Civil Appeals No. @ SLP (C) Nos.9602-03 of 2022

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEALS NO. 5503-04 OF 2022

ARISING OUT OF

PETITIONS FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CIVIL) NO.9602-03 OF 2022

S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY .… APPELLANT

Versus

V. NARAYANA REDDY AND OTHERS ….. RESPONDENTS

ALONG WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.5505 OF 2022

ARISING OUT OF

PETITION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CIVIL) NO.11290 OF 2022

S. NARSIMHA REDDY .… APPELLANT

Versus

V. NARAYANA REDDY AND OTHERS ….. RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

HIMA KOHLI, J.

1.Leave granted.

2.The present appeals are directed against a common judgment and order dated

29

th

April, 2022 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court for the State of

Telangana at Hyderabad, allowing the review petitions filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to

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6 herein (IA No.2 of 2014 in Revision CRPMP No. 6377 of 2014 moved in and Civil

Revision Petition No.2786 of 2013 and IA No.1 of 2014 in Revision CRMP No.4997 /

2014 moved in and Civil Revision Petition No.2787 /2013). As a result of allowing the

review petitions, the common judgment and order dated 09

th

July, 2013 passed by the

predecessor Bench upholding the common order dated 23

rd

March, 2013 in Cases No.

F1/3/2005 and F1/4/2005 passed by the Joint Collector, Mahabubnagar, has been set

aside and as a sequel thereto, the orders dated 31st March, 1967 passed by the

Tahsildar, Shadnagar, accepting the surrender of protected tenancy rights by the

ancestors of the appellant have been confirmed.

3.The appeals have a chequered history that dates back to the year 1967. The

facts relevant for deciding the present appeals are as follows:-

3.1 Late Shri Chandra Reddy and late Shri Chenna Reddy, both sons of Buchi

Reddy, were protected tenants in respect of separate parcels of land situated in different

survey numbers of Kammadanam Village, Shadnagar Mandal, Mahabubnagar District

1

.

The recorded landlord of the protected tenants was late Venkat Anantha Reddy, who

was the Karta of a joint family comprising of himself and his brother, late Laxma Reddy.

On the basis of an oral partition of the land that took place between the two brothers, the

subject land fell to the share of late L. Harshavardhan Reddy (respondent No.6), son of

late Laxma Reddy. Pertinently, L. Harshavardhan Reddy expired during the pendency of

the review petitions and L. Sameera Reddy was brought on record as his legal heir. As

1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘subject land’

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per the respondents, late Shri Chandra Reddy, who was a protected tenant in respect of

the subject land measuring 57 acres and 16 guntas, had surrendered his protected

tenancy rights on submitting a written application dated 6th August, 1966 to the

Tehsildar. A similar application was submitted by the three legal heirs of Late Chenna

Reddy (Ram Reddy, Chandra Reddy and Laxma Reddy) in respect of land measuring

98 acres 18 guntas. The respondents claim that on receiving the said applications, the

Tehsildar, Shadnagar, recorded the statements of the applicants and after confirming the

identity of the parties, issued a public notice and thereafter, accepted the surrender on

satisfying the requirements prescribed in the A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and

Agricultural Lands Act, 1950

2

. After accepting the surrender applications, the names of

the protected tenants were struck off from the final records of tenancy, vide order dated

31

st

March, 1967.

3.2It is also the version of the respondents that the protected tenants had

surrendered their tenancy rights in favour of late Venkat Anantha Reddy pursuant to an

understanding that the latter would not oppose the 38-B Certificate issued by the

Tenancy Tribunal in favour of Chandra Reddy and the sons of late Chenna Reddy in

respect of the parcel of land measuring 85 acres 23 guntas situated in Kammadanam

Village. In other words, there was a reciprocity between the protected tenants and the

landlord based on which, the landlord relinquished his rights in respect of land

2 For short ‘Act’

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measuring 85 acrs 23 guntas in exchange of the surrender of the subject land by

Chandra Reddy and the legal heirs of late Chenna Reddy.

3.3On the other hand, the appellant, who is the legal heir of the original tenants,

claims that his ancestors were dispossessed from the subject land in the year 1975

when they were trying to obtain 38-E Certificate from the authorities. Only in the year

2001 when the legal heirs of the protected tenants had applied for the final record of

tenancy, did they discover that the names of the protected tenants had been struck off

on the basis of the purported surrender proceedings conducted by the Tehsildar in the

year 1967. Challenging the said surrender proceedings, the predecessors-in-interest of

the appellant being the protected tenants, preferred appeals before the Joint Collector in

February, 2002 along with an application seeking condonation of delay. The said

appeals were allowed by the Joint Collector, Mahabubnagar, being the Appellate

Authority, vide order dated 2nd April, 2005. Aggrieved by the said order, the

respondents approached the High Court of Andhra Pradesh

3

raising a plea that it was an

ex-parte order and filed two Civil Revision Petitions (CRP No. 4620/2005 and CRP No.

4988/2005), which were allowed, vide order dated 19

th

September, 2006 and the matters

were remanded back for fresh disposal. On a re-hearing, the Appellate Authority passed

an order on 23

rd

March, 2013 whereby, the order dated 31

st

March, 1967 passed by the

Tehsildar, Shadnagar accepting the surrender of the protected tenancy rights by the

3 For short ‘High Court’

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ancestors of the appellant, was set aside and the original entries in respect of the land in

the final record of tenancy as existing prior to 1967, were restored.

3.4Dissatisfied by the order dated 23

rd

March, 2013, the respondents once again

approached the High Court by filing two Civil Revision Petitions (CRP No.2786/2013 and

CRP No.2787/2013), which came to be dismissed by a common judgment and order

dated 09th July, 2013. The review petitions subsequently filed by the respondents for

seeking review of the aforesaid judgment (Rev. CRMP No.5443/2013 in Civil Revision

Petition No. 2786/2013 and Rev. CRMP No. 5432/2013 in Civil Revision Petition No.

2787/2013) were also dismissed, vide order dated 20th February, 2014. The common

judgment and order dated 9

th

July, 2013 and the order dated 20

th

February, 2014 were

assailed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 6 through Special Leave Petitions (C) CC No.

8209- 8210/ 2014 that were disposed of with the following order passed on 4

th

July,

2014:

“Delay condoned.

The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that he would be in a

position to file genuine documents to show that there was surrender of

tenancy. If he will be able to obtain such documents, it is open to him

to file a review before the High Court. The special leave petitions are

disposed of accordingly.”

3.5Armed with the above order, the respondents No. 1 to 6 again approached the

High Court and filed a second round of review applications seeking review of the

common order and judgment dated 9th July, 2013 which have been allowed by the

impugned order. The learned Single Judge has upheld the surrender order dated 31st

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March, 1967 passed by the Tehsildar, Shadnagar whereby the names of the protected

tenants (predecessors-in-interest of the appellants) were deleted from the final records

of tenancy.

4.Arguing for the appellant, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned Senior Advocate

has contended that the review petitions filed by the respondents No. 1 to 6 are not main-

tainable as they do not satisfy any of the conditions for review provided in Order XLVII

Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908

4

. He submitted that the grounds taken in the

second set of review petitions were akin to those taken in the first set of review petitions

and once the first set of review petitions were dismissed by the High Court, vide order

dated 20th February, 2014 and no new grounds were taken by the respondents No.1 to

6 subsequently, there was no occasion to allow the second set of review petitions; that

the respondents No. 1 to 6 did not take a plea that the documents subsequently filed by

them, were not in their knowledge when they had filed the civil revision petitions and the

first set of review petitions before the High Court for attracting the provisions of Order

XLVII Rule 1 CPC. Stating that the scope of review is very limited and a review applica-

tion can only be entertained if there is any error apparent on the face of the record,

which the respondents No. 1 to 6 have failed to point out in the instant case, learned Se-

nior Counsel submitted that the High Court ought to have dismissed the same outright.

It was argued that by virtue of the impugned order, the High Court has virtually treated

the review petitions filed by the respondents No. 1 to 6 as independent appeals, which is

4 For short ‘CPC’

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impermissible. To buttress the aforesaid submissions made on the limited ambit and

scope of a review petition and the bar on filing successive review petitions, the decisions

of this Court in Babboo Alias Kalyandas and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh

5

and Lilly Thomas and Others v. Union of India and Others

6

have been cited.

5.Another plea sought to be taken on behalf of the appellant is that the name of the

father of the protected tenants, Chandra Reddy and Chenna Reddy has been stated to

be Papi Reddy in the surrender proceedings whereas, his correct name is Buchi Reddy

which goes to show that the surrender proceedings conducted by the Tehsildar were

fabricated and the fact of the matter is that neither the appellant, nor his ancestors had

ever surrendered the tenancy rights in favour of the respondents/their ancestors/ prede-

cessors- in-interest. It was contended that this fact is borne out from the declaration

made by the landlord in the ceiling proceedings where he had admitted that 38-E Certifi-

cate was granted in respect of the subject land and the tenants were in possession

thereof. It was canvassed that the High Court has failed to appreciate that had surrender

of lands by the protected tenants in favour of the landlord actually taken place in the

year 1967, as alleged, there was no occasion for the landlord to have later on claimed

exemption of these lands for being computed as part of his holdings under the Andhra

Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973

7

.

5 (1979) 4 SCC 74

6 (2000) 6 SCC 224

7 For short ‘the Land Ceiling Act’

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6.The aforesaid submissions made on behalf of the appellant have been

vehemently contested by Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the

respondents. It was submitted that the surrender proceedings had attained finality in the

year 1967 and after maintaining silence for almost 35 years, the legal heirs of the

protected tenants, had filed a misconceived appeal under Section 90(1) of the Land

Ceiling Act. Pertinently, the respondents being the purchasers of the subject land, were

not made parties in the said proceedings and the Appellate Authority had proceeded to

pass an order dated 2nd April, 2005 allowing the said appeals behind their back.

Aggrieved by the said ex parte order, when the respondents approached the High Court,

the matters were remanded back to the Appellate Authority for fresh adjudication. The

Appellate Authority allowed the appeals, once again compelling the respondents to

approach the High Court by filing fresh appeals which were knocked off vide order dated

09

th

July, 2013 and their review petitions were also dismissed on 20

th

February, 2014.

Against the said dismissal orders, the respondents had to approach this Court. The

petitions for special leave to appeal preferred by them were disposed of vide order dated

4th July, 2014 that has been extracted in para 5 hereinabove.

7.Learned Senior Advocate submitted that in the light of the permission granted by

this Court, the respondents had filed review petitions in the Civil Revision Petitions

before the High Court after obtaining certified copies of the relevant documents forming

a part of the revenue records. Only after considering the said documents did the learned

Single Judge allow the review petitions for cogent and valid reasons that do not deserve

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any interference. It has been canvassed on behalf of the respondents that the legal heirs

of the protected tenant had knowledge about the surrender of the subject land right from

the year 1967 to 2001 and they were also aware of the fact that the names of their

ancestors were not reflected in the protected tenants register. The real position is that

the ancestors of the appellant were never in possession of the subject land after 1967.

Despite that, they had approached the Appellate Authority challenging the surrender

proceedings after a passage of 35 years. Contending that said appeals were highly

belated and deserved to be thrown out on the ground of limitation alone without going

into the merits, the decisions in Sakuru v. Tanaji

8

and Dharappa v. Bijapur Coop. Milk

Products Societies Union Limited

9

have been cited. It has been urged that the

appeals preferred by the ancestors of the appellant were not maintainable, being

patently barred by limitation which aspect has been gone into by the High Court while

passing the impugned judgment allowing the review petitions filed by the respondents.

8. As for the mis-description of the predecessor-in-interest of the ap-

pellant, it was submitted that Buchi Reddy was also known Papi Reddy in the

village which fact is reflected from the revenue records, namely, Faisal Patti

record of the village, as recorded by the Patwari. Counsel for the respondents

also sought to negate the ground taken by the other side with reference to the

landlord claiming exemption under the land ceiling proceedings on the ground

that Land Reforms Tribunal did not accept such a plea of exemption. It was

8

(1985) 3 SCC 590

9

(2007) 9 SCC 109

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thus submitted that surrender of the tenancy rights had attained finality in the

year 1967 itself and the appellant and his ancestors have reopened settled is-

sues after passage of 35 years reckoned from the date of surrender only for

the reason that the price of the subject land, which is situated close to the In-

ternational Airport at Shamshabad, have escalated and he wants to encash

the same.

9. This Court has carefully perused the impugned judgment and the

orders preceding the impugned judgment, gone through the records and

given its thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned

counsel for the parties. The only point that arises for consideration in these

appeals is whether the respondents/review petitioners had made out a case

for reviewing the judgment and order dated 23

rd

March, 2013 by satisfying the

criteria for entertaining a second set of review petitions, having failed to suc-

ceed in the first set of review petitions.

10. The core argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that the

High Court ought not to have entertained successive review petitions filed by

the respondents when they could not demonstrate emergence of any new

facts or point out any error apparent on the face of the record, for allowing the

review applications, must be put to test by examining the relevant provisions

of law that governs review jurisdiction.

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11. Section 114 of the CPC which is the substantive provision, deals

with the scope of review and states as follows:

“Review:- Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved:-

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but

from which no appeal has been preferred;

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code; or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for

a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order,

and the court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.”

12. The grounds available for filing a review application against a

judgment have been set out in Order XLVII of the CPC in the following words:

“1. Application for review of judgment - (1) Any person considering himself

aggrieved -

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no

appeal has been preferred,

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,

and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which,

after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not

be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made,

or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or

for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree

passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the

Court which passed the decree or made the order.

(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or Order may apply for a

review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other

party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and

the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate

Court the case on which he applies for the review.

1[Explanation-The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the

judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the

subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a

ground for the review of such judgment.] “

13. A glance at the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that a review

application would be maintainable on (i) discovery of new and important

matters or evidence which, after exercise of due diligence, were not within

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the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him when the

decree was passed or the order made; (ii) on account of some mistake or

error apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) for any other sufficient

reason.

14. In Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India and Others

10

,

this Court observed that a review of an earlier order cannot be done unless

the court is satisfied that the material error which is manifest on the face of

the order, would result in miscarriage of justice or undermine its soundness.

The observations made are as under:

“12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri Kapil

at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt without being

heard. But we cannot review our earlier order unless satisfied that material

error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results

in miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra Kante and Another v. Sheikh Habib

11

this Court observed :

‘A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant

resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or

patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by

judicial fallibility. … The present stage is not a virgin

ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal

feature of finality.’ ”

(emphasis added)

15. In Parsion Devi and Others v. Sumitri Devi and Others

12

, stating

that an error that is not self- evident and the one thathas to be detected by the

process of reasoning, cannot be described as an error apparent on the face

10 1980 Supp SCC 562

11 (1975) 1 SCC 674

12 (1997) 8 SCC 715

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of the record for the Court to exercise the powers of review, this Court held as

under:

“7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit

and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P.

13

this Court opined:

’11. What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the

statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve

any substantial question of law is an ‘error apparent on the face of the

record’. The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an

identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not

per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous.

Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was

an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’, for there is a distinction

which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition,

between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be

characterized as vitiated by ‘error apparent’. A review is by no means

an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and

corrected, but lies only for patent error.’

8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury

14

while quoting with approval

a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma

15

this Court once

again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly

confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if

there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which

is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly

be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to

exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of this

jurisdiction under Order 47 rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous

decision to be ‘reheard and corrected’. A review petition, it must be

remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be ‘an appeal in

disguise’”.

[emphasis added]

16. The error referred to under the Rule, must be apparent on the face

of the record and not one which has to be searched out. While discussing the

scope and ambit of Article 137 that empowers theSupreme Court to review its

judgments and in the course of discussing the contours of review jurisdiction

under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC in Lily Thomas(supra), this Court held

as under :

13 1964 SCR (5) 174

14(1995) 1 SCC 170

15 (1979) 4 SCC 389

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“54. Article 137 empowers this court to review its judgments subject to the

provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145 of the

Constitution. The Supreme Court Rules made in exercise of the powers under Article

145 of the Constitution prescribe that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds

specified in Order 47 rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides:

“1. Application for review of judgment - (1) Any person considering

himself aggrieved -

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from

which no appeal has been preferred,

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,

and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence

which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his

knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the

decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or

error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient

reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order

made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court

which passed the decree or made the order.’

Under Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules no review lies except on the

ground of error apparent on the face of the record in criminal cases. Order XL Rule 5

of the Supreme Court Rules provides that after an application for review has been

disposed of no further application shall be entertained in the same matter.

XXX XXX XXX

56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for

correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be

exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The

review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two

views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is

dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of

following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking

different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be

followed and practised. However, this Court in exercise of its powers under Article

136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and upon satisfaction that the earlier judgments

have resulted in deprivation of fundamental rights of a citizen or rights created under

any other statute, can take a different view notwithstanding the earlier judgment.

XXX XXX XXX

58. Otherwise also no ground as envisaged under Order XL of the Supreme Court

Rules read with Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been pleaded in the

review petition or canvassed before us during the arguments for the purposes of

reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case

16

. It is not the case of the petitioners that

they have discovered any new and important matter which after the exercise of due

diligence was not within their knowledge or could not be brought to the notice of the

Court at the time of passing of the judgment. All pleas raised before us were in fact

16 (1995) 3 SCC 635, Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani and Others v. Union of India and

Others

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addressed for and on behalf of the petitioners before the Bench which, after

considering those pleas, passed the judgment in Sarla Mudgal

16

case. We have also

not found any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record requiring a review.

Error contemplated under the rule must be such which is apparent on the face

of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must

be an error of inadvertence. No such error has been pointed out by the learned

counsel appearing for the parties seeking review of the judgment. The only arguments

advanced were that the judgment interpreting Section 494 amounted to violation of

some of the fundamental rights. No other sufficient cause has been shown for

reviewing the judgment. The words "any-other sufficient reason appearing in

Order 47 Rule 1 CPC" must mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least

analogous to those specified in the rule" as was held in Chajju Ram v. Neki

Ram

17

and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos. v. Most

Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius

18

. Error apparent on the face of the proceedings is

an error which is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of

law. in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa

19

this Court held that such error is an error

which is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. In Hari Vishnu Kamath v.

Ahmad

20

, it was held:

“It is essential that it should be something more than a mere

error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the

record. The real difficulty with reference to this matter, however, is not

so much in the statement of the principle as in its application to the

facts of a particular case. When does an error, cease to be mere error

and become an error apparent on the face of the record? Learned

Counsel on either side were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by

which the boundary between the two classes of errors could be

demarcated.

Mr. Pathak for the first respondent contended on the

strength of certain observations of Chagla, CJ in – ‘Batuk K Vyas v.

Surat Borough Municipality'

21

, that no error could be said to be

apparent on the face of the record if it was not self-evident and if it

required an examination or argument to establish it. This test might

afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of cases. But

there must be cases in which even this test might break down,

because judicial opinions also differ, and an error that might be

considered by one Judge as self-evident might not be so considered

by another. The fact is that what is an error apparent on the face

of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there

being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature,

and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of

each case.

Therefore, it can safely be held that the petitioners have not made out

any case within the meaning of Article 137 read with Order XL of the

Supreme Court Rules and Order 47 Rule 1 CPC for reviewing the

17 AIR 1922 PC 112

18 1955 SCR 520

19 1955 SCR 250

20 AIR 1955 SC 233

21 ILR 1953 Bom 191

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judgment in Sarla Mudgal case

16

. The petition is misconceived and

bereft of any substance.” (emphasis added)

17. It is also settled law that in exercise of review jurisdiction, the Court

cannot reappreciate the evidence to arrive at a different conclusion even if

two views are possible in a matter. In Kerala State Electricity Board v.

Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. and Others

22

, this Court

observed as follows:

“10. ....In a review petition it is not open to this Court to reappreciate the

evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. Learned

counsel for the Board at best sought to impress us that the correspondence

exchanged between the parties did not support the conclusion reached by this

Court. We are afraid such a submission cannot be permitted to be advanced in a

review petition. The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the

domain of the appellate court. If on appreciation of the evidence produced,

the court records a finding of fact and reaches a conclusion, that

conclusion cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that

there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin

thereto. It has not been contended before us that there is any error apparent on

the face of the record. To permit the review petitioner to argue on a question

of appreciation of evidence would amount to converting a review petition

into an appeal in disguise."

(emphasis added)

18. Under the garb of filing a review petition, a party cannot be

permitted to repeat old and overruled arguments for reopening the

conclusions arrived at in a judgment. The power of review is not to be

confused with the appellate power which enables the Superior Court to

correct errors committed by a subordinate Court. This point has been

22 (2005) 6 SCC 651

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elucidated in Jain Studios Ltd. V. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd.

23

where it

was held thus:

“11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the learned

counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that virtually the applicant seeks the

same relief which had been sought at the time of arguing the main matter and had

been negatived. Once such a prayer had been refused, no review petition would

lie which would convert rehearing of the original matter. It is settled law that the

power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a

superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. It is

not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and overruled

argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. The power of

review can be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and

only in exceptional cases.

12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the applicant herein had been made

at the time when the arbitration petition was heard and was rejected, the same

relief cannot be sought by an indirect method by filing a review petition. Such

petition, in my opinion, is in the nature of 'second innings' which is

impermissible and unwarranted and cannot be granted.”

(emphasis added)

19. After discussing a series of decisions on review jurisdiction in

Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and Others

24

, this Court observed that review

proceedings have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order

XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As long as the point sought to be raised in the review

application has already been dealt with and answered, parties are not

entitled to challenge the impugned judgment only because an alternative

view is possible. The principles for exercising review jurisdiction were

succinctly summarized in the captioned case as below:

“20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable

as stipulated by the statute:

20.1. When the review will be maintainable:

23 (2006) 5 SCC 501

24 (2013) 8 SCC 320

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(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of

due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be

produced by him;

(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

(iii) Any other sufficient reason.

The words "any other sufficient reason" has been interpreted in Chajju Ram vs.

Neki

17

, and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most

Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius & Ors.

18

to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at

least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been

reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors.

25

,.

20.2. When the review will not be maintainable: -

(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded

adjudications.

(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.

(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.

(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of

the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.

(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision

is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error.

(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for

review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error

which has to be fished out and searched.

(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the

appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.

(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of

arguing the main matter had been negatived.”

20. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma

15

, this

Court was examining an order passed by the Judicial Commissioner who

was reviewing an earlier judgment that went in favour of the appellant, while

deciding a review application filed by the respondents therein who took a

ground that the predecessor Court had overlooked two important documents

that showed that the respondents were in possession of the sites through

which the appellant had sought easementary rights to access his home-

25 (2013) 8 SCC 337

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stead. The said appeal was allowed by this Court with the following

observations:

“3 …It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh and Others v. State of

Punjab

26

there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High

Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary

jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and pulpable

errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power

of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new

and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence

was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not

be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be

exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is

found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not

be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That

would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be

confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to

correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.”

(emphasis added)

21. In State of West Bengal and Others v. Kamal Sengupta and

Another

27

, this Court emphasized the requirement of the review petitioner

who approaches a Court on the ground of discovery of a new matter or

evidence, to demonstrate that the same was not within his knowledge and

held thus:

“21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is sought on the

ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be

relevant and must be of such a character that if the same had been produced, it

might have altered the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or

important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito

justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also to show that such

additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after

the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the

court earlier.”

(emphasis added)

26 (1979) 4 SCC 389

27 (2008) 8 SCC 612

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22. In the captioned judgment, the term ‘mistake or error apparent’

has been discussed in the following words:

“22. The term ‘mistake or error apparent’ by its very connotation signifies an

error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not

require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or

the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires

long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent

on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3)

(f) of the Act. To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be

corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a

different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a point of fact

or law. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal

concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision”.

(emphasis added)

23. In S. Nagaraj and Others v. State of Karnataka and Another

28

,

this Court explained as to when a review jurisdiction could be treated as

statutory or inherent and held thus :

“18. Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of

procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way. The order of the court

should not be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered for

consistency but it is not as inflexible in Administrative Law as in Public Law. Even

the law bends before justice. Entire concept of writ jurisdiction exercised by

the higher courts is founded on equity and fairness. If the court finds that

the order was passed under a mistake and it would not have exercised the

jurisdiction but for the erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and

its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice then it cannot on any

principle be precluded from rectifying the error. Mistake is accepted as valid

reason to recall an order. Difference lies in the nature of mistake and scope

of rectification, depending on if it is of fact or law. But the root from which

the power flows is the anxiety to avoid injustice. It is either statutory or

inherent. The latter is available where the mistake is of the Court”.

(emphasis added)

24. In Patel Narshi Thakershi and Others v. Shri Pradyuman

Singhji Arjunsinghji

29

, this Court held as follows:

28 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595

29 (1971) 3 SCC 844

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“4….. It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It

must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. No

provision in the Act was brought to notice from which it could be gathered that the

Government had power to review its own order. If the Government had no power

to review its own order, it is obvious that its delegate could not have reviewed its

order.……”

(emphasis added)

25. In Ram Sahu (Dead) Through LRs and Others v. Vinod Kumar

Rawat and Others

30

, citing previous decisions and expounding on the scope

and ambit of Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1, this Court has

observed that Section 114 CPC does not lay any conditions precedent for

exercising the power of review; and nor does the Section prohibit the Court

from exercising its power to review a decision. However, an order can be

reviewed by the Court only on the grounds prescribed in Order XLVII Rule 1

CPC. The said power cannot be exercised as an inherent power and nor can

appellate power be exercised in the guise of exercising the power of review.

26. As can be seen from the above exposition of law, it has been

consistently held by this Court in several judicial pronouncements that the

Court’s jurisdiction of review, is not the same as that of an appeal. A

judgment can be open to review if there is a mistake or an error apparent on

the face of the record, but an error that has to be detected by a process of

reasoning, cannot be described as an error apparent on the face of the

record for the Court to exercise its powers of review under Order XLVII Rule

30 (2020) SCC Online SC 896

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1 CPC. In the guise of exercising powers of review, the Court can correct a

mistake but not substitute the view taken earlier merely because there is a

possibility of taking two views in a matter. A judgment may also be open to

review when any new or important matter of evidence has emerged after

passing of the judgment, subject to the condition that such evidence was not

within the knowledge of the party seeking review or could not be produced by

it when the order was made despite undertaking an exercise of due

diligence. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision as

against an error apparent on the face of the record. An erroneous decision

can be corrected by the Superior Court, however an error apparent on the

face of the record can only be corrected by exercising review jurisdiction. Yet

another circumstance referred to in Order XLVII Rule 1 for reviewing a

judgment has been described as “for any other sufficient reason”. The said

phrase has been explained to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds, at least

analogous to those specified in the rule” (Refer: Chajju Ram v. Neki Ram

17

and Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose

Athanasius and Others

18

).

27. In the light of the legal position crystalized above, let us now

examine the grievance raised by the appellant. The learned Single Judge of

the High Court has taken great pains to discuss the three circumstances

available under Order XLVII CPC for maintaining a review application and

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observed that in the instant case, the respondents had stated before this

Court that they had in their possession, genuine documents relating to

surrender of the protected tenancy rights in respect of the subject land and in

view of the said submission, the petitions for Special Leave to Appeal were

disposed of with an observation that if the respondents were able to obtain

such documents, it would be open to them to file a review petition before the

High Court. What is relevant is that this Court had even then declined to

interfere with the findings on merits returned by the High Court vide

Judgment dated 09

th

July, 2013; nor was the review order dated 20

th

February, 2014, interfered with. Under the garb of the liberty granted to them

to approach the High Court again, all that the respondents have done is to

obtain certified copies of the revenue records in respect of the subject land

and enclosed them with the second set of review petitions. This is so when

photocopies of the said documents had been filed by them earlier.

28. Nothing prevented the respondents from filing the certified copies

of the revenue records even earlier, but they elected to file only photocopies

of the very same surrender proceedings along with the revision petitions that

were ultimately dismissed by the High Court vide common judgment dated 9

th

July, 2013. The High Court refused to accept the version of the respondents

that the protected tenants had surrendered the subject lands in favour of the

landlord. The discussion in the judgment regarding the purported surrender

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proceedings of protected rights by the tenants before the Tehsildar in the year

1967 is revealing and extracted hereinbelow for ready reference :-

“2. …………The legal representatives of the protected tenants were not

parties to the alleged surrender proceedings before the then Tahsildar

in the year 1967. There is nothing on record to show that they were ever

dispossessed from the lands, so that they can take necessary steps

under relevant provisions of the Act before the authorities concerned.

After coming to know about earlier proceedings which are stated to be in

the year 1967, they rushed to the Joint Collector with the present

appeals. There is nothing on record to impute knowledge of the

proceedings of the year 1967 to them at any time prior to filing of the

appeals before the Joint Collector.

3. Though the alleged surrender of protected tenancy rights by one

protected tenant and three legal representatives of the other protected

tenant was stated to be in the year 1967, it is pointed out by the

Joint Collector in the impugned order that the original land

holder/landlord sought for exemption from computing these lands in his

holding under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on

Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. If really the alleged surrender of lands

by the protected tenants in favour of the landlord was in the year 1967,

the landlord would not have claimed exemption for these lands from

being computed in his holding under the Ceiling Act. No doubt, the

Land Reforms Tribunal rejected the plea of exemption put forward by

the landlord on the ground that he did not produce proper evidence of

granting certificates under Section 38-E of the Act in favour of the

protected tenants for these lands. Therefore, these lands were

computed in the holding of the landlord not on the ground of the

protected tenants surrendering their protected tenancy rights, but on

the ground that the landholder could not produce relevant documents

for exemption. Therefore, the Joint Collector rightly came to the

conclusion that file relating to surrender of lands by the protected

tenants in the year 1967 was manipulated by ante dating the same

after the land ceiling case was finalized by the Land Ceiling Tribunal.

4. Further, the Joint Collector rightly disbelieved the alleged

surrender of protected tenancy rights in the year 1967 on the ground

that if the surrender in the year 1967 was correct, the question of again

terminating protected tenancy rights for Ac.36.34 guntas by order

dated 16.06.2008 does not arise.

5. Record of the then Tahsildar in the year 1967 discloses

that one protected tenant and legal heirs of other protected tenant

intended to surrender protected tenancy rights in favour of the landlord

as the landlord intended to cultivate these lands personally. Further,

the Joint Collector came to the conclusion that the alleged surrender

in the year 1967 was without knowledge of the protected tenant and

legal heirs of another protested tenant inasmuch as the landholder

pleaded before the Land Ceilings Tribunal in his land celling declaration

that these lands are in possession of the protected tenants. From the

above circumstances, it can be safely concluded that record of the

then Tahsildar, Shamshadnagar by way of surrender of protected

tenancy rights under Section 19 of the Act was not only ante dated

but also cooked up. Hence, find no reason to come to a different

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conclusion

from that of the Joint Collector in this revision petition. The common

order passed by the Joint Collector is proper, legal and regular.”

29. In the first round of the review proceedings filed by the

respondents for seeking review of the order and judgment dated 9

th

July,

2013, they had sought to raise, amongst others, the plea of limitation, the

purported error on the part of the Appellate Authority in calling for the records

from the office of the Revenue Divisional Officer for deciding the case and the

alleged misconstruction of the ceiling proceedings conducted by the Land

Reforms Tribunal, all of which were earlier argued and did not find favour with

the High Court. But, at no stage was a plea taken by the respondents with

regard to the discovery of new documents which could not have been

produced by them after undertaking due diligence before the order dated 9

th

July, 2013 came to be passed. When the first set of review petitions were

dismissed by the learned Single Judge by a detailed order dated 20

th

February, 2014, it was specifically observed in para 2 that the respondents

did not plead that any new facts had come to light for the consideration of the

Court. In fact, a perusal of the said order shows that the respondents only

sought to reargue the points that had already been taken by them and were

rejected outrightly, vide judgment dated 9

th

July, 2013.

30. The sequence of events narrated in the order dated 20

th

February,

2014, passed by the High Court while dismissing the first set of review

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applications brings to the fore the fact that the respondents had approached

the High Court twice by filing Civil Revision Petitions. In the first round, two

Revision Petitions [CRPs No. 4620 and 4988 of 2005] filed by the

respondents against the order dated 2

nd

April, 2005, passed by the Appellate

Authority, were allowed by the High Court vide order dated 19

th

September,

2006 on the ground that the proceedings initiated by the legal heirs of the

protected tenants went uncontested before the Appellate Authority.

Accordingly, the appeals were remitted back to the Appellate Authority for

fresh consideration. On remand, the said appeals were disposed of by the

Appellate Authority on merits vide order dated 23

rd

March, 2013. The second

set of Revision Petitions filed by the respondents questioning the said

decision, were turned down on merits by the common order dated 9

th

July,

2013, review whereof was also dismissed vide order dated 20

th

February,

2014.

31. The above chronology of events gains significance as it goes to

amply demonstrate that several opportunities were available to the

respondents if they really wished to file authenticated copies of the revenue

records relating to the purported surrender proceedings before the Tehsildar

which they did not avail of, for reasons best known to them. The first

opportunity arose when the respondents challenged the ex parte order dated

2

nd

April, 2005 passed by the Appellate Authority when they filed two Civil

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Revision Petitions which were allowed and the matter was remanded back to

the Appellate Authority for fresh consideration; the second opportunity arose

when the Appellate Authority re-considered the appeals remitted by the High

Court and passed an order dated 23

rd

March, 2013, in favour of the

predecessors-in-interest of the appellant; the third opportunity arose when the

respondents preferred a second set of Civil Revision Petitions assailing the

order dated 23

rd

March, 2013 that culminated in the common judgment and

order dated 9

th

July, 2013 passed by the High Court; the fourth opportunity

arose when the respondents filed two review applications for seeking review

of the common judgment and order dated 9

th

July, 2013, that came to be

dismissed vide order dated 20

th

February, 2014; and the fifth opportunity

arose when the respondents preferred petitions for special leave to appeal

before this Court being aggrieved by the common judgment and orders dated

9

th

July, 2013 and the review order dated 20

th

February, 2014 passed by the

High Court.

32. Pertinently, this Court had declined to entertain the said petitions

preferred by the respondents but having regard to the submission made on

their behalf that they would be in a position to file documents to show that

there was surrender of tenancy on the part of the protected tenants and their

legal heirs, it was left open to the respondents to file a review petition before

the High Court. It was only thereafter that the respondents woke up to filing

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certified copies of those documents, xerox copies whereof had already been

filed by them in the second round of revision petitions preferred before the

High Court. That being the position, the respondents cannot be heard to

state that the documents in question were not to their knowledge or that the

certified copies of the revenue record could not be produced by them before

the High Court passed the common judgment and order dated 09

th

July, 2013.

At the time of filing the second set of review petitions, the respondents raised

a plea that the learned Single Judge did not consider the relevant record

produced by them regarding the surrender proceedings and had erroneously

returned a finding that the file relating to surrender of the land by the

protected tenants in the year 1967, was manipulated by ante-dating the same

after the land ceiling was finalized by the Land Ceiling Tribunal. However,

apart from the bald averment by the respondents that the documents were

not considered, which averment has been replicated in the impugned order, a

perusal of the earlier judgment of the High Court does not suggest any such

non-consideration. Rather, it appears that the High Court considered the

records available before it, which included the copies of the revenue records

as admitted by the parties and passed certain observations.”

33. A perusal of the averments made in the second set of review

petitions shows that there is no explanation offered regarding discovery of

new material in the form of the documents sought to be filed. When it is the

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case of the respondents themselves that the relevant documents were all

along available in the revenue records and they had already filed xerox

copies thereof during the second revision proceedings, they can hardly be

heard to state that the said documents were unknown to them and were

unavailable for being produced before the learned Single Judge prior to

passing of the common judgment and order dated 9

th

July, 2013. It is evident

from the above that the respondents had not discovered any new material for

them to have moved a second set of review petitions. In order to satisfy the

requirements prescribed in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, it is imperative for a

party to establish that discovery of the new material or evidence was neither

within its knowledge when the decree was passed, nor could the party have

laid its hands on such documents/evidence after having exercised due

diligence, prior to passing of the order. What to speak of conclusive proof of

having undertaken an exercise of due diligence for accessing the relevant

documents, there is not an averment made by the respondents in the second

set of review petitions to the effect that they could not trace the documents in

question earlier or that they had made sincere efforts to obtain certified copies

thereof before the common order dated 9

th

July, 2013 was passed, but could

not do so for some cogent and valid reasons.

34. In other words, nothing has been stated on affidavit to substantiate

the plea taken by the respondents at such a belated stage that the documents

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sought to be filed by them with the second set of review petitions had come

to light after passing of the judgment and order dated 9

th

July, 2013. Under

the garb of the liberty granted to them, the respondents have tried to fill in the

glaring loopholes and introduce evidence in the review proceedings that was

all along in their power and possession and ought to have seen the light of

the day much earlier. In fact, it appears that the Civil Revision Petitions were

originally argued to the hilt on several other grounds, not limited just to the

revenue record, which were all considered and turned down as meritless.

Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that non-production of the

relevant documents on the part of the respondents at the appropriate stage

cannot be a ground for seeking review of the judgment and order dated 9

th

July, 2013 particularly, when five opportunities enumerated in para 31 above,

were available to them for production of the said documents, which were all

frittered away, one by one.

35. In our opinion, even otherwise, recourse to successive review

petitions against the same order is impermissible more so, when the

respondents have miserably failed to draw the attention of this Court to any

circumstances that would entitle them to invoke review jurisdiction within the

ambit of the Rules. Under the rules, the respondents were not required to

produce “genuine” documents but new documents/evidence that was not

within their knowledge and could not have been so even after exercise of due

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diligence, which could have turned the tables in their favour. Nor has any

error apparent on the face of the record been brought out by them.

36. Given the above facts and circumstances, we are of the firm view

that the second set of review petitions were nothing short of an abuse of the

process of the court and ought to have been rejected by the High Court as not

maintainable, without having gone into the merits of the matter. In the result,

the present appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment dated 29

th

April,

2022, is set aside and the common judgment and order dated 9

th

July, 2013

passed in CRP No.2786/2013 and CRP No. 2787 of 2013, is restored.

37.Parties are left to bear their own expenses.

.................................CJI.

[N. V. RAMANA]

.................................J.

[KRISHNA MURARI]

...................................J.

[HIMA KOHLI]

NEW DELHI,

AUGUST 18, 2022

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