LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 1 of 24

$~

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 16 February 2026

Pronounced on: 29 May 2026

+ LPA 266/2017

REKHA SABHARWAL .....Appellant

Through: Mr. Aditya Singla, Ms. Supriya

Juneja, Ms. Arya Suresh Nair and Mr.

Arvind Menon, Advs. along with Appellant

in person.

versus

MANAGEMENT OF SAAI MEMORIAL GIRLS

SCHOOL & ORS ....Respondents

Through: Mrs. Palak Rohmetra, Adv.

+ LPA 268/2017 & CM APPL. 13928/2017

REKHA SABHARWAL .....Appellant

Through: Ms. Aditi Gupta and Mr. Akash

Deep, Advs. along with Appellant in person.

versus

DIRECTORATE OF EDUCATION & ORS .....Respondents

Through: Mrs. Palak Rohmetra, Adv.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA

JUDGMENT

% 29.05.2026

C. HARI SHANKAR, J.

1. These appeals assail judgments dated 6 February 2017 passed

by a learned Single Judge of this Court in WP (C) 1130/2010 and WP

LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 2 of 24

(C) 7331/2008. Except for the fact that the dramatis personae in these

appeals are the same, and the writ petitions were decided on the same

date, there is no similarity between these two appeals. We, therefore,

proceed to deal with them individually.

LPA 266/2017

A. Facts, and the lis

2. As we are of the opinion that this appeal is required to be

allowed on a preliminary ground, we do not propose to dwell in detail

into the facts. A brief recital thereof would, therefore, suffice.

3. Disciplinary proceedings were instituted against the appellant,

then serving as Assistant Teacher with the Saai Memorial Girls

School

1

by issuance of a charge sheet dated 16 October 2006,

containing various allegations against her, including inefficiency in

discharging her duties, misbehaviour with colleagues, and the like.

The Articles of Charge, as elaborated in the statement of imputations

of misconduct in the charge-sheet, read thus:

Statement of imputation of misconduct and misbehaviour in

support of articles of charges framed against Smt. Rekha

Sabharwal, Asstt. Teacher

Article-I

Saai Memorial School is an English Medium School known for

quality education in the locality. Smt. Rekha Sabharwal, Asstt.

Teacher was asked to teach English and environmental studies to

the students of Class-III. It was observed that She had wilfully

1

“School”, hereinafter

LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 3 of 24

neglected in her performance of duties. A number of parents

lodged complaints regarding her quality of teaching and behaviour.

Complaints of parents further stand corroborated with the quality

of checking of exercise books/notebook of students by Smt. Rekha

Sabharwal and performance report of Consultant (Primary

Education) dated 7.8.06 shows that Smt. Rekha Sabharwal does

not know basics of English-language and is not fit for teaching the

English Medium Students of Primary Class.

Article II

On 10.8.06, when Principal of School alongwith Consultant

(Primary Education) checked her way of teaching, Smt. Rekha

Sabharwal abused and misbehaved with the Principal of School.

Article III

She is in habit of misbehaving with fellow teachers and other staff

of School and Mrs Jasvir Kaur on 1.07.05, Mrs Vandana Nagi

(TGT) on 14.08.06 and Mrs Mithlesh, Class IV on 21.3.06.

Article IV

School holds Parents Teachers meeting periodically to have

interaction of parents with Teachers regarding performance of

students. Smt. Rekha Sabharwal who was deputed to teach

students of Class III-B, refused to attend the parents of Class III-B

on Parent Teacher Meeting held on 26/8/06.”

We may note, however, that there was no allegation touching on the

integrity of the appellant as an employee of the School.

4. The charge-sheet was accompanied by a List of Witnesses who

would depose in favour of the Management, all of whom were parents

of children studying in the School.

5. The charge-sheet was issued by the Manager of the School,

though it purported to convey the decision of the Disciplinary

LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 4 of 24

Authority

2

constituted under Rule 118

3

of the Delhi School Education

Rules, 1973

4

.

6. The Saai Memorial Girls School is a private unaided School.

7. The appellant tendered a reply to the chargesheet on 31 October

2006, denying the allegations against her. Following this, by Order

dated 7 November 2006, again purporting to convey the decision of

the DA though issued by the Manager of the School, retired officer of

the Delhi Government was appointed as the Inquiry Officer

5

to

enquire into the charges against the appellant.

8. The IO recorded the statements of Mrs. Indu Sinha as MW

6

1,

Mrs. Ritu Singh as MW2, Mrs. Suman Chawla as MW3, Mrs. Jasbir

Kaur as MW4, Mrs. Poonam Sharma as MW5, Mrs. Sunaina Dawara

as MW6, Mrs. Poonam Mittal as MW7 and Mr. Lokesh Jain as MW8.

The witnesses were cross-examined by the appellant.

9. On 28 November 2006, the appellant was asked to provide

details of documents which she desired to cite, or witnesses whose

2

"DA" hereinafter

3

118. Disciplinary authorities in respect of employees

The disciplinary committee in respect of every recognised private school, whether aided or not,

shall consist of:-

(i) the chairman of the managing committee of the school;

(ii) the manager of the school;

(iii) a nominee of the Director, in the case of an aided school, or a nominee of the

appropriate authority, in the case of an unaided school;

(iv) the head of the school, except where the disciplinary proceeding is against him

and where the disciplinary proceeding is against the Mead of the school, the Head of any

other school, nominated by the Director;

(v) a teacher who is a member of the managing committee of the school; nominated by

the Chairman of such managing committee.

4

"the DSE Rules" hereinafter

5

"IO" hereinafter

6

Management Witness

LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 5 of 24

evidence she desired to lead, in her defence. The appellant furnished a

bundle of papers which, she submitted, were required to be considered

by the IO. The IO allowed her to submit the documents with her

defence brief. The appellant further submitted that the complainants of

the documents enlisted at S. Nos 9 to 15 of the List of Documents

annexed to the chargesheet were also required to be examined. She

sought copies of the said documents. The IO directed the Presenting

Officer to prepare a complete set of copies of the documents and

supply it to the appellant so that she could cross-examine the authors

thereof, if she so desired. The enquiry was adjourned to 26 December

2006.

10. On 26 December 2006, however, the following Record of

Proceedings was entered by the IO:

“The CO has informed that she has already submitted her defence

reply to the chargesheet as such at this stage now she has nothing

to say in her defence in writing or verbally. She has made a request

that she should be given date for submitting her defence brief. She

has opted for the purpose 27.1.07, when she will submit her

defence brief, but prior to the defence brief the PO will submit the

prosecution brief in writing which will be attached to the Inquiry

officer and a copy thereof shall be endorsed to the charged officer

under registered cover. The PO is granted date of 11.01.2007 for

submitting the prosecution brief as stated above.”

11. Consequent on completion of evidence and submission of brief

by the School and the appellant, the IO submitted his report dated 17

February 2007, holding Articles I to III of the Articles of Charge

against the appellant to have been proved and Article IV to have been

partly proved. Based on the Inquiry Report, an undated Show Cause

Notice was issued to the appellant, proposing to remove her from

LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 6 of 24

service and requiring her to show cause thereagainst. The appellant

submitted her reply to the show cause notice on 6 March 2007 .

12. By order dated 29 March 2007, issued by the Manager of the

School, the decision of the Managing Committee of the School to

impose, on the appellant, the penalty of removal from service, was

communicated to the appellant. The order specifically stated that it

had been issued in accordance with the judgment of this Court in

Kathuria Public School v. Director of Education

7

.’

13. The appellant appealed, against the said decision, to the Delhi

School Tribunal

8

, which, vide judgment dated 31 July 2009, dismissed

the appeal. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant approached this Court by

means of WP (C) 1130/2010 which stands dismissed by a learned

Single Judge of this Court vide judgment dated 6 February 2017.

B. Rival Contentions before the learned Single Judge, and

findings thereon

14. Before the learned Single Judge, the appellant contended that (i)

having themselves been complainants against her, the Principal and

Vice-Principal of the School could not have deposed against the

appellant, as held by the Division Bench of this Court in Managing

Committee Vidya Bhawan Mahavidyalaya v. Directorate of

Education

9

(ii) the Inquiry Report and the punishment order passed by

7

123 (2005) DLT 89 (DB)

8

“DST”, hereinafter

9

ILR (2006) 1 Delhi 403 (DB)

LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 7 of 24

the DA were non-speaking, (iii) the appellant was not allowed to file

documents in her favour, (iv) the allegation that the appellant was not

a good teacher was factually incorrect and (v) the punishment of

removal from service was grossly disproportionate to the charges

against the appellant.

15. Apropos these submissions, the learned Single Judge has held

as under:

(i) Though it was true, as held in Vidya Bhawan

Mahavidyalaya, that a person could not double up as

complainant as well as a witness in the enquiry proceedings,

this infirmity affected only Article II of the Articles of charge

against the appellant. Article II was severable from the other

Articles of charge which, by themselves, too, justified the

decision of the DA.

(ii) Regarding the submission that the Vice Principal Mrs.

Jasvir Kaur was part of the disciplinary committee, and also

deposed in the enquiry proceedings, Article III stood

established even by the depositions of other teachers with

respect to the rudeness and misbehaviour of the petitioner, and

the fact that she did not perform her duties appropriately. Again,

even if Article III were to be severed from the Articles of

charge against the appellant, Article I was serious enough to

justify the decision of the DA.

(iii) Article I alleged that the appellant did not have the

LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 8 of 24

requisite knowledge of English and was not, therefore, suited to

teach primary classes in the School. This allegation, along with

Article III, sufficed to justify the decision to dispense with the

appellant’s services.

(iv) The Inquiry Report was detailed and reasoned. The DA

agreed with the IO and was not, therefore, required to again

pass a detailed order.

(v) The order of the DST established, on facts, that the

appellant had been given adequate opportunity to file

documents in her support, which she did not utilize.

(vi) The complaints of the parents also established that the

appellant was not good at teaching.

In the light of these findings, the learned Single Judge has, by the

judgment dated 6 February 2017 under challenge in the present

appeal, dismissed the writ petition.

C. Rival Contentions before us, and Analysis

16. We have heard Mr. Aditya Singla, learned Counsel for the

appellant and Ms. Palak Rohmetra, learned Counsel for the School, at

length.

I. Breach of Section 8(2) of the Delhi School Education Act,

LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 9 of 24

1973

10

17. The first submission of the appellant is that the order of

dismissal from service could not have been passed without written

approval from the Director of Education as required under Section

8(2)

11

of the DSE Act.

18. Though it does not appear that this contention was taken before

the learned Single Judge, we permitted it to be raised, as it is

jurisdictional in nature and is not dependent, for its adjudication, on

any disputed facts.

19. The respondents, by way of response thereto, place reliance on

the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Kathuria Public

School. The appellant contends that the decision in Kathuria Public

School was overruled by the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar v. Director

of Education

12

, which was followed by one of us, sitting singly, in

Meena Oberoi v. Cambridge Foundation School

13

.

20. All these decisions have been noted by us in our decision in

Asha Rani Gupta v. Ravindera Memorial Public School

14

, which

attempts to chart the precedential history and, we humbly feel, does so

with a reasonable degree of accuracy. We may, nonetheless, briefly

recapitulate it:

10

“the DSE Act” hereinafter

11

8. Terms and conditions of service of employees of recognised private schools.—

(2) Subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, no employee of a recognised private

school shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor shall his services be otherwise

terminated except with the prior approval of the Director.

12

(2016) 6 SCC 541

13

265 (2019) DLT 401, “Meena Oberoi-I”, hereinafter

14

2024 SCC OnLine Del 7143

LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 10 of 24

(i) Kathuria Public School, rendered by a Division Bench

of this Court, held that Section 8(2) of the DSE Act did not

apply to private unaided schools.

(ii) In Raj Kumar v. Director of Education

15

, the Supreme

Court held Kathuria Public School to have been wrongly

decided.

(iii) The Supreme Court, thereafter, followed, and applied,

retrospectively, the decision in Raj Kumar, in Marwari Balika

Vidyalaya v. Asha Srivastava

16

.

(iv) Another Division Bench of this Court, in Red Roses

Public School v. Reshmawati

17

, observed, in passing, that the

judgment of the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar could apply only

prospectively, but without noticing Marwari Balika Vidyalaya.

(v) One of us (C. Hari Shankar, J), sitting singly, took stock

of the above precedential history, and, following Raj Kumar

and Marwari Balika Vidyalaya, held, in Meena Oberoi-I, that

an order of removal of an employee of a private unaided school

could not be passed without the prior approval of the

Directorate of Education as required by Section 8(2) of the DSE

Act.

15

(2016) 6 SCC 541

16

2019 SCC OnLine SC 408

17

2019 SCC OnLIne Del 10937

LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 11 of 24

(vi) This position was reiterated, later, by a Division Bench of

this Court in Asha Rani Gupta. We, with humility, reproduce

the following paragraphs from Asha Rani Gupta:

“16. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court

in Raj Kumar, it is obvious that the order dated 6 June

2013, dismissing the appellant from service, cannot sustain.

17. The entire gamut of case law has been considered

by this Court in Meena Oberoi, which has subsequently

been followed in other decisions including Mangal Sain

Jain v. Principal, Balvantray Mehta Vidya Bhawan

18

. The

submission that, in view of the then existing law

in Kathuria Public School, orders of dismissal and removal

of employee of private unaided school from service without

obtaining prior approval of the DOE, passed before the

rendition of the decision in Raj Kumar, ought not to be

reopened, was considered. It was also noted that a Division

Bench of this Court had, in its decision in Red Roses Public

School v. Reshmawati chosen not to follow Raj Kumar in

respect of decisions rendered prior thereto, on the ground

that applying Raj Kumar from a date prior to its rendition

would result in reopening of claims which stood settled in

terms of the then existing law in the shape of the judgment

in Kathuria Public School. The decision in Red Roses

Public School, it was however noted, had been rendered

without the Court having been informed of the judgment of

the Supreme Court in Marwari Balika Vidyalaya v. Asha

Srivastava, in which the Supreme Court had applied Raj

Kumar retrospectively, to invalidate an order of termination

of an employee of private unaided school passed in 2001

without obtaining prior approval of the DOE.

18 As such, this Court, in Meena Oberoi, adopted the

view that the decision of the Division Bench in Red Roses

Public School was effectively per incuriam, as it was

contrary to the prior judgment of the Supreme Court

in Marwari Balika Vidyalaya.”

Thus, Asha Rani Gupta has considered Red Roses Public

School. It has been noted in Asha Rani Gupta that the Division

Bench in Red Roses Public School was not shown the judgment

18

2020 SCC OnLine Del 2608

LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 12 of 24

of the Supreme Court in Marwari Balika Vidyalaya which

followed the decision in Raj Kumar and applied it

retrospectively. In that view of the matter, as we have held in

Asha Rani Gupta, Red Roses Public School, to the extent it

observes that the decision in Raj Kumar, would apply only

prospectively is clearly per incuriam.

21. Besides, it is well settled that it is not open to a Court, lower in

the judicial hierarchy, to avoid following a judgment of the Supreme

Court on that ground that it applies only prospectively. The judgment

of the Supreme Court can be said to apply prospectively only if the

judgment itself says so. Else, the Supreme Court under Article 141 of

the Constitution of India declares the law and a declaration of the law

has to be treated as a declaration of law as it always stood. It is trite

that the judgments of the Supreme Court apply retrospectively unless

the judgments itself state otherwise. The decision in Raj Kumar does

not state that it would apply only prospectively. Marwari Balika

Vidyalaya in fact followed Raj Kumar and applied it retrospectively.

22. Apropos this submission of the appellant, the School responds

that the decision in Raj Kumar applies only prospectively.

23. For the reasons already outlined hereinabove, this submission

cannot be accepted.

24. Incidentally, we may note that, in its written submissions, the

School has referred to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court

LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 13 of 24

in Meena Oberoi v. Director of Education

19

which, according to the

School, holds that Section 8(2) applies only prospectively. We have

searched high and low but have not come across the decision in

Meena Oberoi-II as cited by the School. The decision at 2020 SCC

Online Del 1478 is Amarjeet Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi, which

is a criminal matter. In fact, it appears that the LPA preferred against

the judgment in Meena Oberoi-I is still pending before a Division

Bench. Meera Oberoi-II appears, therefore, to be mere wishful

thinking.

25. The order dated 7 November 2006 dismissing the appellant

from service, having been issued without the prior approval of the

DOE, violates Section 8(2) of the DSE Act and is, therefore, liable to

be set aside.

II. The sequitur

26. The School contends, however, that, even if the order

dismissing the appellant was passed by an incompetent authority and

was, therefore, liable to be set aside, reinstatement would not be the

inevitable sequitur.

27. However, apart from merely advancing it as a proposition, the

School has not cited any authority in its support. It is axiomatic, in

logic and in law, that, if an action is set aside, the status quo ante is

restored. The normal sequitur to setting aside of an order of dismissal

from service is reinstatement, except where there are supervening

19

2020 SCC OnLine Del 1478, “Meena Oberoi-II”, hereinafter

LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 14 of 24

considerations such as a case in which the employee has been in

gainful employment elsewhere after being dismissed. No such case is

pleaded by the School. Besides, the Supreme Court, in Raj Kumar as

well as Marwari Balika Vidyalaya, directed reinstatement of the

employee concerned, with back wages in both cases. In Surendra

Kumar Verma v. Central Govt Industrial Tribunal

20

, it was held that

“plain common sense dictates that the removal of an order terminating

the services of workmen must ordinarily lead to the reinstatement of

the services of the workmen”. We see no reason, in the present case,

to hold otherwise.

III. Nemo judex in causa sua

21

28. It is next contended, by Mr. Singla that the Principal of the

School and Ms. Jasvir Kaur deposed as witnesses against the

appellant, were also part of the DA. Articles II and III of the Articles

of Charge against the respondent directly alleged misbehaviour, by the

appellant, with the Principle and Ms. Kaur, respectively. The

complaint addressed by Ms. Kaur to the Principal on 1 July 2005 was,

in fact, the genesis of one of Article III. They could not, therefore,

have been part of the DA, especially as they had also deposed against

the appellant in the inquiry. He submits that this was impermissible, as

it breaches the nemo judex in causa sua principle.

29. The learned Single Judge has accepted this submission of the

appellant, to the extent of holding that it could vitiate the findings

20

(1980) 4 SCC 443

21

No man can be a judge in his own cause

LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 15 of 24

against the appellant in respect of Article II of the Articles of Charge.

He has, however, invoked the doctrine of severability to hold that the

other Articles of Charge were severable and were not, therefore,

affected. Article III, he holds, was not dependent on the statement of

Ms. Kaur alone, but was corroborated by statements of other MWs as

well.

30. Mr. Singla has sought to contend that the doctrine of

severability cannot apply where the complainants and witnesses in the

inquiry were also part of the Disciplinary Committee which acted as

the DA.

31. We agree with Mr. Singla that the DA could not have included

the Principal and Ms. Jasvir Kaur as members, as that would clearly

breach the nemo judex in causa sua doctrine. The charges against the

appellant included allegations of misbehaviour against the Principal

and Ms. Kaur. There cannot, therefore, be any objection to their

having deposed in the inquiry, being the alleged victims of the

misbehaviour by the appellant. Having done so, however, they could

not have been part of the DA. The apprehension of bias which the

appellant could legitimately harbour would, therefore, stand assuaged

by requiring the DA to be reconstituted without including the

Principal or Ms. Kaur.

IV. On the merits of the findings on the Articles of Charge

32. To what stage, however, does that take the case back?

LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 16 of 24

33. The charge-sheet dated 16 October 2006, from which the

proceedings germinated, was unquestionably issued by a competent

authority, as it was issued by the Manager, conveying the decision of

the DA constituted under Rule 118 of the DSE Rules. The

appointment of the IO and the PO, by order dated 7 November 2006

was also, therefore, legal and proper.

34. On the individual Articles of Charge against the appellant, the

learned Single Judge has himself agreed that the finding of the IO on

Article I could not sustain, as the Principal and Vice Principal, who

were the complainants, also deposed against the appellant. The

School has not chosen to challenge that part of the impugned

judgment, which must, therefore, be regarded as having become final.

35. The learned Single Judge proceeds, however, to hold that, even

on the surviving Articles of Charge, the decision to dismiss the

appellant from service could sustain. In our considered opinion, that is

a decision which must be left to the DA. It might well be that the DA

forms the opinion that, once the finding of the IO on Article I of the

Articles of Charge was found to be unsustainable, the remaining

Articles of Charge, even if proved, would not warrant the extreme

penalty of removal from service.

36. Apropos the efficiency of the appellant as an English teacher,

which constitutes the basis of Article IV of the Articles of Charge

against the appellant, however, Mr. Singla has advanced a contention

which is required to be examined seriously. He submits that the

appellant was a holder of BA degrees in History and Hindi along with

LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 17 of 24

a B. Ed. Degree and was, in fact, appointed as a Hindi teacher. There

was, he submits, no complaint whatsoever against the discharge, by

the appellant, of her duties as a Hindi teacher. By an order dated 2

August 2006, the appellant was directed to regularly teach EVS

22

and

English to students of Class III. The appellant represented against this

to the Principal on 4 August 2006, also complaining of mental

harassment which she was being subjected. It is only thereafter that

the appellants performance was found, suddenly, to be unsatisfactory,

and allegations of misbehaviour with the Principal and other faculty

members began.

37. Ms. Rohmetra has sought to contend that the appellant was

never appointed as an English teacher, but was required, at the time of

her appointment, to teach all subjects.

38. We are not certain that this response answers the submission of

Mr. Singla. Admittedly, the appellant did not process any graduation

or post graduate degree in English. She was a graduate in Hindi and

history and, at the time of her appointment, it is reasonable to believe

that the School was aware of her educational qualifications. It was

apparently because of the fact that she was holding a Bachelor’s

degree qualification in Hindi that the appellant was made to teach

Hindi to the students for 3 ½ years. Ms. Rohmetra does not dispute

Mr. Singla’s contention that there was no complaint about the

appellants performance as a Hindi teacher during this period.

Complaints surfaced only after she was, by the order dated 2 August

2006, suddenly directed to teach English and EVS to Class III

22

Environmental Science

LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 18 of 24

students. While it may be true that the level of English taught to Class

III students would not be very high, the School has proffered no

explanation as to why a teacher, holding a graduation in Hindi with no

qualification in English, and who was teaching Hindi for 3 ½ years,

was suddenly asked to teach English.

39. Given the fact that

(i) there is no explanation as to why the appellant was

suddenly directed to start teaching English, and

(ii) there was no complaint against her, regarding the manner

in which she discharged her duties, or even her behaviour, till 2

August 2006 and thereafter,

we are of the opinion that the IO would have to holistically re-

examine all Articles of charge against the appellant. We cannot ignore

the fact that the appellant was alleging harassment by the School.

Though we are hesitant to return any conclusive finding on this aspect,

we expect the IO, in the de novo proceedings that we intend to direct,

to holistically examine all aspects of the matter, including the aspect

of who the oppressor is, and who the oppressed.

40. In that view of the matter, we feel that the entire inquiry, into

the Articles of Charge against the appellant, is required to be

conducted de novo. For this purpose, the DOE would be required to

appoint an entirely independent IO, as we are certain that the IO

earlier appointed would, after two decades, no longer be available to

conduct the Inquiry. Till that exercise is undertaken, the directions

contained in this judgment would continue to operate.

LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 19 of 24

V. Re. the plea that Inquiry Report and order of DA were

unreasoned

41. It had been sought to be contended by the appellant, before the

learned Single Judge, that the Inquiry Report dated 17 February 2007,

as also the punishment order dated 29 March 2007, were unreasoned.

42. As we have deemed it appropriate to direct the de novo enquiry,

it is not necessary for us to comment on the Inquiry Report dated 17

February 2007 of the IO.

43. However, we find that the order dated 29 July 2007, whereby

the DA imposed the punishment of removal from service on the

appellant, is completely unreasoned. All that it records is that a Show

Cause Notice had been issued to the appellant, to which she

responded. Once the appellant had so responded to the show cause

notice, the DA assumed the role not merely of a DA expressing his

agreement, or disagreement, with the findings of the IO, but of an

adjudicating authority adjudicating on the show cause notice. Ideally,

the appellant ought to have been given an opportunity of hearing by

the DA, before a decision was taken on the show cause notice. In any

event, the least that justice required was coverage, in the decision on

the show cause notice, of the points raised by the appellant, and a

dispassionate consideration thereof. That, sadly, is totally lacking in

the order dated 29 July 2007 which cannot, therefore, sustain in law.

44. In the de novo proceedings that we are directing, therefore, it

LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 20 of 24

would be ensured that, if occasion arises for issuance of any show

cause notice to the appellant by the DA, the order that is subsequently

passed by the DA thereon would be properly reasoned and speaking,

and would deal with all contentions raised by the appellant both before

the IO as well as before the DA.

45. In the event of any of the Articles of Charge being found to be

proved against the appellant, the DA would also have to take into

consideration the aspect of proportionality, viz., whether the

indiscretions attributed to the appellant were so serious as warranted

removal from service.

46. In the interests of justice, we further direct that the appellant

would be granted an opportunity of hearing before a decision is taken

by the DA. The decision, needless to say, would have to be reasoned

and speaking, dealing with all issues raised by the appellant.

47. In the event of the DA deciding to impose any of the penalties

envisaged in Section 8(2) of the DSE Act, such decision would have

to be preceded by approval, a priori, of the DOE, as required by the

provision.

VI. In the interregnum

48. In the interregnum, the appellant would be entitled to be

reinstated in service, with all benefits including continuity of service.

As we have our misgivings regarding the manner in which the School

has proceeded against the appellant, we also deem it appropriate to

LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 21 of 24

grant the appellant 50% back wages, for the period she has remained

out of service.

49. This would, however, remain subject to the de novo decision to

be taken by the DA. The appellant would also have to furnish an

affidavit to the School to the effect that, after her removal, she has not

been in any gainful employment elsewhere.

50. In case the appellant has crossed the age of superannuation, the

retiral benefits of the appellant would be computed and payable to her

in the above terms.

51. It also goes without saying that, if the appellant continues to

remain aggrieved by the de novo decision which would be taken, her

remedies in law would remain reserved.

52. The appeal is, therefore, disposed of in the following terms:

(i) The impugned judgment dated 6 February 2017, the

judgment dated 31 July 2009 of the DST, the order dated 7

November 2006 of the DA, and the Inquiry Report dated 17

February 2007, are quashed and set aside.

(ii) The appellant is, therefore, entitled to be reinstated in the

service of the School, if she has not crossed the age of

superannuation. She would be entitled to continuity in service

as well as fixation of her pay as if she had remained in service

beyond her termination.

LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 22 of 24

(iii) The appellant would also be entitled to back wages, but

limited to 50%.

(iv) In case the appellant has crossed the age of

superannuation, she would be disbursed her retiral benefits on

the same basis.

(v) Inquiry proceedings, on the charge-sheet dated 16

October 2006, would be conducted de novo, in accordance with

the observations and directions contained in this judgment.

(vi) In the event of the DA intending to proceed against the

petitioner, the DA would strictly act in accordance with Section

8 of the DSE Act and other applicable statutory provisions.

(vii) The observations and findings contained in this judgment

would be borne in mind both by the IO as well as the DA.

(viii) Should the appellant continue to remain aggrieved by the

decision of the DA, her remedies in law would remain reserved.

53. There shall be no orders as to costs.

LPA 268/2017

54. In this appeal, we are in entire agreement with the learned

Single Judge.

LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 23 of 24

55. The writ petition, from which this appeal emanates, alleged that

payment of her salary was being made to the appellant, by the School,

by cheque, and a considerable part thereof was taken back in cash. A

complaint, addressed by the appellant in that regard was made subject

matter of an enquiry, culminating in an Inquiry Report dated 15

December 2006, which did not find substance and the allegation.

56. The learned Single Judge has observed, in the impugned

judgment, that payment of salary was made to the appellant by

cheque, against her signatures, crossing the revenue stamp in the

register of the School. The appellant did not dispute her signature. The

learned Single Judge has also observed that no other teacher came

forward to support the appellant.

57. In such circumstances, the learned Single Judge has rejected the

writ petition, holding that it raised disputed questions of fact which

could not be decided in writ proceedings.

58. We agree.

59. We are aware of the fact that there did exist, in certain

institutions, an unsavoury practice of payment of salary by cheque and

taking back, by the institution, of part of the salary in cash. Any such

practice, if followed, is completely illegal, and the institution in

question would be civilly and criminally liable. It would be, however,

for the employee who makes such an allegation to substantiate it. If

the allegation is denied, and if there is no conclusive material

available, on the basis of which the allegation can be said to have been

LPA 266/2017 & LPA 268/2017 Page 24 of 24

established, the appropriate forum, which the employee would have to

approach, would not be a writ court.

60. Needless to say, we should not be treated as having expressed

any opinion on the allegations made by the appellant, or the

correctness or otherwise thereof.

61. We agree, therefore, that there was no conclusive material on

the basis of which, in proceedings under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India, the allegations by the appellant could be said to

have been proved. Though Mr. Singla has drawn our attention to

various pages from the record, they are mere allegations. We do not

deem it necessary to make reference thereto.

62. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

C. HARI SHANKAR, J.

OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.

MAY 29, 2026/aky/yg