As per case facts, the Petitioner challenges his conviction for rash and negligent driving, causing grievous injuries and death, and property damage, as upheld by the Additional Sessions Judge. The ...
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
Reserved On :25.09.2025
CRR-2406-2025 (O&M)
Date of decision: 13.10.2025
Sanjay ...Petitioner
VERSUS
State of Haryana ...Respondent
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD S. BHARDWAJ
Present :- Mr. Vipin Kumar, Advocate for the petitioner.
Dr. (Ms.) Malvika Singh, DAG Haryana.
*****
VINOD S. BHARDWAJ, J.
1. The present petition raises a challenge to the judgement dated
07.08.2025 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Hisar as well as to the
judgement and order dated 12.02.2020 passed by the Judicial Magistrate 1
st
Class, Hisar in case bearing FIR No. 258 dated 18.11.2016 registered under
Sections 279, 337, 304-A, 427 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter
referred to as 'IPC') and Sections 181, 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
registered at Police Station Adampur, District Hisar whereby the petitioner
was convicted for the commission of the aforesaid offences and was
sentenced as under:
For the commission of offence under
Section 279 of I.P.C.
Simple imprisonment for a period of
six months
For the commission of offence under
Section 337 of I.P.C.
Simple imprisonment for a period of
six months
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For the commission of offence under
Section 304-A of I.P.C.
Rigorous Imprisonment for a period
of two years and fine of Rs.3000/-
For the commission of offence under
Section 427 of I.P.C.
Simple imprisonment for a period of
six months
2. Briefly stated, the case of the prosecution and the sequence of
events leading to the filing of the present petition are that on 17.11.2016,
the Police Control Room, Hisar, received information regarding the
admission of one Balbir, son of Munshi Ram, to AMC Hospital, Hisar, on
account of injuries sustained in a roadside accident. On the following day,
i.e., 18.11.2016, Sub-Inspector Phool Kumar visited AMC Hospital and
collected the Medico-Legal Report (MLR) and rukka from the attending
doctor, who declared the injured unfit to make a statement.
3. At the hospital, Satish, son of the injured Balbir, recorded his
statement, stating that his father earned his livelihood by operating a
pushcart (rehri) at Kabrel bus stand, where Satish used to assist him after
school hours. On 17.11.2016, around 7:30 P.M., Balbir had gone near the
shop (khokha) of Vikas, son of Satbir, to relieve himself, while Satish
remained at the pushcart. In the meantime, a vehicle bearing registration
number HR 44 E 0207, driven rashly and negligently from the direction of
Dobhi, struck Balbir, causing him multiple grievous injuries. The said
vehicle further rammed into Vikas’s khokha. Satish and Vikas rushed to the
spot, but the driver fled, abandoning the vehicle. Later, Satish came to know
that the driver was Sanjay, son of Phool Singh. It was alleged that Sanjay,
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CRR-2406-2025 (O&M)
by his rash and negligent driving, caused injuries to Balbir and damage to
Vikas’s khokha. Satish accordingly sought legal action.
4. During investigation, the police prepared the site plan,
recorded the statements of witnesses, and arrested the accused. In the
meantime, Balbir succumbed to the injuries sustained in the accident,
whereupon Section 304-A IPC was added. As the accused failed to produce
the Registration Certificate of the offending vehicle and his driving licence,
Sections 181 and 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act were also invoked. Upon
conclusion of investigation, challan was presented before the Court by the
SHO, Police Station Adampur.
5. The petitioner was convicted and sentenced as stated above for
the commission of the aforesaid offences vide order dated 12.02.2020
passed by the Judicial Magistrate 1
st
Class, Hisar.
6. Aggrieved of the aforesaid judgement of conviction and order
of sentence, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Court of
Additional Sessions judge, Hisar bearing Criminal Appeal No.
CRA/133/2020. After hearing learned counsel representing the respective
parties, the Sessions Judge recorded as under:
“12. I have carefully perused and scrutinized the
evidence of prosecution. From the above evidence of the
prosecution, it is clear that prosecution has successfully
connected the accused with the offence. The two cardinal
principles of criminal jurisprudence are that the prosecution
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must prove its case against the accused beyond shadow of
reasonable doubt and the onus to prove the guilt of the accused
is on prosecution and it never shifts. The prosecution has to
stand on its own legs to bring home the guilt to the accused
conclusively and affirmatively and it cannot take advantage of
any weakness in the defence version. The intention of the
legislature in laying down these principles has been that
hundreds of guilty persons may got Scot free but even one
innocent should not be punished. In light of these principles, I
proceed to determine the criminal liability of accused.
13. Assailing the impugned judgment of conviction
dated 12.02.2020 and order of sentence dated 13.02.2020,
counsel for the accused argued that the learned Trial Court
has misconstrued the evidence on file and has jumped over
certain conclusions without any basis. This case was
registered on a complaint made by PW-6 Satish who alleges
himself to be an eye witness to the accident. No Test
Identification Parade of the accused was got conducted by the
police. Accused was first time identified by PW-6 Satish in the
court. The identification of the accused for the first time in the
court will not serve any purpose and is meaningless.
Prosecution has, thus, failed to establish the identity of the
accused.
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CRR-2406-2025 (O&M)
14. The machinery of criminal law was set in motion
on the basis of a statement made by the complainant, namely
Satish (examined as PW6 during trial). In his detailed
statement recorded by the police, marked as Ex.PW6/A, Satish
categorically asserted that the driver of the offending vehicle,
bearing registration number HR 44E-0207, was driving in a
rash and negligent manner and, as a result, struck his father,
causing him serious injuries. Satish further stated in his police
statement that, upon inquiry, he came to know that the driver
of the said vehicle was one Sanjay, son of Phool Singh.
Subsequently, during the trial proceedings, complainant
Satish stepped into the witness box and deposed as PW-6. In
his testimony before the Court, he reiterated and reaffirmed
the factual assertions made in his police statement. He stated
on oath that on the evening of 17.11.2016, he was present
along with his father near their pushcart (rehri), which they
used to operate at the bus stand in Kabrel. According to him,
his close friend Vikas was also present at the spot at that
particular time. He deposed that his father had proceeded
towards the nearby khokha (a small roadside stall) of Vikas to
relieve himself, and at that very moment, a vehicle specifically
a Pick-up van bearing registration No. HR 44E-0207
approached from the side of Dobhi and was being driven in an
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CRR-2406-2025 (O&M)
extremely rash and negligent manner. The said vehicle directly
hit his father, resulting in severe injuries. Satish went further
to state that he had witnessed the entire incident unfold before
his eyes and that he could clearly identify the driver of the
offending vehicle. He pointed to the accused, Sanjay (present
in Court), and identified him as the individual who was driving
the said vehicle at the time of the accident. His version with
respect to the identity of the accused and the manner of driving
was fully corroborated by PW-7, Vikas, who also entered the
witness box and identified the accused Sanjay as the driver of
the offending vehicle. Vikas supported the prosecution’s
version and confirmed that the accused was indeed driving in
a rash and negligent manner at the time of the incident. During
the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the
appellant/accused attempted to raise certain doubts over the
prosecution version, primarily by pointing to the time and
visibility conditions at the scene of the incident. He argued that
since the incident took place in the month of November, at
around 7:30 P.M., it would have been dark by then, as the sun
sets early during that season. Therefore, according to him, it
was not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant
Satish and his friend Vikas could have actually seen and
identified the accused at the time of the occurrence. However,
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CRR-2406-2025 (O&M)
this argument advanced by the learned counsel for the
appellant is wholly without merit and cannot be accepted. A
bare perusal of the complainant’s statement, Ex.PW6/A,
clearly reveals that after striking his father, the offending
vehicle did not merely pass by, but actually crashed into the
khokha located nearby and became entangled in it. It has been
further stated that the accused, who was driving the said
vehicle, alighted from it and then fled from the spot. The very
nature and manner of the accident — where the vehicle hit a
person, then struck a stall, and became stuck —demonstrates
that the sequence of events would not have allowed the
accused to flee immediately. Rather, there was sufficient
opportunity and time for the complainant Satish and his friend
Vikas to observe the accused and take note of his appearance.
In fact, as is evident from the police proceedings, the offending
vehicle was recovered from the spot itself. It had been
abandoned by the accused in a damaged state, embedded in
the khokha after striking the victim. This provided a clear
window of opportunity for the witnesses to see the driver and
subsequently identify him. Both Satish and Vikas, who were
natural witnesses and present at the scene of occurrence, were
subjected to lengthy and detailed cross-examinations during
trial. However, despite the vigorous cross-examination,
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CRR-2406-2025 (O&M)
nothing substantial or material emerged to discredit their
testimony or create reasonable doubt regarding the identity of
the accused or the manner in which the incident occurred.
Another argument put forth by the defence counsel was that no
Test Identification Parade (TIP) had been conducted by the
police during investigation, and hence the accused was
entitled to the benefit of doubt on this ground alone. However,
this contention also does not hold any legal weight. The law is
well-settled on this aspect. In the present case, both key
prosecution witnesses PW-6 Satish and PW-7 Vikas have
clearly and unequivocally identified the accused Sanjay in
open court as the person who was driving the vehicle at the
relevant point in time. Their identification in court is direct
and categorical. In support of this position, reliance may be
placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Ravi Kapur v. State of Rajasthan, [2012 AIR (SC) 2986],
wherein it was held that identification of the accused in court
is valid and admissible in law, and that it is not always
mandatory that such identification must be preceded by a Test
Identification Parade. The Court further observed that the
absence of a TIP does not render the prosecution case weak or
unreliable, especially when the witnesses have had ample
opportunity to observe the accused and subsequently identify
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CRR-2406-2025 (O&M)
him with confidence during the trial. Therefore, merely
because no Test Identification Parade was conducted during
the investigation does not ipso facto entitle the accused to the
benefit of doubt. The identity of the accused, Sanjay, has been
clearly and convincingly established by the prosecution
through the consistent and corroborated testimonies of eye-
witnesses Satish and Vikas. There is nothing on record to
suggest that these witnesses had any motive to falsely
implicate the accused, nor has any such suggestion been
substantiated during cross-examination. In light of the
foregoing, the Court is of the considered view that the
prosecution has successfully proved the identity of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The accused Sanjay cannot claim
any benefit of doubt on this issue. His role as the driver of the
offending vehicle involved in the accident stands clearly
established.
15. Now we shall examine the second aspect of the
case. In order to establish criminal liability the “rash or
negligent” act by the accused is to be established the
prosecution. The prosecution has to prove that that the
negligence or rashness of the accused went beyond a mere
matter of civil liability and he showed such disregard for life
and safety of others as to amount to a crime. In case titled
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CRR-2406-2025 (O&M)
Mohammed Aynuddin @ Miyam vs State of Andhra 2000(3)
RCR (Crl.) 619, the Apex Court has held that:
“It is wrong proposition that for any motor accident,
negligence of driver should be presumed. To constitute
either of the offence under section 279 IPC or section
304-A IPC, the proof of criminal rashness or criminal
negligence is essential. Even in ordinary parlance
'negligence' connotes want of proper care and
'rashness' conveys the idea of recklessness or doing of
an act without due consideration. The rashness or
negligence must be described as criminal rashness or
criminal negligence. ”
16. The learned counsel for the appellant/accused
has contended that the mere deposition of the eye-witnesses is
insufficient to conclusively establish that the accused was
driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. However,
I find no merit in this contention. In the present case, the
prosecution’s consistent case is that the deceased Balbir was
proceeding from his pushcart (rehri) towards the khokha of
Vikas to attend to the call of nature when he was hit by the
vehicle driven by the accused in a rash and negligent manner.
This version of events is corroborated by the site plan placed
on the record as Ex.PW3/E. The site plan clearly marks point
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CRR-2406-2025 (O&M)
‘A’ as the place where the deceased was struck by the vehicle.
Notably, point ‘A’ is situated on the side of the road, an area
typically used by pedestrians. It is important to highlight that
the accused has not taken any specific defence to the effect that
the deceased was crossing the road recklessly, walking in the
middle of the road, or that he had suddenly come in front of
the vehicle. There is no suggestion from the defence that the
deceased contributed to the accident in any manner. On the
contrary, it is clearly evident from the site plan and the
testimonies on record that the deceased was walking on the
side of the road, in an area normally occupied by pedestrians.
Moreover, the site plan also indicates that the location of the
accident was surrounded by several shops, stalls, and hawkers
on both sides of the road, suggesting that it was a congested
or densely populated commercial area. In such surroundings,
a higher degree of caution and vigilance is expected from any
person driving a motor vehicle. The legal position is well
established that when a driver is operating a vehicle in a
crowded or busy locality, the standard of care required is
considerably higher, and any deviation from that duty amounts
to negligence. Driving in a rash and negligent manner in a
busy area enhances culpability. In the present case, both key
witnesses the complainant Satish (PW-6) and Vikas (PW-7)
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CRR-2406-2025 (O&M)
have consistently deposed regarding the rash and negligent
driving of the accused. Their depositions have remained
unshaken during cross-examination. The accused has not
raised any plea of sudden mechanical failure, poor visibility,
or any other mitigating circumstance that could absolve him
of criminal liability. In the absence of any such defence and in
light of consistent ocular evidence and corroborative
documentary proof, the prosecution has clearly succeeded in
proving the elements of rashness and negligence on part of the
accused. Therefore, the issue of rash and negligent driving
stands duly established on record. There remains no doubt that
the deceased Balbir succumbed to the injuries sustained in this
accident.
17. The learned counsel for the accused has also
advanced an argument that the deceased, Balbir, had
voluntarily left medical treatment midway, allegedly against
the advice of the attending doctors. It was thus suggested that
the death of the deceased cannot be directly attributed to the
accident, and that had he continued his treatment, he might
have survived. While this argument may appear plausible at
first glance, a deeper scrutiny of the medical evidence
completely undermines its foundation. The medical records on
file, including the Medico Legal Report (MLR) marked as
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CRR-2406-2025 (O&M)
Ex.PW1/B, clearly reflect the grievous and severe nature of the
injuries sustained by the deceased. Additionally, the post-
mortem report of deceased Balbir, marked as Ex. PX, clearly
attributes the cause of death to complications arising from the
injuries sustained over his body. It is further observed in the
post-mortem report that viscera samples were preserved and
sent to Karnal for chemical analysis. The defence has pointed
out that there is no Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report
available on record. However, this omission does not, in any
manner, weaken the prosecution’s case. The absence of the
FSL report does not take away the probative value of the post-
mortem findings. The doctors who conducted the post-mortem
have categorically opined that the death occurred due to
trauma and complications from the physical injuries sustained
in the accident. The injuries were not superficial or minor in
nature but were of such gravity that they led to fatal
complications, as explicitly stated in the post-mortem report.
It is a settled proposition of law that once it is established that
the injuries caused in an accident were serious and ultimately
led to the death of the victim, the question of whether the
deceased continued treatment or discontinued it becomes
immaterial in establishing criminal liability. Negligence
cannot be diluted or disregarded merely because the victim
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CRR-2406-2025 (O&M)
chose not to continue medical treatment. In light of the above,
the post-mortem report Ex. PX, which is a scientific and
neutral piece of evidence, clearly supports the conclusion that
the death of Balbir was directly linked to the injuries suffered
in the accident. The nature of injuries, their severity, and the
timing of death all support the prosecution’s case.
Accordingly, the argument advanced by the learned defence
counsel in this regard is rejected as being devoid of merit and
unsupported by the medical evidence on record.
18. The prosecution case is also strengthen by the
official witness PW-5 EASI Amrik Singh, who mechanically
examined the offending vehicle bearing registration No. HR
44 E-0207 and proved his report as Ex.PW5/A. As per his
report the left side head light and indicators of both sides were
found broken, bumper of left side was found broken and was
found separate from the vehicle, there was bend in left
mudguard and in show net and bonnet, front mirror was found
badly damaged as well as the left light and there is bend in the
body of the vehicle, fan is found broken and pipes were found
damaged. The vehicle was not found in the running condition.
Hence, from the report of the mechanical examiner it is proved
that the vehicle taken in police custody is held responsible for
causing the death of Balbir. Further, how his vehicle
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CRR-2406-2025 (O&M)
(offending vehicle) was broken is not explained by the accused.
Therefore, from the testimonies of the complainant Satish PW-
6, eye-witness Vikas PW-7 coupled with the mechanical report
Ex.PW5/A and site plan Ex.PW3/A, this fact stands proved that
the deceased Balbir was hit by the vehicle bearing registration
No. HR 44 E/0207 being driven in a rash and negligent
manner and injured Balbir succumbed to the injuries caused
by this collision. The driver of the offending vehicle is duly
identified by the complainant and eye witness.
19. Further, the counsel for the appellant/ accused
has failed to convince this court about any reasons as to why
the prosecution witnesses will try to falsely implicate the
accused in the present case.
20. Further the testimony of above witnesses stands
corroborated in the testimony of by PW-3 HC Vipin Kumar,
who had recorded the statement of complainant Satish
Ex.PW3/B and besides proving the other investigation
proceedings he proved the FIR Ex.PW3/C, endorsement
Ex.PW3/D, site plan Ex.PW3/E, recovery memo of vehicle No.
HR 44E0217 Ex.PW3/F and proceeding under Section 174
Cr.P.C. Ex.PW3/G.
21. No other point was raised or argued before me.
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CRR-2406-2025 (O&M)
22. Thus, from the evidence on file, it stands proved
that on 17.11.2016, at 7:30 P.M., accused drove his vehicle
bearing registration No.HR 44E/0207 in a rash and negligent
manner and hit Balbir who sustained multiple injuries and
lateron succumbed to the injuries received in the accident. In
view of the reasons as mentioned above, I do not find any
ground to differ with learned Trial Court and the judgment of
conviction dated 12.02.2020 stands affirmed.
23. So far as the quantum of sentence is concerned,
injured Balbir received multiple injuries on his body and
lateron he succumbed to his injuries. Therefore, keeping in
view the aforementioned facts and circumstances, I find no
reason to reduce the sentence awarded to the accused by the
learned Trial Court. The order of sentence dated 13.02.2020
is, thus, also affirmed.
24. As a sequel to my above discussion, present
appeal is hereby dismissed. The judgment of conviction dated
12.02.2020 and order of sentence dated 13.022020 passed by
learned Trial Court stand affirmed. Bail bonds and surety
bonds of accused stand cancelled and he be taken into custody
to serve the sentence accordingly. Requisite Jail warrants be
prepared. Trial Court record with a copy of judgment be sent
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CRR-2406-2025 (O&M)
back and appeal file be consigned to records after due
compliance.”
7. Aggrieved thereof, the instant criminal revision petition has
been filed.
8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has
advanced a twofold argument.
9. Firstly, it is submitted that the death of the deceased was not a
direct consequence of the accident in question. The deceased, Balbir, had
initially been admitted to AMC Hospital, Hisar on 17.11.2016, but left the
hospital against medical advice (LAMA) on 23.11.2016. On the same day,
he was admitted to Satija Hospital, Hisar, from where he again left against
medical advice on 08.12.2016. He was thereafter admitted to MAMCH,
Agroha (Hisar), where he expired on 09.12.2016. Learned counsel contends
that the persistent shifting of the injured from one hospital to another,
coupled with his repeated decision to leave treatment against medical
advice, creates a reasonable doubt as to whether the death occurred as a
proximate result of the accident or due to intervening medical lapses.
10. Secondly, it is argued that the identification of the petitioner
as the driver of the offending vehicle suffers from serious infirmities. No
test identification parade was ever conducted during the course of
investigation. The complainant, Satish (PW-6), and Vikas (PW-7), an
alleged eye-witness, identified the petitioner for the first time during their
cross-examination before the Court. Given that the incident occurred in
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CRR-2406-2025 (O&M)
November, counsel submits it is highly improbable that the complainant
and the witness could have actually recognized the petitioner at the time of
occurrence and later identified him in Court without prior identification
proceedings. Further, it is contended that both PW-6 Satish and PW-7 Vikas
are closely connected to the deceased, being his son and friend respectively,
and thus their testimonies cannot be treated as wholly reliable in the absence
of corroboration from any independent witness.
11. On the strength of the above submissions, learned counsel
argues that no independent evidence has been brought on record to establish
that the petitioner was indeed driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent
manner. In the absence of proximity between the alleged rash and negligent
act and the eventual death of the deceased, the conviction of the petitioner
under Section 304-A IPC is unsustainable in law.
12. Learned State counsel, while opposing the submissions
advanced on behalf of the petitioner, has vehemently contended that the
case at hand involves the unfortunate loss of life of one Balbir, aged about
50 years, who was survived by his wife and four children. It is argued that
the family of the deceased has been left to face immense hardship and
irreparable loss solely on account of the rash and negligent driving of the
petitioner.
13. It is further submitted that although an amount of
approximately ₹11,76,000/- was awarded by way of compensation, the
offending vehicle was admittedly not insured. Hence, it is highly
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CRR-2406-2025 (O&M)
improbable that the family of the deceased actually received such financial
assistance. Thus, the argument that the family was duly compensated is
wholly untenable.
14. On the facts, learned counsel for the State submits that the
deceased was standing across the road when the petitioner, while driving
the pick-up truck registered in his own name, came from the side of village
Dobhi, crossed over the entire road and, instead of negotiating the turn
towards Hisar, hit the deceased. The site plan, it is submitted, clearly
demonstrates that the deceased had not contributed to the occurrence in any
manner and that the accident was entirely attributable to the rash and
negligent act of the petitioner alone.
15. With respect to the medical evidence, it is argued that the
deceased remained under continuous treatment for nearly three weeks and
ultimately succumbed to his injuries at MAMCH, Agroha, Hisar. The
contention that his death was the result of repeated changes in medical
treatment is, therefore, unsustainable.
16. It is further contended that the vehicle in question had been
released on supurdari to the petitioner. At no stage did the petitioner
disclose the name of any other person who may have been driving the
vehicle at the relevant time. The burden to disclose such a fact squarely lay
upon the registered owner once he raised a plea that he was not the driver.
Having failed to discharge this burden, the petitioner cannot now take
advantage of such a plea.
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17. Learned State counsel has thus argued that no amount of
monetary compensation can indemnify the loss of human life, and that the
petitioner does not deserve any leniency. The sentence of two years'
rigorous imprisonment as awarded by the learned Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Hisar, cannot be said to be either excessive or harsh. On the contrary,
all relevant factors were duly considered by the trial Court while imposing
the sentence.
18. In support of her submissions, reliance has been placed on the
judgment of the Hon ’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Balwinder
Singh & Others, (2012) 2 SCC 182, wherein it was observed that
deterrence is one of the prime considerations in sentencing for offences
relating to rash and negligent driving, as the alarming rate of motor
accidents caused by careless and callous driving demands stern judicial
response.
19. It is, therefore, prayed that the revision petition merits
dismissal.
20. I have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respective parties and have gone through the documents appended with the
present criminal revision petition.
21. In so far as the submission advanced on behalf of the
petitioner, namely, that there was no proximity or causal nexus between the
accident in question and the subsequent death of the victim on account of
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his frequent shifting from one hospital to another against medical advice, is
concerned, I am unable to persuade myself to accept the same.
22. It is not in dispute that the deceased remained under
continuous medical treatment from the date of the accident until his demise.
The mere shifting of the injured from one hospital to another cannot, by
itself, be construed as an act of negligence attributable to the family of the
deceased. Such decisions, as a matter of common experience, may be
dictated by a variety of factors ranging from financial constraints,
availability of requisite medical facilities, dissatisfaction with the line of
treatment, or even the advice and recommendation of acquaintances.
23. For the plea of the petitioner to merit acceptance, it was
incumbent upon him to establish, on the strength of medical evidence, that
the protective or therapeutic treatment being followed was materially
altered, or that any of the hospitals had extended improper or deficient
medical care which could have aggravated the injuries and directly
contributed to the death. In the absence of any such medical evidence, no
presumption can be drawn that the treatment afforded at any stage was
inappropriate or that it materially led to the deterioration of the condition
of the victim.
24. On the contrary, the record itself reflects that the deceased
remained under constant treatment, being admitted in one hospital or
another continuously from the date of the accident till his demise. In these
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circumstances, the death must be perceived as proximately linked to, and a
direct consequence of, the injuries sustained in the accident itself.
25. In so far as the argument advanced by the learned counsel for
the petitioner with regard to the absence of a test identification parade is
concerned, it is evident from the judgments rendered by both the Courts
below that PW-6, the son of the deceased, who was present at the spot,
categorically deposed that on the fateful day his father had gone near the
shop (khokha) of PW-7 Vikas to answer a call of nature, while he himself
remained at the cart. At that moment, the vehicle bearing registration No.
HR-44E-0207, driven rashly and negligently, struck his father, causing fatal
injuries. The petitioner, who was driving the said vehicle, fled from the
spot. PW-6, as well as PW-7, clearly identified the petitioner in their
depositions and affirmed that it was the petitioner who was driving the
offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner.
26. It further stands established that the petitioner himself sought
release of the offending vehicle on supurdari and had annexed the
registration certificate reflecting him to be the registered owner thereof. At
no stage did he explain as to who, if not he himself, was driving the vehicle
at the relevant time. The mechanical inspection of the vehicle revealed
extensive damage including broken headlights and indicators, a damaged
bumper, bent mudguard, shattered windscreen, and damage to the bonnet,
fan, and pipes, thereby corroborating the occurrence of a violent collision.
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The petitioner could not explain how such damage had been caused if the
vehicle had not been involved in the accident in question.
27. The contention of the petitioner disputing his identification as
the driver of the offending vehicle is thus wholly untenable. The law is well
settled that the testimony of witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the
ground that they are related to the deceased. While Courts remain
circumspect in evaluating such testimony, the mere fact of relationship
cannot be a ground to discredit witnesses. PW-6 was the son of the
deceased, assisting his father in his daily vocation, while PW-7 was a
neighbouring shopkeeper. Their presence at the spot was most natural, and
no evidence of prior enmity, bias, or mala fides has been brought on record
to cast doubt on their depositions.
28. The site plan further fortifies the prosecution case. The
deceased was standing towards the kuccha portion near PW-7 ’s shop, away
from the metalled road. The petitioner, while driving a pick-up vehicle,
approached from village Dobhi, failed to negotiate the T-point, and crossed
the entire width of the road before striking the deceased. Such conduct
either indicates high speed or gross lack of control. The doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur squarely applies and the very manner of accident demonstrates
negligence on part of the driver. The deceased, who was merely standing
off the road, cannot by any stretch be attributed contributory negligence.
29. In so far as the plea regarding non-establishment of the
petitioner ’s identity is concerned, the same deserves outright rejection. The
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petitioner has not denied ownership of the vehicle. The burden lay upon
him to disclose who else was driving the vehicle at the relevant time if not
himself. His failure to discharge this burden renders the defence vague and
unsubstantiated.
30. Both the Courts below, upon a comprehensive appreciation of
the evidence, have concurrently recorded findings of guilt against the
petitioner. Such findings cannot be said to suffer from perversity, illegality,
or misreading of evidence. In revisional jurisdiction, this Court is not
expected to re-appreciate the entire evidence or substitute its own opinion
for that of the Trial Court and the Appellate Court. Where the findings are
reasonable, probable, and supported by material on record, interference is
unwarranted merely because another view is theoretically possible.
31. Accordingly, the contentions advanced on behalf of the
petitioner in respect of identification and credibility of witnesses are
without merit and are hereby rejected.
32. The above issue was examined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the matter of Soman Vs. State of Kerala, (2013) 11 SCC 382, the
relevant extract of the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:-
“'15. Giving punishment to the wrongdoer is at the heart of the
criminal justice delivery, but in our country, it is the weakest
part of the administration of criminal justice. There are no
legislative or judicially laid down guidelines to assist the trial
court in meting out the just punishment to the accused facing
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trial before it after he is held guilty of the charges. In State of
Punjab v. Prem Sagar (2008) 7 SCC 550, this Court
acknowledged as much and observed as under –
“2. In our judicial system, we have not been able to
develop legal principles as regards sentencing. The
superior courts except making observations with regard
to the purport and object for which punishment is
imposed upon an offender, have not issued any
guidelines. Other developed countries have done so. At
some quarters, serious concerns have been expressed in
this behalf. Some committees as for example Madhava
Menon Committee and Malimath Committee have
advocated introduction of sentencing guidelines.”
16. Nonetheless, if one goes through the decisions of this Court
carefully, it would appear that this Court takes into account a
combination of different factors while exercising discretion in
sentencing, that is proportionality, deterrence, rehabilitation
etc. (See: Ramashraya Chakravarti v. State of Madhya
Pradesh (1976) 1 SCC 281, Dhananjoy Chatterjee alias
Dhana v. State of W.B. (1994) 2 SCC 220, State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Ghanshyam Singh (2003) 8 SCC 13, State of
Karnataka v. Puttaraja (2004) 1 SCC 475, Union of India v.
Kuldeep Singh (2004) 2 SCC 590, Shailesh Jasvantbhai and
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CRR-2406-2025 (O&M)
another v. State of Gujarat and others (2006) 2 SCC 359,
Siddarama and others v. State of Karnataka (2006) 10 SCC
673, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Babulal (2008) 1 SCC 234,
Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of
Maharashtra (2009) 6 SCC 498).
14. In a proportionality analysis, it is necessary to assess the
seriousness of an offence in order to determine the
commensurate punishment for the offender. The seriousness of
an offence depends, apart from other things, also upon its
harmfulness. The question is whether the consequences of the
offence can be taken as the measure for determining its
harmfulness? In addition, quite apart from the seriousness of
the offence, can the consequences of an offence be a legitimate
aggravating (as opposed to mitigating) factor while awarding
a sentence. Thus, to understand the relevance of consequences
of criminal conduct from a Sentencing standpoint, one must
examine: (1) whether such consequences enhanced the
harmfulness of the offence; and (2) whether they are an
aggravating factor that need to be taken into account by the
courts while deciding on the sentence.
26. Punishment should acknowledge the sanctity of human life.
We fully agree.
27. From the above, one may conclude that:
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27.1. Courts ought to base sentencing decisions on various
different rationales – most prominent amongst which would be
proportionality and deterrence.
27.2. The question of consequences of criminal action can be
relevant from both a proportionality and deterrence
standpoint.
27.3. Insofar as proportionality is concerned, the sentence
must be commensurate with the seriousness or gravity of the
offence.
27.4. One of the factors relevant for judging seriousness of the
offence is the consequences resulting from it.
27.5. Unintended consequences/harm may still be properly
attributed to the offender if they were reasonably foreseeable.
In case of illicit and underground manufacture of liquor, the
chances of toxicity are so high that not only its manufacturer
but the distributor and the retail vendor would know its likely
risks to the consumer. Hence, even though any harm to the
consumer might not be directly intended, some aggravated
culpability must attach if the consumer suffers some grievous
hurt or dies as result of consuming the spurious liquor.”
33. The fundamental purpose of imposition of sentence is based
upon making an accused realize the consequences of the crime committed
by him and the creation of the dent in the life of the victims and also the
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social fabric. The same by itself does not oblige the Court to extend
opportunity to a convict for reforming himself. The principles of
proportionality have to be balanced and the impact of the offence on the
society as a whole and its ramification on the victim and the immediate
collectives also has to be examined.
34. In the matter of State through Central Bureau of
Investigation, Anti Corruption Branch, Chandigarh Vs. Sanjiv Bhalla
and another the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held as under:-
“22. It does appear that depending upon the facts of each case,
causing death by what appears (but is not) to be a rash or
negligent act may amount to an offence punishable under Part
II of Section 304 of the IPC, not warranting the release of the
convict under probation. There may also be situations where
an offence is punishable under Section 304-A of the IPC in an
accident "where mens rea remains absent" and refusal to
release a convict on probation in such a case may be too harsh
an approach to take. An absolute principle of law cannot be
laid down that in no case falling under Section 304-A of the
IPC should a convict be released on probation. This is
certainly not to say that in all cases falling under Section 304-
A of the IPC, the convict must be released on probation - it is
only that the principles laid down in Sections 360 and 361 of
the Criminal Procedure Code and the Probation of Offenders
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Act should not be disregarded but should be followed and an
appropriate decision, depending on the facts of the case, be
taken in each case.
23. In Ajahar Ali v. State of West Bengal 19 the appellant was
convicted of an offence of outraging the modesty of a woman
punishable under Section 354 of the IPC. This was held to be
"a heinous crime and with the social condition prevailing in
the society, the modesty of a woman has to be strongly
guarded" and so the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act
was not given to him. This may be contrasted with Prem Chand
and subsequently Dharam Pal where the convict was guilty of
a far more serious offence of attempted rape and yet granted
the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, notwithstanding
the nature of the crime, and only because of his age.
24. These decisions indicate that the philosophical basis of our
criminal jurisprudence is undergoing a shift - from punishment
being a humanizing mission to punishment being deterrent and
retributive. This shift may be necessary in today’s social
context (though no opinion is expressed), but given the
legislative mandate of Sections 360 and 361 of the Criminal
Procedure Code and the Probation of Offenders Act, what is
imperative for the judge is to strike a fine balance between
releasing a convict after admonition or on Probation of
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Offenders Act, what is imperative for the Judge is to strike a
fine balance between releasing a convict after admonition or
on probation or putting such a convict in jail. This can be
decided only on a case by case basis but the principle of
rehabilitation and the humanizing mission must not be
forgotten.”
35. It is evident from the discussion and consideration of the
arguments advanced by the counsel for the petitioner that both the Courts
have duly considered the evidence and arguments. Such concurrent
findings cannot be held to be misplaced or without any tangible evidence.
The same are not without any evidence or based upon misappreciation or
misinterpretation of facts, evidence or law. The findings of conviction as
affirmed by the appellate Court are thus upheld.
36. Hence, the criminal revision petition is dismissed to the extent
it raises a challenge to the judgments of conviction and dismissal of appeal,
the same leads to next question which pertains to the punishment awarded
to the petitioner.
37. Counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner is a poor
person and is the only breadwinner of his family and has 04 minor children
to look after. Moreover, his wife has already passed away and there is no
other person to take care of the children. It is also submitted that there is
nothing on record to suggest that the petitioner was under influence of any
intoxicant at the time of accident. It is also argued that the family of the
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deceased has been suitably compensated in the claim petition filed under
Section 166 of the M.V. Act, 1988 and a compensation to the tune of
Rs.11,76,509/- has been awarded to the family of the deceased.
38. Considering the rival contentions of the parties, as well as the
mitigating circumstances including that he petitioner is aged nearly 44 years
and single breadwinner of his family and also the fact that he was not
driving the vehicle under the influence of any intoxicant, I am of the opinion
that the compensation awarded under the M.V. Act, 1988 to the tune of
Rs.11,76,509/- has already been awarded, the interest of justice would be
well served in case, the sentence awarded by the Courts is modified as
under:-
Section(s) Sentence Modification
279 of I.P.C. SI for a period of 06
months
No change
337 of I.P.C. SI for a period of 06
months
No change
304-A of I.P.C. RI for a period of 02
years and fine of
Rs.3000/-
RI for a period of 18
months and fine of
Rs.3,000/-.
427 of I.P.C. SI for a period of six
months
No change.
All The sentences shall run currently and in default of fine, to
undergo SI further for a period of 01 month. The order for grant of
compensation under Section 357 (3) Cr.P.C. is maintained.
39. The present revision petition is partly allowed in terms as
aforesaid.
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40. All other pending misc. application if any shall also stand
disposed of accordingly.
(VINOD S. BHARDWAJ)
13.10.2025 JUDGE
Mangal Singh
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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