1

$~

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+ W.P.(C) 14707/2024 and CM APPL 29764/2026

IN THE MATTER OF:

RANI SINGH

w/o Shri Jivan Kumar Singh

S/o Late Shri Satendra Prasad Singh

R/O 89/4., Ground Floor,

Krishna Kunj Apartments, Krishna Nagar

Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi - 110029

......PETITIONER

(Through: Mr. R. V. Sinha, Mr. A. S. Singh, Ms. Nidhi Singh and Ms. Shriya

Sharma, Advocates.)

Versus

GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI

Through: The Principal Secretary (Home)

Home Department, Dehi Secretariate, I.P. Estate,

New Delhi – 110002

......RESPONDENT NO.1

THE SUB DIVISIONAL MAGISTRATE

(HAUZ KHAS)

D.C. Office Complex

M.B. Road, Saket, New Delhi – 110068

......RESPONDENT NO. 2

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI

Through: its Commissioner

17

th

Floor, Civic Centre,

S.P.M. Marg, New Delhi – 110002

……RESPONDENT NO. 3

2

(Through: Ms. Vaishali Gupta, Panel counsel GNCTD and Mr. Kartik

Sharma, Advs for R-1. Mr. Harshit Chopra, Standing Counsel along with

Ms. Swati Tiwari, Mr. Khushal Chand Agarwal and Ms. Nidhi Mutreja,

Advocates for R-3.)

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% Reserved on: 20.05.2026

Pronounced on: 29.05.2026

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JUDGEMENT

The instant petition is filed seeking declaration and directions for

issuance of death certificate in the name of one Mr. Jivan Kumar Singh

under Section 13(3) of the Registration of Birth and Death Act, 1969 (“Act

1969”) read with Rule 9(3) of the Delhi Registration of Birth and Death

Rules, 1999 (“Rules 1999”).

2. The Petitioner claims to be a legally wedded wife of Mr. Jivan Kumar

Singh who was serving as a Sub-Inspector in Delhi Police. Mr. Kumar went

missing on 08.06.2005 and did not return, thereafter. A missing complaint

was lodged on 16.06.2005 at Police Station Malviya Nagar vide DD No. 59

– B. According to the Petitioner, despite various efforts made by the family

members and investigation by police authorities, his whereabouts, could not

be ascertained and no information regarding him has been received since

then.

3. Mr. Kumar is survived by petitioner and three children. For the sake

of clarity, the relationship is narrated in tabular form. The same is extracted

as under:

S.NO. NAME AGE/YEARS RELATIONSHIP

3

a. Smt. Rani Singh 54 Wife

b. Ms. Garima Singh 29 Daughter

c. Ms. Annu Singh 25 Daughter

d. Krish Singh 19 Son

4. It is stated that certain insurance policies were obtained by Mr.

Kumar in his name and also in the name of Petitioner and his daughter. The

benefits arising therefrom were inaccessible, as the concerned authorities

had insisted upon production of death certificate or an appropriate

declaration through Court orders before releasing any such benefits and

dues.

5. The Petitioner then filed an application dated 05.09.2023 before

Respondent no. 2 – Sub Divisional Magistrate (“SDM”) under Section 13(3)

of the Act 1969 read with Rule 9(3) of Rules 1999 seeking delayed

registration of death of Mr. Jivan Kumar. During the consideration of

application, Respondent no.2 – SDM sought verification from Station House

Officer (“SHO”), Police Station Malviya Nagar.

6. Thereafter, the police authorities confirmed registration of missing

report dated 16.05.2005 and informed that despite search efforts, Mr. Kumar

could not be traced. According to the Petitioner, despite repeated follow-ups

and written submissions, no formal order disposing of the application was

communicated. Pursuant thereto, a complaint dated 25.05.2024 and an

application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 dated 27.07.2024 were

submitted seeking information regarding the status of the application.

7. Vide RTI response dated 22.08.2024, the Petitioner was informed that

the application dated 05.09.2023 could not be accepted on the ground that

4

while Section 108 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides for presumption

regarding death of a missing person, declaration of the death falls within the

jurisdiction of the competent Civil Court and appropriate relief is required to

be obtained through declaratory proceedings.

8. Aggrieved by the aforesaid action and alleging that the Respondent

authorities have failed to discharge their obligations under the Act of 1969

and Rules 1999, the Petitioner has filed the present petition.

SUBMISSIONS

9. Mr. R.V. Sinha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner

has made followings submissions:

i. The rejection of Petitioner‟s application seeking registration and

issuance of death certificate is legally unsustainable, as the authority

declined the relief on the premise that a declaration from a Civil Court

under the Specific Relief Act, 1963 was mandatory.

ii. The statutory presumption embodied under Section 108 of the Indian

Evidence Act, 1872 [corresponding Section 111 of the Bhartiya

Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023] creates a legal fiction regarding death of

person who has not been heard of for a period exceeding seven years.

Such legal fiction must be accorded its full legal effect and cannot be

rendered ineffective by requiring a separate adjudicatory declaration.

iii. The objections raised by the Respondents regarding absence of

specific particulars relating to date, time and place of death is

misconceived. Section 108 of the Evidence Act 1872 [corresponding

Section 111 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023] concerns only

5

presumption of death and does not require determination of exact

date, place or circumstances of death.

iv. The Petitioner is not seeking adjudication of actual date, time or place

of death but only seeks registration of death in official records and

issuance of consequential death certificate under delayed registration

mechanism under Section 13(3) of the Act, 1969 read with Rule 9(3)

of the Rules, 1999. The authorities are obligated to process such

registration upon satisfaction regarding the factum of presumed death

and cannot refuse to exercise jurisdiction by insisting upon civil

proceedings.

v. The statutory frame work governing registration of births and deaths

must prevail over administrative practice and internal procedural

requirements. No rule expressly mandates procurement of declaratory

decree in cases where death is sought to be recorded on the basis of

statutory presumption and, therefore, executive authorities cannot

import additional conditions not contemplated under the Act or Rules.

Further a declaratory suit under section 34 of the Specific Relief Act,

1963 is not mandatory in facts of the present case, as no competing

civil right or inter se disputes regarding status is involved.

vi. Reliance has been placed on various decisions

1

to support the

aforesaid submissions.

1

Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. V. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors. (1978) 1 SCC 405,

Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation & Anr (2013) 5 SCC 470, Union of

India v. Rajeev Kumar (2003) 6 SCC 516, LIC of India v. Anuradha (2004) 10 SCC 131, Chhaya & Anr. v.

Public at Large ILR 2024 MP 1845, Savitribai & Ors. v. Superintendent Engineer, Maharashtra State Road

Development Corporation & Ors 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 2858.

6

10. Per Contra, Ms. Vaishali Gupta and Mr. Harshit Chopra, learned

counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents have made following

submissions:

i. The relief sought by Petitioner before Respondent no. 2 - SDM did

not pertain to delayed registration of an established death but sought

registration on the basis of presumed death of person whose death has

never been officially confirmed. Section 13(3) of the Act, 1969 read

with Rule 9(3) of Rules 1999 and Rule 9(3) of Rules 1999 as

amended in 2024 operates only after occurrence of death is

ascertainable and capable of registration.

ii. Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [corresponding Section

111 of Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023] merely creates a

rebuttable presumption regarding death of person who has not been

heard for seven years and does not itself confer jurisdiction upon

Executive Magistrate or SDM to declare such person dead or to

determine consequential civil status.

iii. The Evidence Act, 1872 and Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023

apply to judicial proceedings and the presumption contemplated

therein, can be drawn only by a competent judicial forum authorized

to appreciate evidence and adjudicate rival claims. Respondent no. 2

being an Executive Magistrate is not vested with powers to conduct

adjudicatory proceedings for determination of civil status or

declaration of presumed death.

iv. Petitioner‟s reliance upon presumption under Section 108 of the

Evidence Act, 1872 [corresponding Section 111 of Bhartiya Sakshya

Adhiniyam, 2023] is misplaced as such presumption extends only to

7

the factum of death and not to date, time, place etc. The registration of

death necessarily requires recording of statutory particulars; the

authority cannot presume those essential details in absence of

adjudication by competent forum.

v. The proper remedy available to the Petitioner is to approach the

competent Civil Court seeking declaration and other such reliefs,

where evidence can be led and all relevant facts can be examined.

vi. Reliance has been placed upon various decisions

2

to support the

submissions.

11. I have heard submissions on behalf of both the parties and have

perused the record.

ANALYSIS

12. At the outset, the controversy involved in the petition lies in a narrow

compass. The petition raises an important question concerning the interplay

between statutory scheme governing delayed registration of deaths under the

Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 and legal presumption relating

to death of a missing person embodied under Section 108 of the Indian

Evidence Act, 1872 [corresponding Section 111 of the Bhartiya Sakshya

Adhiniyam, 2023.]

13. The issue involved herein, is not whether Mr. Kumar has remained

untraceable for a prolonged period or whether circumstances exist giving

rise to such presumption, rather the question which arises for consideration

2

Sudarshan B. Biradar v. State of Karnataka AIR 2023 Kar 274, Kallu Khan v. State of Madhya

Pradesh & Ors (2022) 2 MP LJ 593, Shakuntala Devi & Anr. v. Vimal Kumar @ Lala &

Ors.

2

CS(OS) No. 688/2022.

8

is whether Respondent no. 2 - SDM, while exercising powers under Section

13(3) of Act 1969 read with Rules thereunder, possesses jurisdiction to

invoke such presumption and direct registration of death.

14. Before examining the rival submissions, it would be apposite to refer

to the relevant statutory provisions. The same is extracted as under:

Section 13(3) of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 provides as

under:

―Any birth or death of which delayed information is given to the

Registrar after one year of its occurrence, shall be registered only on an

order made by a District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate or by

an Executive Magistrate authorised by the District Magistrate, having

jurisdiction over the area where the birth or death has taken place, after

verifying the correctness of the birth or death and on payment of such

fee as may be prescribed..‖

Rule 9 (3) of the Delhi Registration of Births and Deaths Rules, 1999, as

existed earlier:

―Any birth or death which has not been registered within one year of its

occurrence shall be registered only on an order of Magistrate of first

class or a Presidency Magistrate and on payment of a late fee of rupees

10.‖

Rule 9 (3) of the Delhi Registration of Births and Deaths Rules, 1999 as

amended in 2024 applicable, provides:

“(3) Any birth or death of which delayed information is given to the

Registrar after one year of its occurrence, shall be registered only on an

Order made by a District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate or by

an Executive Magistrate authorised by the District Magistrate, having

jurisdiction over the area where the birth or death has taken place and

on payment of a late fee of one hundred rupees.‖

15. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions demonstrates that they operate

in cases of delayed registration of an event which has already occurred. The

jurisdiction conferred under the statutory framework is to permit registration

9

beyond the prescribed period after satisfaction regarding the correctness of

the birth or death sought to be recorded. The provisions do not create an

independent mechanism for determination of civil status or adjudication

regarding existence or occurrence of death itself.

16. In order to substantiate the submission, Ms. Vaishali Gupta learned

counsel for the Respondents, presented a chart purporting to summarise, the

statutory and procedural framework governing registration of deaths under

the Act 1969 read with Rules 1999 and Amendment Rules 2024. The same

reads as under:

S. No. Reporting of Death Concerned Authority

1. Within prescribed period of

21 days

Registrar of Death and Birth

2. More than 21 days but within

30 days

Registrar of Death and Birth with

late fees

3. More than 30 days but within

1 year

Officer prescribed with late fees

4. Beyond 1 year By the Registrar upon order made

by - Magistrate of First Class with

late fees. District Magistrate or

Sub-Divisional Magistrate or by an

Executive Magistrate

10

5. In case of missing persons By the Registrar upon the order

made by –

Order of the Civil Court.

The presumption of death and its

date and place of occurrence is

matter of burden of proof. The

same may be determined by the

competent Court/Authority on

being approached by the plaintiff.

17. A perusal of the aforesaid tabulated chart demonstrates the marked

distinction between cases of delayed registration of an already occurred

event, and cases where death itself is sought to be inferred, on account of

prolonged disappearance of a person. Registration depending upon the stage

at which information is furnished identifies the competent authority

empowered to permit such registration.

18. Though the aforesaid chart is not a source of law and cannot control

the interpretation of the Act, 1969 or Rules framed thereunder, the

distinction reflected, therein, appears to be broadly consistent with the

statutory scheme.

19. In the facts of the present case, it is not disputed that Mr. Kumar has

remained missing since 08.06.2005 and that a missing report was lodged

with Police Station Malviya Nagar on 16.06.2005. It is further not disputed

that despite police verification and subsequent enquiry initiated by

Respondent no. 2 – SDM, no information regarding his whereabouts could

be traced. However, disappearance of a person and legal determination of

death do not stand on the same footing.

11

20. In order to overcome this difficulty, the Petitioner relies upon Section

108 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [corresponding to Section 111 of the

Bhartiya Shakshya Adhiniyam, 2023]. The relevant provision is extracted

under:

Section 108 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 reads as under:

―Provided that when the question is whether a man is alive or dead,

and it is proved that he has not been heard of for seven years by those

who would naturally have heard of him if he had been alive, the burden

of proving that he is alive is shifted to the person who affirms it.‖

Section 111 of the Bharatiya Skashya Adhiniyam, 2023 reads as under:

―Burden of proving that person is alive who has not been heard of for

seven years.—When the question is whether a man is alive or dead,

and it is proved that he has not been heard of for seven years by those

who would naturally have heard of him if he had been alive, the

burden of proving that he is alive is shifted to the person who affirms

it.‖

21. The submission advanced on the behalf of the Petitioner is that once

conditions under Section 108/111 stands satisfied, statutory presumption of

death automatically operates and Respondent no.2 ought to have proceeded

with registration under Section 13(3) of Act 1969 read with Rule 9(3) of

Rule 1999.

22. Section 108 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [corresponding to Section

111 of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023] embodies a rule of evidence

governing the burden of proof in judicial proceedings. It is a rule of

evidentiary presumption, not a substantive provision conferring status or

creating a legal fiction of death for all purposes, irrespective of forum where

such question arises.

12

23. At this stage, reference is being made to Section 1 of the Indian

Evidence Act, 1872 [Section 1 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023].

The same reads as under:

1. Short title. ––This Act may be called the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Extent. ––It extends to the whole of India and applies to all judicial proceedings

in or before any Court, including Courts-martial, convened under the Army Act,

the Naval Discipline Act; or the Indian Navy (Discipline) Act, 1934 (34 of 1934),]

or the Air Force Act but not to affidavits presented to any Court or officer, nor

proceedings before an arbitrator.‖ [Emphasis supplied]

24. Section 3 of the Evidence Act, 1872 [Section 2(a) of Bhartiya

Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023] „Court‟ is defined as under:

2. Definitions. — (1) In this Adhiniyam, unless the context otherwise requires, —

(a) ―Court‖ includes all Judges and Magistrates, and all persons, except arbitrators,

legally authorised to take evidence; [Emphasis supplied]

25. A conjoint reading of Section 1 read with Section 3 of the Indian

Evidence Act, 1872 [corresponding Section 1 read with 2(a) of the Bhartiya

Sakhsya Adhiniyam, 2023] makes it evident that provisions relating to

evidentiary presumptions are intended to operate in the context of “judicial

proceedings” before a ―Court‖. The statue in express terms, limits its

application to proceedings in or before a Court which includes Judges,

Magistrates and other persons legally authorised to take evidence. The

determinative factor, therefore, is not the designation of the authority but the

nature of the function being performed, namely, adjudication of disputed

questions of fact in a judicial capacity.

26. Administrative or executive authorities, even if designated as

Magistrates for limited statutory purposes, do not, by that fact alone assume

13

the character of a ―Court” unless they are discharging judicial functions in a

lis inter partes.

27. Tested on the aforesaid touchstone, it is manifest that the SDM, while

exercising powers under Section 13(3) of the Act 1969 read with Rule 9 (3)

of Rules, 1999, acts in an administrative capacity. The said function

discharged is confined to permitting delayed registration upon satisfaction of

correctness of factum of birth or death, as already occurring in fact. It does

not extend to adjudication of contested civil status or declaration of death in

law, which would otherwise require a determinative adjudicatory process.

28. Invocation of the presumption contemplated under Section 108 of the

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [corresponding Section 111 of Bhartiya Sakshya

Adhiniyam, 2023] is not an automatic consequence of lapse of time. Before

such presumption can be invoked, it must be established that the person

concerned has not been heard of for the statutory period. Such satisfaction

would necessarily involve examination of foundational facts and

appreciation of evidence.

29. The scheme of the Registration of Birth and Deaths Act, 1969 and

Rules framed, thereunder, does not contemplate the SDM acting as an

adjudicatory forum for declaration of death based on presumption, but only

as a registering authority in respect of events already capable of being

recorded.

30. In the present case, the relief ultimately sought by the Petitioner is not

merely entry of an existing death in official records but recognition of legal

death of a missing person and issuance of death certificate carrying civil

consequences. Such determination transcends the limited administrative

14

function of delayed registration under Section 13(3) of the Act, 1969 and

enters the domain of adjudication of civil matters.

31. The aforesaid position also finds support from the decision of the

Supreme Court in the case of LIC of India v. Anuradha

3

wherein, while

examining the scope and nature of presumption under Sections 107 and 108

of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it was observed as under:

― 14.On the basis of the abovesaid authorities, we unhesitatingly arrive at a

conclusion which we sum up in the following words: the law as to

presumption of death remains the same whether in the common law of

England or in the statutory provisions contained in Section 107 and 108 of

the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In the scheme of the Evidence Act, though

Sections 107 and 108 are drafted as two sections, in effect, Section 108 is an

exception to the rule enacted in Section 107. The human life shown to be in

existence, at a given point of time which according to Section 107 ought to be

a point within 30 years calculated backwards from the date when the

question arises, is presumed to continue to be living. The rule is subject to

proviso or exception as contained in Section 108. If the persons who would

have naturally and in the ordinary course of human affairs heard of the

person in question, have not so heard him for seven years, the presumption

raised under Section 107 ceases to operate. Section 107 has the effect of

shifting the burden of proving that the person is dead on him who affirms the

fact. Section 108, subject to its applicability being attracted, has the effect of

shifting the burden of proof back on the one who asserts the fact of that

person being alive. The presumption raised under Section 108 is a limited

presumption confined only to presuming factum of death of the person whose

life or death is in issue. Though it will be presumed that the person is dead

but there is no presumption as to the date or time of death. There is no

presumption as to facts and circumstances under which the person may have

died. The presumption as to death by reference to Section 108 would arise

only on lapse of seven years and would not by applying any logic or

reasoning be permitted to be raised on expiry of 6 years and 364 days or at

time short of it. An occasion for raising the presumption would arise only

when the question is raised in a court, tribunal or before an authority who is

called upon to decide as to whether a person is alive or dead. So long as

dispute is not raised before any forum and in any legal proceedings, the

occasion for raising presumption does not rise.‖

[Emphasis supplied]

3

(2004) 10 SCC 131

15

32. A careful perusal of the aforesaid leaves, no manner of doubt that the

presumption contemplated under Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act,

1872 is essentially evidentiary in character and ordinarily arises when the

issue regarding the life or death of a person falls for consideration before a

competent judicial forum.

33. At the same time, this Court is unable to agree with any broad

proposition that a declaratory decree under Section 34 of the Specific Relief

Act, 1963 is mandatory in every case as an inflexible rule. The requirement

is not of the source of jurisdiction but of nature of adjudication. Where

invocation of presumption of death requires determination of foundational

facts and consequential declaration affecting civil rights and status, such

exercise must be undertaken before a competent forum empowered to

receive evidence and render such declaration.

34. Insofar as the decisions relied upon by the Petitioner namely

Mohinder Singh Gill, Chief Election Commissioner, Rajasthan State

Industrial Development, Diamond & Gem Development, LIC of India,

Chhaya & Anr. and Savitribai are concerned, the said decisions were

rendered in distinct factual and statutory contexts and do not deal with the

scope of jurisdiction exercisable under Section 13(3) of the Act, 1969 or

empower the registering authority to invoke presumption under Section

108/111 of the Evidence Act, 1872 / Bhartiya Sakshaya Adhiniyam 2023

and proceed to register death of a missing person.

35. The decision relied upon by the Respondents namely, Sudarshan B.

Birdar, Kallu Khan, State of Madhya Pradesh and Shakuntala Devi

support the principle that presumption regarding death is evidentiary in

16

character and does not, by itself, amount to a declaration of civil death. It is

further reiterated that wherever consequential civil rights are involved, such

determination must be undertaken by the competent adjudicatory forum.

36. However, the matter does not rest there. Constitutional Courts, while

interpreting statutory provisions, cannot remain unmindful of human

realities underlying legal disputes. The present case is not one where the

disappearance is recent, uncertain or clouded by the disputed facts. The

statutory period ordinarily contemplated for drawing presumption regarding

death is seven years. In the facts of the present case, the period of absence

has extended to 20 years 11 months 21 days i.e. nearly three times the

duration ordinarily recognised by law.

37. Despite passage of decades, the Petitioner and her children have

remained trapped in a prolonged state of emotional uncertainty and legal

hardship, unable to secure closure either in life or in law. What may have

initially begun as hope of return has, with relentless passage of time,

transformed into continuing anguish, deprivation and helplessness. The

Court cannot lose sight of the fact that behind the present lis lies a family

which has endured the silent suffering of waiting for more than two decades,

suspended between hope and despair, without the certainty of death and

without comfort of life.

38. The predicament of the Petitioner cannot be viewed as a mere

procedural inconvenience. For almost two decades, the family has remained

caught in a peculiar state where the disappearance of Mr. Kumar stands

accepted in reality, yet remains unacknowledged in the eyes of law. The

absence of formal recognition has not only denied them access to financial

and legal entitlements, but has also prolonged a condition of uncertainty

17

from which no family can reasonably be expected to emerge unscathed. The

Courts cannot be oblivious to the fact that with passage of such

extraordinary length of time, the line separating legal presumption from

lived reality becomes exceedingly thin.

39. Time, in certain circumstances, ceases to remain mere measure of

duration and becomes the most solemn witness to human affairs. The

Sanskrit expression aptly states, ―कालः सर्वस्य साक्षी‖ - time is the witness to

all things. A disappearance which continues uninterrupted for nearly two

decades with lack of any trace cannot be viewed as a matter resting merely

within the realm of conjecture. The prolonged continuity of silence

surrounding the existence of Mr. Kumar has, with passage of years, assumed

a degree of certainty which law cannot altogether ignore. Therefore,

insistence upon further procedural rigours may itself result in perpetuation

of injustice rather than advancement of law.

40. The constitutional jurisdiction of this Court is not exercised in

abstraction from realities of human existence. Law undoubtedly proceeds on

procedure and evidentiary discipline, yet procedure cannot be permitted to

operate in a manner that renders justice itself illusory. To compel a family to

remain indefinitely suspended between legal recognition and lived reality,

would amount to carrying procedural formalism beyond the point of

fairness. There are situations where strict insistence upon ordinary

procedural routes may itself occasion injustice.

41. This Court is conscious that ordinarily adjudication relating to civil

status and declaration of presumed death may require parties to avail

remedies before the competent forum. This Court is equally conscious that

the presumption under Section 108/111 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

18

and Bhartiya Sakshaya Adhiniyam, 2023 is not intended to operate

mechanically. Yet, Article 226 of the Constitution confers wide equitable

jurisdiction intended to advance substantial justice in exceptional cases. In

considered opinion of this Court, the lis in the present matter falls within the

narrow and exceptional category where constitutional discretion must

prevail to ensure that law remains a vehicle of justice and not its obstruction.

42. The statutory scheme, as understood herein, does not empower the

registering authority to assume adjudicatory jurisdiction for declaration of

presumed death founded upon Section 108 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872

[corresponding Section 111 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.]

43. In view of the aforenoted, this Court finds no infirmity in the stand

adopted by Respondent no. 2 – SDM in declining to proceed with

registration on basis of the application under Section 13(3) of the Act, 1969.

44. At the same time, this Court cannot remain constrained by procedural

limitations to the extent that justice itself becomes inaccessible. To relegate

the Petitioner yet to another round of proceedings would risk attracting

principle of summum jus, summa injuria, which would mean extreme

application of law would become extreme injustice.

45. Having regard to peculiar facts of the case, at this stage, this Court

does not find it appropriate to relegate the Petitioner to Civil Court. The

concerned SDM is directed to get published, a public notice, in an English

newspaper and a Hindi newspaper, having wide circulation in Delhi, and

inviting objections within 30 days from the date of publication of notice

from interested persons, if any, in treating Mr. Jivan Kumar as dead.

46. In case, no objection is received to the same, let the SDM to pass an

order under Rule 9(3) of the Delhi Registration of Births and Deaths Rules,

19

1999. Let the SDM to issue directions to the concerned Registrar for

registration and issuance of death certificate. However, in case of any

objection, the petitioner ought to approach the jurisdictional Civil Court for

declaratory relief.

47. With aforesaid directions, the writ petition along with pending

application stands disposed of.

48. No order as to costs.

(PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV)

JUDGE

MAY 29, 2026 / SS