1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 7086-7087 OF 2009

SABIR ALI KHAN …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

SYED MOHD. AHMAD ALI KHAN

AND OTHERS …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

K.M. JOSEPH, J.

1. The Appeals are lodged against the Order passed by

the High Court of Allahabad in Civil Revision Nos. 595

and 596 of 2003. The Revisions, in turn, were directed

against the Order passed by the Waqf Tribunal on an

Appeal filed by the first respondent before us. The

first respondent again, in turn, put in issue the Order

passed by the Collector, Bulandshahar. The Order passed

by the Collector was passed under Section 52(2) of the

Waqf Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’).

2

Finally, we must point out at this stage that the

Collector was acting on the basis of a requisition

given by the Controller of Waqf Board to obtain and

deliver possession of the land in dispute to the Waqf

Board. The requisition was made under Section 52(1) of

the Act.

2. By the Order passed by the Tribunal , it had set

aside the Order passed by the Collector on various

grounds. By the impugned Order passed by the High Court

in the Revisions filed against the aforesaid Order by

the appellants, the High Court has affirmed the Order

passed by the Tribunal, however, on the ground that the

first respondent, in the Appeals, had perfected title

by adverse possession.

3. We have heard Shri Salman Khursh id, learned Senior

Counsel on behalf of the Appellant and Shri P.S.

Patwalia, learned Senior Advocate on behalf of the

first respondent and Shri S.R. Singh, learned Senior

Advocate on behalf of the second respondent -the

Assistant Survey Commissioner, Waqk, Bulandshehar and

the fourth respondent -the Collector, Wakf,

Bulandshehar.

3

FACTS

4. We begin by setting out the following genealogical

chart:

Syed Mohd Akbar Ali Khan

Qasim Ali Khan Syed Qasim Ali Khan Syed Raza Ali Khan

Sayeed Shujat Ali Khan Sajjad Ali Khan Syed Mohd. Ali Khan Mohd Ahmed Ali Khan

(Respondent No.1) (Respondent No.1)

5. Parties are Shia Muslims. Moh d. Akbar Ali khan

purported to create a waqf-alal-aulad by a deed dated

26.07.1934. He appointed himself as a first Mutawalli.

However, he purported to execute a sale deed in the

year 1948 in respect of a tube well and some adjoining

land. Qasim Ali Khan, one of the sons of Akbar Ali

Khan, filed OS No. 1 of 1950 impugning the sale deed.

The trial court decree d the said suit and the decree

was affirmed by the High Court by its judgment rendered

on 11.07.1962. The High Court in the course of its

4

Judgement did hold that, Akbar Ali Khan had created a

valid and effective wa qf as required of a Shia Muslim

which he was. On 16.12.1958 , Akbar Ali Khan passed

away. He left behind him three sons , Qasim Ali khan,

Kazim Ali Khan and Raza Ali Khan. It appears that Qasim

Ali Khan took over as the Mutawalli. His name was

entered in the register of wa qf. However, his younger

brothers, i.e., Kazim Ali Khan and Raza Ali Khan got

their names mutated in the Revenue Records as Bhumidhar

in regard to the property. This led to the second suit

again by Qasim Ali Khan , i.e., OS No. 421 of 1959. He

sought a declaration that the plaint schedule property

was a waqf property. He further sought the relief of

expunging the names of his two brother s. The said suit

was decreed in favo ur of the plaintiff on 21.05.1962.

Mohd. Kazim Ali Khan on 14.10.1960 during the pendency

of the suit transferred his alleged one-third share to

Mohd. Ahmad Ali Khan who was his nephew being the son

of Raza Ali Khan . This shall be referred to as the

first

sale.

6. After a remand in an Appeal, when the Suit was

pending, consolidation proceedings began in the

5

village. Under the law, the Suit was to stand abated.

The Suit stood abated. Shri Qasim Ali Khan filed

objection seeking expunging of the names of the other

sons, viz., his brothers. This was done on the basis

that the properties were waqf properties. The

Consolidation Officer accepted the objection. He

directed that the entry of waqf be made in the Revenue

record. It was his reasoning that upon the creation of

the waqf, properties stood vested in the Almighty and

the first sale was infirm. The Appeal filed by Shri

Kasim Ali Khan and Shri Raza Ali Khan came to be

dismissed by the Settlement Officer. The Revision filed

by them also came to be dismissed by Order dated

29.01.1969. However, it would appear that an

application, seeking restoration, was filed in r egard

to the Order of the Deputy Director, Consolidation. The

same stood dismissed on 02.03.1972. Another Application

for Restoration, however, came to be filed. It is in

the said Restoration Application, a compromise was

entered into on 13.02.1974 between the three brothers,

viz., Qasim Ali Khan, Kasim Ali Khan and Raza Ali Khan.

The compromise proceeded on the footing that the waqf

6

was a paper transaction. It was the further basis that

the waqf was never acted upon and further that the

Bhumidars of the plots were Qasim Ali Khan, Raza Ali

Khan and Mohammad Ahmad Ali Khan (the last being the

alienee), who were entitled to one -third share each.

The Deputy Collector, Consolidation accepted the

compromise, set aside the Order dated 29.01.1969, an

Order passed on merit, and, disposed of the Revision

on the basis of the compromise. No sanction was

obtained from the Waqf Board within the meaning of

Section 49A of the Uttar Pradesh Muslim Waqf Act, 1960

(hereinafter referred to as, ‘the 1960 Act’, for

short). The Shia Waqf Board was not a party. We also

notice that the Order dated 02.03.1972 was set aside.

A sale deed came to be executed based on the compromise

on 26.09.1974 by Shri Qasim Ali Khan, purporting to

convey his one-third share in favour of his nephew,

viz., Shri Syed Mohammad Ali Khan, who was another son

of Shri Raza Ali Khan hereinafter referred to as the

second sale. Shri Syed Shujat Ali Khan, who was the son

of Qasim Ali Khan, filed Writ Petition (C) No. 5874 of

1974 challenging Order dated 12.09.1974 passed by the

7

Deputy Director, Consolidation. On 01.05.1988, it would

appear that Shri Qasim Ali Khan resigned as Mutawalli.

It is the case of the appellant that Shri Sujat Ali

Khan became the Mutawalli. The Writ Petition filed by

Shri Sujat Ali Khan came to be withdrawn. Thereafter,

Shri Sajjad Ali Khan, who was another son of Shri Qasim

Ali Khan and who claimed as a beneficiary of the Wakf,

filed a complaint before the U.P. Shia Waqf Board. He

called in question the transfer made of waqf property,

both by Shri Qasim Ali Khan, his father, and his uncle,

viz., Shri Kasim Ali Khan. He also sought to bring

under a cloud the compromise entered into by them

before the Deputy Director, Consolidation besides the

withdrawal of Writ Petition (C) No. 5874 of 1974. T he

Controller of the Waqf Board passed Order dated

16.07.1997. By the said Order, he invoked Section 52(1)

of the Act and directed the Collector to recover and

deliver possession of the disputed land from the

unauthorised occupants, viz., Shri Syed Mohamad Ahmad

Ali Khan and Shri Mohamad Ali Khan, who were the sons

of Shri Raza Ali Khan. They are the first respondents

in the Appeals and referred to as such. It is thereupon

8

that the Collector passed Order dated 31.12.1997,

directing the respondents to deliver possession of the

property to the Board within thirty days. This Order

came to be challenged by the first respondents in the

Appeals, viz., the alleged unauthorised occu pants

before the Additional District Judge, Bulandsh ahar. The

said Appeals were allowed by the Additional District

Judge. The appellant filed Writ Petition (C) No. 23414

of 1998, contending that it was the Waqf Tribunal which

had the jurisdiction and not t he Additional District

Judge. This contention found favour with the High Court

and it was found that the Additional District Judge did

not possess jurisdiction. The Order of the Additional

District Judge came to be set aside. Thereafter, the

first respondent filed Appeal No. 2 of 2002 and Appeal

No. 3 of 2002 before the Waqf Tribunal. By Order dated

28.03.2003, the Waqf Tribunal allowed the Appeals and

the Order of the Collector was set aside. It is the

said Order, which has been confirmed by the High Court

by passing the impugned Order, by which, the Revision

Petitions filed by the appellant, came to be dismissed.

9

FINDINGS OF THE WAQF TRIBUNAL

7.

i. Under Section 52(1) of the Act, the Board was to

first satisfy in such manner as was prescribed,

after making inquiry that the property is recorded

in the Waqf Register and further that the property

was alienated without any prior permission of the

Board. Thereafter, the matter is to be sent to the

Collector for recovering possession.

ii. After perusing the rec ord and a true copy filed by

the appellant (the papers Nos. 42C and 53C2 ), it

was found that it was not mentioned in the Order

that the Board had done any inquiry.

iii. The Board had not satisfied itself, after making

inquiry. This finding was entered on the b asis of

there being no evidence in the record requisitioned

from the Board.

iv. A Report of a Senior Waqf Inspector found included

in the record, was considered and it was found that

Senior Waqf Inspector had not actually seen whether

the property was recorded in the Waqf Register.

10

The Controller had not satisfied itself as per the

prescribed procedure laid down in Section 52(1) of

the Act.

v. The procedure adopted was illegal. There was no

Officer known as Controller under the Act. The

power under Section 52(1) could be exercised by

the Board. No Notification was produced to

establish that the Board transferred its power to

any Officer known as Controller. The Order passed

by the Controller was without jurisdiction.

vi. A period of seven days alone was given, which is

illegal.

vii. The possession of the respondents was clearly

admitted in the petition filed by the appellant

before the Waqf Board. It was further admitted that

the respondents were using the property for their

own interest and as their own personal property.

The respondents were found to have become owners

by way of adverse possession. There were exceptions

to Section 49A of the U.P. Act and Section 51 of

the Act. Both Acts were special Acts on the subject

of Waqf. There was no absolute Rule that a property

11

could not be transferred as new rights could accrue

to any person on the basis of adverse possession.

FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT

8.

i. There is merit in the contention of the appellant

that the compromise entered into before the Deputy

Director, Consolidation, being a collusive one,

could not defeat the Waqf. Once a Waqf, always a

Waqf.

ii. In the absence of the Waqf Board, the Order passed

by the Deputy Director, Consolidation acting on

the compromise was invalid in view of Section 69

of the 1960 U.P. Act.

iii. The sale executed by Shri Qasim Ali Khan on

29.06.1974 (the second sale) was invalid for the

reason also that no permission of the Waqf Board

was obtained under Section 49A of the 1960 U.P.

Act. Equally, the sale executed by Shri Kasim Ali

Khan in the year 1960 (the first sale), who was a

12

beneficiary, who had no right to sell Waqf

Property, was void.

iv. Shri Syed Mohammad Ahmad Ali Khan and Shri Syed

Mohammad Ali Khan were beneficiaries in the waqf-

al-al-aulad. Rejecting the contention of the

appellant that a beneficiary could not acquire

title by adverse possession over waqf property, it

was found that title by adverse possession could

be acquired.

v. Relying upon Shri Mohammad Ismail Faruqui v. Union

of India and others

1

and also The Mosque Known as

Masjid Shahid Ganj, and others v. Shiromani

Gurdwaba Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar, and

another

2

, it was found that title by adverse

possession could be acquired over waqf property.

vi. A person in a fiduciary relationship or one, in

whom the property was vested in trust, could not

claim title by adverse possession over trust

property. A Mutawalli, accordingly, on the said

principle, could not claim title by adverse

1

AIR 1995 SC 605

2

AIR 1940 PC 116

13

possession over waqf property [See Faqir Mohd. Shah

v. Qazi Fasihuddin Ansari and others

3

]. That a Co-

owner also cannot acquire title by adverse

possession over trust property, is found to be

well-recognised in law.

vii. A beneficiary is not a co -owner and, therefore,

the principle that a co -owner cannot acquire a

right by adverse possession over the share of

another co-owner, was not applicable to a

beneficiary. A beneficiary did not hold the

property in trust.

viii. “In every case of Waqf, whether public or private,

the property vests in God Almighty or in the Waqf

itself as an institution or a foundation econ omic,

for the time being in force”. The High Court drew

support from the aforesaid view expressed by a Full

Bench in the decision reported in Moattar Raza and

others v. Joint Director of Consolidation, U.P.

Camp at Bareilly and others

4

.

3

AIR 1956 SC 713

4

AIR 1970 Allahabad 509

14

ix. Article 96 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides

for a period of twelve years for a Suit by a Manager

of a Muslim Religious or Charitable Endowment,

inter alia, to recover possession transferred by a

previous Manager for valua ble consideration. The

sale executed by Shri Kasim Ali Khan (the first

sale) would not come under its purview as he was

not the Mutawalli/Manager.

x. In regard to the sale deed executed in 1974 by Shri

Qasim Ali Khan, who was noted as the Mutawalli,

the Court went into the interplay of Articles 65

and 96 of the Limitation Act , 1963. It was found

that Article 96 would not apply in the case of a

void transfer. In the case of a transfer being void

on account of breach of a statutory requirement,

adverse possession o f the transferee would

commence from the date of the transfer. If the Suit

for Recovery of Possession was not instituted

within the period of twelve years under Article

65, the rights of the Manager to recover the

endowed property would stand extinguished under

Section 27 of the Limitation Act.

15

xi. The correct interpretation to be placed on Article

96 is to confine its ambit to suits to recover

possession where the right to recover possession

was not lost under Section 27 of the Limitation

Act. In other words, it is found that Article 96

would be of avail only in regard to voidable

transfers.

xii. The finding of the Tribunal that the respondents

had acquired title by adverse possession, was found

correct. The contention based on Section 66G of

the Waqf Act, 1954, was repelled, though it

provided for a period of thirty years. This was on

the basis that the said enactment was never made

applicable to Uttar Pradesh.

xiii. Section 107 of the Act, which excludes the

Limitation Act, was found to be of little avail to

the appellant. A person in adverse possession does

not claim through the Mutawalli. The right of the

respondents having ripened by adverse possession,

it could not be defeated by invoking Section 107

of the Act.

16

xiv. The view expressed by the Tribunal that the Waqf

Board was duty-bound to hold an inquiry and that

such an inquiry was not held, was found to be

erroneous. The contention of the appellant that

the Waqf was registered, had not been disputed,

and it was also not disputed that there was no

previous sanction for th e sale, was found to be

with merit.

xv. It was noted that in the Report of the Inspector,

it is stated that Waqf was registered as Waqf No.

1456, which recital was not established as

incorrect. It was further found that the

respondents had not set up any case that the Waqf

was not registered in the Register of Waqfs. The

Order of the Controller, therefore, was not

required, it is found, to be quashed on the ground

of no inquiry being held under Section 52. It was

also found that it could not be so quashed on t he

ground that there was no application of mind.

17

xvi. The effect of the decision reported in Khilli Ram

v. State of Rajasthan

5

, was found to be that the

entry in the Waqf Register would not be open to

question in an Appeal against the Order passed by

the Collector. The Appeal against the Order of the

Collector lies before the Tribunal under the Act.

The Tribunal has wide powers a nd it can go into

the question. The Tribunal could go into the

validity of the Requisition Order issued by the

Board. These are views expressed in the Judgment

of a learned Single Judge in the decision reported

in (Smt.) Amina Khatoon v. Third Addl. D.J.

Farukhabad and others

6

. The High Court agreed with

the said view.

xvii. The Tribunal erred in finding the notice being

defective on the ground that thirty days’ notice

was not given. High Court notes the same to be a

mistake and that no prejudice had been caus ed as

no steps were taken for their eviction before the

expiry of thirty days.

5

(1985) 1 SCC 28

6

1987 All LJ 1282

18

xviii. The contention of the respondents that the

Report given by the Senior Inspector of the Waqf

was an ex parte Report and they had not been given

any opportunity, was found to be f actually correct.

However, it is found that the Controller had found

the property in question was waqf property, the

Waqf was registered and, lastly, the transfer was

invalid for want of permission. It is specifically

found that ‘there appears no dispute o n facts upon

the point’. No prejudice, it is found further to

the respondents, especially in view of the full

opportunity given by the Tribunal, especially when

it was not contended that the Waqf was not

registered or that the property was not waqf

property or that permission was taken before the

transfer.

xix. It was, however, found that in view of the finding

that the respondents had acquired title by adverse

possession, there was no merit in the Revision

Petitions and, accordingly, they were dismissed.

19

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

9.

i. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant,

Shri Salman Khurshid, contended that Article 96 of

the Limitation Act did apply. The period of

limitation would commence from 1996 or from the

date, when the appellant Shri Sajjad Ali Khan was

appointed Mutawalli, as twelve years had not run

out from 01.05.1988, when Shri Qasim Ali Khan

resigned or from the date of appointment of the

present Mutawalli Shri Sajjad Ali Khan. Therefore,

Shri Sayed Mohammad Ahmad Ali Khan co uld not

acquire title by adverse possession.

ii. Article 65 of the Limitation Act did not apply.

The claim of Shri Sayed Ahmad Ali Khan was based

on the compromise dated 13.02.1974. It was not

founded on the sale deed dated 14.10.1960. The

right under the said sale deed, if any, got

extinguished in view of there being no objection

by him during the consolidation proceedings and

20

also the decisions of the three Consolidation

Courts.

iii. As regards the claim of adverse possession of Shri

Syed Mohammad Ali Khan, it is contended that

Article 65 was a general Article and it is Article

96, which would apply. Appellant was appointed

Mutawalli. The period would start running, when he

was so appointed or from the date of the complaint

filed by him in 1996.

iv. The High Court erred in finding that the right of

the Waqf stood extinguished by virtue of Section

27 of the Limitation Act. As the Suit for

Possession was against the transferee from the

earlier Mutawalli, the possession would become

adverse from the date of death or the re signation

of the earlier Mutawalli under Article 134B of the

earlier Limitation Act and upon the expiry of

twelve years, as provided in Article 96, and not

from the date of the sale deed.

v. Appellant would further contend that respondents

being beneficiaries , could not acquire title, by

adverse possession, of the waqf property.

21

vi. Reliance was placed on the following Judgments:

a. Chhedi Lal Misra (Dead) Through Lrs. v. Civil

Judge, Lucknow and others

7

;

b. K.S. Viswam Iyer (Dead) Through Lrs. v. State

Wakf Board, Madras

8

; and

c. Wali Mohammed (Dead) by Lrs. v. Rahmat Bee (Smt)

and others

9

.

10. Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel,

appearing on behalf of Respondent No.1 in the appeals

makes the following submissions:

There is no valid waqf created as the waqif

never acted upon it. He never divested himself of

the property as required under Mohammedan law

pertaining to Shi a Muslims. Under the law, it is

mandatory that there must be a change in the

character of possession of property. No change in

mutation records was made by the waqif. The

property remained in the person’s name till his

7

(2007) 4 SCC 632

8

1994 Suppl. (2) SCC 109

9

AIR 1999 SC 1136

22

demise on 16.12.1958. Thereafter the property was

mutated into the names of his three sons. Reliance

is placed on the object of the waqf dated

26.07.1934. There in it is indicated:

“The object of the Waqf reads inter alia”

With a view of perpetuating the

name of my ancestors and with the

object of benefiting my offspring and

their offspring and relatives

belonging to the family and their

offspring, and, in their absen ce, the

Shia Poor, the indigent, the

miserable and Syeds-for this purpose

under Mohammedan law, in accordance

with Act 6 of 1913, I have by a formal

statement (sigha) in accordance with

the Sharia put into Waqf (trust) the

following property, thereby,

excluding it from own estate, and

having put into writing this deed of

Waqfu’l aulad (Trust for

offspring)….”

Clause E of Waqf Deed provides inter alia:

“E. In case, God forbid my

generation exterminates altogether and

none survives there and nor my wife

Pakeeza Begum or any other wife remains

alive, then in such case the income from

the endowed property which will be manage

by the members of the committee will be

spent for the charitable matters in TAB

A of the Convenience Compilation. ”

23

11. It is further conte nded that all the property

except a small parcel admeasuring hundred bighas, which

is the subject matter of the present case has been

sold. In fact, the waqif himself sold a portion to one

Mr. Manzoor Hasan. Almost 4272 bighas ha ve been sold

by the sons of Akbar Ali Khan. Neither the appellant

nor the Waqf Board objected. The Waqf Deed contemplated

proceeds of the Waqf Property being used to repay

outstanding debts. It was, therefore, not a valid waqf.

The Waqf was created on 24.07.1934, at which time, the

Mussalman Waqf Validating Act, 1913 was in force. The

Act did not provide for registration of the Waqf. It

was, thereafter, that the Mussalman Waqf Act, 1923 was

enacted. Thereunder, by virtue of Section 2(e), waqf-

alal-aulad was excluded from the operation of the 192 3

Act. Still further in the year 1930, the Mussalman Waqf

Validating Act, 1930 was enacted, which declared only

that the 1913 Act applied to Waqf s created before the

commencement of the 1913 Act. It is thereafter that the

U.P. Muslim Waqfs Act, 1936 (hereinafter referred to

as, ‘the 1936 Act’) and the 1960 Act were enacted.

Neither the 1936 nor the 1960 Acts applied to the facts.

24

Therefore, it is contended that the appellant cannot

have a case that the alleged Waqf was registered either

under the 1936 Act or the 1960 Act. The object of the

Waqf relied upon is to benefit the offspring and their

offspring and in their absence to the Shia poor. The

1936 Act did not apply and Waqf could not have been

registered under th e 1936 Act. There is no religious

or charitable purpose to the Waqf Deed dated

26.07.1934. Reliance is placed on the decision of this

Court in Fazlul Rabbi Pradhan v. State of West Bengal

and others

10

. The waqf not being registered, the summary

procedure under the Act was not applicable. It is

further complained that the appellants have different

versions in regard to the alleged registration. On the

one hand, it is contended that registration was

actually done in 1934, at which time, the 1923 Act was

in force. The said Act, apart from specifically

excluding waqf-alal-aulad from its ambit did not

provide for any provisions relating to registration.

It is further pointed out that during the hearing, a

case is set up that registration was done under the

10

1965 3 SCR 307 / AIR 1965 SC 1722

25

1936 Act. In view of the specific exclusion, by way of

Section 2(2)(i), it does not apply as the entire income

was going for the benefit of the members of the family.

There is a procedure at any rate prescr ibed under the

1936 Act, in Section 38. The same has not been followed.

The third version, it is pointed out, was that the waqf

was registered under the 1960 Act. A Report of the

Controller, which was for the first time relied upon

in this Court and which was disbelieved by the

Tribunal, cannot be the basis. Still further, as the

entire income was dedicated to the descendants of the

waqif stood excluded from the ambit of the 1960 Act ,

the claim was without basis. Here again, Section 29

provided the procedur e for registration. The same,

having not been conf ormed with, it could not be said

that the waqf was registered under the 1960 Act. In

view of the 1960 Act not being applicable, the bar to

the compromise of the suit or proceeding relating to

waqfs, enacted in Section 69, was inapplicable. The

summary procedure for recovery of Waqf Properties

mentioned in Section 45B was not available. No reliance

could be placed on the extract of the Register of the

26

Waqf purporting to establish the registration of the

waqf and which was produced by Respondent No.4 -

Collector for the first time in Rejoinder submissions

before this Court. The date of the Registration

Certification is 08.07.2008, which was after the

passing of the Order by the High Court. Here again, the

procedure under Section 36 of the Act was not followed.

The particulars, which are to be mandatorily specified

were missing. In the absence of a valid registration,

the summary procedure provided in Section 52 of the Act

was not available to the appellants. The appellants are

estopped from challenging the compromise of 1974, after

a period of 22 years. The parties to the compromise

acted upon the same. The second sale took place.

Appellant being the son of the transferor stood

estopped. The dismissal of the writ p etition filed by

Sujad Ali Khan as not pressed, has led to Order dated

12.09.1974, becoming final. Respondents have been in

continuous and uninterrupted possession. The

Limitation Act was applicable to the Waqf properties

under Mohammedan Law till the Act came into force,

whereunder, Section 107 specifically barred the

27

application of the Limitation Act, 1963. Reliance is

placed on the Judgment of the Privy Council in 1940 XXI

ILR 493. Also, support is drawn from the Judgment of

this Court in Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui and others v. Union

of India

11

. Section 107 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was

prospective in its application. Our attention is drawn

to the Judgment of this Court in T. Kaliamurthi

(supra). The respondents have been in possession of

two-thirds of the suit property since the first sale

deed and the remaining one -third came by their

possession in 1974. Documentary evidence establishing

such possession include the following:

i. Order dated 16.07.1997 by the Controller, Waqf

Board;

ii. Sale deed dated 26.09.1974;

iii. The averments in the appeal (No.4 of 1998) filed

by the respondent before the District and

Sessions Judge, Bulandshehar;

iv. Order dated 30.05.1998 passed by the District

Judge;

v. The Waqf Appeal No. 3 of 2002;

11

(1994) 6 SCC 360

28

vi. The findings of the Order of the Tribunal;

vii. The admission of the possession of the

respondents by the appellant in the impugned

Judgment and, lastly,

viii. Reliance is placed on the very List of Dates

submitted by the appellant, which indicates that

the Order of the Collector was for recovery of

possession.

12. Thus, it is contended that the respondents have

been in possession of two -thirds since 1960 and

remaining one-third since 1974 and the rights of the

respondents emerged before the Act came into force.

Even counting from 1974 the respondents have perfected

title in the year 1986, i.e., 12 years from 1974. Thus,

the Limitation Act, 1963 would indeed apply as hostile

possession had led to the ripening of the title before

Section 107 of the Act came into force.

13. It is next pointed out that the appointment of

Mutawalli did not lead to a fresh starting point of

limitation. Decision of this Court in Syed Yousuf Yar

29

Khan and others v. Syed Mohammed Yar Khan and others

12

is set up to counter the said case. The High Court had

rightly applied Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963

in the present case. The first respondent in the

Appeals are not beneficiaries, it is next pointed out

as no valid waqf has been established. There is no

evidence to suggest that the alleged waqf was

generating any income which was being distributed

amongst the beneficiaries. This meant that the three

sons of the original Wakif were not beneficiaries and

were not so treated. It is also pointed out that there

is no bar in law preventing the beneficiary of waqf

from claiming adverse possessi on. The bar applies only

to a Mutawalli. This is for the reason that the

Mutawalli holds a fiduciary duty towards the Waqf. It

is open to the first respondent, it is lastly pointed

out, to plead both title and adverse possession

simultaneously. Reliance wa s placed on M. Siddiq

(Dead)Through Legal Representatives (Ram Janmabhumi

12

(1967) 2 SCR 318

30

Temple Case) v. Mahant Suresh Das and others

13

and

Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India and others

14

.

SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT NOS. 2 AND 4

14. Respondent Nos. 2 and 4 are Assistant Survey

Commissioner Waqf, Bulandshehar and the Collector,

Waqf, Bulandshehar, U.P., respectively. The learned

Senior Counsel, Shri S.R. Singh would submit that the

compromise application by the three sons of Akbar Ali

Khan without prior approval of the Board, as

contemplated in the Act of 1960, was not maintainable

in view of the requirement of Section 69 of the 1960

Act. The Order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation

setting aside the Order dated 29.01.1969 and also the

Order dated 02.03.1972 was illegal. The Controller of

the Waqf Board held inquiry on the complaint before the

Waqf Board. He found that the disputed property was

Waqf property which was registered as such in the

Register of Waqfs. It was further found that the

property was illegally sold without obtaining the

13

(2020) 1 SCC 1

14

(2004) 10 SCC 779

31

sanction of the Board. Thereupon, the Controller issued

the requisition to the Collector to obtain possession.

The High Court p laced reliance on Judgment of this

Court in Thakur Mohd. Ismail v. Thakur Sabir Ali

15

, that

in a waqf-alal-aulad, the property stood transferred

to the Almighty but still dismiss ed the Revisions

without considering whether title could be acquired by

adverse possession. He points out that the High Court

did not consider the quest ion whether Articles 65 and

96 of the Limitation Act could be invoked against the

God/Almighty. The Order passed by the Deputy Director,

Consolidation was a nullity, being bereft of sanction

under Section 69 of the 1960 Act. The result was the

earlier decisions of the Consolidation Authorities

stood restored wherein it was held that the Waqf in

question was a valid Waqf. Section 49 of the U.P.

Consolidation of Holding Act, 1953 bars the same issue

being considered by the Tribunal which had the

trappings of the Civil Court. The two sales were void

ab initio under Section 51(1) and Section 51(A) of the

Act. Again, support is drawn from the Judgment in

15

AIR 1962 SC 1722

32

Thakur Mohd. Ismail (supra) as also Ahmed G.H. Ariff

and others v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Calcutta

16

. A

beneficiary/Mutawalli had no right to transfer the waqf

property. Article 65 of the Limitation Act did not

apply to the proceedings of the Act in view of Section

107 of the Limitation Act. It is furt her contended that

Article 65 applied to suits. It did not apply to

proceedings. Therefore, Section 27 of the Limitation

Act, 1963 did not apply to the waqf property which

stood vested in Almighty. Reliance is placed on

Judgment of this Court in Chhedi Lal Misra (Dead)

Through Lrs. v. Civil Judge, Lucknow and others

17

.

Paragraph-34A of the Waqf Deed, which contemplates

spending of Rs.500/ - on charitable purposes and

paragraph-34E, which contemplates that in case all the

descendants of the Waqif die, then, the waqf shall be

used for charitable purposes, brought the waqf un der

the definition of ‘waqf’. A void document, as is the

case with the sale deed and the compromise, would be

ignored without the need to set aside the same. The

16

AIR 1971 SC 1691

17

(2007) 4 SCC 632

33

respondent no.1 in both the Appeals could not be said

to have perfected their title by adverse possession

against the State for which the period is 30 years. The

litigation started in 1997, i.e., 23 years from the

date of the collusive compromise and the void sale

deed. This argument is based on the fact that the waqf

property is managed on behalf of God by the Waqf Board

which comes under the superintendence of the Government

under the law.

ANALYSIS

15. Going by the contentions raised and, in the facts,

the following points are noted:

1. Whether there was a valid Shia Waqf and whether it

was registered?

2. Whether the compromise dated 13.02.1974 and the

Order dated 12.09.1974. are valid or are they void?

3. Whether the two sales, one on 14.10.1960 and the

second on 26.09.1974, in favour of the first

respondent in the two Appeals before us, are void?

4. Whether the action is barred by limitation?

34

5. Whether the High Court was correct in finding that

the action was barred as it is not Article 96 of the

Limitation Act, which applied but Article 65?

What is the interplay between the said Articles in

the facts?

6. What is the impact of Section 27 of the Limitation

Act, 1963 in the facts?

7. Whether Section 107 of the Act removes the bar of

limitation at any rate?

16. The High Court in the impugned order has confirmed

the findings of the Tribunal that Respondent No.1 in

both the cases have acquired title by adverse

possession. This is on the basis that the first sale

was effected in the year 1960 and the second sale was

effected in the year 1974. The Act came into force with

effect from 1.1.1996. It is further found that the

period began to run from the dates of the two sale

deeds as the sales were void. The further finding is

that Article 96 of the Limitation Act, 1963 did not

apply to the first sale of the year 1960. The said sale

was effected at a ti me when Qasim the eldest brother

35

was the Mutawalli. The sale was effected by a person

who in other words was not the Mutawal li. Therefore,

Article 96 did not apply. As far as the second sale is

concerned, it was effected by Qasim Ali Khan on

26.09.1974 purporting to convey his one -third right to

his nephew who is the first respondent in the other

appeal. The further reasoning of the High Court is that

the second sale deed was executed by the Mutawal li.

The court thereafter demarcated the field covered by

Articles 65 and 96. The court then also took into

consideration Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The Court found the proper interpretation was that

Article 96 was to be confined to suits to recover

possession where the right to recover p ossession had

already not been lost under Section 27 of the

Limitation Act, 1963 . Article 96, in other words, it

was found, applied to voidable transfers. On the said

basis, finding that the second sale represented a case

of void transfer, it was found th at Article 96 did not

assist the appellant. It was also found that there is

no obstacle in a beneficiary of a Wakf perfecting title

by adverse possession. Such an obstacle , undoubtedly,

36

existed in the case of a Mutawal li, a trustee or a co-

owner. A benefic iary was none of the above. Thus,

proceeding on the basis that the first respondent in

both the appeals were beneficiar ies of the Wakf and as

the sales under which they claim ed were found to be

void, the period of limitation contemplated under

Article 65 of the Limitation Act began to run from the

date of the sale. This meant that when the Act was born

on 01.01.1996, the title stood vested with the first

respondent by adverse possession. It is further found

that Section 107 of the Act under which the Limit ation

Act was not applicable to the Act could not rescue the

case of the appellant.

17. It is apposite that we advert to the relevant

provisions of the Limitation Act. Section 27 of the

Limitation Act provides that at the determination of

the period limited to any person for instituting a suit

for possession of any property, ‘his right’ to such

property would stand extinguis hed. Article 65 of the

Limitation Act, 1963 reads as follows:

“

37

Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to

run

65. For possession of immovable property or any interest

therein based on title.

Twelve

years

1

When the possession

of the defendant

becomes adverse to

the plaintiff.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this article—

(a) where the suit is by a remainderman, a reversioner

(other than a landlord) or a devisee, the possession of the

defendant shall be deemed to become adverse only when

the estate of the remainderman, reversioner or devisee,

as the case may be, falls into possession;

(b) where the suit is by a Hindu or Muslim entitled to the

possession of immovable property on the death of a Hindu

or Muslim female, the possession of the defendant shall be

deemed to become adverse only when the female dies;

(c) where the suit is by a purchaser at a sale in execution

of a decree when the judgment -debtor was out of

possession at the date of the sale, the purchaser shall be

deemed to be a representative of the judgment-debtor who

was out of possession.

”

18. Article 134B of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908

was the predecessor provision holding the field till

Article 96 supplanted it in the year 1963. The

following table sets out Article 134B of the Limitation

Act, 1908 and Article 96 of the Limitation Act, 1963 :

“

Article 134-B of the Limitation Act, 1908

“Description of suit Period of

limitation

Time from which

period begins to

run

38

134-

B.

By the manager of a Hindu, Muhammadan or

Buddhist religious or charitable endowment to

recover possession of immovable property

comprised in the endowment which has been

transferred by a previous manager for a valuable

consideration.

Twelve

years

The death,

resignation or

removal of the

transferor.”

Article 96 of the Limitation Act, 1963

“Description of suit Period of

limitation

Time from which period

begins to run

96. By the manager of a Hindu, Muslim or

Buddhist religious or charitable

endowment to recover possession of

movable or immovable property

comprised in the endowment which has

been transferred by a previous manager

for a valuable consideration.

Twelve

years

The date of death,

resignation or removal of

the transferor or the date of

appointment of the plaintiff

as manager of the

endowment, whichever is

later.”

”

19. The distinction between the two Articles have been

noted by the judgment of this Court in T. Kaliamurthi

and another v. Five Gori Thaikkal Wakf and others

18

.

It reads as under:

“35. ……We have carefully noted two

Articles viz., Article 96 of the Limitation

Act, 1963 and Arti cle 134B of the

Limitation Act, 1908 and we find that they

are different from each other insofar as

while under the 1908 Act 12 years was to

run from the death, resignation or removal

of the transferor, under the 1963 Act the

said period of 12 years was to run from the

date of death, resignation or removal of

the transferor, or the date of appointment

of the plaintiff a s Manager of the

endowment, whichever was later.”

18

(2008) 9 SCC 306

39

20. As far as the first sale is concerned , the sale

was not effected by the Mutawa lli or the Manager of the

Waqf. The sale was effected by the brother of the

Mutawalli. Therefore, the High Court is correct in

finding that Article 96 will not come to the aid of the

appellant.

21. As far as the second sale is concerned, it was no

doubt, executed by the Mutawal li by sale deed

26.09.1974. This is a sale executed by him on the

strength of the compromise which was enter ed into

between the three brothers on 13.02.1974 . As we have

noticed, the compromise led to order dated 12.09.1974

being passed by the Deputy Director (Consolidation)

setting aside the dismissal of the revision by order

dated 20.09.1969 as also the dismiss al of the first

restoration application dated 02.03.1972. If the said

sale is found to be v alid, then obviously, the

appellant would fail. If on the other hand, the sale

is void, the question would be whether the proceeding

initiated beyond 12 years from t he date of the sale

would be within time. If by seeking shelter under

Article 96 of the Limitation Act, 1963 , the period of

40

limitation is to commence from the date of resignation

of the Mutawalli then would not the period of 12 years

commence from 01.05.1988 when Qasim Ali Khan, the

Mutawalli resigned? Then, the period of 12 years would

expire only in the year 2000. Could it not be said that

the action was not barred ? It is here that the High

Court reasons that Article 96 is not meant to apply to

a void sale. Instead, it applies to a voidable sale.

22. There cannot be any doubt that Waqf property can

be the subject matter of acquisition of title by

adverse possession (see AIR 1940 PC 116). That a

Mutawalli however c annot acquire rights over waqf

property by adverse possession is not open to question.

(See AIR 1956 SC 713).

23. The High Court finds that Article 96 will not apply

as it is a case of a void sale and not voidable sale.

The reasoning is based on the rationale furnished in

the Judgment of the High Court of Orissa in Chintamani

Sahoo (deceased by LR.) and others v. Commissioner of

Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa and others

19

.

19

AIR 1983 Orissa 205

41

In the said case, the Division Bench of the High Court

was dealing with the following facts:

The Mahant of a math executed certain permanent

leases. It was without sanction of the Commissi oner

as contemplated in Section 58 of the Orissa Hindu

Endowments Act, 1939. Such lease s were contrary to

the aforesaid provision. The Mahant came to be

later dismissed. The Executive Officer of the math

appointed by the Commissioner instituted

proceeding under Section 68 of the said Act for

recovery of possession, which was allowed. He also

instituted proceedings for recovery of possession

under Section 25 of the Act. Th e Commissioner

allowed the proceeding under Section 25 and

directed issue of a requisition to the Collector

for evicting the appellant who thereupon brought a

suit for declaration contending that he had

acquired an indefeasible right of tenancy by

uninterrupted possession and sought an injunction.

We may notice the following finding:

“8. The main question in controversy is as

regards limitation and adverse possession.

The finding of fact is that the plaintiff was

42

in possession of the lands from the

respective dates of the leases, namely, 26 -

7-1943, 8 -1-1944 and 15 -7-1944. The

proceeding under Section 25 of the Orissa

Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951 was

allowed on 30-10-69 and direction was issued

to the Collector for delivery of possession.

The right to evict the plaintiff would be

barred by limitation after expiry of 12 years

which comes to 1956 if the starting point

would be the dates of the respective leases.

If, however, it is held that adverse

possession of the plaintiff would start only

after the dismissal of the Mahant, the right

to recover in 1969 would be in time. It is

contended on behalf of the respondents that

the correct Article to apply is Article 96

of the new Limitation Act. On the other hand,

it is contended on behalf of the appellant

that Article 65 of the new Limitation Act is

the governing Article. The applicability of

either Art. 65 or Art. 96 would depend on

whether the transfer was void ab initio or

only voidable.

xxx xxx xxx

10. An alienation made in contravention of a

statutory provision which is enacted in

public interest is void. Admittedly the

permanent leases were granted in violation

of Section 58(1) which prohibits grant of

lease for more than five years without prior

sanction. The transfer by permanent leases

is, therefore, void. We are fortified in this

view by the earlier decisions of this Court.

In the case of Naba Kishore

Panda v. Bulendra, (1974-40 Cut LT 1152),

43

referred to above, Hon'ble S.K. Ray, J. (as

he then was) held that a permanent lease

created in express breach of the mandatory

provisions of S. 58(1) is void. In a

subsequent Single Bench decision in the case

of Arjuna Jena v. Chaitanya Thakur (1978) 45

Cut LT 461, Hon'ble B.K. Ray, J. also held

that a lease created in violation of the

provisions of Section 58(1) of the old Act

is a void one. For this proposition, his

Lordship relied on an earlier Division Bench

decision of this Court in the case of Shri

Chiranjilal Patwari v. Commr., Hindu

Religious Endowments, Orissa,

Bhubaneswar (1974) 40 Cut LT 4 1. In another

Single Bench decision of this Court in the

case of Gulam Ali Saha v. Sultan Khan, (1966)

32 Cut LT 510 : (AIR 1967 Orissa 55), decided

by Hon'ble G.K. Misra, J. (as he then was)

the question of validity of an alienation of

wakf property without permission of the Court

came up for consideration and it was held

that the alienation, even though for

consideration, was void ab initio. It was

further held, relying on the principles laid

down by the Privy Council in Masjid Shahid

Ganj v. S.G.P. Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1940

PC 116, that Article 144 of the old

Limitation Act applies to such a case for

acquisition of title by adverse possession.

In an unreported decision of this Court in

Second Appeal No. 361 of 1966 disposed of on

3rd August, 1970 ( Sambari Bewa v. Orissa

Board of Wakfs) Hon'ble R.N. Misra, J. (as

he then was) considered the validity of an

alienation made by a Mutwalli in violation

of the provisions of Section 36 -A of the Wakf

Act and came to hold that a permanent lease

44

granted in violation of the provisions of the

Wakf Act is ab initio void (vide para. 8).”

24. Thereafter, the Court posed a question , as to

whether it was Article 65 or Article 96 , which applied.

The Court thereupon held:

“12. This Article refers to a transfer for

valuable consideration. A transfer which is

void ab initio is in the eye of law no

transfer at all and hence will not come within

the scope of this Article. This Article

obviously applies to cases where the transf er

can be avoided or is voidable. But if the

transfer is void ab initio then Art. 65 of

the new Limitation Act would apply. The

transferee's possession since the date of the

transfer becomes adverse from the date of the

transfer inasmuch as the transferee had no

right in respect of the property at all and

he was a mere trespasser.

xxx xxx xxx

14. In AIR 1966 SC 859 ( Srinivasa

Reddiar v. N. Ramaswamy Reddiar ), the

question for decision before their Lordships

was “Does Art. 134 -B permit any distinction

to be made between transfers effected by a

previous manager on the basis that the

property transferred belongs to the religious

endowment and those made by him on the basis

that the said property is his own private

property?” Their Lordships held that Arti cle

134-B does not permit any such distinction.

45

It was held that the character of the

representations made by the previous manager

in regard to his relation with the property

which is the subject -matter of transfer is

irrelevant for the purpose of Art. 134 -B. The

question whether this Article applies to void

or voidable transaction did not arise for

consideration in that case.”

(Emphasis supplied)

25. Since reference was made to AIR 1966 SC 859 and

the same was distinguished, we may advert to the said

Judgment. The contention, which was taken before this

Court was that when a transfer is made by a Manager not

as Manager but as an individual, such transf er being

void ab initio, the possession of the transferee was

adverse from the date of the transfer and therefore,

in such a situation, Article 134B of the Limitation

Act, 1908, the predecessor Article of Article 96 of the

present Limitation Act, with the difference we have

noted in the third column, would not apply. This Court,

in fact, noted that two Judgments of the Privy Council,

viz., 1900 27 Indian Appeals 69 (EC) and 37 Indian

Appeals 147 EC , supported the said contention. In

regard to the first of t he cases (27 Indian Appeals 69

EC, it is found that the Privy Council held that where

46

hereditary Trustees of a religious endowment sold their

hereditary right of management and transferred the

endowed property, the sales were null and void, if

there was no custom providing otherwise. It was further

noted that the Privy Council was dealing with the case

of Article 124 of the Limitation Act , 1908. It was

further found that what was sold was the hereditary

office as also the property , though, immovable

properties of the temple were also sold. The further

reasoning was that it was Article 144 of the old Act

which operated to bar the suit after 12 years of adverse

possession. The Court noted certain divergence of

opinions in the Calcutta High Court. It fur ther went

on to doubt whether the first of the Judgment 27 Indian

Appeals 69 (EC) could lead to the inference that if a

part of the property was transferred by the Manager of

a religious endowment, on the basis that it belonged

to him, the right of the suc ceeding Manager could be

lost. Thereafter, the Court went on to find that the

matter must be viewed in the context of Article 134B

of the Limitation Act, 1908. This Court found that it

did not make any difference to the application of

47

Article 134B, if the transfer is made on the basis that

the property belonged not to the endowment but to the

Manager. All that was necessary for the successor

Manager to prove were found to be the following facts:

“(1) that the property belongs to the religious

endowment; (2) that it was transferred by a

previous manager; and (3) that the transfer was

for a valuable consideration. The character of

the representations made by the previous manger

in regard to his rela tion with the property

which is the subject matter of transfer, is

irrelevant for the purpose of Art. 134 -B.”

26. The High Court of Orissa in Chintamani Sahoo

(Deceased by LR.) (supra), distinguishes the aforesaid

Judgment on the basis that this Court was not

considering the question whether Article 134B applied

to void or voidable transaction s as it did not arise.

27. The appellants have placed reliance on certain

Judgments of other High Courts contending that they lay

down a different principle. In Chinna Jeeyangar Mutt,

Tirupath v. C.V. Purushotham and others

20, a learned

Single Judge traced the history of Articles 134A,

Article 134B, Article 134C also with reference to the

20

AIR 1974 AP 175

48

Third Report of the Law Commission of India. The said

portion reads as follows:

“12. The Law Commission observed in its 3rd

report relating to Limitation Act, 1908 in

paragraph 123 as follows:

“The starting point of limitation for suits

covered by Article 134 -B is the date of death,

resignation or removal of the transferor. This

has given rise to some difficulties in certain

cases. Thus, an Endowment Commissioner may find

it necessary to challenge an alienation by one

of the previous managers, after decades; or,

there may be a gap of more than 12 years between

the death, resignation or removal of one

manager and the appointment of his successo r.

In such cases, it would be more equitable to

make the date of the plaintiff's appointment

as Manager the starting point for limitation.

But there may be cases and circumstances where

the existing provision may be more favourable

to the institution. To p rovide for both

contingencies, the later of the two dates

should be taken as the starting point of

limitation.”

28. The Court also relied on the Statement of Objects

and Reasons. It also referred to Srinivasa (supra).

Still further, the Court set down the position at law

prior to amendment, as follows:

“23. From the above discussion the following

position of law emerges. A Mahant of a mutt is

incompetent to create any interest in respect

of muth property to enure beyond his lifetime.

49

He can alienate the property permanently only

for legal necessity or ben efit to the estate.

In the case of an alienation made by him, which

was not for legal necessity or benefit the said

alienation becomes voidable at the instance of

his successor. The right to question the

alienation accrues to the successor only on the

alienor's death. The adverse possession of the

alienee also begins to run only from the date

of his death and not until then. A permanent

lease of temple lands is also an alienation of

this nature. If it was not for legal necessity

or benefit it is not binding on the mutt. The

cause of action which once accrues continues.

The right of the mutt would be extinguished in

regard to that property at the end of the

period prescribed by the law of limitation.

Each succeeding mahant does not get a revival

of the cause of action in his favour. The

appointment of successor was never considered

to give a fresh start of limitation, under the

law as it stood prior to 1963. Whether it was

an alienation made for legal necessity or not

was a question depending upon the facts an d

circumstances of each case.”

29. Thereafter, the learned Judge went on to lay bare

the true purport of Article 134B:

“24. Such was the state of law when the

Limitation Act was amended in 1963. The

legislature must be presumed to know the

existing law and the interpretation given by

the courts to the law then in force. If the

right to question a voidable alienation in

respect of a Hindu or Muhammadan religious or

charitable endowment is denied to a mutt or

religious institution, such an institution

looses the properties once for all. As the

State was interested in protecting and

50

safeguarding the properties of such

institutions, it brought about an amendment to

achieve that purpose in 1963. The Law

Commission, which was appointed to go into that

question suggested that in the case of Hindu,

Muslim and Buddhist religious or charitable

endowments, a fresh start or a terminus quo

should be given for actions brought by the

succeeding Mahant to set aside such

alienations, which were not made for legal

necessity or benefit of the institution. The

Legislature also accepted that view and

inserted in column 3 to Article 96, which

previously had only the following words: “the

death, resignation or removal of the

transferor” the following words: “or the date

of appointment of the plaintiff as manager of

the endowment, whichever is later”. It is

obvious from the plain words of the amendment

that the legislature had in view such

alienations about which a right to institute

suits has already become barred and therefore

it wanted to provide a fresh period of

limitation in regard to them. The Legislature

was also aware of the fact that according to

the law as laid down by decisions prior to

1963, the date of appointment of the plaintiff

as manager by an endowment did not give h im

fresh start of limitation for that purpose. It

was only to remedy the obvious difficulties

felt in the interpretation of such law that

this amendment has been brought about. By

virtue of this amendment, if the plaintiff had

been appointed within 12 year s from the date

of the filing of the suit, he can question any

alienation, which was not made for legal

necessity or benefit to a mutt by a previous

manager. The fact that 12 years have elapsed

from the date of death, resignation or removal

of the transferor manager would not stand in

the way of the plaintiff in such a suit from

recovering the property. That is clear from the

last three words in the amendment ‘whichever

is later’, purposely introduced by the

51

Legislature. In view of this amendment the

courts have got to apply the plain words of

the Statute to any action brought by any

manager of a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist

religious or charitable endowment, to recover

possession of the movable or immovable property

of an endowment which was the subject of an

alienation by a previous manager for valuable

consideration. It is also clear that the

transferor manager need not be the immediate

predecessor of the plaintiff, that files such

a suit. From a reading of Article 96, such a

conclusion cannot be arrived at. It is enough

if the alienation was made by a previous

manager. The first column does not say that it

should be by the previous manager.”

30. In the State Wakf Board, Madras, superseded by the

Government of Tamil Nadu in G.O.Ms. No. 2031, dated

20th November, 1961 and appointed by G.O.Ms. No. 2264,

dated 30th December, 1967 , The Special Officer for

Wakfs Madras v. Subramanyam and others

21

, the learned

Judge was, inter alia, dealing with the following

facts:

The suits were filed for recovery of

properties alleged to belong to the waqf, which

were dismissed on the ground of limitation. The

Court drew upon the later part of the third column

21

AIR 1977 Madras 79

52

of Article 96 and found that the suit was within

time. In the said case, in fact, the Waqf Board

was the plaintiff. The Single Judge found that the

Waqf Board was constituted only in the year 1953.

The suits were instituted in 1967. In assigning

the role of the Manager to the Board within the

meaning of ‘manager appointed’ in the third column

of Article 96, also, the Court drew support from

the Judgment of learned Single Judge in Chinna

Jeeyangar Mutt (supra). We may notice the following

reasoning:

“6. The argument of the learned counsel now

is that only when the Wakf Board assumes

direct management of the wakf, it can be

said to be a manager as contemplated by the

third column in Art. 96 of the new Act and

that so long as there is no assumption of

direct management, the Wakf Board cannot be

said to be a manager. I am unable to accept

this argument, from one point of view.

Neither S. 42 nor S. 43 -A of the Wakfs Act

on which reliance has been placed uses the

word, “Manager”. The word, “Manager” in

relation to a religious or charitable

endowment is not a term of art. The said

word denotes the person who is in charge of

the administration of the endowment or

manages the property or supervises the

performance of the charity and the word is

one of very wide and general import. As a

matter of fact, the judgment of Natarajan

J., has referred to the provisions

53

contained in S. 15(2) of the Wakfs Act. S.

15(1) of the Wakfs Act provides that

subject to any rules that may be made under

the said Act, the general supe rintendence

of all Wakfs in a State shall vest in the

Board established for the State; and it

shall be the duty of the Board so to

exercise its powers under the Act as to

ensure that the Wakfs under its

superintendence are properly maintained,

controlled and administered and the income

thereof is duly applied to the objects and

for the purposes for which such Wakfs were

created or intended. Sub -S. (2) or S. 15,

without prejudice to the generality of the

powers conferred by Sub -S (1) by way of

illustration, enumerates certain specified

power also. One such specified power so

enumerated is contained in S. 15(2)(h),

which enables the Wakf Board to take

measures for the recovery of lost

properties of any Wakf. S. 15(2)(i) also

enables the Wakf Board to institute and

defend suits and proceedings in a court of

law relating to Wakfs The combined effect

of S. 15(1) and 15(2) of the Wakfs Act will

certainly be sufficient to designate the

Wakf Board as a manager for the purpose of

recovery of possession of Wakf propert y and

consequently it can certainly be termed as

“Manager” contemplated by the third column

to Art. 96 of the new Limitation Act and if

so construed, the constitution of the Wakf

Board under the statute can certainly be

construed to be the appointment of t he Wakf

Board as Manager of the Wakf in question,

because even the word, “appointment” just

like the word, “Manager” is not a term of

art and therefore has to receive its

ordinary, natural and normal meaning.”

54

31. Before we finally pronounce on the question as to

whether Article 96 would apply in respect of a void

transaction, we deem it appropriate to deal with

certain other aspects. The waqf in question is the

creation of Akbar Ali Khan on 26.07.1934. It is the

case of the appellant that it was registered as waqf

al aulad at No. 1476. The transferor of the second sale

deed, viz., Qasim Ali Khan took over as the Mutawalli

when Akbar Ali Khan, his father, died on 16.02.1958.

It is not in dispute that Qasim Ali Khan i nstituted OS

1 of 1950 wherein he impleaded his father Akbar Ali

Khan and the transferee of a part of the waqf property

which was effected by his father. The Decree of the

Trial Court in favour of the plaintiff was affirmed by

the High Court by Judgment da ted 11.07.1962. The

Judgment affirmed the view of the Trial Court that

there was a valid waqf. It is categorically found by

the High Court that all the legal requirements in

respect of the creation of the waqf by a Shia under the

Mohammedan law had been ma de out. It was held that

Akbar Ali Khan did create a waqf-alal-aulad on

26.07.1934 which was effective in law. Therefore, as

55

between the waqif who was the first Mutawalli also, and

between his son, Qasim Ali Khan, the findings in the

Judgment of the High Court clearly holds that there was

a valid waqf. After the death of Akbar Ali Khan, his

son Qasim Ali Khan took over as Mutawalli. He

instituted OS 421 of 1959. Therein, his brothers were

the defendants, viz., Kasim Ali Khan and Raza Ali Khan.

It was the act of the defendants getting their names

mutated in the Revenue Records, which occasioned the

said suit. It is during the pendency of the suit, i.e.,

on 14.10.1960, one of the defendants Kazim Ali Khan

transferred his alleged, one-third right in favour of

the first respondent in one of the Appeals before us.

The suit was decreed. The High Court in the Appeal

filed by the defendants, remanded the matter back by

Order dated 25.09.1963. However, while it was so,

consolidation proceedings commenced under the U.P .

Consolidation of Proceedings Act , 1953. Under the

provisions of the said Act, the proceedings in the suit

would abate when consolidation commences. Thereafter,

it is the Consolidation Officer, whose decision is

appealable to the Settlement Officer and wh ich latter

56

Authority’s decision can be revised in a Revision by

the Deputy Director, who hold sway. The plaintiff in

the suit, viz., Qasim Ali Khan, accordingly, placed his

objections against the name of his brothers being

entered. The objections of Qasim Ali Khan were found

to be with merit. Resultantly, the names of the

brothers were directed to be removed and their place,

the name of the waqf was directed to be entered. The

brothers of Qasim Ali Khan unsuccessfully appealed

before the Settlement Officer. A Revision carried by

them before the Deputy Director proved equally

unsuccessful as it was dismissed by Order dated

29.01.1969. The Order was passed on merit. It reads,

inter alia:

“3. That I find that Wakf is admitted between the

parties. The disputed land was sir. It after the

execution of wakf, the sir should have been

converted into ex-proprieto tenancy. It could have

been inferred that the rights of ex -proprieto

tenancy which ultimately converted at sirdari

right after the date of vesting, did not b elong

to the wakf and then there was justification for

continuances of the applicants a successors of

their father. But, the position is otherwise, when

the father of the parties created at wakf, the

disputed land which was sir, was not converted

into expropriatory tenancy and was recorded

bhundhary after the date of vesting. It has

therefore, to be concluded that absolute rights

57

in the land were transferred to the almighty and

the proper course, therefore, was to record the

opp. Party as Mutwalli and expun ge the names of

the applicants. In the litigation in regular

courts, the civil court had also held the same

view but the matter could not become final in

these courts. On account of advent of

consolidation. In these circumstances, I come to

conclusion that the orders of the Lower Courts are

sound and deserves no interference.”

32. The defendants, viz., Kasim Ali Khan and Raza Ali

Khan filed a Restoration Application which came to be

dismissed by Order dated 02.03.1972. Yet another

Restoration Application was filed. It is in the same

that a compromise was entered into between Qas im Ali

Khan, Kasim Ali Khan and Raza Ali Khan, all the three

brothers, on 13.02.1974. They purported to disown the

waqf. They proclaimed that it had not taken effect. It

was based on this compromise that the second

Restoration Application was allowed. The earlier orders

rejecting the Revision and the Restoration being

dismissed, were set aside by the Deputy Director. The

compromise dated 13.02.1974 formed the basis for th e

same. It is acting on the said compromise and the Order

passed thereon that Qasim Ali Khan purported to convey

58

his one-third share to his nephew by sale deed dated

12.09.1974.

33. The 1960 Act was in force. Section 69 of the Act

provided as follows:

“69. Bar to compromise of suits by or against

mutawallis. –

No suit or proceeding pending in any court

by or against the mutawalli of a wakf

relating to title to wakf property or the

rights of the mutawallis shall be compromised

without the sanction of the Board .”

34. Also, Sections 49A and 49B of the said Act read as

follows:

“49A Transfer of immovable property of waqf -

Notwithstanding anything contained in the deed

or instrument, if any, by which the waqf has

been created, no transfer by way of -

(i) sale, gift, mortgage or exchange; or

(ii) lease for a period exceeding three years

in the case of agricultural land, or for a

period exceeding one year in the case of non -

agricultural and or building of any immovable

property of the waqf shall be valid without t he

previous sanction of the Board.”

49-B. Recovery of waqf property transferred

in contravention of Section 49 -A.—(1) If the

Board is satisfied after making an inquiry in

such manner as may be prescribed that any

immovable property entered as property of a

waqf in the register of waqfs maintained

under Section 30, has been transferred

without the previous sanction of

the Board in contravention of the

provisions of Section 49 -A, it may send a

59

requisition to the Collector within whose

jurisdiction the property is situate to

obtain and deliver possession of the property

to it.

(2) On receipt of a requisition under sub -

section (1), the Collector s hall pass an

order directing the person in possession of

the property to deliver the property to the

Board Within a period of thirty days from the

date of the service of the order.

(3) Every order passed under sub -section (2)

shall be served—

(a) by giving or tendering it or by sending

it by post to the person for whom it is

intended; or

(b) if such person cannot be found, by

affixing it on some conspicuous part of his

last known place of “bode or business, or by

giving or tendering it to some adult male

member or servant of his family or by causing

it to be affixed on some conspicuous Part of

the property to which it relates:

Provided that where the person on whom the

order is to be served is a minor, service

upon his guardian or upon any adult member

or servant of his family shall be deemed to

be service upon the minor.

(4) Any person aggrieved by an order of the

Collector under sub -section (2) may, within

a period of thirty days from the date of the

service of the order, prefer an appeal to the

Court of the District Judge within whose

jurisdiction the property is situate.

(5) The District Judge may either dispose of

the appeal himself or may transfer it to the

Court of any Additional District Judge or

Civil Judge under his administrative control

and may also withdraw any such appeal and

either dispose of the same or transfer it to

any other Court of Additional District Judge

60

or Civil Judge under his administrative

control, and in every case the decision of

the court shall be final.

(6) Where an order passed under sub-section

(2) has not been complied with and the time

for appealing against such order has expired

without any appeal having been preferred or

the appeal, if any, preferred within that

time has been dismissed, the Collector shall

obtain possession of the property in respect

of which the order has been made, using such

force as may be necessary, for the purpose,

and then deliver it to the Board.

(7) In exercising his functions under this

section the Collector shall be guided by such

rules as may be m ade in that behalf by the

State Government.”

35. Sections 49A and 49B were inserted in the 1960 Act

by way of U.P. Act 28 of 1971. Therefore, the sale deed

dated 26.09.1974 by Qasim Ali Khan in favour of his

nephew, being in the teeth of the prohibition against

a sale without the previous sanction of the Board, was

illegal. It is this narrative which give s rise to the

question as to whether the sale is void as it was in

transgression of a statutory mandate. If it is void for

such a reason, would it pave the way for the beginning

and the running of the period of adverse possession by

the transferee. Would it not open the doors for

61

applying Article 65 of the Limitation Act? Would it not

then, equally, invite Section 27 of the Limitation Act

to its doorstep? Resultantly, on the expiry of 12 years

from 13.09.1974, would the title set up by the

appellant, be extinguished? If that is so, would not

the complaint filed in the year 1997, after the Act

came into force on 01.01.1996, leading to invoking the

power under Section 52 of the Act, be impermissible?

36. Section 52 of the Act, which is t he fountainhead

of the action by the Controller of the Waqf Board and

the Collector, is a sequel to Section 51. Section

51(1), inter alia, before its substitution by Act 27

of 2013, read as follows:

“51(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in

the wakf deed, any gift, sale, exchange or

mortgage of any immovable property which is

waqf property, shall be void, unless such gift,

sale, exchange or mortgage is effected with the

prior sanction of the Board:

Provided that no mosque, dargah or khangah

shall be gifted, sold, exchanged or mortgaged

except in accordance with any law for the time

being in force.”

37. We may only notice that Section 51(1)(a) as

substituted by Act 27 of 2013, subject to the provisos

declares a sale, gift, exchange or mortgage or transfer

62

of waqf property to be ab initio void. Section 52 of

the Act provides that if the Board is satisfied, after

making any inquiry, as may be prescribed, that any

immovable property of a waqf entered as such in the

Register of Waqfs maintained under Section 36, has been

transferred without previous sanction of the Board in

contravention of Sections 51 or 56 of the Act, it may

send a requisition to the Collector of the place within

which the property is situated to obtain and deliver

possession. The Collector is b ound to pass an order

directing the person in possession to deliver the

property to the Board within 30 days from the receipt

of the Order. It is under this provision that the

impugned Orders came to be passed.

38. It will be noticed that the Act came into effect

on 01.01.1996. Section 52 empowers the Board to send a

requisition to the Collector, if property has been

transferred without the previous sanction of the Board

in contravention of Section 51, inter alia. We have

noticed that Section 51 has provided that any sale of

property, which is waqf property, without the previous

sanction of the Board, w ould be void. The two sales in

63

this case took place prior to 01.01.1996. The first

sale is dated 14.10.1960 whereas the second sale is

dated 13.09.1974.

39. Section 112 of the Act provides for repeal and

sales. It reads as follows:

“112. Repeal and savings. —(1) The Wakf Act,

1954 (29 of 1954) and the Wakf (Amendment) Act,

1984 (69 of 1984) are hereby repealed.

(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done

or any action taken under the said Acts shall

be deemed to have been done or taken under the

corresponding provisions of this Act.

(3) If, immediately before the commencement of

this Act, in any State, there is in force in

that State, any law which corresponds to this

Act that corresponding law shall stand

repealed:

Provided that such repea l shall not affect the

previous operation of that corresponding law,

and subject thereto, anything done or any

action taken in the exercise of any power

conferred by or under the corresponding law

shall be deemed to have been done or taken in

the exercise of the powers conferred by or

under this Act as if this Act was in force on

the day on which such things were done or

action was taken.”

40. Section 49B of the 1960 Act is pari materia with

Section 52 of the Act. In other words, it provided that

the Board may, if a transfer is made contravening

64

Section 49A of the 1960 Act, send requisition to the

Collector for recovery of possession. Section 49A of

the 1960 Act also provided on similar terms as provided

in Section 51(1) of the Act that for a sale of property

comprised in a waqf, previous sanction of the Board was

necessary. As far as Sections 49A and 49B came to be

inserted by Act 28 of 1971 and the second sale took

place in 1974, which is after the insertion of Sections

49A and 49B in the 1960 Act , therefore, the power,

indeed, vested with the Board to take action for

recovery of possession under Section 49B. Under Section

112(3) of the Act, we proceed on the basis that the

1960 Act would stand repealed. However, the proviso

declares that the repeal would not affect the previous

operation of the corresponding law. The corresponding

law, in this case is Section 49A read with Section 49B.

Action taken in the exercise of the power thereunder,

is to be deemed as taken in the exercise of powers

under the Act. The powers under the Act must be treated

as flowing from Section 52 of the Act. For the said

purpose, the proviso to Section 112(3) provides that

the provisions in the Act, which in this c ase would be

65

Section 52, must be treated as being on the Statute

Book.

41. But then could it be said that no action has been

taken under Section 49B of the 1960 Act with regard to

the transfers in question and, therefore, Section

112(3) of the Act, may have n o application? We proceed

on the basis that, the power exists as for reasons to

follow, the appellants will fail on surer foundation.

42. A contention has been raised that the waqf-alal-

aulad in question cannot be treated as a waqf under the

Act. It is the ca se of the first respondent that the

Mussalman Waqf Validating Act, 1913 did not provide for

registration of the waqf. Though the Mussalman Waqf

Act, 1923 was enacted, waqf-alal-aulad was excluded

from its operation. Neither the 1936 Act nor the 1960

Act applies and the appellant cannot claim that the

waqf was registered under either enactment. There is

no religious or charitable purpose. In view of the

specific exclusion in the 1936 Act, it is contended

that the Act did not apply to the waqf as the entire

income was to go for the benefit of the members of the

family of the waqif.

66

43. The waqf in question is created by Akbar Ali Khan

by deed dated 26.07.1934. It is, no doubt, a waqf-alal-

aulad. A waqf-alal-aulad is a waqf under Mohammaden

Law. It was the Privy Council which in the case of

Abdul Fatah Mohammad Ishak v. Russomy Dhar Chaou dhary

22

held that if the charity is illusory or so small, it

could not be treated as a waqf. This Judgment led to

the passing of the Mussalman Waqf Validating Act, 1913.

Sections 3 and 4 of the said enactment reads as follows:

“3. It shall be lawful for any person

professing the Musalman faith to create Wakf

which in all other respects is in according

with the provisions of Musalman Law, for the

following among other purposes: -

(a) For the maintenance and support wholly or

partially of his family, children or

descendants and

(b) where the person creating a Wakf is a

Hanafi Musalman, also for his own maintenance

and support during his life -time or for the

payment of his debts out of the rents and

profits of the property dedicated.

Provided that the ultimate benefit is

in such cases expressly or impliedly reserved

for the poor or for any other purpose

recognized by the Musalman Law as a religion,

pious or charitable purpose of a permanent

character.

4. No such Wakf shall be deemed t o be

invalid merely because the benefit reserved

therein for the poor or other religious, pious

22

22 Indian Appeals 76

67

or charitable purposes of a permanent nature

is postponed until after the extinction of the

family, children or descendants of the person

creating the Wakf.”

44. Thereafter, the Mussalman Wa kf Act, 1923 came to

be passed. It applied to the whole of British India.

The definition of Wakf contained in Section 2(e) was

as follows:

“2(e) ‘Wakf’ means the permanent dedication by

a person professing the Musalman faith of any

property for any purpose recognized by the

Musalman Law as religious, pious or charitable,

but does not include any Wakf, such as is

described in S.3 of the Musalman Wakf

Validation Act, 1913, under which any benefit

is for the time being claimable for himself by

the person by whom the Wakf was created or by

any of his family or descendants. ”

(Emphasis Supplied)

45. Section 3 of the 1923 Act oblige d the Mutawalli to

furnish statement containing certain particulars to the

competent Court. Notice of the St atement was to be

published under Section 4. The 1923 Act provided for

audit of accounts and the provision for expense which

could be incurred by the Mutawalli came to be inserted.

Section 10 provided for penalty. Certain waqfs were

excluded from its purview under Section 12. In the

68

United Provinces, which meant the United Provinces of

Agra and Awadh, the 1936 Act, came to be enacted.

Section 2 thereof read as follows:

“2(1) Save as herein otherwise specifically

stated, this Act shall apply to all Wakfs,

whether created before or after this Act comes

into force, any part of the property of which

is situate in the United Provinces.

(2) This Act shall not apply to: -

(i) a Wakf created by a deed, if any, under

the terms of which not less than 75 per cent

of the total income after deduction of land

revenue and cesses payable to Government of the

property covered by th e deed of Wakf, if any,

is for the time being payable for the benefit

of the Wakif or his descendants or any member

of his family:

(ii) a Wakf created solely for either of the

following purposes:

(a) The maintenance and support of any person

other than the Wakf or his descendants or any

member of his family,

(b) The celebration of religious ceremonies

connected with the death anniversaries of the

Wakif or of any member of his family or any of

his anscestors;

(c) The maintenance of private imambaras,

tombs, and grave-yards, or

(d) The maintenance and support of the Wakif or

for payment of his debts, when the Wakif is a

Hanafi Musalman; and

(iii) the Wakfs mentioned in the schedule.

Provided that if the Mutawalli of a Wakf to

which this Act does not apply wrongfully sel ls

or mortgages, or suffers to be sold in

execution of a decree against himself, or

69

otherwise destroys the whole or any part of the

Wakf property, the Central Board may apply all

or any of the provisions of this Act to such

Wakf for such time as it may thi nk necessary.

Explanation-A Wakf which is originally exempt

from the operation of this Act may, for any

reason subsequently, become subject to such

operation, for example, by reason of a higher

percentage of its income becoming available

under the terms o f the deed for public

charities.”

(Emphasis supplied)

46. Section 3(1) of the 1936 Act, defined ‘Wakf’ as

follows:

“3(1) ‘Wakf’ means the permanent dedication or

grant of any property for any purposes

recognized by the Musalman law or usage as

religious, pious or charitable and, where no

deed of Wakf is traceable, includes Wakf by

user, and a Wakif means any person who makes

such dedication or grant.”

47. Section 38 (1) of the 1936 Act, read as follows:

“38(1) Every Wakf whether subject to this Act

or not and whether created before or after the

commencement of this Act shall be registered

at the office of the Central Board of the sect

to which the Wakf belongs .

(Emphasis Supplied)

48. It is, no doubt, true that in Fazlul Rabbi Pradhan

(supra), in the context of the question whether the

waqfs were affected by the passing of the West Bengal

Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, and, in that, the waqf

70

in question fell within the definition of the words

‘charitable purpose’ and ‘religious purpose ’, the Court

held, inter alia, as follows:

“13. These cases led to agitation in India

and the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act 1913 (6

of 1913) was passed. It declared the rights

of Mussulmans to make settlements of property

by way of wakf in favour of their families,

children and descendants. For the purposes of

the Validating Act the term “wakf” was

defined to mean “the permanent dedication by

a person professing the Mussalman faith of

any property for any purpose recognized by

the Mussalman law as religious , pious or

charitable”. This gave a wider meaning to the

word wakf but only for the purpose of taking

them out of the invalidity which would have

otherwise existed and which was already

authoritatively stated to have so existed.

14. After the passage of t hese two Acts

wakfs, in which the object was the

aggrandisement of families of wakifs without

a pretence of charity in the ordinary sense,

became valid and operative. But the intention

of the Validating Act was not to give a new

meaning to the word “charity” which in common

parlance is a word denoting a giving to

someone in necessitous cir cumstances and in

law a giving for public good. A private gift

to one's own self or kith and kin may be

meritorious and pious but is not a charity in

the legal sense and the courts in India have

never regarded such gifts as for religious or

charitable purposes even under the Mahomedan

71

law. It was ruled in Syed Mohiuddin

Ahmed v. Sofia Khatun [44 CWN 974] that

neither the Wakf Validating Act 1913 nor

the Shariat Act 1937 had the effect of

abrogating the Privy Council decisions on the

meaning of “charitable p urpose” as such.”

49. No doubt, the Court was dealing with a case of a

waqf-alal-aulad. The Judgment must essentially be

viewed in the context of the definition of ‘religious

and charitable purpose’ provided in the Act in

question.

50. The Wakf in question is dated 26.07.1934. The 1936

Act applied to Wakfs created before or after the

commencement of the Act. However, Se ction 2(2) declares

that the Act shall not apply to certain waqfs. They

included a waqf whereunder not less than 75 per cent

of the total income, after deduction of certain sum s,

was for the time being payable for the benefit of the

waqif or his descendants. However, Section 38(1) of the

1936 Act made it clear that every waqf, whether subject

to the Act or not and whether created or after the

commencement of the 1936 Act, shall be reg istered.

Proceeding on the basis that the waqf dated 16.07.1934

72

was waqf-alal-aulad and which, in terms of Section

2(2)(i), was not subject to the provisions of the 1936

Act, it was compulsorily registerable in view of

Section 38(1). Any waqf which is registered under the

1936 Act would also be deemed to be registered under

the 1960 Act. That is, though the 1936 Act did not

apply to certain wakf s, but when it comes to

registration under Section 38, it was mandatory for

every wakf to be registered (i) whether subject to the

Act and ii) whether created before the Act or not.

Thus, the registration of the Wakf dated 16.07.1934,

was in fact compulsory under Section 38 of the 1936

Act.

51. It has been contended by Shri P.S. Patwalia,

learned Senior Counsel that t here was really no waqf

as known in law and the waqf in question contemplated

only disbursement of the entire income for the benefit

of the descendants of the waqif. Quite apart from the

fact that the question engage d the attention of the

Civil Court, including the High Court , in the first

round of litigation, wherein, it was found that there

was a valid waqf from the standpoint of the Shia law

73

and the Consolidation Authorities also found that there

was a waqf till the Deputy Director, Consolidation

revisited the matter only on the basis of the

compromise between the brothers, the terms of the waqf

did contemplate a certain sum being set apart for

charitable purposes as correctly pointed out by Shri

S.R. Singh, learned Senior Counsel for respondents 2

and 4. In this regard, we notice the stipulation in the

deed that a sum of Rs. 500/- will be spent on charitable

purpose such as Muazzin and lighting in the mosque and

emambara, majlallse ashra of the sacred month of

Moharram. No doubt, there is the residua ry clause,

which reveals that the wakif has provided that if

descendants cease to exist, the income from the endowed

property will be managed by a Committee to be spen t for

charitable purposes.

52. A Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad in

the case of U.P. Sunni Central Board of Waqf and Another

v. Hasan Jehan Begum and Another

23

had to deal with an

argument that in a case of waqf-alal-aulad, having

23

AIR 1977 All 18

74

regard to the definition of the word ‘waqf’ in Section

3(11) of the 1960 Act, whether the entire properties

were dedicated for religious, pious or charitable

purpose, as contemplated in Section 3(11), defining the

word ‘waqf’ or only to the limited extent, i.e., to the

extent of the income which was earmarked for such

purposes. We may not e in this regard, the following

discussion:

“5… With great respect, we are unable to

find ourselves in agreement with the view

taken by the learned single Judge as to us

it appears that the extent of property

cannot be determined on the basis of the

income. It is the dedication which has to

be seen, i f the entire property is

dedicated for two purposes, namely, for

secular purposes and for religious, pious

or charitable purposes, then the entire

property will be deemed to be dedicated for

both purposes. Unless it is possible to

determine the extent to w hich the property

has been dedicated for religious, pious and

charitable purposes, the entire property

will have to be deemed to be dedicated to

God and subject -matter of the Waqf. For

excluding the property it should either be

known or be determinable fro m the deed of

waqf that a particular property or part

thereof is not dedicated. Learned counsel

for the petitioners -respondents contended

that it is the income that is the criterion

for determining the extent of dedication.

But, we find that it is not the income which

is contemplated by the definition of waqf

but the property. The relevant words are

‘to the extent to which the property is

75

dedicated’. The income arises out of

property and it can vary from time to time.

It may be larger than the amount fixed for

the religious, pious or charitable purposes

or may be less than that. It is also not

possible to allocate property relative to

the amount or to say that this amount of

money must come from a particular portion

or property out of the lot or from a

particular proportion of that property. The

entire property, which is the subject -

matter of the waqf, is liable for meeting

the purposes religious, pious or

charitable. If the entire property, which

is the subject -matter of the waqf, is

liable for meeting the e xpenses, it cannot

be said that the waqf or dedication is only

to the extent of some undeterminable and

unascertainable property out of the total

property, which is the subject -matter of

the Waqf. In our opinion, unless it is

possible to determine the exte nt of the

property out of the property which is the

subject-matter of the waqf-alal-aulad meant

for religious, pious or charitable

purposes, the entire property will be the

subject-matter of the waqf within the

meaning of the Waqfs Act. The question of

determining the extent can practically

arise only in a case in which there are a

number of properties and some of them are

earmarked for purposes recognised as

religious, pious or charitable and others

earmarked for the benefit of the waqif or

his descendants. It may also arise in a

case where a share in a property or a part

of a property has been earmarked for the

two purposes. In the present case neither

of the two waqfs contain such a direction.

The entire property has been dedicated for

the purposes recognised as religious, pious

and charitable. It may also be possible to

say that the property, which has been

dedicated for purposes religious, pious or

76

charitable, is the entire extent of the

property. The entire properties under the

deeds will, therefore, be deemed to be waqf

within the meaning of Section 3(11) of the

Waqfs Act.”

53. We would think that the aforesaid view represents

the correct approach and the extent of the income,

which is set apart for the purpose, be it religious,

pious or charitable, in th e facts, cannot detract from

the dedication of the whole property.

54. Another contention taken is that vast extents of

wakf property had been alienated by the sons of the

original wakif and only about 100 bighas which

constitute the subject matter of the app eals before us

remained. We are of the view that the argument is beside

the point. The fact that the property of the waqf has

been dealt with in a manner, which is illegal, or that

it was not questioned, cannot deflect us from either

finding that there was a valid waqf or that the property

which remained of the waqf, must be dealt with in

accordance with law. The compromise before the Deputy

Director (Consolidation) and the order based on the

same are in the teeth of Section 69 of the 1960 Act,

77

therefore, the orders passed by the Consolidated

Officer and Settlement Officer about the Waqf would

revive.

55. Two questions remain. The first question , which we

must consider is, whether a beneficiary of a waqf can

succeed on the strength of the plea of adverse

possession in regard to the property of the waqf. The

High Court has proceeded on the basis that a Mutawalli

may not be able to acquire title by adverse possession.

Equally, a trustee and a co -owner stand precluded in

this regard, it is noted. A beneficiary of a waqf,

however, being neither a trustee nor a co -owner of waqf

property, can acquire title through adverse possession

even if it is the property of the waqf it is found.

56. A beneficiary of a waqf cannot be described as a

stranger to the waqf. No doubt, a beneficiary is not

to be conflated in his position with a Mutawalli. The

Mutawalli is a manager of the waqf. The property of the

waqf, we must remind ourselves, in law vests in the

Almighty. The Mutawalli acts merely as the manager. For

the purposes of Section 10 of the Limitation Act, no

doubt, he is treated as a trustee. A plea of adverse

78

possession undoubtedly requires the requisite

intention, viz., animus possidendi. This is besides

actual possession for the required period. Does the

beneficiary occupy a fiduciary capacity qua the waqf

property, which would prevent him from advancing a

claim of adverse possession? What in the context do the

words ‘fiduciary capacity’ conve y? A beneficiary would

be entitled to receive benefits in terms of the waqf

deed. Does he have any obligation in regard to the waqf

property? Is there a duty in other words which he must

perform by virtue of the fact that he is constituted a

beneficiary under the waqf? Is the assertion of hostile

title, an indispensable requirement to constitute

adverse possession irreconcilable and incompatible

with the position of the beneficiary? In the case of

adverse possession, since a requirement is that the

possession must be hostile to the real owner and since

the real owner is the Almighty, the requirement would

be that such a person must has the necessary animus to

hold contrary to the title of God. In the case of a co -

owner while mere assertion of title in himsel f may

hardly suffice as the possession of a co -owner is taken

79

to be possession on behalf of all co -owners a case of

ouster being successfully established would entitle the

co-owner to succeed.

57. We may notice the following statement from Mulla

on “Principles of Mohammadan Law” (22

nd

Edition):

“207. Power of mutawalli to sell or mortgage .

A mutawalli has no power, without the

permission of the Court, to mortgage, sell

or exchange waqf property or any part

thereof, unless he is expressly empowered by

the deed of waqf to do so.”

58. The learned Author thereafter refers to Section

51(1) of the Act under which a sale could no doubt be

effected after obtaining prior sanction of the Board.

The change brought about by the Amending Act of 2013

by the insertion of sub -section (1A) in Section 51 of

the Act by which a sale inter alia has been declared

void is also noticed. The embargo against sale unless

it is expressly authorised by the waqf deed is dealt

with under the caption “Unauthorised alienation and

limitation” and it reads as follows:

“the law as regards the period of limitation

for a suit to follow waqf property in the

hands of a mutawalli and to set aside

unauthorized transfers of such property, and

80

to recover possession thereof from the

transferee, was amended and altered by Act 1

of 1929. The amendments consist of an

addition of para 2 t o s. 10 of the original

Act (Limitation Act, 1908), and of the

insertion of new articles, being Arts. 48B,

134A, 134B and 134C.”

59. We have already noticed the purport of Article 134B

of the Limitation Act, 1908 and the change brought

about in the successor provision, namely, Article 96

of the Limitation Act, 1963.

60. In Anisur Rahman and others v. Sheikh Abul Hayat

24

,

a Division Bench of the High Court had occasion to deal

with the very question which we are confronted with.

The Court went on to hold as follows:

“7. In Mukherjea's well known book on Hindu

Law of Religious and Charitable Trust , 2nd

edition, at page 274, the said Calcutta

decision was referred to and it was further

pointed out at page 282 that limitation in

case of an unauthorised alienation would

start as soon as possession vested with

regard to any property. To quote his own

words at page 282:

“The correct princ iple deducible from

these cases is that the possession of

the alienee would become adverse as soon

as he is without any title to the

property. If the transfer is void ab

initio, the possession of the transferee

24

AIR 1965 Patna 390

81

is adverse from the date of the transfer.

If, on the other hand, it is not void,

but voidable merely at the instance of

the succeeding manager, the possession

cannot be adverse until the office of

the transferring manager ceases.”

8. In other words, the applicability of

either Article 144 or Article 134B of the

Limitation Act would depend on whether the

transfer was void ab initio or only voidable

at the instance of the succeeding manager.

9. A transfer which is void ab initio is in

the eye of law no transfer at all and hence

will not come within th e scope of Article

134B. Moreover, that Article refers to

transfer made by a manager of an endowment.

If a person transfers property treating it

as his own private property, it is difficult

to hold that merely because he happens to be

the manager of the en dowment on the date of

the transfer and the property is the properly

of the endowment such transfer should come

within the scope of that Article. Mr. Hussain

for the appellants could not cite any

decision after AIR 1946 Cal 473 in support

of his extreme contention to the effect that

the principle laid down in that decision his

no application in respect of void transfers

made after the coming into force of the

amendment of 1929. On the other hand, a

Division Bench of the Orissa High Court

in Govinda Jiew Thakur v. Surendra Jena, AIR

1961 Orissa 102 applied the principle; of

that decision and held that transfers void

ab initio are outside the scope of Article

134B; a transferee in such a case is a mere

trespasser and his title will be perfected

by the twelve years adverse possession. With

respect I am inclined to agree with this

view. There is also a Madras decision in V.

82

Rajaram v. Ramanujam Iyengar, AIR 1963 Mad

213 paragraphs 4 and 5 to the same effect. ”

61. Therefore, the principle , which emerges, is this.

In order that a suit may fall under Article 96, there

must be a transfer by a Manager which would include a

Mutawalli of a waqf. It must be for valuable

consideration. In order that there is a transfer, it

must not be still born . It should not be a void

transaction. This is for the reason that a void

transaction would not amount to a transfer. An

unauthorized alienation as understood in Mulla (supra),

which we have referred to , viz., a transfer, which was

made by a Mutawalli, for which, there was no authority

in the waqf deed, would constitute a transfer to which

Article 134B and Article 96 would have applied. With

the advent of the laws relating to Waqfs which included

the 1960 Act in Uttar Pradesh, the Mutawalli was

obliged to obtain the previous sanction of the

concerned Board. In cases wher e a transfer is made

under the 1960 Act without previous sanction of the

Board, the transfer would be void. This is for the

reason that the requirement of previous sanction is a

83

statutory command conceived with a definite and sublime

purpose and the transgression of which can only result

in a void transaction. There is no provision which

enables the validating of such a sale. In fact, the

stand of respondents 2 and 4 is that, the transfers

were void. Therefore, the authorities have also

proceeded on the basis that the transaction was void

and we can therefore proceed on the said foundation.

62. Proceeding on the basis that the sale executed in

1974 was a void transaction we are inclined to approve

of the view taken by Chintamani Sahoo (Deceased by LR.)

(supra) and Anisur Rahman (supra), which we have

referred to and hold that Article 96 of the Limitation

Act, 1963 cannot be invoked in the case of a void

transaction. The impugned Order, proceeding on the said

premise, cannot be said to be flawed.

63. We are of the view that there cannot be any embargo

against a beneficiary of a waqf claiming acquisition

of title by adverse possession. Section 2(k) of the

Waqf Act, 1955, reads as under:

“2(k) “person interested in a waqf means any

person who is entitled to receive any

84

pecuniary or other benefits from the waqf and

includes-

(i) Any person who has a right to offer

prayer or to perform any religious

rite in a mosque, idgah, imambara,

dargah, khanqah, peerkhana and

karbala, maqbara, graveyard or any

other religious institution connected

with the waqf or to participate in any

religious or charitable institution

under the waqf;

(ii) The waqf and any descendant of the waqf

and the mutawalli;

64. While he may be a person who can be treated as

“interested” in a waqf within the meaning of Section

2(k) both by reason of the fact that he is a rec ipient

of pecuniary or other benefit and also he may be a

descendant of the wakif, it is a far cry from describing

him as a Trustee. The beneficiary may have benefits

coming his way in terms of the waqf deed. He may be

clothed with rights in this regard.

65. Can it be said that a beneficiary of a waqf is a

fiduciary or that there is a fiduciary relationship

and, therefore, he cannot acquire title to the property

of the waqf by adverse possession? The term

‘fiduciary’, as such, has not been defined, so is the

85

case with the ‘fiduciary relationship’. In fact,

Section 88 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, inter alia,

provides that a person standing in a fiduciary

character and bound to protect the interest of another,

cannot by using such character, obtain an advantag e and

resist making over the benefit to the person, whose

interest he was bound to protect. In Central Board of

Secondary Education and another v. Aditya Bandopadhyay

and others

25

, though in the context of Right to

Information Act, 2005, the question arose whether an

Examining Body holds the evaluated answer books in a

fiduciary relationship within the meaning of Section

8(1)(e) of the Right to Information Act, 2005. In the

course of the Judgment, this Court, inter alia, held

as follows:

“38. The terms “fiduciary” and “fiduciary

relationship” refer to different capacities

and relationship, involving a common duty or

obligation.

38.1.Black's Law Dictionary (7th Edn., p.

640) defines “fiduciary relationship” thus:

“Fiduciary relationship .—A relationship

in which one person is under a duty to act

for the benefit of the other on matters

25

(2011) 8 SCC 497

86

within the scope of the relationship.

Fiduciary relationships —such as trustee -

beneficiary, guardian -ward, agent -

principal, and attorney -client—require the

highest duty of care. Fiduciary

relationships usually arise in one of four

situations: (1) when one person places

trust in the faithful integrity of another,

who as a result gains superiority or

influence over the first, ( 2) when one

person assumes control an d responsibility

over another, (3) when one person has a

duty to act for or give advice to another

on matters falling within the scope of the

relationship, or ( 4) when there is a

specific relationship that has

traditionally been recognised as involving

fiduciary duties, as with a lawyer and a

client or a stockbroker and a customer.”

xxx xxx xxx

39. The term “fiduciary” refers to a person

having a duty to act for the benefit of

another, showing good faith and candour,

where such other person reposes trust and

special confidence in the person owing or

discharging the duty. The term “fiduciary

relationship” is used to describe a situation

or transaction where one person (beneficiary)

places complete confidence in another person

(fiduciary) in regard to his a ffairs,

business or transaction(s). The term also

refers to a person who holds a thing in trust

for another (beneficiary). The fiduciary is

expected to act in confidence and for the

benefit and advantage of the beneficiary, and

use good faith and fairness in dealing with

the beneficiary or the things belonging to

87

the beneficiary. If the beneficiary has

entrusted anything to the fiduciary, to hold

the thing in trust or to execute certain acts

in regard to or with reference to the

entrusted thing, the fiducia ry has to act in

confidence and is expected not to disclose

the thing or information to any third party.

40. There are also certain relationships

where both the parties have to act in a

fiduciary capacity treating the other as the

beneficiary. Examples of these are: a partner

vis-à-vis another partner and an employer

vis-à-vis employee. An employee who comes

into possession of business or trade secrets

or confidential information relating to the

employer in the course of his employment, is

expected to act as a fiduciary and cannot

disclose it to others. Similarly, if on the

request of the employer or official superior

or the head of a department, an employee

furnishes his personal details and

information, to be retained in confidence,

the employer, the offi cial superior or

departmental head is expected to hold such

personal information in confidence as a

fiduciary, to be made use of or disclosed only

if the employee's conduct or acts are found

to be prejudicial to the employer.”

66. A fiduciary can, therefore, be taken to be a person

who becomes charged with the duty to protect the

interest of another. Fiduciary relationship is founded

upon the reposing of confidence by one in another. The

88

beneficiary of a waqf is endowed with rights in terms

of the waqf deed. We are unable to cull out any duty,

as such, to protect the interest of another. No doubt,

it could be said that as the property in a waqf, vests

in the Almighty, there must be a concern and,

undoubtedly, a moral duty to act in a manner that the

object of the wakf is fostered. But a beneficiary is

not like a Trustee, who assumes possession in his

character as a Trustee, coming under the restraint of

discarding his character as Trustee and donning the

robes of an encroacher or a person asserting hostile

title. Section 14 of the Indian Trusts Act, reads as

follows:

“14. Trustee not set up title adverse to

beneficiary-The trustee must not for

himself or another set up or aid any title

to the trust property adverse t o the

interest of the beneficiary.”

67. It is not, as if, the beneficiary was in possession

of the property in any capacity prior to the sale.

68. In fact, in this case, we may notice that in the

second sale, the former Mutawalli, viz., Qasim Ali

89

Khan, entered into the sale deed on the strength of a

compromise and the order of the Deputy Director ,

Consolidation, under which, he purported to act as one

possessed of one-third right in his own right. We bear

in mind that no doubt it would have mattered little to

the applicability of Article 96 that the transferor

purported to transfer waqf property professing it to

be his property having regard to what this Court has

laid down in Srinivasa (supra). But this is a case

where the voidness arises on account of the fact that

what is found to be waqf property has been purported

to be alienated contrary to the peremptory statutory

mandate. We have also noticed Section 69 of the 1960

Act and its impact.

69. The argument that Section 107 of the Act will

assist the appellant in tiding over the bar of

limitation does not appeal to us. Section 107 of the

Act, no doubt, proclaims that nothing in the Limitation

Act,1963 shall apply to any suit for possession of the

immovable property comprised in any waqf or for

possession of any interest in such property.

90

70. The Act came into force on 01.01.1996. The first

sale was effected on 14.10.1960 . The second sale was

effected on 26.09.1974 . As far as the first sale is

concerned, we have already found that Article 96 cannot

be pressed into service as the transfer was not

purported to be made by the Mutawalli. The doors stood

open for the application of Article 65. As far as the

second sale is concerned which was effected in the year

1974 in view of our finding that Article 96 was not

applicable, the only other competing Article vying for

acceptance, appears to be Article 65. Applying Article

65 and as the adverse possession would kick in from the

date of the transfer , on the expiry of twelve years ,

i.e., in 1986 applying Section 27 of the Limitation Act

whatever title remain ed within the meaning of Section

65 would stand extinguished. The Act was brought into

force only with effect from 01.01.1996. We cannot

understand the purport of Section 107 to be that it

would revive an extinguished title as nothing stood in

the way of running of time from the date of the second

sale under the law as it stood.

91

71. No doubt, the law of limitation is what prevails

as on the date of the suit (see C. Beepathumma and

others v. Velasari Shankaranarayana Kadambolithaya and

others

26

). Taking 1997 as the date , on which a suit is

filed, and applying the Act , which enables the

plaintiff to disregard the bar of law of limitation ,

it cannot mean that what stood extinguished under the

earlier law would revive. In this regard, we notice the

Judgment of this Court in T. Kaliamurthi(supra):

“40. In this background, let us now see

whether this section has any retrospective

effect. It is well settled that no statute

shall be construed to have a retrospective

operation until its language is such that

would require such conclusion. The

exception to this rule is enactments

dealing with procedure. This would mean

that the law of limitation, being a

procedural law, is retrospective in

operation in the sense that it will also

apply to proceedings pending at the time of

the enactment as also to proceed ings

commenced thereafter, notwithstanding that

the cause of action may have arisen before

the new provisions came into force.

However, it must be noted that there is an

important exception to this rule also.

Where the right of suit is barred under the

law of limitation in force before the new

provision came into operation and a vested

right has accrued to another, the new

26

AIR 1965 SC 241

92

provision cannot revive the barred right or

take away the accrued vested right. ”

72. A contention is taken that the Court is not dealing

with a suit and the matter arises from a proceeding

under Section 52 of the Act. It is contended that in

regard to Section 52 the bar of limitation for a suit

is inapplicable. We have noticed that the d ebate in

the High Court essentially centered around the question

whether Article 96 would apply and applying the same,

the appellant could get around the impact of Article

65 read with Section 27 of the Act. We have found that

Article 96 has no applicatio n. Even in regard to a

proceeding under the Act be it Section 52 if as on the

date the action is taken, the title in the property

stood vested with the person in possession by virtue

of Section 27 of the Limitation Act then it may not be

permissible to ig nore the right which had been

acquired. The decision in T. Kaliamurthi (supra) would

apply in the facts and the action is barred.

93

73. The upshot of the above discussion is that the

Appeals are to be found without merit and will stand

dismissed. Parties to bear their respective costs.

………………………………….J.

[K.M. JOSEPH]

……………………………………J.

[HRISHIKESH ROY]

NEW DELHI;

DATED: APRIL 13, 2023.