In the High Court at Calcutta

Civil Appellate Jurisdiction

Appellate Side

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya

And

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Supratim Bhattacharya

F.A.T. No. 469 of 2025

IA No: CAN 1 of 2025

Sanjiv Nandan Sahaya and Others

– Versus –

Poonawalla Fincorp Limited and Another

For the appellants : Mr. Probal Kumar Mukherjee,

Sr. Adv.,

Mr. Gopal Pahari,

Ms. Mandeep Kaur,

Ms. Piyali Kaulavi,

Mr. Jagatjyoti Nag

For the State : Mr. Suman Kr. Dutt, Sr. Adv.,

Mr. Siddhartha Banerjee,

Mr. Dwaipayan Basu Mallick,

Mr. Arkaprava Sen,

Ms. Sambita B. Chatterjee

Heard on : 04.02.2026 & 25.02.2026

Reserved on : 25.02.2026

Judgment on : 09.03.2026

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-

1. In the present appeal, the plaintiffs in a suit for declaration of

their lawful possession in respect of the suit property and

consequential injunction protecting such possession have

2

challenged a deemed decree, whereby an application under

Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, “the

Code”) filed by the defendants/respondent nos. 1 and 2 was

allowed, rejecting the plaint of the said suit.

2. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the

plaintiffs/appellants argues that the learned Trial Judge acted

without jurisdiction in entering into the merits of the suit upon

consideration of documents which were neither referred to nor

relied on and/or annexed to the plaint in rejecting the same, on

a misconception of the scope of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code.

3. It is contended that although the present suit has been filed

exclusively in respect of Premises No. 24/7/1, Raja Santosh

Road, the learned Trial Judge rejected the plaint on the premise

that previous litigations and orders passed in respect of

Premises No. 32, Raja Santosh Road, a different property, were

suppressed by the plaintiffs/appellants, which amounts to

perversity as per the plaintiffs/appellants.

4. Moreover, the learned Trial Judge, it is submitted, arrived at the

conclusion that the plaintiffs have failed to reach the standard of

cause of action made out in the plaint so that the plaint can be

entertained and that the cause of action disclosed is not

“properly framed”, whereas Clause (a) of Order VII Rul e 11

stipulates non-disclosure of cause of action as a ground for

rejection of the plaint. The quality of the cause of action, it is

3

argued, ought not to have been looked into by the learned Trial

Judge while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11.

5. That apart, learned senior counsel argues that the learned Trial

Judge adverted to documents filed along with the application

under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, in the absence of any

pleadings in that regard from the end of the

defendants/respondents by way of a written statement as yet. It

is submitted that unless such documents are properly brought

on record by being marked as exhibits and an opportunity is

given to the plaintiffs/appellants to controvert the same, also by

adducing evidence, the plaint could not have been rejected at

the outset. At best, the grounds on which the plaint was

rejected might be germane at the time of final hearing of the

suit, on a full-fledged trial on evidence.

6. Learned senior counsel takes the court through the pleadings in

the plaint of the present suit and contends that the reliefs

sought therein pertain to the possession of the

plaintiffs/appellants and it has not been stated anywhere that

the ownership of the plaintiffs has been challenged by the

defendants. Thus, the learned Trial Judge erred in law in

holding that the suit envisages the denial of the plaintiff’s title.

7. It is contended that the pendency of a partition suit in respect of

a portion of the present suit property is not germane, since the

plaintiffs/appellants have not sought a declaration of their title.

4

In view of the frame of the suit, based on the threat to the

possession of the plaintiffs/appellants from the

defendants/respondents, the learned Trial Judge erred in law in

arriving at the finding that the outcome of the partition suit was

necessarily to be disclosed and/or that the other co-owners were

to be impleaded in the present suit. The learned Trial Judge, it

is submitted, based on such purported non -disclosure/non-

impleadment, came to the conclusion that there was

suppression of material facts by the plaintiffs and rejected the

plaint.

8. As such, the appellants contend that the impugned deemed

decree ought to be set aside and the suit directed to be tried in

regular course.

9. Learned senior counsel appearing for the

defendants/respondent nos. 1 and 2, on the other hand, argues

that even apart from the documents which were not a part of the

plaint or relied on therein, the documents referred to in the

plaint itself and annexed thereto are sufficient to indicate that

the suit is palpably vexatious and ought to have been nipped in

the bud.

10. Learned senior counsel draws the court’s attention to a

comparative study of the judgment and decree passed in an

earlier suit, bearing Title Suit No. 17 of 2002, which has been

referred to in the plaint of the present suit. In the present

5

plaint, it has been categorically admitted that Title Suit No. 17 of

2002 (initially numbered as Title Suit No. 54 of 1989) was

decreed on December 14, 2017 and the said decree is binding on

the parties. Admittedly, the earlier suit bearing Title Suit No. 17

of 2002 pertained to Premises No. 32, Raja Santosh Road and

that the question as to whether the plaintiffs/appellants have

encroached upon the said property was finally decided by

holding that there was no such encroachment. From the tenor

of the present plaint as well as the judgment passed in the said

earlier suit, it is evident that the question of identity of the suit

property therein was raised and finally decided in the said

judgment. The question as to whether Premises No. 32, Raja

Santosh Road and the present suit property, that is, Premises

No. 24/7/1, Raja Santosh Road are identical fell for

consideration and was finally decided in the said suit.

11. By placing reliance on the decree passed in the earlier suit, it is

pointed out that the boundaries of the subject property of the

said suit were identical with the present suit, although the

number of the premises was shown to be different. Even the

sketch map annexed to the plaint of the present suit and

marked as Annexure “X” thereto, it is urged, is identical to the

map which was referred to in the earlier decree. Thus, the

plaintiffs/appellants, it is argued, are seeking to re-agitate the

self-same question which was conclusively adjudicated upon in

6

Title Suit No. 17 of 2002. Relying on the principle that a person

cannot be vexed twice on the self-same cause of action, learned

senior counsel contends that the learned Trial Judge was

justified in rejecting the plaint of the present suit.

12. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, the Court comes

to the following conclusions:

13. The learned Trial Judge rejected the plaint both under Clauses

(a) and (d) of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code.

14. Clause (a) contemplates rejection of a plaint where it “does not

disclose” a cause of action. However, the learned Trial Judge

proceeded to enter into a qualitative analysis of the cause of

action disclosed in the suit, coming to conclusions such as

“Cause of action disclosed here is not properly framed”, “I find

that the Plaintiffs failed to reach the standard of cause of action

made out in the plaint so that the plaint can be entertained”,

“the point of baseless cause of action resulting into meaningless

litigation is discouraged”, etc.

15. While so observing, the learned Trial Judge observed that the

plaintiffs have brought the cause of action in such a way that

the defendants are denying the title of the plaintiffs and are

disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs as well.

16. However, from a comprehensive perusal of the plaint pleadings,

we find that a chain of events, giving rise to a cause of action,

has been disclosed in the plaint. The build-up of events, as

7

narrated in the plaint, lead logically to the cause of action and

the reliefs sought in the present suit.

17. The suit property is comprised of land area of 1534.385 Sq. Mt.

together with several recorded huts with 21 Ft. wide passage

connecting the said premises to Raja Santosh Road, at

Municipal Premises No. 24/7/1, Raja Santosh Road.

18. In Paragraph No. 3 of the plaint, it is stated that prior to 1981,

one Syed Iman Ali, Begum Gulanar Bibi, Zamila Khatoon,

Mamuda Khatoon and Jabeda Khatoon were the owners of land

and structures at the said premises.

19. In Paragraph No. 4, it is pleaded that by a conveyance dated

December 2, 1981 (giving the particulars of the registration) and

by another conveyance dated December 21, 1981 (also giving the

particulars of the registration), the right, title and interest to and

in landed property of an area of 18 cottahs and 35 sq. ft.

equivalent to 1207.274 sq. meters of land, together with several

huts and a 21 ft. passage connecting the premises , were

conveyed to the members of the Sahaya Family, the

predecessors-in-interest of the present plaintiffs/appellants. The

rest of the suit property is alleged to have remained in

possession and occupation of the plaintiffs since the month of

December, 1981 without any interruption.

20. In Paragraph No. 5 of the plaint, it is stated, inter alia, that the

plaintiffs and/or their predecessor-in-interest were and are in

8

lawful possession of the said property. In several paragraphs

thereafter, the plaintiffs have narrated about a previous suit,

bearing Title Suit No. 54 of 1989, which was subsequently

renumbered as Title Suit No. 17 of 2002, in the Court of the

learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ninth Court at Alipore.

21. It has been stated thereafter in the plaint that the judgment and

decree passed on December 14, 2017 in the said suit, which was

in respect of 32, Raja Santosh Road, are in full force and are

binding on the parties. In Paragraph No. 17 of the plaint, it has

been stated that having failed to obtain the decree for recovery of

possession (in the said earlier suit), the defendants are now

wrongfully and illegally trying to forcibly obtain possession.

22. It has further been alleged that the defendants/respondent nos.

1 and 2 have employed their own security guards to create an

impression to the persons of the locality that they are in

possession of the said property, which is guarded by the security

persons employed by the said defendants. It has been alleged

further that although the security guards employed by the

respondent nos. 1 and 2 are not encroaching into the plaintiffs’

property, they are creating pressure by remaining just outside

the gate of the said property, “watching and besetting” the said

premises and disturbing the ingress to and egress from the said

property, wrongfully and illegally.

9

23. In Paragraph No. 18 of the plaint, it has been alleged that the

plaintiffs have approached the police authorities several times,

who have made it clear that they are not in a position to take

any active step in the matter to protect the property of the

plaintiffs without a specific order of the court.

24. In Paragraph No. 26 of the plaint, it is alleged that the cause of

action of this suit first arose when, after the aforementioned

judgment and decree dated December 14, 2017, the defendants

“started to recover” the possession having resort to extra legal

methods.

25. On the strength of such averments, the plaintiffs seek the

following reliefs:

“a) Leave under Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908;

b) A decree for declaration that the plaintiffs are lawfully

entitled to possession of and remain in possession of

the said property situate at 24/7/1, Raja Santosh

Road, Ward No. 74 of the Kolkata Municipal

Corporation, Police Station-Chetla (formerly New

Alipore), District- South 24-Parganas, Pin-700027 more

fully described in the schedule to this plaint and to use

and enjoy the same without any interference and

disturbance from the defendants, their servants and

agents;

c) A decree for perpetual injunction restraining the

defendants, their servants and agents from disturbing

and/or interfering with the plaintiffs‟ possession,

occupation, use and enjoyment of the said property

situate at 24/7/1, Raja Santosh Road, Ward No. 74 of

10

the Kolkata Municipal Corporation, Police Station-

Chetla (formerly New Alipore), District- South 24-

Parganas, Pin-700027 more fully described in the

schedule hereto;

d) Perpetual injunction restraining the defendants and

their servants and agents from in any way disturbing

the free ingress to and egress from the said premises;

which particularly described in the Schedule hereto;

e) Temporary injunction;

f) Costs;

g) Such further or other relief or reliefs to which the

plaintiffs are entitled to;”

26. Thus, from a bare perusal of the plaint of the instant suit, it is

evident that a logical chain of events, comprising a bundle of

facts forming the cause of action for the present suit, has been

sufficiently pleaded in the plaint. The said chain of events

disclose sufficient cause of action for the remedies sought in the

suit.

27. The learned Trial Judge, in the impugned order, has inter alia

proceeded on the basis that the cause of action has been

brought in such a way that the defendants are denying the title

of the plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs have not disclosed in the

plaint as to how they gather right, title and interest and

possession in respect of the Suit Schedule Property.

28. However, as indicated above, sufficient pleadings have been

narrated in the plaint to disclose not only the source of title but

also the history of possession of the plaintiffs.

11

29. Moreover, contrary to the findings of the learned Trial Judge, the

plaintiffs have not claimed any relief in respect of their title and

have not averred in the plaint that their title is being disputed by

the defendants. The primary relief claimed in the suit is

declaration of the plaintiffs’ lawful possession in the suit

property and the ancillary relief is a consequential perpetual

injunction restraining the defendants, their servants and agents

from disturbing and/or interfering with such possession.

30. Thus, ample cause of action has been disclosed in the suit to

justify the reliefs claimed therein. Hence, Clause (a) of Order VII

Rule 11 of the Code is not satisfied at all.

31. Secondly, the learned Trial Judge took into account documents

annexed to the application of the defendants/respondent nos. 1

and 2 under Order VII Rule 11, which are extraneous to the

plaint, having neither been referred to or relied on nor

annexed/filed with the plaint. It is well-settled that, for the

purpose of adjudicating an application under Order VII Rule 11

of the Code, the court can only look at the averments made in

the plaint as a whole and, at best, any documents which have

been filed therewith and/or annexed thereto or even referred to

therein.

32. However, the learned Trial Judge flouted such settled legal

principle by taking into consideration several documents

including an indenture between one Jyoti Kumar Rajgharia and

12

the present defendant no.1-Company, a Deed of Conveyance of

the year 1961, which purportedly establishes the chain of title of

Jyoti Kumar Rajgharia, a land acquisition proceeding in respect

of Premises No. 32, Raja Santosh Road, an order passed by a

learned Single Judge of this Court and judgments and decrees

passed in other suits, to come to the conclusion that there has

been suppression of material facts by the plaintiffs. On the

premise of the said documents , the learned Trial Judge

proceeded on the premise that the “version of the Defendants

supports the allegation of suppression of material truth”.

33. Apart from the facts that the version of the defendants is not

material for deciding an application for rejection of plaint, the

several documents taken into consideration by the learned Trial

Judge at the behest of the defendants/respondent nos. 1 and 2,

which are not a part of or have relied on in the plaint, could not

be taken into consideration at all while deciding an application

under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. If any extraneous

documents are relied on, those have to have corresponding

foundational pleadings in the written stat ement of the

defendants and have to be brought before the court by way of

formal proof as evidence in the suit, at the time of trial. Only

upon a trial on evidence and upon giving opportunity of rebuttal

and hearing to both the parties, can the Civil Court ascertain

the veracity of such documents. The allegation of suppression,

13

in the present case, is inextricably linked with a consideration of

the legal effect of the documents on merits, which exercise can

only be undertaken at the trial of the suit, and not at the

threshold stage, when the existence of the foundational facts

supporting such documents have not even been pleaded . Such

an exercise cannot be undertaken while deciding an application

under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code and is completely beyond

the scope of the said provision.

34. Even to decide on the validity and veracity of such purported

documents and the effect thereof on the cause of action pleaded

in the plaint, trial on evidence is essential. Only upon such

documents coming on record as formal evidence can the court

look into the same even for the purpose of ascertaining whether

such documents are germane for adjudication of the suit.

35. Adjudicating at the threshold that the plaintiffs are guilty of

suppression of material facts linked with documents extraneous

to the plaint is de hors the scope of Order VII Rule 11 of the

Code.

36. Thus, the learned Trial Judge erred in law in taking into

consideration of such documents.

37. Moreover, there is not an iota of reasoning in the impugned

order as to why the plaint was rejected under Clause (d) of Order

VII Rule 11, which envisages the rejection of a plaint where the

14

suit appears from the statements in the plaint to be barred by

any law.

38. The learned Trial Judge has not even spelt out as to what is the

legal bar that vitiates the institution of the suit, let alone

explaining how such bar is evident from a plain reading of the

plaint as a whole.

39. The learned Trial Judge referred to the previous suit bearing

Title Suit No. 17 of 2002, which admittedly pertains to Premises

No. 32, Raja Santosh Road, which is not the suit property as

described in the plaint of the present suit.

40. In the narrative leading to the cause of action for the present

suit, the plaintiffs/appellants have merely stated about such

suit, indicating that it was held by a Revisional Court in

connection with the earlier suit that the apprehension of the

present plaintiffs/appellants as to the present defendants (who

were plaintiffs in the earlier suit) seeking to impress upon the

court that in the garb of Premises No. 32, Raja Santosh Road,

the said plaintiffs were trying to recover the present suit

property situated at Premises No. 24/7/1, Raja Santosh Road

was unfounded. Since the plaintiffs in the earlier suit had taken

a specific stand that the said suit was restricted to Premises No.

32, Raja Santosh Road, and such admission was recorded in an

earlier Revisional application, a learned Single Judge of this

Court, in CO No. 1455 of 2011, observed that such submissions

15

would bind the plaintiffs in the earlier suit at all stages of the

proceeding.

41. Accordingly, the earlier suit was decreed in part, declaring the

title of the present defendant nos. 1 and 2 (plaintiffs therein),

but not granting recovery of possession, upon disbelieving the

case made out in the said suit regarding alleged encroachment

by the present plaintiffs on the Premises No. 32, Raja Santosh

Road.

42. Such disclosure in the present plaint, by itself, does not

necessarily signify that the present suit is barred by any law, for

the simple reason that the earlier suit was in respect of an

entirely different premises than the present suit.

43. As such, the learned Trial Judge proceeded on a misconception

of law in holding that the cause of action disclosed in the

present suit is baseless and the plaintiffs are guilty of

suppression. As observed earlier, the quality or standard of the

cause of action, which was held not to be up to the mark by the

learned Trial Judge, is not a matter of any relevance at the stage

of Order VII Rule 11, unless it is palpably evident from the plaint

that the suit is vexatious.

44. We do not find any chink in the chain of events comprising the

cause of action for the present suit from the statements made in

the plaint.

16

45. Thus, we do not find that the plaint is liable to be rejected either

under Clause (a) or Clause (d) of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code.

46. However, although the impugned judgment and deemed decree

cannot be supported on the reasons given by the learned Single

Judge, this Court would be failing in its duty if it does not take

into consideration the argument to which the

defendants/respondent nos. 1 and 2 have confined themselves

in the appeal, although such case was not specifically argued,

nor adverted to in the impugned judgment and deemed decree.

47. Learned senior counsel for the defendants/respondent nos. 1

and 2 has drawn the attention of this Court to the Schedules of

the present suit, as depicted in the plaint, and that of Title Suit

No. 17 of 2002. For the sake of convenience, the two Schedules

are set out hereinbelow:

Title Suit No. 775 of 2020

(present suit)

Title Suit No. 17 of 2002

(earlier suit)

ALL THAT the land area of

1534.385 Sq. Mt. Together with

several recorded huts together

with 21 Ft. Wide passage

connection the said premises to the

Raja Santosh Road at the limits of

Ward No.74 of the Kolkata

Municipal Corporation within the

jurisdiction of Sub-Registrar at

Alipore, under P.S. New Alipore

now Chetla, District – 24 Parganas

(South) is butted and bounded by

SCHEDULE A ABOVE REFERRED

TO IN THE PLAINT.

Original Premises No.32, Raja

Santosh Road measuring more or

less 2 Bighas 12 Cottahs 12

Chittacks 13 Sq. Feet within

Police Station Alipore (now New

Alipore), District – 24 Parganas (S)

butted and Bounded as follows–

On the North: Partly by premises

No. 36, Raja Santosh Road, partly

by premises No. 34, Raja Santosh

17

ON THE NORTH:- By Raja Santosh

Road and the portions of the

premises No.30, Raja Santosh

Road;

ON THE EAST: - By premises

No.32, Raja Santosh Road;

ON THE SOUTH: - By premises

No.24/7, Raja Santosh Road and

portions of 13, Alipore Avenue;

ON THE WEST: - By premises

No.14, Alipore Avenue and

portions of 30, Raja Santosh Road;

A copy of the site plan of the said

property which is the subject

matter of this suit is annexed

hereto and marked Letter – “X”.

Road and partly by a common

passage lying between premises

No. 36 Raja Santosh Road and

premises No. 40-C Raja Santosh

Road, partly by Raja Santosh

Road and partly by premises nos.

30, Raja Santosh Road and 28,

Raja Santosh Road;

On the South: Partly by premises

No. 14, Alipore Avenue and partly

by premises No. 13, Alipore

Avenue and partly by vacant plot

of land being premises No. 24/7,

Raja Santosh Road;

On the East: By premises No. 40-

C, Raja Santosh Road and

On the West: partly by premises

No. 14, Alipore Avenue and partly

by premises No. 30, Raja Santosh

Road as delineated in the map or

plan marked „A‟.

Schedule B Above Referred to in

the plaint.

South Western portion of the

premises No. 32, Raja Santosh

Road measuring more or less 1

Bigha 1 Cottah 5 Chittacks 32 Sq.

Feet within Alipore P.S. (now New

Alipore), District – 24 Parganas (S),

Butted and bounded as:

On the North: Premises No. 30,

Raja Santosh Road and remaining

part of premises No. 32, Raja

18

Santosh Road;

On the East: Premises No. 32A,

Raja Santosh Road,

On the South: By premises No.

24/7, Raja Santosh Road and

premises Nos. 13 and 14, Alipore

Avenue;

On the West: Premises Nos. 14,

Alipore Avenue and 30, Raja

Santosh Road.

As delineated in map or pl an

marked „B‟.

48. In Title Suit No. 17 of 2002, the plaintiffs therein (present

defendants/respondent nos. 1 and 2) sought declaration of their

title and ownership in respect of the entire suit premises

(comprised in Schedule “A” thereof) and a decree for khas

possession of Schedule “B” property, a part thereof.

49. It is argued by the respondents herein that the property

comprised in Schedule “B” of Title Suit No. 17 of 2002 is

identical with the subject-matter of the present suit.

50. However, although there are substantial similarities in the

description of the two, there are dissimilarities as well.

51. The subject-matter of the present suit includes a 21 Ft. wide

passage and specifies the Kolkata Municipal Corporation ward

number, whereas those were absent in the Schedules to the

19

plaint of the earlier suit. The area of the two properties are also

not the same.

52. There are subtle differences in the boundaries of the two

properties as well. Whereas the northern boundary of the

present suit is delineated by Raja Santosh Road and portions of

Premises No. 30, Raja Santosh Road, the northern boundary of

“B”-Schedule of the earlier suit is comprised of only Premises

No. 30, Raja Santosh Road and the remaining part of 32, Raja

Santosh Road. The norther boundary of Schedule-“B” property

in the earlier suit did not include the road itself, that is Raja

Santosh Road.

53. Similarly, whereas the eastern boundary of the present suit

property is demarcated by Premises No. 32, Raja Santosh Road,

the eastern boundary of Schedule-“B” property of Title Suit No.

17 of 2002 comprised of Premises No. 32A of the self-same road

54. In the southern boundary, Premises No. 14, Alipore Avenue is

missing in the present suit, whereas the same was mentioned in

the earlier suit.

55. Although the western boundary of the two properties are similar,

whereas the present suit mentions “portions of” 30, Raja

Santosh Road, such qualification of the said premise is not

found in the earlier suit.

56. The site plan of the present suit property, annexed with the

plaint and marked with the letter “X”, despite being roughly

20

similar in shape with the plan marked “B” in the earlier suit, the

said plan is not found to be a part of the certified copy of the

decree in the previous suit, a copy whereof is handed over to us.

However, even if affording the benefit of doubt to the

defendants/respondent nos. 1 and 2 we accept the copy of such

Plan “B” handed over by them as correct, we find that, although

the general contours and shapes of the two sketches are similar,

a comparison by the naked eye of the two cannot ensure that

the two plots are exactly identical.

57. The test for rejection of a plaint on the high ground of

suppression has to be satisfied to the hilt inasmuch as such

suppression should be evident on the face of the plaint. Without

a local investigation being held upon comparison of the title

deeds of the present plaintiffs as well as those of the

defendants/respondent nos. 1 and 2 with the Schedule

properties of the two suits, it cannot be said conclusively that

the two properties are ex facie identical.

58. Thus, the court taking up an application under Order VII Rule

11 of the Code could not be in a position, without a local

investigation and/or trial on evidence, to come to the conclusive

finding that subject matters of the earlier suit and the present

one are exactly identical and that the plaintiffs/appellants

herein are trying to vex the defendants twice on the self-same

cause of action by fraudulently describing Premises No. 32, Raja

21

Santosh Road, the identity of which was finally adjudicated

upon in Title Suit No. 17 of 2002, with Premises No. 24/7/1,

which has been described to be the subject-matter of the present

suit.

59. Hence, it would not be prudent for the court, at the premature

stage of deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the

Code, to reject the plaint at the threshold, either on the ground

of res judicata or on the ground that the plaint is vexatious, on

the premise that the self-same property which was conclusively

adjudicated upon in a previous suit has been sought to be

fraudulently numbered to seek a fresh adjudication on the

same, thereby denying the plaintiffs/appellants the opportunity

to establish the contrary by trial on evidence.

60. The standard yardstick in adjudica tion of applications for

rejection of plaint is that the bar of law and/or non-disclosure of

cause of action and/or the vexatious nature of the suit alleged

must be evident at the first blush on a composite reading of the

plaint as a whole. However, in the present case, in the event the

court is to reject the plaint on any of the above grounds, a

conclusion has to be arrived at regarding such bar being

palpable on the face of the plaint. As discussed above, such a

conclusion cannot be arrived at on a mere reading of the plaint

or the documents referred to therein, without granting the

parties an opportunity to lead evidence and a thorough

22

adjudication on the factual aspects of the matter regarding the

identity of the subject-matters of the two suits.

61. Hence, the arguments of the respondents on such score cannot

be accepted at this stage.

62. The appropriate course of action would be for the learned Trial

Judge to take up the suit for adjudication on trial and, if the

issue of identity of the subject-property and/or suppression of

material facts is raised in the pleadings of the

defendants/respondents by way of their written statement(s), to

frame proper issue on the same and, if necessary, to decide the

said issue first, prior to embarking on an adjudication on the

other issues.

63. Thus, in view of the above observations, the impugned judgment

and decree rejecting the plaint of the present suit cannot be

sustained.

64. Accordingly, FAT No. 469 of 2025 is allowed on contest, thereby

setting aside the impugned judgment and deemed decree dated

August 22, 2025 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior

Division), First Court at Alipore, South 24 Parganas in Title Suit

No. 775 of 2020, whereby the plaint of the said suit was

rejected.

65. The learned Trial Judge shall now adjudicate the said suit on its

own merits by way of a regular and full-fledged trial on evidence.

While doing so, the learned Trial Judge may frame and decide

23

issues on the identity of the subject properties involved in the

present suit and Title Suit No. 17 of 2002 and/or res judicata, if

necessary and permissible in terms of the pleadings of the

parties, and decide the same prior to the other issues involved in

the suit.

66. We make it amply clear that this Court has not entered into the

merits of any of the questions raised before us and it would be

open to the Trial Court to come to its own conclusions upon trial

on merits, by taking evidence and if necessary by appointing a

Survey-passed Advocate Commissioner to compare to the

properties in the context of the title deeds of the parties and the

Schedules of the two suits.

67. Consequentially, CAN 1 of 2025 is also disposed of.

68. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated.

69. There will be no order as to costs.

70. A formal decree be drawn up accordingly.

(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)

I agree.

(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)