1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2003 OF 2012

RITESH SINHA … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. … RESPONDENT (S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1318 OF 2013

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1187 OF 2019

[Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No.9671 of 2017]

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1188 OF 2019

[Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No.1048 of 2018]

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1189 OF 2019

[Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No.2225 of 2018]

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1190 OF 2019

[Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No.3272 of 2018]

J U D G M E N T

RANJAN GOGOI, CJI.

1. Leave granted in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Nos.

9671 of 2017, 1048 of 2018, 2225 of 2018 and 3272 of 2018.

2

2. Criminal Appeal No.2003 of 2012.

Facts:

On 7

th December, 2009 the In-charge of the Electronics

Cell of Sadar Bazar Police Station located in the district of

Saharanpur of the State of Uttar Pradesh lodged a First

Information Report (“FIR” for short) alleging that one Dhoom

Singh in association with the appellant – Ritesh Sinha, was

engaged in collection of monies from different people on the

promise of jobs in the Police. Dhoom Singh was arrested and

one mobile phone was seized from him. The Investigating

Authority wanted to verify whether the recorded conversation

in the mobile phone was between Dhoom Singh and the

appellant – Ritesh Sinha. They, therefore, needed the voice

sample of the appellant and accordingly filed an application

before the learned jurisdictional Chief Judicial Magistrate

(“CJM” for short) praying for summoning the appellant to the

Court for recording his voice sample.

3. The learned CJM, Saharanpur by order dated 8

th

January, 2010 issued summons to the appellant to appear

before the Investigating Officer and to give his voice sample.

3

This order of the learned CJM was challenged before the High

Court of Allahabad under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”). The High

Court having negatived the challenge made by the appellant

by its order dated 9

th July, 2010, the present appeal has been

filed.

4. The appeal was heard and disposed of by a split

verdict of a two Judge Bench of this Court requiring the

present reference.

5. Two principal questions arose for determination of the

appeal which have been set out in the order of Justice Ranjana

Prakash Desai dated 7

th December, 2012 in the following

terms.

“(1) Whether Article 20(3) of the Constitution of

India, which protects a person accused of an

offence from being compelled to be a witness

against himself, extends to protecting such an

accused from being compelled to give his voice

sample during the course of investigation into

an offence?

(2) Assuming that there is no violation of Article

20(3) of the Constitution of India, whether in the

absence of any provision in the Code, can a

Magistrate authorize the investigating agency to

record the voice sample of the person accused

of an offence?”

4

6. While the first question was answered in the negative by

both the learned Judges (Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai and

Justice Aftab Alam) following the ratio of the law laid down in

State of Bombay vs.Kathi Kalu Ogha d

1, difference of

opinion has occurred insofar as second question is concerned.

7. Justice Desai took the view that voice sample can be

included in the phrase “such other tests” appearing in

Explanation (a) to Section 53 Cr.P.C. by applying the doctrine

of ejusdem generis and, therefore, the Magistrate would have

an implied power under Section 53 Cr.P.C. to pass an order

permitting taking of voice sample in the aid of criminal

investigation.

8. On the other hand, Justice Aftab Alam took the view

that compulsion on an accused to give his/her voice sample

must be authorized on the basis of a law passed by the

Legislature instead of a process of judicial interpretation. In

this regard, the learned judge (Aftab Alam, J.) also took note

of the amendments in Sections 53, 53A and 311 -A of the

Cr.P.C. by Act No.25 of 2005 introduced with effect from 23

rd

1

A.I.R. 1961 SC 1808

5

June, 2006 which amendments did not bring, within the fold

of the aforesaid provisions of the Cr.P.C., any power in the trial

Court to compel an accused to give sample of his/her voice for

the purpose of investigation of a criminal charge.

9. Despite unanimity amongst the learned Judges hearing

the appeal on the first question on which the learned counsel

for the appellant has also not laid much stress it would be

appropriate to make the discussions complete to answer the

question on the strength of the test laid down by this Court in

State of Bombay vs.Kathi Kalu Oghad (supra). Speaking on

behalf of the majority the then learned Chief Justice B.P.

Sinha was of the view that the prohibition contemplated by the

constitutional provision contained in Article 20(3) would come

in only in cases of testimony of an accused which are self-

incriminatory or of a character which has the tendency of

incriminating the accused himself. The issue in the case was

with regard to specimen writings taken from the accused for

comparison with other writings in order to determine the

culpability of the accused and whether such a course of action

was prohibited under Article 20(3) of the Constitution. The

6

following observations of the then Chief Justice B.P. Sinha

would be apt for recollection as the same conclusively

determines the first question arising. The same, therefore, is

extracted below:

“(11)……….It is well-established that cl. (3) of

Art. 20 is directed against self-incrimination by

an accused person. Self-Incrimination must

mean conveying information based upon the

personal knowledge of the person giving the

information and cannot include merely the

mechanical process of producing documents in

court which may throw a light on any of the

points in controversy, but which do not contain

any statement of the accused based on his

personal knowledge……….

(12) In order that a testimony by an accused

person may be said to have been self -

incriminatory, the compulsion of which

comes within the prohibition of the

constitutional provision, it must be of such

a character that by itself it should have the

tendency of incriminating the accused, if not

also of actually doing so. In other words, it

should be a statement which makes the ca se

against the accused person at least probable,

considered by itself. A specimen handwriting or

signature or finger impressions by themselves

are no testimony at all, being wholly innocuous,

because they are unchangeable; except, in rare

cases where the ridges of the fingers or the style

of writing have been tampered with. They are

only materials for comparison in order to

lend assurance to the Court that its

inference based on other pieces of evidence

7

is reliable. They are neither oral nor

documentary evidence but belong to the third

category of material evidence which is outside

the limit of ‘testimony’.

[emphasis supplied]”

10. We may now proceed to answer the second question,

namely, whether in the absence of any specific provision in the

Cr.P.C. would a Court be competent to authorize the

Investigating Agency to record the voice sample of a person

accused of an offence. We are told that no authoritative

pronouncement of this Court has been rendered by this Court.

11. Medical examination of an accused for the purposes of

effective investigation of a criminal charge has received a wider

meaning by the amendment to the Explanation to Section 53

Cr.P.C. made by Act No.25 of 2005 with effect from 23

rd June,

2006. Similarly, Section 53A has been inserted by the same

Amending Act (No.25 of 2005) to provide for examination of a

person accused of rape. Likewise, by insertion of Section 311-

A by the same Amending Act (No.25 of 2005) a Magistrate has

been empowered to order any person, including an accused

8

person, to give specimen signatures or handwriting for the

purposes of any investigation or proceeding under the Cr.P.C.

12. None of the said amendments specifically authorize or

empower a Magistrate to direct an accused person or any other

person to give his/her voice sample for the purposes of an

inquiry or investigation under the Code. “Omission” of the

Legislature to specifically so provide has led the learned judge

(Justice Aftab Alam) on the two judge Bench to doubt as to

whether legislative wisdom was in favour of a specific

exclusion or omission so as to make a judicial exercise through

a process of interpretation impermissible.

13. The Law Commission of India, in its 87

th report dated

29

th August, 1980, also had an occasion to deal with the

question presently confronting the Court. The Law

Commission examined the matter (almost four decades earlier)

in the context of the working of the provisions of the

Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920. The view taken was that

a suitable legislation which could be in the form of an

amendment to Section 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act,

1920 would be appropriate so as to specifically empower a

9

Judicial Magistrate to compel an accused person to give a

sample of his voice. The following extract from the 87

th Report

of the Law Commission dated 29

th August, 1980 would be

relevant.

“A voice print is a visual recording of voice. It

mainly depends on the position of “formants”.

These are concentrates of sound energy at a

given frequency. It is stated that their position

in the “frequency domain” is unique to each

speaker. Voice prints resemble finger prints, in

that each person has a distinctive voice with

characteristic features dictated by vocal cavities

and articulates.

Voice-print Identification seems to have a

number of practical uses. In England, in

November 1967, at the Winchester Magistrate’s

Court, a man was accused of making malicious

telephone calls. Voice-print Identification

(spectrograph) was used and the accused was

found guilty.”

2

*** *** ***

“Often, it becomes desirable to have an accused

person speak for the purposes of giving to the

police an opportunity to hear his voice and try

to identify it as that of the criminal offender. A

comparison may even be desired between the

voice of an accused person and the recorded

voice of a criminal which has been obtained by,

say, telephone tapping. To facilitate proof of the

crime the police may like that the accused

should be compelled to speak,- and even that

2

Paragraph 5.27, 87

th

Report of the Law Commission of India

10

his voice as recorded may be converted into a

“voice print”

……………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………

However, if the accused refuses to furnish

such voice, there is no legal sanction for

compelling him to do so, and the use of force for

that purpose would be illegal.”

3

*** *** ***

“The scope of Section 5 needs to be expanded in

another aspect. The general power of

investigation given to the police under the

Criminal Procedure Code may not imply the

power to require the accused to furnish a

specimen of his voice. Cases in which the voice

of the accused was obtained for comparison

with the voice of the criminal offender are

known but the question whether the accused

can be compelled to do so does not seem to have

been debated so far in India

There is no specific statutory provision in

India which expressly gives power to a police

officer or a court to require an accused person

to furnish a specimen of his voice.”

4

14. Section 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920

coincidentally empowers the Magistrate to order/direct any

3

Paragraph 3.16, 87

th

Report of the Law Commission of India

4

Paragraph 5.26, 87

th

Report of the Law Commission of India

11

person to allow his measurements or photographs to be taken

for the purposes of any investigation or proceeding. It may be

significant to note that the amendments in the Cr.P.C., noticed

above, could very well have been a sequel to the

recommendation of the Law Commission in its Report dated

29

th August, 1980 though the said recommendation was in

slightly narrower terms i.e. in the context of Section 5 of the

Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920. In this regard, it may

also be usefully noticed that though this Court in State of

Uttar Pradesh vs. Ram Babu Misra

5 after holding that a

Judicial Magistrate has no power to direct an accused to give

his specimen writing for the purposes of investigation had

suggested to Parliament that a suitable legislation be made on

the analogy of Section 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act,

1920 so as to invest a Magistrate with the power to issue

directions to any person including an accused person to give

specimen signatures and writings. The consequential

amendment, instead, came by way of insertion of Section 311-

A in the Cr.P.C by the Code of Criminal Procedure

5

A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 791

12

(Amendment) Act, 2005 (Act No.25 of 2005) with effect from

23

rd June, 2006.

15. The legislative response in remaining silent or acting at

a “slow” pace can always be explained by legislative concerns

and considerations of care and caution. It is in the aforesaid

context and in the admitted absence of any clear statutory

provision that the question arising has to be answered which

is primarily one of the extent to which by a process of judicial

interpretation a clear gap in the statute should be filled up

pending a formal legislative exercise. It is the aforesaid

question that we shall now turn to.

16. “Procedure is the handmaid, not the mistress, of

justice and cannot be permitted to thwart the fact-finding

course in litigation”

6. We would like to proceed in the matter

keeping the above view of this Court in the backdrop.

6

A.I.R. 1975 SC 349 [Vatal Nagaraj vs. R. Dayanand Sagar)

13

17. A detailed reference to the facts of a case decided by this

Court in “Sushil Kumar Sen vs. State of Bihar”

7 is deemed

appropriate.

The appellant in the above case was the owner of a plot

of land measuring about 3.30 acres located in the district of

Purnea in Bihar. The said parcel of land was acquired under

the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Land

Acquisition Officer by order/Award dated 12

th October, 1957

awarded compensation to the appellant(s) therein at the rate

of Rs.14 per katha. The learned Additional District Judge,

Purnea while hearing the reference under Section 18 of the

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 enhanced the compensation to

Rs.200 per katha. This was by order dated 18

th August, 1961.

The State of Bihar sought a review of the aforesaid order dated

18

th August, 1961 which was allowed on 26

th September, 1961

scaling down the compensation to Rs.75 per katha. Not

satisfied, the State of Bihar preferred an appeal before the High

Court against the order dated 26

th September, 1961 passed in

the review application granting compensation at the rate of

7

(1975) 1 SCC 774

14

Rs.75 per katha. No appeal was, however, filed by the State of

Bihar against the original order dated 18

th August, 1961

awarding compensation at the rate of Rs.200 per katha. Cross

appeal(s) before the High Court against the order dated 26

th

September, 1961 passed in the review application was filed by

the appellant – landowner. The High Court by its order

dated 16

th February, 1968 held the review application of the

State of Bihar, in which the order dated 26

th September, 1961

was passed, to be not maintainable. However, the High Court

adjudicated the case on merits and awarded compensation to

the landowner(s) at the rate of Rs.75 per katha. Aggrieved, the

landowner – Sushil Kumar Sen approached this Court.

Justice K.K. Mathew who delivered the lead judgment in

the case took the view that the original decree/award of the

Reference Court dated 18

th August, 1961 stood superseded by

the decree/award dated 26

th September, 1961 passed in the

review application. However, once the said dec ree/award

dated 26

th September, 1961 was set aside in the cross appeal

filed by the landowner(s) the earlier decree/award dated 18

th

August, 1961 stood revived. As there was no appeal against

15

the said decree/award dated 18

th August, 1961 the

landowner(s) would be entitled to compensation in terms of the

said original decree/award dated 18

th August, 1961.

Justice Krishna Iyer delivered a concurring opinion

agreeing with the aforesaid conclusions but expressing a

thought process which would be of significant relevance to the

issue in hand. The position can be best explained by

extracting the following observations from the opinion

rendered by Justice Krishna Iyer in Sushil Kumar Sen vs.

State of Bihar (supra)

“I concur regretfully with the result reached by

the infallible logic of the law set out by my

learned Brother Mathew, J. The mortality of

justice at the hands of law troubles a Judge’s

conscience and points an angry

interrogation at the law reformer.

6. The processual law so dominates in

certain systems as to overpower substantive

rights and substantial justice. The humanist

rule that procedure should be the handmaid,

not the mistress, of legal justice compels

consideration of vesting a residuary power in

Judges to act ex debito justiciae where the

tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly

inequitable. In the present case, almost every

step a reasonable litigant could take was taken

by the State to challenge the extraordinary

increase in the rate of compensation awarded by

the civil court. And, by hindsight, one finds that

the very success, in the review application, and

16

at the appellate stage has proved a disaster to

the party. Maybe, Government might have

successfully attacked the increase awarded in

appeal, producing the additional evidence there.

But maybes have no place in the merciless

consequence of vital procedural flaws .

Parliament, I hope, will consider the wisdom of

making the Judge the ultimate guardian of

justice by a comprehensive, though guardedly

worded, provision where the hindrance to

rightful relief relates to infirmities, even serious,

sounding in procedural law. Justice is the goal

of jurisprudence — processual, as much as

substantive. While this appeal has to be

allowed, for reasons set out impeccably by

my learned brother, I must sound a

pessimistic note that it is too puritanical for

a legal system to sacrifice the end product of

equity and good conscience at the altar of

processual punctiliousness and it is not too

radical to avert a breakdown of obvious

justice by bending sharply, if need be, the

prescriptions of procedure. The wages of

procedural sin should never be the death of

rights.”

[Emphasis is ours]

18. In the present case, the view that the law on the point

should emanate from the Legislature and not from the Court,

as expressed in the judgment of this Court from which the

reference has emanated is founded on two main reasons, viz.,

(i) the compulsion to give voice sample does in some way

involve an invasion of the rights of the individual and to bring

it within the ambit of the existing law would require more than

17

reasonable bending and stretching of the principles of

interpretation and (ii) if the legislature, even while making

amendments in the Criminal Procedure Code (Act No.25 of

2005), is oblivious and despite express reminders chooses not

to include voice sample either in the newly introduced

explanation to Section 53 or in Sections 53A and 311A of

CR.P.C., then it may even be contended that in the larger

scheme of things the legislature is able to see something which

perhaps the Court is missing.

19. Insofar as the first reservation is concerned, the same

would stand dispelled by one of the earlier pronouncements of

this Court on the subject in State of Bombay vs.Kathi Kalu

Oghad (supra), relevant extracts of which judgment has

already been set out. The following views in the concurring

opinion of Justice K.C. Das Gupta in State of Bombay

vs.Kathi Kalu Oghad (supra) would further strengthen the

view of this Court to the contrary.

“(32) ………It has to be noticed that Article

20(3) of our Constitution does not say that

an accused person shall not be compelled to

be a witness. It says that such a person shall

not be compelled to be a witness against

himself. The question that arises therefore

18

is: Is an accused person furnishing evidence

against himself, when he gives his specimen

handwriting, or impressions of his fingers,

palm or foot? The answer to this must, in our

opinion, be in the negative.

(33) …….the evidence of specimen handwriting

or the impressions of the accused person’s

fingers, palm or foot, will incriminate him, only

if on comparison of these with certain other

handwritings or certain other impressions,

identity between the two sets is established. By

themselves, these impressions or the

handwritings do not incriminate the accused

person, or even tend to do so. That is why it

must be held that by giving these impressions

or specimen handwriting, the accused person

does not furnish evidence against himself. So,

when an accused person is compelled to give a

specimen handwriting or impressions of his

finger, palm or foot, it may be said that he has

been compelled to be a witness; it cannot

however be said that he has been compelled to

be a witness against himself.”

[Emphasis is ours]

20. So far as the second basis for the view taken is

concerned, we have already expressed an opinion that what

may appear to be legislative inaction to fill in the gaps in the

Statute could be on account of justified legislative concern and

exercise of care and caution. However, when a yawning gap in

the Statute, in the considered view of the Court, calls for

19

temporary patchwork of filling up to make the Statute effective

and workable and to sub-serve societal interests a process of

judicial interpretation would become inevitable.

21. The exercise of jurisdiction by Constitutional

Courts must be guided by contemporaneous realities/existing

realities on the ground. Judicial power should not be allowed

to be entrapped within inflexible parameters or guided by rigid

principles. True, the judicial function is not to legislate but in

a situation where the call of justice and that too of a large

number who are not parties to the lis before the Court ,

demands expression of an opinion on a silent aspect of the

Statute, such void must be filled up not only on the principle

of ejusdem generis but on the principle of imminent necessity

with a call to the Legislature to act promptly in the matter.

22. Illustratively, we may take the decision of this

Court in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board vs. A

Rajappa and others

8 . A lone voice of dissent against

expansion of the frontiers of judicial interpretation to fill in

gaps in the Statute enunciated by Lord Denn ing, L.J, in

8

(1978) 2 SCC 213

20

Seaford Court Estates Ltd. vs.Asher

9 though did not find

immediate favour of the learned Judge’s contemporaries was

acknowledged to have carried within itself the vision and the

perception of the future. Coincidentally, the view enunciated

by Lord Justice Denning in Seaford Court Estates Ltd.

vs.Asher (supra) of ironing of the creases in the legislation has

been approved by the Indian Supreme Court in the following

words of the then Chief Justice M.H. Beg:

“147. My learned Brother has relied on what

was considered in England a somewhat

unorthodox method of construction in Seaford

Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher [(1949) 2 ALL ER 155,

164] where Lord Denning, L.J., said:

“When a defect appears a Judge cannot

simply fold his hands and blame the

draftsman. He must set to work on the

constructive task of finding the intention

of Parliament — and then he must

supplement the written words so as to give

‘force and life’ to the intention of

legislature. A Judge should ask himself

the question how, if the makers of the Act

had themselves come across this ruck in

the texture of it, they would have

straightened it out? He must then do as

they would have done. A Judge must not

alter the material of which the Act is

woven, but he can and should iron out the

creases.”

When this case went up to the House of Lords it

appears that the Law Lords disapproved of the

9

(1949) 2 All. E.R. 155 (at 164)

21

bold effort of Lord Denning to make ambiguous

legislation more comprehensible. Lord Simonds

found it to be “a naked usurpation of the

legislative function under the thin disguise of

interpretation”. Lord Morton (with whom Lord

Goddard entirely agreed) observed: “These

heroics are out of place” and Lord Tucker said

“Your Lordships would be acting in a legislative

rather than a judicial capacity if the view put

forward by Denning, L.J., were to prevail.”

148. Perhaps, with the passage of time,

what may be described as the extension of a

method resembling the “arm -chair rule” in

the construction of wills. Judges can more

frankly step into the shoes of the legislature

where an enactment leaves its own

intentions in much too nebulous or

uncertain a state. In M. Pentiah v. Muddala

Veeramallappa [AIR 1961 SC 1107, 1115]

Sarkar, J., approved of the reasoning, set out

above, adopted by Lord Denning. And, I must

say that, in a case where the definition of

“industry” is left in the state in which we find it,

the situation perhaps calls for some judicial

heroics to cope with the difficulties raised.”

[Emphasis is ours]

23. A similar view of Lord Justice Denning in Magor

& St. Mellons Rural District Council vs. Newport

Corporation

10 would be equally apt to notice.

“we sit here to find out the intention of

Parliament and of ministers and carry it

10

(1951) 2 All.E.R. 1226

22

out, and we do this better by filling in the

gaps and making sense of the enactment

than by opening it up to destructive

analysis.”

24. Would a judicial order compelling a person to give

a sample of his voice violate the fundamental right to privacy

under Article 20(3) of the Constitution, is the next question.

The issue is interesting and debatable but not having been

argued before us it will suffice to note that in view of the

opinion rendered by this Court in Modern Dental College and

Research Centre and others vs.State of Madhya Pradesh

and others

11, Gobind vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and

another

12 and the Nine Judge’s Bench of this Court in K.S.

Puttaswamy and anot her vs. Union of India and others

13

the fundamental right to privacy cannot be construed as

absolute and but must bow down to compelling public

interest. We refrain from any further discussion and consider

it appropriate not to record any further observation on an

issue not specifically raised before us.

11

(2016) 7 SCC 353

12

(1975) 2 SCC 148

13

(2017) 10 SCC 1

23

25. In the light of the above discussions, we

unhesitatingly take the view that until explicit provisions are

engrafted in the Code of Criminal Procedure by Parliament, a

Judicial Magistrate must be conceded the power to order a

person to give a sample of his voice for the purpose of

investigation of a crime. Such power has to be conferred on a

Magistrate by a process of judicial interpretation and in

exercise of jurisdiction vested in this Court under Article 142

of the Constitution of India. We order accordingly and

consequently dispose the appeals in terms of the above.

……………………… ..…..,CJI

[RANJAN GOGOI]

...…………………… ..…….,J.

[DEEPAK GUPTA ]

……………………… ..…….,J.

[SANJIV KHANNA ]

New Delhi;

August 02, 2019.