A woman filed a complaint against a man with whom she had been in a relationship for sixteen years. She alleged that he had engaged in sexual relations with her ...
2025 INSC 308 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2025
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.) NO(S). 8549 OF 2023)
RAJNISH SINGH @ SONI ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Mehta, J.
1. Heard.
2. Leave granted.
3. The appellant herein has preferred the instant appeal by
special leave, assailing the order dated 24
th April, 2023, passed by
the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad
1 dismissing the petition filed by the appellant, being
Application U/S 482 No. 43177 of 2022, for quashment of the
proceedings of Criminal Case No. 1246 of 2022 arising out of
chargesheet in Case Crime No. 269 of 2022 under Sections 376,
1
Hereinafter, referred to as ‘High Court’.
2
384, 323, 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
2 at Police
Station Bakewar, District Etawah.
4. Brief facts relevant and essential for the disposal of the
present appeal are reproduced hereinbelow.
5. Ms. A, respondent No. 2-complainant
3, lodged an FIR in Case
Crime No. 269 of 2022 dated 5
th July, 2022, against the appellant
at Police Station Bakewar, District Etawah alleging, inter alia, that
she is a resident of village Kudaria and was qualified with degrees
in M.Com and B.Ed. and since 2008, she had been serving on the
post of Lecturer in AFS Bhemora College in Lucknow.
6. It was alleged that the accused, appellant herein, sometime
in the year 2006, sneaked into the house of the complainant in the
night and subjected her to forcible sexual intercourse. She was
neither able to scream nor could call out for help as the appellant
had gagged her mouth due to which her parents, who were also
present in the house, were unable to get a wind of the incident.
She warned the appellant that she would disclose about the
incident to her family members , upon which the appellant
apologised profoundly and requested her to remain quiet and gave
her an assurance of marriage. The complainant, therefore, neither
2
Hereinafter, being referred to as ‘IPC’.
3
For short, ‘complainant’.
3
lodged any complaint nor did she take other action in respect of
the incident of sexual assault upon her.
7. The appellant initially, was working as a constable in the
police department. Later, in 2009, he joined as a Clerk in the State
Bank of India in Dhani branch of Maharajganj district. In the
intervening period, the intimacy between the appellant and the
complainant continued to flourish. The appellant had once called
the complainant to Maharajganj, where he made her to consume
some intoxicant mixed with ENO, without her knowledge, which
made her semi-conscious. Taking advantage, the appellant
subjected her to forcible sexual intercourse. He not only video-
graphed the offending acts but later, showed it to the complainant
when she regained consciousness. The complainant, fearing
retribution in society, did not share information about the said
incident with anyone. Subsequently, the complainant became
pregnant which was confirmed with a pregnancy detection kit.
When this information came to the knowledge of the appellant, he
mixed some medication in water and made the complainant to
drink it in order to cause miscarriage. Since the appellant
continuously blackmailed and threatened the complainant using
the obscene video, she did not tell anyone about the abortion.
4
8. The complainant had initially gone to meet the appellant out
of her own free will, but the appellant, later on, pressurised her
under the threat of making the obscene video/pictures viral. She
would therefore, meet him only with the objective of collecting the
video from him so that she could delete it. In 2015, the appellant
called the complainant to Pratapgarh and threatened her that if
she did not accede to his demands, he would make the video viral.
9. Additionally, it was also alleged in the FIR that the appellant
forcibly took money from the complainant on a number of
occasions. In 2011, the appellant had taken a cheque of
Rs.94,000/- from the complainant, however, he did not return a
dime to her. As the appellant threatened her by using the obscene
video of intimate relations that he possessed, she did not complain
to anyone, about the aforesaid criminal acts that had taken place
with her between the years 2006 to 2021.
10. In 2021, a woman, named Namrata, entered into the life of
the appellant, whereupon the complainant filed a complaint with
Lucknow Commissionerate. However, she was advised to go to
Etawah Police Station. Thereupon, she lodged a complaint against
the appellant at the One Stop Centre, Lalitpur on 23
rd March, 2022
which was closed based upon an agreement entered into between
5
the complainant and the appellant, wherein they both agreed to
marry each other. However, on 22
nd April, 2022, the appellant
resiled from his promise and married Namrata. When the factum
of appellant’s marriage came to the complainant’s knowledge, she
immediately shared the information of the illegal acts and
incidents of sexual assaults by the appellant with her family
members and the people of her community. Later, when she
decided to take police action, the appellant along with his brother-
Ashwani and father-Rajbahadur made an attempt to cause harm
to her parents. On 1
st May, 2022, the appellant barged into her
house, in the presence of her parents, and threatened that she
would be killed if she continued with the legal cases filed by her.
11. Based on the above allegations, an FIR
4 dated 5
th July, 2022,
came to be registered against the appellant for the offences
punishable under Sections 313, 376, 384, 323, 504 and 506 of IPC
and investigation was commenced. Almost similar allegations were
set in the statements of the complainant recorded under Sections
161 and 164 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
5 and in addition,
she further stated that upon discovering that the appellant had
developed relations with Namrata, she had disclosed everything to
4
FIR No. 269 of 2022.
5
Hereinafter, referred to as ‘CrPC’.
6
her but in spite thereof, Namrata got married to appellant on 22
nd
April, 2022.
12. Consequent to the completion of the investigation, the police
submitted a report under Section 173(2) CrPC dated 29
th
September, 2022, against the appellant for the offences punishable
under Sections 376, 384, 323, 504 and 506 IPC in the Court of
learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. -04,
Etawah. Vide order dated 10
th November, 2022, the learned
Magistrate took cognizance for the above offences and issued
summons to the appellant. Aggrieved, the appellant filed a criminal
petition under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 1246 of 2022 in the High Court.
The quashing petition stands rejected vide order dated 24
th April,
2023, which is assailed in this appeal by special leave.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT: -
13. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently and fervently
urged that the entire case as set out in the impugned FIR and the
chargesheet is false and cooked up. The complainant is a major
educated girl, who was fully conscious of the consequences of the
intimate relationship which flourished between her and the
appellant for a period of almost 16 years. The acts of repeated
7
intimacy and sexual relations were totally consensual in nature
and were not established under any false promise, threat, duress
or coercion. The appellant all along intended to marry the
complainant. He thus, urged that the case of a prolonged
voluntary relationship/love affair between two consenting adults
has been given a colour of forcible sexual intercourse with oblique
purposes and motive.
14. Learned counsel further submitted that, as a matter of fact,
the appellant and the complainant had performed the rituals of
marriage with each other during the subsistence of their love affair
which extended to over one and a half decade. However, the
relationship went sour leading to the strife and culminated into the
FIR. In this regard, he placed reliance on the application dated 25
th
May, 2022, given by the complainant to the Senior Superintendent
of Police, Etawah and urged that the said application was filed
prior to the lodging of the FIR, wherein the complainant had
categorically mentioned her marital status as the wife of the
appellant. She had also alleged in the complaint that her husband,
i.e., the appellant herein, had refused to keep her with him.
15. Learned counsel urged that it is a case of voluntary sexual
relationship between two consenting adults and hence, the
8
proceedings of the criminal case registered against the appellant
for the aforesaid offences, tantamount to a gross abuse of the
process of law and therefore, the same deserve to be quashed.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS: -
16. Per contra, learned counsel for the State and learned counsel
appearing for the complainant have vehemently opposed the
submissions advanced by the counsel for the appellant. They
urged that the appellant won over the confidence of the
complainant by giving her false assurances of marriage and based
on such promise he sexually exploited her, when in fact, he had
no intentions to marry her. After subjecting the complainant to
forcible sexual intercourse repeatedly over a period of almost 15
years, the appellant ditched her and married another woman.
17. Learned counsel further contended that the appellant had
also recorded intimate videos and pictures of the complainant and
blackmailed her under the threat of making them viral. They,
urged that the High Court was justified in dismissing the criminal
petition filed by the appellant and hence, sought rejection of the
present appeal.
9
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION: -
18. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions
advanced at the bar and have carefully gone through the impugned
judgment and the material placed on record.
19. The allegation that the appellant spiked the complainant’s
drink and caused her miscarriage stand s refuted as the
Investigation Officer has deleted Section 313 IPC while submitting
the police report under Section 173(2) CrPC dated 29
th September,
2022. Further, Investigation Officer also concluded that the
involvement of the other co-accused, i.e., the relatives of the
appellant who were arraigned by the complainant in the FIR, was
not substantiated by any reliable evidence and thus, the
chargesheet was only submitted against the appellant.
20. Therefore, we have to consider whether in the facts and
circumstances of the present case, the appellant is liable to be
prosecuted for committing rape upon the complainant by giving
her a false promise of marriage.
21. There is no dispute that the complainant, a highly qualified
female, was major at the time when her relationship with the
appellant sprouted. The first act of sexual intercourse between the
appellant and the complainant is alleged to have taken place in the
10
year 2006 and that too in her own house. However, at that time,
the complainant did not make any complaint to anyone, including
her own family members , that the appellant had established
sexual relations with her based on an express promise to marry
her in future. It needs to be highlighted that the complainant
categorically came out with a case in the FIR that the first act of
sexual relation between her and the appellant (albeit forcible as
per the complainant) took place in her own house where her
parents were also present. The very manner in which this incident
is said to have taken place, puts the case of the complainant under
serious doubt. It is difficult to swallow that the complainant, a
well-qualified major girl, was subjected to forcible sexual
intercourse by an outsider in her own house where her parents
were present and still, they did not get a whiff about the incident.
Thus, the complainant’s allegations seem to be a well-orchestrated
story and nothing beyond that.
22. It was nearly 16 years since the first incident, in a highly
belated FIR, that the complainant alleged, for the first time, that
the appellant, who was on friendly terms with her, forcibly
subjected her to sexual intercourse in the year 2006. Further, she
also stated that though she initially protested to this act and
11
intended to report the matter to the police, she changed her mind
trusting the appellant’s assurance that he loved her and if she
refrained from spilling the beans, he would marry her. Under this
guise, the appellant continued to establish sexual relations with
the complainant.
23. Admittedly, the appellant got a job in the year 2006 as a
Constable in the police department and was posted in a different
town. The complainant alleged that whenever the appellant would
visit the village Kudaria, he would establish sexual relations with
her under the promise of marriage. However, she has not clarified
or elaborated when and where these acts of fornication took place.
In the year 2008, the complainant came to be appointed as a
Lecturer in the Kendriya Vidyalaya whereas, the appellant in the
year 2009, got a job as a Clerk in the State Bank of India. As per
the complainant, in the year 2009, the appellant called her to his
residence in the town Farinda, Anand Nagar, where he mixed
certain intoxicating substance in her drink and thereafter,
subjected her to sexual assault and while she was in the state of
drug induced stupor, he recorded her obscene videos and pictures.
He, thereafter, sent offensive messages to the complainant on
WhatsApp, threatening that he would make her videos and
12
pictures viral unless she continued to have sexual relations with
him.
24. It does not stand to reason that when the intimate relations
were continuing between the parties without any hitch for more
than three years, then why would the appellant be impelled to take
the trouble of spiking the drink of the complainant in order to
establish sexual relations with her.
25. It is hard to believe that the complainant, being a highly
qualified and well-placed major woman, kept on bending to the
demands of the appellant for a period of nearly 16 years without
raising any protest to any quarter that the appellant was exploiting
her sexually under the pretext of a false promise of marriage. The
prolonged period of 16 years during which the sexual relations
continued unabatedly between the parties, is sufficient to conclude
that there was never an element of force or deceit in the
relationship. The complainant and the appellant were posted at
different places pursuing their respective jobs. On a few occasions,
the appellant would visit the complainant at her place whereas on
other occasions, the complainant was called by the appellant to
his house where these acts of fornication continued unabatedly till
the year 2020/2021. It is almost impossible to swallow the version
13
of the complainant that for the entire period of 16 years, she
unreservedly allowed the appellant to subject her to repeated acts
of sexual intercourse under the impression that the accused would
on someday act upon his promise of marriage.
26. In the case of Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of
Maharashtra
6, this Court held that to make a man, accused of
having sexual relationship by making a false promise of marriage,
criminally liable, the physical relationship must be traceable
directly to the false promise made and it must not be qualified by
other circumstances or consideration. In a situation where the
woman knowingly maintains the physical relationship for a
prolonged period, it cannot be said with certainty that the said
physical relationship was purely because of alleged promise made
by the accused to marry her.
27. In conclusion, the Court held that unless it can be shown
that the physical relationship was purely because of the promise
of marriage and without being influenced by any other
consideration, it cannot be said that there was vitiation of consent
under misconception of fact. It was further held that even if it is
assumed that a false promise of marriage was made to the
6
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471.
14
complainant initially by the accused, the fact that the relationship
continued for a period of nine long years would render the plea of
the complainant that her consent for all these years was under
misconception of the fact that the accused would marry her
implausible.
28. In the case of Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi)
7, this Court
observed that it is inconceivable that the complainant would
continue to meet the accused or maintain a prolonged association
or physical relationship with him in the absence of voluntary
consent on her part.
29. Testing the facts of the case at hand, on the touchstone of the
above precedents, it is clear that the complainant, being a highly
qualified major woman continued in a consensual intimate sexual
relationship with the appellant over a period of 16 years. At some
point in time, the relationship went sour leading to the filing of the
FIR. No reasonable man would accept the version that the
complainant allowed the accused to establish sexual relations with
her over a period of 16 years purely under the misconception of
marriage.
7
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3375.
15
30. There is no dispute that from the year 2006 onwards, the
complainant and the appellant were residing in different towns.
The complainant is an educated woman and there was no pressure
whatsoever upon her which could have prevented her from filing a
police complaint against the accused if she felt that the sexual
relations were under duress or were being established under a
false assurance of marriage. On many occasions, s he even
portrayed herself to be the wife of the appellant thereby, dispelling
the allegation that the intention of the appellant was to cheat her
right from the inception of the relationship. We cannot remain
oblivious to the fact that it was mostly the complainant who used
to travel to meet the appellant at his place of posting. Therefore,
we are convinced that the relationship between the complainant
and appellant was consensual without the existence of any
element of deceit or misconception.
31. Further, the application filed by the complainant at One Stop
Center, Lalitpur on 23
rd March, 2022, makes it abundantly clear
that she was in a consensual relationship with the appellant since
2006. It is alleged in the complaint that when she had proposed
that they should marry and live together, the appellant physically
abused her and beat her up. If at all there was an iota of truth in
16
this allegation then the FIR should have been registered
immediately after this incident. However, it is only when it came to
the knowledge of the complainant that the appellant was getting
married to another woman, in an attempt to stop his marriage, she
filed aforesaid complaint at the One Stop Center wherein she also
admitted that she was eq ually guilty as the appellant and
therefore, his marriage must be stopped.
32. Further, on the perusal of the statement made by the
complainant under Section 161 CrPC, it is evident that she came
to know about the relations between the appellant and Namrata in
the year 2020-2021. Thus, once the complainant was aware that
the appellant had broken the ties with her and was involved in a
relationship with another woman, there was no reason for her to
hold back from filing the FIR.
33. To the contrary, the complainant has herself set up a case
that there was a secret marriage ceremony between her and the
appellant. Therefore, in our opinion, even if the allegations made
by the complainant are accepted on their face value, it is evident
that the appellant and the complainant were in a long-standing
live-in relationship during which they even performed marriage
rituals albeit informal in nature.
17
34. It is trite that there is a distinction between rape and
consensual intercourse. This Court in Deepak Gulati v. State of
Haryana,
8 differentiated between a mere breach of promise and
not fulfilling a false promise and held that an accused will only be
liable if the Courts concludes that his intentions are mala fide and
he has clandestine motives. The relevant extract is reproduced
hereinbelow: -
“21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided,
obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of
reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in
a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear
distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case
like this, the court must very carefully examine whether
the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or
had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this
effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the
ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction
between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a
false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there
was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the
accused; and whether the consent involved was given after
wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual
indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix
agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love
and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of
misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an
accused on account of circumstances which he could not
have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was
unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do
so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can
be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion
that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that
he had clandestine motives.
. . .
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate
evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial
stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of
keeping his promise to marry the victim . There may, of
8
(2013) 7 SCC 675.
18
course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of
intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various
unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise
made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons
that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not
always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within
the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must
have an immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be
called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a
girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the
other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the
very beginning, the accused had never really intended to
marry her.”
(emphasis supplied)
35. It is, therefore, clear that the accused is not liable for the
offence of rape if the victim has wilfully agreed to maintain sexual
relations. The Court has also recognised that a prosecutrix can
agree to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and
passion for the accused.
36. This Court in Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka ,
9 had
quashed criminal proceedings on the ground that it is difficult to
hold sexual intercourse in the course of a relationship, which
continued for eight years, as ‘rape’ especially when the
complainant therein had alleged that they lived together as man
and wife. The relevant extract is reproduced hereinbelow: -
“4. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is
difficult to sustain the charges levelled against the appellant who
may have possibly, made a false promise of marriage to the
complainant. It is, however, difficult to hold sexual
intercourse in the course of a relationship which has
continued for eight years, as “rape” especially in the face of
9
(2019) 18 SCC 204.
19
the complainant's own allegation that they lived together as
man and wife.”
(emphasis supplied)
37. Thus, by no stretch of imagination, can this Court be
convinced that present is a case wherein the appellant is liable to
be prosecuted for having sexually exploited/assaulted the
complainant based on a false promise of marriage. The allegations
of the complainant are full of material contradictions and are ex
facie unbelievable. Throughout the prolonged period of 16 years,
the complainant kept completely quiet about the alleged sexual
abuse, meted out to her by the appellant until she learnt that the
appellant had married another woman. Further in complete
contradiction to the case setup in the FIR, the complainant has on
many occasions portrayed herself to be the wife of the appellant
and thus, evidently, they lived together as man and wife.
Additionally, the long gap of 16 years between the first alleged act
of sexual intercourse, continued relations for one and a half decade
till the filing of the FIR convinces us that it is a clear case of a love
affair/live in relationship gone sour.
38. In this background, we are of the opinion that allowing the
prosecution of the appellant to continue for the offences alleged,
20
under Sections 376, 384, 323, 504 and 506 IPC would be nothing
short of a gross abuse of the process of law.
39. The order dated 24
th April, 2023, passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad is quashed and set aside and as a
consequence, the impugned FIR No. 269 of 2022 and all the
consequent proceedings sought to be taken thereunder against the
appellant are also quashed and set aside.
40. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
41. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
………………………….J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
………………………….J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 03, 2025.
In a significant ruling that provides crucial clarity on the nuances of consent in relationships, the Supreme Court of India recently delivered its judgment in the case of Rajnish Singh @ Soni v. State of U.P. and Another (2025 INSC 308). This landmark decision critically examines allegations of false promise of marriage leading to charges of rape, distinguishing it from a consensual sexual relationship that spanned nearly two decades. This case, categorized under 'Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction', is an essential read for legal professionals, and its detailed analysis, along with other high-profile judgments, is readily available on CaseOn, making it easy to track its status and implications.
The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether a long-term sexual relationship, extending over 16 years between two educated, consenting adults, could be deemed 'rape' simply because the initial promise of marriage was eventually unfulfilled. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the complainant's consent was vitiated from the outset by a false promise of marriage, thereby making the appellant criminally liable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
The Supreme Court reiterated established legal principles concerning consent in sexual relationships, particularly in cases involving a promise to marry. Drawing upon significant precedents such as Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka, and Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi), the Court highlighted the crucial distinction between a mere breach of promise and a false promise of marriage made with mala fide (bad faith) intentions from the very beginning.
For legal professionals needing to grasp the essence of such rulings swiftly, CaseOn.in's 2-minute audio briefs provide an invaluable resource, offering concise analyses of complex judgments like this, making it easier to stay updated and apply relevant precedents in practice.
The complainant, a highly qualified lecturer, lodged an FIR in July 2022, alleging that the appellant, starting in 2006, subjected her to sexual intercourse under the promise of marriage. Her allegations included an initial incident in her home in 2006 (which she claimed was forcible but never reported), later incidents involving intoxication, video recording, blackmail, and a forced abortion. She claimed to have kept silent due to fear and the appellant's continued promises.
However, the FIR was filed 16 years after the first alleged incident, only after the appellant married another woman in April 2022. Earlier, in March 2022, she had filed a complaint at a One Stop Centre, where she reportedly admitted being "equally guilty" and sought to stop the appellant's marriage.
The Supreme Court meticulously analyzed the complainant's narrative and found several inconsistencies and implausibilities:
Based on the thorough analysis, the Supreme Court concluded that the relationship between the appellant and the complainant was consensual, a "love affair/live-in relationship gone sour." The prolonged nature of the relationship, the complainant's education and age, her actions (including portraying herself as his wife and the belated complaint), all pointed away from the idea that her consent was based on a fundamental misconception of fact caused by a false promise of marriage from the appellant's inception. Therefore, prosecuting the appellant for rape under Sections 376, 384, 323, 504, and 506 IPC would constitute a "gross abuse of the process of law."
Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed and set aside the High Court's order, the impugned FIR, and all consequent proceedings against the appellant.
This judgment is a significant read for lawyers, law students, and anyone interested in criminal law for several reasons:
Disclaimer: All information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers are advised to consult with a qualified legal professional for any specific legal concerns or actions.
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