MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 1 of 50

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

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March 2026

Pronounced on : 29

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May 2026

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June 2026

+ MAC.APP. 175/2015 & CM APPL. 3065/2015

RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO LTD .....Appellant

Through: Mr. Rajeev M. Roy, Advocate

with Mr. P. Srinivasan, Advocate.

versus

MEENA KATIYAR & ORS .....Respondents

Through: Mr. Siddharth Mittal, Mr. Sumit

K. Sharma, Ms. Shilpa G. Mittal,

& Mr. Abhijeet Varshney,

Advocates for Respondent No.5.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANISH DAYAL

JUDGMENT

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ANISH DAYAL, J.

1. The present appeal has been preferred assailing the award dated

14th November 2014 [“impugned award”] passed by the learned Motor

Accident Claims Tribunal [“Tribunal”], Dwarka Courts, New Delhi in

MACP No. 329/11/14, whereby compensation of Rs.49,09,587/- along

with interest came to be awarded in a fatal accident case arising out of

the death of Shri Adarsh Kumar Katiyar [“deceased”]. The

appellant/Insurance Company contends, inter alia, that the Tribunal

erred in assessing only 20% contributory negligence on the part of the

deceased despite the admitted position that the deceased had collided

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 2 of 50

with the offending vehicle from behind and that the driver-cum-owner

[respondent no.5 herein] was holding a fake license. Challenge has also

been laid to the addition towards future prospects, adoption of multiplier,

deduction towards income tax and personal expenses, award under

conventional heads, grant of enhanced interest, and refusal to grant

recovery rights to the appellant despite alleged breach of policy

conditions.

Incident

2. On 15th August 2010 at about 7:00 p.m., deceased was travelling

from Jaipur to Delhi in a Hyundai car bearing registration no. UP-16W-

8764. Upon reaching near Malpura Village, in front of HP Petrol Pump,

Bawal, Rewari, the vehicle tractor-trolley bearing registration no. HR-

36M-5886 [“offending vehicle”], stated to be carrying bricks and driven

by respondent no.5 [driver-cum-owner], allegedly applied brakes

suddenly while taking a turn, due to which the deceased’s vehicle

collided with the offending vehicle from behind and went underneath it.

3. Deceased sustained grievous injuries and was taken by the local

police to ESI Dispensary, Bawal, Rewari, where he succumbed to the

injuries sustained in the accident. Claimants [respondent nos.1 to 4

herein], being the legal heirs and dependents of deceased, thereafter

instituted a claim petition alleging that the accident occurred solely due

to the rash and negligent driving of respondent no.5.

4. As per claim petition, deceased was 53 years of age at the time of

the accident and was employed as “Deputy General Manager (Vendor

Development)” with M/s Universal Autofoundry Pvt. Ltd., allegedly

earning a monthly salary of Rs.60,000/-. Offending vehicle was stated to

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 3 of 50

be owned by respondent no.1 and insured with the appellant/Insurance

Company under a policy valid for the period from 29th October 2009 to

28th October 2010.

Impugned Award

5. On the issue of negligence, the Tribunal relied upon the

testimonies of PW-1 [Meena Katiyar, wife of the deceased], PW-2

[official witness who proved the criminal record], and PW-3 [Vinod

Chand Katiyar/eye-witness and brother-in-law of the deceased]. PW-

3/eye-witness deposed that the offending vehicle, namely the tractor

trolley carrying bricks, was moving ahead of deceased’s vehicle and

suddenly applied brakes while taking a turn, resulting in the deceased’s

vehicle colliding with the tractor trolley from behind. The Tribunal

observed that PW-3/eye-witness had withstood cross-examination, his

presence at the site was believable, and his testimony regarding the

manner of the accident was trustworthy and corroborated by the criminal

record including FIR No. 244/2010, site plan, seizure memos and post-

mortem report.

6. The Tribunal, therefore, held that the accident had occurred due to

rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle driven by respondent

no.5 [driver-cum-owner]. However, while examining the aspect of

contributory negligence, the Tribunal referred to Rules 23 and 24 of the

Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989 and observed that a vehicle

following another vehicle is required to maintain “sufficient distance” to

avoid collision in case the vehicle ahead suddenly slows down or stops.

The Tribunal further observed that although the tractor-trolley had

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 4 of 50

abruptly applied brakes while taking a turn, the deceased was also

required to maintain a “safe distance” and control over his vehicle.

7. The Tribunal concluded that the deceased had also contributed

towards the occurrence of the accident since the collision had taken place

from behind and it appeared that the deceased was driving at such speed

that he could not control the vehicle in time to avoid the collision.

Accordingly, contributory negligence on the part of the deceased was

assessed to the extent of 20% and deduction of the said amount was

directed from the total compensation awarded.

8. On the aspect of income, the Tribunal accepted the evidence of

PW-4 [official from Universal Autofoundry Pvt. Ltd.], and held that the

deceased was employed as Deputy General Manager (Vendor

Development). Monthly salary of deceased was assessed at Rs.57,600/-,

from which 10% was deducted towards Tax Deducted at Source [TDS],

resulting in assessed monthly income of Rs.51,840/- and annual income

of Rs.6,22,080/-. Tribunal further added 15% towards future prospects

considering that the deceased was 53 years of age at the time of the

accident. Since there were four dependents, 1/4

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deduction was made

towards personal expenses and multiplier of ‘11’ was applied.

9. As regards the defence of appellant/Insurance Company that the

tractor-trolley was not covered under the insurance policy and that the

vehicle was being used for commercial purposes, the Tribunal rejected

the same relying upon the decision in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.

Sanjay Tyagi & Ors., 2014 SCC OnLine Del 1339, observing that “mere

attachment of a trolley with a tractor would not amount to violation of

the terms and conditions of the insurance policy”. The Tribunal further

held that the appellant/Insurance Company had failed to establish that

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 5 of 50

the driving licence of respondent no.5 was fake, despite the plea

regarding missing licensing records and registration of a FIR in that

regard. Consequently, no recovery rights were granted in favour of the

appellant/Insurance Company.

10. The compensation awarded is tabulated as under:

S. No. Heads Amount Awarded

1. Monthly Income Rs.51,840/-

2. Annual Income Rs.6,22,080/-

3. Future Prospects 15%

4. Deduction towards Personal Expenses ¼

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5. Multiplier 11

6. Loss of Dependency Rs.59,01,984/-

7. Loss of Love and Affection Rs.1,00,000/-

8. Loss of Consortium Rs.1,00,000/-

9. Funeral Expenses Rs.25,000/-

10. Loss of Estate Rs.10,000/-

Total Compensation Rs.61,36,984/-

Less: 20% towards contributory negligence Rs.12,27,397/-

Final Compensation Awarded Rs.49,09,587/-

Interest 7.5% p.a.

Submissions on behalf of appellant

11. Counsel for appellant/Insurance Company contended that the

Tribunal erred in assessing contributory negligence of the deceased only

to the extent of 20%, despite the admitted factual position that the

deceased had collided with the offending tractor-trolley from behind.

Reliance was placed upon the claim petition as well as the testimony of

PW-3 [eye-witness], who had deposed that the deceased was travelling

behind the offending tractor-trolley carrying bricks and that the tractor-

trolley had suddenly applied brakes while taking a turn, resulting in the

deceased’s vehicle colliding with the offending vehicle from behind.

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 6 of 50

12. It was submitted that the testimony of PW-3 [eye-witness]

regarding the tractor-trolley moving at a speed of 50–60 kmph could not

be accepted at face value, since it is common knowledge that the

maximum speed of a tractor is ordinarily not more than 30 kmph and

attachment of a trolley loaded with bricks would further reduce its speed.

According to the appellant/Insurance Company, the fact that the

deceased’s vehicle struck the tractor-trolley from behind clearly

established that the deceased was driving at excessive speed and had

failed to maintain “sufficient distance” from the vehicle moving ahead.

13. Reliance was placed upon Rule 23 of the Rules of the Road

Regulations, 1989, which mandates that the driver of a vehicle moving

behind another vehicle shall maintain “sufficient distance” so as to avoid

collision in the event the vehicle ahead suddenly slows down or stops. It

was contended that the principle of res ipsa loquitur was applicable in

the facts of the present case and the circumstances led to the only

reasonable inference that the deceased himself had substantially

contributed towards the occurrence of the accident. Reliance was further

placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Nishan Singh & Ors.

v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (2018) 6 SCC 765 to contend that

contributory negligence to the extent of at least 50% ought to have been

attributed to the deceased.

14. Counsel for appellant/Insurance Company distinguished the

decisions relied upon on behalf of respondent nos.1 to 4 [claimants],

namely Archit Saini v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. [2018] 1 S.C.R. 626

and Sushma vs Nitin Ganapati Rangole & Ors. 2024 INSC 706,

contending that in those matters, the offending vehicles were parked in

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 7 of 50

the middle of the road without indicators, whereas in the present case the

tractor-trolley was admittedly moving ahead of the deceased’s vehicle.

15. As regards liability, counsel for the appellant/Insurance Company

submitted that recovery rights ought to have been granted in favour of

the appellant/Insurance Company since respondent no.5/driver-cum-

owner had failed to establish that he possessed a valid and effective

driving licence. It was contended that respondent no.5/driver-cum-

owner, after filing written statement, stopped appearing before the

Tribunal and was proceeded ex parte. Reliance was placed upon the

testimony of R3W1 from the Licensing Authority, Farrukhabad, to

submit that the records pertaining to the driving licence produced by

respondent no.5/driver-cum-owner were not traceable and an FIR had

been registered regarding missing records. According to appellant, the

burden to prove validity of the driving licence was upon respondent

no.5/driver-cum-owner and adverse inference ought to have been drawn

against him.

16. It was further submitted that the offending vehicle was a tractor

attached with a trolley carrying bricks and was therefore being used for

‘commercial purposes’ rather than ‘agricultural purposes’. Counsel for

appellant/Insurance Company contended that only the tractor stood

insured under the policy and not the attached trolley. It was submitted

that attachment of a trolley required separate insurance coverage and use

of the tractor-trolley for carrying bricks amounted to violation of policy

conditions.

17. In support of the aforesaid contention, reliance was placed upon

the decisions in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Brij Mohan (2007) 7

SCC 56, and Dhondubai v. Hanmantappa Bandappa Gandigude 2023

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 8 of 50

SCC OnLine SC 2387. It was contended that the decision in Fahim

Ahmad v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2014) 14 SCC 148, relied

upon on behalf of respondent no.5/driver-cum-owner was

distinguishable, since in the present case attachment of the trolley with

the tractor was admitted and undisputed. It was also contended that the

decision in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. V. Chinnamma (2004) 8

SCC 697, would not apply, as in the said case the tractor was being used

for carriage of vegetables constituting agricultural produce, whereas in

the present case the tractor-trolley was carrying bricks, which could not

be treated as an ‘agricultural purpose’. Accordingly, it was submitted

that the appellant/Insurance Company ought to have been granted

recovery rights against respondent no.5/driver-cum-owner and the

compensation payable by the appellant/Insurance Company deserved to

be reduced proportionately on account of higher contributory negligence

attributable to the deceased.

Submissions made on behalf of respondent nos.1-4/claimants

18. Counsel for respondent nos.1 to 4/claimants opposed the appeal

and submitted that the challenge raised by the appellant/Insurance

Company was essentially confined to the findings on contributory

negligence and refusal to grant recovery rights. It was contended that no

interference was warranted with the impugned award insofar as

respondent nos.1 to 4/claimants were concerned.

19. As regards contributory negligence, it was submitted that the

appellant/Insurance Company had neither led any independent evidence

nor produced any documentary material to substantiate the plea that the

deceased was negligent. According to claimants, the entire plea of

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 9 of 50

contributory negligence rested merely upon suggestions put during

cross-examination, which by themselves could not constitute evidence.

20. Reliance was placed upon the testimony of PW-3 [eye-witness],

who had deposed that the offending tractor-trolley had abruptly applied

brakes while attempting to take a turn, which led to the collision. It was

contended that the appellant/ Insurance Company was selectively

emphasizing the fact that the collision had occurred from behind while

ignoring the evidence regarding “sudden braking” and “abrupt turning”

by the offending vehicle.

21. Counsel for respondent nos.1 to 4 further submitted that the site

plan demonstrated that the accident had occurred in the middle of the

road and corroborated the version of PW-3 [eye-witness]. It was also

pointed out that the FIR and chargesheet filed by the police authorities

remained unchallenged and the appellant/Insurance Company had not

even summoned the Investigating Officer for examination.

22. Reliance was placed upon the decisions in Archit Saini and

Another v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd & Ors. (supra), Sushma

and Others v. Nitin Ganpati & Ors (supra), Prabhavathi & Ors. v The

Managing Director, Bangalore Metropolitan, Transport Corporation

2025 INSC 293 and Dheeraj Gupta v. Ajay Kumar & Anr @ Bharati

AXA General Insurance Co. Ltd. 2024:DHC:1963, to contend that

negligence could not be inferred merely because the collision had

occurred from behind and that the overall facts and circumstances of the

accident were required to be assessed.

23. Without prejudice to the aforesaid submissions, counsel for

respondent nos.1 to 4 further contended that the deduction of 20%

towards contributory negligence itself was unwarranted and unsupported

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 10 of 50

by evidence on record. It was submitted that mere existence of a

statutory obligation to maintain safe distance could not, by itself, lead to

a presumption of negligence on the part of the deceased in absence of

cogent evidence. According to the claimants, the deduction towards

contributory negligence had resulted in unjust reduction of compensation

payable to the legal heirs of the deceased.

24. On the aspect of quantum, counsel for respondent nos.1 to 4

submitted that the Tribunal had correctly appreciated the evidence led by

the claimants, including the salary records and testimony of PW-4, while

assessing the income of the deceased and computing compensation. It

was further submitted that despite all family members being entitled to

consortium, only a lump sum amount had been awarded under the said

head.

25. It was also submitted that the claimants had lost their sole

breadwinner in the year 2010 and had been deprived of compensation for

a considerable period due to the pendency of proceedings. In these

circumstances, the award of interest did not warrant any interference.

26. Counsel for respondent nos.1 to 4 further stated that even in

absence of cross-objections, this Court, while exercising appellate

jurisdiction in motor accident cases, is empowered to award just

compensation where the facts of the case so warrant.

Submissions made on behalf of respondent no.5/ driver-cum-owner

27. Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no.5/driver-cum-owner

opposed the appeal and submitted that no ground for interference with

the impugned award was made out insofar as refusal to grant recovery

rights was concerned. It was contended that the appellant/Insurance

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 11 of 50

Company had primarily raised two objections, namely, that respondent

no.5/driver-cum-owner was not holding a valid driving licence and that

the tractor-trolley was being used for ‘commercial purposes’ while only

the tractor stood insured.

28. On the issue of driving licence, counsel for respondent no.5

submitted that the driving licence had duly been produced on record

before the Tribunal. It was contended that appellant/Insurance Company

had not taken any specific plea in its written statement alleging that the

licence was fake and had also failed to lead cogent evidence to establish

the same. Reliance was placed upon the testimonies of R3W1 [Amit

Rastogi, Clerk from the Licensing Authority, Farrukhabad] and R3W2

[Naresh Kumar, Deputy Manager of the appellant/Insurance Company].

29. It was further submitted that the report of the Assistant Regional

Transport Officer [ARTO] did not declare the driving licence to be fake,

but merely recorded that several original records pertaining to driving

licences were missing and that FIR No.334/2013 under Section 409 of

the Indian Penal Code 1860 [IPC] had been registered in that regard.

According to respondent no.5/driver-cum-owner, mere non-availability

of records could not lead to the conclusion that the licence itself was

‘fake’ or ‘invalid’. It was contended that the Tribunal, upon appreciation

of evidence, had rightly concluded that the appellant/Insurance Company

had failed to substantiate its defence regarding breach of policy

conditions on account of fake driving licence.

30. As regards the plea that only the tractor stood insured and not the

attached trolley, counsel for respondent no.5 submitted that the

appellant/Insurance Company had failed to specifically plead and prove

violation of policy conditions. It was contended that except for a vague

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 12 of 50

defence in the written statement, neither any specific issue was framed

nor any evidence led by the appellant/Insurance Company to establish

that the tractor was being used in violation of the insurance policy.

31. Reliance was placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in

Fahim Ahmad v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra), to contend

that the insurer is required not only to plead breach of policy conditions

but also substantiate the same through positive evidence. It was

submitted that in the said decision, involving a tractor-trolley carrying

sand, the Supreme Court had rejected the plea of breach in absence of

cogent proof.

32. Counsel for respondent no.5 further relied upon the decision of

this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sanjay Tyagi and Others

(supra), wherein it was held that mere attachment of a trolley with a

tractor would not amount to violation of terms and conditions of the

insurance policy where the tractor was insured for ‘agricultural

purposes’. Reliance was also placed upon the decision in United India

Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rekha 2024 SCC OnLine Del 9019.

33. It was further contended that the reliance placed by the appellant

upon Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Brij Mohan (supra) was misplaced,

since the said decision pertained to gratuitous passengers and was

distinguishable on facts. It was submitted that the judgment in National

Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chinnamma and Others (supra) referred to in

Brij Mohan (supra), had itself been considered in Fahim Ahmed

(supra), wherein the Supreme Court observed that a tractor fitted with a

trailer may or may not answer the definition of a ‘goods carriage’

depending upon the facts of each case.

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 13 of 50

34. Accordingly, it was submitted that no ground existed for grant of

recovery rights in favour of the appellant/Insurance Company and the

impugned award did not warrant interference insofar as respondent

no.5/driver-cum-owner was concerned.

Analysis

35. The issues which have been raised by counsel for parties and

which require this Court’s assessment:

i) first, the issue of contributory negligence assessed at 20% with

respect to the deceased;

ii) second, the defence of the insurer regarding the attachment of

the trolley to the tractor loaded with bricks;

iii) third, the lack of a valid and effective driving licence.

Each of these issues are discussed hereunder in some detail.

I. Contributory Negligence

36. Contributory negligence, in tort law, contemplates a situation

where a person’s own negligence has materially contributed to the harm

suffered, thereby warranting apportionment of liability to the extent of

such negligence.

37. The accident occurred between the offending vehicle i.e. a tractor-

trolley carrying bricks, admittedly moving ahead of deceased’s vehicle,

and allegedly applying brakes while taking a turn, resulting in deceased’s

vehicle colliding from behind. Rear-end collisions can be divided into

two categories- first, where an abandoned/stationary vehicle is parked on

the road without indication, lighting or warning signs, and the

impacted/following vehicle crashes into the rear end, being unable to

estimate that the offending vehicle is abandoned/stationary; and second,

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 14 of 50

where there is flowing traffic and the vehicle in front suddenly applies

brakes. In the latter case, the matter has to be assessed with regard to the

duty of the person following the vehicle to maintain a ‘safe distance’ in

order to avoid a collision.

38. Considering that the facts of the present case fall within the

second category, the decisions of this Court, the Supreme Court and

some from other international jurisdictions, in this context, are briefly

discussed hereunder:

a) Rajpal v. Dharampal 2012 SCC Online Del 31:

This Court was dealing with an accident which occurred due to

the offending vehicle coming at a high speed, overtaking the

two-wheeler scooter, and suddenly applied brakes. The

Tribunal held that even though the accident had occurred on

account of “sudden application of brakes”, the two-wheeler

rider had also contributed to the accident since he was not in

full control of the vehicle. Ratio of negligence was accordingly

assessed as 70:30.

b) Nishan Singh & Ors. v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors.

2018 6 SCC 765:

The Supreme Court dealt with the issue of a moving vehicle in

a rear-end collision. The decision of the Supreme Court’s

continues to holds the field with regard to rear-end collision. A

Maruti car dashed against a truck moving ahead of it.

Claimants alleged that the truck driver “suddenly applied

brakes” being in the centre of the road but bringing it to the

right side as a result of which the Maruti car collided. The

Tribunal recorded the testimony of the driver of the car, who

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 15 of 50

stated that he was at a distance of about 10 to 14 feet. In these

circumstances, the issue arose as to whether the said distance

was “sufficient” to avoid a collision in a case of sudden

braking.

The Tribunal, and thereafter the High Court, held that the

Maruti car had been driven in a rash and negligent manner,

which was the cause of accident resulting in fatality. The

Supreme Court emphasized on Rule 23 of the Rules of the

Road Regulations 1989, which obligates the vehicle following

the truck to maintain a “safe distance”. The Supreme Court

noted that the expression “sufficient distance” has not been

defined and therefore, the thumb rule would be ‘at least a safe

distance of 2 to 3 seconds gap in ideal conditions’. This would

allow the driver of the vehicle behind to respond and avert a

collision. The distance of “10 to 15 feet” was held not to be a

‘safe distance’.

The Tribunal had also noted that there was no evidence to

indicate that the driver of the truck suddenly applied brakes in

the middle of the road, which was endorsed by the High Court.

Though, the claim was dismissed, the Court proceeded to grant

limited relief under Section 140 of the MV Act.

c) S. Mohammed Hakkim v. National Insurance Company Ltd.

& Ors. 2025 INSC 905:

The Supreme Court was dealing with an accident wherein a

motorcycle carrying two occupants collided with the vehicle

ahead, which had suddenly applied brakes, resulting in

amputation of the left leg of one of the occupants. The

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 16 of 50

Tribunal as well as the High Court affirmed that the accident

had occurred due to the sudden stoppage of the car and, relying

on Rule 23 of the Rules of the Road Regulations 1989, imposed

contributory negligence of 20% for failure to maintain a “safe

distance”.

The Supreme Court noted that the root cause of the accident

was the “sudden braking” by the car driver. It was the

responsibility of the said driver to provide warning or signals

to vehicles moving behind on the road. The percentage of

contributory negligence was, therefore, increased.

d) Rouse v. Squires 1973 QB 889:

The Court of Appeal in England was dealing with a collision

where a lorry skidded into a jack-knife position, obstructing

the centre lane of a three-lane carriageway of a motorway. A

motor car being driven in the centre lane collided with a lorry

and came to a halt with its rear lights switched on. Another

lorry driver, who had been following, parked with the hand

brake engaged in the near side lane. Yet another lorry driver,

who was approaching the spot, did not realise that the vehicles

were stationary, and though he braked, could not avoid

colliding with the parked lorry, resulting in a fatal accident. In

relation to such chain reaction accidents, the Court of appeal

relied on Harvey v. Road Haulage Executive [1952] 1 KB 120

and Barber v. British Road Services, reported in the Times,

November 18, 1964. The Court held:

“if a driver so negligently manages his vehicle so as

to cause it to obstruct the highway and constitute a

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 17 of 50

danger to other users including those who are

driving fast and not keeping a proper lookout, but

not those who deliberately or recklessly drive into

the obstruction, then the first driver’s negligence

can be held to have contributed to the causation of

an accident of which the immediate cause was the

negligent driving of the vehicle is because of the

presence of the obstruction collides with it or with

some other vehicle or some other person.”

(emphasis added)

The Court held that the lorry driver who ultimately collided

had not initiated the dangerous situation but had failed to take

adequate steps to cope with an already existing danger.

Accordingly, 75% of the blame was put on his shoulders as

against 25% to the third-party driver. The third-party driver

was the first lorry which ended up across two lanes of the road

way creating a risk. The Court held that:

“where the party guilty of the prior negligence has

created a dangerous situation and the danger is still

continuing to a substantial degree at the time of the

accident and the accident would not have happened

but for this continuing danger, he is responsible for

the accident as well as the party who was subsequently

negligent.”

(emphasis added)

The Court, therefore, effectively held that an initial negligent

act creating a dangerous obstruction continues to attract

liability so long as the danger remains an effective cause of the

accident. A subsequent negligent act does not break the chain

of causation unless it is wholly independent and unforeseeable.

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 18 of 50

e) Flynn v. Bus Átha Cliath [2012] IEHC 398:

The Irish High Court held that “sudden braking” is not

negligent, where scientific evidence establishes an imminent

danger requiring an immediate response. The victim was

thrown to the ground when the bus driver braked sharply to

avoid a child. Video evidence showed that, as the bus

approached, two children were standing at a bus stop on the

opposite side of the road and one of them attempted to cross

the road in the path of the bus. Since, there had been no reason

to anticipate such manoeuvre, even at the level of a bare

possibility, but there arose an immediate necessity to react

appropriately once it occurred, “sudden braking” was

warranted. The Court held that:

“the courts cannot apply a counsel of perfection. The

duty of care expected of a driver is a high standard,

but it is still to be measured by the reactions and

expectations of reasonable men and women’ and

observed that ‘in making decisions in emergencies, the

Court must bear in mind that detached reflection and

the weighing of various options is not to be expected

and certainly not required where a human life is to be

saved.”

(emphasis added)

The Court ultimately held that the bus driver had reacted

correctly to a potential hazard to life and, was, therefore, not

responsible for the injuries suffered by the plaintiff.

f) Leslie O'Donnell v. Smith and Royal & Sun Alliance

PLC [2018] SC EDIN 68:

In this decision of the Scotland Personal Injury Court rendered

in December 2018, the matter related to a motorcyclist

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 19 of 50

travelling on a highway with the respondent’s car moving

ahead. While attempting to overtake the car, the driver of the

car slowed down and braked rather abruptly. The motorcyclist

also braked hard but was unable to avoid a collision, resulting

in injury. Submissions were advanced to the effect that there

were no strict rules governing the distance to be maintained by

a following vehicle, nor could negligence automatically be

inferred merely because a vehicle collided with the rear side of

another. Contributory negligence was urged by the respondent

car driver. The Court noted that there was no evidence to

suggest that the motorcyclist had been travelling too close to

the car and, rather, had been maintaining a distance of

approximately 50-60 metres, which was considered

reasonable. On the issue of contributory negligence, the Court

held that the preponderance of blame would still lie upon the

car driver. The Court found the car driver to be in breach of

duty by abruptly stopping due to apprehension about the

motorcycle overtaking the vehicle. There had been no

justification for such sharp braking, and the manoeuvre was

found to be inappropriate. The Highway Code advised steady

driving without sudden changes in speed or direction and,

accordingly, the primary negligence was attributed to the car

driver. The assessment was based on the rule of “stopping

distances” in the Highway Code. The apportionment resulted

in a 20% reduction in the award of damages. Effectively, the

Court held that “the duty of a following driver is to maintain a

manner and position of driving enabling response to

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 20 of 50

reasonably anticipated traffic exigencies”. However, where a

reasonable distance is maintained and the lead vehicle

performs an unexpected emergency stop, contributory

negligence cannot be presumed in the absence of evidence

demonstrating that the following vehicle had been too close or

driven imprudently.

g) Rules of the Road Regulations 1989

Reference may also be made to both Rules 23 and 24 of the

Rules of the Road Regulations 1989, the former being a duty

on the following vehicle to maintain “sufficient distance” and

the latter being on the vehicle ahead to avoid “abrupt braking”

unless for safety reasons. For ease of reference said rules are

extracted as under:

“Rule 23

“23. Distance from vehicles in front.-The driver of a

motor vehicle moving behind another vehicle shall

keep at a sufficient distance from that other vehicle to

avoid collision if the vehicle in front should suddenly

slow down or stop.”

Rule 24

“24. Abrupt brake.- No driver of a vehicle shall apply

brake abruptly unless it is necessary to do so for safety

reasons.”

Assessment in the present case

39. The issue requiring consideration is whether the finding of

20% contributory negligence attributed to the deceased in the

impugned award warrants interference.

40. At the outset, the evidentiary position assumes significance.

PW-1/wife of the deceased, though admittedly not an eye witness,

consistently deposed in her affidavit [Exhibit PW1/A] that the

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 21 of 50

offending tractor carrying bricks, while moving ahead of the

deceased’s vehicle, suddenly took a left turn and applied brakes

without any indication, as a consequence of which the deceased had

no sufficient time to react and collided with the offending vehicle

from behind. The version of PW-1/wife of the deceased substantially

derives corroboration from the testimony of PW-3/Vinod Chand

Katiyar, who was treated by the Tribunal as the sole eye-witness.

41. PW-3/eye-witness specifically deposed that he had met the

deceased at Dharuhera Bus Stand and was following him for some

distance on his scooter when he witnessed the occurrence. His

testimony records that the tractor-trolley laden with bricks was

travelling ahead of the deceased’s vehicle and suddenly applied

brakes in order to take a turn, resulting in the deceased’s vehicle

colliding with the trolley from behind. Significantly, in cross-

examination, PW-3/eye-witness denied the suggestion that the

deceased was driving at a speed of 80–90 kmph, and no contrary

material was produced by the insurer [appellant herein] to

substantiate excessive speed. Equally material is the fact that PW-

3/eye-witness candidly stated that he could not say whether the

tractor owner had signalled by hand before turning, which

demonstrates absence of embellishment and lends credibility to his

testimony.

42. The Tribunal itself accepted PW-3/eye-witness to be a reliable

witness, specifically recording that his testimony remained free from

contradiction, explained his presence at the site, and stood

corroborated by the criminal record including the FIR and site plan.

Consequently, the foundational factual finding regarding the

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 22 of 50

offending vehicle/tractor-trolley having suddenly slowed down or

braked while negotiating a turn cannot be lightly displaced.

43. The site plan also depicts the place of occurrence on NH-8 near

the HP Petrol Pump and the turning point, and broadly corroborates

that the accident occurred while both vehicles were moving in the

same direction of travel. Importantly, the site plan does not indicate a

case of a stationary or parked vehicle obstructing the carriageway.

Therefore, the present case is distinguishable from those where a

stationary vehicle was left negligently parked on the road without

indicators. Rather, the facts indicate a moving tractor-trolley ahead

and a moving car behind, where the collision occurred in the

backdrop of a sudden attempt to turn.

44. In this factual setting, the principles governing rear-end

collisions require cautious application. In Raj Pal & Ors. v.

Dharampal & Ors. (supra), this Court held that a collision from

behind cannot automatically result in an inference of sole negligence

on the part of the following vehicle and that surrounding

circumstances, including the conduct of the vehicle ahead, are

required to be assessed. Thus, the mere fact that deceased’s vehicle

struck the tractor-trolley from behind cannot, by itself, conclude the

issue of negligence. At the same time, Nishan Singh & Ors. v.

Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors (supra) recognizes the duty of a

vehicle following another to maintain “sufficient distance” so as to

account for foreseeable slowing down or stopping of the vehicle

ahead. The principle underlying the judgment is that the following

vehicle must retain “sufficient control” to avoid collision. However,

the decision does not lay down an absolute rule that every rear-end

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 23 of 50

collision ipso facto establishes exclusive negligence of the rear

vehicle irrespective of the conduct of the lead vehicle.

45. The present facts indicate competing obligations on both sides.

On the one hand, the offending tractor-trolley, admittedly laden with

bricks, is alleged to have suddenly applied brakes while attempting to

turn, thereby attracting concern regarding abrupt braking and safe

turning manoeuvre. On the other hand, the collision from behind also

suggests that the deceased may not have maintained such distance or

control as would have enabled him to avoid impact after the tractor

slowed down.

46. The approach adopted by the Tribunal appears to reflect this

balanced position. The Tribunal consciously considered both Rule 23

of the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, concerning maintenance

of “sufficient distance” by the vehicle behind, and Rule 24, which

restrains abrupt braking except for safety reasons. Having accepted

the claimant’s version regarding sudden braking by the offending

vehicle, the Tribunal nonetheless held that the deceased, being the

following vehicle, was also expected to maintain “sufficient reaction

distance”. The finding of contributory negligence was thus not based

merely on the factum of rear impact, but upon the combined

circumstances surrounding the occurrence.

47. The Supreme Court in S. Mohammed Hakkim v. National

Insurance Company Ltd. (supra) has reiterated that in road accidents

involving sequential vehicular conduct, negligence may legitimately

be apportioned where the conduct of both vehicles contributes to the

occurrence. The Court recognized that “sudden braking” by one

vehicle and inability of the vehicle behind to sufficiently react may

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 24 of 50

together justify attribution of contributory negligence rather than

complete exoneration of either side. Tested on the anvil of the

aforesaid principles, the impugned award does not appear to suffer

from perversity in attributing 20% contributory negligence to the

deceased.

II. Tractor-Trolley

48. There is definitional difference between ‘tractor’ and a ‘goods

carriage’. While Section 2 (44) of the MV Act defines ‘tractor’ as:

“Section 2(44)

(44) “tractor” means a motor vehicle which is not

itself constructed to carry any load (other than

equipment used for the purpose of propulsion); but

excludes a road-roller;”

Section 2 (14) defines ‘goods carriages’ as under:

“Section 2(14)

(14) “goods carriage” means any motor vehicle

constructed or adapted for use solely for the

carriage of goods, or any motor vehicle not so

constructed or adapted when used for the carriage

of goods;”

‘Trailer’ on the other hand is defined under Section 2 (46)

as under:

“Section 2(46)

(46) “trailer” means any vehicle, other than a semi-

trailer and a side-car, drawn or intended to be

drawn by a motor vehicle;”

49. In the present case, the insurer has raised a defence that the

insurance policy pertains only to a tractor, whereas the trolley attached

to the tactor, and being laden with bricks, gives a valid defence to the

insurance company for breach of policy conditions under Section 147

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 25 of 50

read with Section 149 (2)(a)(i)(a) of the MV Act. In this regard, it will

be instructive to traverse through the decisions of the Supreme Court and

this Court in a chronological manner, as under:

a) National Insurance Company Limited v. V. Chinnnama

(2004) 8 SCC 697:

The Court was dealing with a deceased, who had purchased

five bags of vegetables, loaded them in a trailer connected to a

tractor and, upon seeing an oncoming bus, could not control

his vehicle, fell down and suffered injuries. Insurance

Company disputed its liability on the ground that the deceased

was travelling in the said tractor as a paid passenger. In this

context, the Court noted that the tractor was not even a goods

carriage and, therefore, in context of Section 147 of the MV

Act, the provision applicable to a goods vehicle would not be

triggered. Relevant paragraphs are extracted as under:

“15. Furthermore, a tractor is not even a goods

carriage. The expression “goods carriage” has been

defined in Section 2(14) to mean

“any motor vehicle constructed or adapted for

use solely for the carriage of goods, or any motor

vehicle not so constructed or adapted when used

for the carriage of goods”

(emphasis supplied)

whereas “tractor” has been defined in Section 2(44)

to mean

“a motor vehicle which is not itself constructed to

carry any load (other than equipment used for the

purpose of propulsion); but excludes a road

roller”.

“Trailer” has been defined in Section 2(46) to mean

“any vehicle, other than a semi-trailer and a sidecar,

drawn or intended to be drawn by a motor vehicle”.

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 26 of 50

16. A tractor fitted with a trailer may or may not

answer the definition of goods carriage contained in

Section 2(14) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The tractor

was meant to be used for agricultural purposes. The

trailer attached to the tractor, thus, necessarily is

required to be used for agricultural purposes, unless

registered otherwise. It may be, as has been

contended by Mrs K. Sharda Devi, that carriage of

vegetables being agricultural produce would lead to

an inference that the tractor was being used for

agricultural purposes but the same by itself would

not be construed to mean that the tractor and trailer

can be used for carriage of goods by another person

for his business activities. The deceased was a

businessman. He used to deal in vegetables. After he

purchased the vegetables, he was to transport the

same to the market for the purpose of sale thereof

and not for any agricultural purpose. The tractor

and trailer, therefore, were not being used for

agricultural purposes. However, even if it be

assumed that the trailer would answer the

description of “goods carriage” as contained in

Section 2(14) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the case

would be covered by the decisions of this Court

in Asha Rani [(2003) 2 SCC 223 : 2003 SCC (Cri)

493] and other decisions following the same, as the

accident had taken place on 24-11-1991 i.e. much

prior to coming into force of the 1994 amendment.”

(emphasis added)

The important aspect of this decision is that the Supreme Court

notes that the trailer attached to the tractor is necessarily

required to be used for ‘agricultural purposes’, unless

registered otherwise. Thus, while the tractor and trailer can be

used for ‘agricultural purposes’, they cannot be used for

carriage of goods by another person for his business activities.

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 27 of 50

b) Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Brij Mohan (2007) 7 SCC 56:

The Supreme Court was dealing with a claimant, a labourer

travelling on a trolley attached to the tractor. Earth dump was

loaded on the trolley attached to the tractor, and claimant and

other workers were returning to the brick mill. The tractor was

allegedly driven rashly and negligently by the driver, and the

claimant slipped from the trolley, came under the wheels, and

suffered grievous injuries. The insurer’s defence was that the

trolley was not insured and that the tractor was insured only

for the purpose of carrying of ‘agricultural loads’. The earth

dug and stored in the trailer was for manufacturing bricks and

could not amount to agricultural work. Relying on

Chinnamma (supra), the Court noted that the claimant was

merely a passenger travelling on the trolley. The Court,

therefore, continued to endorse the award to the claimant, but

recovery rights were granted to the insurer from the owner of

the tractor and trolley.

c) United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Kadapa District v. Koduru

Bhagyamma & Ors., 2007 SCC OnLine AP 830:

The Andhra Pradesh High Court was dealing with an issue of

whether Insurance Company could be fastened with the

liability in respect of a person who died while travelling in a

trailer attached to a tractor, where the trailer was not

separately insured. Upon analysing the provisions of the MV

Act and earlier judgments, reliance was placed on the decision

of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Gunti Devaiah v. Vaka

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 28 of 50

Peddi Reddy (2004) ACJ 1881, holding that the MV Act does

not contemplate separate insurance for a trailer and that, when

a trailer is attached to the tractor, it becomes part of the

tractor. The reasoning was that the trailer by itself cannot be

driven and has to be carried or towed with a motor vehicle

namely a tractor or a self-propelled vehicle. Therefore, the

question of driving the trailer in a rash and manner would not

arise. It is only the prime mover or the motor vehicle which

controls the movement, and the owner of the vehicle and its

insurer can be made liable for compensation. The trailer

therefore, when attached to the tractor, becomes a “tractor-

trailer” and, there is no provision requiring the trailer to be

separately insured to cover the third-party risk.

d) Fahim Ahmad and Others v. United India Insurance Co.

Ltd. and Others (2014) 14 SCC 148:

In this case, the Supreme Court was dealing with collision

involving a tractor and the deceased. The Insurance Company

raised an objection that there was a breach of policy conditions

because, at the time of the accident, the tractor was carrying

sand. The Court held as under:

“5. A perusal of the records shows that, at the time of

the accident, a trolley was attached with the tractor,

which was carrying sand for the purpose of

construction of underground tank near the farm land

for irrigation purpose(s). However, merely because it

was carrying sand would not mean that the tractor

was being used for commercial purpose and

consequently, there was a breach of the condition of

policy on the part of the insured. There is nothing on

record to show that the tractor was being used for

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 29 of 50

commercial purpose(s) or purpose(s) other than

agricultural purpose(s) i.e. for hire or reward, as

contemplated under Section 149(2)(a)(i)(a) of the said

Act.

6. Although the plea of breach of the conditions of

policy was raised before the Tribunal, yet neither any

issue was framed nor was any evidence led to prove

the same. In our opinion, it was mandatory for

Respondent 1 Insurance Company not only to plead

the said breach, but also substantiate the same by

adducing positive evidence in respect of the same. In

the absence of any such evidence, it cannot be

presumed that there was breach of the conditions of

policy. Thus, there was no reason to fasten the said

liability of payment of the amount of compensation

awarded by the Tribunal on the appellants herein.

7. We may also notice that this Court in National

Insurance Co. Ltd. v. V. Chinnamma [(2004) 8 SCC

697 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 378 : JT (2004) 7 SC 167] held

that: (SCC p. 702, para 16)

“16. … carriage of vegetables being agricultural

produce would lead to an inference that the

tractor was being used for agricultural purposes

but the same by itself would not be construed to

mean that the tractor and trailer can be used for

carriage of goods by another person for his

business activities.”

Thus, a tractor fitted with a trailer may or may not

answer the definition of “goods carriage” contained

in Section 2(14) of the said Act.”

(emphasis added)

The Supreme Court held that merely because the tractor was

carrying sand would not mean that it was being used for a

‘commercial purpose’ rather than ‘agricultural purpose’.

e) New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sanjay Tyagi 2014 SCC

OnLine Del 1339:

The Coordinate Bench of this Court, while dealing with an

accident with a tractor carrying a trolley and the plea of the

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 30 of 50

Insurance Company that there was a breach of the policy, noted

that the insurance policy was a comprehensive policy for

‘agricultural purpose’ and that the tractor, without equipment,

is actually of no use. The term ‘agricultural purpose’ denotes a

wide amplitude; it is not only the tractor simpliciter that is

insured, rather it is insured for ‘agricultural purposes’, which

covers the trolley as well.

f) Dhondubai v.Hanmantappa Bandappa Gandigude 2023 SCC

OnLine SC 2387:

The Supreme Court was dealing with a tractor-trolley collision

and the Insurance Company’s plea that only the tractor was

insured. The Court noted in the following paragraphs as under:

“5. In a matter of the present nature, the law is well

settled that when a tractor and trailer are involved,

both the tractor as well as the trailer are required to

be insured. Therefore, in a normal circumstance,

when the appellant/claimant was travelling in the

trailer which was not insured, the liability on the

Insurance Company cannot be fastened and to that

extent the High Court was justified.

6. However, the question for consideration herein is

as to whether in the peculiar facts and circumstances

arising in this case, this Court is required to exercise

the power under Article 142 of the Constitution of

India to direct the Insurance Company to pay the

amount and recover the same from the owner of the

vehicle. In that regard, the position is no more res-

integra in view of the consideration made by this

Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Brij Mohan

2

.

This Court in a similar circumstance where the

trailer did not have insurance, has exercised the

power under Article 142 taking into consideration

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 31 of 50

the difficult circumstances in which the claimant

therein was placed.

7. If the said decision is taken note and the instant

facts are taken into consideration, it is noticed that

the claimant a lady who was working as a labourer

and was travelling in the tractor attached to the

trailer, was about 20 years old as on the date of the

accident. Due to the injuries suffered in the accident

she had also undergone amputation of her left lower

limb above the knee joint. Therefore, apart from the

disability being 100%, there is prejudice to the

marriage prospects and to lead a normal life. In such

circumstance, it would not be possible for the

claimant to recover the amount from the owner.

Therefore, in that circumstance, we direct that the

respondent-Insurance Company shall pay the

amount awarded by the High Court as compensation

with the accrued interest and recover the same from

the owner of the vehicle. The amount shall be

deposited before the MACT within six weeks from the

date of receipt of a copy of this judgment whereupon

the amount shall be disbursed to the claimant.”

(emphasis added)

The Supreme Court effectively noted that both the tractor and

the trailer are required to be insured. Therefore, if the claimant

was travelling in the trailer which was not insured, liability

cannot be ordinarily fastened on the Insurance Company.

g) United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rekha 2024 SCC OnLine

Del 9019:

The challenge by Insurance Company was to the compensation

awarded in a case involving a tractor-trolley, where the tractor

was allegedly carrying rohri, which, according to the

Insurance Company, showed that it was being used for

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 32 of 50

‘commercial purpose’. The Court held that the commercial use

could not be established since there was no corroborative

evidence to show that it was carrying rohri. Therefore, the

Insurance Company was not entitled to recovery rights.

h) Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Honnamma

2025 SCC OnLine SC 1027:

The Supreme Court dealt with a case where the deceased was

travelling in a tractor and trailer as a coolie for unloading soil.

The High Court enhanced compensation while fastening

liability upon the Insurance Company. Insurance company

appealed, the Supreme Court noted that it was clear that the

tractor, which was insured, was the cause of the accident and

that the accident was not caused solely because of a stand-

alone trailer. The principal cause of the accident was a tractor

and, in sequence of events, the trailer overturned. The Court

relied upon certain judgments to note that ultimately the root

cause of the accident is the tractor, which was insured, and this

fact could not be lost sight of. The Court further noted:

“Moreover, this Court is duty bound to be mindful of the

ground realities of our nation and cannot let practicality be

overshadowed by technicality”. The Court further noted as

under:

“13. In Dhondubai (supra), the Court stated:

‘5. In a matter of the present nature, the law is well

settled that when a tractor and trailer are involved,

both the tractor as well as the trailer are required to

be insured. Therefore, in a normal circumstance,

when the appellant/claimant was travelling in the

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 33 of 50

trailer which was not insured, the liability on the

Insurance Company cannot be fastened and to that

extent the High Court was justified.

14. To our mind, the learned Judges

in Dhondubhai (supra) did not lay down an absolute

principle of law, but taking note of Oriental

Insurance Co. Limited v. Brij Mohan, (2007) 7 SCC

56, it was ordered that the ‘respondent-Insurance

Company shall pay the amount awarded by the High

Court as compensation with the accrued interest and

recover the same from the owner of the vehicle.’ A

decision by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh

High Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd.,

Kadapa District v. Koduru Bhagyamma, 2007 SCC

OnLine AP 830 is relevant:

‘1. This case has come before this Court on a

reference made by a learned Single Judge of

this Court as it was contended before the

learned Single Judge by the appellant that as

the trailer in which the deceased was travelling

was not insured, although it was attached to

the tractor which was insured, therefore no

liability could be fastened upon the insurer.

xxx

13. Now on analysis of these judgments and the

provisions of law which have been quoted

above, we feel that the law has been correctly

appreciated by a learned Single Judge of this

Court in Gunti Devaiah v. Vaka Peddi

Reddy (supra) and the reasons given by him

are sufficient to hold that under the Motor

Vehicles Act no separate insurance is

contemplated for a trailer and when the trailer

is attached to the tractor which is insured, it

becomes the part of the tractor. We reproduce

the Para 26 of the said judgment as under:

“The word “vehicle” mentioned in Section 147

is co-relatable to the word motor vehicles,

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 34 of 50

which is stipulated in Section 146. Therefore,

the expression vehicle wherever appearing in

Chapter X(XI) has to be only read as motor

vehicle. The principle of claim for

compensation in accidents arising out of the

use of the motor vehicle is based on tortuous

liability and the negligence of the driver of the

motor vehicle is a sine quo non for

maintaining a claim under the provisions of

the Act. Inasmuch as the trailer by itself

cannot be driven and it has to be carried or

towed with a motor vehicle namely a tractor or

a like self-propelled vehicles. Therefore, the

question of driving the trailer in a rash and

negligent manner would not arise. It is only

the prime mover or the motor vehicle which

controls movement of the tractor and in case

of the negligence driving of the trailer or the

motor vehicle, the owner of the vehicle and its

insurer alone will be made liable for payment

of compensation. But, since the trailer is

attached can it be said that trailer should also

be independently insured so as to avoid the

liability of compensation in case of rash and

negligent driving by the driver. That

contingency would not arise, as it is only a

vehicle and not a motor vehicle. It may be for

tax purposes, it is treated as a goods vehicle.

But, under the provisions of the Motor

Vehicles Act, no separate insurance is

contemplated. When the trailer is attached to

the tractor it becomes a tractor-trailer. There is

no provision requiring the trailer to be

separately insured to cover the third party risk.

The reasons are obvious that it cannot be

driven by the driver as in the case of motor

vehicles or tractors. Thus, a separate

distinction has been drawn between the motor

vehicle and a vehicle i.e., visible in all the

definitions and more especially in Chapter XI.

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 35 of 50

The same situation also persists in Chapter X

in case of no fault liability wherein it has been

stated that whether a death or a permanent

disability of any person has been resulted from

an accident arising out of the use of a motor

vehicle or motor vehicles and there is no

reference to vehicle as such. This aspect was

never considered in any of the decisions relied

on by the learned Standing Counsel for the

Insurance Company and also for other side.”

(underlined in original; emphasis supplied by

us through the bold highlight)

(emphasis added)

The Court distinguished the decision in Dhondubai (supra)

while observing that it did not lay down an absolute principle

of law. In fact, the Andhra Pradesh High Court's decision in

Kadapa District v Koduru Bhagyamma (supra) was relied

upon.

i) New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmla 2025 SCC OnLine

Del 10698:

In this decision by a Coordinate Bench of this Court, which

related to a tractor being driven by the owner along with a

trolley carrying packets of chana, the Insurance Company

pleaded that that the trailer was not covered under the policy.

However, noting the decision of the Supreme Court in

Honnamma (supra), the Court held that the limitation of

liability under the insurance policy relates to the use of the

tractor for drawing more trailers than permitted by law.

Therefore, the Insurance Company was liable to compensate

the claimants. The limitation of liability under insurance policy

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 36 of 50

in the present case that case is akin to the limitation considered

in Honnamma (supra).

Assessment in the present case

50. After an assessment of all these decisions, in the opinion of this

Court, relying upon the recent decision of the Supreme Court in

Honnamma (supra), which places the issue of causation of an accident

upon the tractor itself, the aspect of the trailer stands separated, while

observing that the trailer was no entity as a stand-alone motor vehicle.

The focus was on the principal cause of the accident, namely, the tractor

pulling/hauling/moving the trailer, and therefore, the accident is

considered to have been caused by the tractor.

51. This Court, therefore, defers to the categorical opinion of the

Supreme Court in this regard and, in fact, notes that this proposition had

previously been considered in Kadapa District (supra) by the Andhra

Pradesh High Court and in Sanjay Tyagi (supra) by this Court.

52. The fundamental issue requiring appreciation is that, admittedly,

the tractor is insured. In the present case, there is nothing in the

insurance policy placed on record to indicate that the tractor was insured

only for ‘agricultural purposes’. However, for the sake of assessment, it

shall be assumed that the insurance policy covers the tractor for

‘agricultural purposes’. The moving vehicle or motor vehicle is,

therefore, the tractor, which is defined under Section 2(44) of the MV

Act, and in fact states that the vehicle is “not itself constructed to carry

any load”.

A trailer, to the contrary, as defined under Section

2(46) of the MV Act, is merely a ‘vehicle’ and not a

‘motor vehicle’, which is “drawn or intended to be

drawn by a motor vehicle”.

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 37 of 50

53. The Supreme Court in Dhondubai (supra) states that, as a general

rule, a tractor and trailer are both required to be insured; however, it

restricts the same to “normal circumstances” where the trailer was not

insured. In Honnamma (supra), the Supreme Court clearly noted that

Dhondubai (supra) did not lay down an absolute principle of law. The

driving on the road is by a motor vehicle, namely, the motorised vehicle

which is in motion, and the accident is caused due to the alleged braking

of that vehicle. Whether a trailer is attached to it or not, and whether it is

separately insured or not, would not make any difference, in the opinion

of this Court, since the negligence, if any, has to be attributed to the

entire tractor-trolley unit being driven by a person and cannot be severed

between the tractor and the trailer.

54. Essentially, the trolley/trailer not being separately insured cannot

be held to be the cause of the accident. It so happens that the

trolley/trailer is attached to a motorised vehicle which, due to its

movement on the road, becomes the cause of an accident. The

trolley/trailer has no independent identity as a motorised vehicle on the

road unless it is left abandoned or detached from the motorised vehicle

and is involved in a situation involving a rear-end collision with another

vehicle. However, this is not a case of a stationary vehicle left

abandoned, but rather of a moving vehicle, indeed a motor vehicle in the

form of a ‘tractor’, which is alleged to have caused the accident by

‘abrupt braking’ and a ‘sudden turn’.

55. Insurance companies have often attempted to introduce the

distinction between a tractor and trolley/trailer into the controversy.

However, in the opinion of this Court, the Supreme Court has now

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 38 of 50

provided a determinative opinion, and the Courts henceforth would be

expected to align with the said opinion, unless a different view is taken

subsequently.

56. The fact that the trolley was carrying bricks or not would not be an

issue in a case of “sudden braking”. However, it could assume

significance where Section 147 of the MV Act comes into play with

regard to the tractor being used for carrying goods and, therefore, the

insurance not extending to a ‘goods vehicle’.

57. The principal cause of the accident is the movement of the tractor

on the road, involved in ‘abrupt braking’ and ‘sudden turn’. In the

opinion of this Court, the carriage of the trolley, together with whatever

contents it carried, would not fall within the scope of a successful

insurance defence. Accordingly, the plea of the insurance company in

this regard is not sustainable.

58. The issue of the principal cause is exemplified in the decision in

Honnamma (supra), particularly in paragraph 12, as also in chain-

reaction collisions as discussed in the English decision in Rouse v.

Squires (supra). In fact, Rouse v. Squires (supra) was relied upon by the

Supreme Court in Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. K.V.

Sakeena, (1996) 3 SCC 446.

III. Fake Driving Licence

59. Further, appellant/Insurance Company prays for recovery rights

against the respondent no.5/driver-cum-owner of offending vehicle, on

the basis that he did not possess a valid and effective driving licence at

the time of accident.

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 39 of 50

60. In response to aforesaid, respondent no.5/driver-cum-owner stated

that said driving licence had been duly produced on record, and that

appellant/Insurance Company neither took any specific plea as regards

the license being fake in its written statement nor led any cogent evidence

in this regard.

61. Appellant/Insurance Company's plea was based on the testimony

of clerk from Licensing Authority Farrukhabad, Uttar Pradesh [R3W1],

who stated that records pertaining to the driving licence produced by

respondent no. 5/driver-cum-owner were not traceable and a FIR had

been registered regarding said missing records. For ease of reference,

statement of R3W1 is extracted as under:

“The ARTO has given this letter to me and I do not

know anything about the DL in question. The FIR is

registered by Predecessor of present ARTO.

xxxxx

1 do not know whether the non availability of

original record of DL is for the reason mentioned in

the complaint given to the police.”

62. Since driving license could not be verified by Licensing Authority

Farrukhabad, Uttar Pradesh, appellant/Insurance Company contended

that the driving licence produced by respondent no. 5/driver-cum-owner

could not be considered genuine. Accordingly, what needs to be

examined is whether mere non-availability of records with Licensing

Authority would, by itself, lead to a conclusion that the driving license

was ‘fake’ or ‘invalid’.

63. The Tribunal, vide impugned award, concluded that Insurance

Company had failed to substantiate its defence regarding breach of

policy conditions on the ground that the driving license was fake.

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 40 of 50

64. With respect to fake driving licenses and defences available to

appellant/Insurance Company on the said ground, reference may be

made to certain decisions of the Supreme Court, as under:

a) Pepsu Road Transport Corporation v. National Insurance

Company Ltd., (2013) 10 SCC 217:

The Supreme Court in the said case was dealing with an insurer's

plea for exoneration under Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the MV Act,

relating to breach of conditions concerning the driving licence, on

the allegation that the driver was holding a fake driving license.

The Court relied upon the decisions made by the Supreme Court

in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lehru, 2003 3 SCC 338

and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, 2004 3 SCC

297, wherein it was held that “mere absence of a valid driving

license, possession of fake or invalid driving licence, or

disqualification of driver, would not constitute valid defences

available to Insurance Company against the insured or third

parties”.

Insurance Company, in such cases, was required to establish that

the insured was guilty of negligence. and had failed to exercise

reasonable care in complying with the policy conditions relating

to use of insured vehicle by a duly licensed driver. The Court,

therefore, held as under:

“10. In a claim for compensation, it is certainly open

to the insurer under Section 149(2)(a)(ii) to take a

defence that the driver of the vehicle involved in the

accident was not duly licensed. Once such a defence

is taken, the onus is on the insurer. But even after it

is proved that the licence possessed by the driver was

a fake one, whether there is liability on the insurer is

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 41 of 50

the moot question. As far as the owner of the vehicle

is concerned, when he hires a driver, he has to check

whether the driver has a valid driving licence.

Thereafter he has to satisfy himself as to the

competence of the driver. If satisfied in that regard

also, it can be said that the owner had taken

reasonable care in employing a person who is

qualified and competent to drive the vehicle. The

owner cannot be expected to go beyond that, to the

extent of verifying the genuineness of the driving

licence with the licensing authority before hiring the

services of the driver. However, the situation would

be different if at the time of insurance of the vehicle

or thereafter the insurance company requires the

owner of the vehicle to have the licence duly verified

from the licensing authority or if the attention of the

owner of the vehicle is otherwise invited to the

allegation that the licence issued to the driver

employed by him is a fake one and yet the owner

does not take appropriate action for verification of

the matter regarding the genuineness of the licence

from the licensing authority. That is what is

explained in Swaran Singh case [National Insurance

Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297:2004

SCC (Cri) 733] . If despite such information with the

owner that the licence possessed by his driver is

fake, no action is taken by the insured for

appropriate verification, then the insured will be at

fault and, in such circumstances, the Insurance

Company is not liable for the compensation.”

(emphasis added)

On facts of the case, the Court held that driver had been engaged

nearly six years prior to the accident, had been put to a driving

test, and had also been imparted training. Therefore, in these

circumstances, insured could not be considered at fault for having

employed a person whose licence was subsequently proved to be

fake.

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 42 of 50

Notably, the Supreme Court held, in the paragraph extracted

above, that the position may be different, where, either at time of

issuance of insurance policy or thereafter, Insurance Company

requires the owner to have the driving license verified from

Licensing Authority, or where insured/owner is informed that the

driver’s license is fake and yet it fails to take appropriate steps in

that regard.

b) IFFCO Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Geeta Devi (2024)

13 SCC 755:

The Supreme Court was dealing with an appeal preferred by

Insurance Company against the denial of recovery rights. The

Tribunal, initially recorded that driver of the tempo was holding a

fake driving license and consequently, opined that Insurance

Company would not be liable to pay compensation. The High

Court, however, reversed the said finding and denied recovery

rights to Insurance Company on the ground that it had neither

been pleaded nor proved that the owner of the vehicle had failed

to take adequate steps to verify the genuineness of the driving

licence. Accordingly, it was held that breach of the terms and

conditions of insurance policy could not be sufficiently

established. Relevant paragraphs in this regard are extracted as

under:

“8. The argument with respect to the driving skill test

does not merit acceptance as the insurance policy in

question admittedly did not postulate that a driving

skill test should compulsorily be taken before

employing a chauffeur to drive the insured vehicle. The

relevant condition in the insurance policy, titled

“Driver Clause”, reads as follows:

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 43 of 50

“Any person including insured: provided that the

person driving holds an effective driving licence at the

time of the accident and is not disqualified from

holding or obtaining such a licence.”

There is, thus, no mandate in the statutory provision or

the above clause that a driving skill test should be

undertaken without fail before employing a driver.

Therefore, it is not open to the petitioner Insurance

Company to cite the same as a breach of the terms and

conditions of the policy. In fact, there was no such term

or condition in the policy.

9. As regards the contention that the driver of the

vehicle was not duly licensed as he possessed a fake

licence, it may be noted that neither Section

149(2)(a)(ii) of the 1988 Act nor the “Driver Clause”

in the subject insurance policy provide that the owner

of the insured vehicle must, as a rule, get the driving

licence of the person employed as a driver for the said

vehicle verified and checked with the Transport

Authorities concerned. Generally, and as a matter of

course, no person employing a driver would undertake

such a verification exercise and would be satisfied with

the production of a licence issued by a seemingly

competent authority, the validity of which has not

expired. It would be wholly impracticable for every

person employing a driver to expect the Transport

Authority concerned to verify and confirm whether the

driving licence produced by that driver is a valid and

genuine one, subject to just exceptions. In fact, no such

mandatory condition is provided in any car insurance

policy and it is not open to the petitioner Insurance

Company, which also did not prescribe such a

stringent condition, to cite the failure of the deceased

vehicle owner to get Ujay Pal's driving licence checked

with the RTO as a reason to disclaim liability under

the insurance policy.”

(emphasis added)

65. Yet again, the Supreme Court, emphasised that insurance policy

did not contain any stipulation requiring a compulsory driving test to be

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 44 of 50

conducted before employing a driver to drive the insured vehicle, while

referring to the “driver clause in the Insurance Policy”. Therefore, the

contention raised by the Insurance Company that the vehicle owner did

not conduct due diligence while employing the said person as a driver,

by insisting upon a condition which was neither prescribed under the

statute nor under the insurance policy, cannot be sustained. While

adverting to Swaran Singh (supra) and Lehru (supra), the Court further

held as under:

“15. Further, in the context of cases where the

driver's licence was found to be fake, the Bench

in Swaran Singh [National Insurance Co.

Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297 : 2004 SCC

(Cri) 733 : (2004) 118 Comp Cas 396] observed that

the question would be whether the insurer could

prove that the owner was guilty of wilful breach of

the conditions of the insurance policy. It was pointed

out that the defence to the effect that the licence held

by the person driving the vehicle was a fake one

would be available to the insurance company but

whether, despite the same, the plea of default on the

part of the owner has been established or not would

be a question which would have to be determined in

each case. The earlier decision in United India

Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lehru [United India Insurance

Co. Ltd. v. Lehru, (2003) 3 SCC 338 : 2003 SCC

(Cri) 614] was considered and the Bench in Swaran

Singh [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh,

(2004) 3 SCC 297 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 733 : (2004)

118 Comp Cas 396] observed that the ratio therein

must not be read to mean that an owner of a vehicle

can, under no circumstances, have any duty to make

an inquiry with regard to the genuineness of the

driving licence and the same would again be a

question which would arise for consideration in

each individual case. The argument that the decision

in Lehru [United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lehru,

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 45 of 50

(2003) 3 SCC 338 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 614] meant

that, for all intent and purport, the right of the

insurer to raise a defence that the licence was fake

was taken away was, however, rejected as not being

correct and it was held that such a defence can

certainly be raised, but it will be for the insurer to

prove that the insured did not take adequate care

and caution to verify the genuineness or otherwise of

the licence held by the driver.”

(emphasis added)

In the case of Lehru (supra), the Supreme Court further

elaborated upon the manner in which burden cast upon the insured

could be discharged. In this regard, reference may be made to

paragraphs 16 and 19 of the judgement which have been extracted

hereinbelow:

“16. The findings summed up by the Bench, to the

extent presently relevant, are as under: (Swaran

Singh [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh,

(2004) 3 SCC 297 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 733 : (2004) 118

Comp Cas 396] , SCC pp. 341-42, para 110)

“110. … (iii) The breach of policy condition e.g.

disqualification of the driver or invalid driving

licence of the driver, as contained in sub-section

(2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, has to be proved to have

been committed by the insured for avoiding

liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or

invalid driving licence or disqualification of the

driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in

themselves defences available to the insurer

against either the insured or the third parties. To

avoid its liability towards the insured, the insurer

has to prove that the insured was guilty of

negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care

in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the

policy regarding use of vehicles by a duly

licensed driver or one who was not disqualified

to drive at the relevant time.

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 46 of 50

(iv) Insurance companies, however, with a view

to avoid their liability must not only establish the

available defence(s) raised in the said

proceedings but must also establish “breach” on

the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden of

proof wherefor would be on them.

(v) The court cannot lay down any criteria as to

how the said burden would be discharged,

inasmuch as the same would depend upon the

facts and circumstances of each case.

(vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove

breach on the part of the insured concerning the

policy condition regarding holding of a valid

licence by the driver or his qualification to drive

during the relevant period, the insurer would not

be allowed to avoid its liability towards the

insured unless the said breach or breaches on the

condition of driving licence is/are so fundamental

as are found to have contributed to the cause of

the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the

policy conditions would apply “the rule of main

purpose” and the concept of “fundamental

breach” to allow defences available to the

insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act.

(vii) The question, as to whether the owner has

taken reasonable care to find out as to whether

the driving licence produced by the driver (a fake

one or otherwise), does not fulfil the

requirements of law or not will have to be

determined in each case.

………

19. As already pointed out supra, once a seemingly

valid driving licence is produced by a person

employed to drive a vehicle, unless such licence is

demonstrably fake on the face of it, warranting any

sensible employer to make inquiries as to its

genuineness, or when the period of the licence has

already expired, or there is some other reason to

entertain a genuine doubt as to its validity, the burden

is upon the insurance company to prove that there was

a failure on the part of the vehicle owner in carrying

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 47 of 50

out due diligence apropos such driving licence before

employing that person to drive the vehicle.”

(emphasis added)

66. The Supreme Court has, therefore, categorically laid down the

legal position with respect to the defences available to Insurance

Company in order to succeed on the ground that the driving license held

by driver was fake. Firstly, the burden lies upon Insurance Company to

establish that the insured was guilty of negligence, and had failed to

exercise reasonable care in complying with the condition of insurance

policy relating to use of the vehicle by a duly licensed driver; secondly,

no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to manner in which such

burden must be discharged, and the same will depend on the facts of

each case; thirdly, even if the breach is established or proved, the same

must be so fundamental so as to have contributed to the cause of the

accident; fourthly, the question of whether owner had taken reasonable

care to verify the driving licence, has to be determined on a case-to-case

basis; fifthly, as a matter of general principle, where a seemingly valid

driving licence is produced, unless the same is demonstratably fake on

the face of it, has expired or any other reason, or the employer has been

intimated that license is fake, or is otherwise propelled by a specific

clause of the insurance policy to have license verified, the burden would

be upon Insurance Company to prove that insured failed in carrying out

the due diligence process.

67. Accordingly, the factors which could be taken into consideration,

as general guidelines, to apply in cases involving a plea of “fake driving

license” can be formulated as under:

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 48 of 50

i. Whether the driving licence was demonstratably fake, on the

face of it?

ii. Whether the license seemed, on the face of it, to have expired?

iii. Whether the driver had been engaged by the owner/employer

for a substantial period of time, and, during said period had

given any occasion to owner/employer to doubt his driving

skills?

iv. Whether there existed an easily accessible manner by which

employer could verify driving license of driver, including

through online platforms such as Parivahan Application

instituted by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways

(MoRTH)?

v. Whether the license was valid at the time the driver entered

employment, but subsequently expired and was not renewed in

time, and whether the owner/employer failed to insist upon

such renewal before assigning driving duties to driver?

vi. Whether Insurance Company discharged its burden of proof by

establishing that driving licence was fake on the basis of

official records, and not merely by relying upon the absence or

lack of verification by owner/employer arising out of

administrative and processual deficiencies within transport

authorities?

68. The aforesaid list of factors is merely illustrative and not

exhaustive, and only indicates some of the situations that may arise

where Insurance Company raises a defence on the basis of a fake driving

license.

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 49 of 50

Assessment of the present case

69. In the present case, there is nothing on record to state that the

driving licence produced by respondent no.5/ driver-cum-owner was

“fake”. Further, Insurance Company neither took any specific plea as

regards the license being fake in its written statement nor led any cogent

evidence in this regard. Contention of Insurance Company was therefore,

solely based on testimony of R3W1, stating that he did not know

anything about the driving license in question, which is not the same as

stating that the said licence was fake or invalid. R3W1, further stated

that FIR No. 334/2016 had been registered under Section 409 of IPC,

pertaining to missing records of various driving licenses, not specific to

the driving licence produced by respondent no.5/ driver-cum-owner. In

fact, copy of driving license produced, clearly shows that it was valid

from 16

th

April 2003 to 14

th

August 2020. In view of aforesaid and since

the accident in question occurred on 15

th

August 2010, it can be said that

the plea of appellant/Insurance Company of defence of breach of

insurance policy, may not be merited.

Conclusion

70. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case,

appellant has failed to establish the contentions raised by it.

71. A plea was raised by counsel for the Insurance Company, with

regard to the rate of interest. Reliance in this regard can be placed upon

the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kaushnuma Begum (Smt.) & Ors.

v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., (2001) 2 SCC 9 wherein, while

interpreting the powers of the Tribunal under Section 171 of the MV Act

to award simple interest on compensation from the date of institution of

MAC. APP. 175/2015 Page 50 of 50

the claim petition, it was observed that the rate of interest awarded by

nationalised banks on fixed deposits ought to serve as the guiding factor

while determining the rate of interest payable on compensation amounts.

72. In the facts of the present case, since the long-term fixed deposit

rates offered by nationalised banks during the year 2010, i.e. the year of

filing of the claim petition, were between 7% and 7.75% per annum, the

interest awarded on the compensation granted in the impugned award is

correct @ 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition.

73. Vide order dated 23

rd

February 2015, the Court had directed

deposit of 50% of the awarded amount along with proportionate interest

to be deposited before the Tribunal and released to the claimants, as per

disbursal directions contained in the impugned award

74. Accordingly, this Appeal stands dismissed.

75. In view of dismissal of appeal, balance amount shall also be

disbursed as per directions passed by the Tribunal.

76. Pending applications (if any) are rendered as infructuous.

77. Statutory deposit, if any, be refunded to the appellant.

78. Judgement be uploaded to the website of this Court.

(ANISH DAYAL)

JUDGE

MAY 29, 2026/tk/ya