2026 INSC 524 Page 1 of 25

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2207 OF 2011

ROSHAN LAL ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF HARYANA & ANR …RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2209/2011

And

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2210/2011

JUDGEMENT

NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, J.

1. The present three appeals, Criminal Appeal Nos.2207/2011,

2209/2011 and 2210/2011 have been preferred against the

common judgment and order dated 16.08.2010 passed by the High

Court of Punjab & Haryana in CRA No. 801-SB of 2002 as well as

Page 2 of 25

CRA No. 802-SB of 2002, dismissing the appeals filed by the

appellants herein, upholding the conviction and sentence imposed

by the Additional Sessions Judge, Rewari, (Trial Court), vide its

judgment dated 02.05.2002 in Sessions Case No. 1 3/2000 in

relation with FIR No. 116 dated 06.06.2000, initially under Sections

323/325/506 IPC, with Section 307 IPC added later; trial charge

under Sections 307/506 read with Section 34 IPC.

2. At the outset, it is apposite to recall the principles applicable

when dealing with concurrent findings of the courts below, for

which we may refer to the decision in Dalbir Kaur & Ors. vs. State

of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 158, wherein it was held as below:

“8. Thus, the principles governing interference by this Court

in a criminal appeal by special leave may be summarised

as follows:

(1) that this Court would not interfere with the concurrent

finding of fact based on pure appreciation of evidence even

if it were to take a different view on the evidence;

(2) that the Court will not normally enter into a re-appraisement

or review of the evidence, unless the assessment of the High

Court is vitiated by an error of law or procedure or is based

on error of record, misreading of evidence or is inconsistent

with the evidence, for instance, where the ocular evidence

is totally inconsistent with the medical evidence and so on;

(3) that the Court would not enter into credibility of the evidence

with a view to substitute its own opinion for that of the High

Court;

(4) that the Court would interfere where the High Court has

arrived at a finding of fact in disregard of a judicial process,

principles of natural justice or a fair hearing or has acted in

violation of a mandatory provision of law or procedure

resulting in serious prejudice or injustice to the accused;

Page 3 of 25

(5) this Court might also interfere where on the proved facts

wrong inferences of law have been drawn or where the

conclusions of the High Court are manifestly perverse and

based on no evidence.”

It is very difficult to lay down a rule of universal application,

but the principles mentioned above and those adumbrated

in the authorities of this Court cited supra provide sufficient

guidelines for this Court to decide criminal appeals by

special leave. Thus, in a criminal appeal by special leave,

this Court at the hearing examines the evidence and the

judgment of the High Court with the limited purpose of

determining whether or not the High Court has followed the

principles enunciated above. Where the Court finds that the

High Court has committed no violation of the various

principles laid down by this Court and has made a correct

approach and has not ignored or overlooked striking

features in the evidence which demolish the prosecution

case, the findings of fact arrived at by the High Court on an

appreciation of the evidence in the circumstances of the case

would not be disturbed.”

3. Keeping the aforesaid principles in mind, this Court shall

proceed to examine the present set of appeals to determine whether

any manifest error or illegality has occurred, or whether there has

been a grave miscarriage of justice arising from a misreading of, or

failure to consider, material evidence. Such determination

necessarily entails a careful and comprehensive examination of the

facts and circumstances of the case. Accordingly, it becomes

imperative to revisit the background facts and the evidence placed

on record.

Page 4 of 25

4. It may be noted that since the State has not preferred any

appeal against the acquittal of the fourth accused, Dharamvir, we

may not burden ourselves in detail with the evidence relating to the

acquittal of the fourth accused Dharamvir except those as may have

ramifications for the present three appellants.

5. The case of the Prosecution, in brief, is that on 05.06.2000,

the injured-informant Amar Singh (PW3) was assigned night

watchman duty in the village. In the course of his duty, he

proceeded to ascertain the whereabouts of other persons who were

to accompany him and was informed that they had already

assembled near the house of one Rama Nand. Upon reaching the

said place, the complainant noticed a gather ing of persons

assaulting and beating an individual. When he intervened and

questioned the conduct of those persons, the accused persons,

acting in furtherance of their common intention, turned upon him.

Accused Sajjan Singh, armed with a lathi, inflicted a blow on the

head of the complainant; accused Satya Parkash dealt a lathi blow

on his right hand; accused Dharamvir assaulted him with fists and

kicks; and accused Roshan Lal also delivered a lathi blow on his

head. As a result of the assault, the complainant raised an alarm,

Page 5 of 25

whereupon Rama Nand (PW4) arrived at the spot and rescued him

from the accused persons. It is further the case of the prosecution

that the accused extended threats to kill anyone who came to the

aid of the complainant.

6. The matter was thereafter reported to the police, while also

immediately providing medical aid to injured Amar Singh (PW3),

leading to the registration of an FIR the next morning being FIR No.

116/2000 at 8:30 AM on 06.06.2000.

7. The injured Amar Singh (PW3) was immediately taken to the

General Hospital, Rewari by his wife and son. Since he was a Goods

Clerk in the Railways at the time of the incident, he was referred to

Central Hospital, Northern Railway, New Delhi, as his condition

worsened. He remained there from 08.06.2000 to 01.07.2000. He

was admitted again, from 15.07.2000 to 20.07.2000.

8. All the accused persons denied all allegations, alleged false

implications, pleaded not guilty. Accordingly, the trial commenced.

9. As per the Prosecution, upon being taken to the hospital,

immediately after the incident, Dr. O.P. Dabas (PW1) had examined

the injured-informant. As per his statement, a lacerated wound

measuring approximately 6 × 1 cm with irregular margins was

Page 6 of 25

observed on the left parietal region of the scalp. The injury was

transversely placed, situated about 10 cm above the left pinna, and

the underlying bone was visible. The scalp hair had not been cut,

and the wound was found to be bleeding upon cleaning. An X-ray

was advised, and the injury was kept under observation pending

radiological examination. In the medical opinion, the injury had

been caused within 24 hours by a blunt weapon. Dr. Dabas opined

that Amar Singh had a compound fracture of scalp. At the time of

admission to the hospital, the injured Amar Singh was experiencing

vomiting. As per the CT scan findings, a small parietal haematoma

was detected, accompanied by weakness on the right side of the

body. In view of these clinical findings, the injury sustained by Amar

Singh was opined to be dangerous to life.

10. During the trial, Dr. C. Sharma, Medical Officer, Lok Nayak

Hospital, New Delhi was also examined as PW9. He stated that the

injured informant was referred from Central Hospital, Northern

Railway, New Delhi due to a head injury. During the treatment, he

found that Amar Singh (PW3) had small haemorrhagic contusions

in the right temporal and left fronto parietal regions, along with

evidence of bifrontal extra-axial collections along the convexities.

Page 7 of 25

The CT scan report from Lok Nayak Hospital dated 12.06.2000

further revealed fractures in both parietal bones near the midline.

11. Dr. Sanjeev Singhal (PW11), Neurosurgeon at Central

Hospital, Northern Railway, New Delhi added another medical

dimension that the victim was developing multi-organ failure after

his return from the Lok Nayak Hospital, on 13.06.2000 and he

remained in the hospital till 01.07.2000.

12. Insofar as the accused Dharamvir was concerned, the

evidence on record indicated that he was not armed with a lathi and

was alleged only to have delivered fist and slap blows to the injured

Amar Singh (PW3). The injuries attributed to him did not find

corroboration from the medical evidence. Moreover, the testimony

of the prosecution witnesses was insufficient to establish his guilt

for the offence punishable under Section 307 of the Indian Penal

Code. In the absence of cogent and reliable evidence against

Dharamvir, he was acquitted.

13. The Trial Court, vide judgment dated 02.05.2002, convicted

accused persons Roshan Lal, Satya Prakash and Sajjan Singh

under Sections 307 read with 34 and Section 506 of IPC, relying on

the evidence of PW-3, the victim and the testimony of eye-witness

Page 8 of 25

Rama Nand (PW4) that, in furtherance of their common intention,

the said accused persons caused injuries to Amar Singh (PW3) with

such intention and knowledge, which was corroborated by the

forensic evidence of Dr. O.P Dabas (PW1), Dr. C Sharma (PW9) as

well as Dr. Sanjeev Singhal (PW11), which proved that the Injury

No. 1 was dangerous to life, and in such circumstances, the Trial

Court held that had their act resulted in his death, they would have

been guilty of murder. Accordingly, all the essential ingredients of

the offence punishable under Section 307 read with Section 34 of

the IPC were held duly proved against the three accused.

Accordingly, accused Roshan Lal, Satya Prakash and Sajjan Singh

were convicted under Section 307 IPC read with Section 34 IPC and

were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of

seven years for the offence punishable under Sections 307 r/w 34

IPC along with a fine of Rs. 5000/- each and to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for a period of one year for the offence punishable

under Section 506 IPC along with a fine of Rs. 1000/-.

14. The High Court, in the appeals preferred by the convicted-

accused persons, upheld the conviction of the appellants herein.

Page 9 of 25

15. Before the High Court, the appellants contended that they

were falsely implicated by the informant due to existing jealousy

and rivalry. The injuries upon Amar Singh (PW3) were inflicted by

some unidentified persons and that even though, there were a large

number of people stated to be present at the spot of the incident,

none of them were examined by the prosecution. The appellants

further contended that the investigating officer of the case was never

examined, and that the prosecution had failed to prove any

intention to cause any injury. Lastly, it was submitted that since

only one injury was noticed as per the medical records, a conviction

under Section 307 IPC was unsustainable.

16. Additionally, the Prosecution also stated that the appellants

had been attempting to badger and threaten the key eye-witness

Rama Nand (PW4) by lodging false FIRs against him and his family

members. One FIR No. 263/2000 was lodged upon the statement

of Satya Prakash against Rama Nand and his son Narender Singh

u/s 323/324/325/506/452 IPC, which, after investigation, was

found to be false. Further, another FIR was lodged u/s 452, 354

and 506 IPC against Mukesh who is the other son of Rama Nand,

on the basis of the statement of Rozy, sister of appellant Satya

Prakash. This FIR was also later found false.

Page 10 of 25

17. The Prosecution, before the High Court, also stated that even

after the incident and the registration of the FIR, the injured

informant continued to face mental and physical harassment. Due

to persistent threats from the accused-appellants directed at him

and his witnesses, the injured complainant was compelled to

relocate to Gurgaon.

18. In the appeal, the High Court observed that from the

testimonies of Dr. C. Sharma (PW9) and Dr. Ajay Aggarwal (PW15),

it stands clearly established that the injured sustained fractures in

both parietal bones near the midline. The evidence of Dr. Sanjeev

Singhal (PW11) further indicates that the injured informant was

progressing towards multi-organ failure, with investigative reports

revealing deranged kidney and liver functions. The discharge

summary records that the complainant suffered injuries on both the

left and right sides of the head, along with a loss of power in the

right wrist. Taken together, the medical evidence conclusively

demonstrates that the accused -appellants inflicted grievous

injuries upon the complainant.

19. The High Court relied upon the case of Prakash Chandra

Yadav v. State of Bihar & Ors., 2007 (4) RCR (Crl.) 860, while

Page 11 of 25

upholding that the nature or extent of the injury is neither essential

nor determinative; it is merely one of the relevant considerations,

for the purposes of Section 307 IPC. The primary inquiry is into the

intention of the accused, which must be inferred from the

surrounding circumstances.

20. The High Court accepted the ocular version supported by

medical evidence and held that the post-incident conduct of the

accused-appellants was highly reprehensible, inasmuch as they

subjected the injured and other witnesses to continuous mental and

physical harassment by lodging false FIRs in an attempt to

intimidate him. The High Court held that it was further proved that

the appellants inflicted serious injuries upon Amar Singh, as fully

corroborated by the medical evidence on the vital parts of the body,

namely, both sides of the head, which led to deranged kidney and

liver malfunctions, as well as loss of power in the right wrist.

21. The High Court, after a detailed analysis of the evidence on

record, repelled the contentions of the appellants and upheld the

conviction and the order of sentence which was passed by the

Sessions Court.

Page 12 of 25

22. Thus, all the three convicted accused persons Roshan Lal,

Sajjan Singh and Satya Prakash are before us, by way of three

separate criminal appeals, with the following pleas:

a) Accused Roshan Lal argues that his conviction rests on

the limited allegation that he caused an injury with a lathi on

the right side of the head; however, no such injury finds

mention in the testimony of Dr. O.P. Dabas (PW1), who refers

only to an injury on the left side. The evidence of PW1, Dr.

O.P. Dabas, undermines the version of Amar Singh (PW3)

regarding the involvement of multiple assailants, a

discrepancy that was overlooked by both the Trial Court and

High Court.

b) Accused Roshan Lal has also specifically argued that

since he was not the principal assailant, and the sentence

imposed by the Trial Court, as affirmed by the High Court

being seven years’ imprisonment under Section 307 IPC and

one year under Section 506 IPC, is excessively severe. In the

given circumstances, particularly considering that the

petitioner is a first-time offender, he ought to have been

extended the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

Page 13 of 25

c) The High Court’s characterization of the said injury as

“serious” does not satisfy the requirement under Section 307

IPC, which mandates that the injury be of such a nature as

is sufficient, in the ordinary course, to cause death.

d) The High Court placed reliance on the post-incident

conduct of the co-accused, Satya Prakash, characterising it

as deplorable, and proceeded to affirm the conviction on that

basis, even though such reliance was founded on FIRs lodged

by third parties and not by the said injured/complainant

himself.

e) Following the alleged incident, the injured-informant

was taken to the hospital by his wife, despite her not being

shown as present at the scene.

f) The ocular evidence is not corroborated by the medical

evidence since Dr. O.P. Dabas (PW1), who examined the

complainant on 06.06.2000, has deposed in a manner

inconsistent with the certificate issued by him on the same

date. As per the said certificate, the injured informant was in

a normal condition and had sustained only a single lacerated

wound with irregular margins measuring 6 × 1 cm. However,

Page 14 of 25

in his deposition, PW1 stated that the injured had suffered a

compound fracture with a haematoma and described the

injury as dangerous to life.

g) The jeep driver, who was allegedly beaten at the place of

the incident was a material witness who was never examined.

Further, the Investigating Officer, who was in charge of the

case, was not examined as a witness and was dispensed with

as being unnecessary.

h) According to the FIR, a large number of persons were

present at the scene; however, none of them were identified

or examined as witnesses in support of the Prosecution’s

case.

i) The Prosecution has failed to establish on record any

intention or premeditation to cause injury to the informant

Amar Singh. The injuries were sustained when the informant

intervened to rescue the driver of the vehicle, and in these

circumstances, no intention to cause harm can, even

remotely, be attributed to the appellants.

j) The injured was initially discharged after receiving first

aid; however, thereafter, by manipulation, he got himself

Page 15 of 25

referred to a Delhi Government Hospital but instead secured

admission in a Railway Hospital with an oblique motive of

obtaining a favourable medical report so as to strengthen and

fasten the liability of the appellants. This conduct reflects a

calculated attempt on the part of the injured to implicate the

appellants.

k) High Court also failed to appreciate that the Trial Court

did not adhere to the settled legal principles laid down by this

Hon’ble Court, which mandates that a reasonable

opportunity be afforded to a person found guilty to prepare a

defence on the question of sentence. In the present case, the

appellants were held guilty at the close of proceedings on 2

May 2002, and by 10:30 a.m. the very next day, were awarded

the maximum sentence. This reflects a lack of due application

of mind and, in effect, a denial of any real opportunity to the

appellants.

23. On the other hand, it has been contended before us on behalf

of the prosecution that, insofar as the three appellants are

concerned, the findings recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by

the High Court are founded on admissible and relevant evidence. It

Page 16 of 25

is submitted that their conviction does not suffer from any illegality

and, there being no perversity in the concurrent findings of the

courts below, this Court ought not to interfere with the judgment of

the High Court.

ANALYSIS BY THIS COURT

24. The principal question that arises for consideration before

this Court is whether the accused persons can be held guilty of the

offence punishable under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code,

and, in particular, whether the essential ingredients of the said

provision stood satisfied on the basis of the materials brought on

record.

25. Section 307 IPC reads as below:

307. Attempt to murder. —Whoever does any act with

such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances

that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of

murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either

description for a term which may extend to ten years, and

shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any

person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to

imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is

hereinbefore mentioned.

26. In order to constitute an offence under Section 307 IPC two

elements are essential to be established. First, the intention or

knowledge to commit murder. Secondly, the actual act of trying to

commit the murder. Thus, it must have both the necessary mens

Page 17 of 25

rea and actus reus. Hence, to sustain a conviction under this

section, it is necessary to establish that had the accused succeeded

in his attempt and had the victim met his death because of such

act, the offence of murder punishable u/s 302 IPC would be

established.

27. However, an accused charged u/s 307 IPC cannot be

acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in

the nature of simple hurt, as the determinative factor is intention or

knowledge and not the nature of the injury. This principle was

discussed by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem @

Chamaru, (2005) 5 SCC 554, the relevant paragraph of which

reads hereunder:

“12. To justify a conviction under this section, it is not

essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should

have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually

caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to

a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention

may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may

even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference

at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction

between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such

an act may not be attended by any result so far as the

person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases

in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is

not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim

of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary

circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted.

What the court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of

its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and

under circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt

in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is

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sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with

some overt act in execution thereof.”

Nevertheless, the nature of injury actually caused does render

considerable assistance to the court in ascertaining the intention of

the accused. However, courts may also ascertain the intention from

other circumstances, even without reference to actual wounds. The

aforesaid principle stands reiterated in the case of Bipin Bihari v.

State of M.P. (2006) 8 SCC 799, as follows:

“9. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if

there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in

execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury

capable of causing death should have been inflicted.

Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give

considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the

intention of the accused, such intention may also be

deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some

cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual

wounds. The section makes a distinction between the act of

the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see

whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the

intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned

in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not

be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is

present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution

thereof”

28. Keeping in mind the above principle s, what falls for

determination before this Court is whether the appellants caused

the injuries in question, and whether such act accompanied by the

requisite intention or knowledge, was committed in circumstances

which, if resulting in death, would render the act culpable as

murder.

Page 19 of 25

29. The evidence of eye-witness Rama Nand (PW4) is unwavering

and consistent. PW4 has specifically named all the accused persons

with specific acts attributable to each appellant-accused, in his

testimony. Further, the evidence of the informant Amar Singh (PW3)

itself clearly describes the specific roles played by each of the

accused-appellants herein. The appellants have also not led any

evidence to disprove the testimonies of Amar Singh (PW3) and Rama

Nand (PW4). Hence, it can be concluded without an iota of doubt

that the appellants had caused the injuries to the informant, which

could have led to his death.

30. Having concluded as above, we now proceed to examine the

crucial issue as to whether the injuries in question were inflicted

with the requisite intention or knowledge, and in such

circumstances that, had death ensued, the act would amount to

murder.

31. The words 'such intention' found in Section 307 IPC, refer to

the intention referred to in Section 300 IPC. It means: (i) intention

to cause death; (ii) intention to cause such bodily injury, which the

offender knows is likely to cause death; (iii) intention to cause such

bodily injury, which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to

cause death.

Page 20 of 25

The essential ingredient of the offence of attempt to murder is

the intention to cause death. Such intention exists prior to the

actual attempt and must be established independently of the act

itself or the actus reus. Once the requisite intention to commit

murder is proved, the eventual outcome of the attempt becomes

irrelevant, unless the attempt culminates in death, in which case

the offence would fall within Section 300 IPC. In the absence of

proof of intention, a conviction under this provision cannot be

sustained.

32. Intention, however, can be inferred from surrounding

circumstances, such as the type of weapon employed, the words

spoken by the accused at the time of the incident, the motive behind

the act, the parts of the body targeted, the nature and extent of the

injuries inflicted, as well as the force and manner in which the blows

were delivered.

33. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid legal principles, the

factual matrix of the present case may now be considered. There is

no history of enmity known between the appellants and the injured.

The prosecution has also failed to bring on record any material

suggesting prior planning, preparation, or concerted intention on

Page 21 of 25

the part of the appellants to cause the death of Amar Singh (PW3).

On the contrary, the evidence reveals that the incident occurred

suddenly when the injured intervened in an altercation involving the

driver of the jeep. The assault, therefore, appears to have arisen in

the heat of the moment and as a spontaneous reaction to such

intervention, rather than pursuant to any pre-conceived intention

to eliminate the complainant.

34. The circumstances, viewed holistically, suggest that the

object of the appellants was primarily to deter or intimidate the

complainant from interfering in the ongoing altercation. It is also

significant that the weapons allegedly used by the appellants were

ordinary lathis, which, though capable of causing grievous hurt

depending upon the manner of use, cannot in the facts of the

present case be regarded as inherently deadly weapons. There is

nothing on record to indicate that the appellants persisted in the

assault with such brutality or ferocity so as to unmistakably

disclose an intention to cause death.

35. Undoubtedly, the injuries sustained by Amar Singh (PW3)

were grievous in nature, and the medical evidence demonstrates

that the injury to the head subsequently led to serious

complications. However, the gravity of the injury by itself cannot be

Page 22 of 25

determinative of the offence under Section 307 IPC unless the

prosecution is able to establish the requisite mens rea contemplated

under the provision. The intention to commit murder cannot be

presumed merely because the injuries were ultimately opined to be

dangerous to life. In the absence of evidence showing prior motive,

premeditation, repeated deliberate blows with deadly weapons, or

any conduct indicative of a determined effort to cause death, this

Court is unable to hold that the appellants possessed the intention

or knowledge necessary to attract Section 307 IPC in the light of

Bipin Bihari (supra).

36. At the same time, the evidence on record clearly establishes

that the appellants voluntarily caused grievous injuries to the

complainant, particularly on vital parts of the body, resulting in

fractures and prolonged medical treatment. At this juncture, it is

imperative to reproduce Section 320 IPC for our reference: -

Grievous hurt. —The following kinds of hurt only are

designated as “grievous”: —

First. —Emasculation.

Secondly. —Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.

Thirdly. —Permanent privation of the hearing of either

ear.

Fourthly. —Privation of any member or joint.

Fifthly. —Destruction or permanent impairing of the

powers of any member or joint.

Sixthly. —Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.

Seventhly. —Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.

Page 23 of 25

Eighthly. —Any hurt which endangers life or which

causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days

in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary

pursuits

37. The injuries sustained by the complainant, as borne out from

the medical evidence on record, clearly fall within Clause Seventhly

of Section 320 IPC, and would also attract Clause Eighthly in view

of the finding that the injury was dangerous to life/prolonged

treatment. The evidence of the doctors establishes that the

complainant suffered fractures in both parietal bones near the

midline, accompanied by neurological complications and prolonged

hospitalization. Since fracture or dislocation of a bone constitutes

grievous hurt within the meaning of Section 320 IPC, the offence

committed by the appellants is squarely covered by Clause s

Seventhly and Eighthly thereof. Consequently, the ingredients

necessary to attract Section 325 IPC stand fully satisfied in the facts

and circumstances of the present case.

38. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the

considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish the

essential ingredients necessary to sustain a conviction under

Section 307 IPC, particularly the existence of the requisite intention

or knowledge to commit murder. However, the evidence on record

Page 24 of 25

unequivocally proves that the appellants, in furtherance of their

common intention, voluntarily caused grievous hurt to the

complainant, the injuries being squarely covered under Clauses

Seventhly and Eighthly of Section 320 IPC. Accordingly, the

conviction of the appellants under Section 307 read with Section 34

IPC is altered to one under Section 325 read with Section 34 IPC.

39. Having convicted the appellants under Section 325 IPC, the

next consideration is the quantum of punishment that may be

imposed on them.

40. Under Section 325 IPC, whoever, voluntarily causes grievous

hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for

a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to

fine.

As per the records, Roshan Lal, appellant in Criminal Appeal

No. 2207/2011 has undergone sentence a sentence of 2 years, 7

months; Sajjan Singh, appellant Criminal Appeal No. 2209/2011

has undergone a sentence of 2 years, 8 months; Satya Prakash,

appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 2210/2011 has undergone a

sentence of 1 year, 1 month during the trial and pendency of the

appeals before the High Court and this Court.

Page 25 of 25

41. This Court, vide order dated 25.11.2011 had granted bail to

appellant Roshan Lal, and vide order dated 05.12.2011, had granted

bail to appellants Sajjan Singh and Satya Prakash.

42. Under the facts and circumstances discussed above, we are

of the view that interest of justice will be served if the appellants are

sentenced to the period already undergone by them and impose a

fine of Rs. 50,000/- each on the appellants, which shall be paid to

the injured-informant failing which the appellants will undergo

additional 6 (six) months simple imprisonment. In the event of the

appellants paying the amount, as ordered above, the bail bonds

shall stand discharged. In the event of non-payment, the bail bonds

shall stand discharged only after undergoing the default sentence of

6 (six) months.

43. For the reasons discussed above, the appeal s are partly

allowed as above and all pending applications, if any, are disposed

of in accordance with the judgment above.

…………………… …...J.

(SANJAY KAROL)

……………...………………………………J.

(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)

New Delhi;

May 22, 2026.