REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 7691 - 7694 OF 2022

[Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 21187-21190 of 2019]

S. RAMACHANDRA RAO ………. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

S. NAGABHUSHANA RAO & ORS. ….…. RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.

Leave granted.

2. These appeals are directed against the common order dated

28.06.2019 in Civil Revision Petition Nos. 758, 759, 760 & 761 of 2019,

as passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravathi, whereby

the High Court has not approved the similar orders dated 07.02.2019, as

passed by the Court of III Additional Senior Civil Judge at Vijayawada in

four separate civil proceedings between the same contesting parties.

3. Put in a nutshell, the issue involved in the matter is concerning the

capacity in which the plaintiff-appellant’s wife, who is the General Power

of Attorney

1

holder of the appellant and is also an enrolled advocate,

1 ‘GPA’, for short.

1

could appear and act on his behalf in the said civil proceedings. Even

before passing of the orders which form the subject-matter of present

appeals, this issue had led to various orders by the Trial Court at different

stages of proceedings as also to a couple of orders by the High Court in

challenge to the orders so passed by the Trial Court. Therein, the Trial

Court and the High Court essentially held that merely for the wife of the

appellant being an advocate, there was no prohibition in law for her to act

on behalf of her husband as a GPA holder but, it was made clear that she

would appear in-person as a power agent of her husband and not in her

professional capacity as an advocate. The same proposition was iterated

by the Trial Court in its orders dated 07.02.2019 in these very

proceedings, while rejecting the objection against examination of the

witnesses by the wife of the appellant in her capacity as GPA holder.

However, in the impugned order dated 28.06.2019, the High Court has

held that in view of a Division Bench decision of the same High Court, it

was not permissible for a GPA holder to participate in the proceedings

and, therefore, while disapproving the orders under challenge, the wife of

the appellant has been given liberty to act as an advocate on behalf of

her husband, the plaintiff, in these cases.

4. With the outline as aforesaid, we may take note of the relevant

background aspects as follows:

4.1.A civil suit for partition of certain properties, being O.S. No. 368 of

1995, came to be filed before the said Trial Court, wherein the appellant

2

was arrayed as the 3

rd

plaintiff. The appellant would submit that on

20.04.1987, he had executed a GPA in favour of his brother, the 1

st

respondent herein (the contesting respondent), who had prosecuted the

said civil suit for partition. A decree was passed in the said suit on the

basis of a compromise memo filed on 17.09.1995. The appellant would

allege that he was not aware of filing of the said civil suit; that the decree

was detrimental to his interest and was fraudulently obtained; and

therefore, he revoked the GPA in favour of the 1

st

respondent on

26.01.1996. Later on, the appellant executed another General Power of

Attorney dated 25.01.1997 in favour of his wife. Thereafter, on behalf of

the appellant, I.A. No. 634 of 1997 was filed in the said O.S. No. 368 of

1995 by his new GPA holder (his wife) for recalling the judgment and

decree passed in the suit. This apart, the appellant instituted three more

civil suits, being (i) O.S. No. 388 of 1997, for declaration of title,

possession, partition, and mesne profits; (ii) O.S. No. 104 of 1998, for

rendition of accounts in relation to actions and bank transactions by the

contesting respondent in his erstwhile capacity as agent of the appellant;

and (iii) O.S. No. 445 of 1998, for partition and mesne profits.

4.2.While the said four civil proceedings remained pending, the GPA

holder of the appellant, i.e., his wife, graduated in law and she was

enrolled as an advocate in the year 2011.

4.3.On 27.09.2011, an application, being I.A. No. 1308 of 2011, was

filed in said I.A. No. 634 of 1997 in O.S. No. 368 of 1995 under Order III

3

Rule 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

2

read

with Section 32 of the Advocates Act, 1961

3

read with Rules 32 and 33 of

the Civil Rules of Practice in Andhra Pradesh read with Section 120 of the

Evidence Act, 1872 with the prayer that the GPA holder of the appellant

be permitted to appear in person; and to plead, argue and do all

necessary acts for conduct of proceedings. Similar applications were filed

in two of the aforesaid civil suits, being I.A No. 1307 of 2011 in O.S. No.

104 of 1998 and I.A. No. 1306 of 2011 in O.S. No. 388 of 1997. The Trial

Court, by its similar orders dated 19.02.2018, allowed the applications so

moved and granted the prayer so made while rejecting the contentions

urged on behalf of contesting respondent with reference to Order III Rule

2 CPC. The said order 19.02.2018, as passed in relation to O.S. No. 368

of 1995 reads as under: -

“1. This petition is filed under Order 3 Rule 2 Section 151 CPC and

Section 32 of Advocates Act, 1961 & Rule 32 and 33 of Civil Rules

of practice in A.P. and Evidence Act Sect.120 praying to allow the

petitioner to represent her husband the plaintiff in the above suit,

before the Hon'ble Court to appear in person, to plead and to all

acts necessary in the conduct of above proceedings.

2. The Petitioner who is the authorized GPA holder of the plaintiff

in the suit, seeks permission of this Court, to permit her to

represent the plaintiff in person. The Petitioner says that, as she is

the wife of plaintiff she can protect the best interest of her

husband, and as her husband is staying in a far away place and

as he cannot attend the court in person she may be permitted to

represent her husband in person to conduct the suit and she in

support of her contentions relied upon a judgment reported in AIR

2003 A.P. 317, Sundar Raj Jaiswal and others vs. Smt.Vijaywa

Jaiswal.

2 ‘CPC’, for short.

3 ‘the Act of 1961’, for short.

4

3. Wherein it was held that, under Section 32 of the Advocate Act

the court may permit appearance in a particular case permitting

any person other than the Advocate and that, under the said

provision a discretionary power was given to the court to permit

appearance to any non-advocate for party. it was further held in

the judgment that, the trial court granted permission for the Power

of Attorney holder of the respondent and the said Power of

Attorney has been helping the court by appearing for the

respondent and there is no remark noticed by the court below. It is

always open for the Court to withdraw or cancel permission if the

Power of Attorney holder is 'unworthy or reprehensible. Hence

sought permission to allow her to represent her husband/plaintiff in

the suit.

4. The objection of respondent was that as per Order 3 Rule 2

appearance may be in person or by recognized agent or by

pleader, which is once again subject to the person knowledge of

the transactions, but never empowers to argue on behalf of the

executant, as such the above provisions are not correct for asking

to plead in the court on behalf of plaintiff. He further opposed the

petition stating that, the petitioner is not resident of Vijaywada, as

such, it would be difficult for them to serve notice on the petitioner

in case of any applications filed in the suit. Hence, opposed the

petition.

5. However this court having considered the petition and counter

averments opines that, when the petitioner was permitted by this

court at the inception of the suit itself, to represent as GPA, now

the permission is sought by her to represent her husband in

person, instead of by a pleader. Moreover, she states to be the

wife of the original plaintiff, who in the opinion of this court can

protect the best interest of her spouse and as held by his lordship,

in the above reported judgment that, the permission cannot be

withdrawn at the instance of petitioners. More so, when there is

nothing on record to show that, the GPA holder has created an

unhealthy atmosphere on indiscipline situation or exchanged

words.

6. So when the Hon'ble High Court held that, when once the

permission so granted can be withdrawn, if the acts of GPA

representing the party in person is in derogative to the interest of

the original party, the petitioner herein being the wife of plaintiff, in

the opinion of this court can be permitted to represent in person on

behalf of her husband. With regard to the other objection of

respondent that, service of notice on the petitioner in case of any

applications filed, would be difficult as she does not reside at

Vijayawada, as the petitioner at the time of arguments submitted

that she will stay at Vijayawada, till the suit is disposed off, this

court does not find any grounds to disallow her plea.

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7. Accordingly petition is allowed.”

(emphasis supplied)

4.4.The aforesaid orders dated 19.02.2018 were challenged by the

contesting respondent in the High Court. The High Court by its common

order dated 20.04.2018 in CRP Nos. 1784, 2221 & 2366 of 2018,

confirmed the orders of the Trial Court, but while clarifying that the wife of

the appellant will appear in person as power agent of the appellant but

not in her professional capacity as a lawyer. This order dated 20.04.2018

by the High Court reads as under: -

“These three revisions arise out of the orders passed by the

III Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada, allowing the

applications filed by the 1st respondent herein under Order III Rule

2 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Section 32 of the

Advocates Act, 1961.

2. Heard Mr. V.S.R. Anjaneyulu, learned counsel for the

petitioner and Smt. Hemalatha Suryadevara, the General Power

Agent of the 1st respondent herein, who was the plaintiff in all the

three suits.

3. The 1st respondent, who was the plaintiff in three different

suits namely O.S.Nos.368 of 1995, 389 (sic) of 1997 and 104 of

1998, is the principal and his wife Smt. Suryadevara Hemalatha, is

his power agent. It appears that the 1st respondent and the

plaintiff was all along represented by the counsel before the Court

below. One of the suits already got disposed of. The other two

suits are now pending. Even in the disposed of suit, some

applications have been filed.

4. In the meantime, the wife of the 1st respondent filed

applications in all the three suits, under Order III Rule 2 of CPC for

representing her husband and to appear in person, to plead and to

conduct the above proceedings. These applications were allowed

by the Court below, forcing the 1st defendant in two suits and the

sole defendant in the third suit to come up with the above

revisions.

5. The objections of the learned counsel for the petitioner to

the orders impugned in these revisions are two fold namely (i) that

the wife-cum-General Power Agent of the 1st respondent also

happens to be a lawyer, but she can either appear as a counsel or

as a power agent and not as both and (ii) that the address for

6

service should be intimated by the 1st respondent in Vijayawada

to enable the petitioners to serve notices and summons.

6. The power agent of the 1st respondent, who appeared in

person before me, stated that she is not seeking to appear as an

advocate for the 1st respondent but she is seeking to appear only

as the power agent of the 1st respondent. There can be no

objection to a party to a proceeding to appear through the power

agent. Order III Rule 2 of CPC provides for the same and to that

extent the order of the trial Court allowing the applications cannot

be found fault with. Once an application under Order III Rule 2

CPC is allowed, the power agent has two options, first option is to

appear in person as a power agent and the second option is to

engage an advocate herself. Both cannot be combined in a single

order and that is the objection of the learned counsel for the

petitioner. That objection is sustainable in law.

8. But in so far as the second objection is concerned, if the

1st respondent is appearing only as a power agent of a party, the

question of informing the local address for service does not arise.

It is only when a lawyer is engaged, the question of furnishing a

local address for service would arise.

Therefore, all the Civil Revision Petitions are disposed of

confirming the orders of the trial Court and clarifying that Smt.

Suryadevara Hemalatha, will appear in person as a power agent

of the 1st respondent and will not appear in her professional

capacity as a lawyer.

As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending

shall stand closed.”

(emphasis supplied)

4.5.Thereafter, another application of similar nature in relation to O.S.

No. 445 of 1998 was considered and allowed by the Trial Court by its

order dated 24.09.2018, while rejecting similar objection of the

respondent and while observing as under: -

“The respondent opposed the petition stating that, as per Order

3 rule 2 CPC appearance maybe in person or by recognized agent

or by a pleader, which is once again is subject to the personal

knowledge of the transactions and it never empowers to argue on

behalf of the executants, as such the provisions under which this

petition is filed is not correct to seek permission to represent and

plead on behalf of the plaintiff in the suit.

However, this court considering the petition and counter

averments opines that, when GPA is executed in favour of the

7

petitioner authorizing her to represent the plaintiff in the suit, and

she as GPA also intends to plead on behalf of the plaintiff in the

suit as she can protect the best interest of her husband, and when

as per Sec.32 of Advocate Act any court or authority or person

may permit any person, not enrolled as to advocate under Act, to

appear before it, in any particular case, petitioner being the

authorized agent of plaintiff in the suit, seeking permission to

appear in person and conduct the suit on behalf of her husband

seems reasonable.

Moreover, when the permission granted can be withdrawn by

the Court, if the acts of GPA representing the party, in person in

derogative to the interest of the original party. So, the petitioner

being the wife of plaintiff in the suit seeking permission to

represent in person on behalf of her husband seems justice and

necessary. Hence, for the reasons stated above, I am inclined to

allow the application. Accordingly, the petition in allowed.”

(emphasis supplied)

4.6.The aforesaid order dated 24.09.2018 was challenged by the

contesting respondent in the High Court in CRP No. 6924 of 2018. This

petition was also dismissed by the High Court by its order dated

14.12.2018, which may also be usefully reproduced as under: -

“Aggrieved by an order passed by the trial Court permitting the 1st

respondent to be represented by his wife as the General Power of

Attorney holder, to act, to appear and to plead, the defendant in

the suit has come up with the above revision.

2.Heard Mr. V.S.R. Anjaneyulu, learned counsel for the petitioner.

The G.P.A. holder of the 1st respondent takes notice.

3.The 1st respondent herein has filed a suit in O.S.No.445 of

1998 for partition. It appears that the 1st respondent is a retired

I.A.S. Officer and his wife who is General Power of Attorney holder

is an Advocate enrolled in the Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh.

4.Therefore, the 1st respondent has appointed his own wife as

General Power agent. This fact is not disputed.

5.When an attempt was made by the G.P.A. holder to act in dual

capacity, both as a General Power of Attorney and as an advocate

for her husband, this Court directed that she can only opt for one.

6.Therefore, the 1st respondent filed I.A.No.556 of 2018 seeking

permission for the G.P.A. holder to plead, present and argue his

case in person. This application has been allowed by the trial

8

Court by an order dated 24-09-2018. It is against the said order

that the revision has been filed.

7.The contention of Mr. V.S.R. Anjaneyulu, learned counsel for

the petitioner is that G.P.A. holder, having a personal interest,

cannot plead on behalf of the party. Reliance is placed upon the

clause contained in the deed of a General Power of Attorney.

8.But clauses 2 and 3 of the deed of General Power of Attorney

authorises the G.P.A. holder to sign and verify plaints, written

statements, affidavits etc., and also to appear in all courts.

Therefore, the General Power of Attorney certainly authorises the

holder to plead on behalf of the 1st respondent.

9.Merely because the wife happens to be a lawyer, there is no

prohibition in law for her to plead the case of her husband by

holding a general power. The bar for a lawyer to take a dual role,

is in the context of conflict of interests, which correlate to ethical

principles in respect of the profession. But when a lawyer’s spouse

is involved in litigation, there can be no bar for the lawyer to act as

the power agent of the spouse, for doing whatever is authorised by

the deed of General Power of Attorney to do.

10. Moreover, I do not know in what way the petitioner is

aggrieved by such an act. If at all there are certain things only

within the exclusive knowledge of the principal that can certainly

be raised as a point. Therefore, I find no merits in the revision.

Hence, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs.

As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending

shall stand closed.”

(emphasis supplied)

4.7.On the other hand, when the said proceedings were to

progress further, the contesting respondent filed separate

applications, this time contending that the wife of the appellant, who

was representing him as GPA holder, was not entitled to examine the

witnesses. The Trial Court, yet again, rejected the objection of the

contesting respondent by its separate but substantially similar orders

dated 07.02.2019. The order so passed by the Trial Court in relation

to O.S. No. 368 of 1995 reads as under: -

“1. This petition is filed under Sec.151 CPC by the petitioner

seeking the court to prevent the wife of the plaintiff who is

9

representing the plaintiff in person, as his GPA from examining the

witnesses.

2. The Petitioner says that, the 1st plaintiff in the suit is being

represented by his wife as GPA holder from 1998 onwards, and as

on the said date the suit was being represented by different

counsel. The 1st respondent who came on record as GPA, of the

plaintiff filed an application under Order 3 Rule 2 CPC seeking

permission to represent the 1st plaintiff in person and the said

application was allowed, against which this petitioner preferred

CRP 1784/2018, which was disposed of on 20-4-2018, directing

the GPA holder not to conduct the suit proceedings both in the

capacity of an advocate as she is enrolled in bar, and as GPA. The

petitioner says that, when the 1st respondent nowhere stated that,

the GPA in her name was cancelled, and she was authorized to

make personal appearance on behalf of the plaintiff, the

respondent has to only engaged a counsel represent in her

personal capacity. Hence, the 1st respondent cross examining the

witnesses in person is against the orders of Hon'ble High Court in

CRP 1784/2018. Hence, this petition to declare that the 1st

respondent who is GPA holder is not authorized to participate in

the cross examination of the witnesses.

3. The 1st respondent opposed the petition stating that, she as a

GPA of her husband/plaintiff is appearing in person, after obtaining

permission from this Court, and though she is enrolled in bar

council, she is not appearing in her professional capacity, in this

matter and thus she is appearing in person, as such, she is

entitled to cross examine the witnesses and that petitioner cannot

direct the plaintiff, as to how she has to conduct the case i.e.,

either through a counsel or in person. The Hon'ble High Court in

CRP No.1784/2018 stated that the GPA holder cannot represent

the court both as a GPA and in her professional capacity, but did

not say that she cannot in her personal capacity conduct the suit

proceedings. Hence, she being the GPA of her husband is

competent to do the suit in person that includes the cross

examination of witnesses.

4. Heard both sides.

5. Both the parties did not adduce any oral or documentary

evidence.

"Whether the respondent cannot be permitted to

participate in the examination of witnesses as prayed by

the petitioner?"

POINT:

6. The Petitioner's objection for the 1st respondent to cross

examine the witnesses herself is that, she being the GPA of the

plaintiff can only engage a counsel but cannot participate in the

trial and examine the witnesses or argue the matter. Though she

was permitted to represent the suit proceedings in person, it does

10

not confer her with the authority of doing any such acts, which a

legal practitioner would do. But, the respondent says that, when

she was permitted by this Court to conduct the suit proceedings as

GPA of her husband- 1st plaintiff in person, it is for her to decided,

whether she would continue the suit in person or engage any

counsel to represent the suit proceedings and that this petitioner

has no business to direct the respondent as to adopt to which

course in the conduct of the suit proceedings.

7. The 1st respondent in support of her arguments has relied upon

the following two judgments 1) Surender Raj Jaiswal and others

vs. Vijaya Jaiswal, AIR 2003 AP 317; 2) Prabha P.Shenai vs. Ispat

Industries Limited 2016 Law Suit (Bombay) 271. In the said

judgment referred (1) above at paragraph No.13 his Lordship

opined that

I do not see any bonafides on the part of the petitioners to

insist the respondent to prosecute either personally or appoint

an Advocate. The respondent herself no doubt is empowered to

prosecute the particular case but due to the relationship of

herself with her husband and the acquaintance of the case, she

reposed confidence fully in her husband and appointed him as

her Power of Attorney to appear on her behalf in a particular

case and, therefore, the application filed by the petitioners

herein was rightly dismissed by the Court below. The Trial Court

granted permission for the Power of Attorney Holder of the

respondent and the said Power of Attorney has been helping

the Court by appearing for the respondent and there is no

remark noticed by the Court below. It is always open for the

Court to withdraw or cancel permission if the Power of Attorney

Holder is unworthy or reprehensible.

8. This Court considering the arguments submitted by either side

and the principle held in the above referred judgments opines that,

when once the respondent was permitted to represent the 1st

plaintiff who is no other than her husband, in person opining that

no person can protect the Interest of the spouse, and act in the

best Interest of the spouse other than the wife/husband,

herself/himself, permitted the respondent, who is the wife of 1st

plaintiff, and also GPA to represent the suit proceedings in person

and because she was permitted and representing the suit in

person, now she wants to cross examine the witnesses also, by

herself, as rightly put forth by the respondent what locus standi

does the petitioner have in objecting the respondent, in cross

examining the witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff, and her

husband? when there is no bar for a party to cross examine the

witnesses, the respondent who is representing the plaintiff as a

GPA and permitted to represent in person intending to cross

examine the witnesses by herself be curtailed? In fact the principle

held under ref.(1) above judgment aptly applies to the case on

hand, because in this case also, like in the above referred case,

the GPA holder and the plaintiff are husband and wife, as such this

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court opines that, unless the court opines to withdraw or cancel

the permission, if the power of attorney holder is found unworthy

there can be no hindrance for the respondent to continue to

represent the plaintiff in person.

9. As held in judgment in reference No.2 that-

In the present case, considering the fact that the constituted

attorney in the present case is not only the husband of the

plaintiff but her predecessor in title, who actually carried out the

work in question and to whom the amounts claimed in the suit

were due before he assigned his entitlement to the plaintiff,

there is a preeminent case for permitting him to represent the

plaintiff and argue her case in this suit. I have according,

permitted him to advance arguments for the plaintiff.

10. The said principle also is apt to the case on hand, as in this

suit also the 1st respondent was permitted to represent the 1st

plaintiff in person, so she can very well represent the 1st plaintiff

and argue the case in this matter, and the petitioner cannot raise

any objection with regard to the entitlement of the respondent, who

was permitted to represent in person; with regard to the bar

enshrined by his lordship in CRP 1784/18 that, the respondent

being GPA holder cannot represent the matter in her professional

capacity, when certainly the respondent is not representing the

Court as an advocate, and she is representing the Court, as the

wife of plaintiff who was permitted to represent the 1st plaintiff in

person being his GPA holder and not as an advocate, she cannot

be curtailed from cross examining the witnesses. Accordingly, this

point is answered against the petitioner.

11. In the result, the petition is dismissed.”

(emphasis supplied)

4.8.The aforesaid orders dated 07.02.2019 were challenged before

the High Court in Civil Revision Petition Nos. 758, 759, 760 and 761 of

2019, which have been considered and decided by the impugned

common order dated 28.06.2019.

4.8.1.In the impugned order dated 28.06.2019, the High Court, after

taking note of the background aspects and stand of the respective

parties, stated the point for determination in the following terms: -

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“9. The short point that arises for consideration is “Whether the

G.P.A. holder of the plaintiff can be permitted to act like a counsel

and cross-examine the witnesses?”

4.8.2.Thereafter, the High Court took note of the previous applications

moved in these matters and the orders passed thereupon, while stating

its construction of such previous orders, inter alia, in the following terms: -

“12. The said order came to be passed in the month of December,

2018. As stated above, earlier to this order, a common order was

passed in C.R.P.Nos.1784, 2221 and 2366 of 2018, wherein, the

applications filed under Order III Rule 2 of C.P.C., read with

Section 32 of the Advocates Act were disposed of clarifying that

Smt.S.Hemalatha will appear in-person as a power of agent to the

first respondent and will not appear in her professional capacity.

The said applications came to be filed under Order III Rule 2 of

C.P.C., for the following relief, to represent her husband; to appear

in person to plead and conduct the above proceedings.

13. The said applications were allowed by the Court below,

forcing the first defendant to come up with the above three

revisions. The objections of the learned counsel for the petitioner

therein, were two fold, namely (i) that the wife-cum-General Power

agent of first respondent also happens to be a lawyer, but she can

either appear as a counsel or as a power agent and not as both

and (ii) that the address for service should be intimated by the first

respondent in Vijayawada to enable the petitioners to serve

notices and summons. The Hon’ble High Court held that once an

application under Order III Rule 2 CPC is allowed, the power agent

has two options; the first option is to appear in person as a power

agent and second option is to act as an Advocate herself. Both

cannot be combined in a single order.”

4.8.3.Thereafter, the High Court took note of the reasons that prevailed

with the Trial Court in passing the impugned orders dated 07.02.2019,

and proceeded to allow the revision petitions, essentially with reference to

decision of the Division Bench of the High Court in the case of Madupu

Harinarayana @ Haribabu rep. by his G.P.A., T. D. Dayal v. 1

st

Additional District Judge, Kadapa and Ors.: 2011 (2) ALT 405 (D.B.)

and Section 32 of the Act of 1961. The High Court expressed its views

13

against participation of the wife of the appellant in the proceedings as

GPA holder, while giving her liberty to conduct the case as an advocate

and while observing as under: -

“16. The Hon’ble Division Bench in the Judgment referred to

above observed that any person approaching the court seeking

some legal redressal has to scrupulously, and without exception,

follow the procedural rules and regulations framed by the High

Court. The rules made by the High Court, Civil Rules of Practice

and Circular Orders and Criminal Rules of Practice and Circular

Orders as well as various other procedural rules made under

various statutes supplant the two codes. A party to the proceeding

can either himself appear as a party in person to ventilate his

grievance or engage an advocate enrolled on the rolls of the Bar

Council of Andhra Pradesh (a statutory professional body

constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961). A party to the

proceedings may authorize another by giving a Power of Attorney

to appear in the case, file affidavits, instruct lawyers and act on his

behalf. It was held that the G.P.A. holder cannot plead and/or

argue for his principal. If a person, other than an advocate enrolled

on the rolls of the Bar council, appears in court, it is an offence

punishable under law. Power of Attorney Act defines “power-of-

Attorney” to include any instrument empowering a specified

person to act for and in the name of the person executing it. If so

empowered, the donor may execute any instrument or do anything

in his own name and signature by the authority of the donor of the

power. Section 4 of the POA Act casts an obligation on the POA to

verify the affidavit, give a declaration or other sufficient proof of the

POA, and to deposit the same in the High Court or the District

Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the instrument

may be. Order III C.P.C., deals with recognized agents and

pleaders. Rule 1 thereof enables the recognized agent to make

appearance, application or act in any court. Rule 2 explains

recognized agents as “agents of parties by whom such

appearances, applications and acts may be made or done”. These

are the persons holding POA authorizing them to make an

application and act on behalf of such parties. Section 2(a) of the

Advocates Act defines, “Advocate” to mean an advocate entered

in any roll under the provisions of the said Act. Section 2(15) of the

CPC defines “Pleader” to mean any person entitled to appear and

plead for another in court.

*** *** ***

18. After referring to the provisions of Advocates Act and the

Rules made by the High Court and the circulars issued, this Court

in Madupu Harinarayana’s case (supra) held that all the

pleadings in the proceedings should be made by party in person

as recognized agents. A party in person, and a recognized agent,

14

have to make an appointment in writing (vakalatnama) duly

authorizing the advocate to appear and argue the case. Only an

advocate entered on the rolls of the Bar Council of Andhra

Pradesh, who has been given vakalat and which has been

accepted by such advocate, can have the right of audience on

behalf of the party, or his recognized agent, who engaged the

advocate. Section 32 of the Advocates Act empowers the

Advocate to permit any non-advocate to appear in a particular

case. This means that any person has to seek prior permission of

the Court to argue the case if he is not Advocate enrolled under

the Advocates Act.

19. From the above observations made, it is clear that Section 32

of the Advocates Act empowers the court to permit any non-

advocate to appear in a particular case after seeking prior

permission of the court to argue a case if he is not an Advocate. It

would be appropriate to extract Section 32 of the Act which is as

under:

“32. Power of Court to permit appearances in

particular cases.—Notwithstanding anything contained

in this Chapter, any court, authority, or person may

permit any person, not enrolled as an advocate under

this Act, to appear before it or him in any particular

case.”

20. Prima-facie, a reading of the above provision vis-à-vis the law

laid down by the Division Bench show that it is only the Advocate,

who has enrolled under the provisions of the Advocates Act, has

the right of practice in any court. Any violation of the same would

amount to committing the offence under Section 35 of the

Evidence Act.

21. In the instant case, the wife of the plaintiff, who is representing

her husband, intends to examine the witness as a G.P.A. holder.

She is not arguing the matter as an Advocate for the plaintiff nor

she is cross-examining the witness as a lawyer for the first plaintiff,

though she is a lawyer practicing in the said court.

22. Though the judgment in C.R.P.No.6924 of 2018 between the

same parties held that there is no bar for the petitioner to

participate in the trial, but the Division Bench judgment of this

Court prohibits participation by the G.P.A. Holder. The same was

not brought to the notice of the learned Judge. As observed by me

earlier, the Division Bench of this Court categorically held that the

G.P.A. holder cannot plead and/or argue for his principal. If a

person, other than an Advocate enrolled on the rolls of the Bar

Council, appears in the Court it is an offence punishable under

law.

23. It may be true that the respondent herein, who is also an

Advocate, is doing the case of her husband as a General Power of

Attorney holder. It may also be true that the same may not cause

15

much prejudice to the petitioners. But, in view of the judgment of

the Division Bench of the combined High Court, C.R.Ps. are

allowed, however, giving liberty to the respondent to conduct the

case as an Advocate since she is a practicing Advocate as well.

24. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous Petitions

pending if any in these revisions shall stand closed.”

(emphasis supplied)

5. A long deal of arguments has been advanced before us in these

appeals preferred against the order so passed by the High Court. It has

been contended on behalf of the appellant that the High Court has totally

misdirected itself and has failed to consider that the issue in question

relating to the appearance of wife of the appellant as his GPA holder

stood concluded in these proceedings by virtue of the previous orders of

the High Court dated 20.04.2018 and 14.12.2018; and such an issue

could not have been re-opened at all, for operation of the doctrine of res

judicata. In the other limb of submissions, it has been argued on behalf of

the appellant that the wife of the appellant has a right to conduct the legal

proceedings as his GPA holder; and there is no explicit bar under any law

which prevents the wife of the appellant to act as his GPA holder merely

for her being an enrolled advocate. On the other hand, it has been

contended on behalf of the contesting respondent that the previous

orders between the parties granting permission to the wife of the

appellant to conduct the cases do not attract the doctrine of res judicata,

for having been passed in ignorance of the statutory directions in Section

32 of the Act of 1961. In the other segment, it has been argued on behalf

of the contesting respondent that as an officer of the Court, an advocate

16

cannot plead or cross-examine without filing a vakalatnama and the

jurisprudence of this Court as also of the High Courts does not allow an

advocate to appear as a power of attorney holder. Various authorities

have been cited by the learned counsel for the parties in support of their

respective contentions; we shall deal with the relevant of them at the

appropriate juncture hereafter.

6. Having regard to the background aspects and the rival

contentions, we may, first of all, take up the issue of res judicata before

moving to any other issue raised in these appeals.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended, with reference

to various decisions including that in the case of Y.B. Patil & Ors. v. Y.L.

Patil: (1976) 4 SCC 66, that the doctrine of res judicata is attracted not

only in separate subsequent proceedings but also at subsequent stage of

the same proceedings and hence, the concluded orders passed earlier in

these proceedings are binding on the parties. The learned counsel has

argued that the issue as regards conduct of the case by the wife of the

appellant on his behalf and in her capacity as GPA holder has attained

finality in these proceedings with the concluded orders dated 20.04.2018

and 14.12.2018 as passed by the High Court and such an issue cannot

be reopened at the subsequent stage of these very proceedings. It has

been contended, with reference to the several decisions, including that in

the case of Gorie Gouri Naidu (Minor) v. Thandrothu Bodemma:

(1997) 2 SCC 552, that even an erroneous decision, if rendered between

17

the same parties, binds them if the same had been decided by a Court of

competent jurisdiction. The learned counsel has also referred to the

decision in Makhija Construction & Engg. (P) Ltd. v. Indore

Development Authority: (2005) 6 SCC 304 as regards the distinction

between a precedent and the operation of the doctrine of res judicata;

and to the decision in S. Nagaraj (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors. v. B.R.

Vasudeva Murthy & Ors.: (2010) 3 SCC 353 to submit that the orders as

passed in this matter by the High Court on 20.04.2018 and 14.12.2018

cannot be ignored even on the principles of per incuriam because those

principles have relevance to the doctrine of precedents but have no

application to the doctrine of res judicata.

8. It has, however, been strenuously argued by the learned senior

counsel for the contesting respondent that the said orders dated

20.04.2018 and 14.12.2018 cannot operate as res judicata because

therein, the Court had misapplied the procedural law and had not taken

into consideration the impact of Section 32 of the Act of 1961. In this

regard, a 3-Judge Bench decision of this Court in the case of Mathura

Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal & Ors. v. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy: (1970) 1

SCC 613 has been strongly relied upon. It has been contended that the

principles in Mathura Prasad (supra) would apply to both the questions

of jurisdiction as well as the situations where a decision of the Court

sanctions something which is illegal. The learned counsel would submit

that Section 32 of the Act of 1961 entitles only the non-advocates to seek

18

permission of the Court to plead on behalf of any party and the same

permission cannot be sought by an advocate. The contention has been

that the previous orders of the High Court, having ignored the import and

effect of Section 32 of the Act of 1961, do not operate as res judicata in

the current proceedings. Another decision of this Court in the case of

Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman & Ors.: (1996) 6

SCC 424, has also been cited to contend that this Court has clarified the

law that where the consequence of giving effect to res judicata would be

of enforcing an order standing contrary to statutory direction or

prohibition, the doctrine of res judicata has no applicability.

9. The basic principles of res judicata are generally specified in the

principal part of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which

reads as under:-

“11. Res judicata. —No Court shall try any suit or issue in which

the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and

substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or

between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating

under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent

suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised,

and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.”

9.1.The doctrine of res judicata, having a very ancient history,

embodies a rule of universal law and is a sum total of public policy

reflected in various maxims like ‘res judicata pro veritate occipitur’, which

means that a judicial decision must be accepted as correct; and ‘nemo

debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa’, which means that no man

should be vexed twice for the same cause. The ancient history of this

doctrine and its consistent recognition could well be underscored with

19

reference to the following statement of law in the case of Sheoparsan

Singh and Ors. v. Ramnandan Prasad Narayan Singh and Ors.:

A.I.R. 1916 Privy Council 78: -

“…But in view of the arguments addressed to them, their

Lordships desire to emphasise that the rule of res judicata , while

founded on ancient precedent, is dictated by a wisdom which is for

all time.

“ ‘It has been well said,’ declared Lord Coke, ‘interest

reipublicoe ut sit finis litium, otherwise great oppression

might be done under colour and pretence of law’ ”.-(6 Coke,

9 A.)

Though the rule of the Code may be traced to an English source, it

embodies a doctrine in no way opposed to the spirit of the law as

expounded by the Hindu commentators. Vijnanesvara and

Nilakantha include the plea of a former judgment among those

allowed by law, each citing for this purpose the text of Katyayana,

who escribes the plea thus: “If a person though defeated at law

sue again he should be answered, ‘You were defeated formerly.

This is called the plea of former judgment.” [See “The

Mitakshara(Vyavahara),” Bk. II, ch. I, edited by J. R. Gharpure, p.

14, and “The Mayuka,” Ch. I, sec. 1, p. 11 of Mandlik’s edition.]

And so the application of the rule by the Courts in India should be

influenced by no technical consideration of form, but by matter of

substance within the limits allowed by law.”

(emphasis supplied)

9.2.The contours of this doctrine of res judicata and its application

could be taken into comprehension by a reference to the Constitution

Bench decision of this Court in the case of Daryao and Ors. v. State of

U.P. and Ors.: AIR 1961 SC 1457. In that case, after the writ petitions

filed before the High Court of Allahabad under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India were dismissed, the petitioners filed substantive

petitions in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the

same relief and on the same grounds. In such petitions, this Court upheld

the objection that the decision of the High Court would operate as res

judicata while observing, inter alia, as under: -

20

“(9) But, is the rule of res judicata merely a technical rule or is it

based on high public policy? If the rule of res judicata itself

embodies a principle of public policy which in turn is an essential

part of the rule of law then the objection that the rule cannot be

invoked where fundamental rights are in question may lose much

of its validity. Now, the rule of res judicata as indicated in S. 11 of

the Code of Civil Procedure has no doubt some technical aspects,

for instance the rule of constructive res judicata may be said to be

technical; but the basis on which the said rule rests is founded on

considerations of public policy. It is in the interest of the public at

large that a finality should attach to the binding decisions

pronounced by Courts of competent jurisdiction, and it is also in

the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over

with the same kind of litigation. If these two principles form the

foundation of the general rule of res judicata they cannot be

treated as irrelevant or inadmissible even in dealing with

fundamental rights in petitions filed under Art. 32.

(10) In considering the essential elements of res judicata one

inevitably harks back to the judgment of Sir William B. Hale in the

leading Duchess of Kingston’s case, 2 Smith Lead Cas. 13th Ed.

pp. 644, 645. Said Sir William B. Hale “from the variety of cases

relative to judgments being given in evidence in civil suits, these

two deductions seem to follow as generally true: First, that the

judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction, directly upon the

point, is as a plea, a bar, or as evidence, conclusive between the

same parties, upon the same matter, directly in question in another

court; Secondly, that the judgment of a court of exclusive

jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is in like manner conclusive

upon the same matter, between the same parties, coming

incidentally in question in another court for a different purpose.” As

has been observed by Halsbury, “the doctrine of res judicata is not

a technical doctrine applicable only to records; it is a fundamental

doctrine of all courts that there must be an end of litigation”,

Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed., Vol. 15, Paragraph 357, p.

185. Halsbury also adds that the doctrine applies equally in all

courts, and it is immaterial in what court the former proceeding

was taken, provided only that it was a court of competent

jurisdiction, or what form the proceeding took, provided it was

really for the same cause” (p. 187, paragraph 362). “Res judicata”,

it is observed in Corpus Juris, “is a rule of universal law pervading

every well regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put upon two

grounds, embodied in various maxims of the common law; the

one, public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of

the State that there should be an end to litigation — interest

republicae ut sit finis litium; the other, the hardship on the

individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause

— nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa”, Corpus Juris, Vol. 34,

p. 743…..

(11) The same question can be considered from another point

of view. If a judgment has been pronounced by a court of

21

competent jurisdiction it is binding between the parties unless it is

reversed or modified by appeal, revision or other procedure

prescribed by law. Therefore, if a judgment has been pronounced

by the High Court in a writ petition filed by a party rejecting his

prayer for the issue of an appropriate writ on the ground either that

he had no fundamental right as pleaded by him or there has been

no contravention of the right proved or that the contravention is

justified by the Constitution itself, it must remain binding between

the parties unless it is attacked by adopting the procedure

prescribed by the Constitution itself. The binding character of

judgments pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction is itself

an essential part of the rule of law, and the rule of law obviously is

the basis of the administration of justice on which the Constitution

lays so much emphasis. As Halsbury has observed: “subject to

appeal and to being amended or set aside a judgment is

conclusive as between the parties and their privies, and is

conclusive evidence against all the world of its existence, date and

legal consequences” Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed., Vol. 22,

p. 780 paragraph 1660.

(emphasis supplied)

9.3.It is also equally relevant to reiterate that Section 11 CPC is not

the foundation of the doctrine of res judicata but is merely the statutory

recognition thereof and, hence, is not considered exhaustive of the

general principles of law. This doctrine, it is recognised, is conceived in

larger public interest and is founded on equity, justice and good

conscience. These aspects were tersely put by this Court in the case of

Lal Chand (dead) by L.Rs. and Ors. v. Radha Krishan: (1977) 2 SCC

88 in the following words: -

“19. … The fact that Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure

cannot apply on its terms, the earlier proceeding before the

competent authority not being a suit, is no answer to the extension

of the principle underlying that section to the instant case. Section

11, it is long since settled, is not exhaustive and the principle

which motivates that section can be extended to cases which do

not fall strictly within the letter of the law. The issues involved in

the two proceedings are identical, those issues arise as between

the same parties and thirdly, the issue now sought to be raised

was decided finally by a competent quasi-judicial tribunal. The

principle of res judicata is conceived in the larger public interest

which requires that all litigation must, sooner than later, come to

22

an end. The principle is also founded on equity, justice and good

conscience which require that a party which has once succeeded

on an issue should not be permitted to be harassed by a

multiplicity of proceedings involving determination of the same

issue….”

(emphasis supplied)

9.4.It hardly needs any over-emphasis that but for this doctrine of res

judicata, the rights of the persons would remain entangled in endless

confusion and the very foundation of maintaining the rule of law would be

in jeopardy. Even if this doctrine carries some technical aspects, as

explained by this Court in Daryao (supra), it is in the interest of public at

large that a finality should attached to the binding decisions of the Courts

of competent jurisdiction; and it is also in public interest that individual

should not be vexed twice with the same kind of litigation. As noticed, the

Constitution Bench has placed this doctrine on a high pedestal, treating it

to be a part of rule of law.

9.5.Having taken into comprehension the object and framework of

doctrine of res judicata, a few ancillary principles, relevant to the case at

hand, may also be usefully noticed.

9.5.1.The principle that the doctrine of res judicata is attracted not only

in separate subsequent proceedings but also at subsequent stage of the

same proceedings is hardly of any doubt or dispute. A 3-Judge Bench of

this Court in the case of Y.B. Patil (supra), has tersely underscored this

principle of law in the following terms: -

“4. …It is well settled that principles of res judicata can be invoked

not only in separate subsequent proceedings, they also get

attracted in subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Once an

23

order made in the course of a proceeding becomes final, it would

be binding at the subsequent stage of that proceeding….”

9.5.2.It is also well-settled, as laid down in several decisions, that even

an erroneous decision remains binding on the parties to the same

litigation and concerning the same issue, if rendered between the same

parties by a Court of competent jurisdiction. In the case of Gorie Gouri

Naidu (supra), this Court, inter alia, said,

“4…..The law is well settled that even if erroneous, an inter-party

judgment binds the party if the court of competent jurisdiction has

decided the lis….”

9.5.3.In Makhija Construction & Engg. (P) Ltd. (supra), this Court

also clarified the distinction between a precedent and the operation of the

doctrine of res judicata in the following terms: -

“19. …A precedent operates to bind in similar situations in a

distinct case. Res judicata operates to bind parties to proceedings

for no other reason, but that there should be an end to litigation.”

9.5.4.In S. Nagaraj (supra), it was also made clear by this Court that

binding decisions cannot be ignored even on the principles of per

incuriam because those principles have relevance to the doctrine of

precedents but have no application to the doctrine of res judicata.

10.For what has been noticed and discussed in the preceding

paragraphs, it remains hardly a matter of doubt that the doctrine of res

judicata is fundamental to every well regulated system of jurisprudence,

for being founded on the consideration of public policy that a judicial

decision must be accepted as correct and that no person should be vexed

twice with the same kind of litigation. This doctrine of res judicata is

24

attracted not only in separate subsequent proceedings but also at the

subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Moreover, a binding decision

cannot lightly be ignored and even an erroneous decision remains binding

on the parties to the same litigation and concerning the same issue, if

rendered by a Court of competent jurisdiction. Such a binding decision

cannot be ignored even on the principle of per incuriam because that

principle applies to the precedents and not to the doctrine of res judicata.

10.1.In true application of these principles, it would appear that the

orders passed in these matters by the High Court on 20.04.2018 and

14.12.2018, as regards the issue of participation of the wife of the

appellant in these proceedings as a GPA holder of the appellant, remain

binding on the parties and cannot be ignored. In other words, this issue

concerning the capacity of the wife of the appellant to participate in these

proceedings as his GPA holder cannot be agitated over again in these

very proceedings, even if the earlier orders granting such permission to

her are suggested to be erroneous.

11.However, learned senior counsel for the contesting respondent

has strenuously argued, with reference to the decisions in Mathura

Prasad and Allahabad Development Authority (supra), that the said

orders dated 20.04.2018 and 14.12.2018 do not operate as res judicata.

In view of the submissions made on behalf of the contesting respondent,

we may examine the relevant features of the said cited cases in

necessary details.

25

11.1.In the case of Mathura Prasad (supra), the appellant constructed

buildings for commercial or residential purposes on open land in

pursuance of lease granted by the respondent. His application to the Civil

Judge for determination of standard rent was, however, dismissed on the

ground that the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control

Act, 1947 did not apply to open land leased for the construction of such

buildings. A Single Judge of the Bombay High Court confirmed this order

in a group of revision applications. However, in the case of Vinayak

Gopal Limaye v. Laxman Kashinath Athavale: ILR (1956) Bom 827,

the Bombay High Court decided that a building lease in an open plot was

not excluded from Section 6(1) of the said Act of 1947. The view so taken

by the Bombay High Court in Vinayak Gopal Limaye (supra) was

affirmed by this Court in the case of Mrs. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy v.

Hingoo Manohar Missa: (1962) 3 SCR 928. Relying upon this judgment,

the appellant filed a fresh petition in the Court of Small Causes, Bombay

for an order determining the standard rent since the area was located

within the limits of Greater Bombay. The Trial Judge rejected this

application essentially on the consideration that the matter had already

been decided between the same parties in the earlier proceedings for

fixation of rent. The High Court affirmed the order so passed and hence,

the matter was in appeal before this Court.

26

11.1.1.In the aforesaid context, various features of the doctrine of res

judicata were explained by this Court in the relied upon passage as

follows: -

“11. It is true that in determining the application of the rule of res

judicata the Court is not concerned with the correctness or

otherwise of the earlier judgment. The matter in issue, if it is one

purely of fact, decided in the earlier proceeding by a competent

Court must in a subsequent litigation between the same parties be

regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened. A mixed

question of law and fact determined in the earlier proceeding

between the same parties may not, for the same reason, be

questioned in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties.

But, where the decision is on a question of law i.e. the

interpretation of a statute, it will be res judicata in a subsequent

proceeding between the same parties where the cause of action is

the same, for the expression “the matter in issue” in Section 11 of

the Code of Civil Procedure means the right litigated between the

parties i.e. the facts on which the right is claimed or denied and

the law applicable to the determination of that issue. Where,

however, the question is one purely of law and it relates to the

jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of the Court sanctioning

something which is illegal, by resort to the rule of res judicata a

party affected by the decision will not be precluded from

challenging the validity of that order under the rule of res judicata,

for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land.”

(emphasis supplied)

11.1.2.This Court held that in the given case, the earlier decision of the

Civil Judge that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for

determination of standard rent was plainly erroneous; and if such a

decision was regarded as conclusive, ‘it will assume the status of a

special rule of law applicable to the parties relating to the jurisdiction of

the Court in derogation of the rule declared by the Legislature’. Therefore,

the operation of doctrine of res judicata was ruled out in that case.

11.2.In the case of Allahabad Development Authority (supra), the

relevant aspects were that after a notification under Section 4(1) of the

27

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (‘the Act of 1894’) for acquiring a large extent

of land for Transport Nagar Scheme, the enquiry under Section 5-A was

dispensed with in exercise of power under Section 17(1-A), as amended

by the Legislature of the State; and possession of land in question was

taken on 02.11.1977, whereby the land stood vested in the State under

Section 16 of the Act of 1894. However, the High Court passed an order

declaring that the acquisition proceedings stood lapsed by operation of

Section 11-A, which requires that after acquisition, an award must be

made within a period of two years from the date of publication of

declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire

proceeding for acquisition of land would lapse. The same question was

examined by this Court in Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P.: (1993)

4 SCC 369 and Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar: (1995) 6 SCC

31, where it was held that Section 11-A of the Act of 1894 would not apply

to the cases of land acquisition under Section 17 where possession had

already been taken and the land stood vested in the State. In the given

context and while referring to a decision in the case of Municipal

Committee v. State of Punjab: (1969) 1 SCC 475, this Court held as

under: -

“6. In view of the above ratio, it is seen that when the legislature

has directed to act in a particular manner and the failure to act

results in a consequence, the question is whether the previous

order operates as res judicata or estoppel as against the persons

in dispute. When the previous decision was found to be erroneous

on its face, this Court held in the above judgment that it does not

operate as res judicata. We respectfully follow the ratio therein.

The principle of estoppel or res judicata does not apply where to

give effect to them would be to counter some statutory direction or

28

prohibition. A statutory direction or prohibition cannot be

overridden or defeated by a previous judgment between the

parties. In view of the fact that land had already stood vested in

the State free from all encumbrances, the question of divesting

does not arise. After the vesting has taken place, the question of

lapse of notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under

Section 6 would not arise. Considered from this perspective,

original direction itself was erroneous and the later direction with

regard to delivery of possession of the land, in consequence, was

not valid in law…..”

(emphasis supplied)

11.3.Thus, in the case of Mathura Prasad (supra), this Court observed

that when the earlier decision on the question of jurisdiction was

erroneous, it could not be treated as conclusive, else it would assume a

special status to rule of law applicable to the parties relating to the

jurisdiction, in derogation of the rule declared by the legislature. In

Allahabad Development Authority (supra), this Court was concerned

with operation of the statutory direction and inapplicability of the

provisions of lapsing of acquisition where possession was already taken

and the land stood vested in the State. Simply put, in these cases, the

doctrine of res judicata has been held inapplicable in relation to the

question of jurisdiction and in relation to the question of statutory

direction/prohibition.

12.The question in these appeals, therefore, is as to whether the

previous orders in relation to these proceedings, as passed by the High

Court on 20.04.2018 and 14.12.2018 between the same parties and

dealing with the same issues relating to the capacity of the wife of the

appellant in the present matters, could be said to be not conclusive and

29

not operating as res judicata because of any question of jurisdiction or of

statutory direction or prohibition.

13.What has been argued in this Court on behalf of the respondents

is that Section 32 of the Act of 1961 bars the advocates from seeking

permission of the Court and this provision entitles only the non-advocates

to seek such permission to plead on behalf of any party. According to

learned counsel of the respondents, this provision has been ignored in

the previous decisions.

13.1.Section 32 of the Act of 1961 reads as under: -

“32. Power of Court to permit appearances in particular cases.

—Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter, any court,

authority, or person may permit any person, not enrolled as an

advocate under this Act, to appear before it or him in any particular

case.”

14.We are unable to appreciate the contention which suggests that

the said Section 32 creates a bar for the wife of the appellant to seek

permission of the Court to appear on behalf of her husband in her

capacity as GPA holder because of she being an enrolled advocate. The

enabling provision of Section 32 of the Act of 1961, whereby any Court,

authority or person may permit any non-advocate to appear before it or

him in any particular case is difficult to be read as creating a

corresponding bar in giving permission to a GPA holder of a party to

represent that party as such, if the said GPA holder, during pendency of

the proceedings in the Court, gets enrolled as an advocate. In other

words, there does not appear any statutory prohibition operating in the

situation like that of present case, for which the existing GPA holder of a

30

party cannot be given permission to appear only as the GPA holder, even

if he/she has been enrolled as an advocate.

14.1.As noticed, the meaning, purport and effect of the previous

concluded orders of the High Court dated 20.04.2018 and 14.12.2018

had been clear and unambiguous that in these cases, wife of the

appellant would be entitled to appear only as the GPA holder and not as

an advocate. We are unable to accept the submissions made on behalf of

the contesting respondent that the said orders by the High Court stand at

conflict with any statutory bar or prohibition or they relate to any such

mandatory provision of law which is going to be violated.

14.2.Apart from the above, we are clearly of the view that even if it be

assumed for the sake of arguments that there had been any error in the

previous orders dated 20.04.2018 and 14.12.2018, those orders, having

been rendered between the same parties and on the same issue of

appearance of the GPA holder in the same proceedings, indeed operate

as res judicata.

14.3.In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, where

the only fortuitous event had been that wife of the appellant, who was

already acting as his General Power of Attorney holder, later on took the

degree in law and got herself enrolled as an advocate, the High Court

had, in the previous rounds of proceedings, cautiously balanced the

requirements of law, particularly the requirements of CPC, the Civil Rules

of Practice in the State, and the Act of 1961 as also the rules made under

31

the Act of 1961 by specifically providing that wife of the appellant shall

appear only as his GPA holder and not as an advocate. No such question

like that of jurisdiction or statutory prohibition arises from the said orders

dated 20.04.2018 and 14.12.2018 for which, the issue concluded thereby

could be reagitated at the subsequent stage of these very proceedings by

suggesting different interpretations.

15.At this juncture, we may also deal with the reason that has

prevailed with the High Court in the order impugned.

15.1.As noticed, the High Court has chosen to brush aside the said

previous orders dated 20.04.2018 and 14.12.2018 by reproducing a

couple of paragraphs of the Division Bench decision of that High Court in

the case of Madupu Harinarayana (supra) and by holding that by virtue

of the said decision, the GPA holder cannot plead or argue for his

principal. The High Court has reproduced the following two passages of

the said decision in Madupu Harinarayana:

“28. A conspectus of Rules 1 and 2 of Order III of Code of Civil

Procedure, Section 2(a) and Sections 29, 30, 33, 34 of the

Advocates Act, Rule 2 of Section 34 Rules and Code of Criminal

Procedure would show that all the pleadings in a proceeding shall

be made by the party in person, or by his recognized agent. A

party in person, and a recognized agent, have to make an

appointment in writing (vakaltnama) duly authorizing the advocate

to appear and argue the case. Only an advocate entered on the

rolls of the Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh, who has been given

vakalat and which has been accepted by such advocate, can have

the right of audience on behalf of the party, or his recognized

agnet, who engaged the advocate. Sections 29 and 30 of the

Advocates Act make it clear that advocates are the only

recognized class of persons entitled to pract5ise law, and such an

advocate should have been enrolled as such under the Advocates

Act. Section 32 of the Advocates Act empowers the court to permit

any non-advocate to appear in a particular case. This only means

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that any person has to seek prior permission of the Court to argue

a case if he is not an advocate enrolled under the Advocates Act.

Further, it is an offence for a non-advocate to practice under the

provisions of the Advocates Act. Section 45 prescribes a sentence

of six months imprisonment.

31. The statutes and precedents are clear on the point. It is only

advocates, whose names are entered on the rolls of the state Bar

Council, who have the right to practice in any Court. If a person

practices in any Court without any such authority, and without such

an enrolment, it would be committing an offence under Section 45

of the Advocates Act punishable with imprisonment for a term

which may extend to six months. Therefore the GPA Sri T.D.Dayal

is not entitled to appear and argue for the Appellant. He has no

right of audience in this case or any other case.”

15.2.With respect, we are unable to endorse the approach of the High

Court in this matter, particularly when reliance has been placed on the

decision in the case of Madupu Harinarayana (supra) without taking note

of the basic facts and the background aspects in which the said decision

was rendered by the Court. The appellant of the said matter had filed a

suit for specific performance which was dismissed by the Trial Court. The

decree of the Trial Court was affirmed by the High Court and then, even

the petitions seeking leave to appeal were dismissed by this Court. Until

that juncture, the appellant was being represented by a duly instructed

counsel, an enrolled advocate. Thereafter, the appellant filed a writ

petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India in this Court. It was

lodged under Order XVIII Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966

because no reasonable cause was made out justifying the receipt of the

writ petition. Then, IAs were filed by way of appeal against the Registrar’s

order, which were also dismissed. In these cases, before this Court, one

Mr. T.D. Dayal represented the appellant as his alleged GPA holder, who

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also addressed certain communications to the Registry of the Court that

were also duly replied. Thereafter, a writ petition was filed in the High

Court and an affidavit in support thereof was filed by the alleged GPA

holder wherein, apart from the criticism of the judgment of the Trial Court,

even unfounded and unsubstantiated aspersions were sought to be cast

on the High Court and on this Court. The said writ petition was dismissed

by the Single Judge of the High Court and then, the matter was before the

Division Bench in appeal. The appeal was also conducted by the said

alleged GPA holder. The Division Bench noticed several features of the

questionable dealings of the alleged GPA holder and it was also noticed

that even the copy of GPA was not annexed to the writ petition or the writ

appeal. The High Court found it to be a vexatious litigation by an

interloper and being a gross abuse of the process of Court while

observing at the very beginning of the judgment as follows: -

“2. After giving a very patient hearing to Mr. T.D. Dayal, and

perusing various provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961 as well as

the decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court in which he

himself figured either as a social activist or a GPA for parties to the

proceedings in the writ petitions, we are convinced that this is

vexatious litigation. This is yet another instance of busybodies and

meddlesome interlopers resorting to filing frivolous cases before

the highest Court of the State due to perceived injustice to the

community, or to the cause of a few gullible individuals whom they

represent…….”

15.3.The High Court also issued a slew of directions, including that of

debarring the said alleged GPA holder from taking up any proceedings in

the Court and also registering Suo Motu Contempt case for making

unfounded and scurrilous remarks. We need not go into all those details

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for the purpose of the present case; suffice it to observe that the said

decision proceeded on its own peculiar facts and there had been a

marked distinction of the points arising in the said case from the point

arising before the High Court in the present case. In Madupu

Harinarayana (supra), the point for determination was as to whether a

GPA holder, who was not enrolled as an advocate, was having a right to

appear and plead before the Court, particularly when he has been found

to be involved in filing frivolous cases and making reckless remarks

against the entire justice delivery system. In contrast, the point for

determination in the present case before the High Court was as to

whether the wife of the appellant, being his GPA holder and having been

permitted to appear as such despite having been enrolled as an advocate

during the pendency of proceedings, was not entitled to cross-examine

the witnesses. The said decision in Madupu Harinarayana, in any case,

could not have been pressed into service to override the concluded and

binding decisions between the same parties in the same proceedings at a

previous stage.

16.For what has been discussed hereinabove, we are of the view that

the aforesaid orders dated 20.04.2018 and 14.12.2018 operate as res

judicata and create a bar in raising of the issue again as regards capacity

of the wife of the appellant in these matters. The High Court has fallen in

grave error in ignoring the said previous inter partes binding decisions.

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17.In continuity with what has been observed hereinabove, we are

impelled to observe, as has rightly been contended on behalf of the

appellant, that in the order impugned, the High Court has

mischaracterised the issue before it. As noticed, the High Court has

proceeded to observe that the point for determination in the matter was

as to ‘whether the GPA holder of the plaintiff can be permitted to act like a

counsel and cross-examine witnesses’. It has been pointed out on behalf

of the plaintiff-appellant that his GPA holder (wife) never attempted to act

like an advocate and to cross-examine the witnesses in that capacity. In

the earlier rounds of proceedings, the High Court had specifically ordered

that the wife of the appellant would only act as power agent of appellant

and not in her professional capacity as an advocate. In view of the above

and in view of the objections thereafter raised by the contesting

respondent, the point for determination, in essence, before the Court was

as to whether the wife of the appellant, being his GPA holder, was not

entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, as captured by the Trial Court in

paragraph 5 of its order dated 07.02.2019. The Trial Court had also

noticed the objections of the contesting respondent that the wife of the

appellant, being a GPA holder, could only engage a lawyer but could not

participate in the Trial Court and examine the witnesses or argue the

matter. It was contended that though she was permitted to attend the suit

proceedings in-person, it did not confer her with the authority of doing any

such act which only a legal practitioner would do. The Trial Court had

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rightly overruled such objections, particularly with reference to the

previous orders passed by the High Court.

17.1.Moreover, the errors on the part of the High Court in this case are

not confined to the erroneous framing of the point for determination and

erroneous application of the decision in Madupu Harinarayana (supra).

In fact, reference to the previous orders dated 20.04.2018 and

14.12.2018 by the High Court in the background narrative had also been

incomplete and rather incorrect. It is noticed that in paragraph 13 of the

order impugned, the High Court read as if the previous orders dated

20.04.2018 and 14.12.2018 stopped at observing that the two capacities,

of GPA holder and advocate, cannot be combined. However, further to

that, in the said orders dated 20.04.2018 and 14.12.2018, the High Court

had precisely noticed that the wife of the appellant was appearing only as

a power agent and the orders of the Trial Court were confirmed while

clarifying that she would appear in-person as a power agent and will not

appear in her professional capacity. This later part of the substance of the

both the orders dated 20.04.2018 and 14.12.2018 appears to have not

gone into the requisite consideration of the High Court.

18.Thus, it is apparent that the High Court has viewed the entire case

from an altogether wrong angle, i.e., by misdirecting itself on the real

point for determination; by not taking into comprehension the meaning,

purport and effect of the previous binding orders dated 20.04.2018 and

14.12.2018 between the same parties in the same proceedings; and by

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misapplication of the Division Bench decision of the same High Court.

This misdirected approach has resulted in the High Court ignoring the

doctrine of res judicata and issuing such directions which are squarely

opposite to the directions contained in the previous binding orders.

19.For what has been discussed and held hereinabove, the

impugned order dated 28.06.2019 cannot sustain itself and is required to

be set aside.

20. The discussion until this juncture is itself sufficient to conclude

this matter. However, before closing, we may refer to a few other features

of the case.

20.1.A long deal of arguments has been made on behalf of the

respondents in this case on the point that as an officer of the Court, an

advocate cannot plead or cross-examine without vakalatnama; and as

regards the impact of Bar Council Rules, particularly on the standards of

professional conduct and etiquettes. Several decisions have been cited

to submit that the jurisprudence of this Court and the High Court does not

allow advocates to appear as Power of Attorney holders. In our view, all

such contentions remain entirely inapposite to the facts of the present

case for the simple reason that the matter in issue stands concluded by

the previous decisions by the Trial Court and then by the High Court. We

are unable to find the said decisions operating in any manner against

statutory mandate. Various contentions that the wife of the appellant

being an advocate is likely to face the position of conflict of interest and

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her disability to act as an advocate in the matter in which she is likely to

have direct pecuniary interest, are all rather unnecessary when viewed in

the light of facts that as per the binding orders passed in these cases,

wife of the appellant would be appearing only as GPA holder and not as

an advocate.

20.2.In view of the above, we need not dilate on the other contentions

urged on behalf of the contesting respondent and counter thereto by the

learned counsel for the appellant. However, we may take note of an

apprehension suggested in the submissions made on behalf of the

respondent that if the operation of Section 32 of the Act of 1961 is not

confined to non-advocates, it may additionally create scope for

unscrupulous advocates, who might have been suspended from practice

or might be engaged in other malpractices as per the Bar Council of India

Rules, to circumvent the legal consequences by appearing as power of

attorney holders. This line of submissions is rather unnecessary and

overexpansive; and it does not correlate with the real matter in issue

before us. However, we may observe that the permission under Section

32 of the Act of 1961, by its very nature, is to be granted on case-to-case

basis and could also be refused with reference to the given set of facts

and circumstances referable to a particular case and any particular

person. In any case, for all the features and factors of the present case,

this line of submissions carries no relevance and does not require any

further comment.

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21.For what has been discussed hereinabove, these appeals

succeed and are allowed; the impugned common order dated 28.06.2019

is set aside; and the orders passed by the Trial Court dated 07.02.2019

are restored.

21.1.The costs of this litigation in this Court shall follow the decision in

the main proceedings by the Trial Court.

……....…………………….J.

(DINESH MAHESHWARI)

……....…………………….J.

(ANIRUDDHA BOSE)

NEW DELHI;

OCTOBER 19, 2022.

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