1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF M ADHYA PRADESH

AT GWALIOR

BEFORE

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND PATHAK

&

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT

ON THE 19

th

OF JANUARY, 2026

WRIT APPEAL NO. 137 of 2026

SANJAY SINGH JADON

Vs.

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

APPEARANCE:

Shri MPS Raghuvashi – Senior Advocate with Shri Mohd. Amir

Khan – Advocate for the appellant.

Shri Ankur Mody – Additional Advocate General for the

respondents/State.

ORDER

Per: Justice Anand Pathak

1.The present writ appeal under Section 2 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh

Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005

is preferred by the appellant being crestfallen by the order dated 07-

01-2026 passed by learned Single Judge in writ petition

No.49073/2025 whereby the writ petition preferred by the appellant

(hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) has been dismissed.

2.Appellant has preferred the writ petition seeking direction to the

respondents for filing Expunge Report (ER) against the petitioner

with a further direction that investigation against the petitioner be not

permitted to continue. Said writ petition was under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India and since nature of case was against

investigation and related direction, therefore, it was placed before

2

learned Single Judge, who is looking after the criminal matters.

3.Petition preferred by the appellant as petitioner was disposed of with

the direction to the police authorities/competent

authority/respondents to conduct free and fair investigation in the

matter to reach to a final conclusion at the earliest in accordance with

law. Against the said direction, appellant has preferred this appeal

with limited purpose that a time limit be prescribed in the said

direction given by learned Writ Court.

4.Learned counsel for the respondents/State opposed the prayer on the

ground of maintainability of appeal. According to him, although

petition was preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution but the

relief was akin to the relief which is claimed under Section 482 of

Cr.P.C., therefore, against the said order, writ appeal is not

maintainable.

5.Heard learned counsel for the parties.

6.Petitioner preferred the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution

of India and sought the following reliefs:

“(i) That, the respondents be directed to file expunge report/

E.R. against the petitioner, as they themselves have reached to

the conclusion that no fraud has been detected.

(ii) That, it may also be held that investigation against the

petitioner cannot be permitted to continue at the cost of his

right for unlimited period.

(iii) That, other relief which is just and proper in the facts and

circumstances of the case may also be granted.”

7.Once a petition in the nature of Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is preferred

and decided by learned Single Judge, then even if it is a petition

under Article 226 of the Constitution, the question of maintainability

3

gains ground. Such appeal at the instance of petitioner who availed

the remedy effectively under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. (even in the garb

of writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution) is not

maintainable.

8.We can profitably rely upon the judgment of Apex Court in the case

of Ram Kishan Fauji Vs. State of Haryana and others, (2017) 5

SCC 533 wherein some what, similar question arose for

consideration before the Apex Court. The question was regarding

maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) against the order

passed by learned Single Judge while exercising criminal jurisdiction.

Apex Court held in following manner:

“28. The Court in Ishwarlal Bhagwandas case referred to

Article 133 of the Constitution and took note of the

submission that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court

as regards the grant of certificate pertains to judgment,

decree or final order of a High Court in a civil proceeding

and that “civil proceeding” only means a proceeding in the

nature of or triable as a civil suit and a petition for the

issue of a high prerogative writ by the High Court was not

such a proceeding. Additionally, it was urged that even if

the proceeding for issue of a writ under Article 226 of the

Constitution may, in certain cases, be treated as a civil

proceeding, it cannot be so treated when the party

aggrieved seeks relief against the levy of tax or revenue

claimed to be due to the State. The Court, delving into the

nature of civil proceedings, noted that :

“8. … The expression “civil proceeding” is not defined in

the Constitution, nor in the General Clauses Act. The

4

expression in our judgment covers all proceedings in

which a party asserts the existence of a civil right

conferred by the civil law or by statute, and claims relief

for breach thereof.”

29. After so stating, the Court elucidated the nature of

criminal proceeding and, in that regard, ruled thus:

“8. … A criminal proceeding on the other hand is

ordinarily one in which if carried to its conclusion it may

result in the imposition of sentences such as death,

imprisonment, fine or forfeiture of property. It also

includes proceedings in which in the larger interest of the

State, orders to prevent apprehended breach of the peace,

orders to bind down persons who are a danger to the

maintenance of peace and order, or orders aimed at

preventing vagrancy are contemplated to be passed.”

30. Explicating the concept further, the Court opined that:

(Ishwarlal Bhagwandas case)

“8. … The character of the proceeding, in our judgment,

depends not upon the nature of the tribunal which is

invested with authority to grant relief, but upon the

nature of the right violated and the appropriate relief

which may be claimed.”

It further held that a civil proceeding is, therefore,

one in which a person seeks to enforce by appropriate relief

the alleged infringement of his civil rights against another

person or the State, and which, if the claim is proved, would

result in the declaration, express or implied, of the right

claimed and relief such as payment of debt, damages,

5

compensation, delivery of specific property, enforcement of

personal rights, determination of status, etc.

31. The aforesaid authority makes a clear distinction

between a civil proceeding and a criminal proceeding. As

far as criminal proceeding is concerned, it clearly stipulates

that a criminal proceeding is ordinarily one which, if

carried to its conclusion, may result in imposition of (i)

sentence, and (ii) it can take within its ambit the larger

interest of the State, orders to prevent apprehended breach

of peace and orders to bind down persons who are a danger

to the maintenance of peace and order. The Court has ruled

that the character of the proceeding does not depend upon

the nature of the tribunal which is invested with the

authority to grant relief but upon the nature of the right

violated and the appropriate relief which may be claimed.

9.The Apex Court also discussed earlier judgment passed in the case of

CIT Vs. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas, AIR 1965 SC 1818 and held in

following manner:

“56. As we find from the decisions of the aforesaid three

High Courts, it is evident that there is no disagreement or

conflict on the principle that if an appeal is barred under

Clause 10 or Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, as the case

may be, no appeal will lie. The High Court of Andhra

Pradesh, however, has held that when the power is

exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing

of a criminal proceeding, there is no exercise of criminal

jurisdiction. It has distinguished the proceeding for

quashing of the FIR under Section 482 CrPC and, in that

6

context, has opined that from such an order, no appeal

would lie. On the contrary, the High Courts of Gujarat and

Delhi, on the basis of the law laid down by this Court in

Ishwarlal Bhagwandas, have laid emphasis on the seed of

initiation of criminal proceeding, the consequence of a

criminal proceeding and also the nature of relief sought

before the Single Judge under Article 226 of the

Constitution. The conception of “criminal jurisdiction” as

used in Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is not to be

construed in the narrow sense. It encompasses in its gamut

the inception and the consequence. It is the field in respect

of which the jurisdiction is exercised, is relevant. The

contention that solely because a writ petition is filed to

quash an investigation, it would have room for intra-court

appeal and if a petition is filed under inherent jurisdiction

under Section 482 CrPC, there would be no space for an

intra-court appeal, would create an anomalous,

unacceptable and inconceivable situation. The provision

contained in the Letters Patent does not allow or permit

such an interpretation. When we are required to consider a

bar or non-permissibility, we have to appreciate the same in

true letter and spirit. It confers jurisdiction as regards the

subject of controversy or nature of proceeding and that

subject is exercise of jurisdiction in criminal matters. It has

nothing to do whether the order has been passed in exercise

of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution or inherent jurisdiction under Section 482

CrPC.

7

57. In this regard, an example can be cited. In the State of

Uttar Pradesh, Section 438 CrPC has been deleted by the

State amendment and the said deletion has been treated to

be constitutionally valid by this Court in Kartar Singh v.

State of Punjab. However, that has not curtailed the

extraordinary power of the High Court to entertain a plea

of anticipatory bail as has been held in Lal Kamlendra

Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. And Hema Mishra v. State of

U.P. But that does not mean that an order passed by the

Single Judge in exercise of Article 226 of the Constitution

relating to criminal jurisdiction, can be made the subject-

matter of intra-court appeal. It is not provided for and it

would be legally inappropriate to think so.”

10.After the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Jamshed N. Guzdar

Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 591, Madhya Pradesh

Uchha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005

(hereinafter referred to as “the Adhiniyam, 2005”) came into

existence for intra court appeal. Section 2 of the Adhiniyam, 2005

provides a mechanism of intra court appeal in following manner:

2. Appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a

Judgment or order of one Judge of the High Court made in

exercise of original jurisdiction:- (1) An appeal shall lie

from a Judgment or order passed by one Judge of the High

Court in exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 226

of the Constitution of India, to a Division Bench comprising

of two judges of the same High Court:

Provided that no such appeal shall lie against an

interlocutory order or against an order passed in exercise

8

of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India.

(2) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within 45

days from the date of order passed by a single Judge:

Provided that any appeal may be admitted after the

prescribed period of 45 days, if the petitioner satisfies the

Division Bench that he had sufficient cause for not

preferring the appeal within such period.

Explanation:- The fact that the petitioner was misled by

any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in

ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be

sufficient cause within the meaning of this sub-section.

(3) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed, heard

and decided in accordance with the procedure as may be

prescribed by the High Court.

11.It provides an appeal only arising out of order passed under Article

226 of the Constitution of India. As per discussion held in Ram

Kishan Fauji (supra) proceedings under Article 226 of Constitution

would be original/civil proceedings and here powers exercised by

learned Single Judge is of original/criminal jurisdiction. Therefore,

this distinction is to be kept in mind while considering the moot

question. This aspect is discussed by the Full Bench in the case of

Shailendra Kumar Vs. Divisional Forest Officer and another,

2017(4) MPLJ 109. In para 18 the Full Bench held in following

manner:

“18. We may clarify that the orders passed by the Judicial

Courts, subordinate to a High Court even in criminal

matters when challenged in proceedings before the High

9

Courts are only under Article 227 of the Constitution of

India. Thus no intra court appeal would be maintainable

against an order passed by the Learned Single Judge in

proceedings arising out of an order passed by Judicial

Courts, may be civil or criminal proceedings.”

12.Relying upon the said judgment, the Division Bench in the case of

Pradeep Kori Vs. State of M.P. and another, 2020(4) MPLJ 332

also held that writ appeal is not maintainable out of the order passed

by learned Single Judge in criminal proceedings.

13. Once a litigant exercised extraordinary/inherent/supervisory criminal

jurisdiction before learned Single Judge under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.,

then no appeal would lie before the Division Bench.

14.Resultantly, writ appeal preferred by the appellant is hereby

dismissed on the ground of maintainability. However, respondents

to comply the order passed by learned Writ Court.

15.Appeal stands dismissed.

(ANAND PATHAK) (ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT )

Anil* JUDGE JUDGE