IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT

CHANDIGARH

111

CM-3197-LPA-2025

RA-LP-23-2025 in

LPA-1152-2024

Date of Decision: 26.08.2025

ROHTASH SINGH .......APPLICANT

Versus

STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS .....RESPONDENTS

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK SIBAL

HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE LAPITA BANERJI

Present : Mr. Dilbagh Singh, Advocate

for the review applicant-appellant.

*****

LAPITA BANERJI

, J.

CM-3197-LPA-2025

This is an application for condonation of delay of 303 days in

filing of the review application being RA-LP-23-2025.

The review applicant-appellant has sought

review/modification/correction of an order dated May 08, 2024 passed by a

Coordinate Bench of this Court, of which one of us (Lapita Banerji J.) was a

member.

It has been pleaded in the instant application that the order dated

May 08, 2024 was received on May 22, 2024 and the review applicant-

appellant was not feeling well at that time. Furthermore, he was highly

disappointed and depressed by the manner in which he had been compelled to

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approach this Court time and again, for no fault of his own. Therefore, the

review petition could not be filed within the period of limitation.

We have heard the learned counsel for the review applicant-

appellant and perused the relevant pleadings on record.

Apart from a cursory reference to the ill health of the review

applicant and him suffering from disappointment/depression, no attempt has

been made to provide sufficient cause justifying the delay of 303 days in

filing of the review application. No corroborative evidence in the form of any

medical record has also been brought on record, which would show that the

delay on the part of the review applicant-appellant was neither intentional nor

willful.

The Apex Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v.

Gujaral Industrial Development Corporation and another (2010) 5 SCC

459, Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar

Academy and others (2013) 12 SCC 649 and Office of the Post Master

General and others v. Living Media India Ltd and another (2012) 3 SCC

563 has clearly held that delay is not liable to be condoned at the asking.

In Brijesh Kumar and others v. State of Haryana and others,

(2014) 11 SCC 35, the Supreme Court has made the following observations:-

“xxx

7. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life

Assurance Corp. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, relied upon

the writings of Mr Mitra in Tagore Law Lectures, 1932 wherein

it has been said that:

A law of limitation and prescription may appear to

operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law

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provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of

hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable

grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its

operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized by law.

Xxx

11. It is also a well-settled principle of law that if some

person has taken a relief approaching the court just or

immediately after the cause of action had arisen, other persons

cannot take benefit thereof approaching the court at a belated

stage for the reason that they cannot be permitted to take the

impetus of the order passed at the behest of some diligent

person.

12. In State of Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya this court rejected

the contention that a petition should be considered ignoring the

delay and laches on the ground that he filed the petition just

after coming to know of the relief granted by the court in a

similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation for

delay and laches. The Court observed that such a plea is wholly

unjustified and cannot furnish any ground for ignoring delay

and laches.

Xxx”

In Esha Bhattacharjee’s case (supra), certain principles for

condoning the delay have been carved out by the Apex Court. The relevant

extract is reproduced herein after:-

“21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can

broadly be culled out are:

21.1 (i)There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented,

non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for

condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise

injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

21.2 (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in

their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to

the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be

applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

21.3 (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the

technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled

for emphasis.

21.4 (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation

of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or

litigant is to be taken note of.

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21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking

condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

21.6 (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof

should not affect public justice and cause public mischief

because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the

ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

21.7 (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the

conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally

unfettered free play.

21.8 (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a

delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of

prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be

attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach

whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

21.9 (ix) The conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating

to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into

consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the

courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in

respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a

total go by in the name of liberal approach.

21.10 (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds

urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be

vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a

litigation.

21.11 (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with

fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to

the technicalities of law of limitation.

21.12 (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully

scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm

of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning

and not on individual perception.

21.13 (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing

a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more

guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:

22.1 (a) An application for condonation of delay should be

drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner

harbouring the notion that courts are required to condone delay

on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on

merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.

22.2 (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be

dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual

philosophy which is basically subjective.

22.3 (c ) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard

being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious

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effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the

adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate

institutional motto.

22.4 (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-

serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be

exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of

course, within legal parameters.

Xxx”

It has been held that neither leisure nor pleasure has any room

while one moves an application for condonation of delay.

In Oriental Aroma Chemical’s case (supra), the Apex Court

held as follows:-

“Xxx

14. We have considered the respective submissions. The law

of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does

not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the right of

the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory

tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every

legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the

legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes

a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of

the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with

the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for

not availing the remedy within the stipulated time.

15. The expression “sufficient cause” employed in Section 5

of the Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statute is elastic

enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful

manner which subserves the ends of justice. Although, no hard-

and-fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications

for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated

adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short

duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate –

Collector (L.A) v. Katiji N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy

and Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil.

Xxx”

In view of the above facts and the settled position of law we

have no hesitation to hold that no cogent or sufficient cause has been brought

on record for condoning the inordinate delay of 303 days in filing the instant

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review application. Accordingly, same is dismissed. Since the application for

condonation of delay has been dismissed on merit, the review application is

also liable to meet the same fate as there is no legal necessity to hear the

review application on merits, however, on the insistence of the learned

counsel for the review applicant we have heard him on merits.

RA-LP-23-2025

This is an application for review/modification/correction of an

order dated May 08, 2024 passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in

LPA-1152-2024. The said LPA arose out of an order of dismissal of a writ

petition being CWP-7756-2024. Even if the inordinate delay was to be

overlooked and the review application was to be considered on merits, still

the same is liable to be dismissed with costs in view of the factual position

and the settled law discussed hereinunder.

2. It has been pleaded in the review application that the writ

petition being CWP-7756-2024, filed by the review applicant-appellant, was

dismissed vide an order dated April 05, 2024 in a “most casual manner by

not appreciating the facts and circumstances in a proper perspective.” Due to

such rejection of the writ petition, Letters Patent Appeal being LPA-1152-

2024 was filed by the review applicant-appellant but the same was also

dismissed “in limine” without appreciating the principles of natural justice

and by not giving an opportunity of hearing to the review applicant-appellant.

According to the applicant, there are errors apparent in the order under

review which are required to be reviewed. A miscarriage of justice has been

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committed by wrong recording of facts by this Court and unsettling of the

issue decided by the Supreme Court in Dev Dutt v. Union of India reported

in (2008) 8 SCC 725.

3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the review applicant-

appellant submits that the learned Single Judge acted on an erroneous

assumption/impression that the review applicant-appellant had approached

the Court only after his superannuation on April 30, 2022. The LPA Bench

also proceeded on the same factually wrong assumption. Since the review

applicant-appellant had approached the Court in 2017 by filing two writ

petitions being CWP-4875-2017 and CWP-21190-2017, it was incorrectly

recorded by the learned Single Bench that the review applicant-appellant

started agitating for grant of his second ACP only after his retirement on May

31, 2022. The review applicant-appellant’s first writ petition being CWP-

4875-2017 was allowed vide order January 10, 2023 whereby he was granted

the benefits of second ACP w.e.f. April 01, 2016. The Court on January 10,

2023, also allowed the review applicant-appellant to move a representation

before the authority concerned for release of arrears w.e.f. March 04, 2014 on

the basis of an oral agreement between the parties, which was not recorded in

the order. Acting arbitrarily, the said benefit was denied to the review

applicant by the employer vide speaking order dated January 12, 2017. It was

for the first time recorded in the speaking order that there was an adverse

entry recorded against him in his 2005 ACR for a period of five months

between April 01, 2005 and August 31, 2005. Therefore, he was eligible for

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grant of the second ACP benefits from 2016 and not from 2014. Such an

illegal and arbitrary action on the part of the employer compelled the review

applicant-appellant to file a third CWP-10390-2023 challenging the speaking

order dated January 12, 2017. The review applicant had filed a second writ

petition being CWP-21190-2017.

4. Learned counsel for the review applicant-appellant vehemently

argued that the learned Single Judge recorded facts incorrectly by holding

that the review applicant-appellant had not chosen to challenge the adverse

entry of 2017 prior to the filing of the fourth/present writ petition and

erroneously rejected the same without granting the appropriate relief. The

Courts have acted unjustly especially in view of the fact that the applicant

was compelled to withdraw the third (2023) writ petition and approach the

authorities. The authorities acted arbitrarily in refusing to grant the

applicant’s prayer necessitating filing of the fourth writ petition.

5. Next the learned counsel sought to reargue the appeal by

submitting that the learned Single Judge misappreciated the legal proposition

enunciated by the Apex Court in Dev Dutt’s case (supra). The LPA Bench

also was not inclined to hear the matter and in a hurried and casual manner,

dismissed the same. Therefore, the settled proposition of law was not taken

into consideration either by the learned Single Judge or by the LPA Bench.

The review applicant-appellant had more than 70% of good ACRs and

therefore, was eligible for grant of second ACP benefits from March 04, 2014

instead of April 01, 2016. The review applicant-appellant was rendered

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helpless by the learned Single Bench as it was not inclined to hear the third

writ petition being CWP-10390-2023 filed by the appellant on merits and

compelled him to withdraw the same and avail of the alternative remedy by

filing appropriate appeal/representation against the impugned order.

6. This Court has heard learned counsel for the review applicant-

appellant and perused the material on record.

7. The review applicant has filed several writ petitions. While

disposing of the first writ petition being CWP-4875-2017 the benefits of

second ACP was granted from April 01, 2016. Since the review applicant was

dissatisfied with the order of the learned Single Bench, he made a

representation before the authorities. The said representation was disposed of

by a speaking order dated January 12, 2017. A second writ petition was then

filed by the review applicant in 2017 itself being CWP-21190-2017. In the

said writ petition, the review applicant chose not to challenge the speaking

order passed in January 2017. The only challenge in the second writ petition

was to the factum of his juniors being promoted ahead of him. The third writ

petition being CWP-10390-2023 was filed by the review applicant after his

retirement in 2022 challenging the speaking order of 2017, for the first time

after his retirement. The same was dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty to

the applicant to avail of the alternative remedy.

8. A perusal of the order under review would reveal that after

giving personal hearing to the review applicant-appellant in the

representation filed before the employer/authorities for expunging the

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adverse remarks for the period April 01, 2005 to August 31, 2005, the

Director, Women and Child Development Department, Haryana had rejected

the same. Vide letter dated March 24, 2023 grant of second ACP w.e.f. March

2014 was rejected. Challenging the said order of rejection the fourth writ

petition being CWP-7756-2024 was filed.

9. The learned Single Judge while rejecting the fourth writ petition

vide an order dated April 05, 2024, observed that from 2017 till such time the

review applicant-appellant retired in 2022, he had not challenged the adverse

entries made in his ACRs.

10. The LPA Bench observed that the review applicant neither

pleaded the withdrawal of CWP-10390-2023 (third writ petition) in CWP-

7756-2024 nor was anything brought on record to show that the learned

counsel appearing on behalf of the review applicant-appellant brought the

aforesaid factum to the notice of the learned Single Bench. In such

circumstances, the Coordinate Bench opined that after withdrawal of CWP-

10390-2023 (third writ petition), a latter writ petition being CWP-7756-2024,

on the same cause of action (challenging the speaking order of 2017) would

not even be maintainable. It was also recorded by the LPA Bench that the

speaking order dated January 12, 2017 finds no mention in the second writ

petition filed by the review applicant-appellant being CWP-21190-2017,

where the only challenge was to the factum of juniors of the review

applicant-appellant, being promoted ahead of him. Therefore, it held that the

learned Single Bench had correctly concluded that there was no challenge to

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the 2017 speaking order till 2023 (i.e. after the retirement of the applicant in

2022). There was no challenge in the second writ petition to the

adverse/average entries made in the ACRs for five months (April 01, 2005 to

August 31, 2005) despite the applicant being aware of the speaking order.

Admittedly, the cause of action was available in 2017 for upgradation of his

ACRs or for non-grant of the second ACP benefits from 2014 due to 05

adverse/average entries in the ACRs and the appellant by not challenging the

same approximately for a period of six years till filing of CWP-10390-2023,

is deemed to have waived his legal rights and cannot reagitate the same again

and again. Moreover, despite the fact that the appeal being LPA-1152-2024

was disposed of on May 08, 2024, in the presence of the review applicant-

appellant, still by filing the instant petition he is seeking to reargue the issues

raised before the LPA Bench.

11. Furthermore, the present application for recalling/review of the

said order has been filed almost after 11 months of passing of the same, that

too after one of the Members of the Bench has been transferred to a different

High Court upon being elevated as a Chief Justice.

12. In the light of the aforenoted facts, to the mind of this Court, the

review application is completely misconceived and is an abuse of process of

law where neither there is an error apparent on the face of the record nor has

there been a discovery of new and important fact after passing of the order.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has time and again reiterated that in a review

application re-argument on merits is not permissible. The principles with

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regard to scope and extent of review are discussed in RA-LP-61-2024 in

LPA-670-2024 “Dhirender Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others”

which are reproduced as under:

“xxx

The principles as regards the scope and extent of review

jurisdiction of the court, have been summarized by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and others 2013 (8) SCC 320 and were reiterated by this Court as well, in the

case of Columbia Holdings Pvt. Ltd. and others v. State of

Haryana and others RA-CW-357 of 2015. The principles set out

as regards scope and extent of review jurisdiction in various

judicial precedents may be summarized as follows:

A. Exercise of review jurisdiction is called for only in cases

where one of the following ground exists:

(i) When there is discovery of new and important matter or

evidence, subject to the fulfillment of the following

conditions:

a) New matter/evidence discovered is of such nature which

could change the judgment.

b) Such new matter/evidence was not within the knowledge

of the party seeking review

c) Same could not be produced before court even after due

diligence

(ii) When mistake or error apparent on the face of the

record.

(iii) When there exists “any other sufficient reasons”,

which is interpreted as analogous to the aforesaid two

grounds.

B. The review jurisdiction is not exercisable on

following grounds:

(i) Only a “patent error” and not a “mere wrong

decision” can be said to be an error apparent on the

face of record.

(ii) Review is not maintainable unless the material error,

manifest on the face of the order, undermines its

soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.

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(iii) The error apparent on the face of the record should

not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.

(iv) If a matter is required to be first reheard and then

corrected, it would be an appeal under the guise of

review.

(v) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not

enough to reopen concluded adjudications.

(vi) The power of review is to be exercised for

"correction of mistake" and not for "substitution of

view". Substitution of view would be the province of an

appellate court.

(vii) Merely because a document which was forming

part of the record was not considered at the time of

deciding the case cannot be categorized as a mistake or

error apparent on the face of record.

(viii) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise

whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and

corrected but lies only for patent error.

(ix) The mere possibility of two views on the subject

cannot be a ground for review.

(x) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within

the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be

permitted to be advanced in the review petition.

(xi) Review is not maintainable when the same relief

sought at the time of arguing the main matter had

been negative.

(xii) Failure to argue a point at the time of hearing of

the matter by the court, is also not a ground for

seeking review as it would be a case where the

existing material was overlooked by counsel and not

a case of excusable misfortune or mistake.

Justice Krishna Iyer, in Northern India caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi 1980 (2) SCC 167, while highlighting the

limited scope of review of judgement observed as under:

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"A plea for review, unless the first judicial view is

manifestly distorted, is like asking for the moon".

In “Shri Ram Sahu (dead) through legal representatives

and others v. Vinod Kumar Rawat and others” reported in

(2021) 13 Supreme Court Cases 1, the Hon’ble Apex Court

considered the scope and ambit of the Court’s power to review

under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 of the CPC and

held that the power to review was not an inherent power of the

Court. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by

necessary implication. A review cannot be an appeal in disguise.

A re-hearing of the matter is impermissible in law. It is beyond

doubt or dispute that the review Court does not sit in appeal

over its own order. It only constitutes an exception to the general

Rule that once a judgment is signed and pronounced it should

not be altered.

Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, the Court can review its decision

on the following grounds:

“1. Application for review of judgment:-

1. Any person considering himself aggrieved

a) By a decree or order from which an appeal is

allowed, but from which no appeal has been

preferred,

b) By a decree or order from which no appeal is

allowed, or

c) By a decision on reference from a Court of small

causes, and who from the discovery of new and

important matter or evidence which, after the

exercise of due diligence was not within his

knowledge or could not be produced by him at the

time when the decree was passed or order made, or

on account of some mistake or error apparent on the

face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason,

desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or

order made against him, may apply for a review of

judgment to the Court which passed the decree or

made the order.

2. A party who is not appealing from a decree or

order may apply for a review of judgment

notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some

other party except where the ground of such appeal

is common to the applicant and the appellant, or

when being respondent he can present to the

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appellate court the case on which he applies for the

review.”

The expression “any other sufficient reason” has to be

interpreted in the light of other specific grounds. An erroneous

decision/ order cannot be corrected in the guise of exercise of

power of review.

(emphasis supplied)

Xxx”

13. No satisfactory explanation could be provided by the learned

counsel appearing for the review applicant for not preferring an appeal from

the order under review as the only purpose for filing the review application is

to reargue the issues settled by the Coordinate Bench.

14. In the light of the aforesaid discussion and the law governing the

field, the present application is dismissed in limine for being filed after

inordinate delay and also on merits. Keeping in mind the fact that the review

applicant-appellant belongs to weaker section of the society, this Court

refrains itself from imposing costs for wasting precious judicial time despite

the disrespectful pleadings showing scant regard for authority of law have

been made in the review application.

15. Connected applications, if any, are also accordingly disposed of.

[DEEPAK SIBAL] [LAPITA BANERJI]

JUDGE JUDGE

August 26, 2025

Prince