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Reserved on : 12.02.2026

Pronounced on : 21.02.2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 21

ST

DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA

WRIT PETITION No.3379 OF 2025 (GM - RES)

BETWEEN:

SMT. ROHINI SINDHURI, IAS

AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS,

W/O. SRI G.SUDHIR REDDY,

RESIDENT OF “ARAVINDAM”,

PLOT NO.30, CENTRY ARTIZEN,

NITTE MEENAKSHI COLLEGE ROAD,

BSF CAMPUS, YELAHANKA,

BENGALURU – 560 064.

... PETITIONER

(BY SRI C.V.NAGESH, SR.ADVOCATE A/W

SRI VARDHAN REDDY, ADVOCATE)

AND:

SMT. ROOPA DIVAKAR MOUDGIL

AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,

W/O SRI MUNISH MOUDGIL,

RESIDENT OF NO.60,

RICHMOND ROAD,

NEAR HOSMAT HOSPITAL,

BENGALURU – 560 025.

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EMAIL:ipsroopa@gmail.com

... RESPONDENT

(BY SRI D.R.RAVISHANKAR, SR.ADVOCATE A/W

SRI JAYSHAM JAYASIMHA RAO, ADVOCATE)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND

227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 528 OF

BNSS, PRAYING TO PASS AN APPROPRIATE DIRECTION OR O RDER

SETTING ASIDE THE ORDER DTD. 13.01.2025 PASSED BY T HE VII

ADDL. CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE, BANGALORE CITY IN PCR

NO.15068/2024, AGAINST THE PETITIONER HEREIN, WHO I S

ARRAIGNED AS ACCUSED FOR THE ALLEGED COMMISSION OF AN

OFFENCE WHICH IS MADE PENAL UNDER SECTION 500 OF TH E

INDIAN PENAL CODE, WHICH IS PRODUCED AS ANNEXURE-A; AND

(B) PASS AN APPROPRIATE WRIT, DIRECTION OR ORDER

QUASHING THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE RESPONDENT HERE IN

IN PCR NO.15068/2024 ON THE FILE OF THE VII ADDL. C HIEF

JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE, BANGALOR CITY, AGAINST THE

PETITIONER HEREIN WHO IS ARRAIGNED AS ACCUSED FOR T HE

ALLEGED COMMISSION OF AN OFFENCE WHICH IS MADE PENA L

UNDER SECTION 500 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, WHICH I S

PRODUCED AS ANNEXURE-M; (C) PASS AN APPROPRIATE WRI T,

DIRECTION OR ORDER QUASHING THE RECORDING OF ALL

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN PCR NO.15068/2024 ON THE FIL E OF

THE VII ADDL. CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE, BANGALORE CITY,

AGAINST THE PETITIONER HEREIN WHO IS ARRAIGNED AS

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ACCUSED FOR THE ALLEGED COMMISSION OF AN OFFENCE WH ICH

IS MADE PENAL UNDER SECTION 500 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE

WHICH IS PRODUCED AS ANNEXURE-A.

THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED

FOR ORDERS ON 12.02.2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEME NT

THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-

CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

CAV ORDER

The petitioner is before this Court seeking the fol lowing

prayer:

(a) “pass an appropriate writ, direction or order setting aside

the order dated 13-01-2025 passed by the VII Additional

Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bangalore City, in

P.C.R.No.15068 of 2024, against the petitioner here in,

who is arraigned as accused for the alleged commission of

an offence which is made penal under Section 500 of the

Indian Penal Code, which is produced as Annexure-A.

AND

(b)

pass an appropriate writ, direction or order quashing the

complaint filed by the respondent herein in PCR No.15068

of 2024 on the file of the VII Additional Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Bangalore City, against the petitioner herein

who is arraigned as accused for the alleged commission of

an offence which is made penal under Section 500 of the

Indian Penal Code, which is produced as Annexure-M;

AND

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(c) pass an appropriate writ, direction or order quashing the

recording of all further proceedings in PCR No.15068 of

2024 on the file of the VII Additional Chief Judici al

Magistrate, Bangalore City, against the petitioner herein

who is arraigned as accused for the alleged commission of

an offence which is made penal under Section 500 of the

Indian Penal Code which is produced as Annexure-A;

AND/OR

(d)

Such other order/s as this Hon’ble Court deems fit, proper

and necessary, in the interest of justice.”

2. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: -

2.1. The petitioner is an officer of the Indian Ad ministrative

Service belonging to the Karnataka Cadre. Several averments with

regard to encomiums of the petitioner are narrated in the petition

which would not be necessary to be noticed to the issue projected

in the lis. The respondent is an officer of the Indian Police Service.

The petitioner avers in the petition that she comes across a

Facebook post on 18-02-2023 on the Facebook page of the

respondent bearing the name D Roopa Moudgil, in whi ch the

respondent is said to have posted several derogator y remarks

against the petitioner concerning various issues. Chat conversations

are shown as deleted. Alleging that these messages which were

deleted were pictures of the petitioner sent by her self was

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what was projected on the Facebook page. Further allegation is that

the petitioner had constructed a massive bungalow in Jalahalli, but

had not reported the same in her immovable property returns while

filing periodically by All India Service Officers and so on and so

forth. The petitioner on the said posts, which acc ording to the

averment in the petition were per se defamatory, had to institute a

suit in O.S.No.25288 of 2023 seeking perpetual inju nction

restraining the defendants from in any way or in any mode making

false and defamatory statements/allegations. An ad interim order of

injunction was passed by the civil Court in O.S.No.25288 of 2023 at

a later point of time in the said suit.

2.2. The issue is not with regard to the proceedings before

the civil Court. On the score again that it was per se defamatory,

the petitioner files a private complaint invoking the provision for the

offence which is made penal for defamation under th e IPC i.e.,

Section 500. In the private complaint, cognizance i s taken and

C.C.No.7870 of 2023 is registered. The said order o f taking of

cognizance was called in question by the respondent before this

Court in Criminal Petition No.4575 of 2023. The sai d criminal

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petition comes to be dismissed. The matter was take n up to the

Apex Court by the respondent. The Apex Court heard the matter,

directed the parties to arrive at a settlement and

contemporaneously directed the respondent to delete all the posts

that were allegedly defamatory, which the responden t is said to

have complied. Later, the respondent is said to have withdrawn the

SLP filed before the Apex Court.

2.3. After the said withdrawal, the impugned complaint comes

to be filed by the respondent on 09-12-2024 in P.C.R.No.15068 of

2024 alleging that the petitioner has also indulged herself in making

derogatory remarks against the respondent by calling her mentally

unsound or ill. The said private complaint is registered post the

BNSS i.e., 01-07-2024. Procedures stipulated under the BNSS are

followed by issuing notice to the petitioner and th e petitioner

furnishing her reply, after which cognizance is taken and process is

issued against the present petitioner. Calling in question the entire

proceedings in PCR No.15068 of 2024 the present pet ition is

preferred.

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3. The matter appeared before this Court as it is the roster

bench on 08-01-2026. This Court passed the followin g orders on

different dates:

08-01-2026:

“Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Sri

B.A.Belliappa and the learned counsel for the respo ndent Sri

Jaysham J.Rao would submit that they have no objection for the

Court to take up the subject matter.

In the light of the said submission, list the matter on

29.01.2026.

Interim order granted earlier is extended till the next date

of hearing.”

29-01-2026:

“Heard the learned Counsel Sri B.A.Belliappa,

appearing for the petitioner and the learned senior

counsel Sri D R Ravishankar, appearing for the

respondent.

This Court, on 08.01.2026, had passed the following

order:

“Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Sri

B.A.Belliappa and the learned counsel for the respondent

Sri Jaysham J. Rao would submit that they have no

objection for the Court to take up the subject matter.

In the light of the said submission, list the matter

on 29.01.2026.

Interim order granted earlier is extended till the

next date of hearing.”

This Court is of the opinion that if the parties could arrive

at a settlement, it would give a quietus to the litigation between

them.

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Therefore, the respective learned counsel shall see k

instructions with regard to exploration of the poss ibilities of

settlement. The parties shall be present at 1.30 p. m. on

31.01.2026.

Interim order granted earlier is extended till the next date

of hearing.

List this matter on 31.01.2026.”

31-01-2026:

“This Court on 29-01-2026 had passed the following

order:

“Heard the learned Counsel Sri B.A.Belliappa,

appearing for the petitioner and the learned senior

counsel Sri D R Ravishankar, appearing for the

respondent.

This Court, on 08.01.2026, had passed the

following order:

“Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Sri

B.A.Belliappa and the learned counsel for the

respondent Sri Jaysham J. Rao would submit that

they have no objection for the Court to take up the

subject matter.

In the light of the said submission, list the

matter on 29.01.2026.

Interim order granted earlier is extended

till the next date of hearing.”

This Court is of the opinion that if the parties

could arrive at a settlement, it would give a quietus to

the litigation between them.

Therefore, the respective learned counsel shall

seek instructions with regard to exploration of the

possibilities of settlement. The parties shall be present

at 1.30 p.m. on 31.01.2026.

Interim order granted earlier is extended till the

next date of hearing.

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List the matter on 31.01.2026.”

The parties and their respective counsels on record Sri B

A Belliappa, learned counsel appearing for petitioner, Sri D R

Ravishankar, learned senior counsel and Sri Jaysham Jayasimha

Rao, learned counsel for the respondent had appeared for an in-

camera proceedings. The parties were further direct ed to

explore the possibilities of a settlement. They have sought time.

Therefore, list this matter on 04-02-2026 to report

settlement if any, failing which, the matter would be considered

on its merit.”

04-02-2026:

“The parties to the lis would submit that they are not

agreeable for terms of settlement. Therefore, the matter would

be heard on its merit as was indicated earlier.

List this matter on 06.02.2026 at 2.30 p.m.

Interim order granted earlier, stands extended till the

next date of hearing.”

06-02-2026 :

“Learned counsel Sri.Vardhan Reddy, appearing for th e

petitioner submits that learned counsel Sri.B.A.Belliappa has

given 'No Objection' and is wanting to engage another counsel.

Therefore, list this matter on 12.02.2026.

Arrangement and argument be made on the said date.

Interim order granted earlier, stands extended till the

next date of hearing.”

12-02-2026 :

“With the consent of the learned Senior Counsel

Sri.C.V.Nagesh appearing for the petitioner and learned Senior

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Counsel Sri.D.R.Ravishankar, appearing for the respondent, the

matter is heard.

Reserved.

Interim order granted earlier, stands extended till the

disposal of the petition.”

(Emphasis supplied)

This Court was then informed that there was no settlement between

the parties and, therefore, with the consent of parties the matter

was heard and reserved.

4. Heard Sri C.V.Nagesh, learned senior counsel ap pearing for

the petitioner and Sri D.R. Ravishankar, learned se nior counsel

appearing for the respondent.

SUBMISSIONS :

PETITONER:

5. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner would make

three-fold submissions - first submission is, that stories or

articles that the respondent put up were per se defamatory. What

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the petitioner has said is only a retaliation to those defamatory

statements. Therefore, they would become statements in good

faith, which come within the explanation/exception-9 of Section 499

of the IPC and never become an offence under Sectio n 500; the

second submission is , that the complaint is registered after a

delay of close to two years, that too rendering falsehood insofar as

cause of action is concerned. It is his submission that the cause of

action arose in the year 2023, but the complaint is registered on

09-12-2024 contending that further cause of action had arisen on

12-11-2024; the third submission is, with regard to the order of

taking of cognizance bearing no application of mind. On all these

grounds, the learned senior counsel would submit th at the

proceedings before the concerned Court in the impug ned P.C.R

must be obliterated, failing which it would become an abuse of the

process of law.

RESPONDENT:

6.1. Per contra, the learned senior counsel appear ing for the

respondent would vehemently refute the submissions in contending

that if retaliation to defamation is made, it would on the face of it

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be defamatory. There can be no better illustration of defamation.

The petitioner has also called the respondent that she is of unsound

mind or mentally ill. This is a matter of trial as to what extent and

what was the reason for expression of those statements against the

respondent. At the stage of taking of cognizance this Court should

not interfere with the order so passed.

6.2. The learned senior counsel further submits that there is

no delay in the case at hand. The coordinate Bench dismissed the

petition filed by the petitioner on a particular date, wherein the

respondent had challenged the cognizance taken and registering of

criminal case. This was challenged before the Apex Court. Up to

18-11-2024 the proceedings were before the Apex Cou rt, during

which the Apex Court had directed the parties to settle the issue.

When the settlement talks failed before the Apex Co urt and the

respondent having withdrawn the SLP before the Apex Court,

immediately thereafter the subject PCR is preferred within 30 days

of the dismissal of SLP. Therefore, there can be n o delay in the

case at hand.

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6.3. Insofar as exception is concerned, the learned senior

counsel would take this Court through the order passed in favour of

the petitioner by the coordinate Bench. This very ground of

exception was projected by the respondent before th e coordinate

Bench where she was the petitioner. The coordinate Bench had

clearly rejected the ground of ninth exception that was projected by

the respondent on the score that exception is alway s a matter of

evidence. The same principle is applicable to the petitioner also. He

would, therefore, submit that all these matters are to be thrashed

out in a full-blown trial, as it is defamation versus defamation.

Insofar as the order of taking cognizance is concerned, the learned

senior counsel would submit that it is a very lengthy order which

considered all the aspects and at the stage of taking cognizance the

concerned Court need not indulge in a roving enquir y or an

expedition towards discovery of truth. It is only a matter of trial. He

would thus seek dismissal of the petition.

7. Both the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and

the respondent have relied on certain judgments which would bear

consideration in the course of the order qua their relevance.

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8. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions

made by the respective learned senior counsel and h ave perused

the material on record. In furtherance whereof, the following issues

arise for my consideration:

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:

(i) Whether the complaint and the resultant

proceedings get vitiated on the ground of delay?

(ii) Whether Exception 9 to Section 499 of the IPC

can protect the petitioner from further trial in th e

impugned proceedings?

(iii) Whether the order of taking of cognizance suffers

from non-application of mind?

CONSIDERATION:

ISSUE NO.1:

Whether the complaint and the resultant proceedings

get vitiated on the ground of delay?

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9. The dates and link in the chain of events thoug h are a

matter of record, they would require a skeletal reiteration. On two

dates i.e., on 18-02-2023 and 19-02-2023 it is said that the

respondent has posted derogatory or defamatory stat ements/

stories on her Facebook page. A suit is filed by the petitioner in

O.S.No.25288 of 2023 seeking permanent injunction i n which

temporary injunction is granted against the respond ent.

Contemporaneously, the petitioner also invokes Section 200 of the

Cr.P.C., registers a private complaint for offences punishable under

Section 500 of the IPC. On 24-03-2023 the concerned Court orders

issuance of process against the respondent. The res pondent then

prefers Criminal Petition No.4575 of 2023 seeking t o quash the

proceedings in P.C.R.No.1901 of 2023, which had by then become

C.C.No.7870 of 2023. On 21-08-2023 the coordinate B ench rejects

the challenge of the respondent. The plea of the accused is then

recorded.

10. After receipt of a copy from the hands of this Court in

Criminal Petition No.4575 of 2023, the respondent p refers SLP

before the Apex Court on 11-12-2023. From 12-12-202 3 till

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07-11-2024 the matter was pending before the Apex C ourt. The

orders passed by the Apex Court on different dates are as follows:

11-12-2023:

“To enable the learned senior counsel appearing for the

petitioner to take instructions, list this matter on 13.12.2023.”

13-12-2023:

“List on 14

th

December, 2023.”

14-12-2023:

“As of today, we find that there is no understandin g

between the parties about appointing a mediator.

To enable the petitioner to file appropriate

undertaking, as discussed in the Court, list tomorr ow i.e.

15

th

December, 2023.”

15-12-2023:

“The affidavit of the petitioner affirmed today is

taken on record.

The learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent

states as regards clause (B) of paragraph 2 of the affidavit, in

case any specific post is not get taken down, he wi ll

communicate the same to the learned counsel appeari ng for the

petitioner. The undertaking incorporated in the affidavit is taken

on record.

List on 12

th

January, 2024.

In the meanwhile, the Criminal Case subject matter of

this petition will not proceed further.

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We direct the respondent to place on record copies

of the proceedings filed by her. It will be always open for

the respondent to produce a copy of the affidavit f iled in

this petition by the petitioner in the pending Civil Suit.

Considering the fact that we are making an attempt

to resolve all the disputes pending between the par ties,

none of them shall give any interview or any inform ation

to the media, social and print, in any form.”

12-01-2024:

“We give one more opportunity to the contesting part ies

to work out a solution which will be in the interest of both of

them.

List on 16

th

February, 2024.

In the meanwhile, the interim relief granted earlier by this

Court to continue.”

16-02-2024:

“Notwithstanding the grant of time, the parties are unable

to sort out the issues.

Considering the nature of the controversy, the parties will

be well-advised not to make any public statements r egarding

any of the litigations pending in different Courts.

List on 7

th

May, 2024.

In the meanwhile, the interim relief granted earlier by this

Court to continue.”

07-05-2024:

“List on 15

th

May, 2024 (Wednesday) for directions on the

top of the Board.

In the meanwhile, the interim relief granted earlier by this

Court to continue.”

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15-05-2024:

“Notwithstanding grant of time by this Court to the

parties, they are not able to reconcile their differences.

We direct the petitioner to place on record copy of

deposition of the respondent recorded in the complaint.

List on 11

th

July, 2024.

In the meanwhile, interim relief granted earlier by this

Court to continue.”

11-07-2024:

“From the affidavit filed by the petitioner, it appears that

that the petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. was filed

before the High Court when recording of evidence ha d not

commenced and only after the petition under Section 482 of the

Cr.P.C. was dismissed, the recording of evidence commenced.

Notice has been issued.

List for hearing on 13

th

August, 2024.

Interim order granted by this Court to continue till further

orders.”

13-08-2024:

“List on 24

th

September, 2024 in the first five matters.”

24-09-2024:

“Applications for exemption from filing official translation

are allowed.

Delay condoned.

Leave granted.

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To be listed for hearing on 6

th

November, 2024 in the first

five cases.

Interim order granted earlier by this Court to continue,

pending disposal of this appeal.”

06-11-2024:

“List tomorrow i.e. 7

th

November, 2024 at 2.00 p.m.”

07-11-2024:

“The learned senior counsel appearing for the

appellant, on instructions of the appellant who is

personally present in the Court, seeks permission t o

withdraw this Appeal with liberty to agitate all th e issues

which are raised in this Appeal before the Trial Cou rt.

Accordingly, the Appeal is disposed of as

withdrawn.

All permissible contentions which can be raised by

the appellant as well as the respondent before the Trial

Court are kept open.

It is obvious that the complaint will be decided on its own

merits without being influenced by any observations made by

the High Court in the impugned order.”

(Emphasis supplied)

The SLP thus comes to be disposed of on 07-11-2024. Within 30

days thereafter, the respondent prefers a private complaint alleging

offence punishable under Section 500 of the IPC aga inst the

petitioner. The learned senior counsel for the peti tioner has

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projected that there is delay on the part of the re spondent in

preferring the private complaint.

11. The SLP, as observed hereinabove, was preferred on

11-12-2023 after obtaining certified copy from this Court. The

matter was pending consideration before the Apex Co urt and

settlement talks were on. On 07-11-2024 the SLP co mes to be

withdrawn. The contention of delay is thus devoid of substance.

The chronology of events noted hereinabove unmistak ably reveals

that from December 2023 until November 2024 the mat ter

remained sub-judice before the Apex Court, where ef forts at

amicable resolution of the dispute between the parties were actively

pursued. To expect the respondent to initiate parallel

criminal proceedings, during the pendency of settle ment

negotiations would be antithetical to both propriet y and

prudence. The complaint having been filed within 30 days of

withdrawal of the SLP, the explanation offered is not only

plausible but entirely acceptable . Therefore, the proceedings

are not vitiated on this count, i.e., on the ground of delay in

registration of the complaint.

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ISSUE NO.2:

Whether Exception 9 of Section 499 of the IPC can

protect the petitioner from further trial in the im pugned

proceedings?

12. The next plank of submission of the learned se nior

counsel for the petitioner is resting upon Exception 9 to Section 499

of the IPC, predicated on the assertion of good faith. Section 499

reads as follows:

“499. Defamation .—Whoever, by words either spoken

or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations,

makes or publishes any imputation concerning any pe rson

intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that

such imputation will harm, the reputation of such p erson, is

said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that

person.

Explanation 1.—It may amount to defamation to impute

anything to a deceased person, if the imputation wo uld harm

the reputation of that person if living, and is intended to be

hurtful to the feelings of his family or other near relatives.

Explanation 2.—It may amount to defamation to make an

imputation concerning a company or an association or collection

of persons as such.

Explanation 3.—An imputation in the form of an

alternative or expressed ironically, may amount to defamation.

Explanation 4.—No imputation is said to harm a person's

reputation, unless that imputation directly or indirectly, in the

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estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character

of that person, or lowers the character of that person in respect

of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person,

or causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in a

loathsome state, or in a state generally considered as

disgraceful.

Illustrations

(a) A says—“Z is an honest man; he never stole B's

watch”; intending to cause it to be believed that Z did steal B's

watch. This is defamation, unless it falls within one of the

exceptions.

(b) A is asked who stole B's watch. A points to Z,

intending to cause it to be believed that Z stole B's watch. This

is defamation, unless it falls within one of the exceptions.

(c) A draws a picture of Z running away with B's watch

intending it to be believed that Z stole B's watch. This is

defamation, unless it falls within one of the exceptions.

First Exception—Imputation of truth which public

good requires to be made or published .—It is not

defamation to impute anything which is true concern ing any

person, if it be for the public good that the imputation should be

made or published. Whether or not it is for the public good is a

question of fact.

Second Exception—Public conduct of public

servants.—It is not defamation to express in good faith any

opinion whatever respecting the conduct of a public servant in

the discharge of his public functions, or respecting his character,

so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further.

Third Exception—Conduct of any person touching

any public question.—It is not defamation to express in good

faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of any person

touching any public question, and respecting his character, so

far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further.

Illustration

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It is not defamation in A to express in good faith any

opinion whatever respecting Z's conduct in petitioning

Government on a public question, in signing a requisition for a

meeting on a public question, in presiding or attending at such

meeting, in forming or joining any society which in vites the

public support, in voting or canvassing for a particular candidate

for any situation in the efficient discharge of the duties of which

the public is interested.

Fourth Exception.—Publication of reports of

proceedings of courts .—It is not defamation to publish a

substantially true report of the proceedings of a Court of Justice,

or of the result of any such proceedings.

Explanation.—A Justice of the Peace or other officer

holding an enquiry in open Court preliminary to a trial in a Court

of Justice, is a Court within the meaning of the above section.

Fifth Exception.—Merits of case decided in Court or

conduct of witnesses and others concerned .—It is not

defamation to express in good faith any opinion wha tever

respecting the merits of any case, civil or criminal, which has

been decided by a Court of Justice, or respecting the conduct of

any person as a party, witness or agent, in any such case, or

respecting the character of such person, as far as his character

appears in that conduct, and no further.

Illustrations

(a) A says—“I think Z's evidence on that trial is so

contradictory that he must be stupid or dishonest.” A is within

this exception if he says this in good faith, inasmuch as the

opinion which he expresses respects Z's character as it appears

in Z's conduct as a witness, and no further.

(b) But if A says—“I do not believe what Z asserted at

that trial because I know him to be a man without

veracity”; A is not within this exception, inasmuch as the

opinion which he expresses of Z's character, is an opinion not

founded on Z's conduct as a witness.

Sixth Exception.—Merits of public performance .—It

is not defamation to express in good faith any opin ion

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respecting the merits of any performance which its author has

submitted to the judgment of the public, or respect ing the

character of the author so far as his character appears in such

performance, and no further.

Explanation.—A performance may be submitted to the

judgment of the public expressly or by acts on the part of the

author which imply such submission to the judgment of the

public.

Illustrations

(a) A person who publishes a book, submits that book to

the judgment of the public.

(b) A person who makes a speech in public, submits that

speech to the judgment of the public.

(c) An actor or singer who appears on a public stage,

submits his acting or singing to the judgment of the public.

(d) A says of a book published by Z—“Z's book is

foolish; Z must be a weak man. Z's book is indecent; Z must be

a man of impure mind”. A is within the exception, if he says this

in good faith, inasmuch as the opinion which he exp resses

of Z respects Z's character only so far as it appears in Z's book,

and no further.

(e) But if A says—“I am not surprised that Z's book is

foolish and indecent, for he is a weak man and a libertine.” A is

not within this exception, inasmuch as the opinion which he

expresses of Z's character is an opinion not founded on Z's

book.

Seventh Exception.—Censure passed in good faith

by person having lawful authority over another .—It is not

defamation in a person having over another any auth ority,

either conferred by law or arising out of a lawful contract made

with that other, to pass in good faith any censure on the

conduct of that other in matters to which such lawful authority

relates.

Illustration

A Judge censuring in good faith the conduct of a witness,

or of an officer of the Court; a head of a department censuring

25

in good faith those who are under his orders; a parent censuring

in good faith a child in the presence of other chil dren; a

schoolmaster, whose authority is derived from a par ent,

censuring in good faith a pupil in the presence of other pupils; a

master censuring a servant in good faith for remiss ness in

service; a banker censuring in good faith the cashier of his bank

for the conduct of such cashier as such cashier—are within this

exception.

Eighth Exception.—Accusation preferred in good

faith to authorised per-son.—It is not defamation to prefer in

good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who

have lawful authority over that person with respect to the

subject-matter of accusation.

Illustration

If A in good faith accuses Z before a Magistrate; if A in

good faith complains of the conduct of Z, a servant, to Z's

master; if A in good faith complains of the conduct of Z, a child,

to Z's father—A is within this exception.

Ninth Exception.—Imputation made in good faith by

person for protection of his or other's interests.— It is not

defamation to make an imputation on the character o f

another provided that the imputation be made in goo d

faith for the protection of the interest of the per son

making it, or of any other person, or for the publi c good.

Illustrations

(a) A, a shopkeeper, says to B, who manages his

business—“Sell nothing to Z unless he pays you ready

money, for I have no opinion of his honesty.” A is within

the exception, if he has made this imputation on Z in

good faith for the protection of his own interests.

(b) A, a Magistrate, in making a report to his own

superior officer, casts an imputation on the charac ter

of Z. Here, if the imputation is made in good faith, an d for

the public good, A is within the exception.

26

Tenth Exception.—Caution intended for good of

person to whom conveyed or for public good .—It is not

defamation to convey a caution, in good faith, to one person

against another, provided that such caution be intended for the

good of the person to whom it is conveyed, or of some person in

whom that person is interested, or for the public good.”

Exception-9 of Section 499 of the IPC deals with defence of making

statements in good faith. The petitioner, as observed hereinabove,

had registered a complaint for offence punishable u nder Section

500 of the IPC. The respondent had preferred crimi nal petition

challenging the entire proceedings instituted by th e present

petitioner, in Criminal Petition No.4575 of 2023 wh ich comes to

dismissed on 21-08-2023. The main contention of the present

respondent in the said petition was that she had ma de those

statements in good faith and was entitled to the benefit of the ninth

exception. The coordinate bench declines to accept the said

contention by the following observation:

“…. …. ….

11. If the statements posted on a private account as well

as the statements made before the print media are examined, I

am more than satisfied that petitioner/accused is bound to face

a criminal trial. The question as to whether the posts made on a

face book account and the statements made before th e print

media fall under exceptions is a matter of trial. In order to

claim good faith, the accused must show that before

making the alleged imputation, she has made enquiry

27

with due care and attention. In order to establish good

faith and bonafides, it has to be seen that the

circumstances under which imputations were made and

published. It is only during full-fledged trial, it can be

ascertained as to whether imputations were made wit h

any malice. It is only in an full-fledged trial, it can be

assessed as to whether there are reasons to accept that

petitioner had taken care and caution and as to whe ther

there is preponderance of probabilities that petiti oner

acted in good faith.”

It bears emphasis that this very plea was urged by the

respondent in the earlier proceedings and was repel led by a

coordinate bench of this Court, which held in unamb iguous

terms that question of good faith is a matter of ev idence to

be adjudicated in the crucible of a full fledged trial. The order

is quoted hereinabove. The law does not countenance a

differential application of principle. What was he ld to be

triable issue for one party cannot metamorphose int o a

shield for the other at the threshold stage. The adage “what

is sauce for the goose, is sauce for the gander ” becomes

apposite, in the circumstances obtaining in the case at hand.

28

13. The legal position stands fortified by plethora of

judgments of the Apex Court. The Apex Court consid ers the issue

of exception being projected at the preliminary stage in a case of

defamation. A three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in

SEWAKRAM SOBHANI v. R.K. KARANJIA

1

, holds as follows:

“…. …. ….

9. A bare perusal of the offending article in Blitz shows

that it is per se defamatory. There can be no doubt that the

imputation made would lower the appellant in the

estimation of others. It suggested that he was a ma n

devoid of character and gave vent to his unbridled

passion. It is equally defamatory of Smt Shukla in that

she was alleged to be a lady of easy virtue. We nee d not

dilate on the matter any further. It is for the acc used to

plead Ninth Exception in defence and discharge the

burden to prove good faith which implies the exerci se of

due care and caution and to show that the attack on the

character of the appellant was for the public good. ”

The Apex Court was considering a case of defamation and the plea

put up was that it was done in good faith and was protected under

the 9

th

exception. The Apex Court holds that it is for the accused to

plead 9

th

exception in defence and discharge the burden to proof in

good faith. Therefore, it is a matter of evidence. The concurring

view of another learned Judge in the very judgment is as follows:

1

(1981) 3 SCC 208

29

“…. …. ….

15. The prayer in the application before the High Court

was merely to quash the order dated November 30, 19 77 of the

learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhopal and not to quash the

complaint itself as the High Court has done. But, that was only a

technical defect and we do not take serious notice of it in an

appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution where we are very

naturally concerned with substantial justice and not with shadow

puppetry. The position now is this: The news item in the Blitz

under the caption “MISA Rape in Bhopal Jail”

undoubtedly contained serious imputations against t he

character and conduct of the complainant. In order to

attract the Ninth Exception to Section 499 of the P enal

Code, 1860, the imputations must be shown to have b een

made (1) in good faith, and (2) for the protection of the

interest of the person making it or of any other pe rson or

for the public good. “Good faith” is defined, in a negative

fashion, by Section 52 of the Penal Code, 1860 as f ollows:

“Nothing is said to be done or believed in ‘good fa ith’

which is done or believed without due care and

attention”. The insistence is upon the exercise of due

care and attention. Recklessness and negligence are

ruled out by the very nature of the definition. The

standard of care and attention must depend on the

circumstances of the individual case, the nature of the

imputation, the need and the opportunity for verifi cation,

the situation and context in which the imputation w as

made, the position of the person making the imputat ion,

and a variety of other factors. Good faith, therefo re is a

matter for evidence. It is a question of fact to be decided

on the particular facts and circumstances of each c ase. So

too the question whether an imputation was made for the

public good. In fact the First Exception of Section 499 of

the Penal Code, 1860 expressly states “Whether or n ot it

is for the public good is a question of fact”. “Pub lic good”

like “good faith” is a matter for evidence and not

conjecture.

… … …

18. Several questions arise for consideration if the Ninth

Exception is to be applied to the facts of the present case. Was

the article published after exercising due care and attention? Did

30

the author of the article satisfy himself that ther e were

reasonable grounds to believe that the imputations made by him

were true? Did he act with reasonable care and a se nse of

responsibility and propriety? Was the article based entirely on

the report of the Deputy Secretary or was there any other

material before the author? What steps did the author take to

satisfy himself about the authenticity of the repor t and its

contents? Were the imputations made rashly without any

attempt at verification? Was the imputation the result of any

personal ill will or malice which the author bore towards the

complainant? Was it the result of any ill will or malice which the

author bore towards the political group to which the complainant

belonged? Was the article merely intended to malign and

scandalise the complainant or the party to which he belonged?

Was the article intended to expose the rottenness o f a jail

administration which permitted free sexual approaches between

male and female detenus? Was the article intended to

expose the despicable character of persons who were

passing off as saintly leaders? Was the article mer ely

intended to provide salacious reading material for

readers who had a peculiar taste for scandals? Thes e and

several other questions may arise for consideration ,

depending on the stand taken by the accused at the trial

and how the complainant proposes to demolish the

defence. Surely the stage for deciding these questi ons

has not arrived yet. Answers to these questions at this

stage, even before the plea of the accused is recor ded

can only be a priori conclusions. “Good faith” and “public

good” are, as we said, questions of fact and matter s for

evidence. So, the trial must go on.”

It is clearly held that it is a question of fact to be decided on

particular facts and circumstances of each case. Wh ether or

not the statement is made for public good is a ques tion of

fact and public good, like good faith, is a matter of evidence

31

and not conjecture. The Apex Court refuses to answe r the

exception, on the score that it was not a stage to answer.

14. The Apex Court, later, in IVECO MAGIRUS

BRANDSCHUTZTECHNIK GMBH v. NIRMAL KISHORE

BHARTIYA

2

, while considering offences under Sections 499 and

500 of the IPC has observed as follows:

“…. …. ….

63. Adverting to the aspect of exercise of jurisdiction by

the High Courts under Section 482CrPC, in a case wh ere the

offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have not

been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer

for quashing is made, law seems to be well settled that the High

Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the

accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there before

the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that

what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts m ay

not do. We may not be understood to undermine the H igh

Courts' powers saved by Section 482CrPC; such power s

are always available to be exercised ex debito

justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for

administration of which alone the High Courts exist .

However, the tests laid down for quashing an FIR or

criminal proceedings arising from a police report b y the

High Courts in exercise of jurisdiction under Secti on

482CrPC not being substantially different from the tests

laid down for quashing of a process issued under Se ction

204 read with Section 200, the High Courts on recor ding

due satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a

reading of the complaint, the substance of statemen ts on

2

(2024) 2 SCC 86

32

oath of the complainant and the witness, if any, an d

documentary evidence as produced, no offence is mad e

out and that proceedings, if allowed to continue, w ould

amount to an abuse of the legal process. This too, would

be impermissible, if the justice of a given case do es not

overwhelmingly so demand.

64. Based on our understanding of the law and the

reasoning that we have adopted, issue of process under Section

204 read with Section 200CrPC does not ipso facto s tand

vitiated for non-consideration of the Exceptions to Section 499

IPC unless, of course, before the High Court it is convincingly

demonstrated that even on the basis of the complain t and the

materials that the Magistrate had before him and without there

being anything more, the facts alleged do not prima facie make

out the offence of defamation and that consequently , the

proceedings need to be closed.”

(Emphasis supplied at each instance)

The Apex Court holds that the applicability of Exce ptions to

Section 499 of the IPC hinges upon factual determin ation

necessitating evidence and cannot ordinarily be adj udicated

at the stage of cognizance or quashing. Good faith , by its

very nature, is not presumed; it must be pleaded, p roved and

established by demonstrating due care, caution and absence

of malice. The enquiry into such matters is imperm issible at

this insipient stage.

33

ISSUE NO.3:

Whether the order of taking of cognizance suffers f rom

non-application of mind?

15. The third plank of submission of the learned s enior

counsel is, attack to the order of taking cognizanc e on the

contention that the order of cognizance does not be ar any

application of mind. The said submission, on the f ace of it, is

unacceptable. The entire order of taking cognizance is as follows:

“ORDERS ON ISSUANCE OF PROCESS

The complainant has filed this private complaint seeking

to take cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 500

of IPC against the accused.

2. After receipt of complaint, sworn statement of

complainant has been recorded and in support of her case, the

complainant has placed copy statement made before m edia and

publication of that statement in X website, Kannada Prabha

Newspaper, Public TV English website and website of Vistara

news.com and same have been marked as Ex.Cl to 5. T he

complainant has produced Hash Certificate issued by experts

with certificate under section 63(4)(c) of Bharatiya Sakshya

Adhiniyam along with Ex.C1 to 5.

3. After recording sworn statement of complainant, notice

was issued to accused as required under proviso of sub-section

1 of Section 223 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanh ita, 2023.

In response to the notice, accused has appeared thr ough

learned counsel and filed objection along with documents.

34

4. Heard learned counsel for respective parties and

perused materials on record.

5. The following points arise for consideration of this

court.

1. Whether there is prima facie case to issue process

against the accused?

2. What order?

6. The above points are answered as hereunder:

Point No.1: In the affiramative.

Point No.2: As per final order for the following:

REASONS

7. Point No.1: The case of the complainant is that the

complainant is an Indian Police Service (IPS) Offic er and

presently serving as Inspector General of Police (I nternal

Security), Government of Karnataka. The complainant secured

43 all India Rank in UPSC exam held in the year 2000. She has

married an IAS Officer and she comes well educated family with

her sister being an IRS officer and her husband being an IPS

Officer of the Tamil Nadu. The complainant has serv ed as

District Police Head of Dharwad District in 2004 an d she

arrested and executed a non-bailable warrant against the then

Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh at Hubli. In the year 2013 she

has served as DCP, City Armed Reserve, Bengaluru an d she has

withdrawn 216 excess gunman kept unauthorised by as many

as 81 politicians. In the year 2020 the complainant brought out

tender irregularities in Nirbhaya-Safe City project and due to her

proactive efforts, the tender cost about ₹953 crore s was

cancelled and fresh tender was called by reducing ₹463 crores

and thereby saved ₹500 crore to the public exchequer. Further,

complainant also served as head of District Police of Gadag,

Bidar, Yadgir, DIG of CID, IGP of Home Guards. DIG Prison, SP

of Cyber Crime, thereby the complainant has reached higher

echelons of service of her hard work and dedication to duty.

Further, complainant was conferred President’s Meda l,

Kempegowda Award of State Government also conferred ward

from Channels of Zee Kannada, Asianet Suvarna, Anti -

35

Corruption Academy, Lions Club and Newspaper Associ ation.

She invited by Harvard University Students Associat ion to

deliver speech at “India Fest” at Harvard, USA and also invited

by Kaduna, Nigeria to be the chief guest and key note speaker

and she was selected by Israel Embassy as youth Amb assador

and complainant is having popularity in social media by X about

1,11,000 followers. Such being the reputation of th e

complainant in the society as IPS Officer, on 19-02-2023 the

accused being a responsible IAS Officer, has made d efamatory

press note stating that complainant is suffers from mental

ailment and negatively suggested there is serious issue with the

complainant and denigrates the complainant as an officer, which

was telecasted on various media channels, posted in social

media and also published in many daily newspapers. The

statement made by accused is defamatory and factual ly

incorrect and baseless, which assassinated characte r of the

complainant.

8. The accused has appeared through learned counsel and

filed objection along with documents. In the statem ent of

objections, it is contended by accused that the pre sent

complaint filed by complainant is nothing but a counter blast to

the complaint filed by accused/respondent against t he

complainant herein on 28-02-2023 for malicious acts of causing

defamation to accused. The complaint filed by accused herein

was registered as PCR No.1901 of 2023 by the Hon’bl e XXIV

ACMM Court and after recording sworn statement it w as

registered as CC No.7870 of 2023 and directed to issue process

against complainant herein, the said case was arose on

18.02.2023 when the complainant made multiple unpro voked

false and defamatory allegation on Facebook page ag ainst

accused. The respondent is an IAS Officer belongin g to

Karnataka Cadre and hails from highly educated and respected

family. She has served with distinction for over a decade in the

Indian Administrative Service, she was instrumental in

introducing various new schemes for effective implementation of

programmes brought by the State Government as CEO o f

Mandya and also served as Deputy Commissioner of Ha ssan.

She is instrumental of launching online portal ‘Spandana’ which

is Grievance Redressal System at District level in the first time.

When she was serving as Deputy Commissioner of Myso re took

measures to save Government Lands in spite of stiff resistance

from rich powerful and influential land mafia. While serving as

36

Endowment Commissioner she has Introduced Integrate d

Temple Management System (ITMS), which is an online

platform whereby devotees get complete information of all-

important temples in the State under the concept of “Daiva

Sankalpa” scheme. The respondent has earned the ap preciation

and affection of not only her superior and subordinate officer but

also that of the public at large and she is held in high esteem by

one and all who are known to her for her good condu ct,

character, honesty, integrity and uprightness. That being so, as

per document No.1 submitted along with objection, t he

respondent came across a Facebook post dated 18-02- 2023

which is Facebook of complainant (document No.1 sub mitted

along with objection) bearing ‘D Roopa Moudgil’ alleged that no

IAS officer would go for a settlement with an MLA or politician

regarding their official service rendered and for the first time

she heard about that when respondent went settlemen t with Sa

Ra Mahesh, an MLA. Further, the complainant has upl oaded

photos of respondent projecting with negative connotation and

falsely alleging that they were sent by respondent to ‘three IAS

Officers’, so, she has made serious and unreachable allegation

against the respondent with touches her character and conduct

knowing fully well that same are false and far from truth.

Thereafter, complainant has shared a photograph of WhatApp

chat conversation claiming the same to be that of respondent

(document No.3 submitted along with objection) and it was

shown as deleted. Apart from that in a phone conversation with

an activist the complainant has alleged that due to behaviour of

respondent, her house is not in order and that respondent is like

cancer and entices everyone into her fold and is be hind her

(respondent) husband since the last 8 years and has used in the

said conversation with Gangaraju most derogatory wo rds and

clip of same still available in the media at large like Kannada

Prabha Newspapers (document No.4 submitted along wi th

objection). The above said posts/comments/ allegations made

by complainant on her Facebook page and before medi a is per

se defamatory. She has made another comment on her

Facebook dated 22-02-2023 (document No.5 submitted along

objection) asking the media to focus on corruption issue against

respondent despite of direction of Government dated

20-2-2023.

9. Thereafter, the respondent has filed complaint before

XXIV ACJM Court on 28-02-2023 against complainant a nd after

37

recording sworn statement cognizance was taken and issued

process by registering CC No.7870 of 2023 which is produced as

document No.6, aggrieved by said order, the complai nant

preferred Criminal Revision Petition No.4575 of 202 3 before

Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka seeking quash the s aid order

and same was dismissed, copy of the said order is produced as

document No.7. Thereafter, the complainant has filed a Special

Leave Petition before Hon’ble Supreme Court against the order

passed in Crl.R.P.No.4575 of 2023, after hearing the matter, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court directed the complainant to d elete all

the posts made by her on Facebook against responden t within

24 hours and to file affidavit to that effect and copy of the said

order and affidavit filed in that regard is produced as Document

No.10 and 12. Subsequently, the complainant has fil ed a civil

suit O.S.No.1269 of 2024 against respondent and copy of plaint

and written statement is produced as document Nos. 13 and 14.

For these reasons the respondent has sought for dis missal of

complaint.

10. The learned counsel appearing for complainant during

the course of argument has submitted that the signe d press

statement dated 19-02-2023 released by the accused against

the complainant calling her an mentally ill, which were circulated

in several newspapers, media channels and on social media

platforms such as X Website, has assassinated and b ring down

the credibility of the complainant in the society which would

baseless comments and it is become a habit only for the

purpose of defame the ‘complainant’. The accused ha s wrongly

and baseless alleged that the complainant posts her opinions

and shares her thoughts on face book only to remain as the

center of attention and news to show that press sta tements

which is having viewed by public at large by 183.1K views, 810

likes. The said online article still there on the internet.

11. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for t he

accused during the course of argument has submitted that after

coming into force BNSS a provision has been inserted so as to

provide an opportunity to accused to hear before ta king

cognizance while issuing process. The present complaint is filed

by complainant to counter blast the complaint filed by accused

against complainant in C.C.No.7873 of 2023 to take cognizance

for offence punishable under Section 500 of IPC bas ed on

defamatory statement made by complainant on her Fac ebook

38

against accused/respondent as shown in documents No .1 to 3

on 18-02-2023 and 19-02-2923 which is derogatory st atement

touches the character of respondent not only person al also

official capacity. After that the State Government on 20-02-

2023 has issued a direction directing the complainant herein not

to post such statement. The order of taken cognizance in said

case was questioned by accused before Hon’ble High Court in

Crl.R.P.No.4575 of 2023 was dismissed and the complainant has

questioned said order of Hon’ble High Court before the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition. Thereafter, when the

mater pending before Hon’ble Supreme Court, complai nant filed

civil suit in O.S.No.1269 of 2024 against responden t for

damages for defamation. Therefore, the complainant having

knowledge about alleged defamatory statement dated 19-02-

2023 since above said proceedings and sleeping from those

days, at this juncture filed present complaint suppressing said

facts, which is replica of said proceedings, counterblast to said

complaint and afterthought, so the complainant has not

approached the Court with clean hands. When respond ent was

called by media regarding said complaint, to defend her

reputation she made such Ex.C1 alleged statement on 19-02-

2023 which comes under exception-9 of Section 499 I PC. The

New three Codes came into force from 01-07-2024, th e alleged

act done before that date should have done under ol d Codes

that is IPC and Cr.P.C. as such the date of alleged statement is

19-02-2023 would comes under IPC and procedure whic h needs

to be Cr.P.C. not new Code, so complaint should not have been

entertained and court has not got jurisdiction and hence

complaint is deserves to be dismissed with exemplary cost.

12. The learned counsel appearing for the complainant in

the reply, has submitted that it is clear case of complainant that

Ex.C1 press media statement made by accused on 19-0 2-2023

is defamatory, which is subject matter of the case, if it is not

defamatory statement, then respondent has to answer how it

does not make defamation, in order to ascertain whe ther that

alleged statement is defamatory or comes under exce ption-09

of Section 499 of IPC full fudge trial is required. The prescribed

period for limitation to take cognizance is 3 years from 19-02-

2023 and complaint is in time. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has

suggested the complainant to take back statement po sted in

media, it was not direction. So far as not applicable of New Code

is concerned, Section 358 and 531 of BNSS has clear ly states

39

that if complaint is filed after 01-07-2024 procedure of BNSS

has to be follow, if provisions of New Codes are not applicable

as argued by the learned counsel for respondent, th e

complainant need not argue the matter at this stage, the court

can take the cognizance of offence after recording sworn

statement. Hence, prayed for take cognizance of off ence

punishable under Section 500 of IPC and issue process against

accused.

13. On careful perusal of complaint, sworn

statement of complainant, objection statement and

documents placed on record, it is seen that the

complainant has relied on a signed defamatory press

statement dated 19-02-2023 made by accused against

complainant, which is marked as Ex.C1 and publicati on of

that statement in X Website, Kannada Prabha Newspape r,

Public TV English website and website of Vistara

News.com and same have been marked as Ex.C2 to Ex.C 5.

Further allegation is the statement made by accused is

defamatory statement which assassinated and bring

down the credibility of the complainant in the soci ety. In

order to ascertain prima facie material, it would b e useful

to reproduce Ex.C1 press statement dated 19-02-2023

which read as under:

INTH EGCOUG .

IRFK ABLBDSG ಒಂದು ಬಹು 'GM.J BHPGT. AYR,W BMKo 3G7YT9C5

(9SG- H),o ೌ(%)ಂ* ಮೂಲಕ ಗುಣಪ/ಸ0ೇಕು. ಜ ಾ0ಾ23ಯುತ PIDRYV@g,mmg,

IRFK ABLBDSGlG ಒಳ7ಾದ9ೆ, ಅದು B IsUGX 06,'GM.J ಅ;ಾಯಾ3 0ೆಳವ<7ೆ.

ರೂ;ಾ ಐ>ಎ@ ರವರು, ಜ ಾ0ಾ23ಯುತ PIDRYV@Y,r, ನಮA BೕCೆ 3G759oK

6lG5R,W PIkBZ, IRFK FDw)SG5R,W ಕFೆದುೊಂ/ರುವವರ 3ೕGಯ)4

mdxB,do'Ir8G.

ಐ>ಎ@ ರೂ;ಾ ರವ37ೆ, q'GM1Y, A’ITB3Ij vz—'G. ಅವರು qdoC(R

ವಷHಗಳ)4 ಎCಾ4 6,'Gr–cV@ q'GC 3ೕGಯ ಆQಾರರRತ ?8GMC:–cR,W I.,m

ಮೂಲಕ -S INTH–c ಗಮನ PGyG5,m EI–M SImT 'GLCUB,m mT9o–c BೕCೆ

3G759oK3Ij ಹ7ೆತನ PIkBZ, "ೕಳVಮಟNದ :XmYdoRW :XYZxB,do'Ir8G. ಅವರು

[ಾ ಾಗಲೂ ಸು\2ಯ)4ರ0ೇಕು tR,WmTYR,W 05B,SIo8G EI–M ಅದೆ: 0ೇಾದಂತಹ

40

]ೕ@N –cR,W ತಮA PI I^K INTHY ¥ÀÄಟಗಳ)4 EIK,m ಮೂಲಕ ಸು\2ಯ

ೇಂದXLಂದು ಾಗಲು 5dWB,do'Ir8G.

ಜ ಾ0ಾ23ಯುತ PIDRYV@Y,r ಒFೆ_ಯ ೆಲಸಗಳ ಕ`ೆ ಗಮನ 6aB,mTYR,W

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14. Thereafter, the above statement has been publis hed

in X website, Kannada Prabha Newspaper, Public TV E nglish

website and website of Vistara News.com. said publication are

being marked as Ex.C2 to 5. As contended by

respondent/accused, Ex.C1 alleged statement is made by

accused on 19-02-2023 and it was published X Websit e, News

Channel, is an admitted fact. The specific contention of the

respondent/accused is alleged statement comes under the

Exception-9 of section 499 of IPC because it was made in good

faith to protect interest of herself when she was called by media

about complaint filed by her against complainant herein on basis

41

of defamatory statement. In order to ascertain as to

whether that statement was made by accused in good

faith and to protect her interest, whether there wa s any

malice, whether accused made any inquiry before she

made that allegation, whether there are any reasons to

accept version that she acted with care and caution and

whether there is preponderance of probability that

accused acted in good faith, it requires full fudge d trial,

these facts can be ascertained only after full fledge trial.

15. Therefore, by considering the averment of

complaint and documents placed on record and

contention of accused, at this stage, the complaina nt has

established prima facie case to take cognizance off ence

punishable under 500 of IPC and issue process again st

accused. Hence, this Court answered above in the

affirmation.

16. Point No.2: in view of discussion made above on

point No.1 his Court proceed to pass the following

ORDER

Cognizance of offence punishable under Section 500

of IPC is taken.

Office is directed to register the case in Register

No.III and issue process against accused, if compla inant

furnished list of witnesses as required u/s 227(2) of

BNSS.

Returnable by 22-02-2025.

Sd/-

VII Addl.CJM, Bengaluru”

(Emphasis added)

42

The order of taking of cognizance is quoted in its entirety supra.

The concerned Court has painstakingly rendered reasons for taking

cognizance and issuing process. The order of taking cognizance

runs into 16 pages; not 16 pages of flow of ink, but flow of reasons,

as it is trite that the Court at the stage of taking cognizance, is not

to take an expedition towards discovery of truth. I t is only a

peripheral obligation to record reasons as to why t he Court is

entertaining the complaint and issuing summons to the respondent

to answer in a full-fledged trial. It should bear reasons is the settled

principle of law. It does bear reasons in the case at hand, not

inadequate, but more than adequate. In fact, the entire spectrum

of the case of the petitioner and the respondent is considered while

taking cognizance and issuing process. The Court also records that

under the BNSS, once the private complaint was regi stered, a

notice is issued to the present petitioner, the petitioner appears,

files a reply and the reply is considered, cognizance is taken and

summons are issued.

43

16. The order reveals a meticulous and exhaustive

consideration of the complaint, sworn statements,

objections and documentary material . The learned Magistrate

has adverted to rival contentions, framed points for consideration

and recorded cogent reasons for arriving at a prima facie

satisfaction. It is trite that at the stage of issuance of

process, the Court is not expected to conduct a min i trial or

embark upon a roving enquiry into the disputed fact s. The

order impugned reflects neither mechanical exercise nor

abdication of judicial duty. On the contrary, it m anifests due

application of mind commensurate with the stage of the

proceedings.

17. Insofar as the judgment relied on by the learned senior

counsel appearing for the petitioner concerning taking of cognizance

as held by the Apex Court in SUNIL BHARTI MITTAL V.

CENTRAL BUREAU INVESTIGATION - (2015) 4 SCC 609 , the

observations of the Apex Court that there should be sufficient

ground for proceeding against the accused under Section 204 CrPC

has been completely complied with, in the case at hand. The order

44

of taking cognizance is elaborate, as quoted herein above.

Therefore, the said judgment would not become appli cable to the

facts obtaining in the case at hand.

18. Insofar as the other judgment of the Apex Court in the

case of LALANKUMAR SINGH v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA –

2022 SCC OnLine SC 1383 , which only follows its earlier

judgment in the case of SUNIL BHARTI MITTAL again w ould not

become applicable to the facts obtaining in the case at hand.

19. Further, the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of

HARBHAJAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB – 1965 SCC OnLin e

SC 118, it is considered in the case of IVECO supra. Therefore,

the said judgment has already borne consideration in the course of

the order.

20. In SHAHED KAMAL v. A. SURTI DEVELOPERS

[Crl.A.No.2033 of 2025] the Apex Court follows the judgment in

IVECO supra and certain circumstances to be considered by this

45

Court while dealing with cases concerning the ninth exception to

Section 499 of the IPC. The said judgment is rende red on a

circumstance altogether different.

21. Therefore, the submission of the learned senior counsel

for the petitioner that the order of taking cognizance does not bear

application of mind has no legs to stand as it does bear abundant

application of mind. Beyond this if the concerned C ourt had

considered the issue, it would have been that the C ourt has

undertaken a roving inquiry of deciphering evidence at the stage of

cognizance. Therefore, the tri plank submissions of the learned

senior counsel for the petitioner viz., (i) delay in registering the

complaint; (ii) the petitioner being protected by the exception and

(iii) the order of taking cognizance being unreason ed, all would

tumble down. It is for the petitioner also to come out clean in a

full-blown trial, like what the coordinate Bench had held in the case

of the respondent for her to come out clean in a full-blown trial.

46

22. Finding no merit in the petition, the petition stands

rejected.

Impugned order of any kind operating shall stand d issolved.

SD/-

(M.NAGAPRASANNA)

JUDGE

Bkp

CT:MJ