1

Date of reserved for Judgment :02.01.2026

Date of Pronouncement :10.04.2026

Date of uploading :10.04.2026

APHC010043512012

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

[3520]

FRIDAY, THE TENTH DAY OF APRIL

TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 2084/2012

Between:

1. S. KHADER BASHA, W/O S. PAKEER SAHEB, MUSLIM R/O RTC

NALLAGUTTA, PILER, CHITTOOR DISTRICT.

...APPELLANT

AND

1. A P S R T C REP BY ITS M D, Rep. by its Managing Director,

Musheerabad, RTC Cross Roads, Hyderabad

...RESPONDENT

Appeal filed under Order 41 of CPC praying thet the Highcourt may be

pleased toorder dt. 29-2-2012 passed in MVOP No. 327 of 2009 on the file of the

Court of the Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Cum III Additional

District Judge, Tirupati.

Counsel for the Appellant:

1. T NAGARJUNA REDDY

2

Counsel for the Respondent:

1. ARAVALA RAMA RAO(SC FOR APSRTC KKAC)

The Court made the following:

3

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

M.A.C.M.A.No.2084 of 2012

JUDGMENT:

Introductory:

1. The claimant in M.V.O.P.No.327 of 2009 on the file of the Chairman, Motor

Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-III Additional District and Sessions Judge,

Tirupati (for short “the learned MACT”), feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of his

claim petition filed in terms of Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, filed the

present appeal, questioning the dismissal.

2. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be hereinafter referred to as

the petitioner/claimant and the respondent, as and how they are arrayed in the

impugned proceedings.

Factual Matrix:

3. Respondent herein is the respondent before the learned MACT. Son and

daughter-in-law of the claimant/petitioner died in road traffic accident that

occurred while they were proceeding on a motorcycle bearing No.AP 03 AH 2710

near Jammallapalle Village at about 02:15 p.m. on 18.04.2009. A.P.S.R.T.C. bus

bearing No.AP 11 Z 2750 (hereinafter referred to as “the offending vehicle”)

came in the opposite direction and dashed the motorcycle, causing the accident

and resulting in the death of both the son and daughter-in-law of the claimant.

Claims vide M.V.O.P.Nos.327 and 328 of 2009 were laid by the claimant herein.

4

4. The claim made for compensation for the death of the son of the appellant

was allowed, awarding compensation of Rs.3,97,000/-. However, the claim

made for compensation for the death of the daughter-in-law of the claimant was

dismissed on the ground of absence of dependency. Aggrieved by the dismissal

of the claim, contending that the claimant can be considered both as a legal heir

and dependent of the deceased daughter-in-law and disputing the dismissal of

the claim, the present appeal is filed.

5. Extensive arguments are submitted for both sides.

Arguments in the appeal:

For the appellant:

6. Merely on the ground that the claim in respect of the son is allowed,

dismissal of the claim in respect of the loss of dependency on daughter-in-law is

not correct.

7. The claimant can be considered as dependent even on the daughter-in-

law, as they are living together and as he is aged „58‟ years.

For the A.P.S.R.T.C.:

8. Father-in-law cannot be considered as a dependent or legal heir of the

daughter-in-law and the dismissal of the claim by the learned MACT is proper.

9. Perused the record. Thoughtful consideration is given to the arguments

advanced by both sides.

5

Points:

10. The points that arise for consideration in this appeal are:

1) Whether a father-in-law can be considered as dependent on the

deceased daughter-in-law for a claim for compensation when the death of

the daughter-in-law takes place due to motor vehicle accident?

2) Whether the appellant/claimant is entitled for compensation? If so,

to what amount?

3) What is the result of the appeal?

Point Nos.1 and 2:

Evidence relating to dependency and legal heir status:

11(i). In the inquest report, the claimant participated as a blood relative. The

petitioner / claimant as P.W.1 deposed that he is the only legal heir and that he

was dependent on the income of the deceased . The deceased was

getting/earning Rs.4,000/- per month. He further stated that he lost the love and

affection of the deceased and that here is none to take care of him, as his son

also died.

(ii). During the cross-examination of P.W.1, not even a suggestion is given that

the claimant is having independent income and that he is not dependent on the

deceased. A simple suggestion was given that the deceased was not earning

Rs.4,000/- as claimed. But, it was elicited that the deceased was collecting milk

and supplying it to a depot.

6

12(i). P.W.2 stated that the deceased was a tailor by profession and was selling

milk and earning money for the family. The petitioner / claimant and the

deceased were residing under one roof as a joint family.

(ii). During the cross-examination of P.W.2, it is elicited that P.W.2 is doing

business in a provisions shop and as a resident of a neighboring village of the

petitioner, he had acquaintance with the petitioner's family for 15 years, as they

are coming to his shop. The dependency of the claimant on the deceased is not

disputed during the cross examination of P.W.2 nor the joint living of the

deceased with the petitioner disputed.

(iii). Therefore, the joint living of the deceased and the petitioner is very clear.

Merely because the claimant has received compensation for the death of his son,

whether he is not entitled for compensation for the death of his daughter-in-law is

one aspect and whether in respect of death of his daughter-in-law, the claimant is

entitled for compensation is the second aspect require consideration.

Jurisprudence:

13. The legal position regarding locus standi of a person to make a claim for

compensation in terms of the Motor Vehicles Act, in the event of death of a

person, was addressed by Hon‟ble Apex Court in Gujarat State Road Transport

Corporation, Ahmedabad vs. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and another

1

. The

interpretation of expression "legal representative" with reference to the Fatal

1

1987 Supreme (SC) 522; 1987 ACJ 561; 1987 3 SCC 234

7

Accidents Act and the Motor Vehicles Act was considered by the Hon‟ble Apex

Court and the observations in paragraph Nos.10 to 13 of the judgment are

relevant. They are as follows:

10. Amongst the High courts in India there is a cleavage in the opinion as

regards the maintainability of action under S.110-A of the Act by persons

other than the wife, husband, parent and child of the person who dies on

account of a motor vehicle accident. All these cases are considered by the

High Court of Gujarat in its decision in Megjibhai Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai

Taljabhai, ( AIR 1977 Guj 195) (supra). The first set of cases are those

which are referred to in paragraph 5 of the above decision which lay down

that every claim application for compensation arising out of a fatal

accident would be governed by the substantive provisions in Ss. 1-A and 2

of the 1855 Act and no dependent of the deceased other than the wife,

husband, parent or child would be entitled to commence an action for

damages against the tortfeasors. Amongst these cases are P. B. Kader v.

Thatchamma, AIR 1970 Ker 241 and Dewan Hari Chand v. Municipal

Corpn. of Delhi, AIR 1973 Delhi 67. The second group of cases are those

referred to in Para 6 of the decision of the Gujarat High court. They are

Perumal v. Ellusamy Reddiar, 1974 Acc CJ 482 (Mad) and the Vanguard

Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hanumantha Rao, 1975 Acc CJ -344 (Andh Pra).

These cases lay down that while the compensation payable under S.1-A

of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 is restricted to the relatives of the

deceased named therein the compensation payable under S. 2 thereof

may be awarded in favour of the representatives of the deceased who are

entitled to succeed to the estate of the deceased. The third group of cases

are those referred to in para 7 of the judgment of the Gujarat High Court.

They are Mohmammed Habibullah v. K. Seethammal, AIR 1967 Mad 123;

Veena Kumari Kohli v. Punjab Roadways, 1967 Acc CJ 297 (Punj) and

Smt. Ishwari Devi Malik v. Union of India, AIR 1969 Delhi 183 which take

8

the view that a claim for compensation arising out of the use of a motor

vehicle would be exclusively governed by the provisions of Ss. 110 to 110-

F of the Act and bears no connection to claims under the 1855 Act and the

Claims Tribunal need not follow the principles laid down under the latter

Act. Having considered all the three sets of decisions referred to above,

Ahmadi, J. who wrote the judgment in Megjibhai Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai

Taljabhai, ( AIR 1977 Guj 195) (supra) came to the conclusion that an

application made by the nephews of the deceased who died on account of

a motor vehicle accident was clearly maintainable under S. I 10-A of the

Act.

11. We feel that the view taken by the Gujarat High Court is in

consonance with the principles. of justice, equity and good conscience

having regard to the conditions of the Indian society. Every legal

representative who suffers on account of the death of a person due to a

motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of

compensation and that is provided by S. 110-A to 110-F of the Act. These

provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of torts that every

injury must have a remedy. It is for the Motor Vehicles Accidents Tribunal

to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just as provided

in S. 110-B of the Act to specify the person or persons to whom

compensation shall be paid. The determination of the compensation

payable and its apportionment as required by S. 110-B of the Act amongst

the legal representatives for whose benefit an application may be filed

under S. 110-A of the Act have to be done in accordance with wellknown

principles of law. We should remember that in an Indian family brothers,

sisters and brothers children and sometimes foster children live together

and they are dependent upon the bread-winner of the family and if the

bread-winner is killed on account of a motor vehicle accident, there is no

justification to deny them compensation relying upon the provisions of the

Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which as we have already held has been

9

substantially modified by the provisions contained in the Act in relation to

cases arising out of motor vehicles accidents. We express our approval of

the decision in Megjibhai Khimji Vira. v. Chaturbhai Taljabhai, ( AIR 1977

Guj 195) (supra) and hold that the brother of a person who dies in a motor

vehicle accident is entitled to maintain a petition under S. 110-A of the Act

if he is a legal representative of the deceased.

12. We have carefully gone through the decision of the High Court of

Madhya Pradesh in Budha v. Union of India, (AIR 1981 Madh Pra 151)

(supra). We feel that the view taken in that decision is a narrow one and

does not give full effect to the object with which Ss. 110-A and 110-B of

the Act were enacted. We overrule the said decision.

13. Before concluding we may add that although the Act was extensively

modified after the receipt of the report of the Law Commission, Parliament

did not choose to amend S. 110-A of the Act by defining the expression

1egal representatives in relation to claims under Chapter VIII of the Act as

the spouse, parent and children of the deceased as recommended by the

Law Commission. The Law Commission had observed in its 85th report

that it would be appropriate to assign to the expression legal

representative the same meaning as had been given to the expression

representative for the purposes of the Fatal Accidents Act. 1855 and that

would effectively carry out the purpose of social justice underlying Chapter

VIII of the Act, to which the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was the nearest

approximation. This recommendation was made after referring to the

divergent views expressed by the various High Courts on the meaning of

the expression legal representatives in S. 110-A of the Act. The fact that

Parliament declined to take any action on the recommendation of the Law

Commission of India suggests that Parliament intended that the

expression legal representative in S. 110-A of the Act should be given a

wider meaning and it should not be confined to the spouse, parent and

children of the deceased.

10

14. It is relevant to note that a claim made even by a nephew of the deceased

was found maintainable by the Gujarat High Court and the same was found in

consonance with the principles. However, the test of dependency shall be kept

in view.

15. In Montford brothers of St. Gabriel and Another vs. United India

Insurance & Another

2

, the Hon‟ble Apex Court examined the maintainability of a

claim made by a charitable society to which the deceased was a member and

serving by dedicating all his service. In that context, the interpretation of the

word/term "legal representative" as to whether it includes even “intermeddlers”

etc. was considered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court. As per the factual matrix of the

said case, when a member in complete dedicated service of the organization

died and when the society made a claim and the claim was allowed by the

Tribunal, the award was questioned by way of a writ petition, which was allowed

considering the scope of the Fatal Accidents Act and the term "legal

representative" etc. The Hon‟ble Apex Court found that the claim is tenable and

that the Insurance Company is liable.

16. Further, the Hon‟ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Dr. Gangaraju

Sowmini and Another vs. Alavala Sudhakar Reddy and another

3

, examined

the sustainability of the claim made by a sister for the death of her brother. The

2

2014 Supreme (SC) 58; 2014 1 ACC 461; 2014 4 SCC (Cri) 628

3

2016 Supreme (AP) 95; 2016 3 ACC 208

11

objection of the Insurance Company was that she is not dependent of the

deceased was discarded. The Court examined the point as to whether non-

dependent heir of the deceased who died in a motor accident, is entitled to lay

claim for compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, where

there is no other dependent legal heir claiming compensation. It was situation of

conflicting judgments and a reference was made to a Full Bench. The Full Bench

has considered the case with reference to Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Motor

Vehicles Act, 1939 and other related provisions including Section 163-A of the

Motor Vehicles Act. In the said judgment, reference was made to various

judgments, including Montford brothers of St. Gabriel and Another vs. United

India Insurance & Another (2 supra) and Gujarat State Road Transport

Corporation, Ahmedabad vs. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and another (1 supra)

and also the Rule 2(g) of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, for interpretation

of the word "legal representative" with reference to Section 2(11) of the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908. The observations made in para 16 of the judgment as to

the interpretation of the word/term "legal representative" and who can make a

claim are found relevant in the present case, which are as follows:

16. In view of the clear and unambiguous language under Section 166 of the

Motor Vehicles Act, it is clear that application can be made either by the

injured or the legal representatives of the deceased. Though ‘legal

representative’ is not defined under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act,

1988, from Rule 2(g) of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, it is clear that

the definition of ‘legal representative’ is given same meaning as defined

12

under Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In view of the judgment

of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manjuri Bera’s case (9 supra), it is clear that the

compensation which is payable on account of no fault liability will form part of

the estate of deceased. In that view of the matter, there is no basis for

contending that the application is to be filed only by the dependants. As we

have held that dependency is a matter to be taken into consideration for

award of compensation and merely because one is not dependant, that by

itself, is no ground for not entertaining any claim made for grant of

compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. In view of the clear language

under Section 166 of the Act and in view of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme

Court in Manjuri Bera’s case (9 supra), wherein, it is held that the

compensation to be awarded under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act

will form part of the estate of deceased, and further, as the Act also provides

for compensation on other conventional heads, we are of the view that the

non-dependant also can lay a claim by filing application under Section 166 of

the Act. It is also to be noticed that the situations may arise, where, one may

have suffered injuries initially but ultimately after filing a claim, may have

succumbed to such injuries also. In such an event, lot of amount would be

spent towards hospitalisation etc., and as already discussed in the judgment

of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Montford Brothers’ case (5 supra), it is common

in the Indian society, where, the members of the family who are not even

dependant also can extend their support monetarily and otherwise to the

victims of accidents to meet the immediate expenditure for hospitalization

etc., in such cases, unless the legal representatives are allowed to continue

the proceedings initiated by the person who succumbs to injuries

subsequently, such claims will be defeated and that will also defeat the very

object and intentment of the Act. Any such measure would be wholly un-

equitable and unjust. Plainly, that would never be intent of any piece of

legislation. For the aforesaid reasons and in view of the language under

Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 r/w. Rule 2(g) of the A.P. Motor

13

Vehicles Rules, 1989, we are of the view that even the legal representatives

who are non-dependants can also lay a claim for payment of compensation

by making application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act.

17. From the authorities cited above, it is clear that either a dependent or a

legal heir, even a non-dependent legal heir, can maintain a claim in that view of

the matter. The dismissal of the claim by the learned MACT is found not tenable.

There is no serious dispute about the income of the deceased adopted at

Rs.3,000/- per month (i.e. at the rate of Rs.100/- per day) and the quantification

of compensation arrived at Rs.3,65,000/-. But, restricting award with reference to

the claim made by the claimant is found not proper when the tribunal / the

learned MACT has found the entitlement of the claimant at Rs.3,65,000/-.

18. In view of the discussion made above, the order and decree dated

29.02.2012 passed by the learned MACT in M.V.O.P.No.327 of 2009 found not

sustainable on law or facts. Accordingly, the same is set-aside and the claimant

is entitled for compensation of Rs.3,65,000/- with interest at the rate of 6% per

annum from the date of deposit till date of realization. Point Nos.1 and 2 framed

are answered accordingly.

Point No.3:

19. In the result, the appeal is allowed.

14

(1). The order and decree dated 29.02.2012 passed by the learned

MACT in M.V.O.P.No.327 of 2009 dismissing the petition are set-aside,

and the M.V.O.P.No.327 of 2009 is allowed as follows:

(i) The claimant is entitled for compensation of Rs.3,65,000/- with

interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of petition till the

date of realization.

(ii) The respondent before the learned MACT is liable to pay the

compensation.

(iii) The claimant is liable to pay the Court fee for the balanced amount

viz.Rs.65,000/-.

(iv) Time for payment/deposit of the amount is two months.

(a) If the claimant furnishes the bank account number within 15 days

from today, the Respondent / APSRTC shall deposit the amount

directly into the bank account of the claimant and file the necessary

proof before the learned MACT.

(b) If the claimant fails to comply with clause (iv)(a) above, respondent

/ APSRTC shall deposit the amount before the learned MACT and

the claimant is entitled to withdraw the amount at once on deposit.

(2) There shall be no order as to costs in the appeal.

15

20. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the appeal shall

stand closed.

____________________________

A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA, J

Date:10.04.2026

Knr

16

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

M.A.C.M.A.No.2084 of 2012

10.04.2026

Knr