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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO.19103 OF 2024

WITH

INTERIM APPLICATION (ST) NO. 714 OF 2026

IN

WRIT PETITION NO.19103 OF 2024

Ravindra Govind Jaiswal …Petitioner

Versus

Vice President And CEO MHADA And Ors. …Respondents

Mr. Valmiky H. Narvekar i/b Sumit Kate, for the Petitioner.

Ms. Priyanka Chvan for the Respondent Nos.1 and 2.

Mr. Mayur Khandeparkar a/w Mr. Aditya Miskita, Mr. Sanjeet Kadam,

Ms. Netra Jagtap i/b Kadam & Company, for the Respondent No.3.

Mr. Aseem Naphade i/b Taniya Murudkar, for the Respondent Nos.5

and 6

.

Mr. P. V. Nelson Rajan, A.G.P., for State.

CORAM: SOMASEKHAR SUNDARESAN, J.

DATE: SEPTEMBER 8, 2026

JUDGEMENT :

Context and Factual Background:

1. This Writ Petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India

impugning three orders by which the Petitioner’s objection to the certification

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AARTI

GAJANAN

PALKAR

Digitally

signed by

AARTI

GAJANAN

PALKAR

Date:

2026.09.08

18:04:47

+0530

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of eight tenancies on the second, third and fourth floors of the “ Dadarkar

Building

” was rejected – these are orders of Respondent No. 2, the Chief

Officer, Mumbai Buildings Reconstruction & Redevelopment Board

(“

MBRRB”) dated November 1, 2019; the order in First Appeal passed by

Respondent No. 1, the Vice President & CEO, MHADA dated September 4,

2023; and the order in Second Appeal No. 04 of 2023 passed by Respondent

No. 7, the Additional Chief Secretary, Housing Department dated November

12, 2024 (collectively, “Impugned Orders”).

2. The grievance relates to land bearing C.S. Nos. 1278 and 1279 of

Girgaon Division (“Subject Property”), Building Nos. 249-302, 302A and

302B, located at Vithalbhai Patel Road, Bangadwadi, Girgaon, Mumbai

(bearing Cess Nos. D-1644, D-1645(1-2) and D-1646(1)), known as Dadarkar

Building (“Dadarkar Building”) on C.S. No. 1278; and Guru Niwas Building

(“Guru Niwas Building”) and Guru Niwas Chawl (“Guru Niwas Chawl”) on

C.S. No. 1279.

3. The Petitioner is Mr. Ravindra Govind Jaiswal (“Jaiswal”), Tenant of

Room Nos. 48 and 48A, Guru Niwas Chawl (on C.S. No. 1279), a room held

since the time of his father. Jaiswal was summarily evicted from Room No. 48

under Section 95A of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act,

1976 (“MHADA Act”) in 2021. Jaiswal’s challenge to the grant of no-objection

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certificates to the project on the premise that the certified list of tenants

contained bogus entries was dismissed first by order dated November 1, 2019

by Respondent No.2, and subsequently by an order dated September 14, 2021

passed by a Division Bench of this Court in , in Writ Petition No. 476 of 2020

(“WP 476”) on the ground of alternate efficacious remedy being available to

Jaiswal. Another challenge by Jaiswal in Writ Petition No. 1453 of 2021 (“WP

1453”) to the summary eviction notice and eviction order against him, was

dismissed with costs by a separate order of the same date.

4.Jaiswal himself was certified as an eligible tenant and he is also said to

have given irrevocable consent to the redevelopment by letter dated April 4,

2017. It is contended that he has signed a Memorandum of Understanding

dated September 17, 2017 and has agreed to or has indeed executed a

Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreement (“PAAA”) dated October 12,

2023 and is therefore, personally a beneficiary of the scheme of

redevelopment.

5. Respondent No.3 is Sugee Two Developers LLP (“Sugee”), the Owner

and Developer who has purchased C.S. No. 1278 with Dadarkar Building from

M/s. Marudhar Enterprises by Deed of Conveyance dated January 6, 2017

(“2017 Conveyance”). On September 30, 2010, a Deed of Conveyance (“2010

Conveyance”) had been executed between the landlord, the Dadarkar Family

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and M/s. Marudhar Enterprises to convey C.S. No. 1278, in which Recital (ix)

refers to tenants. Sugee is now carrying out a composite redevelopment of all

three structures under Regulation 33(7) of the Development Control and

Promotion Regulations, 2034 (“DCPR Regulations”). The no-objection

certificate had been issued by MBRRB on May 10, 2018 u nder the

Development Control Regulations, 1991 (“DCR 1991”), and a revised NOC was

issued on August 2, 2019, converting the scheme to one under DCPR 2034.

6. Respondents No.4 to 6 are certified tenants who have acq uired

tenancies and have been given entitlements to flats in the new buildings.

Respondent No. 4 is Mr. Avishkar Agarwal (“Agarwal”), certified tenant of

Room Nos. 1 to 4, 2nd floor, Dadarkar Building. Tenancies are said to have

been transferred to Agarwal on August 12, 2016, for which he is purportedly

entitled to Flat Nos. 1701 and 1702 in the new building.

7. Respondent No. 5 is Bijal Manav (Malav) Shah (“Bijal”), certified tenant

of Room Nos. 1 to 3, 3rd floor, Dadarkar Building. Tenancies are said to have

been transferred to Bijal on August 12, 2016, for which Bijal is purportedly

entitled to Flat Nos. 1801 and 1802 in the new building.

8. Respondent No. 6 is Ms. Vijeta Sunil Shah (“Vijeta”), certified tenant of

Room No. 1, 4th floor, Dadarkar Building. Tenancy is said to have been

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transferred to Vijeta on April 27, 2017, for which she is purportedly entitled to

Flat No. 1902 in the new building.

9. Interim Application (Stamp) No. 714 of 2026 has been taken out to add

Mr. Priyank Mehul Kothari (“Kothari”), proposed Respondent No. 8, who is a

transferee of the 2nd floor tenancies of Agarwal by agreements dated

November 11, 2023. It also seeks to add Ms. Sneha Binoy Shah (“Sneha”),

proposed Respondent No. 9, who claims joint tenancy of the 3rd floor unit

with Bijal, who is described in the Interim Application as Sneha’s spouse.

Contentions of the Parties:

10. By consent of parties, the Petition was taken up for final hearing and

disposal, on an as-if amended basis. Rule, made returnable forthwith.

11. I have heard Mr. Valmiky Narvekar, Learned Advocate on behalf of

Jaiswal, Ms. Priyanka Chavan, Learned Advocate for MHADA, Mr. Mayur

Khandeparkar, Learned Advocate for Sugee, Mr. Aseem Naphade, Learned

Advocate for Bijal and Vijeta (“Tenants”, along with Agarwal), and Mr. P.V.

Nelson Rajan, AGP, on behalf of the State.

12. Jaiswal’s case is that eight tenancies certified in the names of the

Tenants on the second, third and fourth floors of Dadarkar Building are

fabricated in order to inflate the rehabilitation area and, with it, the incentive

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FSI and surplus area available to Sugee under Regulation 33(7) of DCPR 2034.

The chain of events relied upon by Jaiswal is as follows:

A] The MCGM inspection extract of 1995-96 shows the three floors,

with enclosed terraces, in the possession of the landlord, the Dadarkar

family. The 1998 repair plans show one kitchen on the second floor and

internally connected rooms across the floors, and the voter lists (Sr.

Nos. 606, 609, 610, 611) show the Dadarkar brothers living there as one

joint household. There was therefore no tenant on these floors before

the datum line of June 13, 1996;

B] On September 8, 2010, four registered documents were executed

in favour of Jigna Shah, Pramila Chandan, Payal Shah and Satish

Chandan, each a close relative of a partner of M/s. Marudhar

Enterprises. The Index-II describes them as lease deeds, not tenancy

transfers. One month later, M/s. Marudhar Enterprises purchased the

building. The 2010 Conveyance records four tenants on the three floors;

C] In August 2016 and April 2017, those four tenancies were

transferred to the Tenants and, by the time of the 2017 conveyance to

Sugee, these appear as eight tenancies. Sugee sought the NOC on May 3,

2017 with the eight tenancies included; the eligibility list was, according

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to Jaiswal, prepared and first signed by Sugee and the architect, not by

the Executive Engineer, MHADA;

D] The documents against the names of the Tenants in the certified

list are electricity bills and voter IDs standing in the names of the

Dadarkar Family, and these are all post-1996 documents. Nothing

shows these purported tenants or their predecessors, as being in

occupation before 1996;

E] Sneha, a joint lessee was excluded while Bijal was certified; the

fourth floor was leased to Ms. Seema Agarwal in 2016 but Vijeta was

certified; although the four second-floor and three third-floor rooms

were “clubbed” as single tenements, Agarwal and Bijal are each shown

for two (earlier three) flats in the new building with more area than

genuine tenants receive; and

F] Overall, Jaiswal contends that additional construction valued at

more than Rs. 30 crores at Rs. 50,000 per square foot has been

permitted to Sugee’s project pursuant to the aforesaid alleged

manipulation.

13. Jaiswal would contend that under the Government Resolution dated

August 16, 2010 (Schedule B) (“2010 GR”) and Clause 13 of Appendix III to

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Regulation 33(7) of the DCR 1991 (now Regulation 33(7)(13) of DCPR 2034),

it is the tenancy, not the tenement, that must exist prior to June 13, 1996.

Persons without documentary proof of tenancy prior to 1996 are ineligible,

Jaiswal would contend.

14. Sugee’s contention that the existence of the tenement before the datum

line would suffice, is opposed by Jaiswal, who submits that such a reading

would render the 2010 GR redundant. Clause 18 of the 2010 GR, relied on by

the First Appellate Authority, applies only where the occupant proves

possession prior to 1996, which none of the Tenants have shown. Jaiswal

contends that Condition 17 of the NOC makes Sugee answerable if the pre-

datum occupant count is found to be bogus. Moreover, the Government

Resolution dated August 22, 2023 (“2023 GR”) empowers MBRRB to take

over a project for breach of conditions.

15. Jaiswal contends that the three authorities concurrently have accepted

the names as they appeared in the certified list without examining how they

came to be there. He would attack the very certification and submit that these

concurrent findings are perverse and open to correction under Article 227 of

the Constitution of India, relying on the judgement in Chandavarkar

1

.

1 Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram, 1986 (4) SCC 447 – Paragraphs 16 to

20

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16. It was contended on behalf of Sugee that Jaiswal has no locus to raise

these issues, particularly when he is a beneficiary of the very same project, and

that this is not a public interest litigation. To this, Jaiswal responds by

contending that he is no stranger to the project and therefore has locus to

point out an illegality in implementation of the scheme. Jaiswal would submit

that in WP 476, Sugee had argued that an alternate remedy was available and

that alternate remedy was availed of and is now subject matter of this Petition.

Sugee had not contended lack of locus in the disposal of WP 476 and the

appellate remedy was expressly open.

17. The relief sought by Jaiswal is that the Impugned Orders be quashed

and his complaints made in 2018-19 be allowed, that the tenancies in favour of

the Tenants be declared illegal and their certification cancelled. He prays that

MBRRB be directed to take over the project for breach of the NOC dated May

10, 2018 and revised NOC dated August 2, 2019; and for costs.

18. By letters dated February 7, 2025, obtained under the RTI Act, Jaiswal

learnt that Agarwal has transferred all four second-floor tenancies to Kothari

by agreements dated November 11, 2023, and that Kothari seeks entitlement

under the applicable Permanent Alternate Accommodation split into Flat Nos.

1701 and 1702; and that Bijal, jointly with Sneha, seeks joint certification and a

split of the entitlements into Flat Nos. 1801 and 1802. The amended plan is

said to still show two units each for Agarwal and Bijal. Hence the proposed

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amendment to implead them was deemed permitted and the Petition was

heard on an “as if amended” basis.

19. The Chief Officer, MBRRB, in the Impugned Order dated November 1,

2019, proceeded on the report of the Executive Engineer “D-1” Division (office

note dated May 3, 2019) after site inspection, and after two hearings at which

Jaiswal and the NOC-holder’s representative were present. The order deals

with each objection in tabular form. On the central objection it records that

the 1995-96 inspection extract reflects the second, third and fourth floors as

three separate entries “with owner”; that the four tenements on the second

floor and the three on the third floor were clubbed and accepted as single “R”

tenements, with one “R” tenement on the fourth floor, under the 2010 GR; and

that the certification therefore tallies with the extract. The MBRRB held that

the enclosed terraces were reflected in the extract and their carpet area was

correctly included under Clause 11 of the 2010 GR. This order held that Plan

approval and incentive FSI computation fell within the domain of the

municipal authorities and the floor space index depends on certified carpet

area, not built-up area. The operative portion of the order reads thus:

“The NOC for redevelopment of the subjected property issued by this office vide

letter dated 10.05.2018 is as per prevailing provisions of DCR and guidelines issued

by the Government and is as per law.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

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20. The impugned order passed by the Vice President & CEO, MHADA on

September 4, 2023, recorded the submission of the NOC-ho lder’s

representative that certification and verification fell within MBRRB’s

jurisdiction while incentive FSI fell within the jurisdiction of the municipal

authorities. The order relies on Clause 18 of the 2010 GR, which provides that

where the inspection extract records an entire floor with the owner but

tenants/occupants are in fact residing there with strong proof of existence

prior to 1996, they are to be held eligible, and that separate families in

separate occupation are to be treated separately. This order finds that the

three floors are physically separate and have three electric meters pre-dating

the datum line. Therefore, it was held that the certification tallies with the

extract, and that the documents relied on are listed against each entry. The

relevant portion reads thus:

“Hence, it is observed that, there is no inflation of tenancies occurred during

certification as per Inspection Extract of the year 1995-96 with respect to tenements

of 2nd floor, 3rd floor & 4th floor and the contention that, the owner occupied

properties shall not be entitled for incentive FSI has no ground because since the

owners of property are occupiers as well and hence as per DCPR, 2034 under

section 33(7) they are eligible for rehabilitation.”

“As per the provision of DCPR 2034 under Regulation 33(7) and as per GR dated

16.08.2010 Clause No.18 the incentive FSI shall be given to the occupier of cess

building, whether he/she shall be tenant/occupant or owner of the cess building .

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Hence, the objection raised by Mr. Ravindra Govind Jaiswal regarding the illegal

certification on 2nd, 3rd & 4th Floor of Building No.302B, V. P. Road is hereby

rejected.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

21. The third impugned order dated November 12, 2024, passed by the

Additional Chief Secretary, Housing Department records the submissions of

the parties at length and finds thus, in a single paragraph:

“Considering the submission made by Appellant and documents produced before

this Authority, this Authority has examined the authorized documents. The Date of

installation of the BEST and the address of installation, the Voter ID for each

tenement and each tenant proves independent residence prior to the datum line. The

data in the BEST Consumer Information system has been scrutinized and has

substantiated the eligibility of the tenants in the present appeal.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

22. Sugee alludes to MHADA’s affidavit in reply dated February 17, 2020

and an additional affidavit dated April 26, 2021 in WP 476 denying the

allegation of bogus tenancies. The Housing Secretary’s order of April 6, 2022

in favour of Dr. Neha Borole is under challenge in Writ Petition No. 2708 of

2023 and, according to Sugee, during its pendency the parties have executed a

notarised “recording statement” dated October 12, 2023, settling all disputes

and agreeing to withdraw all pending cases, complaints and objections, and

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that 57 of the 58 families in the scheme are cooperating with the

redevelopment.

23. Sugee would also point to the 2010 Conveyance and the 2017

Conveyance which document the existence of the tenancies in question and

the provisions of Conditions No. 4 and 17 of the NOC and the three concurrent

findings pointing to there being no bogus tenancies. Sugee’s submissions may

be summarised thus:

A] Jaiswal, having given irrevocable consent by letter dated April 4,

2017, cannot be permitted to challenge the scheme;

B] He is not an occupant of Dadarkar Building but a resident of Guru

Niwas Chawl and has no locus to raise the dispute;

C] An individual tenant has no locus to challenge the tenancy rights

or certification of other tenants in the project; his rights are limited to

receiving premises in the new building on ownership basis;

D] The Court ought not to interfere with concurrent findings of three

authorities;

E] The Petition raises disputed questions of fact which cannot be

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gone into in the extraordinary writ jurisdiction; and

F] Jaiswal has at every stage sought to scuttle the scheme when 57 of

58 tenants/occupants have willingly joined it.

24. The Tenants would submit that Jaiswal is one of the eligible occupants

of the property and has even executed a PAAA in his favour. They too point to

the 2010 Conveyance, reciting tenants in a ground-plus-four-floor building

and listing the predecessors of the Tenants. This is also seen in the 2017

Conveyance and the transfers of August 12, 2016 (second floor to Agarwal) and

April 27, 2017 (fourth floor to Vijeta), they contend, and submit that Bijal and

Vijeta were certified on electricity bills that pre-date the datum line, making

the tenements occupied by such tenants and transferred to them, eligible

under Regulation 33(7)(13). Bijal is contended to have held three rooms on

the third floor, with two supported by the electricity bills and the third being

clubbed with the other two under Clause 13 of the 2010 GR (adjacent rooms to

be clubbed) and not treated as an independent tenement.

25. The Tenants’ contentions on entitlements may be summarised thus:

A] Each residential occupant is rehabilitated in the carpet area

occupied, subject to a minimum of 27.88 sq. m. (300 sq.ft.) and a

maximum of 120 sq. m. (1,292 sq. ft.);

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B] Area above 120 sq. m. counts for rehab FSI but not for incentive

FSI;

C] Incentive FSI is computed on the area actually occupied, at the

percentage fixed by the basic ratio in the table to Regulation 33(7)(5)(a)

or (b); and

D] Therefore, even if Sugee allots the Tenants more than 1,292 sq. ft.

each, Sugee’s incentive FSI is capped by reference to the area occupied

and cannot exceed the 120 sq. m. ceiling.

26. It may be mentioned that one Dr. Neha Borole, who is Jaiswal’s

daughter has been separately held eligible for a unit in lieu of Room No. 48A

by an order dated April 6, 2022 of the Housing Secretary, which has been

impugned by Sugee in Writ Petition No. 2708 of 2023 (“WP 2708”).

Analysis and Findings:

27. Having heard the Learned Advocates for the parties, and having

examined the material on record with their assistance, I am not satisfied that

this is a fit case for exercise of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction in this case

for the following reasons:

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A] The 2010 Conveyance executed in 2010 depicts the existence of

the tenancies. Even if one were to discount the depiction in the 2017

Conveyance as simply replicating what was contained in the 2010

Conveyance, it is apparent that a registered document indicates the

existence of tenancies as of the date of the 2010 Conveyance. While

neither of these conveyance deeds can speak to the existence as of the

datum line, and indeed the 2010 Conveyance is executed 14 years after

the datum line, the relevance of distinct electricity meters and bills for

the units, presents a disputed question of fact, the trial of which cannot

be conducted in the writ jurisdiction. Indeed, the 2017 Conveyance

mechanically names the tenancies set out in the 2010 Conveyance and

not the new transferred tenancies that are said to have come about

between the two conveyance deeds. Be that as it may, the question to

ask is whether the Impugned Orders lend themselves to interference by

the Writ Court.;

B] Clause 13 of the 2010 GR provides that if a single tenant or

resident is in possession of more than one consecutive tenement

included in the certified extract, and if such person is found eligible, the

area of such tenements should be combined and shown in the name of

that tenant or resident. However, if such tenant or resident possesses

more than one tenement that are not consecutive, they should be

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treated as separate, and the tenant or resident should be held eligible for

more than one tenement;

C] Clause 17 of the 2010 GR also provides that if the actual use is

different from the use shown in the inspection and if such use is proven

to be authorised based on evidence, then the use established by evidence

should be accepted. It provides that care must be taken to ensure that

the occupier’s intent to obtain a larger area by showing a change in use

does not succeed. Thereafter, Clause 18 provides that at times the

inspection extract records an entire floor with the owner although

tenants or residents in fact reside in the premises. In such cases, if the

residing tenants or residents have strong evidence regarding their stay

prior to 1996, and if the same tenants or residents are residing there at

the time of inspection, they should be deemed eligible. It also provides

that if it is proven that the area shown under the owner was divided

among different families of the owner prior to 1996, such families

should be considered as independent families;

D] Therefore, the existence of separate electricity meters has to be

given some weight. Since there are independent electricity connections

involved, although they may have been in Dadarkar’s name, there is a

strong pointer to the existence of separate family units using the

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premises. What Jaiswal seeks to do is create doubt, but this is not a case

where one has to apply the standard of beyond reasonable doubt –

instead, whether the Writ Court ought to act as a Court of Appeal is the

point to be considered. It is plausible that there were individual and

separate residential units and those came to be let out or transferred

before the 2010 Conveyance;

E] Moreover, as pointed out by Mr. Naphade, the first condition in

the revised NOC dated August 2, 2019, reflecting Regulation 33(7)(2) of

DCPR 2034, indicates that the entitlement for each occupant family has

a floor (27.88 sq. m., or 300 square feet) and a cap (120 sq. m., or 1,292

square feet). Therefore, if the incentive FSI is to be computed on the

area actually occupied, provided for and capped, the contention that

excess area has been availed of by the Sugee would stand undermined;

G] The issue then becomes whether Sugee has benefitted from any

excessive FSI on the premise that it has rehabilitated tenants with

tenancies that were allegedly non-existent. As stated above, the

question to ask is whether the existence of electricity meters would point

to the existence of independent units that were let out or transferred

subsequently. Since the existence of separate meters does point to it

being plausible that there were independent units and even if different

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units of the landlord’s families were occupying it, the 2010 GR treats

these as independent units, I am not inclined to delve into a fact-finding

exercise in the writ jurisdiction to adjudicate errors of fact, in the

circumstances of this case.

F] Indeed, the inspection extract by the municipal authorities in

August 15, 1995 uses the phrase “with owner” in respect of the second,

third and fourth floors but the 2010 GR permits that to be displaced by

evidence, which has taken the form of separate electricity meters;

G] Indeed, the following extracts from Chandavarkar, although

pressed into service by Jaiswal, are noteworthy:

16. This appeal challenges the said judgment and order. As mentioned

hereinbefore two questions require consideration – how far and to what extent in

exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and in this

respect regarding power to deal with factual findings, the jurisdiction of the High

Court is akin both under Articles 226 and 227 the Constitution, can the High Court

interfere with the findings of fact ? It is well settled that the High Court can set aside

or ignore the findings of fact of an appropriate court if there was no evidence to

justify such conclusion and if no reasonable person could possibly have come to the

conclusion which the courts below have come or in other words a finding which was

perverse in law. This principle is well settled. In D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee, it

was laid down by this Court that unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice

or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention it was not for the High Court

under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere. If there is evidence on

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record on which a finding can be arrived at and if the court has not misdirected

itself either on law or on fact, then in exercise of the power under Article 226 or

Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court should refrain from interfering with

such findings made by the appropriate authorities.

28.17. ………In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in

exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be

made to the observations of this Court in Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R.

Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of

exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal

when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal….

[Emphasis Supplied].

H] Consideration of the challenge and the allegation that newer

tenancies were created just before the 2010 Conveyance, when made

by a party that has participated in the very same scheme, benefitted

from it, and is claimed to have settled all disputes with Sugee, I do not

think it appropriate in exercise of discretion in the writ jurisdiction to

effect any intervention. In my view, this is not a fit case for the Writ

Court to expend judicial time on adjudicating the grievances raised by

Jaiswal; and

I] Therefore, I do not think it necessary to delve into and pronounce

upon the contentions about whether the entitlements are linked to

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tenements or to tenancies, except to state that in the facts of this case,

the concurrent findings of existence of pre-1996 distinct occupation

cannot be treated as manifestly perverse findings.

28. In the result, the Writ Petition and the attendant Interim Application

are finally disposed of without any interference with the Impugned Orders.

Rule is discharged accordingly. No costs.

29. All actions required to be taken pursuant to this order shall be taken

upon receipt of a downloaded copy as available on this Court’s website.

[ SOMASEKHAR SUNDARESAN, J.]

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