2026 INSC 490

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.446 OF 2023

ROHIT CHATURVEDI …PETITIONER

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & O THERS …RESPONDENTS

WITH

MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO.1370 OF 2024 IN

WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.446 OF 2023

AND

MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. 2339 OF 2024 IN

WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.446 OF 2023

J U D G M E N T

NAGARATHNA, J.

The petitioner has filed the present writ petition seeking a

writ of certiorari for quashing letter dated 09.07.2025 of the

Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) (for short “impugned letter”) which

rejected the recommendation of the State of Uttarakhand and

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disallowed the plea of premature release of the petitioner who has

been in jail for approximately twenty-two (22) years.

2. This case has a chequered history and its facts may briefly be

adverted to. On the basis of a complaint dated 09.05.2003 of the

elder sister of the deceased, Case No.162/2003 under Section 302

of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”) was registered at

Mahanagar Police Station, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) against

the petitioner and other accused persons. The investigation was

initially carried out by the U.P. State Police and thereafter by CB-

CID. However, vide Notification dated 24.06.2003, the case was

transferred to Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). Pursuant to

the investigation, the petitioner along with other co-accused faced

Trial before the Sessions Judge, Lucknow, U.P. However, this

Court, by its order dated 08.02.2007, in Transfer Petition

No.456/2005, transferred the trial to Dehradun, Uttarakhand with

a request to the then Chief Justice of Uttarakhand to create a

Special Court for the trial of the case. The petitioner along with

other co-accused was convicted for the murder of the deceased by

the Special Judge, Dehradun vide judgment dated 24.10.2007 in

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Sessions Trial No.411/2005 under Sections 120B/302 IPC and

sentenced to life imprisonment and fine.

2.1 Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred Criminal

Appeal No.507/2007 before the High Court of Uttarakhand at

Nainital but the same came to be rejected by judgment dated

16.07.2012 and the conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial

Court was affirmed. The petitioner then preferred SLP (Crl.)

No.7507/2013 against the judgment dated 16.07.2012. However,

the same was also dismissed by order dated 19.11.2013 by this

Court.

2.2 On 06.09.2022, the petitioner made a representation to the

Principal Secretary, Office of the President of India seeking

premature release from prison. The said representation was

forwarded to the Chief Secretary, Government of Uttarakhand for

proper action. Since no action was taken on the said

representation, the petitioner approached the High Court of

Uttarakhand at Nainital in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.2146/2022

seeking a writ of mandamus directing the State of Uttarakhand to

consider premature release of the petitioner. The High Court by its

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order dated 13.01.2023 directed the respondents to consider the

premature release of the applicant within a week failing which the

applicant would be released on bail. The State of Uttarakhand

having failed to take a decision within a week, the petitioner

approached the Trial Court for bail and was granted bail vide order

dated 30.01.2023 by the Special Judge, Anti -corruption,

Dehradun.

2.3 Subsequently, the petitioner received a letter dated

07.06.2023 wherein it was mentioned that the appropriate

Government vide G.O. dated 07.05.2023 had rejected his

premature release application and consequently, the petitioner was

directed to surrender immediately. The petitioner, accordingly,

surrendered on 17.06.2023 at District Jail, Haridwar,

Uttarakhand.

2.4 Sometime later, the petitioner preferred Writ Petition (Crl.)

No.896/2023 before the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital

seeking a writ of mandamus directing the State of Uttarakhand to

furnish grounds in support of the rejection of premature release of

the applicant, which according to him were never furnished to him.

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However, the said writ petition came to be dismissed as withdrawn

by order dated 06.07.2023 with liberty to challenge the said

decision, as the grounds were furnished by the State of

Uttarakhand in the Court. Briefly put, the premature release was

rejected on the ground that the petitioner fell within clause 5 of the

Uttarakhand State (for Remission/Premature Release of Convicted

Prisoners Sentenced to Life Imprisonment by Courts) Permanent

Policy, 2022 which is a prohibited category for grant of premature

release being a case investigated by the CBI under the Delhi Special

Police Establishment Act, 1946.

By order dated 15.12.2023, this Court passed the following

order in this Writ Petition:

“… The point now being raised by the petitioner is that the

Government of Uttar Pradesh would have been the proper

authority for considering the remission plea as the offence

had occurred within that State. This appears to be the

position of law, as enunciated by a Coordinate Bench of

this Court in the case of Radheshyam Bhagwandas

Shah Alias Lala Vakil Vs. State of Gujarat and

Another reported in 2022 (8) SCC 552. In this judgment,

it was held:

“14. In the instant case, once the crime was

committed in the State of Gujarat, after the trial had

been concluded and judgment of conviction came to

be passed, all further proceedings have to be

considered including remission or premature

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release, as the case may be, in terms of the policy

which is applicable in the State of Gujarat where

the crime was committed and not the State where

the trial stands transferred and concluded for

exceptional reasons under the orders of this Court.”

This being the position of law, the entire exercise

conducted by the State of Uttarakhand appears to be

without jurisdiction and hence not sustainable under the

law. We, accordingly, direct that the remission plea which

was filed by the petitioner-convict be sent to the Home

Secretary, State of Uttar Pradesh by the State of

Uttarakhand. This shall be done within a period of three

weeks from date. Thereafter, the State of Uttar Pradesh

shall examine the question and take a decision in that

regard within a further period of eight weeks.

The State of Uttar Pradesh shall consider the plea

without being influenced in any manner by the order

passed by the State of Uttarakhand and any observation

made therein.

The present petition shall stand disposed of in the

above terms.”

2.5 However, on expiry of the said period, since no action was

taken by the State of U.P., the petitioner preferred a representation

dated 11.03.2024 to the Additional Chief Secretary (Home

Department), Government of U.P. highlighting the above issue and

praying to consider his premature release in terms of the order

dated 15.12.2023 passed in this Writ Petition. The State of U.P.

having failed to decide on the premature release of the petitioner in

terms of the order dated 15.12.2023 passed in this case by this

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Court, the petitioner preferred an application before this Court.

This Court, by its order dated 02.12.2024, recalled its earlier order

dated 15.12.2023 on the ground that in Bilkis Yakub Rasool vs.

Union of India, (2024) 5 SCC 481, (“Bilkis”) this Court had held

the judgment in Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah vs. State of

Gujarat, (2022) 8 SCC 552 to be per incuriam and non est in law

and had further held the appropriate Government as defined in

Section 432(7), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) for

considering remission or suspension or commutation is the

Government of the State in which the trial and conviction took

place and not where the crime was committed. Accordingly, the

application of the petitioner for remission was directed to be

considered by the State of Uttarakhand on its own merits and in

accordance with the applicable policy.

2.6 Thereafter, on 31.01.2025, this Court noted that the instant

case was investigated by the CBI. Therefore, in terms of sub-

Section (1) of Section 477 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha

Sanhita, 2023 (for short, “BNSS”), the State Government could take

a decision on the prayer for grant of remission under sub-Section

(1) of Section 473 of BNSS only after the concurrence of the Central

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Government. Accordingly, it directed that the State Government

shall forward its decision for concurrence of the Central

Government and the appropriate authority of the Central

Government shall take a decision within a period of one month

from the receipt of the reference from the State Government. Noting

no progress in the matter and considering the long period of

incarceration, this Court granted interim bail to the petitioner on

21.05.2025.

2.7 On 28.07.2025, this Court recorded the submission of the

State Government that the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Union

of India by the impugned letter dated 09.07.2025 had disallowed

the recommendation of the State Government which had proposed

to release the petitioner. However, since the same had not yet been

communicated to the petitioner, this Court directed that the same

be made within two weeks from the date of its order. Subsequently,

the petitioner filed Crl. M.P. No.239654/2025 seeking amendment

of this Writ Petition to add an additional prayer for a writ of

certiorari quashing the impugned letter dated 09.07.2025 which

disallowed the premature release of the petitioner. The same was

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allowed and an amended petition in the above terms has been filed

before us.

2.8 The counter affidavit on behalf of the Union of India/MHA has

also been filed. The following is stated therein:

a) Since the present case was investigated by the CBI, the

respondent-MHA sought comments of the CBI, and in

response, the CBI furnished their comments by way of a

letter dated 08.04.2025 stating that considering the

seriousness of the crime committed by the petitioner, he may

not be released in the interest of justice.

b) Subsequently, vide order dated 02.05.2025 this Court inter

alia directed the CBI as well as respondent -MHA to

immediately take a decision on the basis of the

recommendation forwarded by the State of Uttarakhand and

report compliance. Pursuant thereto, the Government of

Uttarakhand by way of letter dated 12.06.2025 forwarded

the proposal for premature release of petitioner to the MHA.

c) However, respondent-MHA communicated on 09.07.2025 to

the State of Uttarakhand on their proposal of premature

release of the petitioner, informing that it does not concur

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with the proposal of Government of Uttarakhand for

premature release of the petitioner.

d) The said decision was later communicated to the Advocate-

on-Record of the petitioner by way of letter dated

30.07.2025.

3. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned

standing counsel for the State of Uttarakhand, and learned ASG

on behalf of the Union of India and have also perused the material

on record.

3.1 Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the writ

petition has been amended and an additional prayer has been

sought seeking quashing of the impugned letter dated 09.07.2025

of the respondent-Union of India/CBI. By the impugned letter, the

application filed by the petitioner for premature release/remission

of his life sentence has been rejected. It was contended that the

impugned letter is a non-speaking one and does not provide

reasons for disagreeing with the recommendation of the State

Government to release the petitioner. It was also brought to our

notice that the Government of Uttar Pradesh, by notification dated

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24.08.2023, has already granted the benefit of premature release

to one of the co-accused, namely, Amarmani Tripathi who had

undergone approximately seventeen (17) years of actual sentence

and only twenty (20) years with earned remission, keeping in view

his age and conduct. Therefore, the petitioner, who is in custody

for more than 22 years, too, is entitled to the relief of remission of

his sentence on the ground of parity. It was further argued that no

purpose would be served in remanding the matter to t he

respondent-Union of India as on merits they have already decided,

albeit incorrectly, that the petitioner is not entitled to the remission

of his sentence having regard to the facts and circumstances of this

case. The petitioner prayed that by order dated 21.05.2025, this

Court had granted interim bail to him and that the said interim

order may be extended pending disposal of this writ petition.

Learned counsel for the petitioner stressed on the fact that the

State of Uttarakhand had recommended prematur e release of the

petitioner but it is the respondent-Union of India/CBI/MHA which

has come in the way of granting relief of remission to the petitioner

herein, hence the said order may be quashed.

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3.2 Learned Standing Counsel for the State of Uttarakhand also

confirmed that the State had recommended premature release of

the petitioner. However, the respondent-Union of India has

declined to grant the relief to the petitioner, hence appropriate

orders may be passed in this case.

4. Per contra, learned Additional Solicitor General (ASG) Sri

Banerjee appearing for the respondent-Union of India contended

that there is no merit in this petition. The role of the petitioner in

the crime has to be considered from the proven facts of this case,

and it is apparent that the petitioner played a very significant role

in the death of the deceased. Merely because the co-accused has

been released from the prison is no reason to grant similar relief to

the petitioner. The impugned letter holding that the petitioner is

not entitled to the relief of remission has been rightly passed.

Having regard to the facts and circumstances, the impugned letter

may be sustained and the writ petition may be dismissed.

5. Having given our anxious consideration to the rival

submissions and on perusal of the material on record, we are of

the view that the impugned letter of the MHA which disallowed the

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premature release of the petitioner ought to be quashed on account

of it being a non-speaking and cryptic order. The letter, in relevant

paragraph, noted:

“3. The relevant documents having regards to all facts and

material placed on record produced by the Government of

Uttarakhand vide aforesaid letter, the judgements of the

court of Special Judge/ Session Judge, Dehradun, Hon'ble

High Court, Uttarakhand and Hon'ble Supreme Court of

India were considered by the Competent Authority. After

considering the above facts, documents and material on

record, Competent Authority is not concurred with the

proposal of the Uttarakhand Government for premature

release of life convict, Rohit Chaturvedi s/o Suresh

Chandra Chaturvedi.”

Quite clearly, the letter is ex facie non-speaking, as it does not

disclose any reason whatsoever for the conclusion arrived at by the

Competent Authority. While it makes a bare reference to the

consideration of certain documents, including the letter of the

Government of Uttarakhand and the judgments of the Special

Judge, Dehradun, the High Court of Uttarakhand, and this Court,

it conspicuously fails to indicate what weighed with the Competent

Authority in rejecting the proposal for premature release.

5.1 It is a settled principle of law that any order affecting rights of

a person and particularly his liberty must be with reasons and

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must reflect due application of mind. Recording of reasons is not

an empty formality, it is a safeguard against arbitrariness and

ensures transparency, fairness, and accountability in decision-

making. The absence of reasons renders it bald and makes it

impossible to ascertain whether relevant factors were duly

considered or not.

5.2 In the present case, the order merely states that the

Competent Authority “does not concur” with the proposal, without

disclosing any basis for such disagreement. There is no discussion

of the petitioner’s conduct, applicable remission policy, or any

specific adverse material, if at all, against the petitioner. The letter,

therefore, fails to meet the minimum requirement of a reasoned

order and reflects complete non-application of mind. Such a cryptic

rejection not only violates the principles of natural justice but also

frustrates the petitioner’s right to seek effective judicial review as

the absence of reasons deprives a constitutional Court of the

opportunity to examine the propriety of the decision.

Executive discretion, though broad in matters of remission, is

not uncanalised and must necessarily be exercised on relevant,

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rational, and non-discriminatory considerations and not being

rejected owing to irrelevant and extraneous reasons.

5.3 In this regard, we may usefully refer to the case of Laxman

Naskar vs. State of W.B., (2000) 7 SCC 626, in which the jail

authorities were in favour of releasing the petitioner, but the review

committee constituted by the State Government recommended the

rejection of the claim for premature release on three grounds. They

were (i) the two witnesses who had deposed during the trial as also

the people of the locality were apprehensive that the release of the

petitioner will disrupt the peace in the locality; (ii) that the

petitioner being 43 years old had the potential of committing

another crime; (iii) the incident is not an individual act of crime but

a sequel of a political feud. This Court while placing reliance on

Laxman Naskar vs. Union of India, (2000) 2 SCC 595 stipulated

certain factors that govern the grant of remission. These are

namely:

(i) Whether the offence is an individual act of crime

without affecting the society at large?

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(ii) Whether there is any chance of future recurrence of

committing crime?

(iii) Whether the convict has lost his potentiality in

committing crime?

(iv) Whether there is any fruitful purpose of confining this

convict anymore?

(v) Socio-economic condition of the convict's family.

Based on the above factors, this Court held in the said case

that the decision to reject the claim of remission was based on

irrelevant reasons. Consequently, the Court quashed the order of

the government and directed it to consider the matter afresh, as

under:

“8. If we look at the reasons given by the Government, we

are afraid that the same are palpably irrelevant or devoid

of substance. Firstly, the views of the witnesses who had

been examined in the case or the persons in the locality

cannot determine whether the petitioner would be a

danger if prematurely released because the persons in the

locality and the witnesses may still live in the past and

their memories are being relied upon without reference to

the present and the report of the jail authorities to the

effect that the petitioner has reformed himself to a large

extent. Secondly, by reason of one's age one cannot say

whether the convict has still potentiality of committing the

crime or not, but it depends on his attitude to matters,

which is not being taken note of by the Government.

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Lastly, the suggestion that the incident is not an individual

act of crime but a sequel of the political feud affecting

society at large, whether his political views have been

changed or still carries the same so as to commit crime

has not been examined by the Government.”

5.4 In the instant case, even the bare attempt to give any reason,

good or bad notwithstanding, is also not made out. On that basis

alone, this Court can quash the impugned letter dated 09.07.2025

on the ground that it is a non-speaking order and remand the

matter to the respondent–Union of India for fresh consideration.

However, in our view, such a course would serve no useful purpose

in the peculiar facts of the present case. The respondent–Union of

India has defended its decision before this Court by contending

that the petitioner is not entitled to remission having regard to the

role attributed to him in the offence. The stand of the respondent

on merits thus stands fully stated and conclusively articulated

before this Court. In such circumstances, remanding the matter to

the very authority which has already taken a firm view against the

petitioner would amount to an empty formality. The controversy

before this Court, therefore, appears not to be one of absence of

consideration, but the legality and sustainability of the conclusion

already reached. In that light, remand may not be directed

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mechanically where it would not serve any substantive purpose.

Considering that the petitioner has already undergone more than

twenty-two (22) years of incarceration and all relevant material is

already before this Court, relegating the petitioner to another

round of administrative consideration would only prolong the

proceedings unnecessarily. Sending the matter to the very same

authority for reconsideration would be futile and not serve the

interests of justice, particularly when the basis of that rejection is

already fully articulated before this Court on merits. We, therefore,

proceed to examine the case on merits.

6. The principles governing the grant of remission, as distinct

from commutation, pardon, and reprieve, may be understood with

reference to the judgment of this Court in State (NCT of Delhi) vs.

Prem Raj, (2003) 7 SCC 121 (“Prem Raj”). Articles 72 and 161 of

the Constitution of India deal with the clemency powers of the

President of India and the Governor of a State, respectively. These

provisions confer the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites,

or remissions of punishment, as well as the power to suspend,

remit, or commute sentences in specified cases. Under Article 72,

the President’s power extends, inter alia, to (i) all cases where the

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punishment or sentence is for an offence against a law relating to

a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends; and

(ii) all cases where the sentence is one of death. Similarly, Article

161 empowers the Governor of a State to grant pardons, reprieves,

respites, or remissions of punishment, or to suspend, remit, or

commute the sentence of any person convicted of an offence

against a law relating to a matter to which the executive power of

the State extends. In Prem Raj, it was observed that the powers

under Articles 72 and 161 are absolute in nature and cannot be

fettered by statutory provisions such as Sections 432, 433, or 433-

A of the CrPC akin to Sections 473, 474 and 475 of BNSS, or by

prison rules.

6.1 The judgment in Prem Raj further clarified the distinctions

between the various forms of clemency:

a) A pardon is an act of grace from the authority entrusted with

the execution of laws, which exempts the individual from the

punishment imposed for the offence committed. A pardon

affects not only the punishment prescribed for the offence but

also the guilt of the offender itself.

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b) A pardon must, however, be distinguished from amnesty,

which is a general pardon of political prisoners and an act of

oblivion. Amnesty may result in the release of the convict, but

it does not erase any disqualification incurred by reason of

conviction.

c) A reprieve means a stay or postponement of the execution of

a sentence, particularly a capital sentence.

d) A respite refers to the awarding of a lesser sentence instead of

the prescribed penalty, having regard to mitigating

circumstances, such as the absence of prior convictions, etc.

It is akin to release on probation for good conduct under

Section 360 of the CrPC akin to Section 401 of the BNSS.

e) Remission, in contrast, merely reduces the period of sentence

without altering its character. In the case of remission,

neither the conviction nor the guilt of the offender is affected.

The sentence imposed by the court also remains intact, except

to the extent that the convict is relieved from undergoing

incarceration for the entire term awarded. Thus, remission

only shortens the duration of actual imprisonment.

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f) Finally, commutation involves the substitution of one form of

sentence with a lighter sentence of a different nature.

In this context, Section 432 of the CrPC akin to Section 473 of

BNSS empowers the appropriate Government to suspend or remit

sentences.

6.2 In this regard, reference may be had to Sarat Chandra

Rabha vs. Khagendranath Nath , AIR 1961 SC 334 , wherein

this Court clarified that an order of remission does not interfere

with or alter the judicial order of conviction and sentence. The

conviction and sentence continue to stand exactly as passed by the

court; only the obligation to undergo the entir e term of

imprisonment is curtailed. The power of remission, being an

executive power, cannot produce the same effect as an appellate or

revisional order reducing the sentence judicially imposed by the

trial court and substituting it with a lesser sentence. The cutting

short of a sentence by an act of clemency is an exercise of executive

power which abridges the enforcement of the judgment, but does

not alter the judgment itself.

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6.3 The same principles were reiterated in State of Haryana vs.

Mahender Singh , (2007) 13 SCC 606 , wherein this Court

observed that the right of a convict to be considered for remission

under the governing remission policy must surely be regarded as a

legal right. Such a right emanates not only from the Prisons Act,

1894, but also from the Rules framed thereunder. Although no

convict can claim remission as an absolute constitutional right,

except under Articles 72 and 161, the existence of a remission

policy nevertheless confers a legal entitlement to be considered for

remission in terms of that policy. The Court further held that where

a policy decision has been formulated, whether by statutory rule or

otherwise, all persons falling within its ambit are entitled to equal

treatment.

6.4 In Satish vs. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 580 (“Satish”),

this Court held that neither the length of the sentence nor the

gravity of the original offence can, by themselves, constitute the

sole basis for refusing premature release. Any assessment

regarding the likelihood of reoffending upon release must instead

be founded on the antecedents of the prisoner and his conduct

while in custody, rather than merely on age or apprehensions

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expressed by victims or witnesses. The Court further observed that

although remission cannot be claimed as a matter of right, once

the appropriate legislature has enacted a law governing remission,

the executive cannot indirectly defeat or subvert its mandate. It

was also held that where executive authorities fail to discharge

their statutory obligations despite judicial directions, a

Constitutional Court exercising powers of judicial review may itself

intervene and secure compliance through the issuance of a writ of

mandamus. Having regard to the fact that the petitioners in Satish

had undergone nearly two decades of incarceration and had

suffered the consequences of their actions, the Court sought to

strike a balance between individual reformation and societal

welfare by directing their conditional premature release, subject to

continued good conduct. Consequently, the State Government was

directed to release the prisoners on probation under Section 2 of

the U.P. Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938 within two

weeks.

7. Reverting to the present case, the faint ground invoked by the

respondent-Union of India in support of rejection of the petitioner’s

plea for premature release is that the crime committed by the

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petitioner was a heinous one. We wish to make it clear that in a

constitutional polity governed by the rule of law, the denial of

remission cannot rest solely on the ground of heinousness of the

crime. As we have already stated above, remission is not an

extension of the sentencing process, but a distinct executive

function concerned with the present and future, namely, the

prisoner’s conduct, evidence of reformation, and prospects of

reintegration into society. To predicate its denial only on the

heinous nature of the offence is to collapse this distinction and to

reconvert remission into a retrospective reaffirmation of guilt,

which the criminal justice system has already adjudicated upon.

The gravity and heinousness of the offence stand exhausted at the

stage of sentencing and the judicial determination of punishment

necessarily incorporates these considerations. A criminal justice

system that refuses to look beyond the gravity of the offence to the

offender’s transformation will betray its reformative ide al

particularly at the remission stage. Justice does not permit

permanent incarceration of an individual in the shadow of their

worst act.

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7.1 The nature of the offence cannot, therefore, be the sole ground

for denying remission. Emotive retribution is a course,

incompatible with constitutional values. The decision on remission

must emerge from a holistic assessment of the prisoner and after

balancing societal interests with the prisoner’s right to be

considered for release on fair and reasonable criteria.

7.2 As Plato, the Greek Scholar and Philosopher, said any means,

of word or deed, privilege or deprivation, that can be used to make

the unjust man or the criminal, hate injustice and avoid recidivism

are to be employed: the inculcation of an all but instinctive aversion

to injustice “is quite the noblest work of law” (Thomas L. Pangle,

The Laws of Plato, Basic Book Publishers, 1980). Thus, Plato

reminds us to treat punishment as an instrument with a definitive

end, namely, to produce in the offender an instinctive aversion to

injustice sufficient to prevent recidivism. Reading this into the law

of remission will yield a clear conclusion: a remission authority is

not revisiting the gravity of the crime; it is assessing whether the

purpose of punishment continues to subsist. In that sense, Plato

supplies a legal test for remission decisions: If the offender’s

conduct and record in custody indicate that this “instinctive

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aversion to injustice” has taken root, then continued incarceration

becomes unnecessary and arguably contrary to its own objective.

The deprivation of liberty no longer serves correction but becomes

retribution. In a liberal constitutional order, punishment and all

its incidents, including remission, must necessarily be justified

through reason and not outrage.

7.3 Invoking Plato again, as this very court noted in Bilkis as

follows:

“1. …punishment is to be inflicted, not for the sake of

vengeance, for what is done cannot be undone, but for the

sake of prevention and reformation (Thomas L. Pangle, The

Laws of Plato, Basic Book Publishers, 1980). In his

treatise, Plato reasons that the lawgiver, as far as he can,

ought to imitate the doctor who does not apply his drug

with a view to pain only, but to do the patient good. This

curative theory of punishment likens penalty to medicine,

administered for the good of the one who is being chastised

(Trevor J. Saunders, Plato's Penal Code : Tradition,

Controversy, and Reform in Greek Penology , Oxford

University Press, 1991).”

In Plato’s rejection of punishment as retroactive vengeance lies

the deep insight that the past cannot be changed. Instead,

punishment is justified only insofar as it serves a future-oriented

purpose, namely, prevention, reform, and the restoration of order.

The comparison between the judge and the doctor is also

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significant. A doctor may incidentally cause pain through surgery

or medicine, but the pain is not the objective, healing is. Likewise,

punishment may involve suffering, but suffering itself is not

normatively valuable. Its legitimacy comes only from its capacity to

heal the individual and protect the polis (a political/civic

community).

8. All relevant considerations necessary for adjudicating the

petitioner’s entitlement to remission already being before this

Court, we will now proceed to examine the same on merits.

8.1 Firstly, the State Government of Uttarakhand had

recommended the petitioner’s premature release after considering

the relevant factors pertaining to his incarceration and conduct.

The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State has also

taken the stand before this Court that appropriate orders may be

passed in the present case. Thus, the only impediment to the grant

of remission is the refusal by the respondent–Union of India. The

recommendation of the State assumes significance, as the State

authorities are best placed to assess the petitioner’s behaviour

during custody, his reformation, institutional discipline, and the

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likelihood of his reintegration into society. The fact that the State

Government, after evaluating the petitioner’s case in its entirety,

found him fit for premature release shows that the petitioner

satisfies the parameters ordinarily relevant for consideration of

remission. This assumes importance particularly because the State

Government, being directly concerned with prison administration

and the implementation of remission policies, has not found any

reason to deny the petitioner the benefit of premature release. In

fact, the petitioner’s custody certificate dated 16.05.2025

specifically records that his conduct during incarceration has been

good.

8.2 Secondly, the petitioner has already undergone more than

twenty-two years of incarceration. The petitioner having spent

more than two decades in continuous custody, the sentence

undergone by him is itself a relevant consideration while examining

his entitlement to premature release/remission. The prolonged

incarceration undergone by the petitioner demonstrates that he

has already suffered the consequences of the conviction for an

extensive duration and has remained subject to the rigours of

imprisonment for a considerable part of his life.

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8.3 Thirdly, one of the co-accused, namely, Amarmani Tripathi,

has already been granted the benefit of premature release by the

Government of Uttar Pradesh vide notification dated 24.08.2023

after undergoing approximately seventeen years of actual

imprisonment and twenty years with earned remission. The

petitioner’s plea of parity is therefore founded on an admitted

factual position arising out of the treatment accorded to another

convict in the very same case. Despite this, the respondent–Union

of India has opposed the petitioner’s plea of premature release both

in the impugned letter and before this Court by relying upon the

role attributed to the petitioner in the offence. Once a co-accused

in the very same offence arising out of the same incident has been

granted the benefit of premature release after undergoing a lesser

period of incarceration, the denial of similar consideration to the

petitioner necessarily requires the existence of cogent, rational,

and clearly discernible distinguishing circumstances. In the

absence of such reasons, differential treatment between co-

accused would fall foul of the constitutional requirement of fairness

and non-arbitrariness. No such reasons are forthcoming in the

present case.

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8.4 Fourthly, the petitioner’s case deserves to be considered in

light of the reformative theory underlying the modern criminal

justice system. The object of punishment is not merely retribution,

but also the reformation and rehabilitation of the offender so as to

enable his eventual reintegration into society. In Mohd. Giasuddin

vs. State of A.P., (1977) 3 SCC 287, Krishna Iyer, J., while

emphasizing the reformative philosophy of sentencing, quoted

George Bernard Shaw’s observation that: “If you are to punish a

man retributively, you must injure him. If you are to reform him, you

must improve him and men are not improved by injuries.” The

learned Judge also observed that modern penology regards

sentencing as a process of reshaping a person who has deteriorated

into criminality and that society itself has a vital stake in the

rehabilitation of the offender as a means of social defence. The

reformative approach to punishment, therefore, constitutes an

integral component of criminal jurisprudence and remission

policies are founded upon this principle. In the present case, the

petitioner has undergone more than twenty -two (22) years of

incarceration and his custody certificate records that his conduct

during imprisonment has been good. The recommendation of the

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State Government for his premature release also indicates that the

petitioner’s conduct and rehabilitation have been found

satisfactory by the competent authorities. Continued incarceration

in such circumstances would run contrary to the reformative object

underlying remission and premature release policies particularly,

when his co-accused has already been released.

9. In view of the cumulative reasons above, we have no

hesitation to hold that the impugned letter dated 09.07.2025 of

MHA which rejected the recommendation of the State of

Uttarakhand and disallowed the plea of premature release of the

petitioner is arbitrary, non-speaking, unsustainable in law and

merit and is therefore set aside and quashed.

10. Since we have held that the petitioner is entitled to the benefit

of premature release/remission and since he is already on interim

bail, his surrender shall not be required, and the respondents shall

treat him as having been prematurely released/remitted in terms

of the present order.

11. This Writ Petition is allowed and disposed of in the aforesaid

terms.

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12. The Miscellaneous Applications are also disposed of in the

aforesaid terms.

…………………………………..J.

(B.V. NAGARATHNA)

…………………………………..J.

(UJJAL BHUYAN)

NEW DELHI;

MAY 15, 2026.