CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 1 of 35

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: April 17, 2025

% Pronounced on: May 05, 2025

+ CS(COMM) 345/2025

ROYAL CHALLENGERS SPORTS PRIVATE LIMITED

.....Plaintiff

Through: Ms. Shwetashree Majumder, Ms. Priya

Adlaka, Ms. Sucharu Garg and Ms.

Shilpi Sinha, Advs.

Versus

UBER INDIA SYSTEMS PRIVATE LIMITED AND ORS

.....Defendants

Through: Mr. Sai Krishna Rajagopal, Ms. Julien

George, Ms. Anu Paarcha, Mr. Avijit

Kumar and Ms. N. Parvati, Advs. for

D-1 & 2.

CORAM:

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SAURABH BANERJEE

J U D G M E N T

I.A. 9726/2025-(u/O XXXIX R-1&2 CPC for Stay)

1. Vide the present application under Order XXXIX rules 1 and 2 read

with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

1

, the plaintiff seeks

grant of temporary injunction restraining the defendants and/ or their

representatives from broadcasting the ‘advertisement uploaded by the

1

Hereinafter ‘CPC’

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 2 of 35

defendant nos.1 and 2 on their social media platforms’

2

and/ or engaging in

any other acts infringing/ disparaging/ tarnishing the trademark ‘Royal

Challengers Bengaluru’

3

of the plaintiff, as well as directions to take down

the same already uploaded from the said social media platforms, during the

pendency of the captioned suit.

2. Since Mr. Sai Krishna Rajagopal, learned counsel for the defendant

nos.1 and 2 has appeared on advance service, as also since the defendant no.3

has no role to play at this stage of temporary injunction, considering that the

reliefs sought, if granted, are only pertaining to the said defendant nos.1 and

2 and their social media platforms, as recorded in the order dated 17.04.2025,

issuance of notice has been dispensed with.

3. As recorded in the order dated 17.04.2025, since learned counsel for

the defendant nos.1 and 2 appeared on the said date and agreed to proceed

with his submissions, no formal notice to the said defendants was issued.

Both learned counsels for the plaintiff and the defendant nos.1 and 2 then

took this Court through the pleadings as well as the documents on record, and

made eloquent submissions thereon as also handed over their respective

written submissions in Court in compliance of the said order which are taken

on record. Based upon the aforesaid facts and circumstances as also the

pleadings on record, this Court is proceeding to adjudicate the present

application.

2

Hereinafter ‘impugned advertisement’

3

Hereinafter ‘RCB trademark’

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 3 of 35

Brief facts:

4. As per pleadings, the plaintiff, a company incorporated in India under

the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, is the owner of the Indian

Premier League

4

Cricket team ‘Royal Challengers Bengaluru’

5

. The plaintiff

is also the registered proprietor of the RCB trademark and related logos, and

has used it extensively to advertise its RCB Cricket team.

5. The defendant no.1 is also a company incorporated in India offering

travel/ ride-hailing, freight services, etc. through its mobile application, and

is a subsidiary company of the defendant no.2, who is based in the United

States of America and offering travel services globally. The defendant no.3 is

an Australian Cricketer who plays for the Australian National Cricket team,

and is also playing for the ‘Sunrisers Hyderabad’ Cricket team

6

in the

ongoing IPL 2025.

6. On 05.04.2025, the defendant no.1 posted the impugned advertisement

on its Instagram platform in collaboration with the defendant no.3, as well as

on its ‘X’ and Facebook platforms. The defendant no.2 also posted the

impugned advertisement on its official YouTube channel.

7. The moot area of focus being the impugned advertisement involved in

the present application, the contents thereof as available on the internet for

viewers and as depicted in the pleadings, are as under:-

4

Hereinafter ‘IPL’

5

Hereinafter ‘RCB Cricket team’

6

Hereinafter ‘SRH Cricket team’

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 4 of 35

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 5 of 35

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 6 of 35

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 7 of 35

Submissions by learned counsel for plaintiff:

8. Based thereon, as also based on the pleadings, Ms. Shwetashree

Majumdar, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff submitted that the

impugned advertisement shows the “deprecatory” variant of the “well-known

trademark” “ROYAL CHALLENGERS BENGALURU” of the plaintiff as

“ROYALLY CHALLENGED BENGALURU” on the banner in the above

stadium

7

, as also the poster bearing the words “Ee Sala Cup Namde”

8

, which

is a common phrase in Kannada language roughly translating to “This Year

the Cup Is Ours” and which is popularly associated with the RCB Cricket

team and has been wrongly depicted in the impugned advertisement.

9. As per Ms. Majumdar, all the aforesaid derogatory statements in the

impugned advertisement have caused the plaintiff to approach this Court

7

Hereinafter ‘impugned banner’

8

Hereinafter ‘impugned poster’

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 8 of 35

seeking appropriate injunctive and other ancillary reliefs against the

defendants.

10. Ms. Majumdar submitted that the feature of the impugned poster

forming a part of the impugned advertisement is also an act of infringement,

particularly, since the slogan therein is popularly associated with the RCB

Cricket team by its fans/ followers across India who use it to create songs and

victory chants for the RCB Cricket team. Any (mis)use thereof by the

defendants in the impugned advertisement pronounces the element of

deceptive similarity and results in infringement, dilution and disparagement

of the RCB trademark belonging to the plaintiff.

11. Ms. Majumdar further submitted that all the aforesaid cumulatively

taken are clearly amounting to disparagement, more particularly since, as

depicted in the final frame of the impugned advertisement, the defendant no.1

is the “Official Ride Partner of the Hyderbaddies”, which is actually

referring to the SRH Cricket team, a competing team in the ongoing IPL

2025, and the same is the hidden second advertiser behind the impugned

advertisement trying to cast a negative light on the RCB trademark/ RCB

Cricket team during the ongoing IPL 2025, further, the defendant no.3 is also

playing for the said SRH Cricket team. That being the position, the impugned

advertisement by a commercial rival is an act of disparagement on the part of

the defendants.

12. Emphasizing on the elements of disparagement highlighted in the

pleadings, Ms. Majumdar then submitted that had the impugned

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 9 of 35

advertisement used statistics to claim that the SRH Cricket team was better

than RCB Cricket team, no claims of disparagement would’ve been

maintainable. However, the impugned advertisement, is “poking fun” at the

plaintiff, which is not within the permissible contours of comparative

advertisement and there is no ‘fair use’ by the defendants. Moreover, what

has to be seen is (i) the intent, (ii) the manner of representation and (iii) the

message sought to be conveyed, in the impugned advertisement. The

impugned advertisement is aimed at encashing upon the goodwill of the RCB

trademark/ RCB Cricket team by showing them in a derogatory light, and

undermines the public’s emotional connection with them. These, thus,

amount to disparagement and defamation.

13. Ms. Majumdar then referred to Royal Challengers Sports Private

Limited v. Sun Pictures A Division of Sun TV Network Ltd. & Anr.

9

, which

was also a similar suit instituted by the very same plaintiff before this Court

earlier against producers and co-producers of an Indian film titled ‘Jailer’,

who were/ are also the owners of the SRH Cricket team involved herein. The

said suit, which was pertaining to disparagement qua a character who was

shown to commit offensive actions such as assaulting other characters,

including sexually harassing female character(s) wearing an RCB Cricket

team jersey, was decreed in favour of the plaintiff on the first date of hearing

itself i.e. 22.08.2023, as the defendants therein agreed to suffer a decree.

14. Continuing further, Ms. Majumdar relied upon Hamdard National

9

CS (COMM) 581/2023

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 10 of 35

Foundation & Anr. v. Hussain Dalal and Ors.

10

wherein, a co-ordinate

bench of this Court, while dealing with a particular scene of a Hindi film

“YEH JAWAANI HAI DEEWANI” which showed the lead actor calling the

product “ROOH AFZA” of the plaintiff as “bekaar” (useless/ bad) in Hindi,

granted an ad interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff therein and against

the defendant therein, and then relied upon ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Ashok

Thakeria

11

wherein, a co-ordinate bench of this Court again, while dealing

with another Hindi movie “GRAND MASTI” whose plot depicted a Bank

robbery taking place in a certain “IBIBI BANK” in broad daylight, granted an

ad interim order of injunction in favour of the plaintiff therein and against the

defendant therein as the impugned mark was held deceptively similar to that

of the plaintiff, and disparaging as well since it implied that the plaintiff

Bank has weak security.

15. Ms. Majumdar, by drawing attention of this Court to certain comments

by the general public qua the impugned advertisement on the YouTube

channel of the defendant no.2, then submitted that irreparable harm is being,

and will be, caused to the reputation of the RCB trademark/ RCB Cricket

team, if the impugned advertisement, which has already gained a lot of

attention and has already reached millions of viewers, is allowed to remain

on air. If there is any further attention, the plaintiff will suffer more. Hence,

the balance of convenience is also in favour of the plaintiff for grant of

temporary injunction till the pendency of the captioned suit.

10

2013 SCC OnLine Del 2289

11

2013 SCC OnLine Del 6538

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 11 of 35

16. Ms. Majumdar lastly submitted that since the RCB trademark is duly

registered in the name of the plaintiff, and since it has achieved significant

reputation in India, the defendants’ depiction in the impugned banner is

squarely hit by Section 29(4)

12

of the Trade Marks Act, 1999

13

, as the same is

‘deceptively similar’ to the RCB trademark. In effect, the defendants are

infringing the RCB trademark and diluting its positive association in the

minds of the general public by giving it a derogatory spin.

Submissions by learned counsel for defendant nos.1 and 2:

17. Per contra, Mr. Sai Krishna Rajagopal, learned counsel appearing for

the defendant nos.1 and 2 commenced by submitting that the captioned suit is

nothing but a result of hypersensitivity on the part of the plaintiff and that the

impugned advertisement employs only a humorous pun using the names of

the cities Hyderabad and Bengaluru. Even if the impugned banner is taken to

be a reference to the RCB Cricket team, the same is by way of intentional,

denominational use in the spirit of a comical tease or a parody and only

constitutes light-hearted banter, widely accepted by sporting fans and a

culturally entrenched part of the game of cricket.

18. Mr. Rajagopal, then taking this Court through the impugned

12

29(4) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not being a registered proprietor or a

person using by way of permitted use, uses in the course of trade, a mark which—

(a) is identical with or similar to the registered trade mark; and

(b) is used in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is

registered; and

(c) the registered trade mark has a reputation in India and the use of the mark without due cause

takes unfair advantage of or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the registered

trade mark.

13

Hereinafter ‘TM Act’

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 12 of 35

advertisement, submitted that the (i) intent and (iii) message therein is to

indicate that the motorbike services offered by the defendant no.1, which is

not a rival/ competing entity, are extremely efficient and reliable, as is clear

from the sequence where the motorbike ride booked by the defendant no.3

arrives within the stipulated time of three minutes and saves the defendant

no.3 and his accomplice from the security team of the stadium. Similarly, as

per Mr. Rajagopal, the (ii) manner of the impugned advertisement is merely

a wordplay conveying that Bengaluru is going to be “ROYALLY

CHALLENGED” in their upcoming Cricket match with Hyderabad, i.e.

there is going to be a tough fight between their respective Cricket teams. In a

game of cricket, which is a sporting event with an inherently charged, festive

and competitive environment, mere indication of one team being challenged

by the other does not amount to any negative connotation. The culture

developed around Cricket is ripe with such thematic comedy, as the same has

been undertaken multiple times in the past.

19. Further, as per the written synopsis filed, the advertisement of the

Mauka-Mauka campaign referring to the Pakistan Cricket team never being

able to win the Cricket World Cup, or the advertisement of the Australia

matches campaign wherein Australian Cricketers were shown as babies, or

even Amul’s various IPL related witty comics, all evidence the said comical

context of the game of Cricket. It even reads that the RCB trademark/ RCB

Cricket team had earlier also been referred to as “Royally Challenged” in the

past by Consumer News and Business Channel as well. Reference to other

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 13 of 35

similar kinds of advertising campaigns between Coca Cola and Pepsi around

Halloween making fun of each other were also referred. Be that as it may, the

same is of no relevance at this stage.

20. Mr. Rajagopal further submitted that even the reference to

“Hyderabaddies” is only qua the defendant no.3, and the adjective “bad”/

its variants(s) have not been attributed to the RCB trademark/ RCB Cricket

team. Further, the impugned poster and the slogan thereon forming a part of

the impugned advertisement, is a passing/ background presence which is not

very noticeable and even so, only depicted as it is on a poster in reference to

the passion and threat posed by the fans. As such, viewing the advertisement

as a whole in the context of the Cricket matches in the ongoing IPL, there is

not a single element of disparagement in the impugned advertisement.

21. On the aspect of SRH Cricket team being the hidden second advertiser

behind the impugned advertisement, Mr. Rajagopal submitted that the

defendant nos.1 and 2 have arrangements with multiple IPL teams playing in

the IPL 2025, and the SRH Cricket team is only one of them. That, by itself,

does not mean that there is any act of disparagement or any element of

hidden commercial purpose for SRH Cricket team involved. Regardless, for

arguments sake, even if the defendant no.3 is taken to represent the SRH

Cricket team, there is no falsehood/ misrepresentation being perpetrated and

the above arguments against disparagement still hold good.

22. Mr. Rajagopal then submitted that the right to advertise as deemed

appropriate by the advertiser is fortified by the fundamental right to “free

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 14 of 35

speech” guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a)

14

of the Constitution of India.

Reliance in this regard was placed by Mr. Rajagopal on Tata Sons Private

Limited and Ors. vs. Puro Wellness Private Limited and Ors.

15

, wherein a

co-ordinate bench of this Court, after citing Colgate vs. HUL

16

, held that the

right to free speech must weigh the balance in cases of temporary injunctions

and further that there is no absolute rule that while considering

advertisements impugned for disparagement where multiple interpretations

are possible, the Court must discard all but the most adverse one, and that the

advertisement must be viewed as a whole for the overall impression, and not

frame-by-frame with the specific aim of catching disparagement.

23. Mr. Rajagopal, thereafter relying upon Bloomberg Television

Production Services India Private Limited and Ors. vs. Zee Entertainment

Enterprises Limited

17

, submitted that although the same is a case of

defamation in the context of journalism, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has

clearly laid down that in the context of speech in the public domain, the

three-fold test of prima facie, irreparable harm, balance of convenience

should not be applied mechanically, and it must be borne in mind that

14

19. (1) All citizens shall have the right—

(a) to freedom of speech and expression;

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the

State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the

right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of 4 [the sovereignty and integrity of India,] the

security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in

relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.

15

2023 SCC OnLine Del 6338

16

206 (2014) DLT 329 (DB)

17

(2025) 1 SCC 741

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 15 of 35

prolonged litigation can be used to award an effective death sentence to such

speech/ expression.

24. Continuing further, Mr. Rajagopal, then relying upon Tata Sons Ltd.

vs. Greenpeace International &Anr.

18

, on the aspect of infringement

submitted that denominative use of a trademark to draw attention to the same

does not amount to infringement, and has nothing to do with Section 29(4) of

the TM Act.

25. Mr. Rajagopal also then, referring to Laugh It Off Promotions CC v.

South African Breweries and Freedom of Expression Institute

19

, which has

been referenced by this Court in Greenpeace (supra), and wherein the

Constitutional Court of South Africa while denying injunction against Laugh

It Off Promotions CC for altering well-known trademarks into comical

variants (eg.“Black Label” to “Black Labour”) and turning them into T-

shirts for sale, as also while dealing with “Does the law have a sense of

humour?” held that humour is one of the great solvents of democracy; and

that the parody must take from the trademark in order to be recognizable, yet

fall short of infringement, not carrying any element of deception.

26. In the aforesaid backdrop, Mr. Rajagopal once again referred to the

impugned advertisement as nothing more than a humorous twist, which as

per the own contention of the plaintiff is at best “poking fun” at the plaintiff,

more so, since, the advertisers herein are per se not engaged in a similar/

competing good(s)/ service(s).

18

2011:DHC:515

19

CCT 42.04

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 16 of 35

27. Mr. Rajagopal then submitted that the comments posted on the

impugned advertisement annexed by the plaintiff in themselves have no

element of deceptive similarity/ confusion, and the claim of ‘deceptively

similar’ by the plaintiff is not maintainable. Qua the comments posted after

the release of the impugned advertisement as annexed by the plaintiff, Mr.

Rajagopal submitted that the same are selective in nature, and there are other

positive comments by fans of RCB itself. So much so, one of the comments

on page 209 of the list of documents filed by the plaintiff reads “this ad is so

wholesome, even for RCB fans ”. Thus, the average perception is of light-

hearted banter.

28. Mr. Rajagopal then submitted that the plaintiff is making self-contrary

averments/ arguments since in paragraph 27 of the plaint, on one hand, it is

alleged that the defendants are exploiting the ‘goodwill’ but at the same

breadth it is also alleged that the defendants are damaging the ‘reputation’ of

the plaintiff.

29. Mr. Rajagopal lastly submitted that no irreparable harm is likely to be

caused to the plaintiff from the streaming of the impugned advertisement,

since it nowhere derogates, deprecates, or makes even a single negative

remark on the character/ quality of the RCB trademark/ RCB Cricket team.

Since the impugned banner and the impugned poster in the impugned

advertisement are not likely to impact any general perception/ perception of

the fans/ followers of the RCB Cricket team, there is no loss of reputation

being incurred by the plaintiff. The balance of convenience thus heavily tilts

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 17 of 35

in favour of the defendants in view of their fundamental right to free speech.

Rejoinder submissions by learned counsel for plaintiff

30. After conclusion of submissions by Mr. Rajagopal, Ms. Majumdar in

her rejoinder arguments reiterated the submissions already made by her

before, however, qua the case laws cited by Mr. Rajagopal, she submitted

that the same are not applicable to the facts and circumstances involved

herein. She, specifically with respect to Greenpeace (supra), submitted that

the same is not relating to advertisements and hence is not applicable, and

with respect to Laugh it off Promotions SS (supra), she submitted that the

same is not applicable in India. Lastly, she emphasized that the present is a

clear case of infringement by the defendants under Section 29(4) of the TM

Act. Additionally, in the written synopsis filed for and on behalf of the

plaintiff, Ms. Majumdar has sought to interpret the word “CHALLENGED”

in “ROYALLY CHALLENGED” by submitting that the same alludes to the

outcome of the upcoming match between the RCB and SRH Cricket teams in

the ongoing IPL 2025 and that by using a similar mark as the RCB

trademark, the impugned advertisement creates an image in the minds of the

people viewing it that the RCB Cricket team is going to be vanquished as it is

shown as an underperformer/ unreliable. Moreover, although the same

signifies a “Victor”, the impugned advertisement reflects the RCB Cricket

team as a “Loser”.

Analysis and Findings:

31. This Court has heard both Ms. Shwetashree Majumdar, learned

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 18 of 35

counsel for the plaintiff and Mr. Sai Krishna Rajagopal, learned counsel for

the defendant nos.1 and 2 at considerable length as also gone through the

pleadings and the accompanying documents, especially the impugned

advertisement along with the judgements cited at Bar in support thereof.

32. In the light of the aforesaid and since the present proceedings are

pertaining to the impugned advertisement, therefore, the reliefs sought qua

that by the plaintiff have to be tested on the anvil of the two prong test of (i)

Whether there is any disparagement per se? and (ii) Whether the provisions

of Section 29(4) of the TM Act are attracted?, which, needless to say, have to

be dealt with taking into account the provisions of Article 19 of the

Constitution of India.

33. For adjudicating on the aforesaid two prong test, this Court will

proceed to analyse the meaning, scope and application thereof under the

aforesaid facts and circumstances, pleadings and judgments cited by the

learned counsel for the parties herein.

Disparagement

34. Theoretically, disparagement as per the Black’s Law Dictionary is “…

…a false and injurious statement that discredits or detracts from the

reputation of another’s property, products or business.”, and as per the

Merriam-Webster Legal Dictionary it is “… …the publication of false

injurious statements that are derogatory of another’s property, business or

product”, and as per the Oxford English Dictionary is an act which “casts

another in a bad light or undervalues their reputation”. In fact, as per

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 19 of 35

Chapter 19: Trade Libel and Threats of Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and

Trade Names

20

, to maintain such an action, the statement made must “…

…specifically denigrate the claimant, and must be intended to be taken

seriously, and must contain specific false comparison, and must not be mere

general praise of the defendant’s goods.”.

35. Statutorily, since disparagement has nowhere been defined in any

Statute, therefore, it is only a ‘tortious liability’ and so the same has to be

taken into consideration as per the factual circumstances involved of each

case, which is for the plaintiff to show/ establish.

36. Legally, disparagement, and the law qua that has developed over the

years with the interpretations given by the Court(s) across the World,

including India through the lens of different Court(s) of the country.

Disparagement has now (tried to have) been given some shape/ meaning and

the broad contours/ parameters thereof have been set out. In fact, while

analysing disparagement, as also the permissible contours thereof, the High

Court of Madras in Gillette India Limited vs. Reckitt Benckiser

21

, while

dealing with the issue of disparagement, has gone onto hold as under:-

“96. The meaning of the expression “disparage” as given in the

commonly used dictionaries is, inter alia, to speak slightingly, to

undervalue, to bring discredit or dishonour, to deprecate, to degrade, to

derogate, to denigrate, to defame, to reproach, to disgrace, or to unjustly

class. Disparagement is, inter alia, the act of speaking slightingly, of

undervaluing, of bringing discredit or dishonour, of deprecating or

degrading or disgracing or unjust classing. It also means derogation or

20

Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names, Fifteenth Edition (2011) by J. Mellor, D. Llewelyn, T.

Moody-Stuart, D. Keeling and I. Berkeley,

21

2018 SCC OnLine Mad 1126

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 20 of 35

denigration or defamation or reproachment.”

[Emphasis supplied]

37. Interestingly, before Gillette India Limited (supra), a co-ordinate

bench of this Court in Pepsi Co. Inc. and Ors. vs. Hindustan Coca Cola Ltd.

And Anr.

22

, also while dealing with the issue of disparagement, after

venturing into the question of “What is disparagement?” held as under:-

“11. The New International Websters' Comprehensive

Dictionary defines disparage/ disparagement to mean, “to speak of

slightingly, undervalue, to bring discredit or dishonor upon, the act of

depreciating, derogation, a condition of low estimation or valuation, a

reproach, disgrace, an unjust classing or comparison with that which is of

less worth, and degradation.” The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines

disparage as under, to bring dis-credit on, slightingly of and depreciate.

12. In the electronic media the disparaging message is conveyed to the

viewer by repeatedly showing the commercial everyday thereby ensuring

that the viewers get clear message as the said commercial leaves an

indelible impression in their mind. To decide the question of

disparagement we have to keep the following factors in mind namely; (i)

Intent of commercial (ii) Manner of the commercial (iii) Story line of the

commercial and the message sought to be conveyed by the commercial.

Out of the above, “manner of the commercial”, is very important. If the

manner is ridiculing or the condemning product of the competitor then it

amounts to disparaging but if the manner is only to show one's product

better or best without derogating other's product then that is not

actionable. … ....”

[Emphasis supplied]

38. Similarly, a co-ordinate bench of this Court thereafter in S.C. Johnson

And Son v. Buchanan Group Pty Ltd. & Ors.

23

, again while dealing with the

issue of disparagement, held that “… …what is required to be answered is

22

2003 (27) PTC 305 (Del)

23

2010 (42) PTC 77(Del)

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 21 of 35

whether there is denigration of plaintiffs' products. The answer to this

question in my mind lies in what is the fundamental purpose for which the

product is manufactured.”.

39. Practically, disparagement depends upon the facts and circumstances

involved and the touchstone is the underlying message therein viewed from

the eyes of a common layman. Thus, the impugned advertisement, the intent

therein, the manner thereof, and the message thereby, along with the position

of the plaintiff, who is the owner and registered proprietor of the RCB

trademarks, and its rights therein under the existing circumstances have to be

cumulatively taken into consideration. At the end of the day, the plaintiff has

to show/ establish that the acts of the defendants amount to disparagement.

40. As per above, disparagement has to be of such a nature which is

conveying or seems to convey something negative attributable on the face of

it. Tersely put, disparagement per se has to have an element of demeaning/

criticism/ condemning/ ridiculing/ denigrating/ defaming/ disgracing/

belittling/ scorning/ mocking/ falsity with a view to cause injury and/ or

harm. Therefore, at a prima facie level for seeking the relief(s) of temporary

injunction, the plaintiff is at least required to show/ establish the presence of

the aforesaid element(s) of disparagement in the impugned advertisement.

41. While testing the impugned advertisement herein for disparagement,

this Court has to bear in mind that for a better understanding/ appreciation of

the impugned advertisement herein as also the message therein, the

advertisement as a ‘whole’ has to be viewed in one go, without breaking it

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 22 of 35

into segments/ fragments. Segmentizing/ fragmentising, with respect, can

never be the intent of law, especially whilst dealing with the issue of

disparagement. In any event, doing so, would amount to adding colours to a

normal black and white pencil sketch and can add an interpretation/ a new

dimension thereto.

Section 29(4) of the TM Act

42. The plaintiff, who is the owner and registrant of the RCB trademark,

has to show/ establish its rights qua infringement of the said trademark and

the rights therein as per the provisions of the TM Act, especially, as per the

provisions of Section 29(4) of the TM Act. Meaning thereby, the plaintiff has

to primarily show/ establish that the defendants were in “use” of its RCB

trademarks“… …in the course of trade… …”, and that there is an

infringement on their part. Additionally, the plaintiff is required to show/

establish that the same “… …is identical with or similar to… …” its RCB

trademarks as also that the said use is “… …in relation to goods or

services… …”. Finally, the plaintiff has also to show/ establish that the

aforesaid is “… …without due cause... …” whereby the defendants“…

…takes undue advantage… …” and which is “detrimental” to the “…

…distinctive character or repute… …” of the said RCB trademarks of the

plaintiff.

43. The position qua above has already been clarified by a co-ordinate

bench of this Court in ITC vs. Philip Morris

24

, wherein it has been held that

24

2010 SCC OnLine Del 27

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 23 of 35

the threshold of proof required under Section 29(4) of the TM Act is higher

than the preceding provisions of Section 29(1) to (3) of the TM Act on

simpliciter infringement, more so, as the provisions stipulated thereunder

come under the category of dilution of a trademark and relate to the

uniqueness of the trademark itself, not falling strictly within the realm of

traditional trademark law which focuses more on consumer interest.

44. It is thus apparent therefrom that while dealing with the provisions of

Section 29(4) of the TM Act, even in cases of identity between the impugned

marks and the registered trademark, there can be no presumption of

infringement by the defendants herein, simply because they are for different

kinds of “… …goods or services… …” from those of the plaintiff. Even

otherwise, at this stage, the plaintiff will have to not only show, but also

prima facie establish the aforesaid element(s) constituting infringement by

the defendants in the impugned advertisement.

45. Without the aforesaid ingredients, an action for infringement under

Section 29(4) of the TM Act would simpliciter not lie, even if it is assumed

that the mark used by the defendant was similar to the same.

Article 19 of the Constitution of India

46. Though every citizen of the country under Article 19(1)(a) of the

Constitution of India has the right “to freedom of speech and expression”,

however, the same have to be read in consonance with Article 19(2) of the

Constitution of India as the same is subject to “… …reasonable restrictions

on the exercise of the right conferred… …” and cannot be pertaining to “…

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 24 of 35

…decency or morality… …” or which can cause any “… …defamation or

incitement… …”. Therefore, advertisers like the defendants herein, are

though free to come out with an advertisement as per what they choose/

desire, however, the same not being without fetters, has to be within the

permissible contours. Having said that, the plaintiff has to show/ establish

that the defendants, though having equally vital rights, cannot be allowed to

impinge upon its rights.

47. In fact, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tata Press Ltd. v. MTNL &

Ors.

25

has held that advertisement/ commercial speech is also protected under

Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, as the same contributes to the

market place of ideas in the economic sphere. Similarly, a co-ordinate bench

of this Court, after considering the ratio laid down in Reckitt vs. Wipro

26

,

while dealing with the aforesaid issue in Tata Sons Private Limited (supra),

has held as under:-

“99. The findings in Reckitt v. Wipro may almost be transposed,

wholesale, into the facts of the present case; so stark are the similarities

between the two. In the present case, too, there is no direct reference to

Tata's white salt, though the commercial does refer to white salt in

general. Unlike the situation which obtained in Reckitt v. Wipro, there is

no overt, or covert, representation of white salt being removed and being

replaced by Puro Healthy Salt. As in that case, all positive assertions, in

Puro's commercial, are with respect to Puro Healthy Salt. Just as Wipro

emphasised the presence of sandal, in Santoor, as imparting moisturising

properties to it, thereby highlighting its advantages, Puro's commercial

emphasises the natural character of Puro Healthy Salt, owing to its not

being bleached, being free of any added chemicals and possessing

naturally occurring iodine, as features which rendered it a healthy

25

(1995) 5 SCC 139

26

2023 SCC OnLine Del 2958

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 25 of 35

alternative. Extolling one's product, even if it borders on exaggeration, is

perfectly permissible in comparative advertising and, so long as it does not

contain serious representations of qualitative or quantitative facts, does

not even have to pass the test of truth. What is proscribed is denigration of

the rival's product. Declaring one's product to be superior to the other's,

or even to all others, is permissible in comparative advertising. It is only

where the purported inferiority of others' products, to one's own, is

attributed to some specific feature, which is described in qualitative or

quantitative terms, that the truth of the assertion is required to be

established.

xxx xxx

106. It must always be remembered, in cases where commercials and

advertisements are called into question as being disparaging, that what

weighs in the balance is the right to free speech and to promote one's

product in the manner one deems most appropriate. This is an essential

feature of the right to trade and business. A competitor must not be

permitted, by seeking recourse to litigative measures, or by approaching

Court, to dictate the manner in which his rival's product is to be

advertised. His right begins and ends with ensuring that his product is not

disparaged. Additionally, the highest that he can seek is that the rival does

not, in puffing up his product, resort to serious representations of fact

which are misleading or incorrect, or in support of which no quantitative

or qualitative data is forthcoming.”

[Emphasis supplied]

48. Thus, it is clear therefrom that even exaggeration in an advertisement

is permissible, however, only as long as it does not make serious qualitative/

quantitative representations. It is also borne therefrom that if it does not make

such factual representations, it need not even pass the test of truth. However,

it is only when superiority is claimed with respect to a specific aspect by the

advertiser over the rival product will truth be required to be established. The

plaintiff has to thus make out a case accordingly.

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 26 of 35

Impugned advertisement

49. The complete impugned advertisement is running into 52 seconds. It

starts with the defendant no.3 riding on a “Uber-bike”, introducing himself

with a cheeky smile as one of the “Hyderabaddies”, and then asking

“Bengaluru” if they were “… …ready for a Head-ache?”, which is a mere

wordplay of his own name. Thereafter, the said defendant no.3 is, after

simply booking/ checking a ride on “Uber Moto”, seen entering the Stadium

along with his accomplice and writing “ROYALLY CHALLENGED” using

a spray paint right before “‘BENGALURU’ V. HYDERABAD” , which are

the names of two cities. Then the said defendant no.3 is seen leaving the

Stadium in the “Uber Moto” which has arrived within the “three minutes”.

The impugned advertisement then finally ends with the tagline reading “Uber

Moto- Office ride of the Hyderabaddies”.

50. In essence, in the opinion of this Court, the (i) intent (ii) manner and

(iii) message of the impugned advertisement is to show that Uber-Moto/ the

service(s) offered by the defendant nos.1 and 2 are fast and reliable as the

ride booked by the defendant no.3 arrives within the stipulated time and

saves the defendant no.3, who at the very outset had introduced himself in a

negative vein as a “hyderabaddie”, from being caught by the Security team

of the Stadium after finishing the mischievous task. Mere presence of a

reference similar to the RCB trademark on the impugned banner, or the

impugned poster with the slogan thereon in the impugned advertisement

cannot be said to be having any elements of disparagement and/ or

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 27 of 35

infringement within the meaning of Section 29(4) of the TM Act. In fact, the

position will be the same when viewed through the eyes of a common

layman.

51. It is pertinent to note that the defendant no.3 in the impugned

advertisement is seen as himself, hailing and using the services of the

defendant nos.1 and 2, which are ride hailing companies, whose services

have no nexus whatsoever with Cricket. Though the said defendant no.3 is a

Cricketer and calls himself a “Hyderabaddie”, however, nowhere throughout

the impugned advertisement is the said defendant no.3 either heard referring

to the SRH Cricket team or seen wearing the SRH Cricket team jersey. As

such, the impugned advertisement itself does not reflect any connection with

the SRH Cricket team.

52. At best, the impugned banner and the impugned poster in the

impugned advertisement are qua an upcoming match between the RCB and

SRH Cricket teams pitted against each other in an upcoming match they will

be playing in Bengaluru in the ongoing IPL 2025. Even so, the same is a

matter of fact, and throughout the impugned advertisement, the defendants

have never pointed any fingers to the quality/ performance of the RCB

trademark/ RCB Cricket team, nor can be said to seeking to draw out any

comparison with any/ either of them so as to derive something in their

favour. To this effect, it is the own case of the plaintiff in paragraph no.21 of

the plaint, as also noted above, that there is no element of comparison of

player statistics or team performance in the impugned advertisement. As

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 28 of 35

such, it cannot be said that the impugned advertisement has any element of

comparative advertising. Accordingly, there are no element(s) of (un)fair

and/ or (in)accurate comparison of any kind to show any kind of commercial

exploitation by the defendants.

53. Likewise, since it is also the own case of the plaintiff in the aforesaid

paragraph no.21 of the plaint that the same is “… … not a parody… …”,

there is no element of any irony or sarcasm therein. As a result, and even

otherwise in view of the aforesaid discussions, the impugned advertisement

cannot be said to be false and/ or misleading at this stage, and thus there are

no act(s) of disparagement by the defendants.

54. All throughout the impugned advertisement, there is no (in)direct

imputation/ insinuation/ comparison/ exaggeration/ sensationalism/ distortion

of matters of fact of any kind by any of the defendants against the RCB

trademark/ RCB Cricket team. That being so, there is no element of

demeaning/ criticism/ condemning/ ridiculing/ denigrating/ defaming/

disgracing/ belittling/ scorning/ mocking/ falsity with a view to injure or

harm the RCB trademark/ RCB Cricket team.

55. Even the impugned poster with the slogan “Ee Sala Cup Namde”

depicted there on the Stadium wall is only showing the same as it is, there are

neither any comment(s) qua it nor any reference thereto anywhere throughout

the impugned advertisement which can draw this Court to infer and/ or

conclude that there is any element of disparagement and/ or infringement

under Section 29(4) of the TM Act.

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 29 of 35

56. There is nothing underlying in the whole of the impugned

advertisement which can cause to trigger or motivate any members of the

general public, much less any of the players/ viewers/ followers of any of the

RCB and/ or SRH Cricket teams at this stage. There can be no one-sided

impression or one-sided version of the impugned advertisement, particularly,

since what according to the plaintiff is ‘right’ can according to the defendants

be ‘wrong’, and vice versa. The act(s) of disparagement cannot be concluded

on the basis of the reviews/ comments/ statements made by few viewers/

followers as there are always two sides of a coin. In any event, the same

cannot form or be the benchmark for determining the act of disparagement

and/ or infringement under Section 29(4) of the TM Act. This is not a tell-

tale.

57. Further, in the opinion of this Court, there is nothing in the impugned

advertisement which shows/ portrays/ reflects or wherefrom it can be either

inferred or concluded that the defendants have launched the said impugned

advertisement with a view to achieve any benefit and/ or take any kind of

undue/ unfair advantage or to cause any detriment to the character and/ or

repute of the RCB trademark/ RCB Cricket team. The defendants have

neither caused any harm to the reputation of nor derived any benefit from the

goodwill of the RCB trademarks/ RCB Cricket team of the plaintiff.

58. Further, this Court does not see anything in the impugned

advertisement which evidences diminishing of cache or dilution of positive

association in the minds of the general public qua the RCB trademark/ RCB

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 30 of 35

Cricket team. As such, this Court does not find anything negative/

deprecatory/ derogatory/ denigratory in the contents of the impugned

advertisement; and some online stray comments can hardly prove the case of

the plaintiff either way. The impugned advertisement is within the realm of

fair use by the defendants.

59. The aforesaid, coupled with the law qua dilution of trademarks laid

down in ITC (supra), leads to infer that mere use of an identical or similar

mark by the defendants itself does not per se create presumption of

infringement under Section 29(4) of the TM Act, more so, since there is

nothing to show/ establish otherwise.

60. It is also noteworthy that under such circumstances, it is not possible

for this Court to either draw any adverse inference therefrom and/ or to agree

with the submissions made by Ms. Majumdar, particularly, at this stage,

while dealing with the present application. The contention of Ms. Majumdar

that the word “challenged” indicates a “loser”/ “vanquished” is, prima facie,

not acceptable, particularly when the match is yet to be played.

61. Notably, the impugned advertisement involved herein is pertaining to a

game, and that too a game of Cricket, the players/ viewers/ followers whereof

have their own respective genre, space, devotion, bias and tolerance, as the

case may be from stage to stage and time to time, depending upon the

situation(s) involved, and have their own preferred manners of engagement

with the game. The contours of disparagement and/ or infringement while

dealing with an impugned advertisement relating to a game of Cricket cannot

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 31 of 35

be given such a restrictive meaning or viewed by a narrow spectacle.

62. It is also worth noting that the plaintiff in paragraph 15 of the plaint,

has itself pleaded that the impugned advertisement is on a social media

platform/ handles of both the defendant nos.1 and 2, and wherein the

defendant no.3 is admittedly shown as a “fictional anti-hero character named

Hyderabaddie”. Based thereon, this Court would not be wrong to conclude

that the impugned advertisement is at best only a creative depiction of

matter(s) of fact which tries to give a taste of humour to the viewers.

63. In view of the aforesaid, no common layman would be able to draw

any inference and/ or conclusion after seeing the impugned advertisement,

much less, hardly anything of the type sought to be contended by the

plaintiff. As collated hereinabove, a selective reading/ viewing of the

impugned advertisement is neither permissible nor ought to be permitted

while viewing an impugned advertisement through the eyes of a common

layman. In view thereof, the impugned advertisement cannot be said to come

within the purview and periphery of and tantamount to disparagement and/ or

infringement within the meaning of Section 29(4) of the TM Act, especially

taking into account the provisions of Article 19 of the Constitution of India.

64. With regards to Royal Challengers Sports Private Limited (supra), a

prior suit instituted by the very same plaintiff in the context of the movie

‘Jailer’, the same cannot be applicable to the facts involved in the present

proceedings mainly since the same was relating to a different cause of action

qua a character who was shown to commit offensive actions and was wearing

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 32 of 35

the RCB Cricket team jersey. Here, in the impugned advertisement, there is

nothing of that sort. Similarly, the plaintiff cannot seek any benefit from the

law laid down in Hamdard National Foundation (supra) since there too, the

element of derogation/ negative light was clearly discernible, such as the lead

actor calling the product “ROOH AFZA” of the plaintiff as “bekaar”

(useless/ bad) in Hindi. Here, there is nothing of that sort in the impugned

advertisement as well. The same is the situation when it comes to the plaintiff

trying to take benefit from ICICI Bank (supra) wherein a bank robbery is

shown to take place in a certain “IBIBI BANK” in broad daylight and it uses

a similar tagline to that of the ICICI Bank. There is nothing of that sort here.

Interestingly, in the impugned advertisement, the Security team in the

Stadium is rather shown as vigilant.

65. Thus, in view of the afore-going, this Court is of the considered

opinion that the general perception created by wholistic viewing of the

impugned advertisement is one of a healthy banter and good-natured light-

hearted humour without any elements of disparagement and/ or infringement

under Section 29(4) of the TM Act with regards to the RCB trademark/ RCB

Cricket team.

Prima facie case:

66. In view of the afore-going, the plaintiff has not been able to make out a

prima facie case of disparagement and/ or infringement in the impugned

advertisement in its favour and against any of the defendants. More so, when

this Court does not, and in fact cannot find anything wrong with the (i)

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 33 of 35

intent, (ii) manner and (iii) message thereof, especially when seen with the

overall spirit, or the purpose, or the context or the underlying reasoning

therein. Not to forget that such intent, manner and message is required to be

tested when seen through the eyes of a common layman.

Irreparable harm, loss and injury:

67. Considering that the plaintiff has not been able to make out a prima

facie case of any injury as there is no falsity/ misrepresentation/ undue and

unfair advantage/ deprecation/ derogation/ defamation on part of the

defendants qua the RCB trademark/ RCB Cricket team, as also there does not

appear to be any detriment to the repute of the RCB trademark taking place

which would be in-compensable, post the outcome of the present lis, this

Court is of the view that there is no scope of any kind of irreparable harm,

loss and injury likely to be caused to the plaintiff due to non-grant of

temporary injunction.

Balance of convenience:

68. Further, keeping in mind the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in Bloomberg Television (supra), it must be borne in mind that

prolonged litigation can be used to award an effective death sentence to

speech/ expression at pre-litigation stages. The decision in Bloomberg

Television (supra) read together with Tata Press (supra) wherein it was held

by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that commercial free speech is also protected

under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, this Court is of the view that the

balance of convenience is not in favour of the plaintiff for grant of temporary

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 34 of 35

injunction. More so, since in the opinion of this Court, there is no

inconvenience so great being caused to the plaintiff, so as to outweigh the

rights of the defendants.

Conclusion:

69. In light of the aforesaid, as also for the afore-going analysis and

conclusion, there is no prima facie case of disparagement and/ or

infringement of trademark under Section 29(4) made out by the plaintiff in its

favour and against the defendants; neither this is a case of any kind of

irreparable harm, loss and injury likely to be caused to the plaintiff if

temporary injunction is not granted in its favour and against the defendants;

nor the balance of convenience lie in favour of the plaintiff for grant of

temporary injunction.

70. The impugned advertisement is in the context of a game of Cricket, a

game of sportsmanship, which, in the opinion of this Court, does not call for

interference of any sort at this stage, especially while this Court is

considering the present application under Order XXXIX rules 1 and 2 read

with Section 151 of the CPC. More so, since in a case like the present one,

interference by this Court, at this stage, would tantamount to allowing the

plaintiff to run on water with assurances of their not falling.

71. Accordingly, the present application is dismissed. No order as to costs.

72. Before parting, this Court must appreciate the able assistance provided

by both Ms. Shwetashree Majumdar, learned counsel for the plaintiff and Mr.

CS(COMM) 345/2025 Page 35 of 35

Sai Krishna Rajagopal, learned counsel for the defendant nos.1 and 2 as also

their respective team(s) of counsels assisting them.

SAURABH BANERJEE, J.

MAY 05, 2025

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