REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.594 of 2019

(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8103/2018)

RASHMI CHOPRA ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.598 of 2019

(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8050/2018)

ANITA GANDHI ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.599 of 2019

(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8052/2018)

NAYAN CHOPRA THROUGH POA HOLDER

RAJESH CHOPRA ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)

1

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.597 of 2019

(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8042/2018)

AMIT CHOPRA ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.596 of 2019

(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8041/2018)

KULDEEP GANDHI ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)

AND

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.595 of 2019

(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8039/2018)

RAJESH CHOPRA ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

ASHOK BHUSHAN,J.

These appeals have been filed challenging the

judgment of Allahabad High Court dated 08.08.2018 by

2

which the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed

by the appellants praying for quashing the complaint

and proceedings in Complaint Case No. 4967 of 2015

have been dismissed.

2.All the appeals having been filed against the

same judgment, facts of the case are being taken from

Criminal Appeal No. 594 of 2019 – Rashmi Chopra &

Ors. Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., in which

criminal appeal, reply affidavit and rejoinder

affidavit have been filed. The background facts of

the case necessary to be noted for deciding these

appeals are:-

2.1 Nayan Chopra, son of Rashmi Chopra and

Rajesh Chopra got married with Vanshika

Bobal, daughter of respondent No.2,

Indrajeet Singh on 15.04.2012. All the

appellants are family members of Nayan

Chopra. Rashmi Chopra is mother, Rajesh

Chopra is father, Amit Chopra is Brother

and Anita Gandhi is Mother’s Sister of

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Nayan Chopra, whereas Kuldeep Gandhi is

husband of Anita Gandhi. Nayan Chopra with

his mother, father and brother are resident

of 203, Jainti Apartment, Police Station –

Begumpet, Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh).

Anita Gandhi and Kuldeep Gandhi are

resident of Greater Kailash – I, New Delhi.

2.2 After the marriage of Nayan Chopra and

Vanshika, which was performed at Noida,

District Gautam Buddha Nagar on 15.04.2012,

Vanshika went alongwith her husband at

Hyderabad, the matrimonial home of

Vanshika. On 28.04.2012, Vanshika and

Nayan Chopra left for the U.S.A. On or

about November, 2013, Vanshika and Nayan

Chopra separated. On 23.10.2014, an

application was filed by Nayan Chopra in

the Circuit Court for the County of

Kalamazoo Family Division, Michigan, USA,

seeking divorce.

4

2.3 On 10.11.2014, a complaint was sent by

respondent No.2 through registered post to

the Superintendent of Police, Gautam Buddha

Nagar, Noida making allegations against

Rajesh Chopra and two other unknown

persons. An application under Section

156(3) was filed by respondent No.2. The

application of the respondent No.2 was sent

by the Magistrate to Mediation Centre

running under the District Legal Services

Authority for counselling. After failure

of counselling and mediation, an

application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.

was filed by respondent No.2 dated

10.05.2015 making allegations against all

the appellants under Section 498A and

Sections 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.

2.4 In the complaint, allegations have been

made on the basis of incident dated

08.11.2014 against Rajesh Chopra and his

associates. It was alleged that Rajesh

5

Chopra called the respondent No.2 near the

Gurudwara at Sector 18, Noida to talk about

the problem of Nayan Chopra and Vanshika

and when respondent No.2 went for talks, he

met Rajesh Chopra with two unknown persons.

Respondent No.2 further alleges that on his

request to accept his daughter, Rajesh

Chopra repeated his demand of one crore

rupees and used filthy words against

Vanshika, which was objected by respondent

No.2, on which Rajesh Chopra and his

associates became annoyed and they abused

and beat the respondent No.2 and snatched

his gold chain from his neck and

Rs.60,000/- from his pocket. The

allegations within the meaning of Sections

323, 324, 504, 506, 392 of I.P.C. were made

on the basis of the aforesaid incident. In

the application, it was also stated that

Nayan Chopra has filed a petition for

dissolution of marriage in America.

6

2.5 On the basis of the application of divorce

by Nayan Chopra, the Circuit 9

th

Court for

the County of Kalamazoo Family Division,

Michigan gave a judgment of divorce on

24.02.2016. The order of judgment of

divorce was passed after hearing both Nayan

Chopra and Vanshika Bobal, who were

represented through attorneys. The

judgment of divorce made provisions for

alimony, pension benefits and retirement

benefits, life insurance, property

settlement and provision in lieu of dower,

mutual release of claims and other

provisions.

2.6 The application under Section 156(3)

Cr.P.C. filed by respondent No.2 was

treated as a complaint and registered as

Complaint No. 4967 of 2015, on which the

learned Judicial Magistrate, Gautam Budh

Nagar issued a summoning order on

17.01.2017 summoning the appellants under

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Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 of I.P.C. and

Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.

2.7 The appellants filed an application under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the High Court

praying for quashing the complaint and

proceedings and order dated 17.01.2017 in

Complaint Case No. 4967 of 2015. In the

application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., High

Court passed an order referring the matter

to mediation centre of Allahabad High

Court. The mediation having failed between

the parties, application under Section 482

Cr.P.C. was heard. The prayer of the

appellants to quash the complaint and

proceedings have been refused. The

application was disposed of after directing

that the applicants may surrender in the

court below and make an application for

bail within a period of two months.

Aggrieved against the judgment of the High

Court, these appeals have been filed.

8

3.All appeals arise out of the same order passed in

their application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

4.We have heard Shri Shikhil Suri, learned counsel

for the appellants and Shri Santosh Krishnan, learned

AOR appearing for the respondent No.2. We have also

heard learned counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh.

5.Learned counsel for the appellants submits that

High Court failed to exercise jurisdiction under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. in quashing the entire complaint

proceedings, which proceedings are nothing but abuse

of the process of the court. It is submitted that

Nayan Chopra and Vanshika Bobal had already been

granted divorce by Family Court of Michigan, which

fact was not brought into notice of the Magistrate by

respondent No.2 before summoning order was passed.

It is submitted that a reading of the complaint does

not prima facie discloses any offence under Section

498A and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act against the

appellants. The appellants, Anita Gandhi and Kuldeep

9

Gandhi separately reside and they have never met

Vanshika, the girl after marriage. The allegations

in the complaint are vague, sweeping and general.

The complaint is not even filed by Vanshika, the girl

nor she got her statement recorded in support of the

complaint. In so far as incident alleged on

08.11.2014 at Sector 18, Noida no such incident took

place and allegations are false and concocted to

somehow rope in Rajesh Chopra, the father of the boy

Nayan Chopra. The complaint has not been filed by

competent person, hence ought not to have been

entertained.

6.Shri Santosh Krishnan, learned counsel appearing

for respondent No.2 submits that there is no error in

summoning of the appellants by the Magistrate by

order dated 17.01.2017. It is well settled that

Magistrate is not required to record elaborate

reasons for summoning of an accused. The complaint

discloses several allegations pertaining to offence

under Section 498A and other offences mentioned

therein. Two courts having taken one particular view

10

of the matter, this Court may not exercise its

jurisdiction in interfering with the orders. It is

further submitted that Section 498A does not indicate

that complaint on behalf of the women has to be filed

by the women herself. The complaint was fully

competent and no error has been committed by

Magistrate in taking cognizance of the complaint.

7.Learned counsel for the parties have placed

reliance on various judgments of this Court in

support of their submissions, which shall be referred

to while considering the submissions in detail.

8.We have considered the submissions of the learned

counsel for the parties and have perused the records.

9.The copy of the complaint under Section 156(3)

Cr.P.C., which has been treated as private complaint

by Magistrate has been brought on the record as

Annexure P-2. The allegations in the complaint are

that marriage was solemnised on 15.04.2012 in which

marriage, gifts of Rs.50 lakhs were given to Nayan

Chopra and his family members. It is alleged that

11

after the marriage, all family members were not

satisfied by the gifts and they started harassing the

daughter of respondent No.2 by demanding further

dowry of one crore rupees. They further pressurised

to solemnise the marriage of Vanshika as per Punjabi

rites and ceremonies, on which pressure, marriage was

solemnised on 06.11.2012 in Gurudwara at Sector 37,

Noida as per Punjabi rites and ceremonies. Further

allegations are that family members of Nayan Chopra

kept on threatening Vanshika to desert her and on

01.12.2013 Nayan Chopra threw Vanshika out of house

and since then Vanshika is residing with respondent

No.2. Another set of allegations are with regard to

incident dated 08.11.2014 alleged to have been taken

place at 6.00 PM near the Gurudwara, Sector-18,

Noida. It is alleged that Rajesh Chopra, father of

Nayan Chopra called the respondent No.2 to talk about

their problem on which date Rajesh Chopra again

repeated his demand of one crore rupees and used

filthy words against Vanshika to which respondent

No.2 objected, on which Rajesh Chopra and his

associates became annoyed and they abused and beat

12

the respondent No.2 and snatched his gold chain from

his neck and Rs.60,000/- from his pocket. The above

two sets of allegations have given rise to summoning

order. The summoning order passed by the Magistrate

on 17.01.2017 is as follows:-

“ORDER

The accused persons Nayan Chopra, Rajesh

Chopra, Rashi Chopra, Amit Chopra, Kuldeep

Gandhi & Anita Gandhi are summoned for the

offence under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506

of IPC and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. The

complainant is directed to take steps as

per Rules within one week. Case is fixed

for 08.03.2017 for appearance.

Sd/- illegible

17.01.2017

(Vikas)

Civil Judge (Jr. Division)

J.M. Gautam Budh Nagar.”

10.One of the submissions, which has been pressed by

learned counsel for the respondent No.2 is that

Magistrate has to be satisfied that there are grounds

for proceeding and there is no requirement of giving

any elaborate reasons for summoning the accused.

11.Learned counsel for the respondent has placed

reliance on Dy. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports

13

Vs. Roshanlal Agarwal & Ors., (2003) 4 SCC 139 , this

Court in paragraph No. 9 of the judgment laid down

following:-

“9. In determining the question whether any

process is to be issued or not, what the

Magistrate has to be satisfied is whether

there is sufficient ground for proceeding

and not whether there is sufficient ground

for conviction. Whether the evidence is

adequate for supporting the conviction, can

be determined only at the trial and not at

the stage of inquiry. At the stage of

issuing the process to the accused, the

Magistrate is not required to record

reasons. This question was considered

recently in U.P. Pollution Control Board v.

Mohan Meakins Ltd., (2000) 3 SCC 745 and

after noticing the law laid down in Kanti

Bhadra Shah v. State of W.B., (20000 1 SCC

722, it was held as follows: (SCC p. 749,

para 6)

The legislature has stressed the need

to record reasons in certain

situations such as dismissal of a

complaint without issuing process.

There is no such legal requirement

imposed on a Magistrate for passing

detailed order while issuing summons.

The process issued to accused cannot

be quashed merely on the ground that

the Magistrate had not passed a

speaking order.”

12.Same proposition was reiterated by this Court in

Nupur Talwar Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation &

Anr., (2012) 11 SCC 465 . There can be no dispute to

14

the above proposition as laid down by this Court that

while taking cognizance of an offence, a Magistrate

is not required to pass a detailed order, however, in

a case when Magistrate issues process against a

person, who is not even charged with the offence for

which he is summoned, whether in such cases also the

summoning order cannot be assailed?

13.In the present case, there are two sets of

allegations, which are contained in the complaint,

which has also been repeated in the statements

recorded by respondent No.2 and his two witnesses –

PW1 – Raj Kumar, brother of respondent No.2 and PW2 –

Deepa, wife of respondent No.2. One set of

allegations of offence under Section 498A and Section

3/4 of D.P. Act and second set of allegations are

allegations made for offences under Sections 323, 504

and 506 of I.P.C.

14.We may first take up the allegations for offences

under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C. The

allegations under Sections 323, 504 and 506 has been

15

made citing the incident dated 08.11.2014. It is

useful to extract the entire allegations pertaining

to incident dated 08.11.2014 from the complaint,

which are to the following effect:-

“…………………..On 08.11.2014 at about 6 p.m.

Nayan Chopra’s father Rajesh Chopra called

the Applicant near the Gurudwara at Sector

18, Noida to talk about their problem.

When the Applicant reached there for talk

then he met there Rajesh Chopra alongwith

two unknown persons. When the Applicant

requested Rajesh Chopra to accept his

daughter the Rajesh Chopra again repeated

his demand of one core Rupees and said that

if he has arranged for one crore Rupees

then he can send his daughter at their

home, otherwise keep Vanshika at his house

and Rajesh Chopra used filthy words against

Vanshika, then the Applicant objected for

the same, on which Rajesh Chopra and his

associates became annoyed and they abused

and beat the Applicant and snatched his

gold chain from his neck and Rs.60,000/-

from his pocket. The wife of the Applicant

and a number of other people gathered at

the spot and saved the Applicant from them.

While leaving these persons threatened the

Applicant that after arranging for one

crore Rupees he can send his daughter at

their house, otherwise keep her at his

house and if he dare to inform the police

then they will kill the Applicant and his

daughter Vanshika…….”

16

15.In the statement made by the complainant in

support of his submission, complainant repeated the

same allegations regarding incident dated 08.11.2014

as made in the complaint, as noted above. PW-2,

Deepa, wife of respondent No.2 has also about the

incident dated 08.11.2014 repeated the allegations as

narrated in the complaint. A perusal of the

allegations in the complaint makes it clear that the

complaint with regard to offences under Sections 323,

504 and 506 has been made only against Rajesh Chopra

and two unknown persons. Neither in the complaint

nor statements made by complainant or his witnesses,

there is any allegation with regard to above offences

against any other appellants before us. There being

no allegations for offences under Sections 323, 504

and 506 in the complaint or statement before the

Magistrate, there was no question of summoning the

other appellants for offences under Sections 323, 504

and 506 of I.P.C. When the complaint does not allege

any offence against other appellants, we fail to see

that how the cognizance of the complaint can be taken

against other appellants with regard to offences

17

under Sections 323, 504 and 506. In above view of

the matter, the complaint as well as summoning order

are liable to be quashed against all the appellants

except Rajesh Chopra due to the above reasons in

above regard.

16.Now, we come to the allegations in the complaint

under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act.

Learned counsel for the respondent in support of his

submission that power of the High Court under Section

482 Cr.P.C. has to be exercised in exceptional

circumstances, has relied on judgment of this Court

in Rakhi Mishra Vs. State of Bihar and Others, (2017)

16 SCC 772. This Court in the above case has relied

on an earlier judgment of this Court in Sonu Gupta

Vs. Deepak Gupta, (2015) 3 SCC 424 , in which

judgment, in paragraph No.8 following proposition was

laid down, which has been referred to and relied on:-

“8. … At the stage of cognizance and

summoning the Magistrate is required to

apply his judicial mind only with a view to

take cognizance of the offence … to find

out whether a prima facie case has been

made out for summoning the accused persons.

At this stage, the learned Magistrate is

not required to consider the defence

18

version or materials or arguments nor is he

required to evaluate the merits of the

materials or evidence of the complainant,

because the Magistrate must not undertake

the exercise to find out at this stage

whether the materials would lead to

conviction or not.”

17.This Court in Rakhi Mishra’s case has also laid

down that High Court in exceptional circumstances can

exercise power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. when a prima

facie case is not made out against the accused .

Paragraph No.5 of the judgment is as follows:-

“5. The order passed by the trial court

taking cognizance against R-2 and R-4 to R-

9 is in conformity with the law laid down

in the above judgment. It is settled law

that the power under Section 482 CrPC is

exercised by the High Court only in

exceptional circumstances only when a prima

facie case is not made out against the

accused. The test applied by this Court for

interference at the initial stage of a

prosecution is whether the uncontroverted

allegations prima facie establish a case.”

18.Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied

on various judgments of this Court in support of his

submissions. In K. Subba Rao and Others Vs. State of

Telangana, (2018) 14 SCC 452 , this Court laid down

following in paragraph Nos. 5 and 6:-

19

“5. A perusal of the charge-sheet and the

supplementary charge-sheet discloses the

fact that the appellants are not the

immediate family members of the third

respondent/husband. They are the maternal

uncles of the third respondent. Except the

bald statement that they supported the

third respondent who was harassing the

second respondent for dowry and that they

conspired with the third respondent for

taking away his child to the U.S.A.,

nothing else indicating their involvement

in the crime was mentioned. The appellants

approached the High Court when the

investigation was pending. The charge-sheet

and the supplementary charge-sheet were

filed after disposal of the case by the

High Court.

6. Criminal proceedings are not normally

interdicted by us at the interlocutory

stage unless there is an abuse of the

process of a court. This Court, at the same

time, does not hesitate to interfere to

secure the ends of justice. See State of

Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC

335. The courts should be careful in

proceeding against the distant relatives in

crimes pertaining to matrimonial disputes

and dowry deaths. The relatives of the

husband should not be roped in on the basis

of omnibus allegations unless specific

instances of their involvement in the crime

are made out. See Kans Raj v. State of

Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207 and Kailash

Chandra Agrawal v. State of U.P., (2014) 16

SCC 551”

19.This Court in Vineet Kumar and Others Vs. State

of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2017) 13 SCC 369 had

20

occasion to examine the parameters of exercise of

power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in respect of

quashing of criminal proceeding. One of us (Justice

Ashok Bhushan) speaking for the Bench after examining

the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. laid down

following in Paragraph Nos. 22 to 25:-

“22. Before we enter into the facts of the

present case it is necessary to consider

the ambit and scope of jurisdiction under

Section 482 CrPC vested in the High Court.

Section 482 CrPC saves the inherent power

of the High Court to make such orders as

may be necessary to give effect to any

order under this Code, or to prevent abuse

of the process of any court or otherwise to

secure the ends of justice.

23. This Court time and again has examined

the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court

under Section 482 CrPC and laid down

several principles which govern the

exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court

under Section 482 CrPC. A three-Judge Bench

of this Court in State of Karnataka v. L.

Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699, held that the

High Court is entitled to quash a

proceeding if it comes to the conclusion

that allowing the proceeding to continue

would be an abuse of the process of the

court or that the ends of justice require

that the proceeding ought to be quashed. In

para 7 of the judgment, the following has

been stated: (SCC p. 703)

“7. … In the exercise of this

wholesome power, the High Court is

entitled to quash a proceeding if it

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comes to the conclusion that allowing

the proceeding to continue would be

an abuse of the process of the court

or that the ends of justice require

that the proceeding ought to be

quashed. The saving of the High

Court’s inherent powers, both in

civil and criminal matters, is

designed to achieve a salutary public

purpose which is that a court

proceeding ought not to be permitted

to degenerate into a weapon of

harassment or persecution. In a

criminal case, the veiled object

behind a lame prosecution, the very

nature of the material on which the

structure of the prosecution rests

and the like would justify the High

Court in quashing the proceeding in

the interest of justice. The ends of

justice are higher than the ends of

mere law though justice has got to be

administered according to laws made

by the legislature. The compelling

necessity for making these

observations is that without a proper

realisation of the object and purpose

of the provision which seeks to save

the inherent powers of the High Court

to do justice, between the State and

its subjects, it would be impossible

to appreciate the width and contours

of that salient jurisdiction.”

24. The judgment of this Court in State of

Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC

335, has elaborately considered the scope

and ambit of Section 482 CrPC. Although in

the above case this Court was considering

the power of the High Court to quash the

entire criminal proceeding including the

FIR, the case arose out of an FIR

registered under Sections 161, 165 IPC and

22

Section 5(2) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1947. This Court

elaborately considered the scope of Section

482 CrPC/Article 226 of the Constitution in

the context of quashing the proceedings in

criminal investigation. After noticing

various earlier pronouncements of this

Court, this Court enumerated certain

categories of cases by way of illustration

where power under Section 482 CrPC can be

exercised to prevent abuse of the process

of the Court or secure the ends of justice.

25. Para 102 which enumerates 7 categories

of cases where power can be exercised under

Section 482 CrPC is extracted as follows:

(Bhajan Lal case, SCC pp. 378-79)

“102. In the backdrop of the

interpretation of the various

relevant provisions of the Code under

Chapter XIV and of the principles of

law enunciated by this Court in a

series of decisions relating to the

exercise of the extraordinary power

under Article 226 or the inherent

powers under Section 482 of the Code

which we have extracted and

reproduced above, we give the

following categories of cases by way

of illustration wherein such power

could be exercised either to prevent

abuse of the process of any court or

otherwise to secure the ends of

justice, though it may not be

possible to lay down any precise,

clearly defined and sufficiently

channelised and inflexible guidelines

or rigid formulae and to give an

exhaustive list of myriad kinds of

cases wherein such power should be

exercised.

23

(1) Where the allegations made in

the first information report or

the complaint, even if they are

taken at their face value and

accepted in their entirety do not

prima facie constitute any

offence or make out a case

against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the

first information report and

other materials, if any,

accompanying the FIR do not

disclose a cognizable offence,

justifying an investigation by

police officers under Section

156(1) of the Code except under

an order of a Magistrate within

the purview of Section 155(2) of

the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted

allegations made in the FIR or

complaint and the evidence

collected in support of the same

do not disclose the commission of

any offence and make out a case

against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the

FIR do not constitute a

cognizable offence but constitute

only a non-cognizable offence, no

investigation is permitted by a

police officer without an order

of a Magistrate as contemplated

under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in

the FIR or complaint are so

absurd and inherently improbable

on the basis of which no prudent

person can ever reach a just

24

conclusion that there is

sufficient ground for proceeding

against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express

legal bar engrafted in any of the

provisions of the Code or the Act

concerned (under which a criminal

proceeding is instituted) to the

institution and continuance of

the proceedings and/or where

there is a specific provision in

the Code or the Act concerned,

providing efficacious redress for

the grievance of the aggrieved

party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding

is manifestly attended with mala

fide and/or where the proceeding

is maliciously instituted with an

ulterior motive for wreaking

vengeance on the accused and with

a view to spite him due to

private and personal grudge.”

20.After referring to several other cases, this

Court concluded and made following observations in

Paragraph No. 41:-

“41. Inherent power given to the High Court

under Section 482 CrPC is with the purpose

and object of advancement of justice. In

case solemn process of Court is sought to

be abused by a person with some oblique

motive, the Court has to thwart the attempt

at the very threshold. The Court cannot

permit a prosecution to go on if the case

falls in one of the categories as

illustratively enumerated by this Court in

State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal. Judicial

25

process is a solemn proceeding which cannot

be allowed to be converted into an

instrument of operation or harassment. When

there are materials to indicate that a

criminal proceeding is manifestly attended

with mala fide and proceeding is

maliciously instituted with an ulterior

motive, the High Court will not hesitate in

exercise of its jurisdiction under Section

482 CrPC to quash the proceeding under

Category 7 as enumerated in State of

Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, which is to the

following effect: (SCC p. 379, para 102)

“102. (7) Where a criminal proceeding

is manifestly attended with mala fide

and/or where the proceeding is

maliciously instituted with an

ulterior motive for wreaking

vengeance on the accused and with a

view to spite him due to private and

personal grudge.”

Above Category 7 is clearly attracted in

the facts of the present case. Although,

the High Court has noted the judgment of

State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, but did not

advert to the relevant facts of the present

case, materials on which final report was

submitted by the IO. We, thus, are fully

satisfied that the present is a fit case

where the High Court ought to have

exercised its jurisdiction under Section

482 CrPC and quashed the criminal

proceedings.”

21.The criminal prosecution can be allowed to

proceed only when a prima facie offence is disclosed.

This Court has observed that judicial process is a

26

solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be

converted into an instrument of oppression or

harassment. If High Court finds that proceedings

deserve to be quashed in parameters as laid down by

this Court in State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992

Supp (1) SCC 335 , High court shall not hesitate in

exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to

quash the proceedings.

22.Now, we revert back to the allegations made in

the complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of

D.P. Act. Few facts have to be noticed before we

look into the allegations made in the complaint in

the above regard. The complaint has been filed by

the respondent No.2 before the C.J.M., Gautam Budh

Nagar on 10.05.2015, before which date, the petition

for divorce has already been filed by Nayan Chopra on

23.10.2014 before the Circuit Court for the County of

Kalamazoo Family Division, Michigan. It is on the

record that at the time of filing of the complaint

Vanishka Bobal was living at Canada whereas Nayan

Chopra was living at U.S.A. Both were separately

27

living. It was pleaded in the application for

divorce that husband and wife had separated on or

around November, 2013. It is on the record that on

the day criminal complaint was filed on 10.05.2015 in

the Court of C.J.M. Gautam Budh Nagar by respondent

No.2, neither Vanishka was in India nor she was in

India at the time when statements were recorded in

complaint of complainant as well as his two

witnesses. The complaint is not by Vanishka but it

has been filed by father of Vanishka, respondent

No.2. In the divorce application filed in the State

of Michigan, Vanishka Bobal was represented by her

attorney. The divorce was granted with orders

relating to alimony, pension benefits and retirement

benefits, life insurance, property settlement and

provision in lieu of dower, mutual release of claims

and other aspects on 24.02.2016.

23.There is nothing on the record to indicate that

orders of divorce between the parties was brought

into the notice of the Magistrate when he issued

process against the appellants. We, however, are in

28

agreement with the submission of Shri Santosh Krishan

that decree of divorce between Nayan Chopra and

Vanshika shall not wipe out any criminal offence,

which has been committed within the meaning of I.P.C.

or D.P. Act and the criminal offence committed in

jurisdictional court has to be examined despite the

divorce decree having been granted.

24.Coming back to the allegations in the complaint

pertaining to Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P.

Act. A perusal of the complaint indicates that the

allegations against the appellants for offence under

Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act are general

and sweeping. No specific incident dates or details

of any incident has been mentioned in the complaint.

The complaint having been filed after proceeding for

divorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in State of

Michigan, where Vanshika participated and divorce was

ultimately granted. A few months after filing of the

divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the

Court of C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar with the

allegations as noticed above. The sequence of the

29

events and facts and circumstances of the case leads

us to conclude that the complaint under Section 498A

and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act have been filed as

counter blast to divorce petition proceeding in State

of Michigan by Nayan Chopra.

25.There being no specific allegation regarding any

one of the applicants except common general

allegation against everyone i.e. “they started

harassing the daughter of the applicant demanding

additional dowry of one crore” and the fact that all

relatives of the husband, namely, father, mother,

brother, mother’s sister and husband of mother’s

sister have been roped in clearly indicate that

application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed

with a view to harass the applicants. Further, prior

to filing of the application under Section 156(3)

Cr.P.C. there was no complaint at any point of time

by the girl or her father making allegation of demand

of any dowry by any one of the applicants. When both

Nayan Chopra and Vanshika started living separately

since November, 2013, had there been any dowry demand

30

or harassment the girl would have given complaint to

Police or any other authority. Further, in the

divorce proceedings at Michigan, U.S.A., parties have

agreed for dividing their properties including gifts

given at marriage but no complaint was made in those

proceedings regarding harassment by her husband or

his family members. The judgment of the divorce

contains following clauses regarding “Property

Settlement and Provision in Lieu of Dower”:

“ PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AND

PROVISION IN LIEU OF DOWER

1. Each party affirms that he or she

fully and accurately disclosed all the

assets owned by him or her in which he or

she has any interest. By affixing their

signatures on this Judgment, Plaintiff and

Defendant affirm that each has disclosed

all assets each owns or has any interest

in, whether held by him or her

individually, by both of them jointly or

with any other person or entity, or by

another person or entity for the benefit of

a party. The property division set forth in

this Judgment of Divorce is intended to be

a distribution and allocation of all the

property of the parties and also is

intended to declare the parties’ property

interests as of entry of this Judgment of

Divorce. If either party has failed, either

intentionally or unintentionally, to

disclose any of his or her assets, the

issue of property division may be reopened

on the motion of either party to determine

31

and resolve the distribution of any

previously undisclosed assets.

2. It appears to the court that the

parties have divided between them to their

mutual satisfaction all articles of

personal property, household furniture and

appliances, cash, savings and checking

accounts and vehicles except as provided

below. The personal property as so divided

shall be the sole and absolute property of

the party in whose possession or under

whose control each of the articles of

personal property are now found and each

shall defend and hold the other harmless

from liability thereon.

a.The parties agree to return all

jewelry to the other party that they

currently have in their possession,

which was acquired as a result of

their marriage. Plaintiff testified

that he only had one item of jewelry

and provided the only jewelry he had

in his possession to Defendant-a

single gold ring. Plaintiff testified

she does not have any jewelry in her

possession.

b.The parties agree that their

respective parents will return to the

other party’s parents, all jewelry

given as gifts to their parents and

are in their parent’s possession,

which was acquired by them as a result

of the parties’ marriage. The parents

agree to exchange at a mutually agreed

upon location and at a mutually agreed

upon time.

3. Except as otherwise provided herein,

each party shall be liable for the debts

32

incurred by him or her after separation

(11/1/2013) and shall defend and hold the

other harmless from all liability thereon.

4.Except as provide herein, each party

shall be liable for the debts in his or her

name and for the debts associated with

property awarded to him/her pursuant to the

Judgment of Divorce and shall defend and

hold the other harmless from all liability

therein.

5. Except as otherwise provided herein,

each party shall retain all monies in their

respective names, including but not limited

to checking accounts, savings accounts,

certificates of deposit, stocks, bonds,

IRAs or 401Ks.

6. There are no joint debts of the

parties except as provided herein.

7. Plaintiff, NAYAN CHOPRA, shall

receive the 2013 Honda CRV free and clear

from any claim of the Defendant, VANSHIKA

BOBAL, and the Plaintiff assumes and agrees

to pay the liability thereon and to defend

and hold the Defendant harmless thereon.

Defendant shall transfer title of such

vehicles to the Plaintiff if transferring

is needed.

8. Plaintiff, NAYAN CHOPRA, shall

receive the 2005 Toyota Camry free and

clear from any claim of the Defendant,

VANSHIKA BOBAL, and the Plaintiff assumes

and agrees to pay the liability thereon and

to defend and hold the Defendant harmless

thereon.

9.The provisions for each party herein

made for the parties shall be in lieu of

the dower or spousal right in the lands of

the other and each shall hereafter hold

33

their remaining lands free, clear and

discharged from any such dower, spousal

right and claim and said provision shall be

in full satisfaction of all claims either

may have in any property which the other

owns, or may hereafter own, in which either

has or may hereafter have an interest.

10.The parties warrant that neither has

incurred any debt in the other party’s

name, or on which the other party may be

liable, which is not expressly disposed of

in this Judgment.

11.This Judgment of Divorce shall

constitute a termination of all rights of a

surviving spouse including, but not limited

to, homestead allowance, election, exempt

property, settlement and family allowance

by each party in the property of the other,

and a termination of all benefits which

would otherwise pass to one party from the

other by testate and intestate, succession

or by virtue of any provision of any will

executed prior to the entry of this

Judgment of Divorce.”

26.The above judgment in divorce proceedings

indicates that Nayan Chopra and Vanshika have settled

all issues between them including division of

properties at the time when divorce proceedings were

in progress at Michigan and both the parties were not

in India, the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.

had been filed making allegation under Section 498A

34

of IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act only to harass

and put pressure on the applicants.

27.One observation also needs to be made with regard

to order passed by the High Court. High Court in its

impugned judgment has not referred to allegations

made in the complaint except noticing the summoning

order has been passed and noticing the principles of

law. This Court had occasion to consider a similar

order passed by the High Court rejecting the

application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in Jagdish

Prasad and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and

Another, (2019) 2 SCC 184 . In the said case also

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. proceedings, the challenge

was made to summoning order as well as entire

proceedings of complaint case where allegations under

Sections 498A and 323 IPC as well as Section 3/4 of

D.P. Act were made. In paragraph No.3, the facts

giving rise to filing the application under Section

482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court has been noted.

This Court made following observations in paragraph

Nos.6 to 9:-

35

“6. Having heard the learned counsel for

the parties and on perusal of the record of

the case we are inclined to set aside the

impugned order and remand the case to the

High Court for deciding the appellants’

application, out of which this appeal

arises, afresh on merits in accordance with

law.

7. On perusal of the impugned order, we

find that the Single Judge has quoted the

principles of law laid down by this Court

in several decisions relating to powers of

the High Court on the issue of interference

in cases filed under Section 482 of the

Code from para 2 to the concluding para but

has not referred to the facts of the case

to appreciate the controversy of the case.

We are, therefore, unable to know the

factual matrix of the case after reading

the impugned judgment except the legal

principles laid down by this Court in

several decisions.

8. In our view, the Single Judge ought to

have first set out the brief facts of the

case with a view to understand the factual

matrix and then examined the challenge made

to the proceedings in the light of the

principles of law laid down by this Court

with a view to record the findings on the

grounds urged by the appellants as to

whether any interference therein is called

for or not. We find that the aforementioned

exercise was not done by the High Court

while passing the impugned order.

9. We, therefore, find ourselves unable to

concur with such disposal of the

application by the High Court and feel

inclined to set aside the impugned order

and remand the case to the High Court

(Single Judge) with a request to decide the

36

application afresh on merits in accordance

with law keeping in view the aforementioned

observations. Having formed an opinion to

remand the case in the light of our

reasoning mentioned above, we do not

consider it proper to go into the merits of

the case.”

28.What was said by this Court in paragraph No. 7

and 8 of the above judgment is squarely applicable in

the facts of the present case and the order of the

High Court deserves to be set aside on this ground

alone.

29.One of the submissions, which has been made by

the learned counsel for the appellant also needs to

be considered. Learned counsel for the appellant had

submitted that complaint has not been filed by a

competent person. It is submitted that complaint is

not made by Vanshika, but has been filed only by

father of Vanshika, hence it is not maintainable. The

above submission has been refuted by Shri Santosh

Krishnan. He submits that it is not necessary that a

complaint under Section 498A should be filed only by

the victim of offence. He submits that complaint

filed by father of the victim, respondent No.2 was

37

also fully maintainable. Section 498A provides as

follows:-

“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a

woman subjecting her to cruelty. — Whoever,

being the husband or the relative of the

husband of a woman, subjects such woman to

cruelty shall be pun ished with imprisonment

for a term which may extend to three years

and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation.—For the purpose of this

section, “cruelty” means—

(a) any wilful conduct which is of

such a nature as is likely to

drive the woman to commit suicide

or to cause grave injury or

danger to life, limb or health

(whether mental or physical) of

the woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where

such harassment is with a view to

coercing her or any person

related to her to meet any

unlawful demand for any property

or valuable security or is on

account of failure by her or any

person related to her to meet

such demand.”

30.Section 498A provides for an offence when husband

or the relative of the husband, subject her to

38

cruelty. There is nothing in Section 498A, which may

indicate that when a woman is subjected to cruelty, a

complaint has to be filed necessarily by the women so

subjected. A perusal of Section 498A, as extracted

above, indicates that the provision does not

contemplate that complaint for offence under Section

498A should be filed only by women, who is subjected

to cruelty by husband or his relative. We, thus, are

of the view that complaint filed by respondent No.2,

the father of Vanshika cannot be said to be not

maintainable on this ground. We, thus, reject the

submission of the counsel for the appellant that

complaint filed by respondent No.2 was not

maintainable.

31.In view of the foregoing discussions, insofar as

the offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of

D.P. Act is concerned, we are of the view that

present is a case, which is covered by Category 7 as

enumerated by State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal (supra)

and the High Court erred in refusing to exercise its

jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. We, however,

39

observe that in so far as allegations against Rajesh

Chopra pertaining to Sections 323, 504 and 506 of IPC

is concerned, there were specific allegations, which

were also supported by the complainant and his two

witnesses in the evidence, at this stage, this Court

cannot pronounce as to whether any incident as

alleged by the complainant happened on 08.11.2014 or

alleged as offence by respondent No.2 or offence as

alleged was committed by Rajesh Chopra or not. We,

thus, are of the view that insofar as complaint

pertaining to offence under Sections 323, 504 and 506

I.P.C. against Rajesh Chopra is concerned, said

complaint shall be proceeded with and the order dated

17.01.2017 is upheld to the above extent only, i.e.,

summoning of Rajesh Chopra under Sections 323, 504

and 506.

32.In result,

(i) Criminal Appeal Nos.594, 598, 599, 597 and

596 of 2019 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos.

8103, 8050, 8052, 8042 and 8041 of 2018)

40

are allowed. The complaint as well as

summoning order dated 17.01.2017 is set

aside insofar as the appellants in the

above-mentioned criminal appeals are

concerned.

(ii)Criminal Appeal No.595 of 2019 (arising out

of SLP (Crl.) No. 8039 of 2018 – Rajesh

Chopra Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh &

Anr.) is partly allowed. The complaint as

well as summoning order is set aside

insofar as offence under Section 498A and

Section 3/4 of D.P. Act is concerned,

however, complaint shall proceed insofar as

offence under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of

I.P.C. and summoning order to that extent

only is upheld.

......................J.

( ASHOK BHUSHAN )

......................J.

( K.M. JOSEPH )

New Delhi,

April 30, 2019.

41