As per case facts, the appellant-wife secured maintenance under the Domestic Violence Act. The respondent-husband's appeal against this order was dismissed due to delay, rendering the order final. Subsequently, the ... respondent filed an application under Section 25 of the Act seeking to set aside the original order and a refund of maintenance, claiming the wife misrepresented her employment status. This application was initially dismissed but later remanded by the Appellate Court and High Court for reconsideration. The appellant-wife challenged these remand orders before the Supreme Court. The question arose whether an application under Section 25(2) of the Domestic Violence Act could be used to retrospectively set aside an original order and seek a refund of maintenance, especially when the alleged change in circumstances predated the original order. Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that Section 25(2) of the Act permits alteration, modification, or revocation of orders only due to a change in circumstances occurring *after* the original order was passed and operates prospectively. Therefore, the respondent's application, seeking to set aside a final order and obtain a refund based on circumstances predating the original order, was not maintainable. The Court set aside the High Court and Appellate Court orders, dismissing the respondent's application but reserving liberty for a fresh prospective application.