As per case facts, the respondent-complainant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, against the petitioner, a Director of M/s Orient Clothing Company Private Limited. ...
No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
130
Reserved on: 15.01.2026.
Date of decision: 27.01.2026.
Uploaded on: 28.01.2026.
.
(1)
CRM-M-17998-2018 (O&M)
RANJU DHINGRA
...Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
M/S VARDHMAN YARNS AND THREADS LTD.
...Respondent(s)
(2)
CRM-M-32836-2018 (O&M)
RANJU DHINGRA
...Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
M/S VARDHMAN YARNS AND THREADS LTD.
...Respondent(s)
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(3)
CRM-M-32906-2018 (O&M)
RANJU DHINGRA
...Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
M/S VARDHMAN YARNS AND THREADS LTD.
...Respondent(s)
(4)
CRM-M-16473-2018 (O&M)
RANJU DHINGRA
...Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
M/S VARDHMAN YARNS AND THREADS LTD.
...Respondent(s)
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD S. BHARDWAJ
Present :- Mr. Vineet Sehgal, Advocate,
for the petitioner(s).
Mr. R.K. Handa, Senior Advocate, assisted by
Ms. Gauri Handa, Advocate, and
Mr. Dharambir Bhargav, Advocate,
for the respondent(s).
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VINOD S. BHARDWAJ, J.
Involving identical question of law, these four petitions arising
out of different complaints, filed between the same parties for offence under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, are being decided by a
common judgment.
2 The details of the cases are tabulated as under: -
Sr.No. Case Number and
title
Complaint challenged Order
challenged
1 CRM-M-17998-
2018 titled as
‘Ranju Dhingra
Vs. M/s
Vardhman Yarns
and Threads Ltd.’
Complaint No.207
dated 18.04.2016
titled as ‘M/s
Vardhman Yarns and
Threads Ltd. Vs. Ravi
Dhingra and another’
Order dated
21.04.2016,
passed by the
Judicial
Magistrate First
Class,
Hoshiarpur.
CRM-M-32836-
2018 titled as
‘Ranju Dhingra
Vs. M/s
Vardhman Yarns
and Threads Ltd.’
Complaint No.264
dated 12.05.2016
titled as ‘M/s
Vardhman Yarns and
Threads Ltd. Vs. Ravi
Dhingra and another’
Order dated
04.06.2016,
passed by the
Judicial
Magistrate First
Class,
Hoshiarpur.
CRM-M-32906-
2018 titled as
‘Ranju Dhingra
Vs. M/s
Vardhman Yarns
and Threads Ltd.’
Complaint No.171
dated 28.03.2016
titled as ‘M/s
Vardhman Yarns and
Threads Ltd. Vs. Ravi
Dhingra and another’
Order dated
28.03.2016,
passed by the
Judicial
Magistrate First
Class,
Hoshiarpur.
CRM-M-16473-
2018 titled as
‘Ranju Dhingra
Vs. M/s
Vardhman Yarns
and Threads Ltd.’
Complaint No.284
dated 30.05.2016
titled as ‘M/s
Vardhman Yarns and
Threads Ltd. Vs. Ravi
Dhingra and another’
Order dated
07.10.2016,
passed by the
Judicial
Magistrate First
Class,
Hoshiarpur.
3 The facts, for the facility of reference are, however, being
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succinctly adverted to from CRM-M-17998-2018 titled as ‘Ranju Dhingra
Vs. M/s Vardhman Yarns and Threads Limited.’
4 The complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881 had been filed by the respondent alleging that the accused
(petitioner herein) being Director of M/s Orient Clothing Company Private
Limited had been purchasing threads and other material from the
respondent-complainant from time to time in a running account.
Accordingly, cheque No.062091 dated 24.11.2015 for a sum of
Rs.3,74,000/- drawn on AXIS Bank Limited in favour of the complainant
was issued in discharge of legally enforceable debt for the goods purchased
by them.
5 On presentation, the aforesaid cheque was dishonoured for
“insufficient funds” vide memo dated 20.02.2016. The legal-cum-demand
notice dated 11.03.2016 was accordingly served however, the payment was
not made whereupon the complaint had been filed.
6 The order of summoning dated 21.04.2016 was thereafter
issued.
7 Counsel for the petitioner contends that it is alleged in the
complaint that the petitioner-Ranju Dhingra is the Director and authorised
signatory on behalf of M/s Orient Clothing Company Private Limited. The
petitioner had been impleaded as accused no.2 in the said complaint while
Ravi Dhingra, Managing Director, was impleaded as accused No.1. The
specific averments made in the complaint(s) are to the effect that the cheque
in question had been issued in discharge of the liability of the juristic entity
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viz. M/s Orient Clothing Company Private Limited, however,
notwithstanding the same, the juristic entity has not been impleaded as a
respondent-accused in the case. He contends that in the absence of the
juristic entity having been impleaded as a party, the criminal proceedings
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, cannot be
proceeded against the Directors in their individual capacity. In support of his
argument, he has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in
the matter of Aneeta Handa Vs. Godfather Travels and Tours Private
Limited reported as (2012) 5 Supreme Court Cases 661.
8 It is further argued that the petitioner is not a signatory to the
cheque(s) in question and thus is not responsible for the operations,
management and supervision of the Company. Hence, even for the said
reason, the proceedings could not have been initiated against her.
9 Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, fairly concedes
that the dishonoured cheque(s) had been issued for and on behalf of the
juristic entity i.e. M/s Orient Clothing Company Private Limited and that the
juristic entity has not been impleaded as a respondent-accused in the
complaint instituted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881. He, however, contends that the failure to implead the juristic entity
should not, by itself, act as a bar from initiating proceedings for enforcement
of its rights against the juristic entity.
10 I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective
parties and have gone through the documents appended along with the
present petition.
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11 Before proceeding further in the matter, it would be apposite to
extract the memo of parties in the complaint that had been instituted by the
respondent-complainant. The same is extracted as under:-
“Vardhman Yarns and Threads Limited, Regd. Office
Vardhman Premises, Chandigarh Road, Ludhiana and Works
Office at Phagwara Road, Hoshiarpur, through M.S Boora Vice
President (PR and HR) an authorized representative of the
company.
...Complainant
Versus
1. Sh. Ravi Dhingra (Managing Director)
2.. Ranju Dhingra (Director) authorized signatories of Orient
Clothing Company Pvt. Ltd
Both residents of 34-B, Farm House Mandi, Delhi 110030.
Accused”
12 Further, some of the averments as contained in the complaint
would also be essential for final adjudication of the present petition(s). The
same reads thus:-
“2. That the accused being the directors of Orient clothing
company Pvt. Ltd. have been purchasing threads etc from the
complainant from time to time and it was a running account.
3. That the accused issued a cheque No. 062091 dated
24.11.2015 for a sum of Rs. 3,74,000/- drawn at AXIS Bank Ltd.
Sector 10-A Gurgaon in favour of the complainant so as to
discharge their liability for the goods purchased by them from
the complainant.”
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13 Besides, the first ground taken by the petitioner in the petition
for challenging the action reads thus: -
“NO NOTICE WAS SENT TO THE COMPANY, HENCE NO
LIABILITY IS MADE OUT AGAINST THE PRESENT
PETITIONER.”
14 In the joint reply filed by the respondent-complainant, the
specific averment made in para No.1 reads thus: -
“1. That the abovesaid quashing petition is not maintainable.
The petitioner is one of the Director along with Ravi Dhingra of
Orient Clothing Company Pvt. Ltd. Both the Directors have
issued the cheque in question against the liability of the
company M/s Orient Clothing Company Pvt. Ltd. and such are
responsible and liable towards the dishonuor of the cheque
amounting to Rs. 3,74,000 drawn at Axis Bank in favor of the
respondent.”
15 Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
reads thus: -
“138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the
account.—Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account
maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of
money to another person from out of that account for the
discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is
returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of
money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to
honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be
paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank,
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such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and
shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be
punished with imprisonment for 4 [a term which may be
extended to two years’], or with fine which may extend to twice
the amount of the cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall
apply unless—
(a) thecheque has been presented to the bank within a
period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or
within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque,
as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said
amount of money by giving a notice; in writing, to the drawer of
the cheque, 5 [within thirty days] of the receipt of information
by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as
unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment
of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be,
to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of
the receipt of the said notice.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “debt of
other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other
liability.
xxx xxx xxx
141. Offences by companies.—(1) If the person committing an
offence under section 138 is a company, every person who, at
the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was
responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of
the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be
guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against
and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall
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render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the
offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had
exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such
offence:
Provided further that where a person is nominated as a
Director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or
employment in the Central Government or State Government or
a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central
Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he
shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter.
Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),
where any offence under this Act has been committed by a
company and it is proved that the offence has been committed
with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any
neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other
officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or
other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence
and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished
accordingly.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, —
(a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a
firm or other association of individuals; and
(b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in
the firm.”
16 It is evident from above that the proceedings instituted against
the petitioner(s) was challenged on the ground that in the absence of the
juristic entity being proceeded against, the liability on account of the
dishonour of cheque could not be forced against the petitioner. The specific
response of the respondent-complainant is in the nature of conceding to the
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said argument.
17 The Supreme Court in the matter of Aneeta Handa (supra),
had specifically held that it is a mandatory requirement under Section 141 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 to implead the Directors of the
Company. The complaint without arraigning the Company as an accused,
against the directors or the authorized signatories is not maintainable. The
Supreme Court has specifically held that the criminal liability on account of
dishonour of cheque primarily falls on the drawer company and extends to
its officers only when conditions incorporated in Section 141 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 are satisfied for maintaining prosecution.
18 Further, the aforesaid position in law stands reiterated by the
Supreme Court in the matter of Bijoy Kumar Moni Versus Paresh
Manna and Another, reported as 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3833. The relevant
paragraphs are extracted as under: -
“50. A catena of decisions of this Court have settled the
position of law that in case of a cheque issued on behalf of a
company by its authorised signatory, prosecution cannot
proceed against the such authorised signatory or other post-
holders of the company as described under Section 141 of
the NI Act, unless the company who is the drawer of the cheque
is arraigned as an accused in the complaint case filed before
the magistrate. Further, vicarious liability can only be affixed
against the directors, authorised signatories, etc. of the
company after the company is held liable for the commission of
offence under Section 138.
xxx xxx xxx
55. …………..The only way by which the accused could be
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held liable was under Section 141 of the NI Act, however the
same could not have been done in the absence of the company
being arraigned as an accused. This position of law has been
explained by a number of decisions of this Court. A three-Judge
Bench of this Court in Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and
Tours Private Limited reported in (2012) 5 SCC 661 observed
thus:
“17. The gravamen of the controversy is whether any
person who has been mentioned in Sections 141(1) and
141(2) of the Act can be prosecuted without the company
being impleaded as an accused. To appreciate the
controversy, certain provisions need to be referred to.
xxx xxx xxx
58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of
the considered opinion that commission of offence by the
company is an express condition precedent to attract the
vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words “as well as
the company” appearing in the section make it absolutely
unmistakably clear that when the company can be
prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other
categories could be vicariously liable for the offence
subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof.
One cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a
juristic person and it has its own respectability. If a
finding is recorded against it, it would create a concavity
in its reputation. There can be situations when the
corporate reputation is affected when a Director is
indicted.
59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the
irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the
prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a
company as an accused is imperative. The other
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categories of offenders can only be brought in the drag-
net on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same
has been stipulated in the provision itself. We say so on
the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh [(1970) 3
SCC 491 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 97] which is a three-Judge
Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed in Sheoratan
Agarwal [(1984) 4 SCC 352 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 620] does
not correctly lay down the law and, accordingly, is
hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada [(2000) 1
SCC 1 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 174] is overruled with the
qualifier as stated in para 51. The decision in Modi
Distillery [(1987) 3 SCC 684 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 632] has
to be treated to be restricted to its own facts as has been
explained by us hereinabove.”
(Emphasis supplied)
56. As specified in paragraph 59 of the aforesaid decision, the
only exception to the general rule as laid above is embodied in
the doctrine of lex non cogit ad impossibilia which means that
the law doesn't compel the impossible. Thus, it is only in those
cases where the impleadment of the company is not possible due
to some legal impediment that this general rule can be
exempted. In the facts on hand, it cannot be said that there was
any legal difficulty in impleading Shilabati Hospital Pvt. Ltd. as
an accused in the complaint case filed by the complainant.
Thus, even the benefit of the exception cannot be extended to the
complainant in the present case.
xxx xxx xxx
59. In Aneeta Hada (supra), this Court fortified the view that
criminal liability on account of dishonor of cheque primarily
falls on the drawer company and then extends to its officers
only when the conditions incorporated in Section 141 of the NI
Act are satisfied. While explaining the import of the words “as
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well as the company” occurring in the provision, the Court
observed that the commission of an offence by the company is
an express condition precedent and only when the prosecution
is maintainable against the Company that the persons
mentioned in the other categories under Section 141 can be
vicariously made liable for the offence committed under
Section 138 of the NI Act. The relevant observations are
reproduced hereinbelow:
“53. It is to be borne in mind that Section 141 of the Act
is concerned with the offences by the company. It makes
the other persons vicariously liable for commission of an
offence on the part of the company. As has been stated by
us earlier, the vicarious liability gets attracted when the
condition precedent laid down in Section 141 of the Act
stands satisfied. There can be no dispute that as the
liability is penal in nature, a strict construction of the
provision would be necessitous and, in a way, the
warrant.
xxx xxx xxx
58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of
the considered opinion that commission of offence by the
company is an express condition precedent to attract the
vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words “as well as
the company” appearing in the section make it absolutely
unmistakably clear that when the company can be
prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other
categories could be vicariously liable for the offence
subject to the averments in the petition and proof
thereof. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that the
company is a juristic person and it has its own
respectability. If a finding is recorded against it, it would
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create a concavity in its reputation. There can be
situations when the corporate reputation is affected when
a Director is indicted.”
(Emphasis supplied)
60. Following the rationale in Aneeta Hada (supra), this Court
in Anil Gupta v. Star India Private Limited, (2014) 10 SCC
373 held that the guilt for the offence under Section 138 is only
deemed upon the other persons who are connected with the
Company as a consequence of Section 141 of the NI Act.
Herein, since the complaint against the respondent Company
was not maintainable, the High Court had quashed the
summons issued by the trial court against the respondent
Company. This Court opined that since the Company was not a
party to the proceedings under Section 138 read with Section
141 of the Act, the proceedings against the appellant Managing
Director also could not be continued with. The relevant
observations are reproduced hereinbelow:
“13. In the present case, the High Court by the impugned
judgment dated 13-8-2007 [Visionaries Media
Network v. Star India (P) Ltd., Criminal Misc. Case No.
2380 of 2004, decided on 13-8-2007 (Del)] held that the
complaint against Respondent 2 Company was not
maintainable and quashed the summons issued by the
trial court against Respondent 2 Company. Thereby, the
Company being not a party to the proceedings under
Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Act and in view
of the fact that part of the judgment referred to by the
High Court in Anil Hada [Anil Hada v. Indian Acrylic
Ltd., (2000) 1 SCC 1 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 174] has been
overruled by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Aneeta
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Hada [Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours (P)
Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 350 : (2012)
3 SCC (Cri) 241], we have no other option but to set
aside the rest part of the impugned judgment [Visionaries
Media Network v. Star India (P) Ltd., Criminal Misc.
Case No. 2380 of 2004, decided on 13-8-2007
(Del)] whereby the High Court held that the proceedings
against the appellant can be continued even in absence of
the Company. We, accordingly, set aside that part of the
impugned judgment dated 13-8-2007 [Visionaries Media
Network v. Star India (P) Ltd., Criminal Misc. Case No.
2380 of 2004, decided on 13-8-2007 (Del)] passed by the
High Court so far as it relates to the appellant and quash
the summons and proceeding pursuant to Complaint Case
No. 698 of 2001 qua the appellant.”
(Emphasis supplied)
61. This Court's decision in Ashok Shewakramani v. State of
Andhra Pradesh, (2023) 8 SCC 473 acknowledged the normal
rule that there cannot be any vicarious liability under a penal
provision but however, held that Section 141 of the NI Act is an
exception to this rule. It further stated that vicarious liability
would only be fastened when the person who is sought to be
held vicariously liable was “in charge of” and “responsible to
the Company” for the conduct of the business of the Company
at the time when the offence under Section 138 was committed.
In circumstances where such persons are indeed found
vicariously liable, those persons as well as the Company shall
be deemed to be guilty of the offence under Section 138 of
the NI Act. The relevant observations made by the Court are
reproduced hereinbelow:
“21. Section 141 is an exception to the normal rule that
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there cannot be any vicarious liability when it comes to a
penal provision. The vicarious liability is attracted when
the ingredients of sub-section (1) of Section 141 are
satisfied. The section provides that every person who at
the time the offence was committed was in charge of, and
was responsible to the Company for the conduct of
business of the Company, as well as the Company shall
be deemed to be guilty of the offence under Section 138 of
the NI Act.”
(Emphasis supplied)
62. It follows from a conspectus of the aforesaid decisions that
it is the drawer Company which must be first held to be the
principal offender under Section 138 of the NI Act before
culpability can be extended, through a deeming fiction, to the
other Directors or persons in-charge of and responsible to the
Company for the conduct of its business. In the absence of the
liability of the drawer Company, there would naturally be no
requirement to hold the other persons vicariously liable for the
offence committed under Section 138 of the NI Act.
19 The position in law thus remains settled to the effect that
proceedings against the Director cannot continue without impleading the
company in a catena of precedents including in the matter of Anil Gupta Vs.
Star India Pvt. Ltd. bearing SLP (Crl.) No.7039 of 2007 decided on
07.07.2014 as well as in the matter of ‘Himanshu Vs. B. Shiva Murthy and
others’ bearing Criminal Appeal No.1465 of 2009 decided on 17.01.2019.
20 Since the aforesaid position of fact or law has not been
distinguished or countered by the counsel for the respondent-complainant, I
am of the opinion that present petition(s) deserves to be allowed and the
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proceedings against the petitioner herein is held to be not maintainable for
want of proceeding against the juristic entity vis the company.
21 Accordingly, the complaint(s) is/are held to be not maintainable
against the petitioner. Hence, the complaint as well as the order of
summoning are resultantly set aside. The order is however, without
prejudice to the rights of the respective parties, which shall be at liberty to
take recourse to an appropriate redressal/remedy as per law.
22 The present petitions are allowed.
23 Pending misc. application(s), if any, shall also stand(s) disposed
of accordingly.
24 A photocopy of the order be placed on the connected file(s).
January 27, 2026. (VINOD S. BHARDWAJ)
raj arora JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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