REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 86 OF 2004

RAMDAS ATHAWALE … PETITIONER

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. … RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT

B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.

This writ application under Article 32 of the

Constitution of India has been filed by a Member of Lok

Sabha, challenging the validity of the proceedings in the

Lok Sakha commencing from 29

th

January, 2004 on the ground

that the President has not addressed both Houses of

Parliament as envisaged under Article 87 of the

Constitution. The prayer in the writ petition is to

issue appropriate Writ or direction or order declaring

that the Session of the Lok Sabha called by the Notice

dated January 20, 2004 is the first Session in the year

2004; and the proceedings of the Lok Sabha pursuant to

the Notice dated 20

th

January, 2004 are unconstitutional,

illegal, null and void.

2.The case set up by the petitioner is that the Session

commenced on 29

th

January, 2004 was the first Session of

the Lok Sabha in the year 2004, and there was no

address by the President informing the Parliament, the

cause of its summons as provided for and required under

Article 87 (1) of the Constitution of India. The

contention of the petitioner was that the “first

Session” means, the Session, which is held first in

point of time in a given year. According to him, the

Session, which commenced on 29

th

January, 2004 was the

first Session of the House of the year 2004. The

sittings thereafter continued up to 5

th

February, 2004.

3.There is no dispute before us that the Fourteenth

Session of the Thirteenth Lok Sabha commenced on 2

nd

December, 2003 and was adjourned sine die on 23

rd

December, 2003. Thereafter on 20

th

January, 2004, the

Secretary General of the Lok Sabha, by way of a Notice

informed all the Members of the Thirteenth Lok Sabha,

duly stating that under Rule 15 of the Rules of

Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, the

Speaker has directed that the Lok Sabha, which was

adjourned sine die on 23

rd

December, 2003 will resume

its sittings on 29

th

January, 2004.

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4.Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in

terms of mandatory requirement as provided for in

Article 87 (1) of the Constitution of India, the

President has to address both Houses of Parliament at

the commencement of the Session every year and inform

the Parliament of the causes of its summons. It was

submitted that the commencement of the first Session of

each year has to be with reference to the first Session

of each year and year shall mean a year reckoned

according to British calendar. The contention was that

the sittings of the Lok Sabha from 29

th

January, 2004

were unconstitutional or it could not have been

assembled at all in the absence of special address of

both the Houses of Parliament by the President. The

House of People could have assembled only after the

special address by the President.

5.The learned Attorney General submitted that in the

instant case the Winter Session of Parliament had

commenced on 2

nd

December, 2003 and was adjourned sine

die on 23

rd

December, 2003. The House resumed sitting

of that adjourned Session in pursuance of the Notice of

the Secretary General dated 20

th

January, 2004 under

Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of

Business in Lok Sabha. It was submitted that the

sitting commenced on 29

th

January, 2004 was not the

commencement of a new Session, but was a continuation

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of Winter Session, which was adjourned on 23

rd

December,

2003. The learned Attorney General further submitted

that the word “first Session” of the year in Article 87

cannot refer to the resumption of the adjourned

Session. It must refer to a new Session. It was

submitted that the distinction in procedure between the

resumption of an adjourned Session and summoning of a

new Session may have to be borne in mind for the

purpose of interpretation of Article 87 (1) of the

Constitution of India. The submission was that, for

the resumption of an adjourned Session, the Speaker,

under Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of

Business in Lok Sabha, directs issuance of a notice

informing the Members of the next sitting of the

Session. But if the House is prorogued, it is only the

President who can summon the next Session of the

Parliament. It was submitted that in the present case,

Article 87 (1) has no application, as the Winter

Session was only resumed on 29

th

January, 2004 and no

new Session was summoned.

6.In dealing with these contentions, we shall follow the

sequence of events and examine the constitutionality of

each happening that would clearly demonstrate that the

matter lies in a narrow compass than what has been made

to appear.

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7.In the United Kingdom the Queen and two Houses of

Parliament constitutes the Legislature so that the

Queen is an integral part of the Legislature.

8.In India the same model has been adopted. Article 79

of the Constitution provides that there shall be a

Parliament for the Union, which consists of the

President and the two Houses to be known respectively

as the Council of the State and the House of the

People. Article 83 (2) provides that the House of the

People, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for

five years from the date appointed for its first

meeting and no longer and the expiration of the said

period of five years shall operate as a dissolution of

the House, except during a proclamation of Emergency,

the period of five years may be extended for a period

not extending one year at a time, and not extending in

any case beyond six months after such proclamation

cease to operate. Under Article 85 (1), the President

has to summon each House of the Legislature at such

time and place as he thinks fit, so that six months do

not intervene between its last sitting in one Session

and its first sitting in the next. Article 85 (2)

provides as follows:

“The President may from time to time—

(a) prorogue the Houses or either House; and

(b) dissolve the House of the People.”

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9.Article 86 speaks about Right of the President to

address and send messages to Houses.

10.The scheme of the Constitution, as is evident from the

compendium of Articles referred to hereinabove, reveals

that Union Parliament consists of the President and the

Council of States and the House of the People unless

dissolved earlier, the House of the People continues

for five years from the date of its first meeting, and

the expiration of five years operates as a dissolution

of the House except that during proclamation of

Emergency, the period of five years may be extended at

a time not exceeding one year and not extending in any

case beyond six months after such proclamation has

ceased to operate. The President is under

constitutional mandate to summon each House of the

Parliament from time to time to meet at such time and

place as he thinks fit. The President alone is vested

with the power to summon the House from time to time

and prorogue the House or either House; and to dissolve

the House of the People. The President has a right to

address either House or both the Houses together and

for that purpose require the attendance of Members. He

may send messages to either House of Parliament,

whether with respect to a Bill then pending in

Parliament or otherwise, and the House to which message

6

is sent is required to take the same into

consideration.

11.Article 87 is an important Article for our present

purpose and it reads as follows:

“87. Special address by the President:- (1)

At the commencement of the first session

after each general election to the House of

the People and at the commencement of the

first session of each year the President

shall address both Houses of Parliament

assembled together and inform Parliament of

the causes of its summons.

(2) Provision shall be made by the rules

regulating the procedure of either House for

the allotment of time for discussion of the

matters referred to in such address.”

12.A plain reading of Article 87 clearly suggests that

(a) the President shall address at the commencement of

the first session after each general election to the

House of the People; and (b) at the commencement of the

first session of each year.

13.The question is whether in this case was there any

failure in complying with the requirement as provided

for under Article 87 (1) of the Constitution?

14.In the present case, the Winter session of the House of

the People commenced on 2

nd

December, 2003 and was

adjourned sine die on 23

rd

December, 2003. The

resumption of its sittings on 29

th

January, 2004, by no

stretch of imagination, could be characterized as

commencement of a new session. The House merely

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resumed its sittings and continued the Session which

actually commenced on 2

nd

December, 2003. As it is

evident from the record, the House was adjourned sine

die on 23

rd

December, 2003, the resumption of its

sittings is nothing but reconvening of the same Session

after its adjournment sine die. It is the second part

of the same session.

15.The words “first session of the year” employed in

Article 87 (1) has no reference to resumption of the

adjourned session. The session commences with the

President’s summoning the House to meet. It is Article

85 which deals with the summoning of Sessions of

Parliament, prorogation and dissolution of the House of

People. The constitutional provision does not require

summoning of every Session of Parliament which was

adjourned for its own reasons after commencement of its

Session pursuant to the summons of the President. It

is only when a House is prorogued and a new Session

thereafter summoned under Article 85 (2) of the

Constitution, the special address by the President as

provided for under Article 87 (1) is required with

reference to the new Session so as to inform the

Parliament of the cause of its summons. No such

special address is needed, if a Sessions is adjourned

sine die in the previous year and the sittings of the

same Session is resumed in the next year.

8

16.Articles 85 and 87 were amended so as to do away with

the summoning of Parliament twice a year and the

constitutional requirement of the President’s special

address at the commencement of each Session. The

present constitutional position is that not more than

six months are to elapse between the last Session and

the first day of the following Session. The House is

now prorogued only once a year and the President

addresses both Houses of Parliament only at the

commencement of the first Session of each year.

17.Article 87, as it originally stood, provided for the

President’s address in ‘every Session of the year’.

The first amendment in 1951 substituted the words

“every Session” by “first Session of each year”. By

the first amendment, Articles 85 and 174 were also

amended. While intervening in the debate Dr. B.R.

Ambedkar, with reference to amendment to Article 85,

stated:

“…due to the word summon, the result is that

although Parliament may sit for the whole

year adjourning from time to time, it is

still capable of being said that Parliament

has been summoned only once and not twice.

There must be prorogation in order that there

may be a new session. It is felt that this

difficulty should be removed and consequently

the first part of it has been deleted. The

provision that whenever there is a

prorogation of Parliament, the new session

shall be called within six months is

retained.”

9

(emphas

is supplied)

18. Kaul & Shakdher’s Practice and Procedure of

Parliament (Fifth Edition, at page 180) gives the

background to the aforesaid amendment and observed:

“Before article 87(1) was amended in its

present form by the Constitution (First

Amendment Act, 1951, the article required

the President to address both the Houses

assembled together at the commencement of

each session. Accordingly, the President

addressed each of the three sessions held

in 1950 of the Provisional Parliament.

During the Third Session, a question

arose whether the next session might

commence with the President’s Address or

would the session be merely adjourned to

meet again on 5 February, 1951, which

would obviate the necessity of the

President’s Address. Speaker Mavalankar,

in this connection, suggested that

instead of the President addressing each

session, it might be provided that he

would give his Address at the

commencement of the first session (First

Amendment) Bill, 1951, as reported by the

Select Committee, observed: “The real

difficulty of course is that this

(Address) involves a certain preparation

outside this House which is often

troublesome. Members are aware that when

a coach and six horses come, all kinds of

things have to be done for that purpose.

Anyhow, that trouble does not fall on the

House or members thereof, but on the

administration of Delhi”.”

Distinction between Prorogation and Adjournment:

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19.In the matter of Special Reference No. 1 of 2002

1

, a

Constitution Bench of this Court while interpreting

Article 85 (2) of the Constitution observed:

“When the House is prorogued, all the pending

proceedings of the House are not quashed and

pending Bills do not lapse. The prorogation

of the House may take place at any time

either after the adjournment of the House or

even while the House is sitting. An

adjournment of the House contemplates

postponement of the sitting or proceedings of

either House to reassemble on another

specified date. During currency of a session

the House may be adjourned for a day or more

than a day. Adjournment of the House is also

sine die. When a House is adjourned, pending

proceedings or Bills do not lapse.”

(emphasis

supplied)

20.An adjournment is an interruption in the course of one

and the same Session, whereas a prorogation terminates

a Session. The effect of prorogation is to put an end

with certain exceptions to all proceedings in

Parliament then current.

21.In May’s Parliamentary Practice, which has assumed the

status of a classic on the subject and is usually

regarded as an authoritative exposition of

Parliamentary practice; it is stated:

“A session is the period of time between the

meeting of a Parliament, whether after the

prorogation or dissolution, and its

prorogation…..During the course of a session,

either House may adjourn itself of its own

motion to such as it pleases. The period

between the prorogation of Parliament and its

reassembly in a new session is termed as

1

(2002) 8 SCC 237

1

‘recess’; while the period between the

adjournment of either House and the

resumption of its sitting is generally called

an ‘adjournment’.”

22.Kaul & Shakdher’s Practice and Procedure of

Parliament further explains the constitutional position

succinctly stating “the session of Lok Sabha comprises

the period commencing from the date and time mentioned

in the order of the President summoning Lok Sabha and

ending with the day on which the President prorogue or

dissolves the Lok Sabha. It is thus clear that a

Session commenced in terms of the order of the

President summoning the House can come to an end only

with the day on which the President prorogue the House

or dissolves Lok Sabha. The Parliamentary Practice

prevalent till then has been noticed in the same

treatise which is to the following effect:

“The Eighth Session of the Eighth Lok

Sabha commenced on 23 February, 1987 and

was adjourned sine die on 12 May, 1987.

The Lok Sabha, however, was not

prorogued. On a proposal from the

Minister of Parliamentary Affairs, the

Speaker, exercising his powers under

proviso to Rule 15 of the Rules of

Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok

Sabha, agreed to reconvene the sittings

of Lok Sabha from 27 July to 28 August,

1987. The two parts, preceding and

following the period of adjournment of

Lok Sabha sine die on 12 May, 1987, were

treated as constituting one session

divided into two parts namely, Part I and

Part II. On conclusion of the second

part of the Eighth Session, Lok Sabha

1

adjourned sine die on 28 August, 1987 and

was prorogued on 3 September, 1987.”

23.It is thus clear that whenever the House resumes after

it is adjourned sine die, its resumption for the

purpose of continuing its business does not amount to

commencement of the session. The resumed sitting of

the House, in this case, on 29

th

January, 2004, does not

amount to commencement of the first Session in the year

2004.

Speaker’s Ruling:

24.The very issue regarding propriety of convening of the

first session of the House on 29

th

January, 2004 without

the Presidential address was raised in the House. The

Speaker gave a ruling declaring that as per the

provisions of the Constitution, a session of the House

comes to an end when the House is prorogued. As the

House was not prorogued after its adjournment sine die

on 23

rd

December, 2003, the session can, at best be

treated as a second part of the 14

th

session of the 13

th

Lok Sabha “notwithstanding the fact that the calendar

year has since changed”. The session convened from 29

th

January, 2004 was held to be second part of the winter

session. The ruling of the Speaker is reproduced

hereunder:

“Tuesday, February 3, 2004/Magha 14, 1925 (Saka)

1

Ruling by the Speaker – Regarding propriety

of (i) terming ‘Vote on Account’ as the

‘Interim Budget’ in the Order Paper of the

day; and (ii) convening of the first session

of the year on 29 January, 2004 without the

Presidential Address.

The Speaker, after hearing ………… gave the

following ruling:-

Let me at the outset make it clear that the

rulings of the Speaker are generally in

accordance with the rules, the rule book and

also the Constitution of India. At times, it

so happens that the issue requires ruling of

Chair and in such circumstances the

precedents are seen. If the precedents are

not available, then the presiding officer has

to make up his own mind and give a ruling on

the issues which are raised. In this

particular case, fortunately, there are rules

of procedure as well as definitions to guide

us. I have gone through Erskine May’s

Parliamentary Practice. I would like the

House to listen carefully to the ruling which

I am now going to give.

Firstly, let me refer to Erskine May who

has given, fortunately, a definition of the

term ‘prorogation’. He has said:

‘A prorogation terminates a session; an

adjournment is an interruption in the course

of one and the same session’.

Therefore, the point which was raised

here about prorogation has been made clear by

this definition.

……………………………

But that was not the main point which

was raised today. The main point which was

raised by Shri Somnath Chatterjee was about

the very holding of this Session and this

point was also raised in the House by Shri

Varkala Radhakrishnan and some other Members

on 30

th

January, 2004 and the Hon’ble Minister

of Parliamentary Affairs had responded to the

points raised by the Members on that day.

Shri Somnath Chatterjee has contended that

was commenced on 29

th

January, 2004 was the

1

first Session of the year. I would like to

clarify that there is no mention of

adjournment sine die of the House in the

Constitution. As per the provisions of the

Constitution, a Session of the House comes to

an end when the House is prorogued. As the

House was not prorogued after its adjournment

sine die on 23

rd

December, 2003 this Session

can, at best, be treated as the second part

of the Fourteenth Session of the Thirteenth

Lok Sabha notwithstanding the fact that the

calendar year has since changed.

I am giving an illustration; I am

giving a precedent regarding the Third Lok

Sabha. On 11

th

December, 1962 the House

adjourned to meet on 21

st

January, 1963.

This was treated as Part-II of the same

Session. I may inform the House that in the

past also there have been occasions when

after adjournment sine die of the House, the

Lok Sabha was re-convened before prorogation.

….For example, the Eighth Session of the

Eighth Lok Sabha was adjourned sine die on

12

th

May, 1987, but the House was not

prorogued…and was reconvened after a gap of

75 days on 27

th

July, 1987 as the second part

of the Session. Similarly, the 14

th

Session

of the Eighth Lok Sabha was adjourned sine

die on 18

th

August, 1989, but the House was

not prorogued and was reconvened on 11

th

October, 1989 after a gap of 53 days as

second part of the 14

th

Session.

….There are several other similar

instances also. I have already made a

reference to the case when the House was

adjourned and thereafter, though it was

reconvened in the next year, it was not

treated as the fresh Session. Therefore I

must make it clear that in this particular

case also, this Session can be treated as the

second part of the Winter Session.

……After listening to the arguments, I

have treated this as the second part of the

Winter Session. Since under the provisions

of the sub-clause (a) of clause (2) of

article 85 of the Constitution, the power to

1

prorogue the House vests in the Hon’ble

President – please remember that this power

is with the Hon’ble President – I am not

inclined to allow any more discussion on the

issue and I hold both the points of order out

of order.”

25.The question that arises for consideration in this writ

petition is whether the decision of the Speaker

directing resumption of sitting of the Lok Sabha which

was adjourned sine die on 23

rd

December, 2003 is

susceptible to judicial review in a proceeding under

Article 32 of the Constitution of India? Under Article

122 of the Constitution, the Courts are precluded from

making inquiry into proceedings of Parliament. Article

122 reads as under:

“122. Courts not to inquire into proceedings of

Parliament:- (1):The validity of any proceedings

in Parliament shall not be called in question on

the ground of any alleged irregularity of

procedure.

(2) No officer or member of Parliament in whom

powers are vested by or under this Constitution

for regulating procedure or the conduct of

business, or for maintaining order, in Parliament

shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any court

in respect of the exercise by him of those

powers.”

26.A plain reading of Article 122 makes it abundantly

clear that the validity of any proceeding in the

Parliament shall not be called in question on the

ground of any irregularity of procedure. The prayer in

the writ petition is to declare the proceedings in the

Lok Sabha pursuant to the Notice dated 20

th

January,

1

2004 issued under the directions of the Speaker as

unconstitutional. The petitioner is essentially

raising a dispute as to the regularity and legality of

the proceedings in the House of the People. The dispute

raised essentially centers around the question as to

whether the Speaker’s direction to resume sittings of

the Lok Sabha which was adjourned sine die on 23

rd

December, 2003 is proper? The Speaker is the guardian

of the privileges of the House and its spokesman and

representative upon all occasions. He is the

interpreter of its rules and procedure, and is invested

with the power to control and regulate the course of

debate and to maintain order. The powers to regulate

Procedure and Conduct of Business of the House of the

People vests in the Speaker of the House. By virtue of

the powers vested in him, the Speaker, in purported

exercise of his power under Rule 15 of the Rules of

Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha got

issued notice dated 20

th

January, 2004 through the

Secretary General of the Lok Sabha directing resumption

of sittings of the Lok Sabha which was adjourned sine

die on 23

rd

December, 2003. Whether the resumed sittings

on 29

th

January, 2004 was to be treated as the second

part of the 14

th

session as directed by the Speaker is

essentially a matter relating purely to the procedure

of Parliament. The validity of the proceedings and

1

business transacted in the House after resumption of

its sittings cannot be tested and gone into by this

Court in a proceeding under Article 32 of the

Constitution of India.

27.There are two Articles to which reference must be

made. Article 118(1) provides that each House of

Parliament may make rules for regulating, subject to

the provisions of the Constitution, its procedure and

conduct of its business. The rules, in fact, are made

and known as Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business

in Lok Sabha. Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and

Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha provides that:

“(1) The Speaker shall determine the time when a

sitting of the House shall be adjourned sine die

or to a particular day, or to an hour or part of

the same day:

Provided that the Speaker may, if he thinks fit,

call a sitting of the House before the date or

time to which it has been adjourned or at any

time after the House has been adjourned sine die.

(2) In case the House, after being adjourned is

reconvened under the proviso to sub-rule (1), the

Secretary General shall communicate to each

member the date, time, place and duration of the

next part of the session.”

28.Article 118(1) makes it perfectly clear that when the

House is to make any rules as prescribed by it, those

rules are subject to the provisions of the Constitution

which obviously include Fundamental Rights guaranteed

by Part III of the Constitution.

1

29.Similarly, Article 122(1) makes a provision which is

relevant. It lays down that the validity of any

proceedings in Parliament shall not be called in

question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of

procedure. Article 122(2) confers immunity on the

officers and members of Parliament in whom powers are

vested by or under the Constitution for regulating

procedure or conduct of the business or for maintaining

order in Parliament from being subject to the

jurisdiction of any Court in respect of the exercise by

him of those powers. This Court In re, Under Article

143, Constitution of India

2

(also known as Keshav

Singh’s case) while construing Article 212(1) observed

that it may be possible for a citizen to call in

question in the appropriate Court of law, the validity

of any proceedings inside the Legislature if his case

is that the said proceedings suffer not from mere

irregularity of procedure, but from an illegality. If

the impugned procedure is illegal and unconstitutional,

it would be open to be scrutinized in a Court of law,

though such scrutiny is prohibited if the complaint

against the procedure is no more than this that the

procedure was irregular. The same principle would

equally be applicable in the matter of interpretation

of Article 122 of the Constitution.

2

1965 (1) SCR 413

1

30.The Notice dated January 20, 2004 is self-explanatory

and reveals that the House was adjourned sine die on

23

rd

December, 2003 by the Speaker. It is the Speaker’s

direction to resume its sittings from 29

th

January, 2004

onwards. The Notice clearly says that it was the

second part of the fourteenth session and was likely to

conclude on 5

th

February, 2004. The Speaker’s decision

adjourning the House sine die on 23

rd

December, 2003 and

direction to resume its sittings e in part two

ssentially relates to proceedings in Parliament and is

of procedural in nature. The Business transacted and

the validity of proceedings after the resumption of its

sittings pursuant to the directions of the Speaker

cannot be inquired into by the Courts.

31.Under Article 122 (2), the decision of the Speaker in

whom powers are vested to regulate the procedure and

the Conduct of Business is final and binding on every

Member of the House. The validity of the Speaker’s

decision adjourning the House sine die on 23

rd

December,

2003 and latter direction to resume its sittings cannot

be inquired into on the ground of any irregularity of

procedure. The business transacted and the validity of

proceedings after the resumption of sittings of the

House pursuant to the directions of the Speaker cannot

be inquired into by the Courts. No decision of the

Speaker can be challenged by a member of the House

2

complaining of mere irregularity in procedure in the

conduct of the business. Such decisions are not subject

to the jurisdiction of any Court and they are immune

from challenge as understood and explained in Keshav

Singh’s case and further explained in Indira Nehru

Gandhi Vs. Raj Narain & Anr.

3

wherein it was observed

that “the House is not subject to the control of the

courts in the administration of the internal

proceedings of the House.” It is a right of each House

of Parliament to be the sole judge of the lawfulness of

its own proceedings. The Courts cannot go into the

lawfulness of the proceedings of the Houses of

Parliament. The Constitution aims at maintaining a fine

balance between the Legislature, Executive and

Judiciary. The object of the constitutional scheme is

to ensure that each of the constitutional organs

function within their respective assigned sphere.

Precisely, that is the constitutional philosophy

inbuilt into Article 122 of the Constitution of India.

32.In M.S.M Sharma Vs. Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha

4

, a

Constitution Bench of this Court held that the validity

of the proceedings inside the Legislature of the State

cannot be called in question on the allegation that the

procedure laid down by the law had not been strictly

followed. Sinha, C.J. speaking for the Court observed:

3

1975 (Supp.) SCC 1

4

AIR 1960 SC 1186

2

“It was contended that the procedure

adopted inside the House of the

Legislature was not regular and not

strictly in accordance with law. There

are two answers to this contention,

firstly, that according to the previous

decision of this Court, the petitioner

has not the fundamental right claimed by

him. He is, therefore, out of Court.

Secondly, the validity of the proceedings

inside the Legislature of a State cannot

be called in question on the allegation

that the procedure laid down by the law

had not been strictly followed. Article

212 of the Constitution is a complete

answer to this part of the contention

raised on behalf of the petitioner. No

Court can go into those questions which

are within the special jurisdiction of

the Legislature itself, which has the

power to conduct its own business.

Possibly, a third answer to this part of

the contention raised on behalf of the

petitioner is that it is yet premature to

consider the question of procedure as the

Committee is yet to conclude its

proceedings. It must also be observed

that once it has been held that the

Legislature has the jurisdiction to

control the publication of its

proceedings and to go into the question

whether there has been any breach of its

privileges, the Legislature is vested

with complete jurisdiction to carry on

its proceedings in accordance with its

rules of business. Even though it may

not have strictly complied with the

requirements of the procedural law laid

down for conducting its business, that

cannot be a ground for interference by

this Court under Article 32 of the

Constitution.”

33. In the present case, there is no complaint of

infringement of any guaranteed fundamental rights and

therefore it may not be necessary to dilate on the

question as to parameters and extent of judicial review

2

that may be available in case of infringement of any

guaranteed fundamental rights of a member of the House.

34.One more aspect of the matter. The petitioner in this

writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution has

challenged the validity of proceedings in the Lok Sabha

commencing from 29

th

January, 2004 on the grounds stated

hereinabove, with which we have dealt with in the

preceding paragraphs. The petition has become

infructuous, since the Lok Sabha was dissolved and

thereafter two elections have been held. The issue

raised in the petition is purely a hypothetical

question. There is no existing lis between the

parties. It is settled practice that this Court does

not decide matters which are only of academic interest

on the facts of a particular case.

35.In R.S.Nayak Vs. A.R.Antulay

5

, a Constitution Bench of

this Court observed:

“We propose to adhere to the accumulated

wisdom which has reopened into a settled

practice of this Court not to decide academic

questions.”

36. Though the writ petition has become infructuous,

having regard to the constitutional issues raised, we

have considered the question as to the interpretation

of Articles 85 and 87 of the Constitution of India.

5

(1984) 2 SCC 183

2

37.It is equally well settled that Article 32 of the

Constitution guarantees the right to a Constitutional

remedy and relates only to the enforcement of the right

conferred by Part III of the Constitution and unless a

question of enforcement of a fundamental right arises,

Article 32 does not apply. It is well settled that no

petition under Article 32 is maintainable, unless it is

shown that the petitioner has some fundamental right.

In Northern Corporation Vs. Union of India

6

, this Court

has made a pertinent observation that when a person

complains and claims that there is a violation of law,

it does not automatically involves breach of

fundamental right, for the enforcement of which alone,

Article 32 is attracted.

38.We have carefully scanned through the averments and

allegations made in the writ petition and found that

there is not even a whisper of any infringement of any

fundamental right guaranteed by Part III of the

Constitution. We reiterate the principle that whenever

a person complains and claims that there is a violation

of any provision of law or a Constitutional provision,

it does not automatically involve breach of fundamental

right for the enforcement of which alone Article 32 of

the Constitution is attracted. It is not possible to

accept that an allegation of breach of law or a

6

(1990) 4 SCC 239

2

Constitutional provision is an action in breach of

fundamental right. The writ petition deserves dismissal

only on this ground.

39.We accordingly find no merit in this writ petition and

is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.

………………………………CJI.

(K.G. BALAKRISHNAN)

.……………………………….J.

(S.H. KAPADIA)

………………………………..J.

(R.V. RAVEENDRAN)

………………………………..J.

(B. SUDERSHAN REDDY)

………………………………..J.

(P. SATHASIVAM)

NEW DELHI,

MARCH 29, 2010.

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