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CGHC010210222026 2026:CGHC:34887-DB

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

WA No. 636 of 2026

Ramesh Kumar Banjare S/o Nand Kumar Banjare Aged About 26 Years

R/o Narra Post- Barhi Thasil District Balod (C.G.)

... Appellant(s)

versus

1.State of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary Geology And Mining

Department Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan Nawa Raipur Atal

Nagar District Raipur (Chhattisgarh) District Raipur Chhattisgarh

2.Director Directorate Geology And Mining Department Indrawati

Bhawan Nawa Raipur Atal Nagar District Raipur (Chhattisgarh)

District Raipur Chhattisgarh

3.Ku. Prerana Sen D/o Niranjan Singh Sen C/o Anupam Jofer Near

New Bus Stand Kankalin Para Kanker (Chhattisgarh) District

Kanker Chhattisgarh.

...Respondent(s)

(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

For Appellant : Mr. Ashok Patil, Advocate.

For Respondent/State : Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate

General.

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge

Judgment on Board

Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice

10 .08.2026

1.Heard Mr. Ashok Patil, learned counsel for the appellant. Also

heard Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General,

appearing for the State/respondents No. 1 & 2.

2.The present intra-Court appeal has been preferred by the

appellant/writ petitioner against the order dated 20.04.2026 passed by

the learned Single Judge in WPS No. 1383 of 2021 (Ramesh Kumar

Banjare vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others), whereby the writ petition

filed by the appellant came to be dismissed.

3.Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant is a

citizen of India and had preferred the writ petition challenging the order

dated 10.08.2018, whereby respondent No.2, the Recruitment Officer,

appointed respondent No.3 to the post of Assistant Chemist. It is

submitted that the appointment of respondent No.3 was made in

disregard of the terms and conditions of the advertisement dated

30.06.2017 as well as the applicable Recruitment Rules. Learned

counsel submits that the advertisement specifically prescribed that,

although the requisite qualification for the post of Assistant Chemist was

a Post-Graduate Degree in Organic Chemistry or Analytical Chemistry,

preference/weightage was to be given to a candidate possessing a

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B.Sc. Degree with Geology as a subject. The said condition was also

consistent with the Chhattisgarh Geology and Mining, Class III

(Ministerial and Non-Ministerial) Service Recruitment Rules, 2008.

4.Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the

appellant possessed the requisite qualifications prescribed in the

advertisement, having completed M.Sc. in Organic Science and B.Sc.

with Geology as a subject, and accordingly applied for the post of

Assistant Chemist. It is submitted that respondent No.3, though

possessing an M.Sc. in Analytical Chemistry, did not possess a B.Sc.

Degree with Geology as a subject. Therefore, the appellant, being a

candidate possessing the additional qualification specifically

contemplated in the advertisement and the Recruitment Rules, was

entitled to be given the prescribed preference/weightage over

respondent No.3 while considering the respective candidatures. He

further contended that the Selection Committee prepared the merit list

primarily on the basis of marks obtained in Post-Graduation, wherein

the appellant was placed at Serial No.10 having secured 75.88 marks,

whereas respondent No.3 was placed at Serial No.2 having secured

82.40 marks. However, according to learned counsel, the mere fact that

respondent No.3 had secured higher marks in Post-Graduation could

not, by itself, justify ignoring the specific preference prescribed in the

advertisement and the Recruitment Rules in favour of candidates

possessing a B.Sc. Degree with Geology as a subject. It is submitted

that the appellant had specifically raised an objection during the

recruitment process against consideration of the candidature of

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respondent No.3 on the ground that she did not possess the

prescribed/preferred qualification of B.Sc. with Geology. However, the

said objection was rejected by the competent authority on the ground

that respondent No.3 was higher in merit.

5.Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the approach

adopted by the recruiting authority effectively rendered the condition

relating to preference for candidates possessing B.Sc. with Geology

meaningless. According to learned counsel, once the recruiting authority

had issued an advertisement prescribing a particular eligibility condition

and preference, the selection process was required to be conducted

strictly in accordance with the terms of the advertisement and the

applicable statutory Recruitment Rules. The recruiting authority could

not subsequently alter, ignore or dilute the prescribed criteria in a

manner which materially affected the consideration of the candidates.

He also contended that the recruitment process commenced with

issuance of the advertisement dated 30.06.2017 and was required to

culminate in appointments being made in accordance with the criteria

disclosed to all eligible candidates. It is argued that the candidates

participated in the selection process on the legitimate expectation that

their candidature would be assessed in accordance with the conditions

published in the advertisement. Any departure from the notified criteria

after commencement of the selection process would amount to an

impermissible alteration of the rules of the game after the process had

commenced.

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6.In support of the aforesaid submission, learned counsel for the

appellant places reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, reported in

2024 SCC OnLine SC 3184, wherein the larger Bench of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court considered the question as to whether the criteria

governing recruitment can be changed after commencement of the

recruitment process. Learned counsel submits that the Hon'ble

Supreme Court has reiterated the principle that the selection criteria

cannot ordinarily be altered after commencement of the recruitment

process, unless such alteration is permissible under the extant statutory

rules or is otherwise authorised by the terms of the advertisement,

provided that the advertisement itself is consistent with the governing

rules. The underlying principle, as submitted by learned counsel, is that

the recruitment process must be transparent, predictable and fair to all

participating candidates and the authority cannot change the criteria in

the midst of the process in a manner that prejudices candidates or

confers an unintended advantage upon others.

7.Learned counsel for the appellant also submits that the aforesaid

principle squarely applies to the present case because the

advertisement dated 30.06.2017 had expressly disclosed the

preference to be given to candidates possessing a B.Sc. Degree with

Geology as a subject, and the appellant admittedly possessed such

qualification. Therefore, the Selection Committee was required to take

the said preference into consideration while determining the

comparative merit and suitability of the candidates. According to learned

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counsel, ignoring such preference merely because respondent No.3

had obtained higher marks in Post-Graduation amounted to departing

from the notified selection criteria. He further submits that the action of

the respondents is also contrary to the constitutional guarantee of

equality of opportunity in matters of public employment under Article 16

of the Constitution of India and the guarantee against arbitrary State

action under Article 14. It is argued that public recruitment must not only

be fair but must also appear to be fair and transparent. A candidate who

participates in a recruitment process on the basis of the conditions

contained in the advertisement is entitled to have his candidature

considered in accordance with those conditions. Any deviation from the

notified criteria, particularly when it affects the comparative

consideration of candidates, would offend the principles of fairness,

transparency and non-arbitrariness.

8.Learned counsel for the appellant further stated that the principle

of equality in public employment also requires that similarly situated

candidates be considered in accordance with the same criteria and that

no candidate should receive an advantage by reason of departure from

the notified conditions. In this regard, reliance is also placed upon

Bhagwan Dass v. State of Haryana, reported in (1987) 3 SCR 714,

wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the constitutional

requirement of equality and non-discrimination in matters of public

employment. Learned counsel submits that the decision reinforces the

broader constitutional principle that State action in the matter of public

employment must conform to the requirements of fairness and equality

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and cannot be based upon an arbitrary or discriminatory criterion.

9.It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that

the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge has failed

to properly appreciate the distinction between the marks obtained in

Post-Graduation and the specific preference prescribed under the

advertisement and the Recruitment Rules. According to learned

counsel, the learned Single Judge has proceeded substantially on the

basis of the higher marks obtained by respondent No.3 without

examining whether the recruiting authority had correctly applied the

notified preference for candidates possessing B.Sc. with Geology. The

material question, therefore, was not merely who had secured higher

marks in Post-Graduation, but whether the Selection Committee had

followed the complete selection criteria prescribed by the advertisement

and the applicable Recruitment Rules.

10.Learned counsel for the appellant consequently submits that the

appointment of respondent No.3, having been made without giving

effect to the preference prescribed for candidates possessing B.Sc. with

Geology, cannot be sustained in law. It is submitted that the appellant's

objection was based upon a specific condition contained in the

advertisement and was not a belated challenge to the recruitment

process. The appellant had raised the issue during the recruitment

process itself and had consistently asserted that respondent No.3 did

not possess the qualification for which preference was specifically

contemplated.

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11.Learned counsel therefore submits that the impugned judgment

and order passed by the learned Single Judge deserves to be set aside,

and the respondents ought to be directed to reconsider the candidature

of the appellant and respondent No.3 strictly in accordance with the

terms of the advertisement dated 30.06.2017 and the applicable

Recruitment Rules, particularly the provision relating to

preference/weightage for candidates possessing a B.Sc. Degree with

Geology as a subject. It is accordingly prayed that the appeal be

allowed and appropriate consequential relief be granted in favour of the

appellant, along with costs throughout.

12.Per contra, learned State counsel submits that the learned Single

Judge has committed no error in dismissing the writ petition warranting

interference in the present appeal. He would submit that respondent

No.3 possessed the essential qualification prescribed for the post of

Assistant Chemist, namely, M.Sc. in Analytical Chemistry, and had

secured 82.40 marks as against 75.88 marks secured by the appellant.

The preference for a candidate possessing B.Sc. Degree with Geology

was only a preferential qualification and could not be treated as an

overriding preference so as to displace a candidate who was otherwise

eligible and higher in merit.

13.Learned State counsel further submits that the selection criteria

prescribed in the advertisement dated 30.06.2017 was neither changed

nor modified during the recruitment process and, therefore, the reliance

placed by the appellant upon Tej Prakash Pathak (supra) is misplaced.

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He submits that the decisions in Maharashtra Public Service

Comission vs. Sandeep Shriram Warade & Others , reported in

(2019) 6 SCC 362 and State of U.P. & Another vs. Om Prakash &

Others, reported in (2000) 6 SCC 474 clearly lay down that preference

cannot mean an en bloc preference irrespective of inter se merit and

suitability.

14.Learned State counsel also submits that the appellant has

approached this Court after approximately two and a half years from the

date of appointment of respondent No.3 and has failed to satisfactorily

explain such delay. He, therefore, submits that the learned Single Judge

has rightly dismissed the writ petition and the present appeal deserves

to be dismissed.

15.We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have

carefully perused the material available on record.

16.It is not in dispute that the advertisement dated 30.06.2017

prescribed a Post-Graduate Degree in Organic Chemistry or Analytical

Chemistry as the essential qualification for the post of Assistant

Chemist. It is also not in dispute that preference was to be given to a

candidate possessing a B.Sc. Degree with Geology as a subject. The

appellant possesses M.Sc. in Organic Science and B.Sc. Degree with

Geology as a subject, whereas respondent No.3 possesses M.Sc. in

Analytical Chemistry but does not possess B.Sc. Degree with Geology

as a subject. It is further not in dispute that the merit list was prepared

on the basis of the marks obtained by the candidates in Post-

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Graduation and that the appellant secured 75.88 marks, whereas

respondent No.3 secured 82.40 marks and was accordingly placed

higher in the merit list.

17.The principal question which arises for consideration in the

present appeal is as to whether the preference contemplated in the

advertisement in favour of a candidate possessing B.Sc. Degree with

Geology is required to be treated as an overriding preference,

irrespective of the inter se merit of the candidates, or whether such

preference can operate only as a tilting factor where the candidates are

otherwise equally positioned.

18.The issue relating to the meaning and scope of the expression

“preference” in a recruitment advertisement has been considered by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sandeep Shriram Warade (supra). The

Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that a preference clause does not, by

itself, confer an overriding right upon a candidate possessing the

additional qualification so as to supersede a candidate who otherwise

satisfies the essential eligibility requirements and is higher in merit. The

preference clause has to be understood in the context in which it is

incorporated in the recruitment conditions.

19.Likewise, in Om Prakash (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court

explained that where the advertisement prescribes an essential

minimum qualification and provides that preference would be given to

candidates possessing an additional qualification, such preference does

not amount to an en bloc preference irrespective of inter se merit and

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suitability. The additional qualification may operate as a tilting factor

when candidates possessing the requisite educational qualification are

otherwise equally positioned. The principle emerging from the aforesaid

decisions is that a preference clause cannot ordinarily be construed as

displacing the comparative merit of candidates who fulfil the essential

eligibility criteria, unless the statutory rules or the advertisement

expressly provide otherwise.

20.Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case, it

is evident that respondent No.3 possessed the essential qualification

prescribed for the post of Assistant Chemist, namely, M.Sc. in Analytical

Chemistry. The appellant also possessed the essential qualification. The

additional qualification of B.Sc. with Geology possessed by the

appellant undoubtedly attracted the preference clause; however, the

advertisement did not provide that possession of B.Sc. with Geology

would automatically override the inter se merit of candidates

irrespective of the marks secured by them. There is also no material on

record to demonstrate that the applicable Recruitment Rules

contemplated an absolute preference in favour of a candidate

possessing B.Sc. with Geology even where such candidate was

substantially lower in merit than another eligible candidate.

21.The distinction between “essential qualification” and “preferential

qualification” is material. The essential qualification determines the

eligibility of a candidate to participate in the selection process, whereas

the preferential qualification, unless specifically provided otherwise,

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does not render an otherwise eligible and more meritorious candidate

ineligible merely because he does not possess such additional

qualification. In the present case, respondent No.3 admittedly

possessed the essential qualification and secured 82.40 marks as

against 75.88 marks secured by the appellant. Thus, respondent No.3

was higher in the merit list by a substantial margin.

22.The contention of the appellant that the preference clause ought

to have resulted in his selection merely because he possessed B.Sc.

with Geology cannot, therefore, be accepted. Such an interpretation

would amount to treating the preference clause as an overriding

eligibility condition, whereas the language of the advertisement does not

support such construction. If the intention of the recruiting authority had

been to make B.Sc. with Geology an essential qualification or to give an

absolute preference to such candidates irrespective of comparative

merit, the same ought to have been expressly prescribed in the

advertisement or the governing statutory rules.

23.The reliance placed by the appellant upon Tej Prakash Pathak

(supra), also does not assist the appellant in the facts of the present

case. The principle considered therein relates to the impermissibility of

changing the selection criteria after commencement of the recruitment

process, particularly where such change is not authorised by the

governing rules or the advertisement. In the present case, however,

there is no material to establish that the Selection Committee changed

or introduced any new criterion after commencement of the recruitment

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process. The advertisement itself prescribed the essential qualification

and the preference, and the same criteria were applied while preparing

the merit list. The controversy in the present case is essentially

regarding the interpretation and application of the preference clause

and not regarding any subsequent alteration of the selection criteria.

The factual foundation necessary for applying the principle laid down in

Tej Prakash Pathak (supra) is, therefore, absent.

24.Similarly, the principle laid down in Dr. Krushna Chandra Sahu

and others v. State of Orissa and others, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 1,

that a Selection Board or Selection Committee cannot prescribe its own

selection criteria unless authorised by the governing rules, is not

attracted in the present case. There is nothing on record to establish

that the Selection Committee formulated a new criterion or added any

qualification of its own. Rather, the Selection Committee proceeded on

the basis of the qualification and preference already contained in the

advertisement and prepared the merit list on the basis of the marks

obtained in Post-Graduation. Thus, the allegation that the respondents

changed the rules of the game during the recruitment process cannot

be accepted.

25.The contention founded upon Articles 14 and 16 of the

Constitution of India also does not advance the case of the appellant.

There can be no dispute with the proposition that recruitment to public

employment must be fair, transparent and non-arbitrary and that all

eligible candidates are entitled to equal opportunity. However, equality

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of opportunity does not mean that a candidate possessing an additional

preferential qualification must necessarily be placed above another

eligible candidate who has secured substantially higher marks, unless

the governing rules or the advertisement expressly so provide. The

respondents were required to apply the same criteria uniformly to all

candidates, and the record does not establish any discriminatory

treatment or deviation from the notified criteria.

26.The decision in Bhagwan Dass (supra), relied upon by learned

counsel for the appellant, also lays down the general constitutional

principle of fairness and equality in matters of public employment. There

can be no quarrel with the said proposition. However, the appellant is

required to establish that the impugned selection resulted in hostile

discrimination, arbitrariness or unequal treatment. In the present case,

the selection of respondent No.3 was based upon her possession of the

essential qualification and her higher position in the merit list. Mere non-

selection of the appellant, despite his possession of an additional

preferential qualification, would not by itself establish violation of Articles

14 or 16 of the Constitution.

27.We also find substance in the submission of learned State

counsel with regard to the delay in approaching this Court. The

appointment of respondent No.3 was made on 10.08.2018, whereas the

challenge to the said appointment was pursued after a lapse of

approximately two and a half years. Although delay by itself may not

invariably defeat a challenge to an illegal appointment, a person

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seeking discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution is

required to approach the Court with reasonable promptitude and to

satisfactorily explain any substantial delay. In the present case, the

appellant has not placed on record any convincing explanation sufficient

to justify the delay of approximately two and a half years in assailing the

appointment of respondent No.3. This aspect assumes significance

particularly because the challenge is directed against an appointment

which had already been made and acted upon. The unexplained delay,

therefore, constitutes an additional circumstance against grant of

discretionary relief in favour of the appellant.

28.Even otherwise, on merits, we are of the considered view that the

learned Single Judge has correctly appreciated the scope of the

preference clause and the comparative merit of the candidates.

Respondent No.3 possessed the essential qualification prescribed for

the post and had secured 82.40 marks, whereas the appellant had

secured 75.88 marks. In the absence of any provision conferring an

overriding preference upon candidates possessing B.Sc. with Geology,

the Selection Committee was justified in considering the inter se merit of

the eligible candidates. The decision of the competent authority cannot,

therefore, be said to be arbitrary, illegal or contrary to the advertisement

or the applicable Recruitment Rules.

29.Consequently, we find no error, illegality or perversity in the order

passed by the learned Single Judge warranting interference in the

present intra-court appeal. The findings recorded by the learned Single

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Judge are consistent with the terms of the advertisement, the applicable

Recruitment Rules and the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court regarding the scope of a preferential qualification. The appellant

has also failed to satisfactorily explain the delay of approximately two

and a half years in challenging the appointment of respondent No.3.

30.In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered

opinion that the learned Single Judge was justified in dismissing the writ

petition.

31.The present writ appeal, being devoid of merit, is accordingly

dismissed.

32.There shall be no order as to costs.

Sd/- Sd/-

(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)

Judge Chief Justice

Brijmohan