CRM-M-61602-2023 #1#

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT

CHANDIGARH

CRM-M-61602-2023

Date of Decision:-  07.11.2025

RAVI KUMAR BHATEJA & ANOTHER

......Petitioners

Vs.

M/S JASBIR COMMISSION AGENT

......Respondent

CORAM:- HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE JASJIT SINGH BEDI

Present:- Mr. Sandeep Arora, Advocate

for the petitioners.

Mr. Vivek Dahiya, Advocate and 

Mr. Anirudh Kaushal, Advocate for 

Mr.B.S. Sudan, Advocate 

for the respondent.

***

JASJIT SINGH BEDI, J.

The prayer in the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is

for quashing of the complaint No. NACT-210 of 2022 dated 12.07.2022

(Annexure P-1) titled as ‘M/s Jasbir Commission Agent vs. M/s Durga Rice

Mills and others’ under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881,

the summoning order dated 12.07.2022 (Annexure P-2) passed by Judicial

Magistrate 1

st

 Class, Patti, vide which petitioners have been summoned to

face   trial   under   Section   138   of   the   Act   along  with  all   consequential

proceedings arising therefrom.

2.  The brief facts of the case are that the accused namely Robin

Batra the working partner/authorized signatory of the accused partnership

CRM-M-61602-2023 #2#

concern M/s Durga Rice Mills of which accused Nos.3 & 4 (including

petitioner Nos.1 and 2 who are accused Nos.3 and 4 in the complaint) are the

other partners, issued a Cheque No.499947 dated 22.03.2022 for an amount

of Rs.2,59,273/- in favour of the complainant’s firm M/s Jasbir Commission

Agent.

3. The aforementioned cheque got dishonoured leading to the

issuance of a legal notice. On non-payment of the amount, a complaint was

filed under Section 138 r/w Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

The copy of the complaint dated 12.07.2022 is attached as Annexure P-1 to

the petition. 

4. Based on the preliminary evidence led, the Court of the Judicial

Magistrate, 1

st

 Class, Patti summoned all the accused to face trial vide order

dated 12.07.2022. The copy of the summoning order dated 12.07.2022 is

attached as Annexure P-2 to the petition.

5. The aforementioned complaint dated 12.07.2022 (Annexure P-

1)   and  summoning  order   dated  12.07.2022  (Annexure   P-2)   are   under

challenge in the present petition.

6. The   learned   counsel   for   the   petitioners   contends  that   the

petitioners were earlier, the partners in the accused firm M/s Durga Rice

Mills which was constituted under a Partnership Deed dated 25.09.2017.

However, subsequently, the partnership was dissolved on 21.06.2020 and a

written dissolution deed was prepared between the petitioners and the other

partner namely Robin Batra in which it was duly mentioned that Robin Batra

along with the petitioners who were carrying on the business of purchase,

CRM-M-61602-2023 #3#

sale and husking of paddy and rice in the name and style of M/s Durga Rice

Mills   at   Fazilka   were   exiting  from   the   partnership and  therefore,   the

dissolution deed dated 22.06.2020 duly signed by the continuing partner

Robin Batra as well as retiring partners Ravi Kumar and Surinder Kumar

(petitioners) was prepared. A written information of the dissolution was also

sent to the Register of Firms maintained under Section 59 of the Indian

Partnership   Act.   After   the   dissolution   of   the   partnership   between   the

petitioners and Robin Batra, Robin Batra entered into a partnership deed

with Mona Rani on 22.06.2020. The cheque is dated 22.03.2022 and was

signed by Robin Batra on behalf of the accused No.1-M/s Durga Rice Mills.

The   petitioners   had   duly   responded   to   the   legal   notice   apprising   the

complainant that they had got no concern with M/s Durga Rice Mills having

exited from the partnership. Despite the said fact having been brought to the

notice of the complainant, the petitioners were still arrayed as accused in the

complaint and they have been summoned to face trial. He contends that the

Directors/Partners   who   cease   to   remain   so   which   fact   has   been   duly

communicated   to   the   statutory   authorities   and   against   whom   in   the

complaint no specific allegations have been levelled regarding the role

played by them cannot be summoned to face trial. Therefore, the instant

complaint dated 12.07.2022 (Annexure P-1) and summoning order dated

12.07.2022 (Annexure P-2) are liable to be quashed qua the petitioners.

Reliance is placed on the judgments in the cases of Bijoy Kumar Moni

Versus Paresh Manna & another, 2025(1) RCR (Criminal) 265,  Ajay

Aggarwal Vs. M/s Integrated Finance Company Ltd., Criminal Appeal

CRM-M-61602-2023 #4#

Nos.586-594 of 2018,  Gunmala Sales Pvt. Ltd. Versus Anu Mehta &

others,   2015(1)   RCR   (Criminal)   54,  Harshendra   Kumar   D.   Versus

Rebatilata Koley etc., 2011 AIR Supreme Court 1090  and  Mrs. Anita

Malhotra Versus Apparel Export Promotion Council & another, 2011(4)

RCR (Criminal). 

7. The learned counsel for the respondent-complainant, on the

other hand, while not denying the factum of the petitioners having exited the

partnership contends that once there are specific averments in the complaint

regarding   the   role   played   by   an   accused,   then   whether   he   is   a

partner/Director or not, it would be a matter of trial as to the culpability of

such Director/Partner. In the instant case, there are specific allegations

levelled in the complaint that the accused carrying on the business of sale

and purchase of paddy crops and rice from the market and accused No.2 to 4

is authorised/partner/administrator of accused No.1-M/s Durga Rice Mills,

Malout Road (Link Road Village Korian Wali) District Fazilka. Therefore,

the present petition is liable to be dismissed. Reliance is placed on the

judgment in the case of  Shivappa Reddy Versus S. Srinivasan, 2025(3)

RCR (Criminal) 264.

8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

9. Before proceeding further in the matter, it would be apposite to

examine the judgments referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners

and they are discussed hereinbelow:-

In Bijoy Kumar Moni (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held

as under:-

CRM-M-61602-2023 #5#

“46. The authorised signatory is merely the physical limb

that signs and makes the cheque on behalf of the company's

incorporeal personality. The company, for all purposes,

continues to remain the drawer of the cheques. If the

interpretation as being canvassed by the complainant is

accepted then even an employee of the Company, who on

account of his being an authorized signatory signs a cheque

issued by the Company towards discharge of the debt or

other liability of the Company, would be liable to

prosecution and conviction under Section 138 of NI Act

even after he resigns from the company and is no more in

its employment. This certainly could not have been the

intention of the legislature. Even the vicarious liability

created under Section 138 of NI Act would not be attracted

in respect of a Director or an employee of the Company

who resigns and severs his connections with the company,

unless the complainant is able to bring his case within the

purview of sub,Section 2 of Section 141, by proving that the

offence had been committed with his consent or connivance

or was otherwise attributable to any neglect on his part.”

(Emphasis supplied)

In Ajay Aggarwal (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as

under:-

“2. In the complaint filed by the respondent under Sec,

tion 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the appellant

is also impleaded as one of the accused on the ground that he

was the Director of the accused,company which had issued the

cheque.

3. The case set up by the appellant before the trial Court was

that he had resigned as Director of the company much before

the cheque was dishonoured and the factum of resignation was

proved by filing certified copy of Form No.32 which was sub,

CRM-M-61602-2023 #6#

mitted before the Registrar of Companies on a date before the

cheque was presented and dishonoured. He refers to the judg,

ment of this Court in 'Anita Malhotra v. Apparel Export Promo,

tion Council and Anr.' [(2012) 1 SCC 520] wherein it is held

that annual return along with Form No. 32 which is filed before

the Registrar of Companies is a public document and certified

copy thereof was admissible in evidence and that it should have

been looked into and acted upon by the trial Court.

4. Having regard to the aforesaid law laid down by this Court,

these appeals are allowed and the appellant is deleted from the

array of parties/accused in the trial pending in CC. No.

2362/1999, CC. No. 1854/2000, CC. No. 2201/1999, CC. No.

6633/1999, CC. No. 2445/1999, CC. No. 4200/1999 and CC.

No. 5344/2000 titled as 'Integrated Finance Company Limited

v. M/s. Trident Steels Limited and Ors.'.”

(Emphasis supplied)

In Gunmala Sales Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court

held as under:-

“33. We may summarise our conclusions as follows :

a) Once in a complaint filed under Section 

138 read with Sec,

tion 141 of the NI Act the basic averment is made that the Direc,

tor was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the busi,

ness of the company at the relevant time when the offence was

committed, the Magistrate can issue process against such Direc,

tor;

b) If a petition is filed under section 482 of the Code for quashing

of such a complaint by the Director, the High Court may, in the

facts of a particular case, on an overall reading of the complaint,

refuse to quash the complaint because the complaint contains the

basic averment which is sufficient to make out a case against the

Director.

CRM-M-61602-2023 #7#

c) In the facts of a given case, on an overall reading of the com,

plaint, the High Court may, despite the presence of the basic

averment, quash the complaint because of the absence of more

particulars about role of the Director in the complaint. It may do

so having come across some unimpeachable, uncontrovertible

evidence which is beyond suspicion or doubt or totally accept,

able circumstances which may clearly indicate that the Director

could not have been concerned with the issuance of cheques and

asking him to stand the trial would be abuse of the process of the

court. Despite the presence of basic averment, it may come to a

conclusion that no case is made out against the Director. Take

for instance a case of a Director suffering from a terminal illness

who was bedridden at the relevant time or a Director who had

resigned long before issuance of cheques. In such cases, if the

High Court is convinced that prosecuting such a Director is

merely an arm,twisting tactics, the High Court may quash the

proceedings. It bears repetition to state that to establish such

case unimpeachable, uncontrovertible evidence which is beyond

suspicion or doubt or some totally acceptable circumstances will

have to be brought to the notice of the High Court. Such cases

may be few and far between but the possibility of such a case be,

ing there cannot be ruled out. In the absence of such evidence or

circumstances, complaint cannot be quashed;

d) No restriction can be placed on the High Court's powers un,

der section 482 of the Code. The High Court always uses and

must use this power sparingly and with great circumspection to

prevent inter alia the abuse of the process of the Court. There are

no fixed formulae to be followed by the High Court in this regard

and the exercise of this power depends upon the facts and cir,

cumstances of each case. The High Court at that stage does not

conduct a mini trial or roving inquiry, but, nothing prevents it

from taking unimpeachable evidence or totally acceptable cir,

cumstances into account which may lead it to conclude that no

trial is necessary qua a particular Director.

CRM-M-61602-2023 #8#

34. We will examine the facts of the present case in light of the

above discussion. In this case, the High Court answered the first

question raised before it in favour of the respondents. The High

Court held that "in the complaint except the averments that the

Directors were in charge of and responsible to the company at

the relevant time, nothing has been stated as to what part was

played by them and how they were responsible regarding the fi,

nances of the company, issuance of cheque and control over the

funds of the company". After so observing, the High Court

quashed the proceedings as against the respondents. In view of

this conclusion, the High Court did not go into the second ques,

tion raised before it as to whether the Director, who has resigned

can be prosecuted after his resignation has been accepted by the

Board of Directors of the company. Pertinently, in the applica,

tion filed by the respondents, no clear case was made out that at

the material time, the Directors were not in charge of and were

not responsible for the conduct of the business of the company by

referring to or producing any uncontrovertible or unimpeachable

evidence which is beyond suspicion or doubt or any totally ac,

ceptable circumstances. It is merely stated that Sidharth Mehta

had resigned from the Directorship of the company on 30/9/2010

but no uncontrovertible or unimpeachable evidence was pro,

duced before the High Court as was done in Anita Malhotra to

show that he had, in fact, resigned long before the cheques in

question were issued. Similar is the case with Kanhaiya Lal

Mehta and Anu Mehta. Nothing was produced to substantiate the

contention that they were not in charge of and not responsible for

the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time.

In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the matter de,

serves to be remitted to the High Court for fresh hearing. How,

ever, we are inclined to confirm the order passed by the High

Court quashing the process as against Shobha Mehta. Shobha

Mehta is stated to be an old lady who is over 70 years of age.

Considering this fact and on an overall reading of the complaint

in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we feel that

CRM-M-61602-2023 #9#

making her stand the trial would be an abuse of process of the

court. It is however, necessary for the High Court to consider the

cases of other Directors in light of the decisions considered by us

and the conclusions drawn by us in this judgment. In the circum,

stances, we confirm the impugned order to the extent it quashes

the process issued against Shobha Mehta, an accused in C.C. No.

24035 of 2011. We set aside the impugned order to the extent it

quashes the process issued against other Directors viz. Kanhaiya

Lal Mehta, Anu Mehta and Siddharth Mehta. We remit the matter

to the High Court. We request the High Court to hear the parties

and consider the matter afresh. We are making it clear that we

have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and

nothing said by us in this order should be interpreted as our ex,

pression of opinion on the merits of the case. The High Court is

requested to consider the matter independently. Considering the

fact that the complaints are of 2011, we request the High Court

to dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible and prefer,

ably within six months.”

(Emphasis supplied)

In Harshendra Kumar D. 

(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court

held as under:-

“15. Every company is required to keep at its registered office a

register of its directors, managing director, manager and

secretary containing the particulars with respect to each of them

as set out in clauses (a) to (e) of sub,section (1) of Section 

303 of

the Companies Act, 1956. Sub,section (2) of Section 303

mandates every company to send to the Registrar a return in

duplicate containing the particulars specified in the register. Any

change among its directors, managing directors, managers or

secretaries specifying the date of change is also required to be

furnished to the Registrar of Companies in the prescribed form

within 30 days of such change. There is, thus, statutory

requirement of informing the Registrar of Companies about

CRM-M-61602-2023 #10#

change among directors of the company. In this view of the

matter, in our opinion, it must be held that a director , whose

resignation has been accepted by the company and that has been

duly notified to the Registrar of Companies , cannot be made

accountable and fastened with liability for anything done by the

company after the acceptance of his resignation. The words

'every person who, at the time the offence was committed',

occurring in Section 141 (1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act

are not without significance and these words indicate that

criminal liability of a director must be determined on the date the

offence is alleged to have been committed.

**** ****

18. On March 4, 2004, the Company informed the Registrar of

Companies in the prescribed form (Form No. 32) about the resig,

nation of the appellant from the post of Director of the Company

and, thus, change among directors.

19. The above documents placed on record by the appellant have

not been disputed nor controverted by the complainants. As a

matter of fact, it was not even the case of the complainants before

the High Court that the change among Directors of the Company,

on resignation of the appellant with effect from March 2, 2004,

has not taken place. The argument on behalf of the complainants

before the High Court was that it was not permissible for the High

Court to look into the papers and documents relating to the appel,

lant's resignation since these are the matters of defence of the ac,

cused person and defence is a matter for consideration at the trial

on the basis of evidence which cannot be decided by the High

Court. The complainants in this regard relied upon a decision of

Single Judge of that Court in the case of Fateh Chand Bhansali.

The counsel for the present appellant (revision petitioner therein)

on the other hand referred to a later decision of a Single Judge of

the Calcutta High Court in the case of Saroj Kumar Jhunjhun,

wala v. State of West Bengal and Anr., (2007) 1 C Cr. LR (Cal)

793 wherein it was held that if before the issuance of cheques, the

accused had resigned from the directorship, then he cannot be

CRM-M-61602-2023 #11#

held liable for the offence. Confronted with two Single Bench de,

cisions of that Court in Fateh Chand Bhansali and Saroj Kumar

Jhunjhunwala, the Single Judge held that the judicial discipline

demanded that he should go by the earlier decision, namely,

Fateh Chand Bhansali and, accordingly, refused to take into con,

sideration the documents relating to the appellant's resignation as

Director from the Company with effect from March 2, 2004.

While relying upon Fateh Chand Bhansali, the Single Judge re,

ferred to a decision of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v.

Awadh Kishore Gupta and Others, 2004(1) RCR (Criminal) 233 :

2004(2) Apex Criminal 158 : (2004) 1 SCC 691 which was re,

ferred in Fateh Chand Bhansali .

**** ****

21. In our judgment, the above observations cannot be read to

mean that in a criminal case where trial is yet to take place and

the matter is at the stage of issuance of summons or taking cog,

nizance, materials relied upon by the accused which are in the

nature of public documents or the materials which are beyond

suspicion or doubt, in no circumstance, can be looked into by the

High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 or for

that matter in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397

of the Code. It is fairly settled now that while exercising inherent

jurisdiction under Section 482 or revisional jurisdiction under

Section 397 of the Code in a case where complaint is sought to be

quashed, it is not proper for the High Court to consider the de,

fence of the accused or embark upon an enquiry in respect of mer,

its of the accusations. However, in an appropriate case, if on the

face of the documents , which are beyond suspicion or doubt ,

placed by accused, the accusations against him cannot stand, it

would be travesty of justice if accused is relegated to trial and he

is asked to prove his defence before the trial court. In such a mat,

ter, for promotion of justice or to prevent injustice or abuse of

process, the High Court may look into the materials which have

significant bearing on the matter at prima facie stage.

CRM-M-61602-2023 #12#

22. Criminal prosecution is a serious matter; it affects the liberty

of a person. No greater damage can be done to the reputation of a

person than dragging him in a criminal case. In our opinion,

the High Court fell into grave error in not taking into considera,

tion the uncontroverted documents relating to appellant's resigna,

tion from the post of Director of the Company. Had these docu,

ments been considered by the High Court, it would have been ap,

parent that the appellant has resigned much before the cheques

were issued by the Company. As noticed above, the appellant

resigned from the post of Director on March 2, 2004. The dishon,

oured cheques were issued by the Company on April 30, 2004,

i.e., much after the appellant had resigned from the post of Dir,

ector of the Company. The acceptance of appellant's resignation

is duly reflected in the resolution dated March 2, 2004. Then in

the prescribed form (Form No. 32), the Company informed to the

Registrar of Companies on March 4, 2004 about appellant's

resignation. It is not even the case of the complainants that the

dishonoured cheques were issued by the appellant. These facts

leave no manner of doubt that on the date the offence was com,

mitted by the Company, the appellant was not the Director; he

had nothing to do with the affairs of the Company. In this view of

the matter, if the criminal complaints are allowed to proceed

against the appellant, it would result in gross injustice to the ap,

pellant and tantamount to an abuse of process of the court.”

                                                                            (Emphasis supplied)

In  Mrs. Anita Malhotra 

(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court

held as under:-

“14. Inasmuch as the certified copy of the annual return dated

30.09.1999 is a public document, more particularly, in view of the

provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 read with section 

74(2) of

the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, we hold that the appellant has val,

idly resigned from the Directorship of the Company even in the

CRM-M-61602-2023 #13#

year 1998 and she cannot be held responsible for the dishonour of

the cheques issued in the year 2004.

15. This Court has repeatedly held that in case of a Director, com,

plaint should specifically spell out how and in what manner the

Director was in charge of or was responsible to the accused Com,

pany for conduct of its business and mere bald statement that he or

she was in charge of and was responsible to the company for con,

duct of its business is not sufficient. [Vide National Small Indus,

tries Corporation Limited v. Harmeet Singh Paintal and Another,

2010(2) RCR (Criminal) 122 : 2010(2) Recent Apex Judgments

(R.A.J.) 22 : (2010)3 SCC 330]. In the case on hand, particularly,

in para 4 of the complaint, except the mere bald and cursory state,

ment with regard to the appellant, the complainant has not spe,

cified her role in the day to day affairs of the Company. We have

verified the averments as regard to the same and we agree with the

contention of Mr. Akhil Sibal that except reproduction of the stat,

utory requirements the complainant has not specified or elabor,

ated the role of the appellant in the day to day affairs of the Com,

pany. On this ground also, the appellant is entitled to succeed.

16. In the light of the above discussion and of the fact that the ap,

pellant has established that she had resigned from the Company as

a Director in 1998, well before the relevant date, namely, in the

year 2004, when the cheques were issued, the High Court, in the

light of the acceptable materials such as certified copy of annual

return dated 30.09.1999 and Form 32 ought to have exercised its

jurisdiction under Section 482 and quashed the criminal proceed,

ings. We are unable to accept the reasoning of the High Court

and we are satisfied that the appellant has made out a case for

quashing the criminal proceedings. Consequently, the criminal

complaint No. 993/1 of 2005 on the file of ACMM, New Delhi, in,

sofar as the appellant herein (A3) is quashed and the appeal is al,

lowed.”

(Emphasis supplied

10. A perusal of the aforementioned judgments would show that

CRM-M-61602-2023 #14#

where a partner in a firm or a Director in a company has resigned and the

said fact has been brought to the notice of the statutory authorities and no

specific role of such Partner/Director has been enumerated in the complaint

but   only   the   necessary   statutory   averments   are   made  that   the

Partner/Director is incharge and responsible for the day-to-day running of

the company, then, proceedings qua such Partner/Director who has resigned

from the partnership/company cannot be allowed to continue and ought to be

quashed.

11. It   would   be   apposite   to   examine   the   averments   qua   the

petitioners in the complaint dated 12.07.2022 (Annexure P-1). The relevant

paragraphs of the complaint are extracted  below:-  

“3 

. That the accused are carrying on the business of sale and

purchase of Paddy crops and Rice from the market and accused

Nos.2 to 4 is authorised signatory/Partners/Administrator of

accused no.1 i.e. M/s Durga Rice Mills Malout Road (Link Road

Village Korian Wali) District Fazilka.

*** *** ***

5.That on demanded of the above said amount the accused issued

one cheque bearing No.”499947” dated 22.03.2022 of

Rs.2,59,273/, drawn at Oriental Bank of Commerce Gaushala

Road Branch Fazilka, District Fazilka against accused bank

account bearing No.02755016001840 of M/s Durga Rice Mills for

your legal liability and you accused No.2 Robin Batra signed the

above said cheque being the authorized signatory/Managing

Partner of M/s Durga Rice Mills firm in the presence of my

complainant and witnesses.

6.That at the time of issuing of cheque the accused nos.2 to 4 also

assured to complainant on behalf of accused no.1 that the above

said cheque will definitely be honoured on its presentation. The

complainant believed on assurance given by the accused.

CRM-M-61602-2023 #15#

12. Coming back to the facts of the present case, it is relevant to

note that the petitioners had resigned from the partnership on 21.06.2020 and

a   dissolution   deed   was   prepared   on   22.06.2020   (Annexure   P-3).   A

communication with respect to the cessation of the petitioners as partners

was also made in Form ‘A’ (Rule 5) in the Register of Firms maintained

under Section 59 of the Indian Partnership Act to the statutory authority

(Annexure P-4). Thereafter, a new partnership deed was prepared with

Robin Batra, the signatory of the cheque in question along with one Mona

Rani to the extent of 50% each (Annexure P-5). The cheque in question was

issued much later on 22.03.2022. The same came to be dishonoured on

09.05.2022. A legal notice was sent by the complainant on 01.06.2022. The

petitioners   replied   to   the   same   claiming   to   have   resigned   from   the

partnership. Despite that fact, having been brought to the notice of the

complainant, the complaint was filed levelling allegations of the cheque

having been issued with the knowledge and consent of the petitioners.

13. Further,   the   averments   made   in   the   complaint   qua  the

petitioners in para Nos.3, 5 and 6 (supra) do not further the case of the

complainant inasmuch as there are only omnibus allegations that the accused

Nos.2 to 4 (the petitioners being accused Nos.3 and 4 in the complaint) were

the authorised signatory/partner/administrator and that the said accused had

assured   the   complainant   that   the   cheque   would   be   honoured   on   its

presentation. These averments are presumptive and ambiguous with a view

to inculpate. Therefore, apparently, the culpability of the petitioners is not

made out.

CRM-M-61602-2023 #16#

14. The judgment in the case of Shivappa Reddy (supra) cited by

the learned counsel for the respondent-complainant will not apply to the

facts of the present case. In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held

that the accused who had pleaded that he had ceased to be a partner of the

accused firm did not comply with the statutory mandate of furnishing

information about his resignation to the appropriate authority. It has been

further held that the accused who claimed to have resigned from the

partnership was alleged to have been present at the house of the accused

signatory when the cheques therein had been signed. It was in that situation

that the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it would be a matter of trial as

regards the culpability of the accused who had claimed to have resigned

from the partnership therein.

15. In view of the aforementioned discussion, I find considerable

merit in the present petition. Therefore, the complaint dated 12.07.2022

(Annexure P-1), the summoning order dated 12.07.2022 (Annexure P-2) and

all  consequential  proceedings arising  therefrom  stand quashed  qua  the

petitioners. 

   ( JASJIT SINGH BEDI )

                       JUDGE

07.11.2025

Jitesh

Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No

Whether reportable Yes/No