2025 INSC 737

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 603 OF 2025

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO. 11233 OF 2022)

RAJNI APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2569 OF 2025

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO. 7370 OF 2025)

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) DIARY NO. 24862 OF 2022)

J U D G M E N T

UJJAL BHUYAN, J.

This order will dispose of both the criminal appeals.

2. It may be mentioned that by order dated 21.02.2023,

this Court directed tagging of SLP (Crl.) D. No. 24862 of 2022

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with SLP (Crl.) No. 11233 of 2022 out of which the related

Criminal Appeal No. 603 of 2025 has arisen.

3. Since SLP (Criminal) D. No. 24862 of 2022 has been

tagged with Criminal Appeal No. 603 of 2025, separate notice

has not been issued therein as parties are the same with the

issues intertwined and being represented by the same set of

lawyers. Accordingly, both the matters were heard together.

4. In Criminal Appeal No. 603 of 2025, appellant is the

complainant. She has challenged the order dated 13.05.2022

passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of

Judicature at Allahabad (‘High Court’ for short) dismissed

Criminal Revision No. 82 of 2022. It may be mentioned that by

order dated 27.08.2021 the Juvenile Justice Board, Meerut

(‘JJB’ for short) dismissed Miscellaneous Case No. 55/2021

(Akki alias Anmol alias Akshansh alias Goldee Vs. State) filed by

the mother on behalf of respondent No. 2 to declare him as a

juvenile in conflict with law. JJB held that on the date of the

incident i.e. on 17.02.2021, respondent No. 2 was an adult

being more than 18 years of age.

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5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 27.08.2021,

respondent No. 2 through his mother/natural guardian filed an

appeal before the Additional District and Sessions Judge/

Special Judge, Exclusive Court, POCSO Act, Meerut (for short

‘the Addl. Sessions Judge’ hereinafter) which was registered as

Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 2021. By the judgment and order

dated 14.10.2021, learned Addl. Sessions Judge set aside the

order of JJB dated 27.08.2021 declaring that respondent No. 2

was a juvenile delinquent on the date of the incident.

6. Appellant, thereafter, preferred criminal revision

petition before the High Court assailing the aforesaid judgment

and order dated 14.10.2021, which was registered as

Criminal Revision No. 82 of 2022. By the impugned order dated

13.05.2022, High Court held that the date of birth of respondent

No. 2 mentioned in the school certificate is determinative and

did not find any reason to disbelieve or ignore the same.

Accordingly, the criminal revision petition was dismissed

upholding the judgment and order of the Addl. Sessions Judge

dated 14.10.2021.

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7. Against the impugned order dated 13.05.2022,

appellant preferred the related special leave petition (criminal).

This Court, by order dated 18.11.2022, had condoned the delay

and issued notice. Thereafter, in the hearing held on

04.02.2025, leave was granted.

8. In SLP (Crl.) D. No. 24862 of 2022, the challenge is

to the order dated 13.05.2022 passed by the learned Single

Judge of the High Court in Criminal Revision No. 234 of 2022

(Goldee alias Anmol Rana alias Akki alias Akshansh Vs. State of

U.P.). By the aforesaid order dated 13.05.2022 (impugned order),

High Court allowed the criminal revision filed by respondent No.

2.

9. Be it stated that JJB vide the order dated 27.10.2021

declined to grant bail to respondent No. 2. When this order was

put to challenge before the Court of Sessions Judge in Criminal

Appeal No. 67 of 2021, learned Additional District and Sessions

Judge passed an order dated 01.12.2021 declining to grant bail

to respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 2, thereafter, filed

Criminal Revision No. 234 of 2022 before the High Court. By the

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impugned order, High Court allowed the criminal revision and

set aside the order of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. High

Court further directed that respondent No. 2 should be enlarged

on bail on furnishing a personal bond by either of his parents

and in absence of his legal guardian with two sureties each in

the like amount to the satisfaction of the court of Additional

District and Sessions Judge.

10. Aggrieved by the grant of bail to respondent No. 2 by

the High Court, complainant has preferred Special Leave

Petition (Criminal) D. No. 24862 of 2022.

11. At the outset, relevant facts may be briefly noted.

12. Respondent No. 2 is an accused in Crime Case No.

80 of 2021 registered before the Medical College Police Station,

Meerut under Sections 302/201/34 of the Indian Penal Code,

1860 (IPC) as well as Crime Case No. 97/ 2021 registered before

the same police station under Sections 3/25/27 of the Arms Act,

1959 (‘Arms Act’ for short). Natural guardian/mother of

respondent No. 2 filed applications before the JJB relating to

both the crime cases to declare respondent No. 2 as a juvenile.

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The two applications were registered as Miscellaneous Case No.

55/2021 and Miscellaneous Case No. 56/2021 . By the order

dated 27.08.2021, JJB dismissed both the applications

declaring that respondent No. 2 was found to be an adult i.e.

more than 18 years of age on the date of the incident i.e.

17.02.2021.

13. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the JJB,

respondent through his mother/natural guardian preferred

Criminal Appeal No. 67/2021 in the Court of the Additional

District and Sessions Judge/ Special Judge, Exclusive Court,

POCSO Act, Meerut. Learned Additional District and Sessions

Judge passed order dated 14.10.2021 holding that order of JJB

dated 27.08.2021 was contrary to law. Accordingly, the said

order was set aside. While allowing the criminal appeal it was

held that date of birth of respondent No. 2 is 08.09.2003 as per

the school certificate. Thus the age of respondent No. 2 was

below 18 years of age on the date of registration of the first

information report. Accordingly, respondent No. 2 was declared

as a juvenile delinquent on the date of the incident. Appellant

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who is the mother of the deceased and the informant filed

Criminal Revision No. 82 of 2022 before the High Court

assailing the order dated 14.10.2021 passed by the learned

Additional District and Sessions Judge holding respondent

No. 2 to be a juvenile and setting aside the order passed by the

JJB. By the order dated 13.05.2022, High Court held that high

school certificate of respondent No. 2 was available on record.

Therefore, the said certificate ought not to have been ignored by

the JJB. When such certificate was available, there was no

question of seeking medical examination of the accused. Date

of birth mentioned in the certificate is determinative of the age.

High Court did not find any reason to disbelieve or ignore the

same. Holding that order of the learned Additional District and

Sessions Judge was in accordance with facts and law, High

Court declined to interfere with the same and dismissed the

criminal revision.

14. While the proceedings were on for determination of

juvenility of respondent No. 2, bail application of respondent

No. 2 was rejected by the JJB vide the order dated 27.10.2021.

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15. Thereafter, respondent No. 2 preferred Criminal

Appeal No. 86/2021 before the Court of Additional District and

Sessions Judge/ Special Judge, Exclusive Court, POCSO Act,

Meerut against the rejection of bail by JJB. By order dated

01.12.2021, learned Additional District and Sessions Judge held

that no ground was made out to grant bail to respondent No. 2.

Accordingly, the criminal appeal filed by respondent No. 2 came

to be dismissed.

16. Aggrieved thereby, respondent No. 2 preferred

Criminal Revision No. 234 of 2022 before the High Court

assailing the orders whereby his prayer for bail were rejected. By

a separate order dated 13.05.2022, a learned Single Judge of the

High Court opined that gravity of the offence cannot be a ground

to reject the prayer for bail of a juvenile in conflict with law.

Learned Single Judge further observed that there were no

satisfactory materials on record to conclude that the release of

the juvenile would expose him to moral, physical or psychological

danger or that it would bring him to be in the association of

known criminals. Opining that respondent No. 2 deserved to be

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released on bail, the orders of JJB and learned Additional

District and Sessions Judge were set aside. The criminal revision

was allowed. Respondent No. 2 was directed to be enlarged on

bail on furnishing of personal bond by his parents /legal

guardian and subject to the conditions mentioned therein.

17. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the

High Court fell in error in holding respondent No. 2 to be a

juvenile ignoring the materials on record. It is evident that

respondent No. 2 has taken shelter under the provisions of the

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (for

short ‘the JJ Act, 2015’ hereinafter) to defeat the ends of justice.

Respondent No. 2 had committed a heinous offence under

Section 302 IPC and, thereafter, took shelter behind the

reformative provisions of the JJ Act under the guise of being a

minor. In a case of this nature, High Court was required to adopt

the procedure provided under Section 15 of the JJ Act, 2015.

17.1. Learned counsel submits that respondent No. 2 has

got four criminal antecedents. He is a habitual offender, all

involving serious offences.

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17.2. It is further submitted that JJB had rightly held that

respondent No. 2 was not a juvenile and was more than 18 years

of age on the date of the incident. Both the learned Additional

District and Sessions Judge and the High Court committed a

manifest error holding respondent No. 2 to be a juvenile though

medical examination clearly indicated him to be above 21 years

of age.

17.3. Learned counsel further submits that even if we

proceed on the assumption that respondent No. 2 was a juvenile

in conflict with law, both JJB and learned Additional District

and Sessions Judge had rightly denied bail to him. High Court

fell in serious error in granting bail to respondent No. 2.

17.4. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that both the

orders declaring respondent No. 2 to be a juvenile and granting

him bail are required to be appropriately interfered with.

Further submission is that even if we proceed on the

assumption that respondent No. 2 is a juvenile, without

admitting the same, any case of this nature where he is accused

of murder, the provisions relating to Section 15 of the JJ Act are

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required to be followed. She, therefore, seeks appropriate

intervention by this Court.

18. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No. 2

supports both the impugned orders. According to him, both the

learned Additional District and Sessions Judge and High Court

followed the correct procedure mandated under Section 94 of

the JJ Act while holding respondent No. 2 to be a juvenile. He

further submits that when it is a case of juvenile in conflict with

law, the parameters for grant of bail would be entirely different.

This has rightly been observed by the High Court while granting

bail to respondent No. 2.

18.1. Learned counsel submits that respondent No. 2 is on

bail for more than three years now. At this stage, it would be

most inappropriate to interfere with the order of bail.

18.2. He submits that no case for interference is made out

insofar both the impugned orders are concerned: one holding

respondent No. 2 to be a juvenile and the other granting him

bail. Therefore, both the criminal appeals are liable to be

dismissed.

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19. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties

have received the due consideration of the Court.

20. In this case, there are two issues. The first issue is

relating to juvenility of respondent No. 2. The second issue is

grant of bail to him. Insofar the first issue is concerned, though

the JJB held that respondent No. 2 was not a juvenile, the said

decision was overturned by the learned Additional District and

Sessions Judge who held respondent No. 2 to be a juvenile. This

decision has since been affirmed by the High Court. In so far

bail is concerned, both JJB and learned Additional District and

Sessions Judge denied bail to respondent No. 2 after he was

held to be a juvenile. However, High Court granted him bail.

Both decisions have been assailed before this Court by the

informant who is the mother of the victim.

21. Let us first deal with the issue of juvenility. Question

for consideration is whether learned Additional District and

Sessions Judge and the High Court were justified in holding

respondent No. 2 to be juvenile and whether any interference is

called for in such decision?

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22. Section 68 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and

Protection of Children) Act, 2000 empowered the state

government to make rules by notification in the official gazette

to carry out the purposes of the Juvenile Justice (Care and

Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (‘the JJ Act, 2000’). As per the

proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 68, the central government

was also empowered to frame model rules which would apply to

the states also till such time rules were made in that behalf by

the concerned state government; and while making any such

rules so far as practicable to conform to the model rules framed

by the central government.

23. With a view to provide for better implementation and

administration of the provisions of the JJ Act, 2000 in its true

spirit and substance, the central government in exercise of the

powers conferred by the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 68

of the JJ Act, 2000 made the Juvenile Justice (Care and

Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (briefly, ‘the JJ Rules, 2007’)

laying down the fundamental principles to be applied in the

administration of juvenile justice. Rule 12 dealt with the

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procedure to be followed in determination of age. As per sub-

rule (1) in every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict

with law, the court or JJB or the child welfare committee was

required to determine the age of such juvenile or child or a

juvenile in conflict with law within a period of 30 days from the

date of making of the application for that purpose. As per sub-

rule (2), the court or the JJB or the child welfare committee was

required to decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or

the child or the juvenile in conflict with law prima-facie on the

basis of physical appearance or documents if available and send

him to the observation home or to jail, as the case may be.

23.1. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 is relevant. Therefore, the

same is extracted hereunder:

(3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict

with law, the age determination inquiry shall be

conducted by the Court or the Board or, as the case may

be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining-

(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates,

if available; and in the absence whereof;

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(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school

(other than a play school) first attended; and

in the absence whereof;

(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation

or a municipal authority or a panchayat;

(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii)

of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be

sought from a duly constituted Medical Board,

which will declare the age of the juvenile or child.

In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done,

the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the

Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them,

may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the

child or juvenile by considering his/her age on

lower side within the margin of one year.

and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking

into consideration such evidence as may be available, or

the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding

in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified

in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence

whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the

age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with

law.

23.2. Thus, sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 provided that age

determination enquiry should be conducted firstly on the basis

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of matriculation or equivalent certificate. If such a certificate

was not available, then the date of birth certificate from the

school first attended (other than a play school). In the absence

of such a certificate, the birth certificate given by a corporation

or a municipal authority or a panchayat should be the basis.

Clause (b) of sub-rule (3) made it clear that only in the absence

of such certificates as enumerated above, medical opinion

would be sought for from a duly constituted medical board

which would declare the age of a juvenile or a child. In case

exact assessment of age could not be done, the court or JJB or

the child welfare committee, for the reasons to be recorded, if

considered necessary, had the discretion to give benefit to the

child or to the juvenile by considering his/her age on the lower

side within the margin of one year. While passing orders in such

a case, evidence as may be available or the medical opinion as

provided should be taken into consideration before recording a

finding in respect of age.

24. To consolidate and amend the law relating to children

alleged and found to be in conflict with law and children in need

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of care and protection by catering to their basic needs through

proper care etc. by adopting a child friendly approach in the

adjudication and disposal of matters in the best interest of

children and for their rehabilitation etc., the Juvenile Justice

(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (already referred to

as the JJ Act, 2015) came to be enacted. Section 111 is the

repeal and savings clause. As per sub-section (1), the JJ Act,

2000 was repealed.

25. Section 94 deals with presumption and determination

of age. Section 94 reads thus:

94. Presumption and determination of age. —(1)

Where, it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based

on the appearance of the person brought before it under

any of the provisions of this Act (other than for the

purpose of giving evidence) that the said person is a child,

the Committee or the B oard shall record such

observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may

be and proceed with the inquiry under Section 14 or

Section 36, as the case may be, without waiting for

further confirmation of the age.

(2) In case, the Committee or the Board has

reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the

person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee

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or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the

process of age determination, by seeking evidence by

obtaining—

(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or

the matriculation or equivalent certificate

from the concerned examination Board, if

available; and in the absence thereof;

(ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or

a municipal authority or a panchayat;

(iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above,

age shall be determined by an ossification test

or any other latest medical age determination

test conducted on the orders of the Committee

or the Board:

Provided such age determination test conducted on the

order of the Committee or the Board shall be completed

within fifteen days from the date of such order.

(3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board

to be the age of person so brought before it shall, for the

purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that

person.

25.1. Thus the process of age determination is provided in

sub-section (2) of Section 94 which is identical to the procedure

prescribed under sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007.

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Sub-section (2) of Section 94 says that to undertake the process

of age determination, the child welfare committee or the JJB

shall seek evidence in the following manner:

(i) the date of birth certificate from the school or the

matriculation or equivalent certificate from the

concerned Board, if available;

(ii) in the absence thereof, the birth certificate given by

a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat;

(iii) in the absence of (i) and (ii), the age shall be

determined by an ossification test or by any other

latest medical age determination test conducted

on the orders of the child welfare committee or the

JJB.

26. Having noticed the relevant legal framework, let us

examine as to how the case of respondent No. 2 vis-à-vis

juvenility was dealt with by the JJB and thereafter by the

learned Additional District and Sessions Judge. As already

noted above, JJB had held respondent No. 2 to be not a juvenile

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which decision was reversed by the learned Additional District

and Sessions Judge and affirmed by the High Court.

27. At this stage, we need to mention that the date of the

incident is 17.02.2021. On behalf of respondent No. 2,

certificate from the DPS Higher Secondary School, Parvesh

Vihar, Meerut was filed. Date of admission was mentioned as

04.04.2016. Date of birth of respondent No. 2 was mentioned

as 08.09.2003. Respondent No. 2 had passed the high school

examination in the year 2018 from the said DPS Higher

Secondary School, Parvesh Vihar, Meerut. Thereafter, he was

studying in CRK Inter College, Meerut. Therefore, on the date of

the incident, respondent No. 2 was below 18 years of age. In the

register of DPS Higher Secondary School and marksheet of high

school examination, the date of birth of respondent No. 2 was

mentioned as 08.09.2003. JJB in an earlier proceeding relating

to respondent No. 2 i.e. Miscellaneous Case No. 9/2000 in

respect of Crime Case No. 11/2000 under Section 307 IPC,

Police Station Medical College, Meerut had accepted the date of

birth of respondent No. 2 as 08.09.2003. It is seen that in the

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present proceeding JJB examined mother of respondent No. 2

who had filed the application to declare her son, respondent No.

2, as juvenile. JJB observed that she did not remember in which

school respondent No. 2 had studied from Class 1 to Class 7

before taking admission in DPS Higher Secondary School in

Class 8. In her statement, Principal of DPS Higher Secondary

School, Smt. Manju Mala Sharma stated that she was working

in the same school since the year 1996 and asserted that

respondent No. 2 had obtained his education from her school

from Class 4 to High School but original record of Class 4 to

Class 8 were not available as those were destroyed due to fire.

27.1. JJB also rejected the birth certificate of Meerut

Municipal Corporation which showed the date of birth of

respondent No. 2 as 08.09.2003 on the ground that it was

issued on 08.06.2020.

27.2. As regards the earlier decision of JJB, it was observed

that the present informant was not a party therein. Therefore,

she had no opportunity to tender evidence or to rebut the claim

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of juvenility of respondent No. 2. Thus the previous decision of

JJB was not applicable.

27.3. It was in that context, JJB passed an order for

medical examination of respondent No. 2. In compliance to such

order, the Medical Board submitted report on 27.07.2021

assessing the age of respondent No. 2 as about 21 years.

27.4. JJB accepted the medical report dated 27.07.2021

wherein age of respondent No. 2 was assessed as about 21 years.

On that basis, respondent No. 2 was found to be more than 18

years of age on the date of the incident. Thus respondent No. 2

was held to be an adult as on 17.02.2021 i.e. the date of the

incident.

28. Admittedly, the line of reasoning adopted by the JJB

is totally fallacious. When the concerned birth certificate from

the school was available as well as birth certificate issued by

the Meerut Municipal Corporation, JJB could not have opted

for ossification test. The statute is very clear that only in the

absence of the certificates under clause (i) and clause (ii) of sub-

section (2) of Section 94 can the JJB order for an ossification

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test or any other medical test to determine the age of the

juvenile. The certificate of the Meerut Municipal Corporation

was issued on 08.06.2020 before the date of the incident. In any

event, it was not open to the JJB to go behind the available

school certificate or the birth certificate of the Corporation and

record evidence to examine the correctness or otherwise of such

certificate. This is not the mandate of Section 94(2) of the JJ Act,

2015. Therefore, the learned Additional District and Sessions

Judge was justified in reversing such decision of the JJB.

Learned Additional District and Sessions Judge gave preference

to the date of birth of respondent No. 2 mentioned in the high

school certificate wherein his date of birth was mentioned as

08.09.2003. Thus, respondent No. 2 was 17 years 3 months 10

days on the date of the incident. Accordingly, he was declared

as a juvenile delinquent.

29. But there is a more fundamental issue here. In an

earlier proceeding being Miscellaneous Case No. 9/2000 arising

out of Crime Case No. 11/2000 registered under Section 307

IPC in the Medical College Police Station, Meerut, JJB had

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accepted the date of birth of respondent No. 2 as 08.09.2003. It

is not open to the JJB to say in subsequent proceeding that date

of birth of respondent No. 2 is not 08.09.2003 and thereafter

proceed to have the opinion of the medical board. If this is

permitted, it will amount to reviewing its earlier order. The JJ

Act, 2015 confers no such power of review upon the JJB. It is

trite law that power of review is either statutorily conferred or

by necessary implication. No such power of JJB is traceable

under the JJ Act, 2015.

30. High Court accepted the high school certificate of

respondent No. 2 and held that there is no scope to interfere

with the order of the learned Additional District and Sessions

Judge.

31. In Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of U.P.

1, this Court

after considering a catena of previous decisions of this Court

held as follows:

33. * * * * * *

1

(2022) 8 SCC 602

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33.1. A claim of juvenility may be raised at any

stage of a criminal proceeding, even after a final

disposal of the case. A delay in raising the claim of

juvenility cannot be a ground for rejection of such

claim. It can also be raised for the first time before

this Court.

33.2. An application claiming juvenility could be

made either before the court or the JJ Board.

33.2.1. When the issue of juvenility arises before a

court, it would be under sub-sections (2) and (3) of

Section 9 of the JJ Act, 2015 but when a person is

brought before a committee or JJ Board, Section 94

of the JJ Act, 2015 applies.

33.2.2. If an application is filed before the court

claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2)

of Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be

applied or read along with sub-section (2) of Section

9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording

a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as

may be.

33.2.3. When an application claiming juvenility is

made under Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 before

the JJ Board when the matter regarding the alleged

commission of offence is pending before a court,

then the procedure contemplated under Section 94

of the JJ Act, 2015 would apply. Under the said

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provision if the JJ Board has reasonable grounds for

doubt regarding whether the person brought before

it is a child or not, the Board shall undertake the

process of age determination by seeking evidence

and the age recorded by the JJ Board to be the age

of the person so brought before it shall, for the

purpose of the JJ Act, 2015, be deemed to be true

age of that person. Hence the degree of proof

required in such a proceeding before the JJ Board,

when an application is filed seeking a claim of

juvenility when the trial is before the criminal court

concerned, is higher than when an inquiry is made

by a court before which the case regarding the

commission of the offence is pending (vide Section 9

of the JJ Act, 2015).

33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the

burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy

the court to discharge the initial burden. However,

the documents mentioned in Rules 12(3)(a)(i), (ii)

and (iii) of the JJ Rules, 2007 made under the JJ

Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of Section 94 of the JJ

Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie

satisfaction of the court. On the basis of the

aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility

may be raised.

33.4. The said presumption is however not

conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same

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may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the

opposite side.

33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a court is

not the same thing as declaring the age of the person

as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the

case is pending for trial before the criminal court

concerned. In case of an inquiry, the court records

a prima facie conclusion but when there is a

determination of age as per sub -section (2) of

Section 94 of the 2015 Act, a declaration is made on

the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the

JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the

person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof

in an inquiry is different from that required in a

proceeding where the determination and declaration

of the age of a person has to be made on the basis

of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy

of such acceptance.

33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay

down an abstract formula to determine the age of a

person. It has to be on the basis of the material on

record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by

the parties in each case.

33.7. This Court has observed that a hypertechnical

approach should not be adopted when evidence is

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adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the

plea that he was a juvenile.

33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence,

the court should lean in favour of holding the

accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is

in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act,

2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict

with law. At the same time, the court should ensure

that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to

escape punishment after having committed serious

offences.

33.9. That when the determination of age is on the

basis of evidence such as school records, it is

necessary that the same would have to be

considered as per Section 35 of the Evidence Act,

inasmuch as any public or official document

maintained in the discharge of official duty would

have greater credibility than private documents.

33.10. Any document which is in consonance with

public documents, such as matriculation certificate,

could be accepted by the court or the JJ Board

provided such public document is credible and

authentic as per the provisions of the Evidence Act

viz. Section 35 and other provisions.

33.11. Ossification test cannot be the sole criterion

for age determination and a mechanical view

29

regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted

solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological

examination. Such evidence is not conclusive

evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be

considered in the absence of documents mentioned

in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.

32. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in P. Yuvaprakash

Vs. State

2 held thus:

14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates

that the date of birth certificate from the school or

matriculation or equivalent certificate by the

concerned examination board has to be firstly

preferred in the absence of which the birth

certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal

Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in

the absence of these such documents the age is to

be determined through “an ossification test” or “any

other latest medical age determination test”

conducted on the orders of the concerned authority,

i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present

case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not

the date of birth certificate or matriculation or

equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e.,

the school transfer certificate showed the date of

2

2023 INSC 676

30

birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the

transfer certificate was produced not by the

prosecution but instead by the court summoned

witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the

prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore,

the prosecution could not have been fallen back

upon a document which it had never relied upon.

Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official

(Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the

records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and

deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the

description of any class of documents mentioned in

Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate,

Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that

M was below 18 years at the time of commission of

the offence.

33. A great deal of reliance was placed by the appellant

on a recent decision of this Court in Union Territory of J&K Vs.

Shubam Sangra

3. In that case, a two-Judge Bench of this Court

had set aside the order of the High Court affirming the order of

the Chief Judicial Magistrate declaring the respondent as a

juvenile. While date of birth of the respondent was shown and

3

(2022) INSC 1205

31

claimed as 23.10.2002, it was found from the record that no

such delivery of the mother of the respondent had taken place

on 23.10.2002 in the municipal hospital. It was in that context,

the Bench observed that there was no good reason to overlook

or ignore or doubt the credibility of the medical opinion given by

a team of 5 qualified doctors all of whom said in unison that on

the basis of physical, dental and radiological examination,

approximate age of the respondent was between 19 and 23

years. The Bench made it clear that the documents evidencing

date of birth of the respondent did not inspire any confidence

and, therefore, there was no other option but to fall back on the

report of the medical board.

33.1. Even while holding so, the Bench observed that if

there is a clear and unambiguous case in favour of the juvenile

in conflict with law that he was a minor on the date of the

incident and that the documentary evidence atleast prima-facie

establish the same, he would be entitled to the special

protection under the Juvenile Justice Act.

32

34. The facts in Shubam Sangra (supra) and the present

case are clearly distinguishable. In the present case, the JJB

itself had accepted in a previous proceeding, the date of birth of

respondent No. 2 to be 08.09.2003 but the ground given for not

accepting the same is that the present informant was not a

party to the said proceeding and therefore she had no occasion

to raise her objection. The earlier proceeding arose out of a

different incident where the appellant was not the informant.

Therefore, she could not have been a party to such proceeding.

Such convulated logic of the JJB was rightly reversed by the

learned Additional District and Sessions Judge and affirmed by

the High Court.

35. Under the scheme of the JJ Act, 2015, a declaration

of juvenility may not by itself enure to the benefit of the juvenile

in conflict with law. Section 2 (33) of the JJ Act, 2015 defines

‘heinous offences’ to include the offences for which the

minimum punishment under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)

or any other law for the time being in force is imprisonment for

seven years or more. Section 15 of the JJ Act, 2015 deals with

33

preliminary assessment into heinous offences alleged to have

been committed by a juvenile by the JJB. Section 15 reads as

under:

15. Preliminary assessment into heinous offences

by Board -

(1) In case of a heinous offence alleged to have been

committed by a child, who has completed or is above

the age of sixteen years, the Board shall conduct a

preliminary assessment with regard to his mental and

physical capacity to commit such offence, ability to

understand the consequences of the offence and the

circumstances in which he allegedly committed the

offence, and may pass an order in accordance with the

provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 18:

Provided that for such an assessment, the Board

may take the assistance of experienced psychologists

or psycho-social workers or other experts.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, it is

clarified that preliminary assessment is not a trial, but

is to assess the capacity of such child to commit and

understand the consequences of the alleged offence.

(2) Where the Board is satisfied on preliminary

assessment that the matter should be disposed of by

the Board, then the Board shall follow the procedure,

as far as may be, for trial in summons case under

the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974):

34

Provided that the order of the Board to dispose of

the matter shall be appealable under sub-section (2) of

Section 101:

Provided further that the assessment under this

section shall be completed within the period specified

in Section 14.

36. Thus, what Section 15 contemplates is that in a case

of heinous offence alleged to have been committed by a juvenile

who has completed or is above 16 years of age, the JJB shall

conduct a preliminary assessment with regard to his mental

and physical capacity to commit such offence, ability to

understand the consequences of the offence and the

circumstances in which he had allegedly committed the offence

and, thereafter, pass an order in accordance with the provisions

of sub-section (3) of Section 18. The proviso says that for

making such an assessment, the JJB may take the assistance

of experienced psychologists or psycho-social workers or other

experts.

37. Section 18 deals with orders regarding child found to

be in conflict with law. We are concerned with sub-section (3)

35

which says that where the JJB after preliminary assessment

under Section 15 passes an order that there is a need for trial

of the said child as an adult, then the JJB may order transfer

of the trial of the case to the Children’s Court having jurisdiction

to try such offences.

38. As per Section 19(1), after receipt of preliminary

assessment from the JJB under Section 15, the Children’s

Court may decide whether there is need for trial of the child as

per provisions of Cr.P.C. or there is no need for trial of the child

as an adult. Depending upon the decision taken, the process

laid down from sub-section (2) to sub-section (5) of Section 19

shall be carried out.

39. It has come on record (Annexure-P/9 in Criminal

Appeal No. 603 of 2025) that JJB in Miscellaneous Case No.

58/2021 had carried out the preliminary assessment under

Section 15 of the JJ Act, 2015. JJB noted that learned

Additional District and Sessions Judge vide the order dated

14.10.2021 had assessed the age of respondent No. 2 as 17

years 3 months and 10 days on the date of the incident which

36

is less than 18 years and therefore declared respondent No. 2

as a juvenile delinquent. Since the crime allegedly committed by

the juvenile delinquent is of heinous nature and the age of

respondent No. 2 being between 16 to 18 years, JJB conducted

the preliminary assessment with regard to the mental and

physical capacity of respondent No. 2 to commit such offence,

ability to understand the consequences of the offence and the

circumstances in which he allegedly committed the offence. In

the course of the preliminary assessment, report of psychiatrist

as well as social survey report from the District Probation Officer

were called for and examined. Thereafter, JJB found that

respondent No. 2 was physically and mentally fit and mature

enough to commit the alleged offence and that he was

competent to understand the consequences of the offence.

Therefore, an order was passed on 10.12.2021 under Section

18(3) of the JJ Act, 2015 to the effect that respondent No. 2 be

sent to and produced before the Juvenile Court/POCSO Court.

37

40. There is nothing on record to show that the said order

of JJB dated 10.12.2021 has been assailed by respondent No.

2 in any proceeding.

41. Be that as it may, we may now proceed to the second

issue which is relating to grant of bail to respondent No. 2. It

may be mentioned that respondent No. 2 had filed a bail

application before the JJB which was dismissed vide order

dated 27.10.2021. As against this, respondent No. 2 preferred

Criminal Appeal No. 86/2021 before the learned Additional

District and Sessions Judge who was also the Special Judge of

the POCSO Court. Learned Additional District and Sessions

Judge vide order dated 01.12.2021 dismissed the criminal

appeal by holding that there was no good ground to grant bail

to respondent No. 2. High Court by order dated 13.05.2022

granted bail to respondent No. 2 subject to the conditions

mentioned therein.

42. Three years have gone by since respondent No. 2 was

granted bail. Nothing has been placed on record to show that

respondent No. 2 has misused the liberty granted to him. If that

38

be the position, we are of the view that it would not be just and

proper to interfere with the order of bail at this stage. Of course,

it is always open to the appellant as well as to the State to seek

cancellation of bail in the event respondent No. 2 misuses the

liberty granted to him. Subject to the above, no case for

interference in the order of bail is made out.

43. Thus having regard to the discussions made above,

we find no good reason to interfere with the impugned orders.

Both the appeals are accordingly dismissed. However, there

shall be no order as to cost.

………………………………J.

[ABHAY S. OKA]

.……………………………J.

[UJJAL BHUYAN]

NEW DELHI;

MAY 20, 2025.