2026:HHC:27

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. Revision No. 38 of 2015

Reserved on: 28.11.2025

Date of Decision: 01.01.2026.

Rajinder Singh ...Petitioner

Versus

State of H.P. ...Respondent

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

No

For the Petitioner : Mr Lalit Kumar Sharma,

Advocate.

For the Respondent/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy

Advocate General.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The present revision is directed against the judgment

dated 12.12.2014, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-

II, Shimla, camp at Rohru (learned Appellate Court), vide which

the judgment of conviction dated 07.06.2011 and order of

sentence dated 23.06.2011, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate

First Class, Court No.2, Rohru, District Shimla, H.P. (learned

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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Trial Court) were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in

the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial

Court for convenience.)

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

revision are that the police presented a challan before the

learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an

offence punishable under Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code

(IPC). It was stated that the victim/informant, Phul Kumari

(PW2), was employed as a Chowkidar in the orchard of Rajinder

Singh (the accused). She left the job and started working as a

Chowkidar in the orchard of Jagmal Singh (PW4). Rajinder Singh

owed the informant’s wages of five months. The informant

demanded her wages, but the accused evaded the issue. She went

to the orchard of the accused on 31.07.2009 at about 4 PM and

demanded the money. The accused was sleeping at that time.

She called him. Accused woke up, started beating the informant

and threw her off the Verandah. She sustained injuries. She

narrated the incident to Min Bahadur (PW1) and Jagmal Singh

(PW4), who advised her to make a complaint before the police.

She went to the Police Station and reported the matter to the

police. The police recorded an entry in the daily diary

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(Ext.PW2/A). Dr Anajana (PW3) medically examined the victim

and found that she had sustained multiple injuries. She advised

X-ray, and a fracture of the fourth metacarpal proximal, 1/3

rd

of

the fourth metacarpal was detected in the X-ray. The nature of

the injury was stated to be grievous. The police registered the

FIR (Ext.PW6/C). HC Tenjing Chhering (PW6) investigated the

matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW6/A) and recorded the

statements of witnesses as per their version. After the

completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and

presented before the learned Trial Court.

3. The learned Trial Court charged the accused with the

commission of an offence punishable under Section 325 of the

IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. The prosecution examined 6 witnesses to prove its

case. Min Bahadur (PW1) accompanied the victim to the police

station. Phul Kumari (PW2) is the informant/victim. Dr Anjana

(PW3) medically examined the victim. The victim narrated the

incident to Jagmal Singh (PW4), who advised her to report it to

the police. Constable Trilok Chand (PW5) proved the entry in the

daily diary. HC Tenjing Cheering (PW6) investigated the matter.

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5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section

313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He

stated that the witnesses were interested and deposed against

him falsely. He did not produce any evidence in defence.

6. Learned Trial Court held that the victim’s testimony

was corroborated by the statement of Jagmal Singh (PW4) and

the medical evidence. The injuries sustained by the victim were

found to be grievous. Hence, the accused was convicted of the

commission of an offence punishable under Section 325 of IPC

and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six

months, pay a fine of ₹1000/- and in default of payment of fine

to undergo further simple imprisonment for 15 days.

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by

the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was

decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Shimla,

camp at Rohru ( learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate

Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial

Court that the victim’s testimony was satisfactory. It was duly

corroborated by the medical evidence and the testimony of

Jagmal Singh (PW4). There was no reason to disbelieve the

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victim’s testimony. Learned Trial Court had rightly convicted

the accused and imposed an adequate sentence. No interference

was required with the judgment and order passed by the learned

Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed.

8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed

by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present

revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in

appreciating the evidence properly. The prosecution had failed

to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The victim’s

testimony was highly contradictory. Jagmal Singh (PW4)

admitted in his cross-examination that he was not on speaking

terms with the accused and made the statement at the instance

of the informant. The informant claimed that Vinod Kumar had

witnessed the incident, but he was not examined by the

prosecution. An adverse inference should have been drawn

against the prosecution for withholding him. Dr Anajana (PW3)

admitted in her cross-examination that injuries could be caused

by a fall. No independent witness corroborated the victim’s

testimony, and learned Courts below erred in relying upon the

victim’s testimony. Therefore, it was prayed that the present

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revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the

learned Courts below be set aside.

9. I have heard Mr Lalit Kumar Sharma, learned

counsel, for the petitioner/accused and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned

Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State.

10. Mr Lalit Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the

petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below

failed to properly appreciate the evidence. The victim’s

testimony was contradictory, and no reliance could have been

placed upon it. Jagmal Singh (PW4) was inimical to the accused,

and the possibility of falsely implicating the accused at his

instance could not be ruled out. The Medical Officer admitted in

her cross-examination that injuries sustained by the victim

could have been caused by a fall. There was no unequivocal

corroboration of the victim’s testimony by the medical evidence.

The learned Courts below failed to extend the benefit of the

Probation of Offenders Act to the accused. Hence, he prayed that

the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order

passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. He relied upon

the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanhaiya Lal & Ors

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vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2013 SC 1940, State of Haryana vs. Ram

Singh, AIR 2002 SC 620, Chander Pal vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2002

SC 989, Harijana Thirupala and Ors. vs. Public Prosecutor AIR 2002

SC 2821, Chellammal and another vs. State represented by Inspector

of Police 2025 INSC 540 and State versus Sanjiv Bhalla and another

in Criminal Appeal Nos. 1338-1339 of 2014 decided on 04.07.2014

in support of his submission.

11. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for

the respondent/State, submitted that both the learned Courts

below found the victim to be a credible witness. This is a pure

findings of fact, and this Court should not interfere with the

pure findings of fact while exercising the revisional jurisdiction.

The victim’s testimony was corroborated by the medical

evidence, and the learned Courts below had rightly relied upon

it. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed.

12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204:

(2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional

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court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent

defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page

207: -

“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at

the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent

findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a

detailed appreciation of the material and evidence

brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision

against conviction is not supposed to exercise the

jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of

interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397

of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests

jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the

correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence

or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of

any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the

provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of

jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error

which is to be determined on the merits of individual

cases. It is also well settled that while considering the

same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon

the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those

findings.

14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.

Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC

1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under

Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to

call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the

purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and

regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case.

The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect

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or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which

has crept in such proceedings.

15.It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this

Court in Amit Kapoor v.Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460:

(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, where the

scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly

explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)

“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the

power to call for and examine the records of an

inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as

to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or

order made in a case. The object of this provision is

to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction

or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it

may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise

the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of

careful consideration and appear to be in accordance

with law. If one looks into the various judgments of

this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction

can be invoked where the decisions under challenge

are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with

the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based

on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or

judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or

perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are

merely indicative. Each case would have to be

determined on its own merits.

13. Another well-accepted norm is that the

revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very

limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine

manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it

should not be against an interim or interlocutory

order. The Court has to keep in mind that the

exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not

lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing

with the question as to whether the charge has been

framed properly and in accordance with law in a

given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the

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exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case

substantially falls within the categories aforestated.

Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced

stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”

15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8

SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC

OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to

reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the

absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:

“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of

Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the

revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala

v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC

452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the

revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has

laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)

5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can

call for and examine the record of any proceedings

to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or

propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other

words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory

jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for

correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said

revisional power cannot be equated with the power

of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a

second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore,

it would not be appropriate for the High Court to

reappreciate the evidence and come to its

conclusion on the same when the evidence has

already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well

as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring

feature is brought to the notice of the High Court

which would otherwise tantamount to a gross

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miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the

impugned judgment of the High Court from the

aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in

concluding that the High Court exceeded its

jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the

respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”

13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and

relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court

in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke,

(2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held

that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional

jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the

Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or

there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the

order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that

another view is possible. The following has been laid

down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)

“14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is

perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly

unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any

relevant material or there is palpable misreading of

records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting

aside the order, merely because another view is

possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an

appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional

jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do

justice in accordance with the principles of criminal

jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under

Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that

of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose

decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be

perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or

glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based

on no material or where the material facts are wholly

ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised

arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere

with the decision in exercise of their revisional

jurisdiction.”

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16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh

Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ)

309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:

“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional

jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure

Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of

perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for

the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the

evidence on record.

17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v.

Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it

is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional

Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by

a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a

jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is,

therefore, in the negative.”

17. This position was reiterated in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore

S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:

“27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional

jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of

perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir

Singh(supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for

the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the

evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales

& Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008)

14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that

the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong

order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the

absence of a jurisdictional error.

28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the

absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in

the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the

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concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions

Court.

18. The present revision has to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

19. The victim Phul Kumari (PW2) stated that she had

worked as a Chowkidar with Jagmal Singh (PW4) for 1½ years.

Earlier, she had worked with the accused as a Chowkidar. The

accused owed her the wages of five months. She demanded her

wages, but the accused evaded the issue. She went to the house

of the accused. The accused was sleeping. She called the accused.

The accused woke up, gave her beatings, and threw her off the

Verandha. She sustained injuries, and her finger was fractured.

The incident was witnessed by Vinod. However, he had left the

country and gone to his home in Nepal. She reported the matter

to the police. She stated in her cross-examination that she had

left the employment of the accused and had not settled the

accounts with the accused. She admitted that the accused used to

pay the expenses of her ration. She admitted that Jagmal Singh

(PW4) had advised her to file the complaint. The house of KTC

was located adjacent to the house of the accused, where the

Chowkidar Tek Bahadur used to reside. She admitted that Jagmal

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had taken her to his orchard after concealing this fact from the

accused. She had narrated the incident to Tek Bahadur. She

admitted that she and Raju have no accounts to settle.

20. It was submitted that (her statement in the cross-

examination) she and the accused have no account to settle

makes the prosecution's case highly suspect because, as per the

victim, the incident occurred when she demanded her wages

from the accused. This submission will not help the accused. It

was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prem Prakash v.

State of Haryana, (2011) 11 SCC 687 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 463: 2011

SCC OnLine SC 907  that the statement of a witness has to be read

as a whole, and it is impermissible to rely upon a stray sentence

to discard the prosecution's version. It was observed at page

693:

“19. The evidence, essentially, must be viewed collec-

tively. The statement of a witness must be read as a

whole. Reliance on a mere line in the statement of the

witness, out of context, would not serve the ends of jus-

tice, and the conclusion of the court based on such an ap-

preciation of evidence could be faulted.”

21. The victim categorically stated in her examination-

in-chief that the accused owed her wages for five months. She

stated in her cross-examination that she had not settled the

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account with the accused, which corroborates her version.

Therefore, the statement in her cross-examination that she had

no account to settle will not make her testimony suspect.

22. She admitted in her cross-examination that Jagmal

Singh (PW4) had employed her without informing the accused.

This admission will not make her an unreliable witness because

Jagmal, and not she, was at fault as per the suggestion. Thus, no

advantage can be derived from this admission.

23. She admitted that she was advised by Jagmal to make

a complaint to the police, and she filed the complaint with the

police after this advice. It was submitted that she had made the

complaint at the instance of Jagmal, who has inimical relations

with the accused. This admission will not make the

prosecution's case suspect. The victim is a poor labourer and a

resident of Nepal. She would have no means of knowing the

remedies available to her after she was beaten. Thus, the mere

advice by Jagmal to approach the police does not amount to a

false implication at the instance of Jagmal.

24. Her testimony is corroborated by Dr Anjana (PW3),

who stated that she medically examined the victim and found a

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superficial abrasion at the back of the left ankle and multiple

injuries. She advised X-ray, and the nature of the injury was

stated to be grievous as there was a fracture of the fourth

metacarpal proximal, 1/3

rd

of the fourth metacarpal. The injuries

could have been caused by means of a blunt weapon. She

admitted in her cross-examination that the injury noticed by her

could have been caused by a fall. This admission will not make

the prosecution's case suspect; rather, it will corroborate the

prosecution's version that the accused had thrown her off the

verandah after beating her.

25. Jagmal Singh (PW4) stated that the victim told him

about the beatings given by the accused to her when she had

gone to the accused to demand the wages. She had sustained

injuries. He accompanied the victim and Min Bahadur (PW1) to

the police station and got the entry in the daily diary registered.

He stated in his cross-examination that he was not present on

the spot and no incident had taken place in his presence. He

admitted that he was making the statement at the instance of

Phul Kumari (PW2). He also admitted that victim Phul Kumari

(PW2) had reported the matter to the police at his instance. He

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admitted that he used to talk to the accused, but he was not on

talking terms with him.

26. The testimony of this witness corroborates the

victim’s statement. The victim had narrated the incident to him

on the date of the incident, and his testimony would be

admissible under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act.

27. It was submitted that the admission made by him in

the cross-examination that no incident had occurred in his

presence shows that he is not an eyewitness. This submission

will not help the accused. The prosecution examined him to

corroborate the victim’s testimony and not as an eyewitness.

Thus, the admission made by him in the cross-examination that

the incident had not occurred in his presence will not make the

prosecution's case suspect.

28. He admitted that he was not on talking terms with

the accused. It was submitted based on this admission that he is

an inimical witness and his testimony should not be believed.

This submission will not help the accused. It was laid down by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanhaiya Lal v. State of Rajasthan,

(2013) 5 SCC 655 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 498: 2013 SCC OnLine SC

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375 that the Court should examine the testimony of the

interested witness carefully, and it can form the basis for

conviction, if found reliable. It was observed at page 665:

24. In Hari Obula Reddy v. State of A.P. (1981) 3 SCC 675:

1981 SCC (Cri) 795, a three-Judge Bench has opined that it

cannot be laid down as

“an invariable rule that interested evidence can never

form the basis of conviction unless corroborated to a

material extent in material particulars by independent

evidence. All that is necessary is that the evidence of

the interested witnesses should be subjected to careful

scrutiny and accepted with caution. If, on such scru-

tiny, the interested testimony is found to be intrinsi-

cally reliable or inherently probable, it may, by itself,

be sufficient, in the circumstances of the particular

case, to base a conviction thereon.” (SCC pp. 683-84,

para 13)

25. In Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar (1996) 1 SCC 614: 1996

SCC (Cri) 188 this Court has stated (SCC p. 621, para 15)

that a close relative who is a natural witness cannot be re-

garded as an interested witness, for the term “interested”

postulates that the witness must have some interest in

having the accused, somehow or the other, convicted for

some animus or for some other reason.

29. Min Bahadur (PW1) stated that the victim told him

about the beatings given by accused Rajinder when she had

demanded the wages. He admitted in his cross-examination that

no incident had taken place in his presence. His testimony is

admissible under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act and

corroborates the victim’s testimony.

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30. It was submitted that the prosecution had failed to

examine Vinod Kumar, who was present at the time of the

incident, and an adverse inference should be drawn against the

prosecution for withholding him. This submission cannot be

accepted. Phul Kumari (PW2) specifically stated that Vinod

Kumar had gone to Nepal. Thus, the reason for his non-

examination was duly explained, and no adverse inference can

be drawn for withholding him.

31. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly

relied upon the testimonies of the informant, Jagmal Singh

(PW4) and Min Singh (PW1) and medical evidence to hold that

the accused had beaten the victim.

32. It was submitted that Dr Anjana (PW3) had referred

the victim for X-rays, and the radiologist was not examined to

prove the X-ray. Therefore, there is no evidence of the fracture.

This submission will not help the accused. Dr Anjana (PW3)

categorically stated after the X-ray that the fracture of the

proximal 1/3

rd

of the fourth metacarpal was detected. She

exhibited the X-ray form and the Skiagram. She was not cross-

examined regarding this part of her testimony. Nothing was

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suggested to her that she was incompetent to go through the X-

ray and form an opinion. Her testimony regarding the fracture

has remained unchallenged and cannot be rejected.

33. Her testimony shows that the victim had suffered

grievous injury. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly

held the accused guilty of committing an offence punishable

under Section 325 of the IPC.

34. In Ram Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court

held that the testimonies of the witnesses were not believable

because their conduct was contrary to the statements. In the

present case, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses do not

suffer from any infirmity, and the cited judgment will not help

the accused.

35. In Chander Pal (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court

found that there were various contradictions in the testimony of

the eyewitnesses which made the prosecution's case suspect.

This judgment turned on its facts and will not apply to the

present case.

36. In Harijana Thirupala (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme

Court held that the High Court was in error in disturbing the

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order of acquittal without displacing the reasons assigned by the

learned Trial Court. This judgment applies to an appeal against

acquittal. In the present case, the Court is dealing with a revision

and not an appeal against acquittal; hence, no assistance can be

derived from the cited judgment.

37. In Chellammal (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court

held that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act can be

granted to an accused convicted under Section 498A of the IPC.

38. In Sanjiv Bhalla (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court

held that the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act should

be considered while awarding the sentence.

39. In the present case, the accused gave beatings to the

victim when she demanded the wages due to her. This act of the

accused shows that the petitioner/accused wanted the victim to

work for him without the payment of wages, which is another

form of ‘Begaar’, specifically prohibited by Article 23 of the

Constitution of India. Any leniency in such matters would

encourage the people to violate the constitutional provisions

and shake the foundation of the nation, which is based upon the

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constitution itself. Therefore, no leniency can be shown to the

petitioner in the present case.

40. Learned Trial Court had imposed a sentence of six

months, which cannot be said to be excessive. Considering the

circumstances that a poor, helpless woman was beaten simply

for standing up for her rights to get the wages for the work done

by her, the sentence of six months is adequate, and no

interference is required with the sentence imposed by the

learned Trial Court.

41. No other point was urged.

42. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it

is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed

of.

43. A copy of this judgment, along with the record of the

learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge

1

st

January, 2026

(Nikita)