As per case facts, the parties married in 2016 and separated in 2017. The husband sought divorce on grounds of cruelty, while the wife filed for restitution of conjugal rights. ...
MATA Nos. 164 & 165 of 2022 Page 1 of 17
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
MATA No.164 of 2022
CNR No. ODHC010542862022
Sai Sonali Nanda …. Appellant
Represented by Adv.
Mr. A. Mohanty, Sr. Advocate
along with Mr. G.M. Rath, Advocate
-Versus-
Sambit Mishra …. Respondent
Represented by Adv.
Mr. A.K. Sarangi, Advocate
MATA No.165 of 2022
CNR No. ODHC010544482022
Sai Sonali Nanda …. Appellant
Represented by Adv.
Mr. A. Mohanty, Sr. Advocate
along with Mr. G.M. Rath, Advocate
-Versus-
Sambit Mishra …. Respondent
Represented by Adv.
Mr. A.K. Sarangi, Advocate
CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH
Date of Hearing: 27.08.2026
Date of Judgment: 01.10.2026 MATA/165/2022
ODHC010544482022
2022:OHC:1-DB
MATA Nos. 164 & 165 of 2022 Page 2 of 17
CHITTARANJAN DASH, J.
1. The present two appeals i.e. MATA No.164 of 2022 and
MATA No.164 of 2022 arise out of a common judgment dated
21.05.2022 passed by the learned Judge, Family Court, Cuttack in
C.P. No.431 of 2020 and C.P. No.32 of 2021. Since both
proceedings arise out of the same matrimonial relationship and
involve overlapping facts and issues, they were heard together and
are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. The marriage between the parties was solemnised on
13.07.2016 in accordance with Hindu rites and customs. The
matrimonial relationship, however, did not continue for long and
the parties have been living separately since 26.02.2017. The
husband instituted C.P. No.431 of 2020 under Section 13(1)(ia) of
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, seeking dissolution of the marriage
on the ground of cruelty. The wife contested the proceeding and,
subsequently, instituted C.P. No.32 of 2021 under Section 9 of the
Act seeking restitution of conjugal rights. The learned Family
Court, upon consideration of the pleadings and evidence adduced
by the parties, allowed the husband's petition for divorce,
dismissed the wife's petition for restitution of conjugal rights and,
while dissolving the marriage, directed payment of ₹16,00,000/- to
the wife towards permanent alimony.
3. Learned counsel for the Appellant-wife, during the course
of hearing, submitted that the learned Family Court erred in
granting a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty. It was
contended that the finding of cruelty substantially rested upon the
MATA Nos. 164 & 165 of 2022 Page 3 of 17
allegation that the Appellant was accustomed to a lavish lifestyle,
which, by itself, could not constitute matrimonial cruelty. Learned
counsel further submitted that the serious allegations made by the
Appellant regarding demand of money, physical and mental
harassment and other matrimonial misconduct had not been
properly appreciated. Reliance was also placed on the decisions of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat (Mrs.),
reported in (1994) 1 SCC 337 and Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj
Pandit, reported in 2006 (3) SCC 778 to contend that the conduct
complained of must be assessed in its matrimonial context and
with reference to the legal standard of mental cruelty. However, as
recorded by this Court on 24.03.2025, learned Senior Counsel for
the Appellant-wife submitted that the Appellant no longer
questioned the decree of divorce and confined the challenge in
MATA No.165 of 2022 to the quantum of permanent alimony and
return of the dowry articles.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondent-husband
supported the judgment of the learned Family Court. It was
submitted that the matrimonial relationship had become
irretrievably strained within a short period of the marriage; the
parties had been living separately since 26.02.2017 and repeated
efforts at reconciliation had failed. It was contended that the
evidence on record, when considered in its entirety, established
the course of conduct on the part of the Appellant which rendered
continuation of the matrimonial relationship untenable. Learned
counsel also supported the amount awarded towards permanent
alimony, on the basis of the income and financial circumstances of
MATA Nos. 164 & 165 of 2022 Page 4 of 17
the Respondent. The Respondent has, during the pendency of the
appeal, also placed the amount of ₹16,00,000/- before this Court
pursuant to the subsequent orders passed in the appeal.
5. The learned Family Court, upon consideration of the
pleadings and evidence, framed the principal questions as to
whether the husband was entitled to dissolution of marriage on the
ground of cruelty and whether he had withdrawn himself from the
company of the wife without reasonable cause. The Court noticed
that the parties had lived together only for a short period after their
marriage and had thereafter remained separate since 26.02.2017. It
also noticed the several attempts at reconciliation and settlement
which had failed. The learned Family Court found that the
allegations levelled by the wife regarding dowry demand, physical
assault, demand for unnatural sex and the husband's alleged
drinking habit had not been satisfactorily established, while the
conduct of the parties and the circumstances surrounding their
separation indicated that there was no realistic prospect of
restoration of the matrimonial relationship. The Court accordingly
granted a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and declined
the wife's prayer for restitution of conjugal rights. It further
directed payment of ₹16,00,000/- towards permanent alimony.
6. We have considered the submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the parties and have carefully examined the pleadings
and evidence available on record. The principal question which
arises for consideration is whether the material brought on record
establishes matrimonial cruelty within the meaning of Section
13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and, consequently,
MATA Nos. 164 & 165 of 2022 Page 5 of 17
whether the Appellant-wife was entitled to a decree for restitution
of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Act.
7. Before examining the evidence, it would be apposite to
notice the settled principles governing the determination of
matrimonial cruelty. The expression “cruelty” has not been
defined under the Hindu Marriage Act and encompasses both
physical and mental cruelty. In Suman Kapur v. Sudhir Kapur,
reported in (2009) 1 SCC 422, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
emphasised that the entire matrimonial relationship has to be
examined and that the cumulative effect of the conduct and its
impact upon the complaining spouse, rather than an isolated
incident, assumes significance. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while
explaining the concept of mental cruelty, held as below:
"39.Mental cruelty has also been examined by this Court in
Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta thus: (SCC pp.716-17,
para21) "21. Cruelty for the purpose of Section 13(1)(i-a)
is to be taken as a behaviour by one spouse towards the
other, which causes reasonable apprehension in the mind
of the latter that it is not safe for him or her to continue the
matrimonial relationship with the other. Mental cruelty is a
state of mind and feeling with one of the spouses due to the
behaviour or behavioural pattern by the other. Unlike the
case of physical cruelty, mental cruelty is difficult to
establish by direct evidence. It is necessarily a matter of
inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of
the case. A feeling of anguish, disappointment and
frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of the
other can only be appreciated on assessing the attending
facts and circumstances in which the two partners of
matrimonial life have been living. The inference has to be
drawn from the attending facts and circumstances taken
cumulatively. In case of mental cruelty it will not be a
correct approach to take an instance of misbehaviour in
isolation and then pose the question whether such
behaviour is sufficient by itself to cause mental cruelty.
MATA Nos. 164 & 165 of 2022 Page 6 of 17
The approach should be to take the cumulative effect of the
facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence on
record and then draw a fair inference whether the petitioner
in the divorce petition has been subjected to mental cruelty
due to conduct of the other."
8. Equally relevant is the exposition of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal,
reported in (2012) 7 SCC 288, that cruelty has an inseparable
nexus with human conduct and behaviour and that no rigid or
universal standard can be prescribed for determining the same.
The social, economic and cultural circumstances in which the
parties live, their background, temperament and the nature of their
matrimonial relationship are relevant considerations. At the same
time, the Court has to examine the actual conduct proved on
record and not proceed merely on the basis of abstract standards.
Relevant paragraphs are reproduced below:
“22. The expression “cruelty” has an inseparable nexus
with human conduct or human behaviour. It is always
dependent upon the social strata or the milieu to which the
parties belong, their ways of life, relationship,
temperaments and emotions that have been conditioned by
their social status.
×× ×× ××
25. After so stating, this Court observed in Shobha Rani
case [(1988) 1 SCC 105 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 60] about the
marked change in life in modern times and the sea change
in matrimonial duties and responsibilities. It has been
observed that: (SCC p. 108, para 5)
“5. … when a spouse makes a complaint about the
treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations,
the court should not search for standard in life. A set of
facts stigmatised as cruelty in one case may not be so in
another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend
upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or
their economic and social conditions. It may also
MATA Nos. 164 & 165 of 2022 Page 7 of 17
depend upon their culture and human values to which
they attach importance.”
26. Their Lordships in Shobha Rani case [(1988) 1 SCC
105 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 60] referred to the observations
made in Sheldon v. Sheldon [1966 P 62 : (1966) 2 WLR
993 : (1966) 2 All ER 257 (CA)] wherein Lord Denning
stated, “the categories of cruelty are not closed”.
Thereafter, the Bench proceeded to state thus: (Shobha
Rani case [(1988) 1 SCC 105 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 60] , SCC
p. 109, paras 5-6)
“ 5 . … Each case may be different. We deal with the
conduct of human beings who are not generally similar.
Among the human beings there is no limit to the kind of
conduct which may constitute cruelty. New type of
cruelty may crop up in any case depending upon the
human behaviour, capacity or incapability to tolerate the
conduct complained of. Such is the wonderful (sic)
realm of cruelty.
6. These preliminary observations are intended to
emphasise that the court in matrimonial cases is not
concerned with ideals in family life. The court has only
to understand the spouses concerned as nature made
them, and consider their particular grievance. As Lord
Reid observed in Gollins v. Gollins [1964 AC 644 :
(1963) 3 WLR 176 : (1963) 2 All ER 966 (HL)] : (All
ER p. 972 G-H)
‘… In matrimonial affairs we are not dealing with
objective standards, it is not a matrimonial offence to
fall below the standard of the reasonable man (or the
reasonable woman). We are dealing with this
man or this woman.’”
9. Tested on the aforesaid principles, the evidence in the
present case discloses that the matrimonial relationship
deteriorated almost from its inception. The parties were married
on 13.07.2016. The evidence of the Respondent-husband is that
there was no cordial relationship even after the first month of
marriage and that the Appellant ultimately left the matrimonial
home on 26.02.2017. More significantly, the Respondent has
spoken of repeated efforts to resolve the dispute. His evidence
MATA Nos. 164 & 165 of 2022 Page 8 of 17
refers to meetings held on 15.10.2016 at Mumbai, 13.12.2016 at
Cuttack, 03/04.02.2017 at Bhubaneswar, 29.07.2017 at
Bhubaneswar and again on 05.08.2017, each of which, according
to him, was intended to resolve the matrimonial dispute but failed
to bring about any reconciliation.
10. The significance of this evidence lies not merely in the
number of meetings, but in what it demonstrates about the state of
the matrimonial relationship. The marriage had lasted only for a
few months when the parties ceased to live together. The attempts
made thereafter did not result in restoration of cohabitation. The
Respondent further stated that he addressed a letter to the
Appellant with a view to working out an amicable settlement, but
the dispute instead escalated into allegations of cruelty and dowry
harassment through the Advocate's letter dated 12.08.2018.
11. On the other hand, the Appellant levelled serious
allegations against the Respondent. She alleged, inter alia, that her
father had been compelled to make payments on different
occasions, including ₹5,00,000/- at the time of marriage and
approximately ₹3,00,000/- thereafter, besides gold ornaments and
household articles. She further alleged that her father had been
compelled to spend approximately ₹10,00,000/- for the marriage
function at a Star Hotel and, subsequently, that the Respondent
demanded a further amount of ₹20,00,000/- as a condition for
taking her back.
12. These allegations, however, required scrutiny on the
touchstone of the evidence. The Appellant's father, while
MATA Nos. 164 & 165 of 2022 Page 9 of 17
supporting her allegations, admitted in cross-examination that he
had no direct knowledge regarding allegations of unnatural sex,
regular drinking and certain instances of ill-treatment allegedly
suffered by his daughter. His evidence regarding the transfer of
₹2,00,000/- was also confined to the fact of such transfer, while
the parties gave different explanations regarding its purpose. The
evidence of the Appellant's uncle, examined as RW-3,
substantially followed the version of the father.
13. The distinction between an allegation and proof assumes
considerable significance in a matrimonial proceeding. The mere
assertion of grave conduct cannot, by itself, establish cruelty.
Equally, the failure to establish each allegation made by one
spouse does not, by itself, establish the case of the other. The
Court is required to look at the evidence as a whole and determine
whether the cumulative conduct of the parties has made the
matrimonial relationship such that the continuation of the
relationship cannot reasonably be expected.
14. There is, in fact, an important admission from the
Appellant herself. In her cross-examination, she admitted that
although the parties had lived together as husband and wife till
February, 2017, thereafter there was no conjugal relationship
between them and they were not even on talking terms. This was
not a temporary interruption in cohabitation. The evidence shows
that this state of affairs continued for years.
15. The Appellant's own evidence in the proceeding under
Section 9 further assumes significance. She stated that she had
MATA Nos. 164 & 165 of 2022 Page 10 of 17
filed the said proceeding approximately four years after the
institution of the Respondent's divorce proceeding. She also
admitted that the Respondent had not agreed to resume
cohabitation and that the conciliation efforts before the learned
Family Court had failed. She stated that she had left the
matrimonial home after the Respondent asked her to leave and
thereafter stayed at her friend's residence as a paying guest.
16. Thus, the record presents a matrimonial relationship
which, within a very short period of the marriage, had ceased to
function in any meaningful sense; the parties had separated on
26.02.2017; there was no subsequent conjugal relationship or even
communication between them; repeated efforts at reconciliation
failed; and the allegations exchanged between the parties became
progressively more serious. This is not a case where an isolated
disagreement or a transient episode is being elevated into
matrimonial cruelty. It is the sustained course of matrimonial
discord, viewed cumulatively, which assumes significance.
17. We may also note the evidence concerning the financial
expectations and circumstances of the parties, though the same
cannot, by itself, constitute cruelty. The learned Family Court
noticed that the Appellant came from a financially well-placed
family and that her father had admittedly transferred ₹2,00,000/-
to the Respondent. The Respondent explained the payment as
being towards marriage-related/household expenses, whereas the
Appellant's case was that such payments were made pursuant to
demands. The transaction itself is therefore not in dispute; what
remains disputed is its purpose. The evidence also discloses that
MATA Nos. 164 & 165 of 2022 Page 11 of 17
the Appellant had herself been employed as an Executive
Engineer prior to marriage.
18. We are conscious that a difference in financial
background, standard of living or lifestyle cannot, standing alone,
be treated as matrimonial cruelty. The relevance of these
circumstances is only in understanding the actual matrimonial
dynamics between the parties. What emerges from the record is
not merely a difference in economic status, but a relationship in
which financial allegations became part of the larger dispute,
attempts at reconciliation repeatedly failed, the parties ceased all
marital interaction within months of marriage, and the separation
continued for several years.
19. It is apposite to visit the principle laid down in V. Bhagat
v. D. Bhagat (Mrs.) (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has held as below:
“15. If so, the question arises what kind of cruel treatment
does clause (i-a) contemplate? In particular, what is the
kind of mental cruelty that is required to be established?
While answering these questions, it must be kept in mind
that the cruelty mentioned in clause (i-a) is a ground now
for divorce as well as for judicial separation under Section
10. Another circumstance to be kept in mind is that even
where the marriage has irretrievably broken down, the Act,
even after the 1976 (Amendment) Act, does not permit
dissolution of marriage on that ground. This circumstance
may have to be kept in mind while ascertaining the type of
cruelty contemplated by Section 13(1)(i-a).
16. Mental cruelty in Section 13(1)(i-a) can broadly be
defined as that conduct which inflicts upon the other party
such mental pain and suffering as would make it not
possible for that party to live with the other. In other
words, mental cruelty must be of such a nature that the
parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together. The
MATA Nos. 164 & 165 of 2022 Page 12 of 17
situation must be such that the wronged party cannot
reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and
continue to live with the other party. It is not necessary to
prove that the mental cruelty is such as to cause injury to
the health of the petitioner. While arriving at such
conclusion, regard must be had to the social status,
educational level of the parties, the society they move in,
the possibility or otherwise of the parties ever living
together in case they are already living apart and all other
relevant facts and circumstances which it is neither
possible nor desirable to set out exhaustively. What is
cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another
case. It is a matter to be Determined in each case having
regard to the facts and circumstances of that case. If it is a
case of accusations and allegations, regard must also be
had to the context in which they were made.”
20. The aforesaid principle is reiterated in Samar Ghosh v.
Jaya Ghosh, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 511. The relevant
paragraphs are reproduced as below:
“101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for
guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some
instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in
dealing with the cases of ‘mental cruelty’. The instances
indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative
and not exhaustive.
(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of
the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as
would not make possible for the parties to live with each
other could come within the broad parameters of mental
cruelty.
(ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire
matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear
that situation is such that the wronged party cannot
reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and
continue to live with other party.
(iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount
to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of
manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a degree
that it makes the married life for the other spouse
absolutely intolerable
MATA Nos. 164 & 165 of 2022 Page 13 of 17
(iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of
deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse
caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to
mental cruelty.
(v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating
treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render
miserable life of the spouse.
(vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of
one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of
the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the
resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave,
substantial and weighty.
(vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect,
indifference or total departure from the normal standard of
conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or
deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental
cruelty.
(viii) The conduct must be much more than jealousy,
selfishness, possessiveness, which causes unhappiness and
dissatisfaction and emotional upset may not be a ground
for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty
(ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and
tear of the married life which happens in day to day life
would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground
of mental cruelty.
(x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and
a few isolated instances over a period of years will not
amount to cruelty. The ill-conduct must be persistent for a
fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has
deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and
behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it
extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer,
may amount to mental cruelty.
(xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of
sterilization without medical reasons and without the
consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly if the wife
undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical reason
or without the consent or knowledge of her husband, such
an act of the spouse may lead G to mental cruelty.
(xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse
for considerable period without there being any physical
incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty.
MATA Nos. 164 & 165 of 2022 Page 14 of 17
(xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after
marriage not to have child from the marriage may amount
to cruelty.
(xiv) Where there has been a Jong period of continuous
separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial
bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction
though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that
tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of
marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the
feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations,
it may lead to mental cruelty”
21. The question is whether, having regard to the entire
matrimonial relationship and the circumstances proved, the
conduct is such that the aggrieved spouse cannot reasonably be
expected to continue living with the other. The answer has to
emerge from a comprehensive assessment of the matrimonial life
and not from a compartmentalised examination of individual
allegations. Applying the aforesaid test, we find that the learned
Family Court was justified in reaching the conclusion that the
matrimonial relationship had crossed the stage of an ordinary
matrimonial disagreement. The prolonged cessation of
cohabitation, absence of conjugal relationship and
communication, repeated but unsuccessful efforts at
reconciliation, the serious allegations exchanged between the
parties and the overall course of the relationship, when viewed
cumulatively, establish a course of conduct which falls within the
ambit of mental cruelty contemplated under Section 13(1)(ia) of
the Hindu Marriage Act. The conclusion of the learned Family
Court, therefore, does not call for interference.
22. The claim for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9
of the Hindu Marriage Act must also be examined in this
MATA Nos. 164 & 165 of 2022 Page 15 of 17
background. The Appellant had remained separate from the
Respondent since February, 2017 and admitted that there had been
no conjugal relationship or communication between them
thereafter. The Respondent's refusal to resume cohabitation cannot
be considered in isolation from the matrimonial circumstances
proved on record. Once the course of matrimonial cruelty
established against the Appellant is taken into account, it cannot
be said that the Respondent's withdrawal from her society was
without reasonable cause. The dismissal of the Appellant's petition
under Section 9, therefore, also warrants no interference.
23. There is one further circumstance which has occurred
during the pendency of these appeals and which puts the issue
concerning the decree of divorce in a still narrower compass. By
order dated 24.03.2025, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
Appellant-wife stated before this Court that the Appellant no
longer questioned the decree of divorce granted by the learned
Family Court and confined the challenge in MATA No.165 of
2022 to the quantum of permanent alimony and the issue relating
to return of dowry articles.
24. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no ground to
interfere with the decree of dissolution of marriage granted by the
learned Family Court in C.P. No.431 of 2020 or with the dismissal
of the Appellant's petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage
Act in C.P. No.32 of 2021. The findings recorded by the learned
Family Court, when tested against the evidence on record and the
settled principles governing matrimonial cruelty, do not warrant
interference in appeal.
MATA Nos. 164 & 165 of 2022 Page 16 of 17
25. As regards permanent alimony, the learned Family Court
awarded a sum of ₹16,00,000/- in favour of the Appellant. The
subsequent disclosure made before this Court also requires notice.
The Respondent's Form-16 for the financial year 2023-24 reflects
an amount of ₹16,46,916/- as having been paid/credited during
that year. At the same time, his affidavit discloses monthly
expenditure of approximately ₹1,15,000/-, including rent and
medical expenditure incurred by him and his mother. These
circumstances have to be considered alongside the fact that the
matrimonial relationship was of extremely short duration and that
the Appellant possesses independent professional qualifications
and prior employment experience.
26. Keeping in view the aforesaid parameters, the income
disclosed by the Respondent subsequent to the judgment of the
learned Family Court, his disclosed expenditure and liabilities, the
professional qualification and previous employment of the
Appellant, and, at the same time, her present non-employment, we
are of the considered view that the amount of ₹16,00,000/-
awarded by the learned Family Court requires a reasonable
enhancement. On an overall assessment of the circumstances, we
deem it appropriate to enhance the permanent alimony by a further
sum of ₹9,00,000/- (Rupees nine lakh only).
27. Accordingly, the Appellant shall be entitled to a total sum
of ₹25,00,000/- (Rupees twenty-five lakh) towards permanent
alimony. The sum of ₹16,00,000/- already awarded by the learned
Family Court shall stand merged in the aforesaid amount, and the
MATA Nos. 164 & 165 of 2022 Page 17 of 17
Respondent shall pay the additional sum of ₹9,00,000/- to the
Appellant towards full and final satisfaction of her claim for
permanent alimony. Upon payment of the aforesaid additional
amount, the claim of the Appellant towards permanent alimony
shall stand fully and finally satisfied, and no further claim on that
account shall survive.
28. In view of the foregoing discussion, the judgment dated
21.05.2022 passed by the learned Judge, Family Court,
Bhubaneswar in C.P. No.431 of 2020 and C.P. No.32 of 2021
stands modified to the aforesaid extent. Subject to the
modification regarding permanent alimony, the judgment of the
learned Family Court is affirmed. As a result, both the
matrimonial appeals stand disposed of.
I Agree.
(Harish Tandon) (Chittaranjan Dash)
Chief Justice Judge
AK Pradhan/Priyanka
Legal Notes
Add a Note....