Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2321 OF 2009

RAJINDER SINGH …APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF PUNJAB …RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

R.F.Nariman, J.

1.The facts of this case raises questions relating to one of

the two great social evils practiced against the women of this

country for centuries. In the facts presented before us, a young

woman consumes pesticide having been driven to do so by

repeated demands being made on her for money by the family

into which she is supposed to merge her identity. Sati and

dowry deaths have plagued this nation for centuries. Sati – the

practice of sending a widow to her husband’s funeral pyre to

burn in it - was first outlawed under British Rule in 1829 and

1

Page 2 1830 under the Governor Generalship of Lord William Bentinck

in the Bengal, Madras and Bombay Presidencies. General Sir

Charles Napier, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces

in India between 1859 and 1861, is supposed to have said to

the Hindu Priests who complained to him about the prohibition

of Sati that “the burning of widows is your custom but in my

country, when a man burns a woman alive, we hang them and

confiscate all their property. Let us both, therefore, act in

accordance with our national customs.”

2.It took free India many years before the Commission of

Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987 was passed by Parliament setting

down various offences relating to the commission of Sati and

the trial of such offences by special courts. In this appeal,

however, we are confronted with the other major problem,

namely, dowry deaths. Parliament responded much earlier so

far as the prohibition of dowry is concerned by enacting the

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 under which minimum sentences

were prescribed as penalty for the giving or taking of dowry.

The specific menace of dowry deaths, however, was tackled by

the introduction of a new provision in 1986 - Section 304B in

2

Page 3 the Penal Code together with another new provision Section

113B of the Evidence Act. These two Sections read as follows:

“304-B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a

woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or

occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances

within seven years of her marriage and it is shown

that soon before her death she was subjected to

cruelty or harassment by her husband or any

relative of her husband for, or in connection with,

any demand for dowry, such death shall be called

“dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall

be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section,

“dowry” shall have the same meaning as in Section

2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be

punished with imprisonment for a term which shall

not be less than seven years but which may extend

to imprisonment for life.”

“113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.—When

the question is whether a person has committed the

dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon

before her death such woman had been subjected

by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in

connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court

shall presume that such person had caused the

dowry death.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,

“dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in

Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

3

Page 4 3.Coming back to the facts of the present appeal, a young

woman, namely, Salwinder Kaur was married to the appellant

Rajinder Singh sometime in the year 1990. On 31

st

August,

1993, within four years of the marriage, Salwinder Kaur

consumed Aluminium Phosphide, which is a pesticide, as a

result of which her young life was snuffed out. On the same

day, an FIR was lodged against the husband, his older brother

and the older brother’s wife. The trial court after examining the

evidence of the prosecution and the defence, acquitted the

appellant’s older brother and his wife but convicted the

appellant under Section 304B and sentenced him to undergo

rigorous imprisonment for seven years, which is the minimum

sentence that can be pronounced on a finding of guilt under the

said Section. This was done after examining in particular the

evidence of PW.2 – Karnail Singh, the father of the deceased

woman, PW-3 – Gulzar Singh, his elder brother and PW-4 –

Balwinder Singh, Sarpanch of the village. The High Court of

Punjab and Haryana confirmed the conviction and the sentence

vide the impugned judgment.

4

Page 5 4.For the purpose of this appeal it is sufficient to set out the

dead woman’s father’s evidence which has been accepted by

the two courts below.

“I have three daughters and two sons, Paramjit

Kaur, Manjit Kaur and Salwinder Kaur are my

daughters. Salwinder Kaur my daughter was

married to Rajinder Singh r/o Bathwala. She was

married to Rajinder Singh four years prior to her

death. After one year of the marriage, my daughter

came to me and told that her husband Rajinder

Singh, the brother-in-law Davinder Singh and

Gurmit Kaur, present in court, are demanding

money for constructing a house. She also informed

me that they were quarrelling with her for the said

demand of money. At the time of marriage of my

daughter, I had given sufficient dowry according to

my status. I told my daughter that at that moment I

am not in possession of money. However, I gave

she-buffalo to my daughter for taking the same to

her in-laws’ house and asked her to pull on with the

parents-in-law. After 7/8 months, when my

daughter was again ill-treated by the accused, she

came to me and again demanded money. The

accused, present in court, were demanding and

compelling my daughter to back with a promise that

I would visit her shortly and on the following day, I

alongwith my brother Gulzar Singh, the then

Sarpanch Balwinder Singh and Ex-Sarpanch

Hazura Singh went to the house of the accused in

village Bathawals. On arrival at the house of the

accused, the accused, present in court, along with

father-in-law of my daughter were present at their

house. Harjinder Singh, my son-in-law along with

Gurmit Kaur and Davinder Singh were also present.

I requested all of them not to quarrel with my

daughter on account of demand of money. I also

5

Page 6 assured the accused that I would pay them the said

amount at the time of harvesting the crop. The

accused insisted about the demand of money. My

daughter Salwinder Kaur visited my house 15 days

prior to her death. I again pacified my daughter that

I would definitely pay the amount after harvesting

the crop. Salwinder Kaur was not happy for not

getting the money from me. She was maltreated by

the accused. After the death of Salwinder Kaur,

member panchayat Harbhajan Singh of V. Bathwala

and Davinder Singh accused came to my house

and informed that my daughter has died after

consuming some poisonous substance and I was

asked to accompany them for cremating the dead

body.”

5.We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Counsel

for the appellant relied upon the cross-examination of Karnail

Singh which is set out hereinbelow:-

“I do not know if Devinder Singh had separate

portion. My daughter had come to me for the first

time 5/6 months after her marriage, but she did not

make any complaint to me regarding the conduct of

the accused persons. She complained to me only

after about a year and she had told me that they

wanted to build a joint house and asked her to bring

money for that purpose. I however did not give any

money to her for this purpose. No written complaint

was ever made to the panchayat. I never talked

about it to Balwinder Singh. It is incorrect to

suggest that no demand of money was ever made

from my daughter or that I have deposed falsely.”

6

Page 7 6.Based on this, learned counsel argued that the link

required between the demand made being connected with the

marriage was snapped as also the fact that since initially, the

complaints were made at long intervals, no offence under

Section 304B could be said to be made out. Counsel for the

State of Punjab reiterated the findings of both courts and

argued in support of the judgment of the High Court.

7.The primary ingredient to attract the offence under

Section 304B is that the death of a woman must be a “dowry

death”. “Dowry” is defined by Section 2 of the Dowry

Prohibition Act, 1961, which reads as follows:

“2. Definition of “dowry”.—In this Act, “dowry”

means any property or valuable security given or

agreed to be given either directly or indirectly—

(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to

the marriage; or

(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by

any other person, to either party to the marriage or

to any other person,

at or before [or any time after the marriage] [in

connection with the marriage of the said parties, but

does not include] dower or mahr in the case of

persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law

(Shariat) applies.

7

Page 8 Explanation I.— [***]

Explanation II.—The expression “valuable security”

has the same meaning as in Section 30 of the

Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

8.A perusal of this Section shows that this definition can be

broken into six distinct parts.

1)Dowry must first consist of any property or valuable

security - the word “any” is a word of width and would,

therefore, include within it property and valuable

security of any kind whatsoever.

2)Such property or security can be given or even agreed

to be given. The actual giving of such property or

security is, therefore, not necessary.

3)Such property or security can be given or agreed to be

given either directly or indirectly.

4)Such giving or agreeing to give can again be not only

by one party to a marriage to the other but also by the

parents of either party or by any other person to either

party to the marriage or to any other person. It will be

noticed that this clause again widens the reach of the

Act insofar as those guilty of committing the offence of

giving or receiving dowry is concerned.

8

Page 9 5)Such giving or agreeing to give can be at any time. It

can be at, before, or at any time after the marriage.

Thus, it can be many years after a marriage is

solemnised.

6)Such giving or receiving must be in connection with the

marriage of the parties. Obviously, the expression “in

connection with” would in the context of the social evil

sought to be tackled by the Dowry Prohibition Act

mean “in relation with” or “relating to”.

9.The ingredients of the offence under Section 304B have

been stated and restated in many judgments. There are four

such ingredients and they are said to be:

(a) death of a woman must have been caused by

any burns or bodily injury or her death must have

occurred otherwise than under normal

circumstances;

(b) such death must have occurred within seven

years of her marriage;

(c) soon before her death, she must have been

subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband

or any relative of her husband; and

(d) such cruelty or harassment must be in

connection with the demand for dowry.

10.This has been the law stated in the following judgments:

9

Page 10 Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350 at

pages 360-361; Bachni Devi & Anr. v. State of Haryana,

(2011) 4 SCC 427 at 431, Pathan Hussain Basha v. State of

A.P., (2012) 8 SCC 594 at 599, Kulwant Singh & Ors. v. State

of Punjab, (2013) 4 SCC 177 at 184-185, Surinder Singh v.

State of Haryana, (2014) 4 SCC 129 at 137, Raminder Singh

v. State of Punjab, (2014) 12 SCC 582 at 583, Suresh Singh

v. State of Haryana, (2013) 16 SCC 353 at 361, Sher Singh

v. State of Haryana, 2015 1 SCALE 250 at 262.

11.This Court has spoken sometimes with divergent voices

both on what would fall within “dowry” as defined and what is

meant by the expression “soon before her death”. In

Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721, this

Court construed the definition of dowry strictly, as it forms part

of Section 304B which is part of a penal statute. The court held

that a demand for money for defraying the expenses of manure

made to a young wife who in turn made the same demand to

her father would be outside the definition of dowry. This Court

said:

10

Page 11 “A demand for money on account of some financial

stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic

expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be

termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is

normally understood. The evidence adduced by the

prosecution does not, therefore, show that any

demand for “dowry” as defined in Section 2 of the

Dowry Prohibition Act was made by the appellants

as what was allegedly asked for was some money

for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing

manure.” (at page 727)

12.This judgment was distinguished in at least four other

judgments (see: Bachni Devi v. State of Haryana (2011) 4

SCC 427 at pages 432 to 434; Kulwant Singh & Ors. v. State

of Punjab, (2013) 4 SCC 177 at page 185; Surinder Singh v.

State of Haryana (2014) 4 SCC 129 at pages 139 to 141 and

Raminder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 12 SCC 582 at

page 586. The judgment was, however, followed in Vipin

Jaiswal v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2013) 3 SCC 684 at

pages 687-688.

13.In order to arrive at the true construction of the definition

of dowry and consequently the ingredients of the offence under

Section 304B, we first need to determine how a statute of this

kind needs to be interpreted. It is obvious that Section 304B is

11

Page 12 a stringent provision, meant to combat a social evil of alarming

proportions. Can it be argued that it is a penal statute and,

should, therefore, in case of ambiguity in its language, be

construed strictly?

14.The answer is to be found in two path-breaking judgments

of this Court. In M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala,

1963 Supp. (2) SCR 724, a Constitution Bench of this Court

was asked to construe Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1947. In construing the said Act, a penal

statute, Subba Rao,J. stated:

“The preamble indicates that the Act was passed as

it was expedient to make more effective provisions

for the prevention of bribery and Corruption. The

long title as well as the preamble indicate that the

Act was passed to put down the said social evil i.e.

bribery and corruption by public servant. Bribery is

form of corruption. The fact that in addition to the

word "Bribery" the word "corruption" is used shows

that the legislation was intended to combat also

other evil in addition to bribery. The existing law i.e.

Penal Code was found insufficient to eradicate or

even to control the growing evil of bribery and

corruption corroding the public service of our

country. The provisions broadly include the existing

offences under Sections 161 and 165 of the Indian

Penal Code committed by public servants and enact

a new rule of presumptive evidence against the

accused. The Act also creates a new offence of

criminal misconduct by public servants though to

12

Page 13 some extent it overlaps on the pre-existing offences

and enacts a rebuttable presumption contrary to the

well known principles of Criminal Jurisprudence. It

also aims to protect honest public servants from

harassment by prescribing that the investigation

against them could be made only by police officials

of particular status and by making the sanction of

the Government or other appropriate officer a pre-

condition for their prosecution. As it is a socially

useful measure conceived in public interest, it

should be liberally construed so as to bring about

the desired object, i.e. to prevent corruption among

public servants and to prevent harassment of the

honest among them.

A decision of the Judicial Committee in Dyke

v. Elliott, cited by the Learned Counsel as an aid for

construction neatly states the principle and

therefore may be extracted: Lord Justice James

speaking for the Board observes at page 191:

“No-doubt all penal Statutes are to be

construed strictly, that is to say, the Court

must see that the thing charged as an

offence is within the plain meaning of the

words used, and must not strain the words

on any notion that there has been a slip,

that there has been a casus omissus, that

the thing is so clearly within the mischief

that it must have been intended to be

included if thought of. On the other hand,

the person charged has a right to say that

the thing charged although within the

words, is not within the spirit of the

enactment. But where the thing is brought

within the words and within the spirit, there

a penal enactment is to be construed like

any other instrument, according to the fair

commonsense meaning of the language

used, and the Court is not to find or make

any doubt or ambiguity in the language of a

13

Page 14 penal statute, where such doubt or

ambiguity would clearly not be found or

made in the same language in any other

instrument.”

In our view this passage, if we may say so,

restates the rule of construction of a penal provision

from a correct perspective.”

15.In Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of

Enforcement, (2005) 4 SCC 530 at page 547, another

Constitution Bench, 40 odd years later, was faced with whether

a corporate body could be prosecuted for offences for which the

sentence of imprisonment is mandatory. By a majority of 3:2,

the question was answered in the affirmative. Balakrishnan,J.

held:

“23. The counsel for the appellant contended that

the penal provision in the statute is to be strictly

construed. Reference was made to Tolaram

Relumal v. State of Bombay [(1955) 1 SCR 158 :

1954 Cri LJ 1333] , SCR at p. 164 and Girdhari Lal

Gupta v. D.H. Mehta [(1971) 3 SCC 189 : 1971

SCC (Cri) 279] . It is true that all penal statutes are

to be strictly construed in the sense that the court

must see that the thing charged as an offence is

within the plain meaning of the words used and

must not strain the words on any notion that there

has been a slip that the thing is so clearly within the

mischief that it must have been intended to be

included and would have been included if thought

of. All penal provisions like all other statutes are to

14

Page 15 be fairly construed according to the legislative intent

as expressed in the enactment. Here, the legislative

intent to prosecute corporate bodies for the offence

committed by them is clear and explicit and the

statute never intended to exonerate them from

being prosecuted. It is sheer violence to common

sense that the legislature intended to punish the

corporate bodies for minor and silly offences and

extended immunity of prosecution to major and

grave economic crimes.

24. The distinction between a strict construction and

a more free one has disappeared in modern times

and now mostly the question is “what is true

construction of the statute?” A passage in Craies on

Statute Law, 7th Edn. reads to the following effect:

“The distinction between a strict and a liberal

construction has almost disappeared with

regard to all classes of statutes, so that all

statutes, whether penal or not, are now

construed by substantially the same rules. ‘All

modern Acts are framed with regard to

equitable as well as legal principles.’ ‘A

hundred years ago,’ said the court in Lyons'

case [Lyons v. Lyons, 1858 Bell CC 38 : 169

ER 1158] , ‘statutes were required to be

perfectly precise and resort was not had to a

reasonable construction of the Act, and

thereby criminals were often allowed to

escape. This is not the present mode of

construing Acts of Parliament. They are

construed now with reference to the true

meaning and real intention of the legislature.”

At p. 532 of the same book, observations of

Sedgwick are quoted as under:

“The more correct version of the doctrine

appears to be that statutes of this class are to

be fairly construed and faithfully applied

15

Page 16 according to the intent of the legislature,

without unwarrantable severity on the one

hand or unjustifiable lenity on the other, in

cases of doubt the courts inclining to mercy.”

16.Concurring with Balakrishnan,J., Dharmadhikari,J. added:

“36. The rule of interpretation requiring strict

construction of penal statutes does not warrant a

narrow and pedantic construction of a provision so

as to leave loopholes for the offender to escape

(see Murlidhar Meghraj Loya v. State of

Maharashtra [(1976) 3 SCC 684 : 1976 SCC (Cri)

493] ). A penal statute has to also be so construed

as to avoid a lacuna and to suppress mischief and

to advance a remedy in the light of the rule

in Heydon's case [(1584) 3 Co Rep 7a : 76 ER

637] . A common-sense approach for solving a

question of applicability of a penal statute is not

ruled out by the rule of strict construction.

(See State of A.P. v. Bathu Prakasa Rao [(1976) 3

SCC 301 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 395] and also G.P.

Singh on Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 9th

Edn., 2004, Chapter 11, Synopsis 3 at pp. 754 to

756.)”

17.And Arun Kumar,J., concurring with both the aforesaid

Judges, followed two earlier decisions of this Court as follows:-

“49. Another three-Judge Bench of this Court in a

judgment in Balram Kumawat v. Union of

India [(2003) 7 SCC 628] to which I was a party,

observed in the context of principles of statutory

interpretation: (SCC p. 635, para 23)

16

Page 17 “23. Furthermore, even in relation to a penal

statute any narrow and pedantic, literal and

lexical construction may not always be

given effect to. The law would have to be

interpreted having regard to the subject-

matter of the offence and the object of the

law it seeks to achieve. The purpose of the

law is not to allow the offender to sneak out

of the meshes of law. Criminal

jurisprudence does not say so.”

50. In M.V. Javali v. Mahajan Borewell &

Co. [(1997) 8 SCC 72 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 1239] this

Court was considering a similar situation as in the

present case. Under Section 278-B of the Income

Tax Act a company can be prosecuted and

punished for offence committed under Section 276-

B; sentence of imprisonment is required to be

imposed under the provision of the statute and a

company being a juristic person cannot be

subjected to it. It was held that the apparent

anomalous situation can be resolved only by a

proper interpretation of the section. The Court

observed: (SCC p. 78, para 8)

“8. Keeping in view the recommendations of

the Law Commission and the above principles

of interpretation of statutes we are of the

opinion that the only harmonious construction

that can be given to Section 276-B is that the

mandatory sentence of imprisonment and fine

is to be imposed where it can be imposed,

namely on persons coming under categories

(ii) and (iii) above, but where it cannot be

imposed, namely on a company, fine will be

the only punishment.”

17

Page 18 18.In keeping with these principles, in K. Prema S. Rao and

another v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao and others, (2003) 1 SCC

217, this Court said:

“The legislature has by amending the Penal Code

and the Evidence Act made penal law more strident

for dealing with and punishing offences against

married women.”

19.In Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam, (2004) 3 SCC 199, in

construing the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, in the

context of Section 498A, this Court applied the mischief rule

made immortal by Heydon’s case and followed Lord Denning’s

judgment in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, where the

learned Law Lord held:

“He must set to work on the constructive task of

finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do

this not only from the language of the statute, but

also from a consideration of the social conditions

which gave rise to it and of the mischief which it was

passed to remedy, and then he must supplement

the written word so as to give ‘force and life’ to the

intention of the legislature.” (at page 213)

The Court gave an expansive meaning to the word

`husband’ occurring in Section 498A to include persons who

18

Page 19 entered into a relationship with a woman even by feigning to be

a husband. The Court held:

“….It would be appropriate to construe the

expression 'husband' to cover a person who enters

into marital relationship and under the colour of

such proclaimed or feigned status of husband

subjects the woman concerned to cruelty or coerce

her in any manner or for any of the purposes

enumerated in the relevant provisions Sections

304B/498A, whatever be the legitimacy of the

marriage itself for the limited purpose of Sections

498A and 304B IPC. Such an interpretation, known

and recognized as purposive construction has to

come into play in a case of this nature. The absence

of a definition of 'husband' to specifically include

such persons who contract marriages ostensibly

and cohabitate with such woman, in the purported

exercise of his role and status as 'husband' is no

ground to exclude them from the purview of Section

304B or 498A IPC, viewed in the context of the very

object and aim of the legislations introducing those

provisions.” (at page 210)

20.Given that the statute with which we are dealing must be

given a fair, pragmatic, and common sense interpretation so as

to fulfill the object sought to be achieved by Parliament, we feel

that the judgment in Appasaheb’s case followed by the

judgment of Kulwant Singh do not state the law correctly. We,

therefore, declare that any money or property or valuable

security demanded by any of the persons mentioned in Section

19

Page 20 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, at or before or at any time after

the marriage which is reasonably connected to the death of a

married woman, would necessarily be in connection with or in

relation to the marriage unless, the facts of a given case clearly

and unequivocally point otherwise. Coming now to the other

important ingredient of Section 304B – what exactly is meant by

“soon before her death”?

21.This Court in Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana (2014)

4 SCC 129, had this to say:

“17. Thus, the words “soon before” appear in

Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 and also in

Section 304-B IPC. For the presumptions

contemplated under these sections to spring into

action, it is necessary to show that the cruelty or

harassment was caused soon before the death. The

interpretation of the words “soon before” is,

therefore, important. The question is how “soon

before”? This would obviously depend on the facts

and circumstances of each case. The cruelty or

harassment differs from case to case. It relates to

the mindset of people which varies from person to

person. Cruelty can be mental or it can be physical.

Mental cruelty is also of different shades. It can be

verbal or emotional like insulting or ridiculing or

humiliating a woman. It can be giving threats of

injury to her or her near and dear ones. It can be

depriving her of economic resources or essential

amenities of life. It can be putting restraints on her

movements. It can be not allowing her to talk to the

outside world. The list is illustrative and not

20

Page 21 exhaustive. Physical cruelty could be actual beating

or causing pain and harm to the person of a woman.

Every such instance of cruelty and related

harassment has a different impact on the mind of a

woman. Some instances may be so grave as to

have a lasting impact on a woman. Some instances

which degrade her dignity may remain etched in her

memory for a long time. Therefore, “soon before” is

a relative term. In matters of emotions we cannot

have fixed formulae. The time-lag may differ from

case to case. This must be kept in mind while

examining each case of dowry death.

18. In this connection we may refer to the judgment

of this Court in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [(2000)

5 SCC 207 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 935] where this Court

considered the term “soon before”. The relevant

observations are as under: (SCC pp. 222-23, para

15)

“15. … ‘Soon before’ is a relative term

which is required to be considered under

specific circumstances of each case and no

straitjacket formula can be laid down by

fixing any time-limit. This expression is

pregnant with the idea of proximity test.

The term ‘soon before’ is not synonymous

with the term ‘immediately before’ and is

opposite of the expression ‘soon after’ as

used and understood in Section 114,

Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. These

words would imply that the interval should

not be too long between the time of making

the statement and the death. It

contemplates the reasonable time which,

as earlier noticed, has to be understood

and determined under the peculiar

circumstances of each case. In relation to

dowry deaths, the circumstances showing

the existence of cruelty or harassment to

the deceased are not restricted to a

21

Page 22 particular instance but normally refer to a

course of conduct. Such conduct may be

spread over a period of time. If the cruelty

or harassment or demand for dowry is

shown to have persisted, it shall be

deemed to be ‘soon before death’ if any

other intervening circumstance showing the

non-existence of such treatment is not

brought on record, before such alleged

treatment and the date of death. It does

not, however, mean that such time can be

stretched to any period. Proximate and live

link between the effect of cruelty based on

dowry demand and the consequential

death is required to be proved by the

prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty

or harassment based upon such demand

and the date of death should not be too

remote in time which, under the

circumstances, be treated as having

become stale enough.”

Thus, there must be a nexus between the demand

of dowry, cruelty or harassment, based upon such

demand and the date of death. The test of proximity

will have to be applied. But, it is not a rigid test. It

depends on the facts and circumstances of each

case and calls for a pragmatic and sensitive

approach of the court within the confines of law.”

22.In another recent judgment in Sher Singh v. State of

Haryana, 2015 (1) SCALE 250, this Court said:

“We are aware that the word ‘soon’ finds place in

Section 304B; but we would prefer to interpret its

use not in terms of days or months or years, but as

necessarily indicating that the demand for dowry

22

Page 23 should not be stale or an aberration of the past, but

should be the continuing cause for the death under

Section 304B or the suicide under Section 306 of

the IPC. Once the presence of these concomitants

are established or shown or proved by the

prosecution, even by preponderance of possibility,

the initial presumption of innocence is replaced by

an assumption of guilt of the accused, thereupon

transferring the heavy burden of proof upon him and

requiring him to produce evidence dislodging his

guilt, beyond reasonable doubt.” (at page 262)

23.We endorse what has been said by these two decisions.

Days or months are not what is to be seen. What must be

borne in mind is that the word “soon” does not mean

“immediate”. A fair and pragmatic construction keeping in mind

the great social evil that has led to the enactment of Section

304B would make it clear that the expression is a relative

expression. Time lags may differ from case to case. All that is

necessary is that the demand for dowry should not be stale but

should be the continuing cause for the death of the married

woman under Section 304B.

24.At this stage, it is important to notice a recent judgment of

this Court in Dinesh v. State of Haryana, 2014 (5) SCALE 641

in which the law was stated thus:

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Page 24 “The expression “soon before” is a relative term as

held by this Court, which is required to be

considered under the specific circumstances of

each case and no straight jacket formula can be laid

down by fixing any time of allotment. It can be said

that the term “soon before” is synonyms with the

term “immediately before”. The determination of the

period which can come within term “soon before” is

left to be determined by courts depending upon the

facts and circumstances of each case.” (at page

646)

25.We hasten to add that this is not a correct reflection of the

law. “Soon before” is not synonymous with “immediately

before”.

26.The facts of this appeal are glaring. Demands for money

were made shortly after one year of the marriage. A she-

buffalo was given by the father to the daughter as a peace

offering. The peace offering had no effect. The daughter was

ill-treated. She went back to her father and demanded money

again. The father, then, went along with his brother and the

Sarpanch of the village to the matrimonial home with a request

that the daughter be not ill-treated on account of the demand

for money. The father also assured the said persons that their

money demand would be fulfilled and that they would have to

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Page 25 wait till the crops of his field are harvested. Fifteen days before

her death, Salwinder Kaur again visited her parents’ house on

being maltreated by her new family. Then came death by

poisoning. The cross-examination of the father of Salwinder

Kaur has, in no manner, shaken his evidence. On the facts,

therefore, the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts

below are upheld. The appeal is dismissed.

………..…..……………………...J.

(T.S. Thakur)

….…..…..………………………...J.

(R.F. Nariman)

….…..…..………………………...J.

(Prafulla C. Pant)

New Delhi,

February 26, 2015.

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