides, if Parliament intended to make newly

inserted clause (d) subject to the existing Regulations, it

would have eschewed words ‘may be’ and could have

simply said ‘subject to the regulations made under this Act’

like in Section 41 of the 1957 Act where, in sub-section

(1) of Section 41, it is stated: “Subject to the provisions of

this Act and the rules, regulations and bye-laws made

thereunder the municipal government of Delhi shall vest in

the Corporation’. Use of the words ‘may be’ before ‘made’

signifies the legislative intent of not making clause (d) of

Section 59 subject to the existing regulations. There is

another reason to support the above conclusion, which

is, if we interpret clause (d) as suggested by the learned

counsel for the appellant, it will render the words ‘may

be made’ redundant or superfluous. Any interpretation

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 60 of 69

which would render some of the words in a statutory

provision nugatory and/or superfluous must be

eschewed

33

. We are, therefore, in agreement with the view

taken by the High Court. Sub -Issue (b) is decided in the

negative.

Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 would

not apply

75. At this stage, we would consider another argument

of the petitioner i.e., Section 24

34

of the General Clauses

Act, 1897 would come to the rescue of the 1959

Regulations since Section 24 applies even to partial

repeal by amendment.

76. In our view, Section 24 would have no application

where the regulations are inconsistent with the re-

enacted statutory provision. Here, by substituted clause

33

Royal Hatcheries Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of A.P. & Ors., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 429, paragraph 8.

34

Section 24. Continuation of orders, etc., issued under enactments repealed and reenacted.-- Where any

Central Act or Regulation is, after the commencement of this Act, repealed and re-enacted with or without

modification, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any appointment, notification, order, scheme, rule,

form or bye-law made or issued under the repealing Act or regulation, shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with

the provisions re-enacted continue in force, and be deemed to have been made or issued under the provisions

so re-enacted unless and until it is superseded by any appointment, notification, order, scheme, rule, form or

bye law, made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted and when any Central Act or Regulation which by a

notification under section 5A of the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874 (XIV of 1874), or any like law, has been

extended to any local area, has, by a subsequent notification, been withdrawn from and re-extended to such

area or any part thereof, the provisions of such Act or Regulation shall be deemed to have been repealed and re-

enacted in such area or part within the meaning of this section.

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 61 of 69

(d) of Section 59, disciplinary authority not specified

earlier in the 1957 Act has been specified subject to any

Regulations that may be made in this behalf. If the

intention of the legislature was not to override the

existing Regulations, they might not have appointed

Commissioner as the disciplinary authority or might not

have used the phrase ‘any Regulation that may be made’,

which implies made after the substitution of clause (d).

Moreover, if we accept the argument of the learned

counsel for the appellant, it would be like subscribing to

the idea that legislature is giving with one hand and

taking it back from the other. In Meera Gupta (Smt.) v.

State of West Bengal and others

35

it was observed that

the legislature cannot be accused to have indulged in

trickery or futility in giving something with one hand and

taking it away with the other. We, therefore, reject this

submission of the appellant.

77. In view of the analysis above, we hold that

consequent to the substitution of clause (d) of Section 59

by Act 67 of 1993, with effect from 01.10.1993,

35

(1992) 2 SCC 494, paragraph 12

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 62 of 69

notwithstanding the existing 1959 Regulations, it is the

Commissioner who is the disciplinary authority of the

appellant and as such competent to impose punishment

of dismissal from service. Issue No.(i) is decided

accordingly.

Issue No.(ii)

78. The next argument on behalf of the appellant is

that if the disciplinary authority as specified in

substituted clause (d) of Section 59 is not construed as

subject to the existing 1959 Regulations, it would give

rise to conflict between Section 59(d), as substituted, and

Section 95(1) of the 1957 Act, or, in other words, render

the words “by such authority as may be prescribed by

regulations” occurring in sub-section (1) of Section 95

meaningless; therefore, to harmonize the two provisions,

the disciplinary authority specified in Section 59(d), as

substituted, must be construed as subject to the existing

1959 Regulations.

79. In G.P. Singh’s Treatise: Principles of Statutory

Interpretation

36

it is written that while construing a

36

Chapter 2 at pages 144-146, 13

th

Edition, published by Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 63 of 69

statute, it must be read as a whole and one provision of

the Act should be construed with reference to the other

provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent

enactment of the whole statute. Such a construction has

the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy

either within a section or between a section and other

parts of the statute. It is the duty of the courts to avoid

‘a head on clash’ between two sections of the same Act

and, ‘whenever it is possible to do so, to construe

provisions which appear to conflict so that they

harmonize’. It should not be lightly assumed that

‘Parliament had given with one hand what it took away

with the other’. The provisions of one section of a statute

cannot be used to defeat those of another ‘unless it is

impossible to effect reconciliation between them’. The rule

of construction is well settled that when there are in an

enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with

each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible,

effect should be given to both. This is what is known as

the rule of harmonious construction. That, effect should be

given to both, is the very essence of the rule. Thus, a

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 64 of 69

construction that reduces one of the provisions to a

‘useless lumber’ or ‘dead letter’ is not harmonious

construction. To harmonize is not to destroy. A familiar

approach in all such cases is to find out which of the two

apparently conflicting provisions is more general and

which is more specific and to construe the more general

one as to exclude the more specific. The question as to

the relative nature of the provisions general or special

must be determined with reference to the area and extent

of their application either generally or specially in

particular situations. The principle is expressed in the

maxims Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant, and

Generalibus Specialia Derogant. If a special provision is

made on a certain matter, that matter is excluded from

the general provision. If two sections of an Act cannot be

reconciled, as they may be absolute contradictions, it is

often said that the last must prevail. But this should be

accepted only in the last resort. However, a more logical

is indicated by Lord Herschell, L.C.: ‘You have to try and

reconcile them as best as you may. If you cannot, you have

to determine which is the leading provision, and which the

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 65 of 69

subordinate provision and which must give way to the

other’.

37

80. In our view, there is no such conflict here because

Section 95 (1) specifies punishments that may be

imposed on a municipal officer or other municipal

employee by such authority as may be prescribed by the

Regulations. By itself it does not specify any disciplinary

authority. Therefore, this provision admits of

specification of the disciplinary authority by the

Regulations. Regulations are piece of subordinate

legislation. What can be achieved by a subordinate

legislation under the Act can always be achieved by an

amendment of the Act by the competent legislature.

Moreover, existence of a Regulation framed under the Act

cannot fetter the legislative power to amend the Act in a

way that it overrides the Regulation. Interestingly, prior

to Act 67 of 1993, the 1957 Act did not specify the

disciplinary authority. Therefore, by virtue of Section

95(1) read with Section 98(1)(d) & (e), the Central

Government, in exercise of powers under Section 480,

37

At pages 151-152 of Principles of Statutory Interpretation (supra)

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 66 of 69

notified the 1959 Regulations. But framing/ notifying the

Regulations did not fetter the power of Parliament to

amend the 1957 Act and thereby specify the disciplinary

authority.

81. In the case on hand, Parliament by substituting

clause (d) of Section 59 has specified the Disciplinary

Authority subject to any regulation that may be made

thereafter. In our view, therefore, Section 59(d), as

substituted, and Section 95(1) have been crafted to

operate in different fields. Section 59(d) provides as to

who would be the disciplinary authority subject to any

regulation that may be made in this behalf whereas

Section 95 (1) specifies punishments that can be imposed

on a Municipal Officer or other Municipal Employees by

such authority as may be prescribed by the Regulations.

So long Regulations are not framed after the amendment

specifying any disciplinary authority other than the one

specified in clause (d) of Section 59, punishments

referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 95 can be inflicted

by the disciplinary authority specified in clause (d) of

Section 59. We, therefore, do not perceive any conflict

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 67 of 69

arising between clause (d) of Section 59, as substituted,

and Section 95 (1) of the 1957 Act by not making the

provisions of clause (d) subject to the existing 1959

Regulations. Issue no.(ii) is answered accordingly.

Issue No.(iii)

82. In view of our answers to Issue Nos.(i) and (ii), we

find ourselves in agreement with the impugned decision

of the High Court and, therefore, Issue No.(iii) is rendered

academic, which we do not propose to address. Suffice

to observe that any view taken to the contrary is hereby

overruled. Moreover, we may put on record that decision

rendered in G.S. Matharoo (supra) was challenged

before this Court through Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.)

Nos. 7932-7933/2012 which was dismissed vide order

dated 26.08.2014 by leaving all questions of law open for

consideration. Therefore, the law laid down in G.S.

Matharoo (supra) has not been affirmed by this Court.

CONCLUSION S

83. Based on the analysis above, we conclude as

under:

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 68 of 69

(a) Clause (d) of Section 59 of the 1957 Act, as

substituted by Act No. 67 of 1993, came into

force on 01.10.1993 and the substituted

provision did not relate back to the date of

enforcement of the provision which it replaced.

(b) The phrase ‘subject to any Regulation that may

be made in this behalf’ used in the substituted

clause (d) of Section 59 of the 1957 Act refers to

the Regulations that may be made after the

substitution i.e., 01.10.1993, and not the

existing 1959 Regulations.

(c) In consequence, the Commissioner was the

Disciplinary Authority on the date when the

appellant was dismissed from service and as

such competent to pass the dismissal order.

(d) Law declared to the contrary by the High Court

in G.S. Matharoo (supra) is overruled.

ORDER

84. In view of our conclusions above, the impugned

judgment of the High Court does not merit interference.

The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. Interim order, if

SLP (C) No.28644 of 2019 Page 69 of 69

any, stands discharged. Pending application (s), if any,

also stand disposed of.

.........................................J.

(Sanjay Karol)

…......................................J.

(Manoj Misra)

New Delhi;

JUNE 17, 2026