2026 INSC 692 SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024 Page 1 of 37

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024)

SAGAR …....APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF HARYANA …RESPONDENT (S)

J U D G M E N T

ARAVIND KUMAR J.

1. Heard. Leave Granted.

I. BRIEF FACTS:

2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts of the instant case

are as follows:

2.1. The prosecution alleges that on 21.10.2018, the police

received information from Civil Lines Police Station,

Kaithal, regarding the death of Mandeep Kumar, who

SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024 Page 2 of 37

had been admitted to Cygnus Hospital with injuries

sustained in a quarrel. Inspector Rohtash Kumar and

other police officials reached the hospital, where they

found that Mandeep had been brought dead and

recorded the statement of the complainant Mandeep

Kumar (PW11), who had stated that himself, Aman

(PW12), and the deceased Mandeep had gone to the

Baba-Rajpuri fair on a motorcycle and while returning

around 1:30 p.m., seven masked persons on two

motorcycles intercepted them and one of the assailants,

identified as accused ‘S’- the Appellant herein,

1

struck

the deceased on the left temporal region with an iron

pipe, after which the others attacked him with knives

and a rod. When the complainant and Aman intervened

and tried to stop, he was also attacked and suffered an

injury to his right little finger. As passersby

approached on hearing their cries, the accused fled

towards village Garhi. The deceased was taken first to

Government Hospital, Kaithal, then referred to PGI

Chandigarh, and later admitted to Cygnus Hospital,

where he died due to the injuries.

2.2. The police carried out investigation following the

incident by registering an FIR under Sections 148, 323,

1

Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Appellant’.

SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024 Page 3 of 37

341, 302 read with 149 Indian Penal Court (IPC for

short), preserving the body for postmortem, preparing

the site plan, photographing the scene of crime,

collecting blood samples, and recording witness

statements under Section 161 Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C for short). Postmortem was

conducted on 22.10.2018, and deceased’s clothes and

shoes were seized. On 23.10.2018, four co-accused

namely Pawan alias Pammu, Raman alias Kaka,

Sandeep, and Vikash alias Babbu were arrested, and on

the next day their disclosure statements were recorded,

in which they confessed that they, along with the

appellant had conspired to assault the deceased using

an iron rod, knife, and danda. The conspiracy was

hatched to teach a lesson to the deceased for hurling

abuses upon the mother and sister of the appellant

(child-in-conflict with law).

2.3. Pursuant to the disclosure statements, recoveries were

made: an iron pipe from accused Vikash, a danda from

accused Raman, a Honda Shine motorcycle from

Sandeep, and a KTM Duke motorcycle and a knife

from the Appellant. The police also prepared

additional site plans, demarcation memos, collected

photographs, and verified call detail records, which

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disclosed the Appellant and Vikash were in the vicinity

of village Baba-Ladana around the relevant time,

thereby corroborating parts of the prosecution case.

2.4. After investigation, the police filed chargesheet against

the Appellant, alleging that the Accused has committed

offences punishable under sections 302, 323 and 341

read with section 148, 149 of the Indian Penal Code,

1860.

2.5. As the Appellant was a minor at the time of

commission of offence (16 and half years), he was

produced before the learned Principal Magistrate,

Juvenile Justice Board, Kaithal

2

, who carried a

preliminary assessment as prescribed under Section 15

of The Juvenile Justice (Care And Protection Of

Children) Act, 2015

3

and vide Order dated 24.01.2019

in Criminal Case No. 04 of 2019 the JJ Board opined

that the Appellant ‘was having capability, mental as

well as physical, to found involve in the act against

him and he is liable to be tried as an adult.’ The JJ

Board after recording its reasons, committed the matter

to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Kaithal

4

i.e.,

the ‘Children’s Court’ as per Section 18(3) of the Act

2

Hereinafter referred to as ‘the JJ Board’.

3

Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’.

4

Herein after referred to as ‘the Children’s Court’.

SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024 Page 5 of 37

to conduct trial for the alleged offences and to try the

Appellant herein as an adult.

2.6. The Children’s Court proceeded with the Trial of the

Case and vide Judgment and Order dated

13/14.03.2019 in CIS No. SC/11/2019 convicted the

Appellant under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code,

1860 (for short ‘IPC’) and sentenced him to undergo

Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of fourteen years

and also ordered that the Appellant should be kept in

the Place of Safety till he attains the age of 21 years

and thereafter, he shall be transferred to the jail.

2.7. The Appellant filed a Criminal Appeal challenging his

conviction in Criminal Appeal-D-649-2019 (O&M)

before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at

Chandigarh

5

. The High Court after re-appreciation of

evidence available on record dismissed the Appeal

filed by the Appellant. It is this order which is

impugned before us.

3. At the time of hearing the matter, the Counsel appearing for

the Appellant raised a plea that the Children’s Court on

committal of the case to it by the JJ Board has not passed

any orders as prescribed under Section 19(1) of the Act. To

5

Hereinafter referred to as the High Court.

SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024 Page 6 of 37

examine the issue this Court, vide order dated: 22-04-2025

had passed the following order:

“During the course of hearing of this matter a

question has been raised by the learned counsel for

the petitioner that in this case there is an order by the

Juvenile Justice Board (for short “the JJB”)

recommending the present petitioner to be tried as a

juvenile. We have also perused the original school

record as produced pursuant to our previous order

dated 04.11.2024, which shows that the date of birth

of the petitioner is 20.04.2002 and therefore, at the

time of commission of offence i.e. 21.10.2018, he was

a juvenile. On this aspect, there is no issue. The

argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner

would be that the JJB has given an assessment report

regarding the juvenility of the petitioner and then the

matter went before the Children’s Court. There is no

order on record showing that there was an

application of mind by the Court concerned under

Section 19(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and

Protection of Children) Act, inasmuch as there is no

order saying that though the accused is a juvenile, he

is liable to be tried as an adult.

For abundant caution, we direct the District &

Sessions Judge, Kaithal, Haryana to submit a report

on this and if there is a specific order, apprise this

Court on this aspect, in relation to Sessions Case

No.SC/11/2019 instituted on 18.01.2019/28.02.2019

by the Additional Sessions Judge, Kaithal, Haryana.

The concerned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court is

hereby directed to communicate this order to the

concerned Court for onward compliance.

List on 23.05.2025.”

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4. Pursuant to the above order of this Court, the Learned

District and Session Court, Kaithal has sent a Report dated

19.05.2025 stating that he is not in a position to verify the

records and prepare a report as the entire Trial Court records

have been sent to this Court and further, as per report of the

concerned Ahlmad, the orders of the said case file are

inaccessible on CIS/online also, as the case being of special

category. Along with the report the Ld. Judge has enclosed

an order/report passed by the Juvenile Justice Board (JJB in

short) dated: 24.01.2019. On perusal of the report it is clear

that the JJB had passed an order as per Section 15 after

preliminary assessment that the Appellant has to be tried as

an adult and therefore committed the matter to the

Children’s Court as per Section 18(3) of the Act.

5. After committal of the case under Section 18(3) of the Act,

the Children’s Court took cognizance of the matter. What

the Children’s Court at this stage ought to have done is pass

an order as contemplated under Section 19(1) on the

preliminary assessment, as to whether it will try the

Appellant herein as a child or as an adult. Without passing

such order, the Appellant was tried as an adult and was

convicted of the offence of Section 302 and was awarded a

sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a period of 14 years

and also ordered that he shall be kept in place of safety till

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he attains the age of 21 years and thereafter he shall be

transferred to jail.

II. POINT FOR CONSIDERATION:

6. We have perused the original Trial Court record. Upon such

perusal, the primary question that arises for our

consideration, before adverting to the merits of the case, is

as follows:

I. Whether the conviction and sentence imposed by

the Children’s Court against the Appellant, and

subsequently affirmed by the High Court, can be

sustained in the absence of an order under Section

19(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection

of Children) Act, 2015?

III. PROVISIONS OF THE ACT:

7. Before adverting to the question under consideration, we

deem it appropriate to reproduce the relevant provisions of

the Act necessary for adjudication of the dispute, which

shall be referred to in the course of this judgment. The said

provisions are as follows:

“Section 2 (12): “child” means a person who has not

completed eighteen years of age;

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Section 2(13):“child in conflict with law” means a child

who is alleged or found to have committed an offence and

who has not completed eighteen years of age on the date of

commission of such offence;

Section 2(20): “Children’s Court” means a court

established under the Commissions for Protection of Child

Rights Act, 2005 (4 of 2006) or a Special Court under the

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32

of 2012), wherever existing and where such courts have not

been designated, the Court of Sessions having jurisdiction

to try offences under the Act;

Section 2 (33): “heinous offences” includes the offences

for which the minimum punishment under the Indian Penal

Code (45 of 1860) or any other law for the time being in

force is imprisonment for seven years or more;

Section 2(35): “juvenile” means a child below the age of

eighteen years;

Section 2(45): “petty offences” includes the offences for

which the maximum punishment under the Indian Penal

Code (45 of 1860) or any other law for the time being in

force is imprisonment up to three years;

Section 8: Powers, functions and responsibilities of the

Board.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any

other law for the time being in force but save as otherwise

expressly provided in this Act, the Board constituted for any

district shall have the power to deal exclusively with all the

proceedings under this Act, relating to children in conflict

with law, in the area of jurisdiction of such Board.

(2) The powers conferred on the Board by or under this

Act may also be exercised by the High Court and the

Children’s Court, when the proceedings come before them

under section 19 or in appeal, revision or otherwise.

(3) The functions and responsibilities of the Board shall

include—

………………………

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(f) adjudicate and dispose of cases of children in conflict

with law in accordance with the process of inquiry specified

in section 14;

……………………….

(i) conducting inquiry for declaring fit persons regarding

care of children in conflict with law;

Section 10. Apprehension of child alleged to be in

conflict with law.—(1) As soon as a child alleged to be in

conflict with law is apprehended by the police, such child

shall be placed under the charge of the special juvenile

police unit or the designated child welfare police officer,

who shall produce the child before the Board without any

loss of time but within a period of twenty-four hours of

apprehending the child excluding the time necessary for the

journey, from the place where such child was apprehended:

Provided that in no case, a child alleged to be in conflict

with law shall be placed in a police lockup or lodged in a

jail.

(2) The State Government shall make rules consistent with

this Act,—

(i) to provide for persons through whom (including

registered voluntary or non-governmental organisations)

any child alleged to be in conflict with law may be produced

before the Board;

(ii) to provide for the manner in which the child alleged to

be in conflict with law may be sent to an observation home

or place of safety, as the case may be

Section 14. Inquiry by Board regarding child in conflict

with law.—(1) Where a child alleged to be in conflict with

law is produced before Board, the Board shall hold an

inquiry in accordance with the provisions of this Act and

may pass such orders in relation to such child as it deems

fit under sections 17 and 18 of this Act.

………………..

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(5) The Board shall take the following steps to ensure fair

and speedy inquiry, namely:—

(a) at the time of initiating the inquiry, the Board shall

satisfy itself that the child in conflict with law has not been

subjected to any ill-treatment by the police or by any other

person, including a lawyer or probation officer and take

corrective steps in case of such ill-treatment;

(b) in all cases under the Act, the proceedings shall be

conducted in simple manner as possible and care shall be

taken to ensure that the child, against whom the proceedings

have been instituted, is given child-friendly atmosphere

during the proceedings;

…………..

(e) inquiry of serious offences shall be disposed of by the

Board, by following the procedure, for trial in summons

cases under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of

1974);

(f) inquiry of heinous offences,— (i) for child below the age

of sixteen years as on the date of commission of an offence

shall be disposed of by the Board under clause (e);

(ii) for child above the age of sixteen years as on the date

of commission of an offence shall be dealt with in the

manner prescribed under section 15.

Section 15. Preliminary assessment into heinous

offences by Board.—

(1) In case of a heinous offence alleged to have been

committed by a child, who has completed or is above the

age of sixteen years, the Board shall conduct a

preliminary assessment with regard to his mental and

physical capacity to commit such offence, ability to

understand the consequences of the offence and the

circumstances in which he allegedly committed the

offence, and may pass an order in accordance with the

provisions of sub-section (3) of section 18:

SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024 Page 12 of 37

Provided that for such an assessment, the Board may

take the assistance of experienced psychologists or psycho-

social workers or other experts.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, it is

clarified that preliminary assessment is not a trial, but

is to assess the capacity of such child to commit and

understand the consequences of the alleged offence.

(2) Where the Board is satisfied on preliminary

assessment that the matter should be disposed of by the

Board, then the Board shall follow the procedure, as far

as may be, for trial in summons case under the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974):

Provided that the order of the Board to dispose of the matter

shall be appealable under sub-section (2) of section 101:

Provided further that the assessment under this section shall

be completed within the period specified in section 14.

Section 18. Orders regarding child found to be in

conflict with law.—

(1) Where a Board is satisfied on inquiry that a child

irrespective of age has committed a petty offence, or a

serious offence, or a child below the age of sixteen years

has committed a heinous offence, [or a child above the age

of sixteen years has committed a heinous offence and the

Board has, after preliminary assessment under Section 15,

disposed of the matter] then, notwithstanding anything

contrary contained in any other law for the time being in

force, and based on the nature of offence, specific need for

supervision or intervention, circumstances as brought out in

the social investigation report and past conduct of the child,

the Board may, if it so thinks fit,—

(a) allow the child to go home after advice or admonition

by following appropriate inquiry and counselling to such

child and to his parents or the guardian

(b) direct the child to participate in group counselling and

similar activities

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(c) order the child to perform community service under the

supervision of an organisation or institution, or a specified

person, persons or group of persons identified by the Board

(d) order the child or parents or the guardian of the child to

pay fine: Provided that, in case the child is working, it may

be ensured that the provisions of any labour law for the time

being in force are not violated.

(e) direct the child to be released on probation of good

conduct and placed under the care of any parent, guardian

or fit person, on such parent, guardian or fit person

executing a bond, with or without surety, as the Board may

require, for the good behaviour and child’s well-being for

any period not exceeding three years

(f) direct the child to be released on probation of good

conduct and placed under the care and supervision of any

fit facility for ensuring the good behaviour and child’s well-

being for any period not exceeding three years;

(g) direct the child to be sent to a special home, for such

period, not exceeding three years, as it thinks fit, for

providing reformative services including education, skill

development, counselling, behaviour modification therapy,

and psychiatric support during the period of stay in the

special home:

Provided that if the conduct and behaviour of the child has

been such that, it would not be in the child’s interest, or in

the interest of other children housed in a special home, the

Board may send such child to the place of safety.

(2) If an order is passed under clauses (a) to (g) of sub-

section (1), the Board may, in addition pass orders to—

(i) attend school; or

(ii) attend a vocational training centre; or

(iii) attend a therapeutic centre; or

(iv) prohibit the child from visiting, frequenting or

appearing at a specified place; or

(v) undergo a de-addiction programme.

(3) Where the Board after preliminary assessment under

section 15 pass an order that there is a need for trial of the

said child as an adult, then the Board may order transfer of

the trial of the case to the Children’s Court having

jurisdiction to try such offences.

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Section 19: Powers of Children’s Court.—

(1) After the receipt of preliminary assessment from the

Board under section 15, the Children’s Court may decide

that—

(i) there is a need for trial of the child as an adult as

per the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 (2 of 1974) and pass appropriate orders after trial

subject to the provisions of this section and section 21,

considering the special needs of the child, the tenets of

fair trial and maintaining a child friendly atmosphere;

(ii) there is no need for trial of the child as an adult

and may conduct an inquiry as a Board and pass

appropriate orders in accordance with the provisions of

section 18.

(2) The Children’s Court shall ensure that the final order,

with regard to a child in conflict with law, shall include an

individual care plan for the rehabilitation of child, including

follow up by the probation officer or the District Child

Protection Unit or a social worker.

(3) The Children’s Court shall ensure that the child who is

found to be in conflict with law is sent to a place of safety

till he attains the age of twenty-one years and thereafter, the

person shall be transferred to a jail:

Provided that the reformative services including

educational services, skill development, alternative therapy

such as counselling, behaviour modification therapy, and

psychiatric support shall be provided to the child during the

period of his stay in the place of safety.

(4) The Children’s Court shall ensure that there is a periodic

follow up report every year by the probation officer or the

District Child Protection Unit or a social worker, as

required, to evaluate the progress of the child in the place

of safety and to ensure that there is no ill-treatment to the

child in any form.

(5) The reports under sub-section (4) shall be forwarded to

the Children’s Court for record and follow up, as may be

required.

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Section 21. Order that may not be passed against a child

in conflict with law. —No child in conflict with law shall

be sentenced to death or for life imprisonment without the

possibility of release, for any such offence, either under the

provisions of this Act or under the provisions of the Indian

Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any other law for the time being

in force.”

IV. ANALYSIS:

8. Before we go into the merits of the present case, it will have

to be examined as to whether Section 19 (1) of the Act is

mandatory for the Children’s Court to comply, and the

consequence flowing if not being followed and the need for

passing order in compliance thereof.

9. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,

2015 mandates a calibrated and sequential procedure when

a ‘child in conflict with law’, aged between 16 and 18 years,

is alleged to have committed a heinous offence.

9.1. A person is said to be a child under Section 2 (1) of the

Act, who has not completed 18 years of age. Section 2

(13) would also indicate that a child who has not

completed 18 years of age on the date of commission

of such offence, who is alleged or found to have

committed an offence to be ‘a child in conflict with

law’. Section 2 (35) defines a child below the age of 18

years as “juvenile”. Upon apprehension of a ‘child in

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conflict with law’ for the commission of an offence,

the procedure prescribed under Section 10 of the Act

comes into operation. Section 10 stipulates that,

immediately upon such apprehension, the ‘child in

conflict with law’ has to be placed under the charge of

the Special Juvenile Police Unit or a designated Child

Welfare Police Officer. Thereafter, the ‘child in

conflict with law’ shall be produced before the

Board. Section 2 (10) defines the “Board” means a

Juvenile Justice Board constituted under Section 4 of

the Act. The composition of such Juvenile Justice

Board is defined under Section 4 of the Act.

9.2. The procedure to be followed by the Board is set out in

Section 14 of the Act. In cases where the ‘child in

conflict with law’ is above the age of 16 years, and who

is said to have committed heinous offence, the manner

in which the Board is required to proceed is prescribed

under Section 15 of the Act. Upon production of such

‘child in conflict with law’ before it, the Board is

required to conduct a preliminary assessment with

regard to the child’s mental and physical capacity to

commit the alleged offence, the ability to understand

the consequences thereof, and the circumstances in

which the offence is alleged to have been committed.

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For undertaking the assessment, the Board would be

empowered to take assistance of experienced

psychologists or pyscho social worker or other experts.

Such preliminary assessment conducted by the Board

is not in the nature of a trial, but is only an assessment.

Upon completion of the said assessment, the Board has

two options. If the Board concludes that the ‘child in

conflict with law’ ought to be tried as an adult, it shall

pass an order in terms of Section 18(3) of the Act and

commit/transfer the matter to the Children’s Court

having jurisdiction to try such offences. On the other

hand, if the Board concludes that the ‘child in conflict

with law’ is to be tried as a child and not as an adult,

then the Board shall proceed to try the matter in

accordance with the procedure prescribed for

summons cases under the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973. Thereafter, the Board shall pass appropriate

orders in terms of Sections 18(1) and 18(2) of the Act.

10. Upon receipt of the preliminary assessment report under

Section 15 transferred by the Board in terms of Section

18(3) of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the

Children’s Court is governed by the provisions of the Act

itself.

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10.1. Upon receipt of the report from the Board, the

procedure to be followed by the Children’s Court is

prescribed under the Act and the Juvenile Justice (Care

and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016

6

. The

first step to be undertaken by the Children’s Court,

upon receipt of the report, is to take cognizance

thereof. After taking cognizance of the matter, the

Children’s Court is required to pass an order in

terms of Section 19(1) of the Act. The question that

now arises for consideration is whether the passing of

an order under Section 19(1) of the Act is mandatory

in nature, and the consequence of non-passing of such

an order?

10.2. In our opinion, there is no doubt in our mind that

passing of an order under Section 19(1) of the Act is

mandatory in nature and without passing an order

under Section 19(1), the Children’s Court cannot

proceed with the matter further. We say so for the

reasons more than one.

10.3. Firstly, Upon a holistic reading of the Act, it furnishes

several indications that compliance with Section 19(1)

is mandatory for the Children’s Court. The first such

indication is found in Section 19(1)(i) and (ii) itself.

6

Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’ or ‘the Model Rules’.

SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024 Page 19 of 37

Section 19(1) commences with the expression, “After

the receipt of preliminary assessment from the Board

under Section 15, the Children’s Court may decide

that…”. Although the expression used is “may”, a

reading of sub-clauses (i) and (ii) indicates that the

same ought to be construed as “shall”. The expression

‘may’ occurring in Sub-section 19(1) and Section

19(1)(ii) will have to be necessarily read as ‘shall’,

since consequences flowing therefrom namely, the

trial of a child in conflict with law as an adult and trial

as a juvenile would be different. Ordinarily, the word

‘may’ would indicate as a word not of compulsion.

They are enabling words and they only confer capacity,

power or authority and imply discretion. However,

considering the nature of the statute as a whole and the

provision in particular, the word ‘may’ has to be read

as ‘shall’ in some circumstances to give the provision

its full value. The reason for the same has been

propounded in the case of Sarla Goel and Others Vs.

Kishan Chand

7

, wherein this Court held as follow:

In Crawford on the Construction of Statutes at p.516,

it is stated that:

7

(2009) 7 SCC 658

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“The question as to whether a statute is

mandatory or directory depends upon the intent

of the legislature and not upon the language in

which the intent is clothed. The meaning and

intention of the legislature must govern, and

these are to be ascertained, not only from the

phraseology of the provision, but also by

considering its nature, its design, and the

consequences which would follow from

construing it the one way or the other”

The reasons for the interpretation of the word ‘may’ in

Section 19 (1) as ‘shall’ are as under:

10.3.1. Unless the Children’s Court arrives at a

decision as to whether the child in conflict with

law is to be tried as an adult or not, it cannot

proceed further with the matter. In a case where

the Children’s Court decides that the child in

conflict with law is to be tried as an adult, it is

required to follow the procedure of a Sessions

trial in terms of Section 19(1)(i). This statutory

obligation is substantive in nature and not

merely procedural, and the Children’s Court

assumes jurisdiction to try the child in conflict

with law as an adult only upon recording

satisfaction on the parameters laid down

therein.

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10.3.2. Conversely, where upon such evaluation the

Children’s Court concludes that the child in

conflict with law ought not to be tried as an

adult, the legal consequence is unequivocal.

The Children’s Court is divested of jurisdiction

to proceed with the trial as a Children’s Court

and is required to deal with the matter as a

Board in terms of Section 19(1)(ii) of the Act

and the procedure to be followed is that of a of

Summons Case as per the Code of Criminal

Procedure.

10.3.3. The Children’s Court cannot, in the above-

mentioned circumstances, undertake its own

‘child inquiry’ or modify the procedure

contemplated under the Act. The statutory

design draws a sharp distinction between an

adult criminal trial before the Children’s Court

and a child-centric inquiry before the Board.

Consequently, once the Children’s Court holds

that the child should not be subjected to an

adult trial, it will try the matter as a Board as

contemplated under Section 19(1)(ii).

10.4. Secondly, the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of

Children) Model Rules, 2016, make it abundantly clear

SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024 Page 22 of 37

that Section 19(1) is mandatory in nature. Rule 13 of

the said Rules elucidates the rationale behind such

reasoning and reinforces the mandatory character of

Section 19(1). The relevant provisions of the Rules are

as follows:

“Rule 13. Procedure in relation to Children’s

Court and Monitoring Authorities. - (1) Upon

receipt of preliminary assessment from the Board

the Children’s Court may decide whether there is

need for trial of the child as an adult or as a child

and pass appropriate orders.

(2 to 5) x x x x x x x x

(6) The Children’s Court shall record its reasons

while arriving at a conclusion whether the child is to

be treated as an adult or as a child.

(7) Where the Children’s Court decides that there is

no need for trial of the child as an adult, and that it

shall decide the matter itself:

(i) It may conduct the inquiry as if it were

functioning as a Board and dispose of the matter in

accordance with the provisions of the Act and these

rules.

(ii) The Children’s Court, while conducting the

inquiry shall follow the procedure for trial in

summons case under the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973.

(iii) The proceedings shall be conducted in camera

and in a child friendly atmosphere, and there shall

be no joint trial of a child alleged to be in conflict

with law, with a person who is not a child.

(iv) When witnesses are produced for examination

the Children’s Court shall ensure that the inquiry is

SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024 Page 23 of 37

not conducted in the spirit of strict adversarial

proceedings and it shall use the powers conferred by

section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of

1872).

(v) While examining a child in conflict with law and

recording his statement, the Children’s Court shall

address the child in a child-friendly manner in order

to put the child at ease and to encourage him to state

the facts and circumstances without any fear, not

only in respect of the offence which is alleged

against the child, but also in respect of the home and

social surroundings and the influence to which the

child might have been subjected.

(vi) The dispositional order passed by the Children’s

Court shall necessarily include an individual care

plan in Form 7 for the child in conflict with law

concerned, prepared by a Probation Officer or Child

Welfare Officer or recognized voluntary

organisation on the basis of interaction with the

child and his family, where possible.

(vii) The Children’s Court, in such cases, may

pass any orders as provided in sub-sections (1)

and (2) of section 18 of the Act.

(8) Where the Children’s Court decides that there is

a need for trial of the child as an adult:

(i) It shall follow the procedure prescribed by the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 of trial by

sessions and maintaining a child friendly

atmosphere.

(ii) The final order passed by the Children’s Court

shall necessarily include an individual care plan for

the child as per Form 7 prepared by a Probation

Officer or Child Welfare Officer or recognized

voluntary organisation on the basis of interaction

with the child and his family, where possible.

SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024 Page 24 of 37

(iii) Where the child has been found to be involved

in the offence, the child may be sent to a place of

safety till the age of twenty-one years.

(iv) While the child remains at the place of safety,

there shall be yearly review by the Probation Officer

or the District Child Protection Unit or a social

worker in Form 13 to evaluate the progress of the

child and the reports shall be forwarded to the

Children’s Court.

(v) The Children’s Court may also direct the child

to be produced before it periodically and at least

once every three months for the purpose of assessing

the progress made by the child and the facilities

provided by the institution for the implementation

of the individual care plan.”

10.4.1. Upon a perusal of Rule 13(1) and Rule 13(6) of

the Rules, it becomes evident that immediately

upon receipt of the report under Section 15, the

Children’s Court is required to pass an order

under Section 19(1) of the Act. Further, sub-

rule (6) of Rule 13, by the use of the expression

“shall”, mandates that the Children’s Court

must record reasons for its decision as to

whether the child in conflict with law is to be

tried as a child or as an adult. Thus, it is clear

that Section 19(1) is not merely procedural in

nature, but constitutes a substantive provision,

obligating the Children’s Court to pass a

reasoned order upon due application of mind.

SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024 Page 25 of 37

10.4.2. If the Children’s Court concludes that the child

in conflict with law is to be tried as an adult, it

is required to follow the procedure of a

Sessions case as prescribed under the Code of

Criminal Procedure. The procedure and the

manner in which such trial is to be conducted

are elaborately provided under the Act as well

as Rule 13(8) of Model Rules. The scheme of

the Act and the Rules ensures that no child is

subjected to an adult trial without due

compliance with the statutory safeguards. It is

in this context that Section 19(1) assumes

critical significance and must be regarded as

mandatory in nature. Conversely, if the

Children’s Court determines that the child in

conflict with law is not to be tried as an adult,

it is required to follow the procedure applicable

to summons cases as given in Rule 13(7) of the

Model Rules. Therefore, in the absence of an

order under Section 19(1), the Children’s Court

may inadvertently bypass its jurisdiction akin

to that of a Board and assume the jurisdiction

of a Sessions Court/Children’s Court, which, in

our considered opinion, is impermissible.

SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024 Page 26 of 37

10.4.3. Upon a perusal of Section 8 of the Act, which

respectively delineate the powers and functions

of the Board and the course to be adopted by

the Children’s Court, the statutory scheme

becomes evident. Sub-section (2) of Section 8

specifically provides that the Children’s Court

shall also exercise the jurisdiction of the Board

in situations contemplated under Section 19(1)

of the Act. The Act and the Rules thus make it

clear that the Children’s Court is vested with

the jurisdiction of the Board including in terms

of Section 19(1)(ii) which stands attracted

when the Children’s Court arrives at the

conclusion that the child in conflict with law is

not to be tried as an adult.

10.4.4. The procedure to be followed by the Board and

the Children’s Court, while trying a ‘child in

conflict with law’ as a child or as an adult

pursuant to a determination under Section

19(1) of the Act, is fundamentally distinct. The

Children’s Court can proceed to try a ‘child in

conflict with law’ as an adult only upon making

a determination to that effect in terms of

Section 19(1) of the Act. In such a case, the

SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024 Page 27 of 37

procedure to be adopted is that of a Sessions

trial, and not that of a summons case.

Conversely, where the determination is that the

‘child in conflict with law’ is to be tried as a

child and not as an adult, the procedure

applicable is that of a summons case, to be

followed by the Board or by the Children’s

Court exercising the jurisdiction of the Board.

Thus, the determination under Section 19(1)

assumes crucial significance. Non-compliance

of the same, may result in, firstly, Children’s

Court not exercising the jurisdiction vested

upon to try the matter as a Children’s Court or

to conduct an inquiry as a ‘Board’ ; secondly,

it would lead such ‘child in conflict with law’

being tried as an adult and being subjected in

sessions trial though there is no need of being

tried as an adult, thirdly, the inquiry to be

conducted by such Court, in appropriate cases

as a Board would not take place.

10.5. Thirdly, the aspect of punishment also assumes

significance. Where a child in conflict with law is tried

as a child and not an adult and after completion of the

inquiry, the Board is empowered to pass orders in

SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024 Page 28 of 37

terms of Sections 18(1) and 18(2) of the Act, including

measures relating to the care, protection and

rehabilitation of the child and it may also direct the

child to be sent to a Special Home for a period not

exceeding three years. In contrast, where a ‘child in

conflict with law’ is tried as an adult, the Children’s

Court, subject to the prohibitions contained in Sections

19 and 21 of the Act (including the bar on death penalty

and life imprisonment without the possibility of

release), is empowered to impose other punishments.

It is for this reason that a determination under Section

19(1) assumes critical importance. In the absence of

such determination, if a child in conflict with law who

ought to be tried as a child is instead tried as an adult,

there exists a real possibility of the child being

subjected to a sentence exceeding three years, which,

in our considered view is contrary to the law, and

therefore impermissible. While it may be argued that,

in certain cases, even in the absence of a formal

determination under Section 19(1), the punishment

imposed may ultimately align with what would have

been awarded had the child been tried as an adult, such

instances cannot justify non-compliance with the

statutory mandate. Even a remote possibility that a

SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024 Page 29 of 37

child in conflict with law, who ought to be tried as a

child, is subjected to an adult trial, such adult trial is

wholly impermissible and it strikes at the very root of

the protective framework envisaged under the Act.

10.6. The above view expressed by us has also been briefly

summarized in the case of Ajeet Gurjar v. State of

Madhya Pradesh

8

wherein it was held as follows:

“9. There are two parts to sub-section 1 of Section

19. The first part requires the children's Court to

decide whether there is a need for trial of the child

as an adult as per the provisions of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973. If the Court is satisfied

that the child needs to be tried as an adult as per

the provisions of Cr.P.C., the Children's Court can

proceed with the trial and thereafter pass an

appropriate order subject to the provisions

of sections 19 and 21 of the JJ Act.

10. Clause (ii) of sub-section 1 of Section 19 is

very crucial which indicates that though the word

'may' have been used in the opening part of sub-

section 1 of Section 19, the same will have to be

read as 'shall'. Clause (ii) provides that after

examining whether there is a need for a trial of the

child as an adult, if the children's Court comes to

the conclusion that there is no need for the trial of

the child as an adult, instead of sending back the

matter to the Board, the Court itself is empowered

to conduct an inquiry and pass appropriate orders

in accordance with provisions of Section 18 of the

JJ Act. The trial of a child as an adult and his trial

as a juvenile by the Juvenile Justice Board has

different consequences.

8

(2023) 15 SCC 678

SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024 Page 30 of 37

11. Therefore, holding an inquiry in terms of

clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Section 19 is not an

empty formality. The reason is that if the

Children's Court comes to the conclusion that there

is no need to try the child as an adult, he will be

entitled to be treated differently in the sense that

action can be taken against him only in terms

of Section 18 of the JJ Act.”

10.7. This Court in the case of Barun Chandra Thakur v.

Master Bholu and Another

9

has also discussed the

nature of Section 15 and 19 of the Act, which might be

some relevance for the discussion. This Court has held:

“47. The order of preliminary assessment decides

whether the child in conflict with law, falling in the

age bracket of 16-18 years and having committed

heinous offence, is to be tried as an adult by the

Children’s Court or by the Board itself, treating

him to be a child. There are two major

consequences provided in the Act, 2015, if the

child is tried as an adult by the Children’s Court.

First, that the sentence or the punishment can go

up to life imprisonment if the child is tried as an

adult by the Children’s Court, whereas if the child

is tried by the Board as a child, the maximum

sentence that can be awarded is 3 years. The

second major consequence is that where the child

is tried as a child by the Board, then under section

24(1), he would not suffer any disqualification

attached to the conviction of an offence, whereas

the said removal of disqualification would not be

available to a child who is tried as an adult by the

Children’s Court, as per the proviso to section

24(1). Another consequence, which may also have

serious repercussions, is that as per section 24(2),

9

(2023) 12 SCC 401

SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024 Page 31 of 37

where the Board or the Children’s Court, after the

case is over, may direct the police or the registry

that relevant records of such conviction may be

destroyed after the period of expiry of appeal or a

reasonable period as may be prescribed. Whereas,

when a child is tried as an adult, the relevant

records shall be retained by the relevant Court, as

per the proviso to section 24(2).

48. These consequences are serious in nature and

have a lasting effect for the entire life of the child.

It is well settled that any order that has serious civil

consequences, reasonable opportunity must be

afforded. The question is of what would be a

reasonable opportunity in a case where a

preliminary assessment is to be made by the Board

under section 15.

……………….

85. We are conscious of the fact that the power to

make the preliminary assessment is vested in the

Board and also the Children’s Court

under sections 15 and 19 respectively. The

Children’s Court, on its own, upon a matter being

referred to under section 18(3), would still

examine whether the child is to be tried as an adult

or not, and if it would come to the conclusion that

the child was not to be tried as an adult then it

would itself conduct an inquiry as a Board and pass

appropriate orders under section 18. Thus, the

power to carry out the preliminary assessment

rests with the Board and the Children’s Court. This

Court cannot delve upon the exercise of

preliminary assessment. This Court will only

examine as to whether the preliminary assessment

has been carried out as required under law or not.

Even the High Court, exercising revisionary power

under section 102, would test the decision of the

Board or the Children’s Court with respect to its

legality or propriety only. In the present case, the

High Court has, after considering limited material

on record, arrived at a conclusion that the matter

SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024 Page 32 of 37

required reconsideration and for which, it has

remanded the matter to the Board with further

directions to take additional evidence and also to

afford adequate opportunity to the child before

taking a fresh decision.”

10.8. From the above discussion it becomes abundantly clear

and evident that the intention of the Act is to have

Section 19(1) as mandatory.

11. Now adverting to the consequence of non-compliance with

Section 19 of the Act, the same has already been considered

by this Court in Thirumoorthy v. State represented by the

Inspector of Police

10

. In the said case, the ‘child in conflict

with law’ was apprehended and subsequently tried by the

Children’s Court without adhering to the mandatory

requirements of Sections 9, 15, 18 and 19 of the Act, and

was convicted and sentenced to a maximum term of ten

years under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, along

with sentences under other provisions. This Court, upon a

detailed analysis of the scheme and provisions of the Act,

held that non-compliance with the mandatory provisions

thereof vitiates the entire trial, and accordingly proceeded to

quash and set aside the judgment of conviction and

sentence. This Court held as follows:

10

(2024) 12 SCC 307

SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024 Page 33 of 37

“33. Section 18(3) provides that where the Board after

preliminary assessment under Section 15 opines that there

is a need for the said child to be tried as an adult, then the

Board may order transfer of the trial of the case to the

Children’s Court having jurisdiction to try such offences.

34. By virtue of Section 19(1), the Children’s Court, upon

receiving such report of preliminary assessment undertaken

by the Board under Section 15 may further decide as to

whether there is a need for trial of the child as an adult or

not.

35. The procedure provided under Sections 15 and 19 has

been held to be mandatory by this Court in the case of Ajeet

Gujar v. State of Madhya Pradesh. In the said case, this

Court considered the import of Section 19(1) of the JJ Act

and held that the word ‘may’ used in the said provision be

read as ‘shall’. It was also held that holding of an inquiry

under 19(1)(i) is not an empty formality. Section 19)(1)(ii)

provides that after examining the matter, if the Children’s

Court comes to the conclusion that there is no need for trial

of the child as an adult, instead of sending back 2023 SCC

Online SC 1255 the matter to the Board, the Court itself is

empowered to conduct an inquiry and pass appropriate

orders in accordance with provisions of Section 18 of the JJ

Act. The trial of a child as an adult and his trial as a juvenile

by the Children’s Court have different consequences.

36. It was further held that the Children’s Court cannot

brush aside the requirement of holding an inquiry

under Section 19(1)(i) of the JJ Act. Thus, all actions

provided under Section 19 are mandatorily required to be

undertaken by the Children’s Court.

37. As can be seen from the facts of the present case, there

has been a flagrant violation of the mandatory requirements

of Sections 15 and 19 of the JJ Act. Neither was the charge

sheet against the accused appellant filed before the Board

nor was any preliminary assessment conducted

under Section 15, so as to find out whether the accused

appellant was required to be tried as an adult.

SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024 Page 34 of 37

38. In absence of a preliminary assessment being conducted

by the Board under Section 15, and without an order being

passed by the Board under Section 15(1) read with Section

18(3), it was impermissible for the trial Court to have

accepted the charge sheet and to have proceeded with the

trial of the accused.

39. Thus, it is evident that the procedure adopted by the

Sessions Court in conducting the trial of the accused

appellant is de hors the mandatory requirements of JJ Act.

40. Thus, on the face of the record, the proceedings

undertaken by the Sessions Court in conducting trial of the

CICL, convicting and sentencing him as above are in gross

violation of the mandate of the Act and thus, the entire

proceedings stand vitiated.

41. It seems that pursuant to the trial being concluded, the

trial Court realized the gross illegality in the proceedings

and thus, in an attempt to give a vestige of validity to the

grossly illegal proceedings conducted earlier, an exercise

was undertaken to deal with the accused appellant as per the

provisions of the JJ Act on the aspect of sentencing.

However, ex facie, the said action which seems to be taken

by way of providing an ex post facto imprimatur to the

grossly illegal trial does not stand to scrutiny because the

very foundation of the prosecution case is illegal to the core.

……………………………

46. In the case of Ajeet Gurjar(supra), this Court remitted

back the matter to the Sessions Court for complying with

the requirements of Section 19(1) of the JJ Act. However,

in the present case, there is yet another hurdle which

convinces us that it is not a fit case warranting de novo

proceedings against the accused appellant by taking

recourse to the provisions of the JJ Act. At the cost of

repetition, it may be reiterated that the charge sheet was

filed against the accused appellant directly before the

Sessions Court (statedly designated as a Children’s Court)

and he was never presented before the Juvenile Justice

Board as per the mandate of the JJ Act.

SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024 Page 35 of 37

47. The accused appellant being a CICL was never

subjected to preliminary assessment by the Board so as to

find out whether he should be tried as an adult. Directing

such an exercise at this stage would be sheer futility because

now the appellant is nearly 23 years of age.

48. At this stage, there remains no realistic possibility of

finding out the mental and physical capacity of the accused

appellant to commit the offence or to assess his ability to

understand the consequences of the offence and

circumstances in which he committed the offence in the

year 2016.

49. Since we have held that the entire proceedings taken

against the appellant right from the stage of investigation

and the completion of trial stand vitiated as having been

undertaken in gross violation of the mandatory

requirements of the JJ Act, we need not dwell into the

merits of the matter or to reappreciate the evidence

available on record for finding out whether the prosecution

has been able to prove the guilt of the appellant by reliable

circumstantial evidence.

50. Thus, we are left with no option but to quash and set

aside the impugned judgment and direct that the appellant

who is presently lodged in jail shall be released forthwith,

if not required in any other case.”

IV. CONCLUSION:

12. Though in Thirumoorthy (supra) there was non-

compliance with both Sections 15 and 19 of the Act, in the

present case there is compliance with Section 15, but there

is non-compliance with Section 19(1) of the Act. We had,

for some time, considered the possibility of reducing the

sentence to the period already undergone, or of limiting the

SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024 Page 36 of 37

sentence to a maximum of three years. However, we are

unable to adopt such a course. In the absence of compliance

with Section 19(1), which is determinative of the procedure

to be followed by the Court, whether a Sessions trial or a

summons case, the entire trial stands vitiated. We are,

therefore, left with no option but to follow the course

adopted in Thirumoorthy.

13. In Thirumoorthy (supra), the appellant was about 23 years

of age at the time of the judgment. In the present case, the

appellant is now 24 years old. At this stage, it would not be

feasible for the Children’s Court to undertake a meaningful

assessment of the mental capacity of the appellant that was

prevailing at the time when crime occurred. Further, having

regard to the fact that the trial has already been concluded

and the appellant has undergone incarceration for a period

exceeding six years, we are of the considered view that no

useful purpose would be served by remitting the matter to

the Children’s Court.

14. In view of the foregoing, the conviction recorded by the

Children’s Court, having been rendered in non-compliance

with the mandate of Section 19(1) of the Act, cannot be

sustained. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and the

consequential sentence imposed in CIS No. SC/11/2019

passed by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Kaithal

SLP (Crl.) NO. 8113/2024 Page 37 of 37

dated 13/14.03.2019 and affirmed by the High Court of

Punjab and Haryana in CRA-D-649-2019(O&M) dated

16.12.2023 are hereby set aside for non-compliance with

Section 19(1) of the Act.

15. Before parting, we deem it appropriate to issue a word of

caution and a direction to Children’s Courts across the

country that upon receipt of records pursuant to

transfer/committal under Section 18(3) of the Act by the

Juvenile Justice Board, the first duty of the Children’s

Court, after taking cognizance of the matter, is to pass a

reasoned order under Section 19(1) of the Act upon due

assessment of the ‘child in conflict with law’ before it

proceeds further in the matter.

16. Consequently, the Appeal is allowed. The Appellant is

acquitted. The Appellant is on bail, the bail bonds executed

by the Appellants stands discharged. Pending applications,

if any stands disposed of.

...................................................J.

[ARAVIND KUMAR ]

....................................................J.

[PRASANNA B. VARALE]

NEW DELHI;

JULY 13

th

, 2026.