POCSO Act; Indian Penal Code; Sexual Assault; Kidnapping; Criminal Intimidation; Testimony Discrepancies; Corroboration; High Court Bombay; Sentence Reduction; Victim Testimony
 23 Jul, 2026
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Ravindra Kisan Ghadge alias Dhum Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr.

  Bombay High Court CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 814 OF 2025
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Case Background

As per case facts, a 15-year-old victim was accosted by the accused, a building resident, who inappropriately touched her and allegedly attempted to drag her towards a terrace before an ...

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Document Text Version

-CRIAPEAL814-2025.DOC

Santosh

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 814 OF 2025

Ravindra Kisan Ghadge alias Dhum ...Appellant

Versus

1. State of Maharashtra

2. XYZ (Victim), through N M Joshi Marg

Police Station.

…Respondents

WITH

INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 2640 OF 2025

IN

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 814 OF 2025

Mr. Ajay Talreja, for the Appellant (Appointed Advocate).

Mr. D. J. Haldankar, APP, for Respondent No.1-State.

Miss. Kanchan Pawar, for Respondent No.2 (Appointed

Advocate).

CORAM:N. J. JAMADAR, J.

RESERVED ON:9

th

JULY, 2026

PRONOUNED ON:23

rd

JULY, 2026

JUDGMENT:-

1. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order

dated 25

th

February, 2025 passed by the learned Special Judge

in Special Case No. 63 of 2019, whereby and whereunde r the

Appellant–accused came to be convicted for the offenc es

punishable under Sections 8 and 12 of the Protection o f

Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (“POCSO Act, 20 12”)

and Sections 354, 363 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

(“the Penal Code”) and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for four

1/18

SANTOSH

SUBHASH

KULKARNI

Digitally signed by

SANTOSH SUBHASH

KULKARNI

Date: 2026.07.23

21:58:28 +0530

-CRIAPEAL814-2025.DOC

years and pay a �ne of Rs.10,000 for the major offence

punishable under Section 8 of the POCSO Act, 2012, and with

lesser sentences for the offences punishable under Section 12 of

the POCSO Act, 2012 and Sections 363 and 506 of the P enal

Code.

2.Shorn of unnecessary details, the background facts

leading to this appeal can be stated as under:

2.1Respondent No. 2-Victim, then 15 years of age, was staying

at ‘X’ Building, situated at Saat Rasta, Mumbai. She was then in

the 9

th

Standard. On the day of occurrence, at 2:30 pm, while

the victim was on her way to home, on the road near Lo dha

Exclusive, the accused, who was also a resident of the ‘X’

Building, accosted the victim. The accused allegedly caught hold

of the hand of the victim. The accused expressed that he was in

love with the victim. The accused inappropriately touched the

breast of the victim. When the victim remonstrated, the accused

forcibly dragged her towards the terrace of the “LP” Building.

Despite the resistance and the cries of the victim, the accused

threatened the victim to kill her and forcibly took her towards

the terrace of the LP Building by the stairs. An unkno wn

person was present on the terrace of the “LP” Building. He

confronted the accused. Thereupon, the accused let go of the

2/18

-CRIAPEAL814-2025.DOC

hand of the victim. Thus, the victim ran to her house and

narrated the incident to her father, who was present in the

house. The victim and her parents initially approached Agripada

Police Station and lodged the report.

2.2As it transpired that the offences were committed within

the local limits of the jurisdiction of N. M. Joshi Marg Police

Station, the FIR came to be transferred to N. M. Joshi Marg

Police Station. Investigation commenced. The Investigating

Of�cer visited the scene of occurrence. Panchanama was drawn.

The accused came to be apprehended. The statements of the

witnesses were recorded, including the statement of the victim

under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1 973

before the learned Magistrate.

2.3Post completion of investigation, the accused was sent for

trial. The learned Special Judge framed charge against th e

accused for the offences punishable under Sections 354, 363,

and 506 of the Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 8 and 12 of the

POCSO Act, 2012. The accused abjured his guilt and claimed for

trial.

2.4At the trial, to bring home the charge to the accused, the

prosecution examined seven witnesses, namely; the victim

(PW1), the father of the victim (PW2), Suresh Koli (PW3); the

3/18

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panch witness, Vaishali Sul (PW4); the then PSI, N. M. Joshi

Marg Police Station; who had received the FIR from Agripada

Police Station, and recorded the statement of the victim ,

Yasmine Mulla (PW5); PSI, who was then attached to Agripada

Police Station and recorded the FIR lodged by the victim at

Agripada Police Station, Rajendra Patole (PW6); the Investigating

Of�cer, and Kiran Patil (PW7), who had arrested the accused

from Village Kharde, Taluka Shirur.

2.5After conclusion of the prosecution evidence, the

statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Co de of

Criminal Procedure, 1973, came to be recorded. The accused did

not lead any evidence in his defence, which was of denial and

false implication.

2.6After appraisal of the evidence and material on record, the

learned Special Judge was persuaded to convict and sentence

the accused, as indicated above. The learned Special Judge was

of the view that there was no reason to disbelieve the testimony

of the victim which found requisite support in the evidence of

her father (PW2). The discrepancies in the evidence as regards

the time of occurrence, and the non-examination of independent

witnesses, in the view of the learned Special Judge, did not

detract materially from the prosecution case.

4/18

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3.Being aggrieved, the Appellant has preferred this appeal.

4.I have heard Mr. Ajay Talreja, the learned Counsel

appointed to espouse the cause of the Appellant, Mr. D. J.

Haldankar, the learned APP for the State-Respondent No.1 and

Miss. Kanchan Pawar, the learned Counsel appointed to

espouse the cause of Respondent No.2-victim. With the

assistance of the learned Counsel for the parties, I have perused

the evidence and material on record.

5.Mr. Talreja, the learned Counsel for the Appellant,

mounted multi-fold challenge to the impugned judgment. Firstly,

there was a material discrepancy in the testimony of the victim

and her father (PW2) as regards the time of the alleged

occurrence, which bears upon not only the probabilities of the

case but also the veracity of the testimony of the victim and her

father (PW2). Secondly, there was in�rmity in the prosecution

case as regards the identity of the person who alleged ly

molested the victim (PW1). Before the Court, the victim (PW1)

deposed that, an unknown person had accosted and se xually

assaulted her. Whereas, in the cross-examination, the victim

(PW1) conceded that she had known the accused, who is a

resident of the same Building. This admission, according to Mr.

Talreja, betrays an intent to falsely implicate the accused, in the

5/18

-CRIAPEAL814-2025.DOC

wake of the quarrel between the victim and the wife of the

accused.

6.Thirdly, Mr. Talreja would submit, the version of the victim

(PW1) is unworthy of credence as there is no corrobor ation

thereto. Amplifying the submission, Mr. Talreja submitted that,

�rstly, the identity of the person who allegedly confronted the

accused while the latter was allegedly dragging the victim to the

terrace of the LP Building remained a mystery. No effort was

made to ascertain the identity of the said person and examine

him as a witness. Secondly, the initial incident of molestation

had allegedly occurred on a busy public road and that too in a

broad daylight. Yet, the Investigating Of�cer did not examine a

single independent witness. Had the victim been allegedly

molested as deposed to by the victim and her father (PW2), the

incident must have been seen by a number of persons a nd it

de�es comprehension that nobody would come forward to

rescue the victim while she was allegedly raising alarm. All

these factors, according to Mr. Talreja, lead to an inference that

the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the accused

beyond reasonable doubt.

7.Mr. Haldankar, the learned APP, stoutly countered the

submissions on behalf of the Appellant. It was submitted that

6/18

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the victim was then barely 15 years of age. The fact that the

victim was a child has not been contested. The report about the

commission of the offence was lodged instantaneously. The FIR

and the statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 fully corroborate the

version of the victim. There is no reason to discard the

testimony of the victim, who has withstood the test of cross-

examination. The learned APP submitted that, the non-

examination of independent witnesses, in a case of the present

nature, does not erode the value of the testimony of the victim.

In any event, it is not a rule of law that the testimony of the

victim of a sexual offence requires corroboration.

8.Miss. Pawar, the learned Counsel for Respondent No. 2-

victim, supplemented the submissions of the learned APP. It

was urged that there was no reason for a 15 year old girl to

falsely implicate the accused and put her life at stake. Thus, the

appeal deserves to be dismissed, submitted Miss. Pawar.

9.The aforesaid submissions now fall for consideration.

From the evidence on record, by and large, the following facts

emerge as rather incontrovertible. First, the victim was a child.

The Birth Certi�cate of the victim (Exhibit-21) came to be proved

in evidence. No endeavour was made on behalf of the accused to

7/18

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assail the testimony of the victim (PW1) and her father (PW2), or

for that matter, the correctness of the entries in the Birth

Certi�cate (Exhibit-21). Resultantly, the fact that the victim

(PW1) was a child on the date of the alleged occurrence can be

said to have been established beyond the pale of controversy.

Secondly, it is pertinent to note, the thrust of the defence of the

accused was that the victim (PW1) and the accused wer e

residents of the same Building, nay the same �oor. On account

of the quarrel between the victim (PW1) and the wife o f the

accused, the latter came to be falsely roped in. Thus, the fact

that, the victim (PW1) and the accused had known each other

from before is not in contest. Thirdly, the incident had allegedly

occurred on the public road in front of the Lodha Exclus ive

Building. In fact, the veracity of the version of the victim (PW1)

was sought to be questioned on the premise that, since the

incident had occurred on a public road, the non-examination of

the independent witnesses, (who would have witnessed the

alleged occurrence, had it taken place) was fatal to th e

prosecution. Fourthly, though the victim (PW1) has depo sed

that the accused had dragged her towards the terrace of the LP

Building by stairs, no resident of the said Building or any other

witness could be examined to lend corroboration to the version

8/18

-CRIAPEAL814-2025.DOC

of the victim (PW1). Lastly, the victim (PW1) speci�cally asserted

that she declined to have herself medically examined.

10.Keeping in view the aforesaid facts, a brief resume of the

evidence, especially that of the victim (PW1) and her father

(PW2), becomes apposite. The broad tenor of the evidence and

the deposition of the victim (PW1) is that, while she was on her

way to home at about 2:30 pm., on the road near Lodh a

Exclusive, one boy, caught hold of her hand and moved his

another hand over the breast of the victim. The accused asked

her to accompany him to the terrace of the LP Building. She

raised an alarm. The accused threatened to kill her, if she

shouted. While the accused was taking her towards the terrace

of the LP Building, one unknown person confronted the

accused. The latter got scared and left her. She ran away and

reported the incident to her father.

11.The father of the victim (PW2) sought to lend support to

the version of the victim (PW1). He deposed that, the victim

narrated the incident as she narrated before the Cou rt. The

father of the victim (PW-2) testi�ed to the fact that the victim

had told him that after she raised shouts, two to three persons

came thereat, and, thereupon, the accused ran away.

9/18

-CRIAPEAL814-2025.DOC

12.The manner in which the victim (PW1) and her father

(PW2) fared in the cross-examination assumes signi�cance to

judge the trustworthiness of their testimony. The victim (PW1)

conceded that the road in front of Lodha Exclusive leads to the

main road, on which Arthor Road Prision is located. There was

pedestrian and vehicular traf�c on the said road. The victim

(PW1) further conceded that the LP Building is at a distance of

�ve minutes walk from Lodha Exclusive. The victim (PW1) was

shouting from Lodha Exclusive upto the LP Building, which is

an eight storeyed Building with �ats on each �oor. The accused

took her by the staircase. CCTV cameras were installed on each

�oor of the LP Building. She had not known the person who

confronted the accused, though the said unknown person was a

resident of the said LP Building.

13.In the cross-examination of the father of the victim (PW2),

it was elicited that the victim had returned home around 4.00 to

4.30 pm. After the mother of the victim returned from work,

they approached the Agripada Police Station and lodged report

at around 6.00 to 6.30 p.m. Though the father of the victim

(PW2) conceded that the accused is a resident of the same

Building and has a wife, yet, he did not cave in to the suggestion

10/18

-CRIAPEAL814-2025.DOC

that there was a quarrel between the wife of the accused and

the victim (PW2) and, thus, a false report was lodged.

14.The learned Special Judge was of the view that the

discrepancy as regards the time of the occurrence in t he

testimony of the victim (PW1) and the father of the victim (PW2),

was not material. This Court is also of the view that, t he

submission of Mr. Talreja that the discrepancy as to the time

when the victim returned home renders the testimony of both

the victim (PW-1) and her father (PW-2) unworthy of credence,

cannot be readily acceded to. It is pertinent to note that the

victim has categorically deposed that at about 2.30 pm., the

accused had allegedly accosted and sexually assaulted her. The

father of the victim (PW2) was not a witness to the occurrence.

The discrepancy as to the time when the victim's father (PW2)

returned home from work, in the context of the short interval of

time, does not detract materially from the prosecution case.

15.The challenge to the reliability of the testimony of the

victim (PW1), on account of non-examination of independen t

witnesses, canvassed with tenacity by Mr. Talreja, is required to

be appreciated in two distinct parts. First, the non-examination

of the potential witnesses to the occurrence on the road in front

of the Lodha Exclusive. Second, the non-examination of t he

11/18

-CRIAPEAL814-2025.DOC

witnesses who would have had the opportunity to witness the

incident at or near the LP Building.

16.On the �rst segment of the alleged incident, the non-

examination of the witnesses who, at the time of the occurrence,

were passing on said road, or did not come to the rescue of the

victim, when she allegedly raised alarm, is required to be

appreciated keeping in view the judicially recognised reluctance

of general public to get involved in the matters, on even though

the offences are committed at a public place and in a broad

daylight, considering the same to be a private affair between the

accused and the victim. (Appabhai and another vs. State of

Gujarat

1

).

17.Moreover, in a situation of the present nature, where a

�eeting body of persons could have witnessed the incident, the

testimony of the victim of a sexual assault cannot be thrown

overboard for non-examination of such persons who might have

had the opportunity to witness the occurrence.

18.The non-examination of the residents of the LP Building

and the inhabitants of the lane leading to the LP Building ,

howver, stands on a different footing. It is pertinent to note, the

victim (PW1) conceded during the course of cross-examination

that, the unknown person who confronted the accused , was a

1 AIR 1988 Supreme Court 696.

12/18

-CRIAPEAL814-2025.DOC

resident of the LP Building. Yet the identity of the said person

remained a mystery, as rightly submitted by Mr. Talreja.

Secondly, the victim (PW1) wants the Court to believe that she

was shouting all the way from Lodha Exclusive to the LP

Building, which was at a distance of about �ve minutes walk

and that the accused took her to the terrace of the LP Building,

which has eight �oors with residential �ats on each �oor. It does

not appeal to human credulity that no resident of the LP

Building would have had the opportunity to observe the

incident. The residents of the LP Building were not a �eeting

body of pedestrians. It de�es comprehension that, the accused

would have been able to drag the victim to the terrace of the LP

Building while she was continuously raising alarm, without

being noticed or confronted by the inhabitants of the lane and

the LP Building.

19.In the considered view of this Court, that part of the

testimony of the victim (PW1), on the aspect of the accused

having dragged the victim (PW1) from in front of Lodha

Exclusive to the terrace of the LP Building while she continued

to raise alarm, appeared to be an exaggerated version. Not only

the identity of the person who allegedly confronted the accused

not ascertained, but even electronic evidence in the nature of

13/18

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CCTV footages which would have lent unwavering corroboration

to the claim of the victim (PW1), could not be adduced. Thus,

this Court �nds it rather dif�cult to believe the testimony of the

victim on the aspect of the accused dragging the victim forcibly

to the terrace of the LP Building.

20.The question that comes to the fore is, whether the

testimony of the victim (PW1) is required to be jettisoned away in

its entirety? I am unable to accede to the submissions of Mr.

Talreja that, on account of the version of the victim (PW1) in

regard to the incident that transpired at the LP Building being

rendered improbable, the entire testimony of the victim (PW1)

deserves to be discarded. The Court is required to m ake an

endeavour to separate the truth from falsehood. It i s well

recognised that the maxim

falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has

not received judicial imprimatur in our criminal justice system.

21.On the �rst part of the incident deposed to by the victim

(PW1), there is ample corroboration in the form of the narration

in the FIR, the statement of the victim recorded under Section

164 of the Code, the testimony of the victim's father (PW-2) and

the instantaneous lodging of the FIR. The version of the victim

(PW1) that the accused accosted her and caught hold of her

hand, touched her breast inappropriately, and thereby used

14/18

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criminal force to her with sexual intent, could not be impeached

during the course of her cross-examination. The suggestion in

the cross-examination that the victim (PW1) had a quarrel with

the wife of the accused and, thus, the victim (PW1) fa lsely

implicated the accused appeared to be a gratuitous one.

22.Even if the testimony of the victim's father (PW-2) is

eschewed from consideration, it is trite, conviction for a sexual

offence can be sustained on the sole testimony of the victim,

if it inspires con�dence. Corroboration of the testimony of the

victim of a sexual offence is not the requirement of law but a

matter of prudence. (State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Manga

Singh

2

, State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Sajay Kumar alias

Sunny

3

, and Ganesan vs. State Represented by its Inspector of

Police

4

).

23.Applying these principles to the facts of the case at hand,

this Court is inclined to hold that the prosecution has

succeeded in establishing the commission of the offences

punishable under Sections 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act, 2 012,

and Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. However, the

evidence on record does not sustain the guilt of the accused for

the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 506 of the

2 (2019) SCC 759.

3 (2017) 2 SCC 51.

4 (2020) 10 SCC 573.

15/18

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Penal Code. Resultantly, the order of conviction for the offences

punishable under Sections 363 and 506 of the Indian Pe nal

Code is required to be reversed.

24.On the aspect of sentence, in the backdrop of the nature

of the occurrence, in the considered view of this Cour t, a

sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment for an o ffence

punishable under Section 8 of the POCSO Act, 2012, sligh tly

errs on the side of severity. Having regard to the nature of the

occurrence and the sitaution in life of the accused, the

minimum sentence of three years, prescribed under Section 8 of

the POCSO Act, appears to be a condign punishment. Since the

learned Special Judge has awarded compensation to the victim,

this Court considers it appropriate to enhance the quantum of

�ne for the offence punishable under Section 8 of the POCSO

Act. No interference is warranted in the sentence imposed for

the offence punishable under Section 12 of the POCSO Act.

25.For the foregoing reasons, the appeal deserves to be

partly allowed. Hence, the following order:

: O R D E R :

(i)The appeal stands partly allowed.

(ii)The impugned order of conviction for the offences

punishable under Sections 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act,

16/18

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2012 and Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860,

stands af�rmed.

(iii)The impugned judgment to the extent of conviction for the

offences punishable under Sections 353 and 506 of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860, stands quashed and set aside.

(iv)The accused stands acquitted of the offences punishable

under Sections 363 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code,

1860.

(v)The sentence stands modi�ed as under:

(a)For the offence punishable under Section 8 of the POCSO

Act, 2012, the accused is sentenced to suffer rigorous

imprisonment for three years and pay �ne of Rs.15,000/-

and, in default of payment of �ne, the accused shall suffer

simple imprisonment for the period of two months.

(b)The sentence for the offence punishable under Section 12

of the POCSO Act, 2012 stands af�rmed.

(c)The substantive sentences shall run concurrently.

(v)The rest of the order, including the direction to pay the

compensation to the victim, stands af�rmed.

(vi)The accused is entitled to set off under Section 428 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure for the period he was in

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custody as an under-trial prisoner i.e. 19

th

December,

2018 to 23

rd

April, 2019.

(vii)A certi�ed copy of this judgment be furnished to the

appellant-accused through the Superintendent of Prison.

(viii)A copy of this judgment be sent to the trial Court.

(ix)R&P sent back.

(x)The appeal stands disposed.

(xi)In view of disposal of the appeal, IA/2640/2025 also

stands disposed.

[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]

18/18

Reference cases

Description

Bombay High Court Upholds POCSO Convictions While Quashing Kidnapping and Intimidation Charges

In a significant ruling that underscores the complexities within the Criminal Justice System concerning sensitive cases, the Bombay High Court recently delivered a nuanced judgment in Ravindra Kisan Ghadge alias Dhum vs. State of Maharashtra. This case, extensively analyzed for its implications under the POCSO Act, 2012, is now available on CaseOn, offering legal professionals and students comprehensive insights into the appellate court's approach to victim testimony and corroboration.

Case Background: The Incident and Initial Convictions

The appeal originated from a judgment by a Special Judge, which had convicted Ravindra Kisan Ghadge (the Appellant) for offences under Sections 8 and 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), and Sections 354, 363, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The Appellant was sentenced to four years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine for the primary offence under Section 8 of the POCSO Act.

The prosecution's case revolved around an incident where the 15-year-old victim (PW1), while on her way home, was accosted by the accused. The accused, a resident of the same building, allegedly caught her hand, expressed his love, inappropriately touched her breast, and then forcibly dragged her towards the terrace of a nearby 'LP' Building, threatening to kill her if she resisted. An unknown person on the terrace reportedly confronted the accused, who then released the victim. The victim subsequently reported the incident to her father, leading to the lodging of an FIR.

The Appellant's Challenge: Discrepancies and Lack of Corroboration

The Appellant, through his counsel Mr. Ajay Talreja, raised several points challenging the conviction:

  • Material Discrepancy: A significant difference in the victim's (PW1) and her father's (PW2) testimonies regarding the time of the alleged occurrence, impacting their credibility.
  • Identity of the Accused: The victim initially described the perpetrator as an 'unknown person' but later conceded she knew the accused, who lived in the same building. This, combined with an alleged quarrel between the victim and the accused's wife, suggested false implication.
  • Lack of Corroboration: The victim's version lacked independent corroboration. The 'unknown person' who allegedly confronted the accused on the terrace was never identified or examined. Furthermore, despite the initial molestation occurring on a 'busy public road' in 'broad daylight' and the victim raising an alarm, no independent witnesses came forward or were examined. This led to an argument that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Prosecution's Response: Credibility of Victim Testimony

The prosecution, represented by Mr. D. J. Haldankar (APP) and Miss Kanchan Pawar (for the victim), countered these arguments:

  • The victim was a minor (15 years old), and her age was not contested.
  • The report was lodged immediately, and both the FIR and the victim's Section 164 CrPC statement corroborated her version.
  • The victim's testimony remained consistent under cross-examination.
  • In cases of sexual offences, the non-examination of independent witnesses does not necessarily diminish the value of the victim's testimony. Corroboration is a matter of prudence, not a legal mandate.
  • There was no plausible reason for a minor girl to falsely implicate the accused.

IRAC Analysis: The Court's Deliberation

Issue

The core issue before the High Court was whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to uphold the convictions for all charges, specifically considering the alleged discrepancies in testimony and the absence of independent corroboration for certain parts of the incident.

Rule

The Court applied several established legal principles:

  • Credibility of Victim Testimony: In sexual assault cases, conviction can be based solely on the victim's testimony if it inspires confidence, as corroboration is not a mandatory legal requirement but a matter of prudence (referencing State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Manga Singh, State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Sajay Kumar alias Sunny, and Ganesan vs. State Represented by its Inspector of Police).
  • Separation of Truth from Falsehood: The maxim 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus' (false in one thing, false in everything) is not accepted in Indian criminal jurisprudence. Courts are expected to endeavor to separate the truth from falsehood in testimony.
  • Public Reluctance: The judicially recognized reluctance of the general public to get involved in criminal matters, even those occurring in public places (referencing Appabhai and another vs. State of Gujarat), can be considered when evaluating the absence of independent witnesses.

Analysis

The High Court meticulously reviewed the evidence, acknowledging the uncontroverted facts that the victim was a child and knew the accused as a fellow resident.

Discrepancies in Time and Identity

The Court deemed the discrepancy in the time of occurrence between the victim and her father as not material, as the father was not an eyewitness to the actual incident. Regarding the identity, while the victim initially stated an 'unknown person,' her later admission of knowing the accused was considered in light of the defense's argument of false implication due to a quarrel. However, the Court ultimately found the suggestion of false implication to be 'gratuitous,' indicating it did not find merit in the defense's claim of a fabricated case.

Corroboration for Different Parts of the Incident

The Court distinguished between two phases of the alleged incident:

  1. Initial Molestation on the Public Road: For this part—the accused accosting her, grabbing her hand, inappropriately touching her breast, and using criminal force with sexual intent—the Court found 'ample corroboration.' This included the immediate lodging of the FIR, the victim's consistent narration in the FIR, her Section 164 CrPC statement, and her father's testimony. This part of the testimony remained unimpeached during cross-examination. The Court also applied the principle that the non-examination of a fleeting body of public witnesses on a busy road does not negate the victim's credible testimony, citing the general reluctance of the public to intervene.
  2. Dragging to the LP Building Terrace: This aspect of the victim's testimony faced critical scrutiny. The victim claimed she was shouting throughout the five-minute walk from Lodha Exclusive to the eight-storey LP Building, and that an 'unknown person,' a resident of the LP Building, eventually confronted the accused. The Court found this part of the narrative 'exaggerated' and improbable. The absence of any residents of the LP Building or the lane being examined as witnesses, coupled with the lack of CCTV footage, made it difficult for the Court to believe that the accused could have dragged the victim while she was continuously raising an alarm without being noticed or confronted by anyone other than the unidentified person.

Application of 'Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus'

Crucially, the Court reiterated that while part of the victim's testimony regarding being dragged to the terrace was found improbable, this did not necessitate discarding her entire testimony. In line with Indian legal principles, the Court separated the truth from falsehood, accepting the credible parts while rejecting the uncorroborated and improbable elements.

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Verdict on Specific Charges

Based on this analysis, the High Court concluded that the prosecution successfully established the commission of offences punishable under Sections 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act (sexual assault and sexual harassment) and Section 354 IPC (outraging modesty of a woman). However, the evidence on record did not sustain the guilt of the accused for offences under Sections 363 (kidnapping) and 506 (criminal intimidation) IPC, as these charges were directly linked to the part of the narrative found to be improbable.

Conclusion

The Bombay High Court partly allowed the appeal. It affirmed the conviction for offences under Sections 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act, 2012, and Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. However, it quashed and set aside the conviction for Sections 363 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, acquitting the accused of these specific charges.

Regarding the sentence, the Court found the initial four-year rigorous imprisonment for Section 8 POCSO slightly severe. It modified the sentence to the minimum prescribed three years of rigorous imprisonment but enhanced the fine to Rs. 15,000 (from Rs. 10,000), with a default simple imprisonment of two months. The sentence for Section 12 POCSO was affirmed, and all substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently. The direction to pay compensation to the victim and the entitlement for set-off under Section 428 CrPC for the period of custody were also affirmed.

Why This Judgment Is an Important Read for Lawyers and Students

This judgment serves as a pivotal reference for legal professionals and students for several reasons:

  • Nuances of Victim Testimony: It illustrates the judicial approach to evaluating victim testimony, especially in sensitive sexual offence cases where complete corroboration may be challenging. It reinforces the principle that courts must separate truth from falsehood rather than discarding an entire testimony due to partial inconsistencies or exaggerations.
  • Application of Legal Maxims: The case clearly demonstrates the practical application of the 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus' principle not being applicable in Indian law, encouraging a careful, evidence-based assessment of each part of a witness's statement.
  • Distinguishing Charges: The judgment highlights the importance of distinguishing between various criminal charges based on concrete evidence. By quashing convictions for kidnapping and criminal intimidation due to lack of credible evidence for the 'dragging' aspect, it underlines the necessity for each element of a crime to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • Evidentiary Value of Independent Witnesses: It provides clarity on when the absence of independent witnesses might not be fatal to the prosecution's case, particularly in situations involving public reluctance, but also emphasizes their crucial role when the alleged incident occurs in a more confined or observable setting (e.g., within a residential building).
  • Sentencing Discretion: The modification of the sentence showcases the appellate court's discretion in reviewing sentencing severity, balancing the gravity of the crime with the specific facts and circumstances of the case, and ensuring adherence to minimum prescribed sentences while factoring in compensation.
  • POCSO Act Enforcement: It reinforces the robust application of the POCSO Act in protecting child victims, even as it ensures fair trial principles are upheld for the accused.

Disclaimer: All information provided herein is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers are advised to consult with a qualified legal professional for advice pertaining to their specific circumstances.

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