Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2085 of 2012

Ravi Yashwant Bhoir ....Appellant

Versus

District Collector, Raigad & Ors. ....Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J .

1. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned

judgment and order dated 18.6.2009 passed by the High Court of

Bombay in Writ Petition No. 4665 of 2009 by which the High

Court has affirmed and upheld the judgment of the Hon’ble Chief

Minister of Maharashtra declaring that the conduct of the appellant

was unbecoming of the President of Uran Municipal Council and

declared him to be disqualified for remaining tenure of municipal

councilorship under Section 55B of the Maharashtra Municipal

Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965

(hereinafter called as the `Act 1965) and further declared him

disqualified for a period of six years from the date of the order i.e.

21.3.2009.

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are:

A. That the appellant was elected as member of Uran

Municipal Council and, subsequently, elected as a President of the

Municipal Council. The appellant was served with a show cause

notice dated 3.12.2008 by the State of Maharashtra calling upon

him to explain why action under Section 55B of the Act 1965 be

not taken against him. The chargesheet contained the following six

charges:

Charge No.1

Uran Charitable Medical Trust has built up unauthorized

construction on Survey Nos. 8 + 9 + 10 + 11 situated at Mouje

Mhatawali to the extent of 1140 square meters for their hospital

and you are the Trustee of the said Trust. Municipal Council

had issued notice dated 17.10.2006 for demolishing the said

unauthorized construction on its own. Shri Dosu Ardesar

Bhiwandiwala had filed Regular Civil Suit No.95/07 against

the said notice in the court of Civil Judge, Junior Division,

Uran and the same was decided on 19.12.2007 in which

plaintiff's application was rejected.

Junior Engineer of Uran Municipal Council lodged a

complaint with Uran police Station under Sections 53 and 54 of

the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966

against the said unauthorized construction on 24.7.2007. Shri

Jayant Gosal and three others filed Public Interest Litigation

No. 57 of 2008 concerning the said unauthorized construction

of the said Trust in the Bombay High Court and the same is

presently subjudice. You are the Trustee of the said Trust and

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as President of the Municipal Council, you are duty bound to

oppose the unauthorized construction. However, you did not

take any action to oppose the same and it appears that you have

supported the unauthorized construction. You have, therefore,

violated Sections 44, 45, 52 and 53 of the Maharashtra

Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966.

Charge No.2

The Municipal Council had called the General Body Meeting

on 22.3.2007 by way of Resolution No. 2 Survey Nos. 8 + 9 +

10 + 11 at Mouje Mhatawali area admeasuring about 4000

square meters was proposed for reservation of garden.

However, instead of that, the resolution was passed for

reserving the same for hospital, nursing home and medical

college. At that time, you were presiding over the meeting. By

this illegal Act, you have violated Sections 44( 1 )(e) and 42(1),

(2) and (3) of Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Panchayat

Samiti and Industrial Township Act, 1965.

Charge No.3

After you were elected as the President on 20.12.2006, a

General Body Meeting was held on 9.1.2007. Although it is

required under Section 80(1) of the Maharashtra Municipal

Councils, Panchayat Samiti and Industrial Township Act, 1965

to hold the General Body Meeting once in two months, no such

meeting was held for a period of three months between

28.2.2007 and 28.5.2007. By the said act, you have violated

Section 81 (1) of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils,

Panchayat Samiti and Industrial Township Act, 1965.

Charge No.4

In the meeting held on 9.1.2007, the suggestion to the Agenda

No.4 made by Members Shri Chintaman Gharat and Shri

Shekhar Mhatre that a rented car be provided for the use of the

President was rejected by you. Similarly, the Members Shri

Chintaman Gharat and Shri Shekhar Mhatrehad made

suggestion to the Agenda No.ll of the same meeting that new

Nalla be constructed near Ughadi at Bhavara Phanaswadi. The

said suggestion was rejected after being read over. Similarly,

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Members Shri Chintaman Gharat and Shri Shekhar Mhatre had

made suggestion to the Agenda No.20 in the same meeting that

new Nalla be constructed in front of the house of Shri Kailash

Patail at Bhavara Phanaswadi. The said suggestion was

rejected. Similarly, suggestion was made by Shri Chintaman

Gharat and Shri Shekhar Mhatre to Agenda No.23 that the

Standing Committee be authorized to open the tender/approvals

and give sanctions for diverse works of the Municipal Council.

The said suggestion was rejected. Similarly, suggestion was

made by Shri Chintaman Gharat and Shri Shekhar Mhatre to

Agenda No. 27 of the same meeting regarding allotment of

contract for spraying insecticides in Ward Nos. 1 to 17 of the

Municipal Council. It appears from the minutes of the meeting

dated 9.1.2007 that even said suggestion was rejected. You

have, therefore, violated rules 30, 32(1) and (2) of the

Maharashtra Municipal Councils (Conduct of Business) Rules,

1966 by frequently rejecting the suggestions of the Members of

the Municipal Council.

Charge No.5

Tenders were invited on 5.10.2006 for installing CI Pipeline of

300 mm. diameter for outlet and inlet of GSR Tank at

Sarvodayawadi within Uran Municipal Council by the

construction department of Maharashtra Jeevan Pradhikaran,

Panvel by its Outward No.MJPBV /MC/MS/Uran /311/3/06

dated 7.12.2006 at the Town Hall of the Uran Municipal

Council. Pursuant to the same three tenders were invited,

details whereof are as follows :

Name &

Address of the

Contractor

Tender Amount

1. M/s Shailesh

Construction

Ulhasnagar

9,11,351.50

2. M/s Padmavati

Enterprise,

Ambernath

8,92,375.00

3. M/s Kiran B.

Jadhav,

Ulhasnagar

8.47,462.98

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Out of the aforesaid three tenders, the lowest tender of M/s

Kiran B. Jadhav, Ulhasnagar was accepted as per Clause 171 of

the Maharashtra Accounts Code, 1971. However, the estimate

was prepared as per the DSR of 2005-2006. As a result when

the tenders were invited, there was a difference of more than

10% in the tender amount. Therefore, by citing Item No.44 of

the Standing Order No.36 of the Commissioner and Director,

Directorate of Municipal Administration, the Municipal

Council called for the current market rates from the concerned

commercial dealers. M/ s Nazmi Electrical & Hardware

Limited, Kalyan and M/s Sanjay Steel Tube Corporation

Limited on 5.1.2007 to compare the difference in the rates of

the tenderers/ contractors and the market rates and decided that

the rates of the tenderers were less than the market rates on the

basis of the comparison and sanctioned the tenders and the bills

of the tenderers were paid thereby you have violated

paragraphs Nos. 44 to 47 of Standing Order No.36 regarding

inviting tenders and approvals dated 29.12.2005 bearing No.

NPS/Inviting Tenders/2005/Case No.151/05and Rule No.171

of the Maharashtra Accounts Code, 1971.

Charge No.6

Tenders were invited on 5.10.2006 for installing CI Pipeline of

300 mm. diameter for outlet and inlet of GSR Tank at

Sarvodayawadi within Uran Municipal Council by the

construction department of Maharashtra Jeevan Pradhikaran,

Panvel by its Outward No.MJPBV/MC/MS/Uran /311/3/06

dated 7.12.2006 at the Town Hall of the Uran Municipal

Council. Pursuant to the same three tenders were invited,

details whereof are as follows:

Name & Address

of the Contractor

Tender

Amount

1. M/s Shailesh

Construction

Ulhasnagar

4,21,165.00

2.

M/s Padmavati

Enterprise,

Ambernath

4,18,889.28

M/s Kiran B. 3,78,507.78

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3. Jadhav,

Ulhasnagar

Out of the aforesaid three tenders, the lowest tender of M/s

Kiran B. Jadhav, Ulhasnagar was accepted as per Clause 171 of

the Maharashtra Accounts Code, 1971. However, the estimate

was prepared as per the DSR of 2005-2006. As a result when

the tenders were invited, there was a difference of more than

10% in the tender amount. Therefore, by citing Item No.44 of

the Standing Order No.36 of the Commissioner and Director,

Directorate of Municipal Administration, the Municipal

Council called for the current market rates from the concerned

commercial dealers. M/s Nazmi Electrical & Hardware

Limited, Kalyan and M/s Sanjay Steel Tube Corporation

Limited on 5.1.2007 to compare the difference in the rates of

the tenderers / contractors and the market rates and decided that

the rates of the tenderers were less than the market rates on the

basis of the comparison and sanctioned the tenders and the bills

of the tenderers were paid thereby you have violated

paragraphs Nos. 44 to 47 of Standing Order No.36 regarding

inviting tenders and approvals dated 29.12.2005 bearing No.

NPS/lnviting Tenders/2005/Case No.151/05 and Rule No.171

of the Maharashtra Accounts Code, 1971.

B. The appellant submitted his explanation dated

18.12.2008 in writing. After considering the same, the appellant

was issued a notice for hearing on 23.1.2009. The appellant

remained present alongwith his advocate before the competent

authority i.e. Hon’ble Chief Minister holding the portfolio of

Department. However, vide impugned order dated 21.3.2009, the

appellant was declared disqualified for his remaining tenure and

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further declaring him disqualified for a period of six years even as

member of the Council.

C. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed the writ petition

challenging the order dated 21.3.2009. The writ petition stood

dismissed vide impugned judgment and order dated 18.6.2009.

Hence, this appeal.

3. Shri Vinay Navare, learned counsel appearing for the

appellant, has submitted that only three charges i.e. charge nos.3, 5

and 6 have been held proved against the appellant. One charge is

that the appellant did not call for a meeting for a period of three

months i.e. from 28.2.2007 to 28.5.2007 as required under Section

81(1) of the Act 1965, for which the appellant had furnished

explanation which was worth acceptance. The officer concerned of

the municipal council did not inform the appellant, nor the

members asked to hold such meeting as required under Section

81(1) of the Act 1965, so it was merely an inadvertent act and could

not be intentional. Therefore, the question of committing any

misconduct could not arise.

4. Other charges which stood proved are regarding the

acceptance of fresh tenders at high rates for incomplete work of

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laying down 300 mm. CI pipeline for water supply. The tender for

lower estimated cost was not accepted rather there was a difference

of more than 10 per cent in tender amount. The explanation was

furnished by the appellant that there was a resolution by the council

itself accepting the said tenders and, therefore, the appellant

exclusively could not be held responsible for acceptance of tenders

on the high rate of CI pipes. Even the rate of C.I. pipe purchased

by Maharashtra Jivan Pradhikaran were also considered and after

considering all these factors, the lowest bid was accepted by the

Uran Municipal Council. The Chief Officer, the Junior Engineer

has also considered the technical aspect, and, then the

recommendation was forwarded under the signature of President,

Chief Officer and Jr. Engineer and thereafter, the Municipal

Council passed resolution and accepted the said tender. Therefore,

it cannot be said that by doing this the appellant has breached any

of the statutory provisions.

5. It is further submitted that at the time of hearing on

21.3.2009, the complainant wanted to rely upon some new grounds,

and, therefore, the appellant raised the objection. The Hon’ble

Chief Minister directed the Secretary to fix up a date of hearing,

however, no date of hearing was fixed and impugned order dated

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21.3.2009 had been passed without affording any opportunity of

hearing to the appellant. Therefore, the said order was passed in

utter disregard of the principles of natural justice and cannot be

sustained in the eyes of law.

The Competent/Statutory authority has not recorded reasons

for conclusions arrived, by which, at least the three charges stood

proved against the appellant. The expression ‘misconduct’ has not

been understood in correct perspective. Even if the three charges

stood proved, the punishment imposed is totally disproportionate,

more so, was not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the

case. The High Court erred in not appreciating the facts in correct

perspective, therefore, the impugned judgment and order is liable to

be set aside.

6. Shri Mike Prakash Desai and Shri Sudhansu Choudhary,

learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, have

vehemently opposed the appeal contending that charges proved

against the appellant constituted grave misconduct on his part and

was liable to be removed and has rightly been declared disqualified

for further period of six years. The appellant had been given full

opportunity to defend himself. The period of disqualification has

lapsed, thus this Court is dealing with an academic issue. The

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impugned order does not warrant any interference in the facts and

circumstances of the case. The appeal lacks merit and, accordingly,

is liable to be dismissed.

7. We have considered the rival submissions made by the

learned counsel of the parties and perused the record.

Before considering the case on merits, it is pertinent to deal

with certain legal issues.

MISCONDUCT:

8. Misconduct has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary,

Sixth Edition as:

“A transgression of some established and definite rule of

action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful

behavior, wilful in character, improper or wrong behavior,

its synonyms are misdemeanor, misdeed, misbehavior,

delinquency,impropriety,mismanagement offense, but not

negligence or carelessness.”

Misconduct in office has been defined as:

“Any unlawful behavior by a public officer in relation to

the duties of his office, wilful in character. Term embraces

acts which the office holder had no right to perform, acts

performed improperly, and failure to act in the face of an

affirmative duty to act.”

P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon, Reprint Edition 1987 at

page 821 defines ‘misconduct’ thus:

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“The term misconduct implies a wrongful intention, and

not a mere error of judgment. Misconduct is not

necessarily the same thing as conduct involving moral

turpitude. The word misconduct is a relative term, and has

to be construed with reference to the subject matter and

the context wherein the term occurs, having regard to the

scope of the Act or statute which is being construed.

Misconduct literally means wrong conduct or improper

conduct. In usual parlance, misconduct means a

transgression of some established and definite rule of

action, where no discretion is left, except what necessity

may demand and carelessness, negligence and unskilfulness

are transgressions of some established, but indefinite, rule

of action, where some discretion is necessarily left to the

actor. Misconduct is a violation of definite law;

carelessness or abuse of discretion under an indefinite law.

Misconduct is a forbidden act; carelessness, a forbidden

quality of an act, and is necessarily indefinite. Misconduct

in office may be defined as unlawful behaviour or neglect

by a public officer, by which the rights of a party have been

affected.”

Thus it could be seen that the word ‘misconduct’ though

not capable of precise definition, on reflection receives its

connotation from the context, the delinquency in its

performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature

of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it must be

improper or wrong behaviour; unlawful behaviour, wilful

in character; forbidden act, a transgression of established

and definite rule of action or code of conduct but not mere

error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in

performance of the duty; the act complained of bears

forbidden quality or character. Its ambit has to be

construed with reference to the subject matter and the

context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the

scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to

serve….”.

(See also: State of Punjab & Ors. v. Ram Singh Ex. Constable,

AIR 1992 SC 2188).

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9. Mere error of judgment resulting in doing of negligent act

does not amount to misconduct. However, in exceptional

circumstances, not working diligently may be a misconduct. An

action which is detrimental to the prestige of the institution may

also amount to misconduct. Acting beyond authority may be a

misconduct. When the office bearer is expected to act with

absolute integrity and honesty in handling the work, any

misappropriation, even temporary, of the funds etc. constitutes a

serious misconduct, inviting severe punishment. (Vide:

Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager & Ors. v.

Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, (1996) 9 SCC 69; Government of Tamil

Nadu v. K.N. Ramamurthy, AIR 1997 SC 3571; Inspector Prem

Chand v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors., (2007) 4 SCC 566; and

State Bank of India & Ors. v. S.N. Goyal, AIR 2008 SC 2594).

10.In Government of A.P. v. P. Posetty, (2000) 2 SCC 220,

this Court held that since acting in derogation to the prestige of the

institution/body and placing his present position in any kind of

embarrassment may amount to misconduct, for the reason, that such

conduct may ultimately lead that the delinquent had behaved in a

manner which is unbecoming of an incumbent of the post.

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11.In M.M. Malhotra v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2006 SC

80, this Court explained as under:

“…….It has, therefore, to be noted that the word

'misconduct' is not capable of precise definition.

But at the same time though incapable of precise

definition, the word 'misconduct' on reflection

receives its connotation from the context, the

delinquency in performance and its effect on the

discipline and the nature of the duty. The act

complained of must bear a forbidden quality or

character and its ambit has to be construed with

reference to the subject-matter and the context

wherein the terms occurs, having regard to the

scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks

to serve.”

A similar view has been reiterated in Baldev Singh Gandhi

v. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 1124.

12. Conclusions about the absence or lack of personal qualities

in the incumbent do not amount to misconduct holding the person

concerned liable for punishment.

(See: Union of India & Ors. v. J. Ahmed, AIR 1979 SC 1022).

13.It is also a settled legal proposition that misconduct must

necessarily be measured in terms of the nature of the misconduct

and the court must examine as to whether misconduct has been

detrimental to the public interest. (Vide: General Manager,

13

Appellate Authority, Bank of India & Anr. v. Mohd.

Nizamuddin AIR 2006 SC 3290).

14.The expression ‘misconduct’ has to be understood as a

transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a

forbidden act, unlawful behaviour, wilful in character. It may be

synonymous as mis-demeanour in propriety and mismanagement.

In a particular case, negligence or carelessness may also be a

misconduct for example, when a watchman leaves his duty and goes

to watch cinema, though there may be no theft or loss to the

institution but leaving the place of duty itself amounts to

misconduct. It may be more serious in case of disciplinary forces.

Further, the expression ‘misconduct’ has to be construed and

understood in reference to the subject matter and context wherein

the term occurs taking into consideration the scope and object of the

statute which is being construed. Misconduct is to be measured in

the terms of the nature of misconduct and it should be viewed with

the consequences of misconduct as to whether it has been

detrimental to the public interest.

DISGRACEFUL CONDUCT :

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15. The expression ‘disgraceful conduct’ is not defined in the

statute. Therefore, the same has to be understood in given

dictionary meaning. The term ‘disgrace’ signifies loss of honor,

respect, or reputation, shame or bring disfavour or discredit.

Disgraceful means giving offence to moral sensibilities and

injurious to reputation or conduct or character deserving or bringing

disgrace or shame. Disgraceful conduct is also to be examined

from the context in which the term has been employed under the

statute. Disgraceful conduct need not necessarily be connected with

the official of the office bearer. Therefore, it may be outside the

ambit of discharge of his official duty.

REMOVAL OF AN ELECTED OFFICE BEARER :

16.The municipalities have been conferred Constitutional

status by amending the Constitution vide 74

th

Amendment Act,

1992 w.e.f. 1.6.1993. The municipalities have also been conferred

various powers under Article 243B of the Constitution.

17.Amendment in the Constitution by adding Parts IX and IX-

A confers upon the local self Government a complete autonomy on

the basic democratic unit unshackled from official control. Thus,

exercise of any power having effect of destroying the Constitutional

15

Institution besides being outrageous is dangerous to the democratic

set-up of this country. Therefore, an elected official cannot be

permitted to be removed unceremoniously without following the

procedure prescribed by law, in violation of the provisions of

Article 21 of the Constitution, by the State by adopting a casual

approach and resorting to manipulations to achieve ulterior purpose.

The Court being the custodian of law cannot tolerate any attempt to

thwart the Institution.

The democratic set-up of the country has always been

recognized as a basic feature of the Constitution, like other features

e.g. Supremacy of the Constitution, Rule of law, Principle of

separation of powers, Power of judicial review under Articles 32,

226 and 227 of the Constitution etc. (Vide: His Holiness

Keshwananda Bharti Sripadagalvaru & Ors. v. State of Kerala

& Anr., AIR 1973 SC 1461; Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union

of India & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1789; Union of India v.

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr., AIR 2002 SC 2112;

Special Reference No. 1 of 2002 (Gujarat Assembly Election

Matter), AIR 2003 SC 87; and Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India &

Ors., AIR 2006 SC 3127).

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18.It is not permissible to destroy any of the basic features of

the Constitution even by any form of amendment, and therefore, it is

beyond imagination that it can be eroded by the executive on its

whims without any reason. The Constitution accords full faith and

credit to the act done by the executive in exercise of its statutory

powers, but they have a primary responsibility to serve the nation

and enlighten the citizens to further strengthen a democratic State.

Public administration is responsible for the effective implication of

the rule of law and constitutional commands which effectuate fairly

the objective standard set for adjudicating good administrative

decisions. However, wherever the executive fails, the Courts come

forward to strike down an order passed by them passionately and to

remove arbitrariness and unreasonableness, for the reason, that the

State by its illegal action becomes liable for forfeiting the full faith

and credit trusted with it. (Vide: Scheduled Castes and Scheduled

Tribes officers Welfare Council v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR

1997 SC 1451; and State of Punjab & Ors. v. G.S. Gill & Anr.,

AIR 1997 SC 2324).

19.Basic means the basis of a thing on which it stands, and on

the failure of which it falls. In democracy all citizens have equal

17

political rights. Democracy means actual, active and effective

exercise of power by the people in this regard. It means political

participation of the people in running the administration of the

Government. It conveys the State of affair in which each citizen is

assured of the right of equal participation in the polity. (See: R.C.

Poudyal v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 1804).

20.In Peoples Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) & Anr. v.

Union of India & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 2363, this Court held as

under:–

“The trite saying that “democracy is for the

people, of the people and by the people” has to be

remembered for ever. In a democratic republic, it is

the will of the people that is paramount and

becomes the basis of the authority of the

Government. The will is expressed in periodic

elections based on universal adult suffrage held by

means of secret ballot. It is through the ballot that

the voter expresses his choice or preference for a

candidate “Voting is formal expression of will or

opinion by the person entitled to exercise the right

on the subject or issue”, as observed by the Court

in Lily Thomas v. Speaker, Lok Sabha, (1993) 4

SCC 234 quoting from Black’s Law Dictionary. The

citizens of the country are enabled to take part in

the Government through their chosen

representatives. In a parliamentary democracy like

ours, the Government of the day is responsible to

the people through their elected representatives.

The elected representative acts or is supposed to

act as a live link between the people and the

Government. The people’s representatives fill the

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role of law-makers and custodians of the

Government. People look to them for ventilation

and redressal of their grievances.”

21.In State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh etc. etc., AIR 1999 SC

2378, this Court considered the issue of removal of an elected office

bearer and held that where the statutory provision has a very

serious repercussions, it implicitly makes it imperative and

obligatory on the part of the authority to have strict adherence to the

statutory provisions. All the safeguards and protections provided

under the statute have to be kept in mind while exercising such a

power. The Court considering its earlier judgments in Mohinder

Kumar v. State, Panaji, Goa (1998) 8 SCC 655; and Ali Mustafa

Abdul Rehman Moosa v. State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 244, held

as under:–

“It must be borne in mind that severer the

punishment, greater has to be the care taken to see

that all the safeguards provided in a statute are

scrupulously followed.”

22.The Constitution Bench of this Court in G. Sadanandan v.

State of Kerala & Anr., AIR 1966 SC 1925, held that if all the

safeguards provided under the Statute are not observed, an order

having serious consequences is passed without proper application of

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mind, having a casual approach to the matter, the same can be

characterised as having been passed mala fide, and thus, is liable to

be quashed.

23.There can also be no quarrel with the settled legal

proposition that removal of a duly elected Member on the basis of

proved misconduct is a quasi-judicial proceeding in nature. (Vide:

Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare &

Ors., AIR 2002 SC 2158). This view stands further fortified by the

Constitution Bench judgments of this Court in Bachhitar Singh v.

State of Punjab & Anr., AIR 1963 SC 395 and Union of India v.

H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364. Therefore, the principles of natural

justice are required to be given full play and strict compliance should

be ensured, even in the absence of any provision providing for the

same. Principles of natural justice require a fair opportunity of

defence to such an elected office bearer.

24.Undoubtedly, any elected official in local self-government

has to be put on a higher pedestal as against a government servant.

If a temporary government employee cannot be removed on the

ground of misconduct without holding a full fledged inquiry, it is

difficult to imagine how an elected office bearer can be removed

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without holding a full fledged inquiry. In service jurisprudence,

minor punishment is permissible to be imposed while holding the

inquiry as per the procedure prescribed for it but for removal,

termination or reduction in rank, a full fledged inquiry is required

otherwise it will be violative of the provisions of Article 311 of the

Constitution of India. The case is to be understood in an entirely

different context as compared to the government employees, for the

reason, that for the removal of the elected officials, a more stringent

procedure and standard of proof is required.

25.This Court examined the provisions of the Punjab

Municipal Act, 1911, providing for the procedure of removal of the

President of the Municipal Council on similar grounds in

Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 2001 SC

2524 and observed that removal of an elected office bearer is a

serious matter. The elected office bearer must not be removed

unless a clear-cut case is made out, for the reason that holding and

enjoying an office, discharging related duties is a valuable statutory

right of not only the elected member but also of his constituency or

electoral college. His removal may curtail the term of the office

bearer and also cast stigma upon him. Therefore, the procedure

21

prescribed under a statute for removal must be strictly adhered to

and unless a clear case is made out, there can be no justification for

his removal. While taking the decision, the authority should not be

guided by any other extraneous consideration or should not come

under any political pressure.

26.In a democratic institution, like ours, the incumbent is

entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected

unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to

law or he is removed by the procedure established under law. The

proceedings for removal must satisfy the requirement of natural

justice and the decision must show that the authority has applied its

mind to the allegations made and the explanation furnished by the

elected office bearer sought to be removed.

27.The elected official is accountable to its electorate because

he is being elected by a large number of voters. His removal has

serious repercussions as he is removed from the post and declared

disqualified to contest the elections for a further stipulated period,

but it also takes away the right of the people of his constituency to

be represented by him. Undoubtedly, the right to hold such a post is

statutory and no person can claim any absolute or vested right to the

22

post, but he cannot be removed without strictly adhering to the

provisions provided by the legislature for his removal (Vide: Jyoti

Basu & Ors. v. Debi Ghosal & Ors., AIR 1982 SC 983; Mohan

Lal Tripathi v. District Magistrate, Rai Barelly & Ors., AIR

1993 SC 2042; and Ram Beti etc. etc. v. District Panchayat

Rajadhikari & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 1222).

28.In view of the above, the law on the issue stands crystallized

to the effect that an elected member can be removed in exceptional

circumstances giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and

holding the enquiry, meeting the requirement of principles of

natural justice and giving an incumbent an opportunity to defend

himself, for the reason that removal of an elected person casts

stigma upon him and takes away his valuable statutory right. Not

only the elected office bearer but his constituency/electoral college

is also deprived of representation by the person of his choice. A

duly elected person is entitled to hold office for the term for which

he has been elected and he can be removed only on a proved

misconduct or any other procedure established under law like ‘No

Confidence Motion’ etc. The elected official is accountable to its

electorate as he has been elected by a large number of voters and it

23

would have serious repercussions when he is removed from the

office and further declared disqualified to contest the election for a

further stipulated period.

RECORD ING OF REASONS:

29.It is a settled proposition of law that even in administrative

matters, the reasons should be recorded as it is incumbent upon the

authorities to pass a speaking and reasoned order. In Kumari

Shrilekha Vidyarthi etc. etc. v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1991

SC 537, this Court has observed as under:–

“Every such action may be informed by reason and

if follows that an act un-informed by reason is

arbitrary, the rule of law contemplates governance

by law and not by humour, whim or caprice of the

men to whom the governance is entrusted for the

time being. It is the trite law that “be you ever so

high, the laws are above you.” This is what a man

in power must remember always.”

30.In L.I.C. of India & Anr. v. Consumer Education and

Research Centre & Ors., AIR 1995 SC 1811, this Court observed

that the State or its instrumentality must not take any irrelevant or

irrational factor into consideration or appear arbitrary in its

decision. “Duty to act fairly” is part of fair procedure envisaged

under Articles 14 and 21. Every activity of the public authority or

24

those under public duty must be received and guided by the public

interest. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Union

of India v. M.L. Capoor & Ors., AIR 1974 SC 87; and Mahesh

Chandra v. Regional Manager, U.P. Financial Corporation &

Ors., AIR 1993 SC 935.

31.In State of West Bengal v. Atul Krishna Shaw & Anr.,

AIR 1990 SC 2205, this Court observed that “giving of reasons is

an essential element of administration of justice. A right to reason

is, therefore, an indispensable part of sound system of judicial

review.”

32.In S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984,

it has been held that the object underlying the rules of natural justice

is to prevent miscarriage of justice and secure fair play in action.

The expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice provides

for requirement to record reasons as it is now regarded as one of the

principles of natural justice, and it was held in the above case that

except in cases where the requirement to record reasons is expressly

or by necessary implication dispensed with, the authority must

record reasons for its decision.

25

33.In Krishna Swami v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1993

SC 1407, this Court observed that the rule of law requires that any

action or decision of a statutory or public authority must be founded

on the reason stated in the order or borne-out from the record. The

Court further observed:

“Reasons are the links between the material, the

foundation for their erection and the actual

conclusions. They would also demonstrate how

the mind of the maker was activated and actuated

and their rational nexus and synthesis with the

facts considered and the conclusions reached.

Lest it would be arbitrary, unfair and unjust,

violating Article 14 or unfair procedure offending

Article 21.”

34.This Court while deciding the issue in Sant Lal Gupta &

Ors. v. Modern Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd. &

Ors., (2010) 13 SCC 336, placing reliance on its various earlier

judgments held as under:

“28.It is a settled legal proposition that not only

administrative but also judicial order must be

supported by reasons, recorded in it. Thus, while

deciding an issue, the Court is bound to give reasons

for its conclusion. It is the duty and obligation on the

part of the Court to record reasons while disposing

of the case. The hallmark of order and exercise of

judicial power by a judicial forum is for the forum to

disclose its reasons by itself and giving of reasons

has always been insisted upon as one of the

fundamentals of sound administration of the justice –

delivery system, to make it known that there had been

26

proper and due application of mind to the issue

before the Court and also as an essential requisite of

the principles of natural justice. “The giving of

reasons for a decision is an essential attribute of

judicial and judicious disposal of a matter before

Courts, and which is the only indication to know

about the manner and quality of exercise undertaken,

as also the fact that the Court concerned had really

applied its mind.” The reason is the heartbeat of

every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order

and without the same, the order becomes lifeless.

Reasons substitute subjectivity with objectivity. The

absence of reasons renders an order

indefensible/unsustainable particularly when the

order is subject to further challenge before a higher

forum. Recording of reasons is principle of natural

justice and every judicial order must be supported by

reasons recorded in writing. It ensures transparency

and fairness in decision making. The person who is

adversely affected must know why his application has

been rejected.”

35.In Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K.

Ratna & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 71, this Court held that on charge of

misconduct the authority holding the inquiry must record reasons

for reaching its conclusion and record clear findings. The Court

further held:

“In fairness and justice, the member is entitled to

know why he has been found guilty. The case can be

so serious that it can attract the harsh penalties

provided by the Act. Moreover, the member has

been given a right of appeal to the High Court

under S. 22 A of the Act. The exercise his right of

appeal effectively he must know the basis on which

the Council has found him guilty. We have already

pointed out that a finding by the Council is the first

27

determinative finding on the guilt of the member. It

is a finding by a Tribunal of first instance. The

conclusion of the Disciplinary Committee does not

enjoy the status of a "finding". Moreover, the

reasons contained in the report by the Disciplinary

Committee for its conclusion may or may not

constitute the basis of the finding rendered by the

Council. The Council must, therefore, state the

reasons for its finding”.

36.The emphasis on recording reason is that if the decision

reveals the ‘inscrutable face of the sphinx’, it can be its silence,

render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their

appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in

adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an

indispensable part of a sound judicial system, reasons at least

sufficient to indicate an application of mind of the authority before

the court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why

the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements

of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made. In other

words, a speaking out, the inscrutable face of the sphinx is

ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.

MALICE IN LAW :

37.This Court has consistently held that the State is under an

obligation to act fairly without ill will or malice- in fact or in law.

28

Where malice is attributed to the State, it can never be a case of

personal ill-will or spite on the part of the State. “Legal malice” or

“malice in law” means something done without lawful excuse. It is a

deliberate act in disregard to the rights of others. It is an act which is

taken with an oblique or indirect object. It is an act done wrongfully

and wilfully without reasonable or probable cause, and not

necessarily an act done from ill feeling and spite. Mala fide

exercise of power does not imply any moral turpitude. It means

exercise of statutory power for “purposes foreign to those for which

it is in law intended.” It means conscious violation of the law to the

prejudice of another, a depraved inclination on the part of the

authority to disregard the rights of others, where intent is manifested

by its injurious acts. Passing an order for unauthorized purpose

constitutes malice in law. (See: Addl. Distt. Magistrate, Jabalpur

v. Shivakant Shukla, AIR 1976 SC 1207; Union of India thr.

Govt. of Pondicherry & Anr. v. V. Ramakrishnan & Ors., (2005)

8 SCC 394; and Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath

Narichania & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 3745).

38.Section 55 of the Act 1965 provides for removal of the

President of the Council by No Confidence Motion. Sections 55A

29

and 55B provide a mode of removal of duly elected President on

proved misconduct or negligence etc., which read as under:

Section 55A.- Removal of President and Vice-President by

Government:-

Without prejudice to the provisions of Section 55-1A and

55, a President or a Vice-President may be removed from

office by the State Government for misconduct in the

discharge of his duties, or for neglect of or incapacity to

perform, his duties or for being guilty of any disgraceful

conduct, and the President or Vice-President so removed

shall not be eligible for re-election or re-appointment as

President or Vice-President as the case may be, during the

remainder of the term of office of the Councillors:

Provided that, no such President or Vice-

President shall be removed from office, unless he has been

given a reasonable opportunity to furnish an explanation.

55B.- Disqualification for continuing as Councillor or

becoming Councillor on removal as President or Vice-

President :

Notwithstanding anything contained in Section

55A, if a Councillor or a person is found to be guilty of

misconduct in the discharge of his official duties or being

guilty of any disgraceful conduct while holding or while he

was holding the office of the President or Vice-President, as

the case may be, the State Government may,-

(a)disqualify such Councillor to continue as a

Councillor for the remainder of his term of office as a

Councillor and also for being elected as a

Councillor, till the period of six years has elapsed

from the order of such disqualification;

(b)Disqualify such person for being elected as a

Councillor till the period of six years has elapsed

from the order of such disqualification.

30

39.It is also pertinent to refer to the provisions of Section 81 of

the Act 1965 which reads as under:

“Section 81- Provisions in regard to meetings of Council:

The following provisions shall be observed with respect

to the meetings of a Council:

(1) For the disposal of general business, which shall

be restricted to matters relating to the powers,

duties and functions of the Council as specified

in this Act or any other law for the time being

in force, and any welcome address to a

distinguished visitor, proposal for giving

Manpatra to a distinguished person or

resolution of condolence (where all or any of

these are duly proposed), an ordinary meeting

shall be held once in two months. The first

such meeting, shall be held within two months,

from the date on which the meeting of the

Council under Section 51 is held, and each

succeeding ordinary meeting shall be held

within two months from the date on which the

last preceding ordinary meeting is held. The

President may also call additional ordinary

meetings as he deems necessary. It shall be the

duty of the President to fix the dates for all

ordinary meetings and, to call such meetings in

time.

(1A)If the President fails to call an ordinary meeting

within the period specified in clause (1), the Chief Officer

shall forthwith report such failure to the Collector. The

Collector shall, within seven days from receipt of the Chief

Officer’s report or may, suo motu, call the ordinary

meeting. The agenda for such meeting shall be drawn up by

the Collector, in consultation with the Chief Officer:

(2) The President may, whenever he thinks fit, and

shall upon the written request of not less than one-fourth of

the total number of Councillors and on a date not later than

31

fifteen days after the receipt of such request by the

President, call a special meeting. The business to be

transacted at any such meeting shall also be restricted to

matters specified in clause (1).

(3) If the President fails to call a meeting within the

period specified in clause (2), the Councillors who had

made a request for the special meeting being called, may

request the Collector to call a special meeting. On receipt

of such request, the Collector, or any officer whom he may

designate in this behalf, shall call the special meeting on a

date within fifteen days from the date of receipt of such

request by the Collector. Such meeting shall be presided

over by the Collector or the Officer designated, but he shall

have no right to vote.”

40.The instant case requires to be examined in the light of

aforesaid settled legal propositions and the statutory provisions.

41.The case has initially originated because of the complaint

filed by Shri Chintaman Raghunath Gharat, Ex-President and the

then sitting Municipal Councillor, Uran Municipal Council

(Respondent No.5) dated 3.5.2007 regarding the misconduct of the

appellant. The preliminary inquiry was conducted through

Collector, Raigad. The Collector, Raigad made an inquiry through

Deputy Collector and submitted the inquiry report dated 25.8.2008

and as no action was taken by the Statutory Authority against the

appellant, Shri Gharat filed a Writ Petition No. 2309 of 2008 before

the High Court which was disposed of vide order dated 3.4.2008

32

directing the respondent no. 2 (Hon’ble Minister of State, Urban

Development, the then Hon’ble Chief Minister) to take a decision

on the application/complaint submitted by Shri Gharat within a

period of 8 weeks. As the decision could not be taken within that

stipulated time, Shri Gharat filed Contempt Petition No. 379 of

2008 which was disposed of by the High Court directing the

statutory authority to take up the decision expeditiously.

It was, in fact, in view of the High Court’s order, the

chargesheet/showcause notice dated 3.12.2008 containing 6

charges was served upon the appellant. In response to the said

chargesheet dated 3.12.2008, the appellant furnished explanation

dated 18.12.2008 denying all the charges framed against him and

furnished a detailed explanation. In this respect, hearing was held

on 23.1.2009 wherein the appellant as well as the complainant

appeared alongwith their advocates and made their submissions

before the Hon’ble Minister. The impugned order was passed on

21.3.2009 holding the appellant guilty of three charges imposing the

punishment as referred to hereinabove.

The impugned order dated 21.3.2009 runs from pages 28 to

52 of the appeal paper-book. The facts and the charges run from

pages 28 to 36. Explanation furnished by the appellant runs from

33

pages 36 to 47. The order of the Hon’ble Minister runs only to 5

pages. It is evident from the said order that the Hon’ble Minister

did not make any reference to the pleadings taken by the appellant

either in his reply to show cause or during the course of hearing.

The order simply reveals that the Hon’ble Minister noticed certain

things. Two paragraphs at page 48 are not relevant at all for our

consideration. The admission of the appellant that meeting was not

held for a period of 3 months between 28.2.2007 to 28.5.2007 has

been relied upon. In other paragraphs reference has been made to

Standing Order 36 issued by the Director and Commissioner,

Directorate of Municipal Administration, providing for the

procedure for inviting tenders and then straightaway without giving

any reason, finding is recorded as under:

“Out of the 3 tenders received for installation of 300

mm diameter pipeline for outlet and inlet of GSR

tank at Sarvodayawadi and Town Hall of Uran

Municipal Council, lowest tender is accepted as per

clause 171 of the Maharashtra Municipal Council

Accounts Code, 1971. However, the tenders were

invited as per the DSR rates for the year 2005-2006.

The lowest tender received at that time and was

more than 10% of the rates of the estimate

(approximately 31% and 37%). Despite this, the

said tender was accepted.”

Then, a very cryptic order of punishment has been passed.

34

42. The explanation furnished by the appellant for not holding

the meeting and acceptance of tender by the council itself and not

by the appellant, has not been considered at all. No reasoning has

been given by the Statutory Authority for reaching the conclusions.

We fail to understand as on what basis such a cryptic order

imposing such a severe punishment can be sustained in the eyes of

law.

43. The High Court has also erred in not dealing with any of the

issues raised by the appellant while furnishing his explanation rather

relied upon the findings recorded by the Hon’ble Minister. There is

nothing in the judgment of the High Court wherein the grievance of

the appellant has been considered or any reasoning has been given

to uphold the findings recorded by the Statutory Authority imposing

such a severe punishment.

44. Shri Chintaman Raghunath Gharat, Ex-President was the

complainant, thus, at the most, he could lead the evidence as a

witness. He could not claim the status of an adversial litigant. The

complainant cannot be the party to the lis. A legal right is an

averment of entitlement arising out of law. In fact, it is a benefit

conferred upon a person by the rule of law. Thus, a person who

35

suffers from legal injury can only challenge the act or omission.

There may be some harm or loss that may not be wrongful in the

eyes of law because it may not result in injury to a legal right or

legally protected interest of the complainant but juridically harm of

this description is called damnum sine injuria. The complainant has

to establish that he has been deprived of or denied of a legal right

and he has sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In case

he has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on, he cannot be

heard as a party in a lis. A fanciful or sentimental grievance may

not be sufficient to confer a locus standi to sue upon the individual.

There must be injuria or a legal grievance which can be appreciated

and not a stat pro ratione valuntas reasons i.e. a claim devoid of

reasons. Under the garb of being necessary party, a person cannot be

permitted to make a case as that of general public interest. A person

having a remote interest cannot be permitted to become a party in

the lis, as the person wants to become a party in a case, has to

establish that he has a proprietary right which has been or is

threatened to be violated, for the reason that a legal injury creates a

remedial right in the injured person. A person cannot be heard as a

party unless he answers the description of aggrieved party. (Vide:

Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai, Advocate General of

36

Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 385; Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v.

Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 578;

Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1976 SC

2602; Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal & Ors., (2002) 1 SCC

33; and Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba v. Tosiba Appliances

Company & Ors., (2008) 10 SCC 766). The High Court failed to

appreciate that it was a case of political rivalry. The case of the

appellant has not been considered in correct perspective at all.

45.In such a fact-situation, the complaint filed by the

respondent No. 5 could at the most be pressed into service as a

material exhibit in order to collect the evidence to find out the truth.

In the instant case, as all the charges proved against the

appellant have been dealt with exclusively on the basis of

documentary evidence, there is nothing on record by which the

complainant could show that the General Body meeting was not

called, as statutorily required, by the appellant intentionally.

46. Not calling the meeting of the General Body of the House

may be merely a technical misconduct committed inadvertently in

ignorance of statutory requirements. It is nobody’s case that the

appellant had done it intentionally/purposely in order to avoid some

37

unpleasant resolution/demand of the council. No finding of fact has

been recorded either by the competent authority or by the High

Court that some urgent/important work could not be carried out for

want of General Body meeting of the council. Merely not to

conduct oneself according to the procedure prescribed or omission

to conduct a meeting without any corresponding loss to the

corporate body, would not be an automatic misconduct by inference,

unless some positive intentional misconduct is shown. It was an

admitted fact that the meeting had not been called. However, in the

absence of any imputation of motive, not calling the meeting by the

appellant could not in itself, be enough to prove the charge.

Section 81 of the Act 1965 requires that for the disposal of

the general business, the President should call the meeting of the

Council within a period of two months from the date on which the

last preceding ordinary meeting was held. The statutory provisions

further provided that in case the President fails to call the ordinary

meeting within the said stipulated period, the Chief Officer may

report such failure to the Collector and the Collector can call the

ordinary meeting of the Council following the procedure prescribed

therein. The President can also call the meeting on the request of

the members not less than one-fourth of the total number of

38

councils. Therefore, the cogent reading of all the provisions makes

it clear that in case the President fails to call the meeting, there are

other modes of calling the meeting and in such an eventuality where

reasonable explanation has been furnished by the appellant to the

show cause notice on this count, the competent authority could not

have passed such a harsh order.

47.So far as the other charges regarding laying down the

pipelines at a much higher rate are concerned, it has been a positive

case of the appellant that as earlier contractor had abandoned the

work in between and there was a scarcity of water in the city, the

Chief Officer, the Junior Engineer considered the technical aspect

and then recommendations were forwarded under the signatures of

the appellant, the Chief Officer and Junior Engineer to the council,

which ultimately passed the resolution accepting the said tenders. In

such a fact-situation, it was a collective consensus decision of the

house after due deliberations. Admittedly, it was not even the

ratification of contract awarded by the appellant himself. Thus, even

by any stretch of imagination it cannot be held to be an individual

decision of the appellant and the competent authority failed to

appreciate that the tenders were accepted by the Council itself and

39

not by the appellant alone. Therefore, he could not be held

responsible for acceptance of tenders.

We have gone through the counter affidavit filed by

respondent No.5, complainant before this court and he has not stated

anywhere that the tenders were not accepted by the council, rather

allegations have been made that the tenders had been accepted at a

higher rate so that the contractor could get the financial gain.

Similarly, technical issue has been raised for not calling the

meeting, committing serious irregularities sufficiently warranting

dis-qualification of the appellant on his omission to call the

meeting, but it is not his case that he did it intentionally. The

counter affidavit filed by the State does not reveal anything in

relation to the issues involved herein and it appears that the

deponent/officer has merely completed the formalities without any

purpose.

48. To conclude, we are of the considered opinion and that too

after appreciation of the entire evidence on record that the first

charge proved against the appellant for not calling the meeting of

Council, did not warrant the order of removal and the explanation

furnished by appellant could have been accepted. Other charges

could not be proved against the appellant, in view of the fact, that

40

the tenders at a higher rate were accepted by the Council itself and

the appellant could not be held exclusively responsible for it. The

Respondent no. 5, being a political rival, could not have been

entertained as a party to the lis. The charge of not calling the

meeting of the Council had been admitted by the appellant himself,

thus, no further evidence was required, for the reason, that the

admission is the best evidence. The competent authority could have

considered his explanation alone and proceeded to take a final

decision. So far as the other charges are concerned, as has been

observed hereinabove, it had been a consensus collective decision

of the Council to accept the tender at higher rate and the appellant

could not have been held guilty of the said charges. Thus, the

instant case has been a crystal clear cut case of legal malice and

therefore, the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. The duly

elected member/chairman of the council could not have been

removed in such a casual and cavalier manner without giving strict

adherence to the safeguards provided under the statute which had to

be scrupulously followed.

49.The appellant has raised a question of fact before the High

Court as well as before this Court submitting that at the time

of hearing before the Hon’ble Chief Minister, respondent

41

No.5 has raised new grounds and the appellant raised

serious objections as he had no opportunity to meet the

same. Thus, in order to give the appellant an opportunity to

rebut the same the competent authority had adjourned the

case and directed the Secretary to fix a date so that the

appellant may meet those new objections/grounds.

However, the order impugned removing the appellant from

the post and declaring him further disqualified for a period

of six years had been passed. It is not evident from the

order impugned as what could be those new grounds which

had not been disclosed to the appellant. Thus, to ascertain as

to whether in order to give an opportunity to the appellant to

meet the alleged new grounds, the competent authority had

adjourned the case, this Court while reserving the judgment

vide order dated 13.2.2012 asked the learned Standing

Counsel for the State Shri Mike Prakash Desai to produce

the original record before this Court within a period of two

weeks. For the reasons best known to the State Authorities

neither the record has been produced before us, nor any

application has been filed to extend the time to produce the

same.

42

In fact, this Court has been deprived of seeing the original

record and to examine the grievance of the appellant. We express

our grave concern and shock the way the State Authorities has

treated the highest court of the land. In such a fact-situation, the

court has no option except to draw the adverse inference against the

State.

50.In view of the above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed.

The judgment and order of the High Court dated 18.6.2009 as well

as the order passed by the Hon’ble Chief Minister dated 21.3.2009

are hereby set aside.

This Court while entertaining the petition had granted

interim protection to the appellant vide order dated 17.7.2009,

which was extended till further orders vide order dated 13.8.2009

and, thus, the orders impugned remained inoperative. Thus, it will

be deemed as no order had ever been passed against the appellant.

In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no

order as to costs.

A copy of the order be sent directly to the Chief Secretary,

State of Maharashtra, Bombay, who may conduct an enquiry and

send his personal affidavit as under what circumstances the State

Authorities could decide not to ensure compliance of the order of

43

this Court dated 13.2.2012, within a period of four week from the

date of receipt of this order, to the Registrar General of this Court

who may place it alongwith the file before the Bench.

....…………….....................J.

( Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN )

.…………............................J.

( J.S. KHEHAR )

New Delhi,

March 2, 2012

44